WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005900010001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 23, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept., NAVY reviews completed
Secr~e9
AItt:f-~iV.A.I. E~,~~t;~2~3 ?June 19 6 7
f~I~~A~E T~,~:~'~`t7h1'~TC~Q 0295 67
AGENCY A~;,CHIVES, 25X1
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(Information as of noon EDT, 22 June 1967)
Far East
VIETNAM
Premier Ky is launching a massive effort to win the
South Vietnamese presidential election set for 3 Sep-
tember. The recent lull in the ground fighting in
South Vietnam was interrupted as the Communists of-
fered stiff resistance to five major allied opera-
tions in widely scattered areas.
DISORDER CONTINUES IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The regime still shows little disposition to use
force to end the fighting among political factions,
probably because militant elements in Peking remain
determined to push the Cultural Revolution.
CHINESE COMMUNISTS TEST THERMONUCLEAR WEAPON
The detonation on 16 June was in the high yield range
and demonstrated the continuing progress of the Chi-
nese nuclear weapons development effort.
CHINESE TRY TO KEEP UP ANTI-BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN HONG KONG 9
.The local Communists' latest effort is a virulent
poster campaign, and Peking's low-keyed propaganda
support continues.
NEW TENSIONS IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS
Despite a rapid chain of incidents in Peking and New
Delhi, neither government apparently wants to push
matters to a break in relations.
POSTELECTION TURBULENCE IN SOUTH KOREA
Responding to public protests, the government is pun-
ishing some of its supporters who were involved in
flagrant irregularities during the parliamentary
elections on 8 June. The opposition party still de-
mands new elections.
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Europe
USSR CONTINUES TO ENLARGE SPACE SUPPORT FLEET
The seventh unit to join the fleet is equipped with
elaborate instrumentation, which will considerably
enhance Soviet capabilities to support advanced space
operations.
TITO MOVES TO REVIVE THIRD-FORCE MOVEMENT
President Tito has quickly reaffirmed Belgrade's de-
votion to the principle of nonalignment in inter-
national affairs after he had gravely weakened the
credibility of his stand by adhering to the 9 June
Soviet bloc declaration in support of the Arabs.
NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING
French obstructionism clouded discussion of the Mid-
east crisis at the 13-14 June semiannual session of
the NATO foreign ministers, which also dealt with
such issues as the nonproliferation treaty, East-West
detente, and the "technological gap."
STUDENT UNREST IN WEST BERLIN
Allied and German officials alike are worried over
the challenge to public order accompanying the in-
creasing tendency to violence among student icono-
clasts.
THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS
As the Arab states, individually and collectively,
and Israel as well display continuing uncertainty
about how to unravel the mess created by their latest
hostilities, their supporters, detractors, and would-
be mediators practically everywhere else in the world
are no more united about what to do. The battle of
words that succeeded the shooting war remains centered
at the UN, having moved from the Security Council to
the General Assembly. There and elsewhere the Com-
munist states' political moves to display support for
the Arabs have accelerated. The Soviet airlift to re-
supply the Arab military forces seems to have ended,
however. In the war zones, the cease-fire, except for
one reported incident without casualties, is holding.
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[VEW STRAINS BETWEEN GREEK COUP GROUP AND KING 26
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SHOWDOWN DELAYED IN NIGERIA 27
The breakaway Eastern region--"Biafra"--is still
awaiting both a military attack by federal forces
and international recognition.
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Western Hemisphere
TROUBLED BOLIVIA FACES NEW PROBLEMS
Unrest in the tin mines and growing cooperation among
opposition political groups are adding to the prob-
lems of the Bolivian Government, already engaged in
an unsuccessful effort to rout guerrillas in the
southeast.
POLITICAL UNREST IN HAITI
The execution of 19 military officers for "high trea-
son" on 8 June has again sparked rumors of coup plot-
ting and the expectation of further punitive action
by Duvalier.
NEW DISORDERS POSSIBLE IN NORTHERN MEXICO
Continuing reprisals against those who oppose the
government candidate for governor of Sonora have en-
gendered increased public bitterness toward the rul-
ing party and have raised the potential for renewed
violence. Large-scale voter defection to the minor-
ity party candidate is expected in the 2 July elec-
tion.
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FAR EAST
Although there are still no signs that the
Communist "summer offensive" has been launched,
heavy infiltration from the North is continuing
and North Vietnamese forces may have completed
preparation for major attacks against allied
Special Forces camps in Kontum Province. A
drive against these positions probably would be
aimed at diverting allied forces from more crit-
ical areas in the strategic central highlands
and from the northern provinces of I Corps.
Premier Ky's maneuvers to advance his presi-
dential candidacy are generating growing concern
among his rivals that the election next September
will be rigged. Ky is manipulating the Saigon
press to attract attention to his own actions
and to censor Chief of State Thieu's statements.
Ky is also replacing unsympathetic police offi-
cials with his own supporters
There is no evidence that the trend toward
growing chaos and violence in China has been re-
versed by the early June directive to the army to
restore order. Leading party journals continue to
deplore the resort to-force by rival "revolutionary"
groups but Maoist leaders appear determined to push
the Cultural Revolution regardless of the political
and social disorder it creates. The achievement
represented by China's thermonuclear test last
week undoubtedly has strengthened the Maoists' con-
fidence that they can maintain the assault against
their political enemies without damaging vital areas
of China's strategic power and prestige.
Most of the steam has been drained from the
Hong Kong Communists' campaign against British au-
thorities. .The majority of the colony's workers
have ignored recent strike calls and business ac-
tivity has remained near normal. The Communists
are trying to maintain momentum through anti-British
posters and by publicizing Peking's contribution of
nearly $2 million to a Hon Kon Communist "struggle
fund . "
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VIETNAM
Fissures in the South Viet-
namese political fabric are be-
ginning to show as candidates
for September's national elec-
tions intensify their campaign
efforts. Mounting tensions are
reflected in both the press and
the Provisional National Assem-
bly (formerly Constituent As-
sembly). According to the US
Embassy, recent assembly voting
has reflected the increasingly
open and caustic rivalry between
presidential aspirants Premier
Ky and Chief of State Thieu,
with a particular effect on the
assembly's majority bloc which
in the past has been generally
responsive to Ky's direction.
Uneasiness among the press was
pointed up by a recent editorial
citing a popular concern that
"rigged elections in Korea" might
be repeated in South Vietnam.
The campaign for the presi-
dency does not get under way
officially until.3 August, but
Ky has already prepared a mas-
sive effort in his own behalf.
His organizational preparations
to date are unusually ambitious
compared with the limited steps
taken by the other candidates.
Ky will benefit from his
placement of sympathetic sup-
porters in strategic corps and
cabinet positions during his two
years in office, and a premier
has many other resources at his
disposal.
Ky's campaign efforts range
from the posting of signs pro-
claiming his government as "the
government of the poor" to frequent
tri s to the rovinces.
He is still trying to
crea e a coalition of diverse po-
litical and religious groups into
a political "front." Moreover,
Police Director Loan's security
apparatus has started to swing
into action in the provinces in
support of Ky.
Ky's minister of information
has not only clamped down on Sai-
gon's newspapers but has also re-
portedly instructed his ministry
to advance Ky's campaign.
