WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 10, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
52
10 February 1967
No. 0276/67
AGENCY
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
SECRET
(Information as of noon EST, 9 February 1967)
VIETNAM
Pare-Tet Viet Cong attacks directed against US airfields
inflicted only minor damage. There are indications of
a sizable buildup of enemy main-force elements in the
northern provinces and possible post-Tet attacks in
this area. The Constituent Assembly adjourned for a
ten-day Tet holiday and postponed consideration of im-
portant issues such as the powers of the proposed leg-
islature. Hanoi insists that its foreign minister's
recent offer to consider talks if the US will stop the
bombings is a "serious gesture of good will" which
the US ignored. Peking, impervious to North Vietnam-
ese sensitivies, has carried its anti-Soviet agitation
to Hanoi.
COMMUNIST CHINA
Maoist leaders seem to be intensifying their drive
against opponents throughout the country, but it is
not clear that they are making much headway. In some
localities the armed forces seem to have sided with
Mao's opposition. Difficulties in the army seem to
have hurt the standing of Defense Minister Lin Piao.
CHINESE STEP UP ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN
The harassment of Soviet personnel still in China, now
in its third week, is designed to goad Moscow into a
diplomatic break. Peking's aim is not only to bolster
its "cultural revolution" by uniting the Chinese
against a foreign enemy, but also to complicate Soviet
problems connected with the Vietnamese war.
ANTI-SUKARNO CAMPAIGN IN INDONESIA GAINS MOMENTUM
Most Indonesians no longer debate whether the Presi-
dent should be removed, but how to accomplish the oust-
er. Appointment of 108 new members of parliament has
strengthened the anti-Sukarno forces.
SECRET
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SI CRET
FACTIONAL MANEUVERING IN LAOS
Neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna appears able to
cope with pressure from the rightist leader in the
National Assembly, but still faces resistance to his
effort to integrate the neutralist military into the
Royal Armed Forces.
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MAY RENEW FOCUS ON DEFENSE
Prime Minister Sato considers the election an endorse-
ment of his support for US-Japanese defense ties
Europe
UK AND MALTA AT IMPASSE OVER PLANNED BRITISH TROOP
CUTBACK
Britain's plan to reduce its forces on the island has
embittered the Maltese but newly proposed talks offer
some hope of an agreed solution.
.PACE OF KENNEDY ROUND TRADE TALKS STEPPING UP
The principal negotiators are trying to get agreement
on the key issues by the beginning of April in order
to be able to meet the 30 June deadline.
Middle East - Africa
INDIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN INTENSIFIES
Electoral prospects for the Congress Party have not
materially changed, but the campaign itself has grown
more heated and violence has increased.
SE(]RE7`
Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
SECRET
REVIVING OPPOSITION IN PAKISTAN
President Ayub Khan faces mounting political problems
which, unless he handles them deftly, could be ex-
ploited by his opponents. The opposition forces, with
the expiration of the seven-year ban placed on promi-
nent civilian politicians by Ayub, are beginning to
gain strength.
EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA TO VISIT UNITED STATES
Haile Selassie arrives on 13 February to discuss his
growing concern over Somali, Arab, and Communist pres-
sures in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin.
TALKS BEGIN BETWEEN UNION MINIERE AND THE CONGOLESE
President Mobutu and Union Miniere have both shown
somewhat greater willingness to resolve their dispute
by discussing the formation of a new international
"association" to mine and market the Congo's copper.
ALGERIA HOLDS COMMUNAL ELECTIONS
The successful holding of communal elections on 5
February--the first balloting for local officials
since independence five years ago--is the Boumediene
regime's first achievement toward putting the country's
administration on a firm foundation.
Western Hemisphere
FRAUD CHARGED IN NICARAGUAN ELECTION
Preliminary returns give General Somoza a substantial
lead in Nicaragua's presidential election on 5 Feb-
ruary, but official results are being announced so
slowly that the opposition is claiming fraud in the
ballot count.
SECRET
Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
SEC R ET
SOVIET-CUBAN ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDED
Moscow will continue under this year's trade agree-
ment to provide substantial financial assistance.
DOMINICAN PRESIDENT MOVES TO SHORE UP POLITICAL POSITION 30
Balaguer's efforts to ensure the support of the secu-
rity forces and improve relations with moderate opposi-
tion elements suggest some apprehension that chal-
lenges to his government may be developing.
BRAZIL PROMOTING TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND USSR
A high-level mission that has visited Moscow, Warsaw,
and Prague has produced some tangible results, and its
leader, Minister of Industry and Commerce Martins, is
optimistic about long-range trade prospects.
