WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 5, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

7A" (, C)
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800 20001-8
secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
47
5 May 1967
No. 0288/67
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Release 2017/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0d5800020001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007WF,4-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8
(Information as of noon EDT, 4 May 1967)
VIETNAM
As the Communists continue their military pressure in
the northern part of South Vietnam they have concen-
trated on shelling US bases and engaging elite US
Marine units. In Saigon the Constituent Assembly is
debating the details of the presidential election
law.
PEKING MAY DAY LINE-UP POINTS TO FURTHER CHANGES
The roster in the biggest display of Chinese Communist
leaders since November suggests possible shifts in
the military command structure, and shows the degrada-
tion of Liu Shao-chi and his adherents.
CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT REPLACED
Sihanouk ousted the moderate Lon Nol cabinet which had
come under leftist attack, and installed a new "in-
terim" regime designed to strike a better balance be-
tween the right and left.
SECRET
5 May 67
Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0d5800020001-
 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
SECRET
Europe
PROGRESS IN SOVIET WEATHER SATELLITE SYSTEM
With the launch of Cosmos 156 last week, the USSR has
two weather satellites in operation, providing almost
world-wide coverage.
FRENCH GOVERNMENT SEIZES THE INITIATIVE IN PARLIAMENT 12
It will probably get the authority it is seeking to
decree economic reforms but the opposition will have
another chance if the reforms are not showing results
six months from now.
YUGOSLAV ELECTIONS STIR GRASS-ROOTS POLITICAL ACTIVITY 13
The elections were the freest yet held. The regime's
liberal supporters did well generally, but they re-
ceived a setback in Serbia.
RUMANIA ACCENTUATES ITS INDEPENDENT STANCE
In deciding to stay away from last week's Karlovy Vary
conference, Bucharest moved to a position similar to
that long held by Yugoslavia.
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 15
GREEK MILITARY REGIME DIGS IN
Below the surface calm there are fears that the purging
of all the moderate political elements can only lead to
an inevitable clash between extreme rightist and left-
ist factions.
NASIR'S VIEW OF US ROLE IN YEMEN
In his speech on 2 May, Nasir again attacked the US
as the prime supporter of the forces of "imperialism."
TROUBLES MOUNTING IN GUINEA
The prestige of Sekou Toure's regime is at its lowest
ebb since independence due to financial scandals and
a sinking economy, but he is likely to survive the
crisis.
SECRET
Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67
'p-proved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/01/25: Cl8 TD927AO05800020001-8
NIGERIA'S WESTERN REGION TAKES A HAND IN THE CRISIS
The West has now demanded the removal of Northern
troops and looser federal ties to keep the East from
seceding.
Western Hemisphere
"NEW LOOK" IN BRAZIL
Costa e Silva's new administration presently enjoys
considerable popularity based on its espousal of
"humanized" economic policies and nationalistic for-
eign policies.
DOMINICAN PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL POSITION WEAKENING
Increasing right-wing dissatisfaction in the wake of
Minister of Interior and Police Amiama's resignation
has stirred new criticism of Balaguer. There are re-
newed rumors of plotting against him.
LABOR UNREST AND MILITARY DISCONTENT IN ECUADOR
Strikes and strike threats continue to plague the
government, and junior military officers are increas-
ingly critical of the government and the constituent
assembly.
HAITIAN PRESIDENT SQUELCHES INCIPIENT PLOT
President Duvalier relieved a number of presidential
guard officers of their duties last week in an effort
to head off a palace intrigue that may have involved
members of his own family.
Kennedy Round
KENNEDY ROUND APPROACHES FINAL BARGAINING
Agreement must be reached shortly if the necessary
documents are to be drawn up before the deadline on
30 June.
SECRET
Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67
Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-
 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007IQ LJ /'RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
FAR EAST
China has reacted to intensified US air strikes
in North Vietnam with charges that the US is plot-
ting to extend the war to China. Peking's propa-
ganda claimed its air force destroyed five US aircraft
which allegedly violated Chinese territory. No
specific threats of counteraction were made. China's
charges appear designed primarily to deter US air
operations near the Chinese frontier.
The pace of Communist military action in north-
ern South Vietnam increased sharply last week with
massive shellings of US positions and an extended
engagement between an estimated 2,500 North Vietnam-
ese regulars and two US Marine battalions.
In Peking, the Chinese staged an unusual May
Day celebration which featured the largest turnout
of leaders since last November. The roster of the
select group surrounding Mao Tse-tung suggests that
further changes have been made in the military high
command. The absence of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-
ping further underlines their isolation and degrada-
tion.
The resignation of Prime Minister Lon Nol's cab-
inet in Cambodia apparently reflects an attempt by
Chief of State Sihanouk to check political infighting
and to establish a better balance between forces of
the right and left. Sihanouk's action may have
been prompted by indications that the prime minister
and the army were preparing a major purge of the left,
threatening his traditional practice of playing
leftist and conservative elements a ainst each other.
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67
Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8
L A O S c
4 MAY
100
MILE{
;Jf
Pleikli
soU1COPS
CHINS
lo Linh
6. H.
THUA
THIEN
PHU
BON
DUC
KHAN
HOA
NINH `
THUAN
QUANG NAM
QU,aNG TIN
QUANG
NGAI
QUANG
L DUC
PHU
YEN
The Indochina -South China Area (,'
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/ R(I1A-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8
VIETNAM
The tempo of Communist oper-
ations in South Vietnam's two
northernmost provinces increased
sharply during the past week,
amid indications of continuing
reinforcement of units.
On 27 and 28 April, Commu-
nist forces shelled US Marine
positions at Gio Linh and Dong
Ha in northern Quang Tri Province
and at Phu Bai in adjacent Thua
Thien Province with one of their
heaviest barrages of artillery,
rocket, and mortar fire to date.