Ky is also looking ahead to
the National Assembly elections.
trolled working majority in both
houses and has advanced plans to
support at least 40 candidates
for the 60-man Senate. Since each
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voter will cast a ballot for 60
senators, Ky could conceivably
carry such a majority.
Military Developments
Heavy fighting occurred in
widely scattered sections of
South Vietnam this week (map on
next page).
In the north, Communist units
of company size or larger engaged
US Marines in the coastal flat-
lands of Quang Nam and Quang Tin
provinces in several pitched bat-
tles. The Marines are sweeping
this area to secure vital supply
lines along the coast between
the major Marine installations
at Da Nang and Chu Lai.
In southern Quang Ngai and
northeastern Binh Dinh provinces,
elements of the US 1st Air
Cavalry Division engaged units
of the NVA 3rd Division on 21-22
June killing more than 130 enemy
soldiers. Six Americans were
killed and 41 wounded in two ma-
jor engagements.
Farther south in Phu Yen
Province, elements of the North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) 95th Regi-
ment have recently displayed in-
creased aggressiveness. On 16
June a force estimated to be of
battalion size attacked South
Vietnamese Army (ARVN) troops
providing security for Revolu-
tionary Development teams near
Tuy Hoa, the provincial capital.
On th,e northern fringes of
Communist War Zone "D" about
45 miles north of Saigon, a Com-
munist regiment offered stiff
resistance to a battalion of the
US 1st Infantry Division partici-
pating in Operation BILLINGS on
17 June. Nearly 200 enemy sol-
diers were killed in the battle,
raising the cumulative Communist
casualty toll to 353 since the op-
eration began on 11 June. US
losses to date stand at 38 killed
and 199 wounded.
Early in the week a battalion
subordinate to the 274th Regi-
ment of the Viet Cong 5th Divi-
sion attacked units of the US 11th
Armored Cavalry Regiment taking
part in the large US/ARVN search-
and-destroy Operation AKRON. The
operation is aimed at clearing the
5th Division and local guerrillas
from their base areas in the Phuoc
Tuy - Long Khanh - Bien Hoa tri-
border area east of Saigon.
In the southern portion of
the delta province of Long An,
two battalions of the US 9th In-
fantry Division killed 250 Commu-
nist soldiers in a battle on 19
June. US forces suffered casual-
ties of 48 killed and 143 wounded
in this operation, named CONCORDIA.
NVA units in the central high-
lands may have completed prepara-
tions for launching a major offen-
sive against allied positions and
installations in Kontum Province.
The newly reinforced NVA 24th Regi-
ment together with another unidenti-
fied Communist regiment apparently
are now located northeast of the
Dak To Special Forces camp. In-
creased pressure against "New Life"
hamlets, outposts, and reconnais-
sance patrols in this area has
been evident since mid-May, and
during the past week, several
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`: f I ~.,n Hue
Dak Seartg
Special Forces GCam1i'~~"'
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Special Forces camps--including
Dak To and Dak Saeng--ar}d an
ARVN regimental headquarters
have been subjected to heavy mor-
tar fire.
Infiltration Through Laos
Infiltration of North Viet-
namese military personnel and sup-
plies into South Vietnam through
Laos continues at a high level.
Although truck traffic moving
through the panhandle has slowed
down with the advent of the rainy
season (June-September), the Com-
munists are trying to keep key
sections of this road net open as
long as possible--particularly
the Mu Gia Pass and Route 922
into the A Shau Valley of South
Vietnam. Recent captives have
confirmed the infiltration of sev-
eral large groups this spring
which are currently being used as
replacements for units in South
Vietnam's I, II, and III Corps.
One recently captured docu-
ment indicates that the North
Vietnamese hope to move some 200
tons a month over Route 922 dur-
ing the rainy season, a figure
comparable to the amount ob-
served during the dry season.
Despite their unprecedented ef-
forts, the Communists probably
will be unable to move more than
a small number of trucks through
Laos during the hei ht of the
rainy season.
DISORDER CONTINUES IN COMMUNIST CHINA
For many weeks warring po-
litical factions have been en-
gaging in violent clashes in
many areas of China. So far the
regime shows little disposition
to use force to end the fighting,
probably because some militant
elements in the leadership, in-
cluding Mao Tse-tung and Defense
Minister Lin Piao, are determined
to push the Cultural Revolution
vigorously, regardless of the
disorder it creates.
Peking periodically issues
statements deploring the use of
violence to settle political
disputes, but continues to aid
and encourage Red Guard groups
which have been the chief in-
stigators of violence. An edi-
torial in People's Daily on 18
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IAMMU
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KASHMIR
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CHI,tiA
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PHILII'PItCLS
June took a tolerant view of re-
cent conflicts, saying that most
are "nonantagonistic," meaning
that the participants are con-
sidered loyal, if misguided, Mao-
ists. On 19 June Red Flag also
assumed a pose of b ieb ng above
the battle. It offered advice
to both sides in recent conflicts,
urging "conservatives" to return
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voluntarily to Mao's side, and
"revolutionaries" to use reasoned
arguments, not force, in con-
verting "misled people" to Mao-
ism.
During the past week the most
disorderly areas of China appear
to have been Honan, Hupeh, and
Szechwan provinces. In Honan
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the conflict has spread from the
provincial capital of Cheng-chou--
the scene of almost daily fight-
ing since April between Red Guards
and local military authorities--
to Lo-yang. According to a Red
Guard poster, a "conservative"
army of 30,000 attacked a group
of revolutionaries at Lo-yang on
19 June, killing 12 and injuring
54. Although undoubtedly exag-
gerated, the account probabl has
a basis in truth, since
a resident
of Lo-yang state t at violent
clashes occurred daily.
The large industrial city of
Wu-han in Hupeh has become an es-
pecially hot spot.
to 15 June, in which "conserva-
tive" members of an "Industrial
Army" killed or injured many
"revolutionary rebels."
Disruptions to railroad op-
erations caused by civil disorders
are continuing but are apparently
not yet as serious as those noted
last winter. The regime issued
a directive for maintenance of
order on the railroads and threat-
ened severe punishment for vio-
lators on 1 Jung and again, in
a broad injunction against dis-
order, on 6 June.
wall posters in Pe-
king charge that "conservative"
forces backed by the Wu-han Mili-
tary Region command attacked rev-
olutionaries on 14 June and in-
terrupted traffic over the Yang-
tze River bridge. Hundreds of
revolutionaries allegedly were
killed in fresh battles that took
place on 17 and 18 June.
In Szechwan, posters report
a new outbreak of fighting at the
Cheng-tu Airframe Factory from 11
The disruptions would have
to become far worse than is ap-
parent at present to hinder
seriously the aid shipments
through China to North Vietnam.
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CHINESE COMMUNISTS TEST THERMONUCLEAR I~JEAPON
Communist China's success-
ful detonation of a high-yield
thermonu-clear weapon on 16 June
shows its continuing progress in
nuclear weapons design.
The sixth test was China's
biggest so far, with a yield in
the range of several megatons.