HEMISPHERE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET NEXT WEEK
The Third Special Inter-American Conference and the
11th Meeting of Foreign Ministers will begin in Buenos
Aires on 15 February to make final decisions on amend-
ments to the OAS Charter and arrangements for the
inter-American summit meeting this spring.
25X1
SECRET
Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET
FAR EAST
The dramatic deterioration of Communist China's
relations with the Soviet Union has tended to over-
shadow further Chinese domestic fireworks. The
abuse heaped upon the departing dependents of So-
viet diplomats and the concerted harassment of the
remaining officials suggest that the Chinese are
trying to force the Soviets to close their embassy.
As the pressure in Peking increases, the Soviets
will have great difficulty maintaining their pres-
ence there.
In the struggle between supporters and oppo-
nents of Mao Tse-tung, the shakiness of Mao's mili-
tary backing continues to be evident
Almost daily exhorta-
tions to supposed followers of Mao to unify them-
selves so as better to oppose the "handful in power"
betray their disarray. The formation of "communes"
--patterned on the short-lived Paris commune of
1871--to rule Shanghai and several provinces is the
regime's latest improvisation in the effort to re-
gain clear control.
In South Vietnam, the New Year holidays have
brought a pause both in military action and consti-
tution-making. Hanoi is extending its campaign to
persuade the US that peace talks could begin if the
bombing of North Vietnam were ended.
In Indonesia, pressures continue to mount for
the ouster of President Sukarno, with even some
leaders of his once reliable National Party adding
their voices to the chorus. Final action might
come through the policy-making Provisional People's
Consultative Assembly, which is scheduled to meet
next month.
SECRET
Page 1. WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET
VI ETNAM
Both military and political
activity in Vietnam has slowed
down with the beginning of the
five-day lunar new year celebra-
tions (Tet) on the morning of 8
February.
Pre-Tet military activity
initiated by the Viet Conq was
highlighted by four attacks
against US airfields in South
Vietnam on 6 and 7 February.
Three of the raids--those at
Binh Thuy, Tra Cu, and Tra Noc
in the Mekong Delta--caused few
casualties and only minor damage
to the installations. The fourth,
against a US Army airstrip in cen?-
t.ral Binh Dinh Province known as
"English Airfield," resulted in
casualties of one killed and 59
wounded.
Shortly before the truce
the Viet Cong destroyed more than
$5 million worth of ordnance at
the Long Binh ammunition dump
northeast of Saigon and nearly
150,000 gallons of napalm at. the
Bien Hoa Air Base.
Six US Army battalions of
Operation GADSDEN, reported sev-
eral heavy engagements with enemy
forces while sweeping the western
section of the long-time Commu-
nist sanctuary known as War Zone
"C" in northern Tay Ninh Province..
There have been continuing
:indications of possible Communist
troop deployments in the northern
provinces. There are also re-
ports of Communist units moving
south from Quang Tri and Thua
Thien provinces into Quang Ngai
Province.
Enemy strength in Quang Ngai
Province is now estimated to be
as high as 15 main-force bat-
talions, and several indicators
point to enemy preparations for
offensive operations in this
province in the near future--a
recent rallier stated that Quang
Ngai would soon become a "major
battlefield." Possible objec-
tives include the Special Forces
camps scattered throughout the
province and/or US Marine and
South Korean base camp areas.
At the same time, a con-
tinuing high level of truck traf-
fic has moved southward on the
Laotian panhandle's infiltration
road network. Nearly 500 ve-
hicles were observed entering
Laos from North Vietnam during
the first three weeks of Janu-
ary--a level of activity al-
most comparable to last year's
SECRET
Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
e:
GULF OF
,-- 'ra jc Az ,rfie d SOUTH VIETNAM
J 25 50 75 IOOMile~ % ~~ 25 5(1 75 1 O Kilometers
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
SECRET
and higher than any other period
since the current dry season be-
gan in October.
South Vietnamese Politics
South Vietnam's Constituent
Assembly adjourned on 3 February
for about ten days without hav-
ing begun discussions on the more
significant aspects of legisla-
tive power in the future govern-
ment.
Some public criticism of the as-
sembly's work, echoing that of
military leaders and given
prominent coverage in the gov-
ernment-controlled press, has
irritated the assemblymen, but
apparently not to the extent of
seriously damaging their relations
with the government.
