WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT FRICTIONS IN THE MAGHREB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005800080002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 16, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Frictions in the Maghreb
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
N2 42
I1. l1 u- 16 June 1967
ARCHIv.Es, 0294/67A 25X1
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FRICTIONS IN THE MAGHREB
The problems and frictions that have developed
among the three former French-ruled North African
territories of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have for
the moment been beclouded by the cry for Arab unity
in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. The issues have
not disappeared, however, and the aftermath of the
hostilities may in fact heighten them. Although in-
tellectuals in all three countries continue to toy
with the idea of Maghreb unity or federation, the
problems that have persisted since independence in
their relationships with each other, with their Arab
and African neighbors, and with the Western powers
preclude the development of any meaningful collabora-
tion among them.
Background
A deceptive aura of unity
based on common heritage and mutual
interests and goals surrounds the
Maghreb--Morocco, Algeria, and
Tunisia. All are Arab and Muslim
in language and tradition, with a
veneer of French culture and phi-
losophy; all are emerging nations,
striving to develop their back-
ward--largely agricultural--
economies and eliminate illiteracy,
poverty, and disease. All are
bound closely to France, their
former colonial master, all have
sentimental ties with other Arab
states, and all seek to expand
horizons in Europe and the Western
Hemisphere. The three are also
ambitious for recognition not
only as leaders in Africa but in
the whole underdeveloped world
as well.
Yet the members of the
Maghreb do not sing the same tune,
as is evident in their divergent
means of expressing "full support"
of Arab solidarity in the present
Arab-Israeli confrontation. In
fact, each assiduously undercuts
the others to promote its own
interests while at the same time
giving lip service to the concept
of Maghreb unity.
Early Attempts at
Unified Action
Long before the first two of
the French-ruled North African
countries recovered independence--
Morocco on 2 March and Tunisia on
20 March 1956--North Africans
collaborated to scheme about throw-
ing off French control. The earliest
of these councils probably were
"bull sessions" of Moroccan, Al-
gerian, and Tunisian students,
principally in Paris but also in
Cairo and other centers. After
World War II, when Egypt gave sanc-
tuary to Abdelkrim, the legendary
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N4W
hero of the Rif rebellion of the
1920s, Cairo became the site for
hatching North African intrigues.
But Abdelkrim failed to supply
the dynamic leadership needed to
mold the individual nationalist
groups into an organization capa-
ble of producing union and action,
and the nationalist politicians
in Cairo soon fell to bickering
among themselves.
In April 1958, although
Algeria was not yet free, an
attempt was made to lay the foun-
dations for a Maghreb union or
federation. Under the auspices
of the Moroccan Istiqlal Party,
representatives of Istiglal,
the Tunisian Neo-Destour Party,
and the Algerian National Libera-
tion Front (FLN) met in Tangier,
Morocco. A Mauritanian observer
also attended this meeting.
Later on, Libyan representatives
were invited to participate in
Maghrebian meetings. The hard
core, however, remains the three
former French-held areas.
At Tangier, the Moroccans
committed themselves to provide
assistance to the FLN more on a
par with what the Tunisians were
already supplying, while the FLN
postponed its plan to establish
a provisional government. All
agreed to exert every possible
pressure to prevent France from
marketing Saharan crude oil.
This apparent harmony was
disrupted less than five months
later when the Algerians launched
their provisional government in
Cairo without the courtesy of
notifying their Moroccan and Tu-
nesian partners in advance. Sub-
sequently, while the Algerians
were still fighting the French,
Tunisian President Bourguiba
angered the Algerians when he
permitted France to construct a
pipeline across Tunisian territory
in order to move Saharan crude oil
from Edjeleh to the Mediterranean.
The growing number of Algerian
refugees in both Morocco and Tu-
nesia also were constant sources
of friction, as were the free-
wheeling activities of Algerian
troops based in both border areas.
Both Rabat and, particularly,
Tunis began to regard their armed
rebel guests as threats to their
own regimes.
Algerian Independence
When Algeria achieved inde-
pendence in July 1962 and the
Algerian refugees and troops had
departed Morocco and Tunisia, new
irritants prevented the develop-
ment of harmonious relationships
among the three governments. Mo-
rocco had remained a conservative
monarchy, Tunisia had become a
moderate socialist republic. Both,
however, were alarmed at the de-
velopment of a radically revolu-
tionary-socialist regime in Al-
geria. King Hassan and President
Bourguiba, having supported mod-
erates such as Ferhat Abbas, the
first head of the Provisional Al-
gerian Government, came to dis-
trust the erratic and flamboyant
Algerian President Ben Bella and
his growing group of leftist and
Marxist advisers.