Peking announced the test as the
successful explosion of China's
"first hydrogen bomb." The third
and fif th tests were probably
development efforts leading to
the sixth test. The weapon was
probably air--dropped by a medium
bomber, most likely one of China's
two TU-16 Badgers.
At present China's capability
to deliver nuclear weapons is
probably limited to its small
force of medium bombers--about
a dozen TU-4s and the two TU-16s.
Peking announced the fourth nu-
clear test as missile delivered,
however, indicating that China
was developing the capability to
mate fission warheads with mis-
siles. The Chinese are believed
to have been developing an MRBM
for several years but there is
no evidence yet of deployment of
an MRBM force.
to use nuclear wea ons. 25X1'
Peking's press announcement
of the test was almost identical
in political content to the state-
ment made after the last test.
Both cite the success of the nu-
clear program as the "rich fruit"
of the Cultural Revolution and
characterize the test as a "very
great encouragement for Vietnam-
ese people in their heroic war
against US aggression. Peking
also stated that the test would
give great encouragement to the
Arabs in their resistance to "ag-
gression by the US and British
imperialists and their tool,
Israel." The Chinese repeated
their standard assurance that
China would never be the first
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CHINESE TRY TO KEEP UP ANTI-BRITISH CAMPAIGN
The Chinese Communist appa-
ratus in Hong Kong is having dif-
ficulty in keeping up the momentum
of its campaign against the Brit-
ish. In an attempt to counter
the largely successful British
efforts to maintain order and un-
dercut Communist leadership in
the labor unions, the Communists
have launched a virulent anti-
British poster campaign. Most
workers have ignored recent strike
calls, however, and business ac-
tivity has remained near normal.
Peking is trying to keep the
dispute alive with low-keyed
propaganda depicting an oppressed
Hong Kong population determined
ultimately to end British control
of the colony.
IN HONG KONG
The tone and content of re-
cent Peking pronouncements sug-
gest that China has no immediate
intention of forcing a showdown
over British rule in the colony.
Peking, however, will almost cer-
tainly continue to demonstrate
its support for the Hong Kong
Communists with propaganda pledges
and financial support. Other
moves to harass the colony will
probably be largely determined by
the strategy the local Communists
adopt after they have sorted out
their own internal problems.
NEW TENSIONS IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS
A series of incidents in
Peking and New Delhi during the
past two weeks has raised Sino-
Indian tensions to the highest
point in nearly two years. There
are no indications that either
side wishes to push matters to a
break in relations, however, and
both appear content to limit their
activities to an exchange of
abusive propaganda and harassment
of diplomatic personnel.
Page 9
The trouble began on 13 June
when the Chinese expelled two In-
dian diplomats for alleged espio-
nage activities eight days earlier.
In rapid succession New Delhi re-
taliated by expelling two Chinese
diplomats, Red Guards beat the de-
parting Indian officials, Indian
demonstrators broke into the Chi-
nese Embassy in New Delhi and at-
tacked embassy personnel, and the
Indian Embassy in Peking was placed
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under a virtual state of siege.
On 20 June, however, no demon-
strators appeared at the Indian
Embassy for the first time in
four days, and the Indians lifted
restrictions they had placed on
Chinese diplomats in New Delhi.
Peking appears to have
trumped up the initial spying
charges as part of a broader cam-
paign to dissuade foreigners
from collecting information from
wall posters and Red Guard pub-
lications, and considered the
Indians a safe target. A Foreign
Ministry statement on 15 June
stated that the expulsion of the
Indians "serves as a warning" to
foreigners engaged in "illegal
activities."
In New Delhi, despite oppo-
sition clamor in Parliament for
a diplomatic break, the govern-
ment-teems to be playing down
some of the more provocative
aspects of the incidents. A de-
tailed Indian news service ac-
count of demonstrations at the
Chinese Embassy was killed on
government instructions and re-
placed with a much blander re-
port.
POSTELECTION TURBULENCE IN SOOTH KOREA
Public protests against ir-
regularities in South Korea's Na-
tional Assembly elections of
8 June have led the government to
punish the more blatant offenders.
This seems to have taken the heat
out of the opposition party's call
for new elections. Early closing
of the colleges and universities
has discouraged the continuation
of student demonstrations.
Following the outbreak of
these widespread demonstrations,
President Pak Chorig-hui on 16 June
publicly admitted the irregulari-
ties and promised retribution.
Two successful candidates of Pak's
Democratic Republican Party have
been arrested. The election of
one of these has been voided, with
his opponent declared the winner.
The two men in custody and six
other winners have been expelled
from the DRP.
The principal opposition,
the New Democratic Party, has
failed to obtain broad public
support for its call for com-
pletely new assembly elections.
An NDP protest rally in Seoul on
19 June drew only moderate sup-
port. The press, although criti-
cal of the government's conduct
of the elections, has character-
ized the NDP's demands as unreal-
istic and self-seeking. The NDP
itself is divided on this issue,
with moderates unhappy over the
present line because they realize
the party lacks the money to con-
duct another nationwide campaign.
Hard liners are in control, how-
ever, and the political tension
is likely to drag on as they con-
tinue efforts to develop a strong
anti overnment movement.
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EUROPE
Moscow's diplomatic campaign in support
of the Arabs overshadowed other European develop-
ments of some consequence during the week. The
Russians made clear that their immediate object
is to ensure that Israeli forces withdraw to the
territorial borders that existed as of 5 June.
More generally, they are bent on preventing de-
terioration in their position in the Middle East.
How much they are prepared to invest in this al-
ready expensive enterprise is not clear, and may
not be fully clear in Moscow.
The USSR's second Venus probe this month
failed on 16 June. The Soviets say the probe
successfully launched on 12 June is still func-
tioning properly, and will reach the planet in
mid-October. The Soviets may try to launch still
another probe this month.
The Soviet party plenum held this week for-
mally elevated Yury Andropov, the recently chosen
head of the security service (KGB), to candidate
membership in the politburo. The party probably
expects that this move will enable it to exer-
cise closer control over KGB activities.
In East Germany, Premier Stoph announced
that there will be a delay in his formal reply to
West German Chancellor Kiesinger's letter of 13
June on how relations should be conducted. Pan-
kow will probably continue to press for a summit
meeting, but might accept negotiations at the min-
isterial level on inter-German trade, transporta-
tion, and communications matters.
The Wilson - De Gaulle talks on 19-20 June
centered on Britain's bid for EEC membership. De
Gaulle used the Middle East situation, however,
to stress his charge that Britain consistently
lines up with the US. He maintained his posi-
tion that Britain has grave problems to solve be-
fore it can ho e to enter the EEC.
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USSR CONTINUES TO ENLARGE SPACE SUPPORT FLEET
The Soviets are continuing
to expand and modernize their
world-wide fleet of instrumenta-
tion ships which support space
operations and extended-range
missile firings. The active
fleet, which augments the USSR-
based tracking network, now con-
sists of 15 vessels, of which
seven have been added since last
fall.
The latest addition, an elab-
orately instrumented ship, com-
pleted its outfitting in Leningrad
last month. It is a large-hatch
Poltava-class cargo ship--believed
to be the Genichevs
The ship is
similar in size an instrumentation
to the new US space and missile
tracking ships, which also are mer-
chant ship conversions especially
designed to support the Apollo
manned space program.