The obviously well-coordinated
attacks resulted in cumulative
US losses of 12 killed and nearly
200 wounded, as well as damage to
US aircraft and artillery.
In western Quang Tri Province
near the Laotian border, two US Ma-
rine battalions and an estimated
2,500 North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
regulars have been engaged for
more than a week in sporadic
heavy fighting some six m les
northwest of Khe Sanh. The ac-
tion began on 25 April when a
Marine engineer convoy participat-
ing in Operation PRAIRIE IV was
ambushed along Route 9 by what
was estimated to be an NVA bat-
talion. The convoy was reinforced
by additional Marine units, and
a major battle then developed
for control of three strategic
hills northwest of Khe Sanh
astride key enemy infiltration
routes from both Laos and the De-
militarized Zone (DMZ).
As of 3 May, US forces,
supported by continuous air and
artillery bombardment, had dis-
lodged some elements of the
enemy force--now tentatively
identified as at least a regiment
of the 325th NVA Division--from
their heavily fortified hilltop
positions. The battle, however,
has been costly to both sides--
enemy casualties to date are
473 killed and US losses are 119
killed and 330 wounded.
The pattern of the past week's
Communist activity in Quang Tri
and Thua Thien provinces sug-
gests at least a temporary shift
of military attention away from
Revolutionary Development teams,
South Vietnamese Army district
headquarters, and outposts. The
massive shellings of US bases
are designed to inflict maximum
American losses at minimum enemy
cost. The action at Khe Sanh
is clearly intended to draw
elite US combat units into a pro-
tracted battle of attrition in
terrain tactically advantageous
to the Communists. The concen-
tration on US targets may also
reflect an increasing determina-
tion to register a spectacular
victory against a major US posi-
tion--for its psychological value
both locally in the provinces
and in Saigon and Washington.
Preliminary analysis of
bomb-damage photography of the
strike on Kep Airfield on 1 May
showed three parked MIG fighters
burning. At least two other MIGs
at Hoa Lac were also damaged.
Although the facilities at both
fields sustained limited damage,
the primary runways appear to be
serviceable.
SECRET
5 May 67
Approved For Release 2097/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/012 c9J1 PDP79-00927A005800020001-8
Politics in Saigon
Considerable anxiety is evi-
dent in current Constituent As-
sembly debate on the proposed
presidential electoral law pre-
pared by an assembly drafting
committee. This anxiety stems
from the desire of both civilians
and the military to derive some
built-in advantage from the pro-
visions of the law.
Premier Ky and his support-
ers have been concerned that the
prospects of the military nominee
could be reduced by possible re-
strictions on the number or
eligibility of candidates, or by
a requirement that the winning
candidate must have a specified
minimum percentage of the total
Although the subcommittee
had dropped the provision calling
for a runoff between the top two
candidates, deputies supporting
civilians for the presidency may
attempt to reinsert it during
the assembly's plenary debate.
In addition, some provision aimed
at restricting the number of can-
didates now seems likely to be
adopted as a compromise.
Certain other differences
between the military and the as-
sembly over the electoral regu-
lations, although not likely to
bear significantly on the outcome
of the elections, reflect the
defiant mood of some of the depu-
ties. For instance, the assembly
has approved a 3 September elec-
tion date out of pique at the
Armed Forces Congress for having
previously, on its own, announced
the date as 1 September. The
draft law also states that mili-
tary personnel must request leave
without pay beginning with the
date they file their candidacies
through election day. Some depu-
ties believe candidates should be
completely divorced from govern-
mental positions. This issue may
arise during plenary debate.
Another irritant which could
upset relations between the mili-
tary and the assembly is the des-
ignation of Police Director Loan
in place of General Tri as the
Directorate liaison contact with
the deputies. Loan's heavy-handed
method of interjecting Ky's rec-
ommendations have already nettled
some of the assemblymen. It is
possible, however, that many of
them fear Loan's security appa-
ratus enough to submit to pressure
tactics.
The final form of the contro-
versial provisions will be decided
upon in the next few days of as-
sembly deliberations. The in-
terests of the military establish-
ment appear to be well represented
through sympathetic deputies in
the Democratic-Alliance bloc--the
largest and most influential as-
sembly grouping-,-and it does not
appear likely that the present
draft presidential. election regu-
lations will be seriously altered.
SECRET
Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 67
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007IO1 ? L; IqjRDP79-00927A005800020001-8
PEKING MAY DAY LINE-UP POINTS TO FURTHER CHANGES
Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao,
and Chou En-lai joined 150 other
officials at a mass May Day rally
in Peking in the biggest turn-
out of Chinese Communist leaders
since last November. The list
of names for this huge turnout
points to possible changes in
the military command structure
and the further isolation and
degradation of Liu Shao-chi, Teng
Hsiao-ping, and their adherents.
Mao and Lin spent the day
cruising from gathering to gather-
ing in an open car, followed by
13 other politburo members, mili-
tary leaders, and Cultural Rev-
olution officials.
Mao
appeared quite healthy and alert
25X1 on the rostrum, where he remained
for 90 minutes.
The roster of the elite group
in Mao's motorcade suggests that
further changes have been made in
the military high command. The
only military men aside from Lin
were acting Chief of Staff Yang
Cheng-wu, Minister of Public Secu-
rity Hsieh Fu-chih, the top army
commissar Hsiao Hua, and Su Yu,
a capable officer who had been
in political limbo since being
replaced as chief of staff in
1958. Su's return to prominence
Page 5
in company with these three
tends to confirm poster reports
late last month that the four
had been named vice chairmen of
the party's Military Affairs Com-
mittee. Reportedly, they have
replaced three members who have
been under heavy Red Guard at-
tack--Hsu Hsiang-chien, Yeh
Chien-ying, and Chen Yi.