Hanoi on Negotiations
Hanoi propaganda has con-
tinued to press for a permanent
cessation of the bombings. On
5 February the party daily news-
papers underscored the signifi-
cance of recent North Vietnamese
offers to consider talks with
the US in exchange for a cessa-
tion of the air strikes and chal-
lenged President Johnson's 2
February statement that there
had been no "serious effort by
the other side." Hanoi charac-
terized Foreign Minister Nguyen
Duy Trinh's 28 January inter-
view expressing a willingness
to talk as a "serious effort
full of good will" and charged
that the US had ignored it. In
another commentary, on 7 Febru-
ary, Hanoi publicly denied that
"secret talks" were being held
with the US. The commentary
called such talks "ambigious
rumor" and "sheer fabrication."
Peking-Hanoi Relations
Page 4
The virulent Chinese anti-
Soviet campaign has spread to
Hanoi. Indicating Peking's will-
ingness to ignore North Vietnam-
ese sensitivities, Chinese stu-
dents and diplomats carried their
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET W
demonstrations in front of So-
viet embassies to Hanoi for the
first time on 30 January. Al-
though both the Soviet and the
Chinese press reported the dem-
onstrations, Hanoi authorities
refused to allow any local re-
lease of the news. The demon-
strators were "gently dispersed,"
Local authorities sup-
pressed the French AFP corres-
pondent's dispatch. The next
day's edition of the local Chi-
nese-language daily was delayed,
possibly because of censorship
problems.
Peking may also have en-
gaged in some limited "obstruc-
tionism" in connection with So-
viet aid personnel. The Soviet
press charges that the Chinese
harassed Soviet technicians en
route to Hanoi at the Peking
Airport.
COMMUNIST CHINA
The supporters of Mao Tse-
tung seem to be intensifying their
drive against opponents through-
out China, but in spite of numer-
ous claims of victory it is un-
clear how much headway they are
really making. In some areas
army forces appear to have sided
with Mao's opposition in party
organizations. This is not sur-
prising since the local party boss
usually is political commissar
of army units in his jurisdiction
and has a higher party rank than
the local. military commander.
In Sinkiang and Tibet the
party chieftain is concurrently
the military commander. Opposi-
Page 5
tion to Mao has been especially
stubborn in these two provinces.
According to posters, pro-Mao
Red Guards have been attack-
ing Sinkiang boss Wang En-mao for
five months and Chang Kuo-hua,
top man in Tibet, for about
two months.
Maoist forces may be gain-
ing the upper hand in Sinkiang.
The Urumchi radio station has
been broadcasting vitriolic at-
tacks on the Sinkiang party com-
mittee since about the first of
February, when propaganda media
were apparently taken over by
pro-Mao forces. Posters seen
in Peking claim that Wang has
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
..' SECRET
been in Peking for six weeks
"consulting" with Premier Chou
En-lai.
A wall poster seen in Peking
on 7 February reported that "reac-
tionary" army troops in six Szech-
wan cities had been suppressing
"revolutionaries." The troops
were said to be led by political
commissars of the Cheng-tu Mili-
tary Region (Szechwan
Province)
who are
responsive to
Li Ching-
chuan,
first political
commis-
sar of
the region and
first sec-
retary
of the Southwest party
bureau.
Other posters have reported
recent clashes between troops
and Maoist militants in Honan
Province and in the Mukden
(Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilung-
kiang provinces), Inner Mongolian,
Tsinan (Shantung) and Canton
(Kwangtung, Hunan, and Kwangsi)
military regions. Such reports
appear to be designed to dis-
credit local military commanders
and may be a prelude to their
dismissal. There is no evi-
dence that pitched battles be-
tween army factions have oc-
curred anywhere.
The drive to discredit and
bring down military leaders con-
tinues to be pushed in Peking,
as well as in the provinces. Mao
Tse-tung is reported in a poster
to have complained to the Mili-
tary Affairs Committee on 27
Page 6
January that many "old leaders"
in the army did not understand
his revolutionary objectives.
Fresh posters have gone up
in the past week attacking Yang
Yung, commander of the crucial
Peking Military Region (which
includes Shansi and Hopeh prov-
inces), and many other military
figures. It is now fairly cer-
tain that Yang, who was in good
standing through mid-January, was
dismissed about 22 January when
he was first criticized. The
reason for the sudden downfall
of this key military commander
is unknown, but presumably he was
a casualty of new maneuverings
among the leaders around Mao.
Recent relevations that the
army is not the trustworthy in-
strument of control it was sup-
posed to be may have hurt the
standing of Defense Minister Lin
Piao. He is still described in
propaganda as Mao's "close com-
rade in arms" but he did not ap-
pear with Mao at a reception on
3 February for the visiting Al-
banian defense minister. In fact,
Lin was last seen in public on
26 November when he appeared with
Mao at a Red Guard rally.