The feeling was mutual: Ben
Bella blamed the Moroccans for
"betraying" him in 1956, thereby
permitting the French to capture
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and imprison him and some other
Algerian leaders. Moreover, he
sharply resented Bourguiba's ef-
forts to counsel and guide him in
the intricacies of establishing
a new government. There was also
some bureaucratic dislocation in
Tunis and Rabat occasioned by the
withdrawal of experienced Algerian
personnel who had been working in
the Tunisian and Moroccan civil
service in order to become the
nucleus of an independent Alge-
rian civil service.
Ben Bella also quickly moved
close to Nasir, who was constantly
feuding with Bourguiba and had
small regard for Hassan in particu-
lar and the Moroccans in general.
In an effort to gain ground with
Algiers, which already was planning
a grandiose reception for Nasir,
Hassan craftily managed to upstage
the Egyptian leader and be the
first chief of state given a state
reception by independent Algeria.
Having been caught off balance,
Ben Bella was in an embarrassing
position vis-a-vis Nasir and in
the long run, Hassan's ploy
redounded to his own disadvantage.
Meanwhile, Hassan--who fancied
himself a protege of De Gaulle,
while the blunt and undiplomatic
Bourguiba was in the French Presi-
dent's disfavor--soon was acutely
aware that French relations with
Algeria were to be, in De Gaulle's
mind, the model for a relationship
which would appeal to other under-
developed areas. Both Tunisia and
Morocco found French assistance
to them curtailed while that to
Algeria seemed to them surpris-
ingly generous. Moreover, when
Algeria nationalized French farm-
lands, both Hassan and Bourguiba
were under strong domestic pres-
sure to do likewise. After capit-
ulating to this pressure, however,
their governments fell into new
difficulties with France whereas
Algerian-French relations were
not seriously affected by Algiers'
land seizures. Algeria remains
the favorite son in French eyes
to this day.
Border Problems
Border problems continue to
be a main irritant in Maghreb re-
lations. On gaining independence
both Morocco and Tunisia claimed
territory that France was continu-
ing to administer as part of Al-
geria. Pressed by nationalist
extremists who demanded large
areas of southwestern Algeria as
well as all of Mauritania and
Spanish Sahara, the Moroccan Gov-
ernment soon after Algerian inde-
pendence broached this subject to
Algeria, citing a commitment of
Ferhat Abbas to negotiate Moroccan
claims after Algerian independence.
Ben Bella categorically refused to
discuss the question, claiming
that Algeria's borders were not
subject to negotiation and citing
a provision in the charter of the
Organization of African Unity
(OAU) to support this thesis.
Although Tunisia's claims were ex-
tremely minor compared with those
of Morocco, the Algerians also
would make no concessions to Tunis.
Numerous border incidents--
illegal crossings, banditry, move-
ments of migrant workers, and sea-
sonal migrations of nomadic tribes
and their herds--caused many prob-
lems for all three governments.
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Tempers in Algiers and Rabat
rose in mid-October 1963 when an
Algerian patrol clashed with a Mo-
roccan auxiliary unit at a Saharan
waterhole they had been sharing.
The conflict quickly escalated,
and the Moroccan Army--benefiting
from air support while the few
Algerian MIGs, loaned by Nasir,
were stranded at a French-con-
trolled field near Bechar--
clearly outfought the Algerian
troops.
A cease-fire, supervised by
Mali and Ethiopia, was arranged on
1 November and the two forces were
separated by a narrow buffer zone
that each continues to keep under
close surveillance lest the other
occupy its strong points. The
seven-member OAU commission es-
tablished to determine the re-
sponsibility for the outbreak of
the conflict and to recommend a
settlement of the border dispute
has served mainly to mark time.
Having already met in 11 ses-
sions, usually at the request of
the Moroccans, it hears arguments
counterarguments, and rebuttals
with little likelihood of reach-
ing a decision. This Algerian
military "defeat" is sometimes
cited as justification for the
subsequent Algerian arms build-
up and sustains Moroccan sus-
picions that one day Algeria in-
tends to "get even."