Several politburo members,
including these three, who have
been castigated through posters
and demonstrations, turned up in
their proper formal ranking on
the Tienanmen rostrum with Mao.
Their presence does not mean
that they have been restored to
good standing. All were point-
edly excluded from the motor-
cade and from small elite groups
which joined Mao in various cere-
monial events during the day.
Their appearance, however, makes
more conspicuous the absence of
such major propaganda targets
as Chief of State Liu Shao-chi.
Several high-ranking mili-
tary officials from the prov-
inces showed up at the rally,
including the commanders of the
Lanchow, Tibet, Kunming and Foo-
chow Military Regions. Their
presence in Peking may be a sign
that a parley of regional mili-
tary officials is under way to
decide how to handle local political
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67
Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-
 Approved For Release 2007//Qy?5kpI4\-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
disturbances. There is evi-
dence, however, that Peking does
not fully trust at least two of
these commanders--those from
Kunming and Lanchow. They may
have been brought to Peking to
get them out of the way while
their commands are being reor-
ganized.
There are, in fact, several
signs that the drive to remove
local military commanders is be-
ing stepped up. Numerous posters
highly critical of local command-
ers have been displayed in Peking
in the past two weeks. Poster's
allege that in Kansu Province,
for example, two party secre-
taries supported by a deputy com-
mander of the Lanchow Military
Region used civilians and troops
to rout Red Guards from a news-
SECRET
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY
paper office on 18 April, result-
ing in the death or injury of
several hundred. A deputy com-
mander in Chengtu allegedly has
instigated similar clashes six
times since 4 April.
25X1
5 May 67
Approved or a ease 007/01/2 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
SECRET
CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT REPLACED
The ouster of the moderate
Lon Nol cabinet in Cambodia rep-
resents another effort by Chief
of State Sihanouk to strike a
fresh balance between the right
and left in Phnom Penh.
In announcing Lon Nol's
resignation on 30 April, Sihanouk
explained that it resulted from
"grave dissension" among "im-
portant leaders" in the govern-
ment and the National Assembly.
Sihanouk has long played leftist
and conservative elements against
each other, and his latest move
may have been prompted by indi-
cations that the prime minister
and the army were preparing a
major purge of the left. One of
the reasons given for Lon Nol's
resignation was the recent dis-
appearance of two leading left-
ists who had been charged with
complicity in recent antigovern-
ment disturbances.
The Cambodian left has at-
tacked the Lon Nol government
since its establishment last Oc-
tober, largely because of its
lack of leftist representation.
Sihanouk's support continued,
however, until the outbreak of
dissidence in western Cambodia
last month and an upsurge in
leftist agitation undermined the
Lon Nol government's position.
The new "interim" cabinet,
which was announced on 2 May,
contains no major surprises. It
is dominated by old-line conserv-
atives, among them the new prime
minister, Son Sann, Sihanouk's
chief economic adviser. The in-
clusion of two prominent left-
ists, however, indicates Sihanouk
is determined to make it less
vulnerable to attack from the
left than its predecessor. Si-
hanouk has stated that the Son
Sann cabinet will hold office
for only one to three months,
in the "hope" that the political
situation will then permit the
installation of a more permanent
government.
The army, meanwhile, is con-
tinuing sweep operations against
what it terms "Communist" dissi-
dents in western Cambodia. Si-
hanouk has also moved to meet
popular discontent in the area
by naming a new governor of
Battambang Province, center of
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67
Approved For Release 2087/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001->
 Approved For Release 2007/O /rjgRDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
SECRET
Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 67
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09L2fE.I iWDP79-00927A005800020001-8
EUROPE
The Soviets displayed no new military equipment
in this year's May Day parade. They are probably
waiting until the 50th anniversary celebrations in
November to show off their newer weapons. Defense
Minister Grechko's May Day speech contained the
standard denunciation of US policy in Vietnam and
the standard specter of a nuclear-armed West Germany.
The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee's re-
convening has been postponed from 9 May until 18 May
in order to give the US and the USSR more time to
work out their differences over the draft nonprolif-
eration treaty. The main problems are the safeguards
article and the question of whether nuclear states
should retain a veto on amendments to the treaty.
Prime Minister Wilson's long-awaited announce-
ment of a new bid to join the Common Market implied
that he will accept the existing community with mini-
mum conditions, although possibly for tactical rea-
sons he stopped short of a flat offer to sign up.
Some Labor backbenchers will be vehement in their
opposition when Parliament debates the subject next
week, but Wilson is certain to get overwhelming en-
dorsement for a formal application. The next impor-
tant steps rest with the EEC members, and all inter-
ested parties are waiting to see what line De Gaulle
SECRET
Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 67
Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-
 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/01k2pj qDP79-00927A005800020001-8
PROGRESS IN SOVIET WEATHER SATELLITE SYSTEM
Soviet efforts to develop
a weather satellite--including
nearly three years of flight
testing---have apparently culmi-
nated in a decision to proceed
with establishing an operational
system.
With the launch of Cosmos
156 on 27 April, the Soviets have
two operating weather satellites
in orbit., indicating that develop-
ment has been completed and that
they have confidence in the sys-
tem. Soviet statements also in-
dicate that the USSR has decided
that a space weather system is
both desirable and feasible.
Cosmos 144 and 156 are in
almost circular orbits more than
300 miles high at inclinations of
81 degrees, giving almost world-
wide coverage. The planes of the
orbits are perpendicular, result-
ing in nearly maximum frequency of
coverage for a two-satellite sys-
tem. The light and dark sides
of the earth are each scanned
twice daily.
the SL-3 launch system (the SS-6
with a Lunik upper stage), the
satellites weigh 3,000 to 5,000
pounds and use solar cells for
electrical power.