Lin's name is appearing much
less frequently in Peking media
than a few months ago. Even ar-
ticles dealing with military af-
fairs either fail to mention Lin
at all, or contain only one or
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
*4w, I~Vw
two pro forma references to him. Provincial
In the past, such articles were
studded with references to "Lin's
instructions."
It is possible that Lin is
in poor health, but this would
not explain why propaganda tributes
to him have diminished.
Page 7
Since 24 January Chinese
broadcasts have claimed victory
for pro-Mao forces in ten of the
28 provincial-level entities in
China, but considerable resist-
ance apparently persists in most
of these. Peking itself has
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
- SECRET
endorsed only four of the take-
overs--in the provinces of
Shansi, Kweichow, and Heilung-
kiang and in the Shanghai munic-
ipality. New organizations
modleled on the Paris Commune of
1871 have been established in
these areas to replace party
committees, but it remains to be
seen whether they can consolidate
control and operate effectively.
Peking's failure to acknowl-
edge victory claims by six pro-
vincial radios suggests either
that it is not satisfied that
those making the announcements
are genuinely pro-Mao, or be-
lieves that the announcements
were premature. The seizure
pronouncements issued by "revo-
lutionaries" in Kwangsi and Kansu
provinces did not use the harsh
language characteristic of gen-
uine pro-Mao forces in attacking
local party leaders.
Shensi Province, which had
announced a take-over of power
on 26 January, seems to be in
turmoil again. A provincial
radiobroadcast from Shensi on
4 February said that "revolution-
aries" were "making slow steps
without advancing" and claimed
that the key to victory "lies in
staging a people's war." The
radio went on to exhort "revolu-
tionaries" to fight this war in
the streets, factories, and rural
areas.
Page 8
The tone of seizure announc
ments indicates that pro-Mao
forces are firmly in control of
the party apparatus in the East
China provinces of Kiangsi, Anhwei
and Shantung. Peking's failure
to endorse these take-overs may
be related to problems involving
the loyalty of local military
commanders.
Economic Aspects
Peking has taken measures to
protect and distribute supplies
of food and other daily necessi-
ties in hopes of alleviating the
more immediate economic problems
resulting from the "cultural revo-
lution." Maoist leaders still
seem determined, however, to push
the revolution despite its dis-
ruptive effects on production and
labor discipline.
In quick succession, Peking
on 30 January ordered postponement
of the lunar new year celebra-
tions, and on 3 February or-
dered the military to take control
of stocks of food and "other im-
portant materials." The celebra-
tions were postponed so as not to
compound existing difficulties--
intermittent transport stoppages,
some consumer goods shortages,
and worker absenteeism. The holi-
day period is normally an occasion
for extensive travel and above-
normal demand for consumer goods.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET I%w
Military control of food
stocks is probably intended to
ensure that food supplies from
the below-average 1966 harvest
are stretched and distributed in
accord with Peking's desires. The
transfer implies distrust of pub-
lic security organizations, which
in the past have controlled food
stocks.
Since the authority of the
Chinese Communist party apparatus
has been badly damaged, it is
doubtful whether it is effectively
carrying out the leadership's
latest directives.
Whether or not Peking suc-
ceeds in alleviating the most
pressing economic problems created
by the "cultural revolution," the
movement continues to generate
SECRET
Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY
future troubles for the economy.
The unprecedented lapse in labor
discipline of the past month has
allowed long-suppressed popular
desire for a better life to sur-
face. Workers and peasants have
been vigorously demanding higher
wages, more welfare benefits, re-
vised employment practices, a
larger share of the crop, more
state loans, and even larger pri-
vate plots. According to official
propaganda, these demands have
been kindled by forces opposed to
Mao in order to sabotage his "cul-
tural revolution." Whatever their
origin, these demands represent
real grievances. High officials,
including Chou En-lai, have felt
compelled, consequently, to promise
consideration of the demands after
the revolution is completed rather
than summarily dismissing them.
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET
CHINESE STEP UP ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN
Peking's drive to goad Mos-
cow into a diplomatic break, now
entering its third week, appears
intended in part to bolster the
"cultural revoluticon" by uniting
the people against a foreign en-
emy. Anti-Soviet demonstrations
are reported in major cities out-
side the capital, and domestic
propaganda broadcasts have warned
against a possible coup by pro--
Soviet Chinese.