The Genichevsk is a sister
ship of the Bezhitsa, which began
its duties last February and is cur-
rently operating in the South At-
lantic. Neither the Bezhitsa nor
the Borovichi, another of the
seven latest additions to this
fleet, are outfitted with large
radar antennas.
TITO MOVES TO REVIVE THIRD-FORCE MOVEMENT
Yugoslav President Tito has
quickly reaffirmed Belgrade's
devotion to the principle of non-
alignment in international affairs
after he had gravely weakened the
credibility of this stand by ad-
hering to the 9 June Soviet bloc
declaration in support of the
Arabs. Tito sent Foreign Minis-
ter Marko Nikezic to New Delhi
last week to repair fences with
Mrs. Gandhi. Nikezic has since
proceeded to the UN, where he
and Premier Mika Spiljak are at-
tempting to coordinate the views
of the nonaligned states on the
Middle East crisis.
Mrs. Gandhi, who with Tito
and Nasir is one of the leaders
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ARTIST'S CONCEPTION OF NEW SOVIET
SPACE SUPPORT SHIP
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of nonalignment, quickly criti-
cized Tito for joining in the Mos-
cow declaration. A prominent
Asian diplomat probably also re-
flected the feelings of many
other nonaligned leaders when he
emphasized that Tito's move, al-
though meant to help Nasir, ac-
tually aligned Yugoslavia with
the Soviet bloc.
Belgrade's efforts at the
UN are meeting with some suc-
cess. With Indian support, its
delegation was the moving force
behind the 17 June meeting of the
representatives of 43 nonaligned
nations. The meeting selected
Yugoslav representative Danilo
Lekic to head a steering commit-
tee to develop a common position
on the mideast. The Yugoslavs
hope that the committee will rep-
resent the nonaligned states in
their relations with other groups
at the UN. The 17 June meeting
also discussed a possible non-
aligned foreign ministers meeting.
Both Yugoslavia and India
continue to maintain a firm pro-
Arab line. Both insist publicly
that Israel must at least with-
draw its forces to territorial
boundaries that existed before
4 June as the essential precondi-
tion for negotiations with the
Arabs. However, Indian and Yugo-
slav diplomats in New Delhi have
hinted that nego-tiations might
begin after a simple Israeli
pledge to withdraw.
Unlike the Indians, Tito has
urged Nasir to make concessions.
The Belgrade press has reaffirmed
that Yugoslavia has always recog-
nized Israel's right to exist
as a state.
Bel-
grade also is recommending direct
negotiations through the UN to
settle other Arab-Israeli issues.
The nonalignment theme, a
cornerstone of Yugoslav foreign
policy for many years, has been
losing its appeal in recent month
The frequent conflicts of inter-
ests among the countries identi-
fied with the movement have con-
stantly undermined such unity as
it possessed, and correspondingly
its ability to influence events.
Despite these weaknesses, how-
ever, the idea has been useful to
Tito over the years. It has af-
forded him considerable room for
diplomatic maneuver and helped
him maintain his independence
with respect to Moscow. In the
process the doctrine has also
given Yugoslavia--and Tito--a
disproportionate international
influence.
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NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING
Discussions of the Middle
East crisis at the semiannual NATO
foreign ministers' meeting on
13 and 14 June underlined once
more that France, in addition to
withdrawing from the military side
of the Alliance, places very nar-
row limits on its participation
in NATO political consultation.
The ministers all held roughly
similar views on the nature of the
Mideast crisis and the UN's role
in its solution. They were espe-
cially critical of U Thant for re-
moving the UN peacekeeping force.
Preparation of a communique' sum-
ming up the consensus of the meet-
ing, however, encountered obdurate
French objections. The French
even refused to agree to express
hope for good relations with all
countries of the Middle East, be-
cause this would in some way imply
their endorsement of the principle
of consensus in NATO.- The impasse
was resolved by accepting the
French position and omitting any
reference to Mideast consensus in
the communique. Ambassador Cleve-
land commented that even Krag of
Denmark and Martin of Canada, who
have been the staunchest advocates
of patience toward the French,
were incensed by their behavior
on this occasion.
German Foreign Minister
Brandt did not join the other min-
isters in endorsing the tabling
of a draft nonproliferation treaty
(NPT) by the US and Soviet dele-
gations at the current Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee meet-
ing. Endorsement was contingent
on the understanding that NATO
members would be free to raise
questions as discussion continues
at Geneva, and that the US would
continue to discuss the subject
in the North Atlantic Council.
Brandt later told US officials
that Germany would go along with
tabling the NPT draft so long as
the other NATO members had agreed.
Members previously opposed to cer-
tain features of the NPT were so-
bered by the consequences the use
of nuclear weapons might have had
in the Israeli-Arab dispute.
Concerning East-West rela-
tions, the Scandinavians, Canadi-
ans, and British still viewed the
prospects for a detente with the
USSR more optimistically than the
German, Dutch, Greek, and Turkish
delegations. Ambassador Cleve-
land, however, noted a definite
tendency by all to question Soviet
motives. Even the French endorsed
the need to continue a strong West-
ern defensive position as a means
of encouraging the Soviets to ac-
cept an eventual detente in Europe.
On the question of the so-
called "technological gap," the
European ministers, rather than.
engaging in their usual criticism
of US economic "hegemony," em-
phasized the question of what Eu-
rope can do for itself. They ap-
proved a report from a special
study group which recommended lim-
iting NATO's role to fostering the
spread of technical knowledge
through joint military production
and research and development proj-
ects. Other related projects are
to be left to such groups as the
Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development and the Eu-
ro can Economic Community ~ 25X1.
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STUDENT UPJREST IN 6~JEST BERLIN
Deepening unrest this past
year among West Berlin youth has
aroused concern among Allied and
German officials. The unrest has
been fomented largely by a small
but vocal "new left" movement
among university students which
rejects all conventional values
and seeks to destroy the "estab-
lishments" of both East and Wes-t
by defying their authority. The
US role in Vietnam is a favorite
target of this element.
Earlier this year student
unrest was directed against the
administration of the Free Uni-
versity, but in recent weeks the
city administration a~1d the po-
lice have been the main targets.
Events took a particularly serious
turn on 2 June when a demonstra-
tion against the visit of the Shah
of I-ran turned into a riot. In
the ensuing clash with the police,
a youthful demonstrator, Benno
Ohnesorg, was killed.
Ohnesorg's death produced an
unprecedented feeling of solidar-
ity between West Berlin students
and professors. City authorities
are especially concerned that many
thousands of students--rather than
the usual 300-400 troublemakers--
now have become involved. The
general public remains outraged
by the rowdyism of the students,
but the Berlin press has taken the
authorities to task far their "in-
ept" handling of the problem. A
parliamentary investigation of the
events of 2 June is expected to
uphold student charges that police
were overzealous.
US observers believe that
the increasingly disorderly ac-
tivities of the students have be-
come a serious challenge to public
authority. The Allied Commandants
concluded at a recent meeting that
the situation required careful
study and called for recommenda-
tions. The French representative
asserted that Allied action was
necessary because the students
were establishing contact "with
the East." He may have been al-
luding to the all-out East German
propaganda exploitation of Ohne-
sorg's death and funeral.