Moscow is sending cloud maps
and other data from both satellites
to the US over the weather "hot
line" under the terms of the bi-
lateral agreement on cooperation
in space. So far, however, the
data is not being sent as quickly
as the agreement calls for. The
initial satellite weather data
provided to the US by the Soviets
came from Cosmos 122 in 1966, the
first of the test vehicles to op-
erate satisfactorily and the first
to be publicly identified as a
weather satellite.
The Soviets will probably
launch more weather satellites
to replace those which malfunc-
tion or to provide increased
The satellites are equipped
with both television and infrared
systems. The television provides
day-time pictures of the earth and
its cloud cover with a resolution
approximating that of similar US
systems., The infrared equipment
permits analysis of cloud cover
and meteorological conditions
both day and night. Orbited by
SECRET
5 May 67
Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-
 Approved For Release 2007:A-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8
FRENCH GOVERNMENT SEIZES THE INITIATIVE IN PARLIAMENT
The government's decision
to seek special powers for six
months in order to decree economic
reforms reflects both the serious-
ness of the problems it faces and
its lack of confidence in parlia-
ment. The reforms are intended
to prepare France for full compe-
tition from its five Common Market
partners when the last tariffs
within the EEC are removed on
1 July 1968. There are measures
to modernize inefficient indus-
tries or regions or to redirect
their efforts, to assure full
employment, to increase state as-
sistance to unemployed workers
and to put the social security
system on a sound financial foot-
ing.
To avoid seeking a majority
in parliament in favor of the
enabling legislation, the govern-
ment probably will take advantage
of a constitutional prerogative
whereby the bill will be adopted
automatically unless a majority
of the membership supports a cen-
sure motion. This tactic spares
dissatisfied deputies from having
to go formally on record in favor
of the bill and places the burden
of gaining a majority on the
opposition.
The opposition Federation of
the Left has already announced
its intention to introduce a
Page 12
censure motion and expects support
from the Communists and many of
the center deputies.. The Gaullist
camp, however, supported by indi-
vidual center deputies, is ex-
pected to hold a thin edge. Gis-
card d'Estaing and his Gaullist-
allied Independent Republicans
are unhappy over a procedure which
robs them of any opportunity to
influence the nature of the pro-
posed legislation. The government
is banking, however, on Giscard's
reluctance to take responsibility
for bringing the government down
in the face of an implicit threat
of new elections.
The government's real problem
is to get under way a program
which, within six months, will
stimulate economic growth. With
the French balance of payments
running a small deficit, the gov-
ernment will try to avoid infla-
tionary measures that would make
French exports less competitive.
Some measures will be highly un-
popular. Should the government's
economic reforms fail to show
satisfactory results by next fall,
the parliament would be emboldened
to strike back, possibly by re-
fusing to pass crucial legisla-
tion. More important, defections
from within De Gaulle's own camp
could seriously erode his parlia-
mentary base.
SECRET
5 May 67
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/01/253.iF 79-00927A005800020001-8
YUGOSLAV ELECTIONS STIR GRASS-ROOTS POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Yugoslavia's elections last
month produced some surprises
as well as a few major defeats
for the regime. The elections
were to fill assembly (parlia-
mentary) seats at local, repub-
lic, and federal levels and were
the first real test of the rota-
tion principle adopted by the
1963 constitution. About one
half (some 14,000) of the seats
in the various assemblies changed
hands to conform with legislation
prohibiting deputies from suc-
ceeding themselves. The elec-
tions were also a test of the
regime's policies which had been
designed to encourage competition
for the seats and to curtail the
direct control of the party over
the selection of candidates.
The regime's complicated
system of filtering candidates
up through local, republican,
and federal levels (only local
elections are direct) generally
resulted in choices acceptable
to the party. Local voters,
however, took a particularly
strong hand in the process. In
one constituency, angry crowds
disrupted a political caucus
to prevent its rejection of their
candidates. In other caucuses,
"mild panic" broke out as many
party hacks found themselves
passed over in favor of younger,
more popular men and women.
The party suffered a definite
defeat in Serbia. Approved nom-
inees for five out of the ten
vacant seats in the country's
highest parliamentary body, the
Federal Assembly, were beaten by
opposition candidates who cam-
paigned against the regime's pol-
icies. The most notable loser,
Foreign Trade Minister Nikola
Dzuverovic, lost by a three to
one margin to a partisan hero
of World War II. His opponent,
and the winners of the other four
seats, won by playing on dissat-
isfaction among the peasants
and by condemning the country's
economic reform program as alien
to their interests and to the
interests of the republic.
The regime had established
a freer election process to help
rid itself of the conservative,
partisan type who resist Yugo-
slavia's liberal programs. The
leaders will be aware that these
very people used the elections
to defeat the party's more lib-
eral candidates in Serbia.
Nevertheless, it seems doubt-
ful the leadership will reinsti-
tute cumbersome controls to en-
sure election of only party-spon-
sored candidates. A conservative
reaction against the ouster of
Aleksandar Rankovic last summer
was to be expected in Serbia, but
backers of the liberal programs
fared well in the other five re-
publics. The regime will prob-
ably continue the policy of en-
couraging a real choice among
generally acceptable candidates.
SECRET
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 67
Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-
i
 Approved For Release 2007ft1prb: CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8
RUMANIA ACCENTUATES ITS INDEPENDENT STANCE
Bucharest, by deciding to
stay away from the all-European
Communist Party conference held
last week at Karlovy Vary, moved
perceptibly closer to a position
long held by neighboring Yugo-
slavia.
This decision climaxed an
unprecedented number of bilateral
contacts with Communist parties
of both NATO and Warsaw Pact coun-
tries as well as with the Yugo-
slavs. To further emphasize its
disapproval, the regime's press
published a wave of articles, one
of which flatly states tliat the
establishment of both internal
and foreign policy lines is the
"...exclusive business, the un-
alienable right of each Commu-
nist party."
