WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005700070001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 7, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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becrei
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
RETURN TO REColkiisiNTk
IMIaDIATELY AFTER IJSE
JOB 71"- 7 2) BOX
Secret
7 April 1967
No. O.84/67
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CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EST, 6 April 1967)
Far East
e
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 1
VIETNAM
The Viet Cong have launched a major military-political
campaign against the South Vietnamese Government's
pacification program. In Saigon, political interest
is focused on the selection of candidates for the
presidency and the upper house of the legislature.
Soviet shipments of economic aid to Hanoi have in-
creased significantly
USSR AND MALAYSIA AGREE ON TRADE AND DIPLOMATIC TIES
The pact results from Moscow's search for additional
contacts in Southeast Asia and from Kuala Lumpur's
efforts to facilitate its rubber trade with the USSR
and to improve its image in Asia and Africa.
PEKING MOUNTS NEW CAMPAIGN TO DISCREDIT LIU SHAO-CHI
The stage is apparently being set to strip the 69-year-
old Chinese Communist chief of state of all his formal
positions. This is one of many signs of continued
dissension over the future course of the Cultural Rev-
olution.
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Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 11
EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY
A number of Eastern European countries are making
almost frantic efforts to slow down West Germany's
campaign to normalize relations as well as create a
facade of unity before a conference of European Com-
munist parties opens on 24 April.
STATUS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM
Moscow's sparse reporting on the reform's progress
suggests that difficulties continues to outweigh
achievements.
YUGOSLAV "DEMOCRATIZATION" GAINS MOMENTUM
After dismissing his conservative heir-apparent Ran-
kovic last year, Tito accelerated his program to de-
centralize economic and political authority in Yugo-
slavia and loosen the party's tight control. Changes
made since then have aggravated the opposition to
this program and created some ',problems which endanger
achievement of its goals. Tito, however, continues
his policy of cautious, moderate change. (Published
separately as Special Report OCI No. 0284/67A)
Middle East - Africa
12
13
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 15
RIGHT-WING TAKE-OVER CHURNS GREEK POLITICAL CRISIS
The King's chances to gain parliamentary approval for
the right-wing government he has appointed appear
slim, and additional developments can be expected as
the struggle for power continues.
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SOVIET-EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS PROBABLY REVIEWED
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko made a hasty, unpub-
licized visit to Cairo last week amid signs that
Egypt's economic problems may have created some strain
in Soviet-Egyptian relations.
VIOLENCE ERUPTS IN ADEN
Violence broke out as expected when the UN mission
arrived but, despite nationalist predictions, did not
get out of hand. The general strike, however, was
effective.
NEW STATE-LEVEL DEFEATS FOR INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY
The fall of the Congress government in the key state
of Uttar Pradesh highlights continuing political in-
stability on the state level, although the party re-
tains its slim majority on the national level.
ANGOLAN INSURGENCY DRAWS PORTUGUESE REPRISAL
Insurgency along Angola's main railroad by Angolan
nationalists operating out of the Congo (Kinshasa)
and Zambia has prompted the Portuguese to suspend
transit trade in an effort to force those two
countries to clamp down on the insurgents.
NIGERIAN BRINKMANSHIP CONTINUES
Both Eastern governor Ojukwu and Commander in Chief
Gowon continue their economic skirmishing, and there
are new indications Ojukwu is thinking in terms of
ultimate Eastern independence.
Western Hemisphere
17
18
L9
20
22
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 23
CHILEAN VOTERS REBUFF PRESIDENT FREI
Frei failed to get the vote of confidence he requested
in the 2 April municipal elections. His Christian
Democratic Party received only 36 percent of the votes,
but remains the largest party in the country.
BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT OVERREACTS TO GUERRILLA ATTACK
Shaken by the 23 March guerrilla attack on an army
patrol near the southeastern town of Camiri, the gov-
ernment is hastily attempting to organize counterin-
surgency operations.
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CRACKS IN THE MEXICAN MONOLITH
The controlling Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) is selecting candidates for congressional and
some gubernatorial elections in July in which an
overwhelming PRI victory is certain. There are
signs, however, that the increasingly sophisticated
Mexican electorate wants more representative leader-
ship.
LABOR RESISTANCE TO ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT POLICY WEAKENS
Various factions are competing for the leadership of
the General Confederation of Labor, and the Onaania
government is taking advantage of the disunity in
worker ranks to impose wage controls designed to com-
bat chronic inflation.
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FAR EAST
There are new signs of sharp dissension within
the Chinese leadership over the future course of the
Cultural Revolution. After two months of marking
time, forces loyal to Mao Tse-tung have renewed
their attacks on Chief of State Liu Shao-chi and
party General Secretary Teng Hsiao-ping. Several
leading members of the Military Affairs Committee
have also been denounced by militants responsive to
Mao and Lin Piao.
The resurgence of pro-Mao forces, following a
conference of central committee members last month,
suggests an attempt to resume the purge of Mao's op-
ponents and to reverse the policies associated with
Chou En-lai--particularly those aimed at subduing
militant Red Guards and Red Rebels. The attacks on
Liu, Teng, and key military leaders may signal a
drive by pro-Mao militants to divide the coalition
of forces which obliged the Mao faction to retreat
in late January and February.
The Vietnamese Communists are maintaining their
intransigent stand on negotiations. Despite unusu-
ally heavy casualties and the failure of three regi-
mental-size attacks against US forces engaged in Op-
eration JUNCTION CITY, there are no signs of any de-
cline in Communist determination to prosecute the
war. The first round of local elections for South
Vietnam's village councils was held without serious
incidents or Viet Conq interference.
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VIETNAM
Following the Communists' un-
successful and costly regimental
attack of 1 April--their third in
two weeks against US forces con-
ducting Operation JUNCTION CITY
north of Saigon--military activ-
ity during the week consisted
mainly of smaller scale but fre-
quently intensive clashes in
widely scattered areas of the
country. Recent patterns of Com-
munist activity, meanwhile, ap-
pear to bear out indications that
the Viet Cong have decided to
launch a major campaign of mili-
tary and political harassment
against the Revolutionary Develop-
ment (RD) program.
reflect increas-
ing Viet Cong concern and frus-
tration, particularly since the
fall of 1966, with pacification
measures and military operations
designed to erode popular support
for the Communists. Late last
year the Peoples Revolutionary
Party (PRP)--the Communist party
in the south and the political
control apparatus of the Viet
Cong--apparently decided on sub-
stantially increased levels of
guerrilla warfare and civilian
proselyting to consolidate Viet
Cong holdings in the countryside
and reverse the RD successes.