All indications suggest, how-
ever, that the East Germans acted
independently, and there is no
proof of significant Communist in-
filtration of the West Berlin
student movement. The East Ger-
mans occasionally send speakers
to "new left" meetings in West
Berlin and radical elements have
smuggled in propaganda material
from Peking's embassy in East Ber-
lin. Virtually all the students
admit, however, that the "estab-
lishment" in West Berlin allows
them more freedom than their con-
temporaries in the East enjoy, and
they consider the East German re-
gime the embodiment of all that
they oppose. The students have,
thus far, refrained from attack-
ing Allied authority in Berlin di-
rectly and appear to accept the
Allies as guarantors of the city's
security.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The radical Arab states keep trying to make
anti-Westernism into a real bandwagon movement,
but the moderates, led by Jordan's King Husayn,
have so far been able to treat the issue some-
what more soberly. Prospects for an Arab summit
have become less and less certain. The Israelis'
main objective now is to get the Arabs to the
conference table, but all the Arabs are opposed
to any meeting until Israel withdraws from the
Arab territories it occupies.
Egypt, meanwhile, is carrying on a public
campaign to whip up tension among the populace,
and the government is claiming that victory over
the Israelis is still a possibility.
The security situation in Aden is worsening
daily. The Front for the Liberation of Occupied
South Yemen, the principal terrorist organization
operating against the British, has called for a
UN investigation of Britain's "war of extermina-
tion." The British Government will be under strong
pressure at home to pull out of the area before in-
dependence in 1968 if the situation gets further
out of hand.
In India, the rapidly deteriorating security
situation in West Bengal has brought the leftist
coalition government in that state to the brink
of collapse. The sharp increase in lawlessness
coincides with a precipitate decline in police
morale and efficiency. A period of direct rule
from New Delhi seems almost inevitable in order to
re-establish law and order.
New strains are developing between the King
and the military junta in Greece, as the regime
consolidates its control.
The most serious problem in Africa remains
the break-up of Nigeria. Governor Ojukwu of the
"Republic of Biafra" has moved to acquire revenue
from oil operations in the Eastern Region form-
erly paid to the federal government.
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THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS
Anti-Western pres-sure is
still heavy throughout the Arab
states, but the radicals--Egypt,
Syria, Algeria--have been unable
so far to make anti-Westernism
into a bandwagon movement which
would compel the moderates to
follow their lead. On the other
hand, the moderates--led by Jor-
dan's King Husayn--have been un-
able to create any forum in which
they could impress their point
of view on the radicals.
The Arab foreign ministers'
meeting in Kuwait on 17 and 18
June produced nothing but a
communique stating that the Arab
states "firmly stood by their
previous decision to cut off the
oil." The foreign ministers then
enplaned for the UN session in
New York, talking of resuming
their meeting there. Prospects
for an Arab summit have thus be-
come even hazier. This meeting,
tentatively scheduled for 24 June,
will probably not be held until
early next month, if it takes
place soon at all.
One likely reason why an
Arab summit has not gotten off
the ground is that the Nasir re-
gime has been busy in its own
house. The "retirement" of Mar-
shal Amir, the putative architect
of Egypt's military disaster, has
evidently left the regime with a
serious gap to fill. A reorgani-
zation announced on 18 and 19
Page 18
June gave President Nasir the
premiership and made him secre-
tary general of the regime's mass
party, the Arab Socialist Union
(ASU), as well. The shift fol-
lowed a week of rumor that Nasir
was a prisoner of allied leftist
and "realist" factions, and that
a power struggle was going on in-
side the regime.
A clearly identifiable rep-
resentative of the army has not
emerged, but the substitution of
Nasir for the pro-Soviet Ali Sabri
as effective head of the ASU lends
some substance to reports that
Sabri as well as Amir has fallen
from favor. Sabri remains, how-
ever, one of Nasir's top deputies
and is minister for local affairs,
The new cabinet as a whole has a
pragmatic flavor with few new
names. Such reshufflings have
occurred before in response to
pressures for new emphases in
Egyptian policy, without bringing
any dramatic shift in the Nasir
regime's attitudes toward the
outside world.
In Jordan, King Husayn's po-
sition has remained surprisingly
good. It may be undermined, how-
ever, unless the Jordanians prove
capable of coping with the flow
of refugees now moving steadily
out of the camps in Israeli-oc-
cupied West Jordan. The Jorda-
nians' arrangements at this point
are makeshift at best. The Libyan
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Jun 67
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 Approved Fotrrii?elease 2007/O~i~9 ~C1AhDP79-0092'4005900010001-8
MEDITERRANEAN
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 Approved For Release 2007$d~i~0$~:CIA-RDP79-00927A0~15900010001-8
Government also has survived the
storm of disorders which in ef-
fect put the country in the hands
of the police and military, but
the price has been a formal re-
quest that the US begin discus-
sions on total withdrawal from
Wheelus Air Base. The Lebanese
Government remains fearful that
some new untoward development will
set off a civil war between Mus-
lims and Christians; tensions are
reported to be extremely high.
Even the Israelis are some-
what distracted by domestic poli-
tics. The partial demobilization
effected during the past ten days
has brought a relaxation, and
with it has come political maneu-
vering involving the Rafi party
of General Dayan, the left-
socialist-oriented Achdut Haavoda,
and Prime Minister Eshkol's Mapai.
A Rafi committee voted this week
to rejoin Mapai, which the leading
lights of Rafi left twa years ago
after ex-premier Ben Gurion had
become dissatisfied with Eshkol's
leadership. Within Mapai, the
move is being resisted by those
who fear that Dayan-may be hoping
to capitalize on his present popu-
larity as a military leader to
take over the civilian leadership
as well. The anti-Dayan group
looks for a merger with Achdut
Haavoda to balance Rafi influence.
This kind of political in-
fighting may well make the Israeli
Government even less flexible on
peace terms; no Israeli leader
presumably wants to face an elec-
torate as the man who gave away
what Israel's soldiers won, even
though it must be clear to the
top Israeli leadership that the
country cannot hope to hold its
present territorial gains indefi-
nitely.
The Israelis continue to em-
phasize, outside the UN forum as
well as within it, that the main
objective now is to get the Arabs
to sit down with them, face to
face, at the table. The Arabs,
however, are digging in their
heels as har-d as they can; even
moderate Arab leaders say cate-
gorically that such talks are im-
possible at present. The Arabs
are focusing almost completely on
the issue of an Israeli withdrawal,
and such voices of radicalism as
Damascus radio have called on the
Palestinians to organize them-
selves for a "secret armed strug-
gle."
asir as we
as other regime spokesmen have
emphasized that Egypt is willing
to wait indefinitely--keeping the
Suez Canal closed the while--for
the Israelis to evacuate Sinai.
So far, however, there has been
only one report of a cease-fire
violation; the Israelis on 18 June
accused the Syrians of shooting,
but there were no casualties.
The Canal and Oil Situations
Oil production in the MiddlF
East is recovering. All Arab
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producing countries with the excep-
tion of Iraq and Libya are produc-
ing and shipping oil to regular
consumers other than the US or UK.