Bucharest based its decision
not to go to the conference on
differences with its Communist
allies much broader than were
evident when it decided not to
attend the Moscow consultative
meeting in March 1965. At that
time, the disagreements were
limited essentially to ideologi-
cal issues within the Communist
camp, for example, the Sino-So.-
viet dispute, and Soviet hegemony.
This time, however, Bucharest
also stressed its unilateral
right to have relations with any
country, such as West Germany.
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY
This "active coexistence"
line resembles Yugoslavia's po-
sition and, this similarity--along
with the greatly stepped-up con-
tacts between the two parties--
indicates that their joint absence
from the Karlovy Vary meeting was
no mere coincidence. The Ruma-
nians and Yugoslavs have made at
least nine party-government ex-
change visits since last November.
President Tito and Rumanian party
chief Ceausescu have met twice
during the same period.
More intensified party con-
tacts between the two countries
can be expected in view of their
common concern for European secu-
rity, and their mutual apprehen-
sions about Soviet hegemony.
Ceausescu reportedly plans an of-
ficial visit to Yugoslavia next
month. In their pursuit of Euro-
pean security the Rumanians will
probably continue to give strong
public and governmental support
to the Group of Nine--an informal
United Nations group of which they
are members and which promotes
friendlier relations among all
European countries. Both Commu-
nist mavericks believe that mean-
ingful progress toward European
security can be made only at the
state level rather than through
Communist party meetin s such
as Karlovy Vary. 25X1
SECRET
5 May 67
pprove or a ease 11
 Approved For Release 2007/01 QIE'f2DP79-00927AO05800020001-8
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The food crisis in India is reaching serious
proportions and will remain acute until at least
the end of the year. Economic strains stemming
from two years of drought are contributing heavily
to the political difficulties India is experienc-
ing. The election for president is scheduled for
6 May, and the Congress Party candidate, a south
Indian Muslim, has only a 50-50 chance to win.
The loss of this post by Congress would further
erode support for Mrs. Gandhi's government.
In Turkey, the split in the opposition Repub-
lican People's Party (RPP) further fragments the
political opposition and strengthens the ruling
Justice Party. Disturbed by the RPP's increasing
drift to the left, 48 center-oriented senators
and deputies resigned on 30 April.
World-wide reaction to the Greek coup has been
strongly antagonistic. This is particularly true
in the USSR and Eastern Europe which harbor large
Greek-exile communities. For events in Greece it-
self see page 16.
Nasir in his speech on 2 May portrayed the US
as Egypt's real enemy, and praised the "honorable
stand of the Yemeni Government" in its recent ac-
tions against the US AID mission.
In Africa, the prestige of Sekou Toure's re-
gime has fallen to its lowest ebb due to financial
scandals and a sinking economy, but the regime is
expected to survive. Tourd most likely will react
by lashing out at "foreign corruption." He has
already directed that all foreign missionaries be
expelled by 1 June.
Nigeria is still on the verge of breaking up.
The Western Region's leaders now say that if the
East secedes so will the West.
SECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67
Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-
 Approved For Release 2007/ RJIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
GREEK MILITARY REGIME DIGS IN
The two-week-old military
regime continues to tighten its
hold on the country, and no or-
ganized resistance has developed.
Below the surface calm, however,
there are fears that the purging
of all the moderate political
elements can only lead to an in-
evitable clash between extreme
rightist and leftist factions.
Prominent political personal-
ities of both the center and the
right are dismayed by recent
events. They doubt that there
can be any speedy return to any
form of representative government.
They believe that eventually the
extreme left may be led or driven
to armed resistance. For now,
however, Communist elements--the
presumptive organizers of guer-
rilla resistance--are all but
paralyzed, because most of the
"hard-core" troublemakers have
been rounded up and sent to de-
tention centers on outlying is-
lands.
The most prominent political
detainee is Center Union deputy
Andreas Papandreou, whom the coup
leaders regard, as Greece's "enfant
terrible" and the man most re-
sponsible for the country's drift
to the left. Andreas apparently
will be detained until the regime
is satisfied that his power to
foment a revolution from the left
is broken.
Cyprus has not been affected
by the coup in Greece. Both the
Greek and Turkish Cypriots reacted
with caution, and the coup leaders
may be too preoccupied with events
at home to concern themselves
with the Cyprus problem.
There has been predictably strong
adverse reaction to the coup around
the world, particularly from East-
ern Europe and the USSR. Both
harbor large Greek-exile communi-
ties from the Communist guerrilla
war of 1947-49. Government and
public opinion in Western Europe
has been almost unanimously crit-
ical of the take-over.
After discussions with UN
representatives from the Communist
countries, UN Secretary General
Thant asked the Greek representa-
tive to urge his government to
follow the usual judicial proceed-
ings in dealing with the political
detainees.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/01 / ICS P79-00927A005800020001-8
NASIR'S VIEW OF US ROLE IN YEMEN
Nasir, in his speech on 2 May,
once again attacked the US as the
prime supporter of the forces of
"imperialism" which are out to
thwart the goals of all "progres-
sive" regimes. He concentrated
on the alleged US and British-
backed factions in the Middle East,
claiming they are trying to negate
his influence in the area. He
also denounced the "puppet Kings"
Husayn and Faysal, made a passing
swipe at Bourguiba, and directed
a number of jibes at Israel.
Regarding the current Yemeni
crisis, Nasir praised the "honor-
able stand" of the Yemeni Govern-
ment and referred to the alleged
involvement of US officials in the
Page 17
recent bazooka attack on an ammu-
nition dump at Taiz.
Yemeni. Deputy Premier Juzailan
and the commander of Egyptian 25X1
forces in Yemen, Talaat Hasan Ali,
made a quick trip to Cairo on 26
April.