Recent Viet Cong and Hanoi
propaganda broadcasts have urged
Communist armed forces to an-
nihilate US-rebel pacif_cation
groups" and announced the estab-
lishment of an award sytpm fn
encourage this effort.
the Communists
plan to recruitand infiltrate
a large number of key urder-
ground party workers into ham-
let and village administrations,
to induce peasants to obstruct
pacification, to propagandize
the RD program as an American-
sponsored activity, to initiate
large-scale attacks on areas
where RD is enjoying suc:ess,
and to direct selective acts of
terrorism against RD team work-
ers in an effort to harass and
demoralize the workers and in-
timidate the population.
The number of Viet Cong -
initiated incidents targeted
against the RD program thus far
in 1967 already substantiatly
exceeds the total number re-
ported for all of 1966. During
the first quarter of 1967 nearly
200 enemy attacks against RD
team workers were reportel, 105
of which occurred during the pe-
riod 1-26 March.
one of the over-all ?bled-
tives of a planned Communist
summer offensive in Quang Nam,
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Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai prov-
inces, is to prevent expansion
of the RD program in these three
southernmost provinces of I Corps.
This campaign reportedly will
begin on 15 April and continue
through September.
Election Plans in South Vietnam
With South Vietnam's con-
stitution now in effect, politi-
cal activity is centering in-
creasingly on elections to fill
out the institutional framework.
Already, in the absence of any
real national cohesion or gen-
uine political organizations,
traditional regional and religious
considerations appear to be in-
fluencing the political maneuver-
ing for presidential and vice-
presidential tickets in the ex-
pectation that such factors will
weigh heavily in the elections.
The only firm candidacy
among prominent civilians in the
?residential race thus far is
that of Constituent Assembly
chairman Phan Khac Suu, an elderly
southerner of the Cao Dai sect
and a former chief of state.
Suu's general area of strength
is the populous delta, and his
slate will probably gain addi-
tional votes on the popularity
of his running mate, Dr. Phan
Quang Dan, among northern ref-
ugees in the Saigon area. How-
ever, former premier Tran Van
Huong, another prestigious south-
erner, is expected to announce
his candidacy soon, and Suu and
Huong may well end up splitting
the southern regionalist vote.
Dai Viet party leader Ha Thuc
Ky is another apparent civilian
candidate, but his popular base
is largely limited to the two
northernmost provinces. He may
ultimately decide to trade his
support for a spot on some other
candidate's ticket.
Fencing for the military's
presidential nomination con-
tinues between Chief of State
Thieu and Premier Ky, with Ky
slightly ahead thus far. Pub-
licly, Ky has stated on several
occasions that he would defer
to Thieu's candidacy, thus in
effect putting pressure on
Thieu to declare himself. Thieu,
who may have some doubts about
his chances in any case, prob-
ably would far prefer to ac-
cept a nomination by the mili-
tary than to announce his
candidacy on his own. Privately,
maneuvering undoubtedly con-
tinues on both sides, although
Thieu's natural reticence in
public may be working against
him behind the scenes as well.
The military hierarchy appears
hopeful that Thieu and Ky will
resolve the question themselves.
If the two men cannot agree
soon, however, other senior gen-
erals may have to decide the
matter.
In any event, the over-
riding consideration in the
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sEcRgr
process continues to be the pres-
ervation of military unity.
Both Thieu and Ky appear well
aware that such unity will de-
pend largely upon the degree of
support that the one who does
not run offers the nominee. Pro-
viding that military unity re-
mains intact and that an accept-
able civilian running mate is
selected, the military candi-
date will be in an extremely
strong position in view of his
connections with the only real
national organization and his
access to other governmental
machinery.
On the legislative side,
potential candidates are already
stirring for the upper house
elections--which will be held
concurrently with the presiden-
tial election on 1 September.
Constituent Assembly deputies,
members of the Peoples - Armed
Forces Advisory Council, and
politicians currently out of
office are reportedly maneuver-
ing to form ten-man electoral
slates as called for in the con-
stitution. Balloting will be
on a nationwide, at-large basis,
and the winning slates will com-
prise the 30- to 60-man Senate.
The lower house election, set
for 1 October, has not yet at-
tracted as much attention, but
many Constituent Assembly mem-
bers apparently have their eye
on this race.
The first step toward im-
plementing local reforms took
place on 2 April with the elec-
tion of some 219 village coun-
cils throughout the courr_ry.
Voter turnout was high, urd lit-
tle Viet Cong counterelection ac-
tivity materialized. Hovever,
US officials remain concerned
about postelection securty for
the successful candidates.
Soviet Aid Deliveries to Hanoi
Soviet shipping to North
Vietnam increaspd
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propaply in response to agree-
ments reached last fall on addi-
tional economic aid. Over-all
shipments of commercial cargo
were up almost 70 percent over
the same period of 1966. Pe-
troleum shipments were up some
25 percent over the average
delivery rate last year, and
deliveries of fertilizer,
transportation and construction
equipment, and machinery and
spare parts also increased.
Part of the larger aid deliv-
eries was in response to ur-
usual North Vietnamese fouc re-
quirements. During this pe-
riod the USSR delivered 3G,000
tons of grain products, con-
pared with only 6,000 in all
of 1966.
an unusi.ally
large number of Soviet ships
called at North Vietnamese ports
in the first three months of the
year--63 compared with a total
of only 122 for all of 1966.
This reflects the use of smaller
ships drawn from the Soviet Far
Eastern Fleet.
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USSR AND MALAYSIA AGREE ON TRADE AND DIPLOMATIC TIES
An agreement signed early
this week between the USSR and
Malaysia on trade and diplomatic
ties results from Moscow's search
for additional contacts in South-
east Asia and from Kuala Lumpur's
efforts to facilitate its rubber
trade with the USSR and to improve
its image in Asia and Africa.