Iraq is
permitting the Iraq Petroleum
Company to pump enough oil to meet
the internal requirements of both
Syria and Lebanon, but there is
no indication of when production
and exports will be resumed.
West European oil consumers
still are not displaying any great
uneasiness about the oil supply
situation. The-OECD Council which
met on 20 June again failed to
institute any emergency programs
because France, and others, could
not agree on the urgent need for
joint action. The problem now
appears not to be the availability
of Arab oil but one of transporta-
tion. The movement of Persian
Gulf oil to markets west of Suez
via the Cape of Good Hope will
require additional tanker capacity
that is not readily available.
This lack of transport will affect
the production and shipment of
.Arab oil at least over the next
thirty days.
Nasir has stated that the
Suez Canal will not be reopened
until Israeli troops are withdrawn
from its vicinity. It now seems
highly likely that the waterway
is, as reported, blocked by a num-
ber of sunken craft. Estimates
of the time required to clear the
Page 21
canal range from a number of days
to six months, but the more re-
liable estimates are one to three
months.
Closure of the canal has
caused charter rates for tankers
to increase by more than 300 per-
cent, and some dry cargo rates
by 100 percent. The landed cost
of a ton of Persian Gulf crude to
Italy, for example, has risen from
$14.50 to $28.50.
Soviet Diplomatic Offensive
The Soviet effort to display
solid support for the Arab cause
was accelerated during the past
week. Premier Kosygin at the UN,
President Podgorny in Cairo, and
the Soviet party central committee
under Chairman Brezhnev in Moscow
made a coordinated series of ges-
tures to bolster the image of all-
out Soviet backing.
Kosygin's speech at the UN
General Assembly on 19 June made
it clear that the chief Soviet
aim is to force Israel to hand
back captured Arab territory. Al-
though his resolution would con-
demn Israel and .call upon it to
make restitution to the Arabs,
the Soviets would probably give
up these demands in return for a
simple withdrawal resolution to
be implemented by the Security
Council. In line with established
Soviet policy, Kosygin did not
take a stand on direct Arab-Is-
raeli talks or access to the Suez
Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.
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Kosygin struck out at
US policies in several areas,
leading off with Vietnam and
rehashing old charges on Cuba,
the Congo, and the Dominican Re-
public. His remarks throughout
were relatively temperate, how-
ever, and particularly so when
speaking of the US role in the
Middle East. He charged the US
with taking steps which the Is-
raelis might have considered as
encouraging their "aggression,"
but he did not so much as hint at
direct US intervention in the
hostilities. He made a general
reference to the passibility of
halting arms races and the de-
sirability of concerted steps by
the great powers toward peace,
which may have been intended to
keep the door open for private
talks with the US.
Podgorny arrived in Cairo on
21 June for talks with Nasir. The
two regimes probably need to com-
pare notes on their intentions
regarding new moves in the crisis.
Podgorny's arrival was preceded
by that of Soviet Chief of Staff
Zakharov, and both will probably
take part in an assessment of the
damage done to the Egyptian mili-
tary machine. Podgorny may be
empowered to bargain with Nasir
over the extent to which the So-
viets need to resupply the Egyp-
tian armed forces. There is no
clear indication as yet of how
far Moscow intends to go in this
regard. Podgorny may also work
with Nasir in hammering out a
more detailed and coordinated
bargaining stance to be adopted
at the UN, in the expectation
that the Soviets' present harsh
resolution will need to be modi-
fied.
In Moscow, a two-day central
committee plenary session ended
on Wednesday after going through
the formality of endorsing the
politburo's handling of the Middle
East crisis. The resolution
adopted by the party body failed
to mention one of Kosygin's three
demands--censure of Israel--but
it used harsher and more ideolog-
ical language than had Kosygin at
the UN. The party document was
unrelieved by the more positive
aspects of Kosygin's Aresentation,
notably his statement on the right
of every people "to establish an
independent national state of its
own," and his reference to great-
power responsibility for peace in
the Middle East.
The resolution took special
note of the Communist summit con-
ference in Moscow on 9 June, call-
ing the "joint action" of the bloc
countries a "powerful factor in
the struggle against aggress-ive
intrigues" but without specifying
what "joint action" was planned.
Podgorny's stop-over in Belgrade
on the way to Cairo was probably
designed to exploit Tito's willing-
ness to join with the USSR and all
the East European countries except
Rumania on this issue.
East European Reactions
Following the pattern set by
the Soviets, all the East European
S EC R }~'}'
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governments except Albania are
represented at the special UN
General Assembly session by pre-
miers and foreign ministers, and
even Albania sent its foreign min-
ister. Their views on the Mid-
east conflict and reactions to the
proceedings--aside from the Ru-
manians--have predictably supported
the Arab cause, but various dele-
gates have revealed private doubts
about the outcome of the session
and about Soviet tactics and lead-
ership in the crisis.
As expected, the Rumanians
have emphasized the neutralist
course party leader Ceausescu set
by refusing to sign the 9 June
Moscow declaration condemning Is-
raeli aggression or to break rela-
tions with Tel Aviv. One Rumanian
representative even noted to US
officials that the views expressed
by President Johnson in his speech
were "not very far" from those of
his own country.
Despite their close public
alignment with the Soviet posi-
tion, Czechoslovak and Hungarian
delegates have complained pri-
vately that the Soviets have not
kept them informed regarding their
intentions. A Czechoslovak dele-
gate even related that on 16 June
Eastern European delegates "were
forced to buttonhole" outsiders
to learn Kosygin's expected time
of arrival.
Reflecting his government's
misgivings, Polish Deputy Foreign
Minister Naszkowski stated
on 15 June that Warsaw
the UN debate as a propaganda
exercise through which Moscow
hopes to demonstrate continued
support for the Arabs and to re-
gain the initiative in the Middle
East.
Meanwhile, in Warsaw, party
boss Gomulka is trying to temper
pro-Israeli sentiment in Poland,
most recently in a speech deliv-
ered on 19 June. Gomulka's ef-
forts in this direction reveal
the regime's extreme sensitivity
to the widespread sympathy for
Israel among influential Jews
within the party and government
apparatus, as well as among the
people in general.
Soviet Military Aid
The Soviet airlift to Egypt
and Algeria appears to have ended.
Between 6 and 19 June over 225
flights were made to those coun-
tries. While the cargoes included
spare parts and some antiaircraft
guns, the flights are believed to
have been intended primarily to
resupply the Arabs with aircraft.
The cargo to Egypt included pos-
sibly as many as 100 MIG fighters.
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~,~ R~Y`
If the Soviets intend to
build the Egyptian military hard-
ware inventory up to the prehos-
tility level and meet new Egyp-
tian military equipment require-
ments, a large-scale sealift of
some duration will be necessary.
Since the fighting began on 5
June, however, only eight freight-
ers possibly carrying military
equipment have arrived in Middle
Eastern ports--one in Algiers,
five in Alexandria,-two in
Latakia--and one freighter is
currently en route to Iraq via
the Cape of Good Hope. Some of
these ships carried armored person-
nel carriers, artillery, and anti-
aircraft guns, and aircraft as well
as tanks and a variety of wheeled
vehicles. Egypt has been seeking
the last two items on an emergency
basis since 24 May.