The arrested Americans will 25X1
likely be released after their
propaganda usefulness has been
exploited because Nasir probably
is reluctant to brave the storm
that would ensue if they were
harmed.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67
Approved For Release 2087/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001->
 Approved For Release 2007% 1~~-CQ-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8
TROUBLES MOUNTING IN GUINEA
The prestige of Sekou Toure's
regime is at its lowest ebb since
Guinea became independent in 1958.
Tour's extensive grass-roots po-
litical apparatus and his long-
standing precautions against an
army take-over will probably keep
him in power although a major
political upheaval cannot be
ruled out.
Problems have been piling up
lately. A number of highly placed
officials have been implicated in
financial scandals involving state
trading enterprises. Some of them
have been arrested, demoted, or
have opted for exile. The re-
gime is pushing a clean-up cam-
paign, which began with the cre-
ation earlier this year of a con-
trol commission to oversee the
activity of the state enterprises.
In addition, Toure promised this
week to punish without clemency
those involved. Financial scan-
dals are not a novelty in Guinea,
but the latest have been more se-
rious and have exposed senior of-
ficials. Toure may be able to
gain some political benefit by
his punitive measures, but popu-
lar respect for public officials
has been further undermined and
Toure's own confidence in those
around him shaken.
The general decline of the
economy also has been continuing.
Food shortages and power failures
threaten in Conakry, and local
markets upcountry are low on
stocks. There have been reports
that the government has not been
meeting its payrolls--including
those at some military facilities.
Moreover, bankruptcy proceedings
against the foreign-owned iron
mining company, which had been
one of the few going concerns in
the country, have just been con-
cluded.
Toure's most likely reaction
to his accumulating problems will
be to lash out at "'foreign cor-
ruption." He holds European busi-
nessmen at least partially respon-
sible for the scandals. He be-
lieves French officials may have
been involved in last month's
"defection" to Paris of one of
his old friends who resigned from
the Guinean diplomatic service.
Antiforeign sentiment already has
been stirred up by the capture of
a French-officered Ivory Coast
fishing boat which the Guineans
claim was lurking offshore near
Conakry for subversive purposes,
and by a world-wide press campaign
that Toure's overthrow is immi-
nent.
The first Guinean retaliation
has been directed at Christian
clergy and foreign missionaries,
who were placed under restriction
last month. The major new item
in Toure's May Day speech was the
announcement that all missionaries
would be expelled by 1 June in
order to "Africanize" the churches,
although the real causes probably
stem from their less than whole-
hearted support of the regime and
the frequency of their contacts
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 67
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/01ACRiDP79-00927A005800020001-8
NIGERIA'S WESTERN REGION TAKES A HAND IN THE CRISIS
Western Reg=ion leaders have
now increased the pressures on
the head of the federal military
government, Lt. Col. Gowon.
25X1 all Northern troops
in the western Region must be re-
moved. Gowon reportedly agreed
and set 31 May as the deadline
i pen InClty
MID-
WESTERN
FERNAN~0' PO
(Sr+.)
for transferring Northerners out
and bringing Yoruba troops back
to the West. Northern troops
comprise about 80 percent of the
battalions in the region and are
the principal power base of the
Northern-dominated federal gov-
ernment in Lagos.
The Western leaders also
handed Gowon a resolution passed
by the Western "Leaders of Thought"
meeting the day before. These po-
litical leaders called for both
N I G E R
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 67
* Maiduguri
Approved For Release 20 7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-
 Approved For Release 200 7gt1I k IA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-8
the removal of Northern troops
and the secession of the Western
Region if the Eastern Region
were allowed or forced to secede.
All peaceful means, the resolu-
tion stated, should be used to
keep the East in the Nigerian
federation, even if this results
in yielding to Eastern Governor
Ojukwu's demanas for looser ties
between the regions and the fed-
eral government.
The departure of Northern
troops from the West would vir-
tually complete the regionaliza-
tion of Nigeria's military and
police forces. Most Eastern Ibos
in the military, including the
navy, and in the police in Lagos,
the West, and Mid-West--perhaps
as many as 2,000-2,500--have re-
cently returned to the East. The
removal of Yorubas from army units
outside the West, together with
the Ibo migration to the East,
will contribute greatly to inef-
ficiency and mismanagement because
these two tribal groups have long
provided the more technically
qualified personnel throughout
Nigeria. It will also reduce po-
lice and military capability to
handle civil disturbances.
Further concessions to the
East, as proposed by the Western
leaders, as well as the removal
of Northern troops from Lagos and
the West would not sit well with
Northern hard-line military officers,
nor with many of the high-level
civil servants in Lagos. Gowon is
to be allowed a guard unit in the
capital. There continue to be
reports, however, that Ghanaians
and a group of leading civilian
politicians from all regions are
attempting to bring Gowon and
Ojukwu together.
If Gowon agrees to ease the
gradually increasing pressure he
has been putting on the East, and
if Ojukwu believes the East may
now be able to profit by Western
pressure on Gowon, Ojukwu may be
willing to postpone his reported
plans to secede the Eastern Region
by the end of May.
SECRET
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 67
prove or a ease 2UDM'1-126:"CIA-F21DP79-00927AO05800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007IO1J CIRI'iDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Troublemakers were almost completely unsuccess-
ful this year in their annual efforts to cause dis-
turbances during the May Day period. The only major
disruption took place in Ecuador, where the Guayaquil
labor day parade erupted into a fistfight between pro-
Moscow and pro-Peking Communist factions who are vying
for control of a labor federation. In Guatemala, Com-
munist plans for violence were disrupted by a police
raid which netted documents detailing plans and lists
of targets. In a clash with Communists, government
security forces wounded and captured a long-time
party member who also was a leader of the Rebel Armed
Forces.