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Moroccan
policy with regard to
Spanish Sahara--Rabat has publicly
supported independence for the area
as contributed
to Morocco's
isolation from
its
neighbors.
Consultations
among
Spain,
Mauritania, and Algeria
have
led
Morocco to suspect
that
it is
being surrounded by a Madrid-
Nouakchott-Algiers axis. 25X1
Tunisian territorial claims
center on a wedge of desert along
Tunisia's southwestern border.
This issue became acute after a
Tunisian-Italian drilling team in
1964 discovered exploitable quanti-
ties of oil very close to the dis-
puted area. Some weeks ago, an
Algerian company also had an oil
strike within a few miles
of the Tunisian well. Ru-
mors o clashes between drilling 25X1
personnel and of the concentra-
tion of troops on both sides of the
border are probably exaggerated.
A joint Algerian-Tunisian military
team has visited the area to di-
rect the placement of border mark-
ers in the vicinity of oil drill-
ing operations. Tunisia has not,
however, abandoned its demand for
the negotiation of the undefined
portion of its southwestern border.
Maghrebian Dissidents
Another issue contributing to
Maghrebian tension in the sanc-
tuary each of the three countries
gives to antiregime dissidents
from the others.
Since Algerian independence,
Moroccan and Tunisian dissidents
have gravitated to Algiers, where
they have found some encouragement
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and assistance for their effort
to undermine the two moderate re-
gimes. Ben Bella refused to ex-
tradite three or four Tunisians
who fled to Algeria after the dis-
covery late in 1962 of a plot
against Bourguiba's life. Al-
geria also openly encouraged the
activities of a handful of Yous-
sefists--supporters of Bourguiba's
murdered rival, Salah ben Youssef.
Before the overthrow of Ben Bella
two years ago, Algeria not only
had established training camps,
but had armed and equipped some
200 Moroccan military defectors.
The Algerians also encouraged the
Moroccan left-wing opposition, the
National Union of Popular Forces
(UNFP), granting asylum and dip-
lomatic facilities to UNFP leader
Mehdi ben Barka--who was under a
Moroccan death sentence--and
other Moroccan leftist refugees.
Rabat angered Bou-
mediene last 'January when the Mo-
roccan Government facilitated, if
not sponsored, a state funeral for
Algerian oppositionist Mohamed
Khider and openly conferred then
and later with other Algerian
exiles.
Soviet Arms Build-up in Algeria
Both Morocco and Tunisia
have been increasingly alarmed
as their larger neighbor Algeria
continues to build up its inven-
tory of sophisticated Soviet
weapons. Bourguiba particularly,
fearing that Nasir will. quickly
overrun Libya when the present
aged Libyan ruler dies, views
himself as wedged in between an
antagonistic Algeria and a hos-
tile Egypt. Hassan, as his re-
lations with France deteriorated
following the disappearance in
Paris of Mehdi ben Barka, has
found himself isolated..
Both Bourguiba and Hassan
therefore have moved closer to
the US and have pressed for mil-
itary assistance above and be-
yond existing US programs. They
ditional weapons in Europe.
For their part, Morocco and
Tunisia have irritated Algiers
by receiving Algerian op osition
leaders
Although the Algerian threat
has impelled the Moroccan and Tu-
nisian governments to collaborate
to a degree, certain basic diver-
gencies between these two
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pro-Western moderates will con-
tinue to prevent the development
of a truly warm relationship.
In 1960, Morocco resented the
fact that Tunisia recognized
Mauritanian independence, and
relations between Rabat and
Tunis were virtually nonexist-
ent. for several years thereafter.
Hassan, moreover, is constantly
offended by Bourguiba's patroniz-
ing and undiplomatic methods.
Bourguiba, in turn, has vainly
sought staunch Moroccan support
for his attempts to develop an
alignment of moderate Arab gov-
ernments as a counterforce to the
Arab radicals, for Hassan sees
himself instead as a mediator in
the quarrels between the two
groups.
Boumediene, for his part,
denies any aggressive intention
toward his neighbors and claims
that the modern arms Algeria has
acquired are merely to protect its
extended frontiers. Neverthe-
less, he has made it clear that
he would retaliate with force
were Morocco or Tunisia to at-
tempt to wrest disputed terri-
tory from Algeria. Algeria also
chose to misinterpret Hassan's
appeal on 28 February 1967 to
the UN secretary general to take
steps toward a reduction of arma-
ments in the Maghreb, countering
that the OAU was already attempt-
ing to resolve Morocco's terri-
torial dispute with Algeria.