Soviet Naval Posture
A significant number of So-
viet combatant ships continue to
operate in the Mediterranean.
Units which have recently entered
the Mediterranean or will do so
in the next week include two
Alligator-class landing ships, two
cruisers, four destroyers, and
five naval auxiliaries. A cruiser
and seven other warships are
scheduled to return to the Black
Sea in the same period.
Four destroyers, an Alligator
landing ship, and an intelligence
collection ship continue to op-
erate east of Cyprus and as many
as eight submarines, including
two nuclear units, may be in the
Mediterranean. The Soviets ap-
pear to be maintaining a large
number of naval units in the area
as a psychological prop to the
defeated Arab states and to in-
terfere with the freedom of
action of the US Sixth Fleet.
UN Situation
There does not appear to be
much chance that either the US or
Soviet resolutions on the Mideast--
at least in their original form--
will attract the necessary two-
thirds vote in the special session
of the United Nations General As-
sembly. Several groups of nations
are considering introduction of
their own resolutions as the de-
bate goes on.
Outside of the Communist and
Arab states, there is almost no
support for the clause of the
Soviet resolution calling for the
condemnation of Israel as the ag-
gressor. Nor is there much in-
terest in the Soviet proposal
that Israel be required to make
reparations. The Soviet resolu-
tion might pass, however, if it
were cut down simply to a call
for the withdrawal of Israeli
forces behind the armistice lines.
There is a possibility that India
and other nonaligned states will
introduce such a resolution them-
selves.
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Many countries tend to be-
lieve that the UN must take a
clear position against territorial
gains as the result of military
action, regardless of other con-
siderations. The Chilean repre-
sentative said that this was an
important matter to most Latin
American countries. Probably
hoping to salvage something of
Britain's economic relations with
the Arab states, British Foreign
Secretary Brown, when he addressed
the assembly, opposed Israel's re-
tention of conquered territory.
The UK, however, is unlikely to
press the Israelis to withdraw
until they have gained some
guarantees.
The US Mission to the UN
characterized the initial reaction
to Ambassador Goldberg's speech
as good to excellent from all
friendly countries, and good from
many marginal ones." Objections,
however, were raised by some that
it ties an Israeli withdrawal to
the recognition of permanent
boundaries. There is deep pes-
simism in the halls of the UN about
the prospects for such recognition
any time soon, or even for Arab-
Israeli talks, as proposed by the
US.
The purpose of the debate in
the General Assembly is generally
recognized as being that of reg-
istering the sense of world opinion
on the Mideast situation, with no
intention by any country to endow
the assembly with new implementing
powers. There is, however, a
growing belief that the UN needs
new and improved machinery to
deal with the Mideast--perhaps a
special mediator appointed by
the Secretary General, or strength-
ened peace-keeping forces. De
Gaulle and Prime Minister Wilson
still hope that a four-power
summit meeting can be arranged.
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rJE6^J STRAINS BETWEEN GREEK COUP GROUP AND KING
There are new signs of
strains between King Constantine
and the military regime in Greece.
Constantine previously
had approved almost pro forma the
junta's suggested military re-
tirements and promotions, which
apparently have been carried out
according to established proce-
dures and without favoritism.
The regime has continued to
consolidate its control with the
appointment of key local, re-
gional, and national governmental
officials. Strict control of
the news media is being main-
tained, and political activity
is still proscribed. The mili-
tary authorities have instituted
severe penalties for both writ-
ten and oral pronouncements
threatening their established
order.
Minister of Interior Pat-
takos announced last week that
over half of the 6,138 political
prisoners had been released. A
press source quotes Pattakos as
having said that over 10,000 per-
sons had been arrested. The most
prominent detainee, Andreas Pa-
pandreou, has still not been tried,
but Pattakos announced that the
government was "speeding up legal
formalities" in this case. Most
observers believe that even if
Andreas is convicted, he will not
serve a sentence but will instead
be deported.
The constitutional revision
committee met last week and was
urged to complete its work by
15 December. No timetable for the
promised referendum has yet been
announced, however.
Various regime officials have
expressed surprise at what they
regard as a cool US response to
the new government. They state
that the US apparently misunder-
stood the necessity for the mili-
tary take-over and have hinted
that the continuance of such a
stance by the US could result in
anti-US reprisals.
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SHOWDOWN DELAYED IN NIGERIA
The three-week-old "Republic
of Biafra"--formerly the Eastern
Region of Nigeria--is still
awaiting both a military attack
by federal government forces and
international recognition. Under
increasing federal pressures,
Eastern officials, including mil-
itary personnel, are reportedly
becoming restless over the in-
action and uncertainty. Some are
even talking of initiating mili-
tary action against the North
NIGERIA
themselves, although military
governor Ojukwu is probably
opposed.
?.` NIGER
` ~"~, ~~
~r~
a_S N
:q ,~' ~
.~; i
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-?-?- New State bound-
ary decreed by
Gowan
... Boundary of
former Region
~. Reglon capital
.T~ Railroad
0 50 100 150 Miles
IT~1 I ~
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
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Federal forces now deployed
near the Biafran border are esti-
mated at 4,000 men. Ojukwu has
some 2,000 regular troops in the
area, many equipped with modern
small arms. They are in a good
defensive posture. Eastern sabo-
teurs recently succeeded in blow-
ing up a number of small bridges
across the border despite the
federal build-up there.
Ojukwu, meanwhile, launched
his move to get control of the
increasingly sizable revenues
heretofore paid to the federal
government by the foreign oil
companies. With the next tax and
royalty payments due next month,
a decree issued by Ojukwu on 21
June formally calls for the pay-
ment to Biafra of all such revenues
derived from operations there.
Under threat of fine, all com-
panies operating in Biafra are
required to file by 28 June full
particulars of the revenues in-
volved and their source, although
the timing of actual payment may
still be negotiable.
The oil companies, among
which Shell-BP is by far the
largest producer, will now have
to choose between abiding by
their existing contractual obli-
gations to the federal government
or dealing with Ojukwu's regime.
Shell-BP's position is a diffi-
cult one. Payment to Biafra at
this stage would be certain to
provoke an extension of the pro-
claimed federal blockade of the
East to oil tankers, which now
are allowed to proceed to Eastern
ports after first being checked
out at Lagos. On the other hand,
payment to Lagos may result in
action by Ojukwu to shut down
oil operations in Biafra in an
effort to force the companies to
come to terms with him. At pres-
ent Shell-BP seems likely to make
its July payment to Lagos, thus
at least preserving its consider-
able interests elsewhere in Ni-
geria. Gowon is clearly most
anxious that Ojukwu not get the
oil revenues, which he feels
would be an important step to-
ward recognition.
Both Gowon and Ojukwu have
recently sent delegations to key
African and world capitals to
press their respective positions.
Gowon has warned that recognition
of Biafra would be regarded as an
unfriendly act and has generally
discouraged would-be mediators.
Ojukwu and his emissaries are
pushing the line that recognition
should be granted immediately to
forestall bloodshed. So far,
Gowon has had much the better of
this diplomatic skirmish as no `
country is yet willing to be first
to recognize Ojukwu's Biafra. Its
only foreign neighbor, Cameroon, '
is cooperating with Lagos' efforts
to seal off the seceded region.