Fidel Castro was in full prominence at the Cuban
celebration but apparently fulfilled an earlier prom-
ise to share the spotlight by letting Acting Minister
of Defense Juan Almeida hurl the usual invectives at
the US. Old records of Che Guevara's voice were used
to perpetuate his image as a leading revolutionary.
Cuba's repeat of calls for armed struggle in Latin
America will sustain the anti-Castro attitude of some
governments and further irritate pro-Soviet Communist
leaders in the hemisphere.
In other d-velopments right-wing dissatisfaction
with Dominican President Balaguer has increased and
there have been more rumors of antigovernment plotting.
On the other end of the island, Haiti's President
Duvalier nipped a suspected plot by transferring and
dismissing some of his elite guard. He has probably
not solved the problem completely, however.
Argentina's President Ongania has kept the lid
on labor and student activities and in Brazil the
authorities have so far coped with several student
anti-US demonstrations. This agitation has not
spread into other elements of the populace.
The Bolivian military continued its attempts to
encircle guerrillas in the southeast, resulting in
minor clashes.
SECRET
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-0
 Approved For Release 2007?/efiR--RDP79-00927A005800020001-8
"NEW LOOK" IN BRAZIL
The new Brazilian Government
which took office on 15 March,
is enjoying considerable domestic
popularity. This is largely a
reflection of President Costa e
Silva's success in playing upon
Brazilian pride and nationalism
and upon popular hopes for a re-
laxation of the economic austeri-
ties of the Castello Branco ad-
ministration. Costa e Silva's
popularity may be short-lived,
however, unless he can show some
positive accomplishments--partic-
ularly in the domestic economic
field--in the relatively near
future.
Of immediate interest to
most Brazilians is the effort
under way to "humanize" the more
stringent aspects of the former
government's stabilization pro-
gram. The government's prime
goal now is said to be "develop-
ment" rather than fighting infla-
tion. Rent increases have been
eased, certain tax hikes delayed,
and income tax exemptions in-
creased. There is as yet, however,
no evidence that the government
is prepared to take the less pop-
ular complementary measures--such
as reducing expenditures to com-
pensate for reduced revenues.
The new administration has
greatly changed the method and
style of government operations.
Instead of maintaining the highly
centralized organizational system
that had characterized the preced-
ing administration, Costa e Silva
has delegated extensive authority
to his ministers. The initial re-
sult appears to be uncoordinated
policies set up by able but ambi-
tious cabinet officers. No one
has yet had to make a tough, un-
popular decision, and it remains
to be seen whether members of
the administration can submerge
their desire for personal ag-
grandizement and work together as
a team.
Costa e Silva's emerging for-
eign policy also reflects the
drive to broaden his popular base
of support. "Independence"--pre-
sumably from the US---is the watch-
word, although the government has
taken this tack in public pro-
nouncements far more firmly than
it has in private. Some key pol-
icy shifts have occurred. For
example, the government has
turned its back on establishing
an Inter-American Peace Force.
Costa e Silva has also won con-
siderable domestic approval with
his impassioned defense of Brazil's
"right" to the advantages of nu-
clear technology and his call for
the formation of a Latin American
atomic community.
The government's "new look"
in foreign and domestic policy
has not yet developed sufficiently
to form a definitive pattern. It
is becoming clearer, however, that
US-Brazilian relations, while re-
maining good, are likely to diverge
more frequently as the Costa e
25X1
Silva administration strives to at-
tract domestic support.
SECRET
Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 67
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/01 / ECIR P79-00927A005800020001-8
DOMINICAN PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL POSITION WEAKENING
Increasing right-wing dis-
satisfaction with Dominican Presi-
dent Balaguer has led to renewed
rumors of antigovernment plotting.
Dissidents are not yet capable of
seriously threatening the govern-
ment, but Balaguer's political
position continues to erode.
Luis Amiama Tio's resignation
as minister of interior and police
last week has contributed to the
unease. Many political factions
had viewed him as a counterweight
to "trujillista" elements in the
government. The leader of the
Social Christians, for example,
said that the replacement of
Amiama with another prominent
"anti-t:rujillista" was vital to
national stability.
Balaguer's appointment of
Carlos Goico Morales to the post
did not stem the discontent. Goico
is a long-time friend of the
President and is considered a good
administrator, but he served in
Trujillo's cabinet and has been
described as one of the dictator's
"foremost panegyrists." Another
of Balaguer's personnel actions
that stirred strong private criti-
cism was his reinstatement of one
of Trujillo's most feared and
brutal police officers, one-time
colonel. Carlos Herrand Blyden.
Rightists are continuing to
exploit the "trujillista" issue
to gain a wider following. Some
are reported to be talking of the
need for an "Argentina-type"
military take-over to solve the
country's problems while others
are promoting an "anti-trujillista,
anti-Communist Dominican Freedom
Front." The coup rumors, as well
as allegations that the US has
withdrawn support from Balaguer,
may originate with rightist ele-
ments which hope to undermine
confidence in the regime.
One danger in the current
situation is that Dominican mod-
erates--who often sit on the
political sidelines--will seek to
disassociate themselves from the
government. Indicative of this
possibility was an editorial in
the respected Santo Domingo daily,
Listin Diario, which noted that
much of the public was preoccupied
with the reasons behind Amiama's
resignation. It said that Bala-
guer's "loyalty to primitive ele-
ments" in the government, as well
as their official conduct gave
opponents a pretext to act. The
paper called on Balaguer to use
his authority to "create public
confidence" that the government
will not tolerate repression and
violence.
Balaguer has promised a public
response to Amiama's resignation
and in it he will probably address
his other critics. In the past
Balaguer has tended to explain
away much criticism--whether well 25X1
intentioned or not--as designed
to discredit the government.