The unprecedented. violence
of the campaign and the evident.
Chinese determination to push it
through to a conclusion suggests,
however, that other, equally im-
portant objectives are involved.
A complete break in diplomatic
ties would enormously complicate
Soviet problems in dealing with
the Vietnamese war, and could
confront Moscow with difficult
decisions regarding support for
Hanoi.
If the Chinese succeed in
forcing Moscow to take the first
step in breaking relations, Peking
would blame the Soviets for any
tie-up in overland aid shipments
to Vietnam. The only feasible
alternative to rail transport of
major military materiel through
China would be shipments by sea.
The Chinese have repeatedly
charged that Moscow was reluctant
to take this step through fear
of a confrontation with the US
and the Chinese probably believe
that in a pinch the Soviets would
refuse to ship by sea and thus
discredit themselves in Hanoi.
Izvestia on 9 February ac-
cused China of doing all. it could
to break transport links between
the Soviet Union and North Viet-
nam. This was the first time an
official Soviet organ had leveled
this charge. The paper also
quoted speculation in the Western
press that Peking is seeking a
break in relations with Moscow
in order to isolate the North
Vietnamese and stop Soviet deliv-
eries. This may be the first
step in an effort to shift the
onus for any future difficulties
onto Peking.
The Chinese are apparently
stepping up the pressure on the
Soviets in Peking. The embassy
is under a virtual siege and the
Chinese have been taking steps
to render the situation intoler-
able. Soviet officials have been
warned to stay inside their com-
pound in order to escape "serious
incidents." East European diplo-
mats, who have been taking in
food and other necessities to
the beleaguered Russians, have
been informed that their safety
cannot be guaranteed if they per-
sist.
SECRET
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
SECRET ..W
Nonstop demonstrations out-
side the embassy have made de-
liveries of fuel impossible and,
according to the Reuters corre-
spondent, Soviet diplomats have
said that coal supplies will last
only until the end of the month.
The Chinese could make the sit-
uation untenable even sooner by
cutting off water and electricity.
Despite their difficult
situation, the Soviets apparently
hope to ride out the current
crisis. Reuters reports from
Peking that the Russians have
laid in several tons of food and
have filled the embassy swimming
pool with a reserve supply of
water. Most if not all dependents
have been flown home
SECRET
Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Moscow thus appears ready
to go to great lengths in order
to maintain a diplomatic mission
in China. On 9 February Premier
Kosygin stated that Moscow would
go on doing all it could to pre-
vent any "break up in diplomatic
relations." He added that "it
all depends on the other side."
The Russians appear to be
preparing against the possibility
that the Chinese will take some
drastic additional action to
force them out of Peking.
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET
ANTI-SUKARNO CAMPAIGN IN INDONESIA GAINS MOMENTUM
Pressures against Indonesia's
President Sukarno continue to
mount. Most Indonesians no longer
debate whether or when he should
be removed but how to accomplish
it and what subsequently should
be done with him.
For the time being, the prin-
cipal emphasis is on persuading
Sukarno to resign. In addition.
to Foreign Minister Adam Malik,
several high-ranking army officers
and some leaders of the National
Party--until recently a Sukarno
bulwark--have asked the President
to leave the country in order to
avoid the necessity of taking
legal action against him.
Student leaders argue that
it is too late to let Sukarno
retire quietly and that he must
be forced to face congressional
action and a court trial. The
Provisional People's Consultative
Assembly (MPRS), the country's
foremost policy-making body which
would be required to take any ac-
tion against Sukarno, reportedly
is scheduled to convene on 6 March.
Anti-Sukarno, pro-army ranks in
the MPRS have been considerably
strengthened by the addition to
the Indonesian Parliament of 108
new appointees, including at
least 20 student and youth leaders.
Parliament, now with 350 members,
sits as a body in the MPRS, whose
total membership now is 649.
While the regime is placing
chief emphasis on the Sukarno
problem, it is also making prog-
ress in restoring Indonesia's
economy and international stand-
ing. The recently passed for-
eign investment act which con-
siderably improves the climate
for foreign business activity
has now become law. Indonesia
has also negotiated an invest-
ment guarantee agreement with
the United States. Stabiliza-
tion measures initiated in late
1966, have helped slow the
country's economic deterioration.
Indonesia's Western credi-
tors are scheduled to meet in
Amsterdam on 23 and 24 February
to deal with the rescheduling
of about two thirds of Indonesia's
total debt to Western nations.