Many other African countries have
now closed their air orts to
O'ukwu's aircraft. 25X1
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
A variety of international meetings, with the
UN discussions of the Middle East crisis foremost
among them,. absorbed the attention of many Latin
American governments last week.
General preoccupation with the Arab-Israeli
conflict and its repercussions in the UN General
Assembly continues throughout the hemisphere. As
matters now stand, it seems likely that the-Latin
American group in the UN would abstain in a vote on
a resolution condemning Israeli aggression, whereas
a significant number of hemisphere governments
probably would see themselves forced to support a
simple call for Israeli withdrawal from conquered
territories. Despite their basic sympathy with the
Israelis, some Latin American regimes probably
would feel that they could not politically afford
to condone any territorial gains made by force.
Other important international meetings during
the week included the preliminary sessions of an
OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Washington to
act on Venezuela's complaint of Cuban aggression,
and the fifth annual meeting of the Inter-American
Economic and Social Council. in Vina del Mar, Chile.
After agreeing unanimously that Venezuela's com-
plaint should be fully examined, the OAS had dif-
ficulty in finding five governments willing to
serve on the investigatory commission that was
named on 21 June. The main themes in Vina del Mar
have been Latin America's persistent quest for US
preferential treatment of its exports, and the
strong differences of opinion that continue to
crop up when trade questions and future Latin
American economic integration are discussed.
Domestically, most Western Hemisphere coun-
tries remain quiet, although rumors of a cabinet
shake-up and still vaguer rumblings of a general
political upheaval continue to circulate in Bolivia.
Also, rumors persist of coup plotting in Haiti, .as
do reports that more executions of suspected con-
spirators are about to occur or have just taken
place.
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TROUBLED BOLIVIA FACES NEW PROBLEMS
The Bolivian Government, en-
gaged for three months in an un-
successful effort to rout guer-
rillas in the southeast, now is
faced with additional problems
of unrest in the tin mines and
growing cooperation among opposi-
tion political groups.
The trouble in the tin mines
stems primarily from economic and
administrative grievances. Agi-
tators have exploited the situa-
tion, inciting the miners to vio-
lence and encouraging them to
defy government authority. Ex-
tremists have maneuvered the miners
into endorsing the guerrillas and
demonstrating in support of them.
Miners at the important Hua-
nuni and Catavi complexes have
declared their regions "free ter-
ritory" in an apparent attempt to
force the government to meet their
demands and to lift the state of
siege imposed on 8 June. Techni-
cal and administrative personnel
fear for their safety under such
conditions of anarchy and have
refused to return to the mines.
The government is reluctant to
move troops into the area as this
probably would only aggravate the
situation.
Durinq the past two weeks
there has also been a flurry of
political activity unknown in Bo-
livia for some time. Leaders of
the Nationalist Revolutionary
Movement (MNR), the rightist Bo-
livian Socialist Falange (FSB),
and the National Lef tilt Revolu-
tionary Party (PRIN)?--Bolivia's
major political parties--have held
a series of meetings aimed at uni-
fying opposition to the Barrientos
government. Some progress has
been made, but unity is still an
illusion at this point.
In an apparent attempt to
forestall such a development and
to split the power-hungry FSB,
President Barrientos offered that
party a chance to participate in
his government, using as bait the
promise of one or two cabinet
posts. The plan eventually was
vetoed by Barrientos' supporters,
but it had the desired effect of
disrupting the unity movement.
The FSB is now in trouble with
the MNR and PRIN for its duplicity
in seeking favor with the govern-
ment while at the same time nego-
tiating with the opposition par-
ties, but the unity of-forts con-
tinue.
The mine situation and the
unity movement among the opposi-
tion political parties are both
troublesome for the government,
but the guerrilla problem is still
the main concern. Additional
guerrilla sites are being set up
in different areas of the coun-
tr ,
If even one of these new
groups starts shooting, the gov-
ernment would be incapable of cop-
ing with the problem. The result-
ing decline of public confidence
would not only undermine the gov-
ernment's authority but could well
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POLITICAL UNREST IN HAITI
The situation in Haiti has
deteriorated since the execution
of 19 military officers for "high
treason" on 8 June. Rumors of
coup plotting are again prevalent
as is the expectation of further
punitive action by Duvalier. As
many as 72 people have taken asy-
lum in various embassies in Port-
au-Prince.
Some of the officers who
were executed had been close to
Duvalier for years, and the action
against them, combined with numer-
ous changes in military commands
which followed, has eroded Du-
valier's already narrow power base.
The creation of an unarmed police
force on 1 June coincides with an
apparent move on the part of
Duvalier to downgrade the national
militia as a security force. No
segment~of Haitian officialdom
has remained unscathed by the
purge, and businessmen are begin-
ning to wonder if they are to be
next. One current rumor has it
that Duvalier has admitted to the
recent execution of 22 additional
prisoners.
The internal situation has
caused trouble with both the
Brazilian and Bahamian governments.
A dispute over the asylum question
resulted on 8 June in the expul-
sion of Brazil's charge, who had
been on duty for only a week.
Relations are also strained with
the government of the Bahamas,
which has demanded that Haiti
stop the flow of emigres. A thou-
sand or more Haitians have reached
the Bahamas in recent weeks, but
most of them were seeking economic
improvement rather than political
asylum. They are being sent back
to Haiti.
The feud within the Duvalier
family may be eased for the time
being by the departure of son-in-
law Colonel Max Dominique and his
wife, the former Marie Denise
Duvalier, who are leaving on
23 June for Europe. Dominique
has been appointed ambassador to
Spain, possibly to get him out
of the way. Many of the purged
officers had been close to Do-
minique, who resigned as military
commander of the Western Depart-
ment in late May as a protest
against their arrest.
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fVEW DISORDERS POSSIBLE IN NORTHERN h1EXIC0
The Mexican Government may
face more trouble in the north-
western border state of Sonora
in connection with the elections
scheduled there for 2 July. Gen-
eral order is likely to be main-
tained, as it has been for the
past month, only by the presence
of federal troops who were sent
in to quell a violent public
protest against the gubernatorial
candidate "imposed" by the ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) .
The refusal of the PRI to
bow to overwhelming popular oppo-
sition to the nomination--and
therefore almost certain election
of Faustino Felix Serna has in-
creased the potential for renewed
violence, however. Gavernment-
influenced newspaper and radio
comment has added to the initial
resentment by treating all oppo-
sition to Felix Serna as inspired
by Communist subversives.
refuge across the border in
Arizona, many teachers have been
fired, and respectable and promi-
nent citizens have been arrested
and harassed. Rumors that vast
amounts of public money were
used to "purchase" Felix's can-
didacy and to buy off the press
point up popular belief that
corruption is rampant.
If voters do not boycott the
election, there will probably be
a strong protest vote in favor
of the National Action (PAN) can-
didate, Gilberto Suarez. Suarez,
not a PAN member, is an attractive
personality with funds to wa e
a ood cam ai n. 25X1
Further exacerbating the sit-
uation are the continuing repri-
sals against those who oppose
Felix Serna's candidacy. An es-
timated 300 student leaders of
the protest movement have sought
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ecret
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