SECRET
5 May 57
Approved For Release 20x7/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005800020001-$
 Approved For Release 2007MYIC2WEY].-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
LABOR UNREST AND MILITARY DISCONTENT IN ECUADOR
Strikes and strike threats
continue to plague the government
of interim president Otto Arose-
mena. Public employees struck
for 36 hours last week to protest
a measure before the constituent
assembly that would eliminate some
400 government jobs for budgetary
reasons. The strike ended on
28 April after the assembly agreed
to observe civil service regula-
tions regarding a reduction of
force, but the government did not
capitulate to the strikers' demand
that the measure be shelved.
The Telecommunications
Workers' Union (FENETEL) walked
out on 27 April to protest alleged
government inaction on a FENETEL-
proposed bill that would create a
government-owned communications
monopoly. Communications were
virtually paralyzed throughout the
country for a day, and there were
some acts of sabotage against
telegraph lines and communications
equipment. The FENETEL strike
has been suspended pending further
assembly action.
In addition to the public
employees strike and that of
FENETEL, a number of other minor
strikes occurred throughout the
country. For the most part these
have been settled or suspended,
but additional walkouts involving
banana workers and railway workers
are scheduled during the next few
weeks.
Military grumbling against
the government and the constituent
assembly is increasing. Junior
officers in particular are annoyed
because the assembly has allowed
some of its members--such as ex-
president Carlos Julio Arosemena--
to harass and denigrate the armed
forces. The officers were also
perturbed that the government, the
military high command, and the
armed forces delegate to the as-
sembly, General Banderas, did not
defend the military in the face
of these attacks. On 26 April
Banderas spoke out strongly in
the assembly for retaining in the
new constitution the president's
power to use the armed forces to
maintain internal order. His
speech and the lessening of labor
tensions have cooled tempers, but
a residue of discontent remains.
SECRET
5 May 67
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/01/ZWt',CRfWP79-00927AO05800020001-8
HAITIAN PRESIDENT SQUELCHES INCIPIENT PLOT
President Duvalier relieved
a number of presidential guard
officers of their duties last
week and reassigned them to posts
outside Port-au-Prince. No reason
was given for the transfers, but
it appears that Duvalier acted
to head off a palace intrigue that
may have involved members of his
own family.
This is the first time that
Duvalier has been known to have
removed any officer from his
elite Presidential guard. One
of the officers transferred,
Jose "Sonny" Borges, was one of
the regime's leading propagan-
dists. He had been in charge of
the government radio station and
was reportedly very close to
Duvalier.
Approved For Release 20Q
Duvalier's moves may have
been set off by a dispute within
the president's family--specific-
ally between his sons-in-law, the
ambitious presidential guard of-
ficer Max Dominique and Director
of Tourism Luc Foucard. Some of
the presidential guard officers
who were transferred were close
to Dominique, suggesting that
Duvalier acted to clip his wings.
Suspected plotters have
been removed from Port-au-Prince
and separated from each other,
thereby diminishing any immediate
danger they may have posed to
Duvalier. The president retains
one of his strongest weapons, his
ability to provide funds for his
personal power structure, but
some plotting can be expected to
continue. 25X1
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 May 67
7/01 /25 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0Q5800020001-1
 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 8t9-00927A005800020001-8
KENNEDY ROUND
KENNEDY ROUND APPROACHES FINAL BARGAINING
Four years of Kennedy Round
negotiations are nearing their end.
Final agreement must be reached
shortly if the necessary documents
are to be drawn up before 30 June,
when the President's authority under
the 1962 Trade Expansion Act expires.
Differences, primarily between
the US and EEC, are still to be re-
solved, however, before the final
"package"--containing a reasonable
balance of concessions among all
the major participants--can be com-
pleted. If differences remain, there
could be a general withdrawal of
concessions already offered and a
drastic "unraveling" of the liber-
alization of trade which the whole
undertaking was designed to achieve.
The Common Market's position
on agriculture is a major problem
in large part because it does not
provide adequate assurance that US
grains will have continued access
to the EEC market. The EEC has
tentatively accepted the idea of a
world food-aid program for the less
developed countries as one way to
dispose of surpluses, but the actual
amount of such aid the Six may be
willing to finance will be small.
Moreover, the Community insists on
including feed grains in any cereals
agreement--a provision which could
undercut the competitive advantage
of the US in this area. EEC "offers"
on other agricultural products are
also meager.
On the industrial side, the ma-
jor issue has been the EEC's insist-
ence that all its proposed reductions
in chemical tariffs be contingent
on the US' abandoning a tariff valu-
ation procedure--American Selling
Price (ASP)--which substantially in-
creases the prices of certain im-
ported chemicals. The US is willing
to request congressional authority
to abandon ASP, but holds that it
could not show Congress a "balanced"
package if all the EEC's offers on
chemicals are conditional. Thus
each side uses grains and chemicals
as a gage of the other's willingness
to liberalize agricultural and in-
dustrial trade, respectively. It
may not be until the final bargain-
ing sessions that an attempt will
be made, if at: all, to trade off
concessions in one area for those
in the other.
The EEC Council met again early
this week to consider the commis-
sion's latest report on the status
of the negotiations, and the commis-
sion is reported to have been given
additional leeway to try to meet
the US demand for a "two-package"
approach on chemicals. It is likely;
however, that the commission will
continue to seek some softening in
the US position on agriculture, and
any deal will still be subject to
council endorsement.
The commission is in a position;.
of great responsibility again. It
will try to present the council next
week with "nearly final" deals
reached in Geneva, figuring that
none of the Six want to risk an in-
ternal Community crisis at that
point over disagreement on the EEC's
offered concessions.
SECRET
Page 26 WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 67
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
SECRET
SEC RET
Approved or Release 200 /01/25 IA - DP79-00927A005800020~001-8~~
 Approved For Release 2007/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-8
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2097/01/25 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05800020001-1