The trade agreement provides
for the establishment in the Ma-
laysian capital of a ten-man So-
viet mission, three members of
which will have diplomatic im-
munity, and provides for a recip-
rocal Malaysian mission in Mos-
cow. The missions will constitute
the first permanent exchange of
representation of any sort be-
tween the two countries. No date
is set for the establishment of
the missions, but Kuala Lumpur
reportedly does not expect the
first Soviet representatives to
arrive before July. Although
the text of the agreement has
not been published, it provides
for "most favored nation" treat-
ment without setting any levels
of trade.
The communique also announced
agreement in principle to exchange
diplomatic representation. Ma-
laysia presently does not have
diplomatic ties with any Commu-
nist country, but there are sev-
eral incentives for this change
in policy. The European Commu-
nist nations comprise the prin-
cipal market for Malaysia's rub-
ber at a time when world rubber
prices are falling--last year
the USSR was its largest single
customer. The Malaysians prob-
ably also believe that these
moves will improve their image
among nonaligned nations who
have been critical of Kuala Lum-
pur's Western orientation.
The agreement marks a sig-
nificant achievement in Moscow's
long-standing effort to establish
contacts in Southeast Asian coun-
tries where it has not tradition-
ally been active. In April l9ffi
it signed a trade agreement with
Singapore with provisions simi-
lar to those in the Malaysian
agreement. Singapore subse-
quently agreed to accept a one-
man TASS office. The Soviets
have also been seeking a TASS
office in Kuala Lumpur, and the
latest agreement may encourage
them to renew this request.
Last month Soviet and Phil-
ippine representatives held talks
in Bangkok concerning the possi-
ble initiation of trade, and an
unofficial Philippine mission is
scheduled to leave for Moscow
later this month. Although Ma-
nila has thus far refused to
establish either trade or diplo-
matic relations with any Commu-
nist country, the Malaysian
agreement may inluence a change
(
in this policy.
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PEKING MOUNTS NEW CAMPAIGN TO DISCREDIT LIU SHAO-CHI
The stage is apparently be-
ing set in Peking to strip Liu
Shao-chi of all his formal posi-
tions. Until August 1966 the
69-year-old chief of state was
number two man in the party.
Teng Hsiao-ping, party general
secretary, will in all likeli-
hood be removed with Liu, and
other high officials may be in-
volved. These developments fol-
low a reportedly stormy central
committee work conference con-
vened in mid-March, and appear
to reflect continuing dissension
in the leadership.
Demonstrations against Liu
have spread to all parts of China.
Foreign newsmen in Peking report
that since 2 April the streets
have been choked from morning
to night with hundreds of thou-
sands of demonstrators. March-
ing in well-disciplined columns
the crowds carried portraits of
Mao and chanted "down with Liu
Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and
Tao Chu." Tao was fourth in
the hierarchy established at the
central committee plenum last
August, but has been in disfavor
since December.
It now is almost certain
that Liu and Teng lost all sig-
nificant authority in August.
They have been heavily attacked
through posters, Red Guard news-
papers, and rallies since Decem-
ber, but the official campaign
against them began with a 30
March broadcast of a Red Flag
attack on Liu's book How To Be
A Good Communist. This key party
document--written in 1939 and re-
published in 1962--now is labeled
a "poisonous weed." On 31 March
Peking broadcast a more direct
and savage Red Flag attack which
described Liu as a "vampire," a
"parasite," and a "Quisling" and
demanded that this "Khrushchev-
like individual ambitionist and
schemer" be thoroughly discred-
ited and removed.
Liu is being accused of at-
tempting to compromise with
Chiang Kai-shek in the 1930s
and to strike a political bar-
gain with the US in 1949 in ex-
change for economic aid. He is
also accused of advocating ex-
tension of privately farmed plots
in rural areas, detente with
the US and the Soviet Union, and
reduced assistance to other
"peoples' revolutionary strug-
gles." The official charges,
without directly naming Liu,
state that he has always op-
posed Mao's thought and
"peddled" his own writings--in
contrast to Vice Chairman (and
present number two) Lin Piao,
who has always called on his
soldiers to study Chairman Mao's
works.
The charges against Liu are
obviously fabricated, as his
statements and actions during
the past 17 years have shown him
to be a staunch supporter of
Mao's policies. One purpose
clearly is to blacken Liu's
name even more and to justify
his ouster. Another may be to
rekindle enthusiasm for the
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Cultural Revolution. Certain of
the accusations, such as exten-
sion of the private agricultural
plots, have been standard ones
leveled against unnamed "class
enemies" for several years.
Chou En-lai himself made these
charges in an address given in
December 1964 at a major ses-
sion of the National People's
Congress. In fact, however,
Chou, but not Liu Shao-chi,
was associated with these
policies when they were in
vogue in 1961 and 1962.
Chou, however, so far has
been able to retain a firm grip
on third place in the leader-
ship. In recent weeks prominent
Red Guard groups in Peking have
been aiming moderate to heavy
fire at several of Chou's sub-
ordinates, but have exempted
Chou from criticism.
Current official denuncia-
tions of Liu accuse him of hav-
ing worked "in collusion with
another top party person in au-
thority taking the capitalist
road"--an obvious allusion to
Teng Hsiao-Ping. The protracted
campaign to remove the two men
may best be explained by dis-
sension over who is to be impli-
cated with Liu and Teng and
brought down. Many senior party
figures have been closely as-
sociated with Liu and Teng, who
had dominated the party appara-
tus for more than a decade be-
fore their fall last Auuust.
The campaign againEt Liu and
Teng is apparently spilling over
into new poster attacks by Red
Guard militants against top-level
military men and government of-
ficials. On 5 April three key
military figures who hao seemed
to be in good standing--Hsu
Hsiang-chien, Yeh Chien-ving,
and Nieh Jung-chen--came inder
fire. Hsu and Yeh were pub-
licly affirmed as vice chairmen
of the party's powerful vIAAtary
Affairs Committee on 25 Aarch.
New attacks on Foreign Minister
Chen Yl and Finance Minister Li
Hsien-nien for pushing tne "Liu-
Teng line" have appeared. De-
spite this, Chen has corn_nnued
to perform his public duties
and, with his usual aplout,
told a group of visiting Japa-
nese on 3 April that he wel-
comed criticism and was not
worried about his personal po-
sition.