The other third was rescheduled
at a meeting in Paris last Decem-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET
FACTIONAL MANEUVERING IN LAOS
Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma's rightist deputy, Leuam
Insiesingmay, is exerting pres-
sure in an effort to bolster his
much eroded position within the
Laotian Government. Souvanna
nevertheless is well set to gain
cooperation from the new National
Assembly which opened last week.
Leuam's failure to secure
the election of more than a half
dozen or so of his followers in
the voting for the new assembly
on 1 January substantially re-
duced his influence. In the pre-
vious assembly his rightist fac-
tion held 32 out of the 59 seats.
In the pre-election maneuvering
Leuam was unable to persuade key
regional military commanders to
support candidates amenable to
his leadership. Since the elec-
tion, he has threatened to resign
from the formal leadership of
the rightist faction--a position
of some importance to the nominal
balancing of the assembly among
leftist, rightist, and neutralist
elements--unless Souvanna gives
him a greater say in government
decisions.
So far, Souvanna has been
unmoved. He has advised Leuam
that if he resigns from the as-
sembly position, he must also
vacate the deputy prime minister-
ship, a considerably more substan-
tial office to which Leuam is
clinging. Souvanna's assembly
position is strong enough that
he need not accommodate Leuam. A
majority of the deputies have
pledged support to the prime
minister, and the president of
the assembly has agreed to shep-
herd his programs through.
A much more difficult prob-
lem for Souvanna is the question
of integrating the neutralist
military into the Royal Armed
Forces. Discussions have found-
ered on the question of revealing
the neutralists' true force lev-
els. They have been receiving
funds and supplies on the basis
of inflated strength figures
which enable officers to pocket
the proceeds of unused allotments.
Certain commanders, notably Col.
Somphet, are jockeying for the
favor of the general staff in
Vientiane by revealing the sizes
of their fellow officers' units
and proclaiming themselves sup-
porters of full integration.
On the military front, the
Communists have again shown their
ability to strike at will at ma-
jor government installations in
many areas by attacking Luang
Prabang Airfield on 2 February
and destroying a number of tac-
tical aircraft. The raid was
probably a reaction to the ef-
fective government use of Luang
Prabang - based aircraft against
Communist ground operations.
SECRET
Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECFZF1
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MAY RENEW FOCUS ON DEFENSE
Prime Minister Sato's man-
date from the Japanese elections
on 29 January has given him a
firmer base for expanding Japan's
defense effort.
Sato has long favored a
strong defense posture for his
country. In late 1965, follow-
?..ng Peking's first nuclear ex-
plosions, he began publicly sup-
porting an increase in Japan's
defense effort, and the first
serious public debate on Japanese
security ensued.
:3ato presumably considers
tdat the election results con-
stituted an endorsement of his
publicly avowed support for the
0", including mutual defense
arrangements, and of his cam-
udign attacks on the Socialists
=,-; the minions of Peking. Pe-
nq,s recent nuclear explosions
d r_ resen : domestic turmoil
sci provide a favorable atmo-
=,here for discussing defense.
,a e will soon try to push budget
F_oposals ::hrough the new Diet
,'age 14
to raise defense appropriations
from little over 1 percent of
Japan's GNP of about $100 bil-
lion to 2 percent.
On 2 February
Vice Foreign Minister Shimoda
told the press that the return
of Okinawa might be feasible
if the US were assured of un-
encumbered use of the bases in
R uk us.
Shimoda stressed the
need for the Japanese to reach
a consensus on unrestricted
use of the US bases.
any
ensuing public discussion helps
focus attention on the wider
problem of Japan's security.
25X6
25X6
25X6
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET `'
EUROPE
Soviet leaders continue their active diplomacy
in Europe. Kosygin is now in the UK promoting, as
Podgorny had done last week in Italy, the ideas of
detente, European security, and trade. Brezhnev,
meanwhile, went to Prague, where, among other things,
he must have been trying to deal with problems cre-
ated by West Germany's diplomatic maneuvers in East-
ern Europe.
The Rumanians refuse to be called to account
for their recognition of Bonn and have let it be
known that they would boycott a meeting of the Warsaw
Pact foreign ministers, at first set for last Monday
in East Berlin, if the meeting were held there and
if the subject of their relations with West Germany
were raised. The meeting was thereupon reset for
later in the week in Warsaw, and it now seems likely
to bring forth only the most general statement of
support for East Germany.
In Western Europe, attention remains focused
on the crucial Kennedy Round trade negotiations and
on discussions over the draft nonproliferation treaty.