Relations With the US
Both Morocco's growing
friendship with the US and Tu-
nisia's special relationship as
a recipient of a long-term commit-
ment for American economic assist-
ance cause additional frictions
in the Maghreb. Many Algerian of-
ficials assume that American capi-
talism seeks the destruction of
all socialism, particularly Al-
geria's revolutionary brand. Fear-
ful of a US-backed Moroccan-Tu-
nisian encirclement, they give
credence to rumors of the consum-
mation of alliances and the es-
tablishment of military bases in
Morocco and Tunisia.
When a Florida shipbuilding
firm was negotiating with the Tu-
nisians to establish a ship re-
pair facility near Bizerte, the
Algerian Government readily be-
lieved that Tunisia was provid-
ing a base for the Sixth Fleet
despite repeated denials by Amer-
ican and Tunisian officials.
The Algerians also assumed,
when a contract was signed for
the construction of an interna-
tional airport at the site of
the former US base at Nouasseur,
Morocco, that the US was reac-
tivating the installation.
The Algerians also resent
the fact that the US has not
pressed large-scale development
projects on them and they make
unfavorable comparisons between
American aid to Algeria--even
though immediately after inde-
pendence the US fed up to half
of the Algerian population for
many months--with American as-
sistance to Moroccan and Tuni-
sian industry.
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Attitudes Toward
Arab-Israeli Conflict
In the early days of the
present Arab-Israeli confronta-
tion, all three Maghreb govern-
ments pledged full support to
Nasir, and Tunisia, which formally
broke with Cairo in October 1966
after 18 months of de facto rup-
ture, resumed relations. There
was a sharp divergence, however,
in the degree and amount of sup-
port each gave to the Arab cause.
Algeria, as a brother pro-
gressive socialist regime, pledged
"all-out" assistance to Nasir and,
if necessary, a "fight to the
death." Algiers sent troops and
jet aircraft, and quickly fol-
lowed Nasir in breaking relations
with the US; however, at least
some Algerian officials are skepti-
cal of Nasir's charges that the
US aided Israel and were prepared
to accept US denials. The Al-
gerians reacted to early Egyp-
tian reverses by characterizing
the Egyptian soldiers as cowards
and were eager for Algerian
troops to avenge Arab honor.
Subsequently, they have indicated
some disillusionment with the
lack of Soviet support for the
Arabs.
Although King Hassan sent
troops to Egypt immediately fol-
lowing the outbreak of hostili-
ties, there are indications that
this was not a wholehearted com-
mitment and that he probably
preferred they not be engaged
in battle. The Moroccan foreign
minister has assured the Ameri-
can Embassy that Morocco will
not break relations with the US.
Moroccan authorities have taken
precautions to prevent public dis-
order of any kind, but especially
against the US, UK, or the Moroc-
can Jewish minority. Rabat also
labeled a's "interference"' in Mo-
roccan internal affairs an Al-
gerian radiobroadcast urging Mo-
roccans to sabotage the "'Ameri-
can bases at Kenitra and Nouas-
seur."
Bourguiba offered troops to
Nasir, but did not send them out
of the country. He went through
the motions of expressing soli-
darity with the Arabs and denounc-
ing Israel--indeed, he could have
done no less in the face of the
strong popular emotion generated
by the outbreak of hostilities.
He has privately reiterated his
friendship for the US, however,
and stated that he would not
break relations.
Outlook
The three governments did
collaborate to some extent dur-
ing the Arab-Israeli crisis--Al-
geria offered transit facilities
to Moroccan troops, and Tunis
provided transit stops for both
Moroccan and Algerian planes and
troops--but the prospects for a
really amicable relationship
seem slight so long as the po-
litical orientations of the three
diverge so sharply and the mili-
tary disparity remains so pro-
found. The Israeli military vic-
tory and the posthostilities pe-
riod of recrimination seem cer-
tain to add to the existing fric-
tions.
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Some small progress may con-
tinue in purely administrative
and economic spheres, such as
the technical committees now
working on standardizing postal
and customs procedures. In addi-
tion, some lip service probably
will still be rendered by all
three to the concept of Maghrebian
unity. But larger economic proj-
ects such as a proposed Maghrebian
airline and the joint development
of basic industries and resources
seem likely to founder on basic
political incompatibility.
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