Rallies and poster Ettacks
during the past week appcar to
be part of a major effort by
militant elements in the lead-
ership to reverse the slowdown
in the Cultural Revolution
noted during February and early
March. All signs, however,
point to continued dissension
among leaders in Peking over
the future course of the all-
tural Revolution.1
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EUROPE
East European diplomatic activity continued
apace this week but produced no evident departures
from established positions on relations with West
Germany or on attendance at the conference of Euro-
pean Communist parties scheduled for late April.
The numerous bilateral consultations serve pri-
marily to prevent additional rents in the already
ragged fabric of East European unity, at least in
advance of the conference.
Moscow appears to be somewhat disconcerted by
press reports of US assurances to Bonn that the
draft nonproliferation treaty would not bar German
participation in a future European nuclear force.
Recent Pravda and Izvestia articles have asserted
that such assurances undermine "the spirit an pur-
poses of the proposed treaty" and create new ob-
stacles rather than clear the way to an agreement.
Although the Soviets have not said an agreement so
construed is unacceptable, the publicizing of this
interpretation in the West causes difficulties for
them, given their general posture vis-a-vis West
Germany and the prospect of demands on the USSR by
some Warsaw Pact countries for a greater role in
nuclear defense matters.
In France, the 261-214 vote which reaffirmed
Chaban-Delmas as president of the National Assembly
suggests that the Gaullists will have little trouble
finding parliamentary support for government pro-
grams. The full extent of government control over
the assembly will not be clear until the presidents
of the six standing committees are elected in the
next few days.
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EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY
The heavy round of diplo-
matic activity in Eastern Europe
that began in February continues
unabated. It has two related
purposes: to slow down West Ger-
many's campaign to normalize its
relations with the Eastern Euro-
peans and to create a facade of
unity in Eastern Europe before
the conference of European Commu-
nist parties which is to open at
Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, on
24 April.
This week, Poland's Gomulka
went to Bulgaria to renew a treaty
of friendship and mutual assist-
ance?almost a year before it was
due to expire. The treaty links
Sofia with treaties Warsaw had
already signed with East Germany
and Czechoslovakia, and with one
between East Germany and Czech-
oslovakia. It is intended to
forestall any early bid by Sofia
for diplomatic relations with
Bonn.
Bulgaria has in addition
agreed to renew its friendship
treaty with the USSR which is
also nearly a year from expira-
tion.
While Sofia bowed to the
pressure of its allies despite
an obvious interest in relations
with Bonn, efforts to get Hungary
into the treaty network have had
no visible success. The Russians
probably made the first represen-
tations when Janos Kadar visited
Moscow in February. Gomulka paid
an official visit to Budapest in
early March and East German For-
eign Minister Winzer took up the
quest late in the month.
The Hungarians have appar-
ently made no promises and may
be bolstered in their resolve
by the visit later this month
of Rumania's Ceausescu--who
started things by establishing
relations with Bonn virtually
without conditions in January.
However, Budapest has agreed to
further talks with the East Ger-
mans.
Meanwhile, preparations for
the Karlovy Vary conference have
run into some discord. Several
parties--particularly the Ital-
ian--reportedly view the origi-
nal uocuments that the French
and the Poles prepared for the
meeting as too rigid. Czecho-
slovak party secretary Koucky's
unannounced visit to Moscow on
30 March probably was to smooth
the way for appointing the Ital-
ians and Czechs to a redrafting
committee.
The Poles and the Italians
have been entrusted with the
task of persuading East Europe's
twin mavericks--Rumania and
Yugoslavia--to send delegations
to Karlovy Vary. Those countries,
however, appear to be lobbying
in their own behalf. Both Tito
and Ceausescu, have conferred
with leaders in Moscow since
February and with each other.
High-level Yugoslav delegations
have visited Warsaw and Bucharest,
and Ceausescu, as noted, will soon
visit Budapest.
There are rumors of indeci-
siveness in Bucharest, but there
seems little likelihood that either
Rumania or Yugoslavia will send of-
ficial delegations. Bucharest may
in the end decide to send observers,
however.
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STATUS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMIC REFCRM
The reform movement in
Soviet industry, nearing the
halfway mark of its initial phase
(1966-68), has so far been only
a partial success. While such
an evaluation now is necessarily
qualified because Moscow's report-
ing has been sparse, the very
lack of data suggests that the
program's difficulties continue
to outweigh its achievements.
Implementation of the reform
movement resumed early this year
after a moratorium during the
last quarter of 1966 on the
transfer of enterprises to the
new system of management and in-
centives. The number of converted
enterprises was scheduled to to-
tal about 2,500 by the end of
March, although less than a third
of this number had been trans-
ferred by the end of 1966. The
schedule calls for half of all
industrial enterprises to be
working under the new system by
the end of 1967, with the re-
mainder to be converted during
1968.
The reform is also being
extended to the nonindustrial
sectors of the economy on an as
yet unspecified schedule. Trans-
portation, communications, and
service enterprises have already
been affected, and recent press
discussion indicates that several
hundred state farms will be re-
organized according to the new
principles.
The Soviets claim that en-
terprises transferred to the new
system last year considerably
outperformed industry as a whole
in terms of sales, profit, and
labor productivity. This coes
not necessarily vindicate the
reform principles, however, since
the converted plants were Ehove
average in efficiency in -te
first place. Moscow has been
silent on how their 1966 pEr-
formances compared with p:-Evious
years.
A large part of the reformed
plants' good showing last year
probably came from their mere
efficient use of land, labor,
and capital. To the extet that
the new principles reduce the
inefficiency of the old s.7E;tem--
which emphasizes maximum output
with few penalties for the
wasteful use of resources--they
will bring about a temporarily
accelerated rate of growt'i_
The reform movement ',,111
take a major step forward cn
July when new wholesale prices
are adopted for heavy indistry.