West German Foreign Minister Brandt, meanwhile, vis-
ited Washington this week to discuss the nonprolif-
eration treaty, the troop offset agreement, and Bonn's
relations with Eastern Europe.
SECRET
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
.-r SECRET
UK AND MALTA AT IMPASSE OVER PLANNED BRITISH TROOP CUTBACK
Britain's plan to reduce
its forces on Malta has embit-
tered the Maltese, but London
now has proposed new talks on
the issue which offer some hope
of ending the impasse between
the two governments.
Malta's principal concern
is the effect the British troop
cutback would have on its econ-
omy. London agreed to limited
concessions three weeks ago but
its final offer failed to satisfy
the Maltese. Malta thereupon re-
Page 17
taliated by abruptly renounc-
ing its defense agreement with
the UK and subsequently rejected
another British offer. It in-
sisted that the British either
reverse the decision to reduce
their forces there--numbering
about 4,300--or get out entirely.
To harass the British, the
Maltese have withheld tax-free
fuel and other supplies and re-
fused services for UK units. They
also introduced legislation to
remove privileges and immunities
granted British military personnel.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
NkI SECRET 4111110
Now, however, the Maltese
Government has indicated an in-
terest in Britain's latest offer
to discuss the economic effects
of the troop reduction. London
also expressed its willingness
to talk about rephasing the with-
drawals.
Maltese Prime Minister Borg
Olivier has been under pressure
from the left-leaning opposition
leader, Dom Mintoff, and from
labor unions--whose members would
suffer the most from an economic
pinch. Mintoff argues that Malta
has always been undercompensated
for the Western presence. He
has made vague claims that he can
get economic assistance from Com-
munist and neutralist countries.
The US ambassador to Malta
believes that further harass-
BALEARIC
ISLANDS
ment of British forces might lead
to a break in relations and a
chaotic internal situation. A
breakdown of order or a rapid de-
terioration of the economy could
lead to the downfall of Borg
Olivier's pro-Western government
and the return of Mintoff's Labor
Party to power.
If the two sides do not re-
solve the dispute in further talks
an effort will probably be made
to have NATO play a conciliatory
role. It would be asked to ex-
pand its proposed study of the im-
plications for Malta of the re-
organization of the NATO Mediter-
ranean Command there to include
a review of the consequences of
the British force reductions. -
R C,
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY
MALTESE ISLANDS
Valletta
M ALTA 7i
rl
ISRAEL,
lexani~7'1a ~4f
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET VW
PACE OF KENNEDY ROUND TRADE TALKS STEPPING UP
Participants in the Kennedy
Round of trade and tariff nego-
tiations are under the pressure
of time to show results within
the next two months. The authority
granted under the US Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962 to cut tariffs
by as much as 50 percent expires
on 30 June, and negotiated con-
cessions must be in shape for
formal approval by then.
sible EEC, and particularly French,
efforts to revive debate on how
to handle the mutual reduction of
particular tariffs which are mark-
edly higher in the US than in
Europe; the US protectionist
valuating system for certain chem-
icals; and various "nontariff
barriers" to trade--the most re-
cent complaint being the new US
auto safety standards.
The principal negotiators
--the US, UK, EEC, and Japan, plus
the Scandinavians, Switzerland,
and Canada--agreed in Geneva last
week to press for agreement on
the key issues by the beginning
of April. To meet this deadline,
negotiations within separate com-
mittees dealing with specific
products such as chemicals, steel,
grains, and cotton textiles will
have to be sharply intensified.
Ultimately, each delegation must
be able to recommend to its re-
spective government a "package"
of concessions balanced among all
these sectors.
With the crunch thus ap-
proaching, the "war of nerves"
which has been part of the Geneva
talks since their inception has
also intensified, and the Euro-
pean press has been carrying
gloomy reports about the final
outcome. These have tended to
concentrate on what are in fact
likely to be major problems: pos-
The EEC--still working out
its internal policies and having
to reconcile the interests of
its six members--remains the main
source of uncertainty. Although
the community will doubtless be
tough to the end, there have been
several favorable developments.
The EEC's Commission is negotiat-
ing more freely than before, and
West Germany, with a recession on
its hands, seems even more eager
to bring about sizable tariff
cuts. Also, the French have
agreed to push for a community
commitment to provide food to
less developed countries as part
of a global grain agreement. Such
a commitment is of great impor-
tance to the US, but the Dutch
and Germans, in particular, will
for financial reasons have con-
siderable difficulty accepting
it.