Comparable revisions went _nto
effect early this year for light
industry. The present pha:;e of
the Soviet economic reform, how-
ever, is just a beginning, and
the basic tenets of the Spviet
economic system--central planning
and administratively set prices--
remain unaltered. Bureaucratic
interference and obstrucLionism
from the banks continue tp com-
pound the problem of conv2rting
part of Soviet industry tD the
new system while the majority of
factories operate on theid
principles. The long-term re-
sults thus will be determined by
actions taken in subseauenT:
years.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The quarterly rotation of Turkish troops on
Cyprus--usually an occasion for incidents--went off
smoothly. This was a boon to Athens because the
Greek Government is currently embroiled in yet an-
other confrontation between the King and the Papan-
dreous. India's Congress government also is suffer-
ing setbacks having now lost control of all but
seven of the 17 state legislatures. Its problems
are exacerbated by the surprising unanimity of the
opposition parties in putting forth candidates for
the presidency and vice presidency, an act which
caught Congress Party leaders off balance.
Army machinations continue to plague three of
West Africa's military regimes. In Dahomey, younger
army officers are threatening to impose a supreme
military committee on the ineffective Soglo govern-
ment. Togolese Army Chief of Staff Eyadema has
stated privately that he would assume the title of
chief of state on 13 April, giving up any idea of
early elections. Sierre Leone's new military re-
gime is off to a shaky start with nascent factional-
ism within he ruling council and signs of restive-
ness among junior army officers.
There have been recent movements of Tanzanian
troops and military supplies to the Mozambique bor-
der, probably related to the anticipated renewal of
activity by Mozambique guerrillas. Since insurgency
began in late 1964, the guerrillas have mounted "of-
fensives" each spring at the end of the rainy season.
In Congo (Kinshasa), Mobutu is talking about a mas-
sive reorganization of his parliament and extensive
constitutional changes.
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RIGHT-WING TAKE-OVER CHURNS GREEK POLITICAL CRISIS
King Constantine's naming
of National Radical Union (ERE)
leader Kanellopoulos as premier
early this week capped two weeks
of intense political maneuvering
in Athens.
The King and the new premier
are trying to obtain a parliamen-
tary vote of confidence and the
passage of a simple proportional
electoral bill, but the chances
for success are slim. All of the
other principal parties have de-
clared they will vote against the
new government when it goes before
Parliament on 12 April. Failing
a vote of confidence, Kanel-
lopoulos is empowered to dissolve
Parliament and to head a service
government to supervise elections
after a 45-day campaign period.
The new cabinet is composed
wholly of ERE deputies, many of
whom support the self-exiled ERE
strong man and former premier
Constantine Karamanlis, who has
had his differences with Kanel-
lopoulos in the past. This ap-
parent detente between the two
party leaders could be short-
lived. Many ERE deputies are
opposed to early elections because
they fear their chances for re-
election are slim. Others have
long expressed the view that some
form of dictatorship is the only
solution that can ensure the fu-
ture of "democracy" in Greece.
Although it appears that the
King is still aiming for elec-
tions in May, his installation of
Kanellopoulos has once again re-
vived the "monarchy" question.
Center Union (EK) leader George
Papandreou has portrayed the
King's action as a "grave scandal"
and insists the "universal dis-
approval" of Kanellopoulos should
persuade him to resign and permit
the installation of an impartial
service government to hold honest
elections. Papandreou's son
Andreas, the King's chief oppo-
nent, has taken his usually bit-
ter stand and charged that the
King has lost forever the chance
to reconcile himself with the
Greek people.
Public reaction to events
so far has been generally mild,
but there have been some student
demonstrations. However, the EK
and the crypto-Communist United
Democratic Left can be expected
to step up their antigovernment
protests, and serious trouble
could develop between the demon-
strators and the security forces.
Kanellopoulos has promised swift
police action if violence does
occur.
With the confidence debate
not scheduled to begin before
next week, the protagonists may
have a short breathing spell.
However, action is sure to step
up at that time as the grappling
for position continues. Regard-
less of the outcome of the vote,
the King will almost surely face
new hurdles before the elections.
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SOVIET-EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS PROBA
Both Moscow and Cairo have
been unusually tight-lipped about
Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit
to Egypt last week. The visit
seems to have been arranged on
short notice and took place amid
signs that Egypt's economic prob-
lems may have created some strain
in Soviet-Egyptian relations.
The Soviet foreign minister's
arrival was coincident with the
presence in Cairo of a delegation
from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), which has been de-
manding stringent economic reform
before considering any further
assistance to Egypt. His visit
also overlapped that of a high-
level Soviet economic delegation
seeking to adjust the Soviet aid
program to conform with Egypt's
latest cutback in development
plans. The latter delegation's
only significant decision was to
allocate about $161 million from
earlier Soviet credits for expan-
sion and new construction at the
steel complex in Helwan which
have been under consideration for
a number of years.
Moscow has shown extreme re-
luctance in assuming the responsi-
bility for bailing Egypt out of
its economic difficulties and
probably is disquieted by Nasir's
failure to heed Soviet advice. A
Soviet economic advisory group,
invited last fall by Nasir, rec-
ommended the adoption of an aus-
terity program similar to but
less stringent than the IMF's
and urged Cairo to reach some
compromise with the IMF. Meeting
the requirements of the IMF is
LY REVIEWED
the key to obtaining some relief
from Western creditors who are
owed about $200 million in 1-ird
currency in 1967 alone.
Moscow probably also is
dismayed by Nasir's recent with-
drawal of Cairo's request ioi US
wheat. The USSR has repeatedly
stressed its reluctance to replace
the US as a major supplier of
Egypt's annual 2.5-million-ton
import requirement. Although it
is providing 250,000 tons of wheat
with repayment under the bilateral
clearing agreement, Moscow has of-
fered to provide an additional
400,000 tons only if Cairo rays
for it in hard cash or in commodi-
ties outside the clearing acree-
ment. France has imposed conditions
just as severe, and Austra.ia,
where Egypt now seeks whea7, is
considering doing the same
The unimformative communique'
following Gromyko's visit merely
mentioned that bilateral re3a-
tions were discussed and dealt
almost exclusively with Vietnam
and general foreign policy mat-
ters. The most topical foreign
policy issue would have be?ri the
situation in Aden. Moscow has not
taken an active role in this is-
sue but could be expected to voice
its concern if it felt that Arab
rivalries in the area might lead
to a dangerous escalation of the
Saudi-Egyptian confrontation. The
omission of any reference to
economic matters--which were
undoubtedly covered--may indicate
that talks in this sphere were
troubled and inconclusive./
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VIOLENCE ERUPTS IN ADEN
Violence erupted in Aden, as
expected, upon the arrival of the
UN advisory mission, but despite
nationalist predictions, the riots
did not get out of hand. The
general strike, however, was com-
pletely effective. Each of the
two main nationalist groups, the
Front for the Liberation of Oc-
cupied South Yemen (FLOSY) and
the National Liberation Front
(NLF), now seems to be directing
its terrorist activity toward
winning dominance over the other.
Torrential rains on 1 April,
the date scheduled for the arrival
of the UN mission, and the subse-
quent delay of its arrival until
2 April, appear to have helped
dampen the violent reception
planned by the nationalist groups.
Discovery of large arms caches by
the authorities just beforehand
may also have reduced the casual-
ties. Through 3 April, the of-
ficial count was three killed
and 24 wounded as a direct result
of the skirmishes between terror-
ists and British troops, but the
final toll will undoubtedly run
higher.
The three-man UN mission--
composed of representatives of
Afghanistan, Mali, and Venezuela--
is under the protection of some
2,500 British troops. The mission
has announced that it intends to
proceed with its investigations
"irrespective of the situation."
So far the FLOSY and NLF leaders
have refused to see the mission
while it is under British sponsor-
ship. However, the mission plans
to visit nationalist headquarters
in Taizz, Yemen, in order to hear
the views of the opposition lead-
ers.
This UN concession to the
nationalists' demands may do
little to assist their cause,
because of the vicious rivalry
between the two main groups.
FLOSY claims that it is the sole
representative of the South Arabian
people; the NLF says that these
people are represented by several
nationalist groups, including it-
self and FLOSY. Behind these
surface issues, there is a deadly
struggle for the postindependence
dominance of South Arabian poli-
tics and for unchallenged support
by Nasir.
Several times previously
the two groups have used general
strikes and terrorist attacks in
Aden to mask assassination at-
tempts against the leaders of
the rival parties. Nationalist
rivals are believed to have
caused several casualties during
the current demonstrations, in-
cluding the death of Haydar
Shamshir, a FLOSY leader. This
has exacerbated animosities to
the point where a FLOSY speaker
is reported to have told a mass
rally on 4 April that Shamshir's
assassination could touch off
civil war.
FLOSY has called for a con-
tinuation of the general strike
through 10 April. The NLF opposes
the extension and will distribute
leaflets to this effect.
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NEW STATE-LEVEL DEFEATS FOR INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY
The fall of an 18-day-old
Congress Party government in the
state of Uttar Pradesh on 1 April
highlights the continuing polit-
ical instability on the state
level resulting from India's
February general elections. On
the national level, however, Con-
gress still retains its slim
majority.
The Uttar Pradesh government
was the second Congress regime
in two weeks to be toppled by
defections from the party. Neigh-
boring Hariana, whose Congress
Party administration collapsed
in a similar manner on 22 March,
now has a new non-Congress coali-
tion government led by the de-
fectors. The same kind of coali-
tion is expected to take power
in Uttar Pradesh.
The loss of Uttar Pradesh--
India's most populous state
(about 85 million people) and
once the major stronghold of
Congress political power--was a
jolting setback for the party.
Congress now has majorities in
only seven of the 17 state leg-
islative assemblies, has failed
to win control of Goa's local
government, and is out of power
in two other union territory
legislatures. Non-Congress gov-
ernments now control not only
the two southernmost states but
also those spanning the entire
width of northern India and
including some of the most heav-
ily populated and productive
areas of the country. The future, -.-
stability of at least three more
Congress state governments could
be threatened by factionali3n
and personality clashes.
Several of the new non-
Congress state governments s:on-
tain built-in elements of in-
stability. Only the Communist-
dominated regime in Kerala, he
regionalist government of Madras,
and the conservative Swatantra-
led coalition in Orissa have
fairly good prospects of hanging
together. Elsewhere the ncn-
Congress coalitions are bond
together mainly by their ccmmon
desire to deprive Congress of
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INDIA
Loco Governments
Potty goveinment
ruie"
.ngress Putty government
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S R ET
power. One of these disparate
coalitions, the leftist-dominated
government of West Bengal, has
been confronted with a major
problem in maintaining law and
order in the capital city of
Calcutta due to communal conflict
between Hindus and Sikhs.
The recent rash of defec-
tions from state Congress Party
governments has touched off
speculation that Congress' slim
majority in the national Parlia-
ment may soon disappear. So
far, however, the malaise has
been confined to the states where
the premium for defection from
the organized party is greatest--
leadership of an alternative
government. This incentive is
absent in New Delhi where the
splintered opposition parties
have not yet been able to forge
a united opposition front to at-
tract dissident Congress legis-
lators.
ANGOLAN INSURGENCY DRAWS PORTUGUESE REPRISAL
Insurgency along Angola's
principal railroad prompted the
Portuguese in mid-March to suspend
transit trade which is vital to
the Congo (Kinshasa) and of im-
portance to Zambia. Insurgents
based in these countries appar-
ently derailed three trains last
month along the Benguela Railroad
in eastern Angola.
Both the Congo and Zambia
are economically dependent on
copper exports, and the Benguela
Railroad has been the largest
single carrier for the Congo and
recently for Zambia. Zambia was
forced in late March to compromise
its policy toward the white regime
in Rhodesia and to revert par-
tially to rail routes through that
country. The importation of
needed goods over the Benguela
Railroad is especially important
to the Congo's Katanga region,
and other import routes, including
the Rhodesian Railways are al-
ready clogged. If the Angolan
line should remain closed for an
extended period of time, the
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cash economy of Katanga will de-
teriorate sharply and Zambia
would be faced with the decision
to set aside its political prin-
ciples and to make fuller use of
the Rhodesian Railways.
Lisbon is fed up with the
private assurances and ambivalent
policies of the Congo and Zambia
in the past. The Angolan gov-
ernor general admits that the
Portuguese may be unable to pre-
vent attacks on the railroad,
but he is convinced they can ef-
fectively hinder insurgent ac-
tivity.
Zambia has been most sus-
ceptible to Portuguese pressure
and has increasingly clamped
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CONGO
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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
Kinshasa OFTHECONGO
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66209 4-67
down on numerous nationalist
groups over the past few months.
The leader of the insurgent group
responsible for at least one of
the rail incidents claims that
attacks on the Benguela Railroad
were contrary to his instructions,
and he hopes to prevent further
incidents. However, he pointed
out that it is virtually impos-
REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA
Pretoria?
Mbab n
renco Marques
sible for Zambia to control its
long border with Angola.
The Congo, involved Ln dip-
lomatic skirmishes with r'ortugal
for several months, has )7et to
face up to the drain on its econ-
omy caused by the railroad shut-
down and so far has done _Attie
to curb the nationalists _n its
area.
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NIGERIAN BRINKMANSHIP
The economic skirmishing be-
tween Nigerian Commander in Chief
Gowon and Eastern Governor Ojukwu
has entered a phase of concrete
but limited moves and countermoves.
Both seem prepared to continue in
this vein for some time, although
there are new indications Ojukwu
is thinking in terms of ultimate
independence for his region.
In partial fulfillment of
his earlier threat to take con-
trol of revenues generated in
the region, Ojukwu issued an
edict on 31 March requesting federal
revenue collectors in the East
to pass all payments directly to
the Eastern government rather
than to the federal account.
The edict does not alter the ex-
isting formula for allocating
revenues among the regions nor
does it touch the important oil
revenues, which are mostly paid
to the federal account in London.
According to Eastern officials,
the revenues collected under the
new edict will be used to pay up
arrears they claim the federal
government owes, after which
they will be remitted to Lagos
as before. There are reports,
however, that the edict is merely
the first step in asserting full
control over all revenues gener-
ated in the East.
Thus far the federal govern-
ment's principal reaction to
Ojukwu's edict has been to halt
Nigeria Airways flights to the
East. This move, which Lagos de-
fends on grounds that Ojukwu has
already sequestered airline rev-
CONTINUES
enue, will deny him any further
income from this fairly lucra-
tive source.
Ojukwu is likely to use the
flight ban to justify new anti-
federal actions and will consider
this one more reason why the
East must operate more independ-
ently. In what may be further
preparation for moves toward
eventual secession, Ojukwu is
appealing to all Ibos--the East's
major ethnic group--to return
home.
It is unlikely that the Su-
preme Military Council would
formally approve military action
against Ojukwu or even a total
economic blockade. Both the
Western and Mid-Western governors
have already opposed a proposal
requiring East-bound shipping to
call first at Lagos. In what is
probably a contingency move, how-
ever, federal forces along the
border between the Eastern and
Northern regions have been re-
inforced in the past two weeks
with several hundred men and
some armored personnel carriers.
Meanwhile the Ghanaian med-
iators who last January managed
to arrange a meeting in their,
country of the feuding Nigerian
leaders are continuing their ef-
forts. Ojukwu has already agreed
to another meeting in Ghana.
Gowon, however, is reportedly re-
luctant but will consult the other
military governors.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Inter-American officials as well as various ex-
tremist groups are completing last-minute prepara-
tions for the summit meeting in Uruguay from 12 to
14 April.
Most of the foreign ministers and their subor-
dinates assembling in Punta del Este for the foreign
ministers' conference beginning on 8 April will stay
on for the meeting of presidents. This preliminary
meeting--which actually is the final session of the
talks begun last month in Buenos Aires--has as its
primary task the drafting of a preamble for the
declaration to be signed by the presidents. The
ministers may also make new efforts to come up with
an acceptable text for an agreement renouncing ac-
quisition of certain costly military equipment.
It now seems virtually certain that the keenest
topics for the summit talks will be Latin American
economic integration and the terms of trade for the
area's raw material exports. On the former issue, a
fairly sharp dichotomy remains between nations like
Brazil and Peru which favor a cautious subregional
approach to a common market, and others which prefer
a more rapid, area-wide approach.
Most official and unofficial Latin American com-
mentary on the eve of the conference--excepting, of
course, the increasingly shrill Cuban and other ex-
tremist propaganda--reflects a sober but guardedly
optimistic attitude toward the chances for success.
Security forces in Uruguay are bracing for more
protest demonstrations and minor attacks on US prop-
erty. Some Communist-inspired violence during the
summit seems likely there and perhaps elsewhere but
should pose no serious threat to the proceedings.
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CHILEAN VOTERS REBUFF PRESIDENT FREI
President Frei did not re-
ceive the vote of confidence he
had requested from the Chilean
electorate in the 2 April munici-
pal elections. Piqued by the op-
position-controlled Senate's re-
fusal to permit him to visit the
US and the failure of his consti-
tutional reform legislation, Frei
concentrated on the elections for
the local councilmen. He cam-
paigned vigorously throughout
the country, urging voters to
support members of his Christian
Democratic Party (PDC) as a sign
of approval of his administra-
tion.
The election results appear
to bear out the opposition claims
that a majority of the population
opposes the Frei administration.
The PDC received only 36 percent
of the votes--a drop from its 42
percent in the 1965 congressional
elections--while the Communist-
Socialist Popular Action Front
increased its total substantially.
However, the PDC got more than
twice as many votes as its clos-
est rival and doubled the number
of municipal posts under its con-
trol. It thus obtained increased
patronage opportunities and will
also be able to improve its local
organization, a well-known PDC
weakness.
The PDC's failure to repeat
the success of its presidential
and congressional campaigns was
in part a result of normal dis-
satisfaction with the actions of
the party in power. Frei's eco-
nomic stabilization program has
hurt many sectors that are ac-
customed to operating in an in-
flationary situation. Further-
more, Chile historically has had
a multiparty political system.
The presidential election of
1964 presented the Chilean elec-
torate with a choice between
Frei and the Communist backed
pro-Castro Socialist Senator
Salvador Allende. Many middle-
class Chileans, who are essen-
tially conservative, voted for
Frei as the lesser of two evils,
and a good deal of his success
carried over into the congres-
sional elections in 1965. The
municipal elections, however,
afforded voters a choice among
a number of candidates, and
many returned to the National
Party, an amalgam of the two
traditional conservative parties
Frei's congressional opposi-
tion probably will become more
intransigent as a result of the
elections. The left wing of
the PDC, which has accused the
government of losing its revo-
lutionary fervor, may attempt to
capitalize on Frei's setback to
gain control of the party at its
national congress later this
year.
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BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT OVERREACTS TO GUERRILLA ATTACK
The Bolivian Government,
shaken by the 23 March guerrilla
attack on an army patrol near
the southeastern town of Camiri,
is hastily attempting to organize
counterinsurgency operations.
The military has abandoned
its earlier idea of confronting
the guerrillas immediately. Plans
call for a sustained counterin-
surgency campaign which could
last for months. Outposts and
roadblocks are being set up, and
patrols are being sent out to
probe for strongholds. A special
army combat force will be equipped
and trained to attack the base
camp at a later date. At pres-
ent there is no unit in the Bo-
livian Army properly trained for
guerrilla warfare.
There have been reports of
limited contact with the guer-
rillas during the past week, but
no significant clashes have oc-
curred since 23 March. The Iden-
tity of the band is still uncer-
tain, but it seems to be a force
of 35 to 100 disparate leftist
elements
parentlyTh7jambushed army pa-
trol had stumbled onto the guer-
rilla nucleus and forced the band
into action earlier than the
guerr4.11as had planned.
The guerrilla band a; now
constituted--limited in size and
isolated--does not pose a threat
to the government. If the mili-
tary succeeds in destroyi-ag the
movement in a relatively ihort
period of time, Barrientos' im-
age as a leader will be eahanced
and other extremist group-; will
be discouraged from atteirroting
similar actions. Conversly,
failure to find and defeat the
guerrillas could give encourage-
ment to the extremists, dissi-
pate military and police (Jun-
teractions, and place Barrien-
tos in a difficult political po-
sition. /
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,u)-rc
CRACKS IN THE MEXICAN MONOLITH
Mexico's controlling Insti-
tutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
is in high gear for the 2 July
election of seven governors and
all 178 deputies of the national
assembly. This is the first nation-
wide election since Gustavo Diaz
Ordaz became president in 1964
and is an important step in the
consolidation of his control over
the country's elaborate political
machinery.
The will of the President
is the main factor in the choice
of candidates. Although top-level
posts in the PRI and in the gov-
ernment bureaucracy are filled
with Diaz Ordaz appointees, most
of the governors and all of the
Congress remain from the last
administration. Some among this
latter group who are considered
loyal to Diaz Ordaz will be ele-
vated to high appointive positions
and will figure heavily in the
speculation for the 1970 presi-
dential race.
The indisputable dominance
of the PRI leaves few questions
about the outcome of this summer's
"contest." A few seats in Con-
gress may be captured by minor
parties, but there are no opposi-
tion candidates for governor.
Despite the absence of effective
partisan opposition, dissatisfac-
tion with the PRI, based on the
ruling party's arbitrary "impo-
sition" of even local candidates,
is growing among the increasingly
sophisticated electorate.
N TED ST TE
.,,Fa,sho FELIX Serna
AN
MEXICO
GOVT. PARTY'S
CANDIDATES
FOR GOVERNOR
2 July 1967 elections
A
2
Eduardo EvzoN0 o Lozano
3
Anfordo ROCHA Cordero
"
Manuel MORENO More
ntl:" Avers., elinn:heCiASTRO
I. Sonora
2. Nuevo LeOn
3. San Luis Potosi
4. Guanajuato
5. Queretaro
6. Colima
7. C;arnoeche
/7
*MEXICO 'Carlos SANSORES
PablAILVA Garth CITY -- Per"
'G A
es
66214 4-67
Currently dramatizing
Mexico City's deafness to grass-
root sentiment is an unusually
persistent protest against the
PRI's gubernatorial candidate
in the state of Sonora. Even
though the 1961 campaign in
Sonora had been bitterly con-
tested and discontent with the
party's choice of Faustino Felix
Serna was predictable, the party
badly misjudged the depth of
popular resentment. Students
who have led the sporadically
violent protest are now calling
for the resignation of the in-
cumbent governor and have elic-
ited student support from out-
side the state for their demands.
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So far the party hierarchy
has indicated no readiness to
back down in Sonora, and PRI
selections in the other six states
have presented no unusual diffi-
culty yet.
President Diaz Ordaz is be-
lieved to be interested in "democ-
ratizing" the government party by
encouraging constituent rather
than party selection of candi-
dates. Such a radical altera-
tion to the system, which would
render impotent the now powerful
party bosses, is a delicate and
difficult undertaking. Develop-
ments such as the Sonora affair
may work toward the liberaliza-
tion of PRI's control, but only
over the long run. I
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LABOR RESISTANCE TO ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT POLICY WEAKENS.
The Ongania government, ap-
parently convinced that Argen-
tina's disorganized labor move-
ment is temporarily powerless to
force it to alter its economic
policies, is imposing new wage
freezes and price controls in
its effort to combat inflation.
Although inflation raised living
costs about 30 percent last year,
the government has announced that
it will limit wage increases
through 1968 to a range of 8 to
24 percent, depending on the
amount of the workers' raises
during 1966. It is comtemplat-
ing complementary restrictions
on price increases.
The labor movement is in
serious disarray after the defeat
last month of its "Action Plan"
for strikes and demonstrations.
Government pressure forced the
General Confederation of Labor
(CGT) to call off the plan. Now
the COT is trying to resume ne-
gotiations with the government
similar to those in the early
months of President Ongania's
rule. Ongania, however, is un-
likely to be moved by labor
leaders' continued claims that
his wage policy will hit the
lower income worker hardest and
that the workers are bearing the
brunt of the government's anti-
inflation policies.
Various factions within the
CGT are struggling to gairi con-
trol of the organization. It
now appears, however, tha_ Peron-
ist moderate Augusto Vandor will
maintain his hold over th,- CGT
ruling council. Surprisinaly,
Vandor has kept the loya17:y and
support of much of labor despite
the failure of the "Action Plan"
for which he was largely -espon-
sible. His main rival, Jose
Alonso, an orthodox Peron_st
who did not support the "Action
Plan," has lost ground in ef-
forts to form a coalition of
unions to fight Vandor's rtle.
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