Thus far, Britain's "prob-
ings" for EEC membership appear
to have had no impact on the
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET
tariff talks. There has, however,
been some questioning in the
French press whether the EEC
should make concessions now to
the UK and EFTA countries, since
their eventual membership in the
E3C would make such concessions
superfluous.
The problems the developing
countries have getting benefits
from the Kennedy Round were re--
cently highlighted at a high-level
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade) meeting in Argentina.
Some of these countries stand to
suffer reductions in the pref-
erences they presently enjoy in
developed-country markets as a
result of the Geneva negotia-
tions. Differences among the
industrialized nations on how to 25X1
"compensate" them for such losses
may create another difficult
Kennedy Round hurdle.
SECRET
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET *ftol
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Official royal African visits to the US domi-
nate the scene this week, with the arrival of King
Hassan of Morocco on 9 February to press for more
defensive arms aid to counter the Soviet arms build-
up in Algeria. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia,
scheduled to arrive on 13 February, also wants ex-
tensive arms aid and may go to Moscow for them if
he does not get the huge package he wants from the
US. (An article on page 15 discusses the numerous
problems that underlie his search for arms.)
On the continent, the picture in the Congo
brightened a bit when Mobutu indicated willingness
to discuss the formation of an international "asso-
ciation" to mine and market the copper. In Nigeria,
however, the prospects for another meeting of the
antagonists are dim, although a meeting of the Su-
preme Military Council has been called for later
this month. Algeria held communal elections on 5
February and the regime's success in holding them
at all may bode well for future elections on a
state and national level.
The closing days of the Indian general elec-
tion campaign have been marked by violence and much
heckling of the Congress Party campaigners--even
Mrs. Gandhi was struck by a thrown rock.
The Greek Crown Council on Cyprus met this
week with Cypriot President Makarios in attendance,
and Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos announced his
intention to continue the dialogue on this thorny
problem with Turkey on the ministerial level.
Israel says it continues to find terrorist
bombs near its borders. Another Israeli-Syrian
meeting on the dispute over farming in the demili-
tarized zone has been postponed for a week. Saudi
Arabia is still sounding out Yemeni anti-Egyptian
sentiment to see what if anything can be done about
the Egyptian presence in Yemen.
SECRET
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET
INDIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN INTENSIFIES
Electoral prospects for
India's long-ruling Congress Party
have not materially changed as
the campaign for the 15-21 Febru-
ary general election enters its
final week. The campaign itself,
however, has grown more heated
and incidents of violence report-
edly have increased.
leaders, including Prime Minister
Gandhi, have been heckled and
even physically assaulted while
campaigning in opposition strong-
holds. Rocks, tomatoes, and
shoes have been thrown at Congress
candidates, especially by vola-
tile conservative elements in the
cities.
Congress seems certain to
retain a viable, but reduced,
working majority in the national
parliament. The biggest gains at
Congress' expense are likely to
be scored by the right-wing oppo-
sition parties--the Hindu nation-
alist Jan Sangh and the conserva-
tive Swatantra. The Indian Com-
munists, split since 1964 into
two rival parties, are not ex-
pected to improve much, if at all,
on the 29 seats won by the united
party in 1962. On the state level,
opposition parties will almost
certainly capture one of the 17
state governments--Kerala--and
have varying prospects of depriv-
ing Congress of its majority in
the legislatures of at least five
other states.
The major opposition parties,
eager to destroy the image of
Congress invincibility, are
strongly on the offensive. They
have kept alive the prevailing
mood of discontent and dissent
by assailing the incumbent Con-
gress governments from virtually
every angle. Congress Party
The extent of pre-electoral
violence has given Indian authori-
ties cause for concern, with the
chief election commissioner warn-
ing that such violence threatens
to alter the climate of freedom
for the elections. Mrs. Gandhi,
herself the victim of a well-aimed
rock, has appealed to the country
to maintain its good record for
orderly electioneering.
Although several national
issues have emerged--inflation,
food shortage, currency devalua-
tion, and the demand for a nation-
wide ban on cow slaughter--none
of these is expected to have a
decisive effect on the election
results. Indian voters, espe-
cially in the rural areas where
most of them live, still tend to
vote on the basis of personality,
caste, and strictly local issues.
It is in these areas that Con-
gress, with the only nationwide 25X1
political machine, has what should
be a decisive advantage over its
splintered opposition.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET
REVIVING OPPOSITION IN PAKISTAN
Pakistani President Ayub Khan
faces mounting political problems.
Although they present no immediate
threat to his regime, he must han-
dle them deftly lest they be ex-
ploited by his reviving opposition.
After seven-year retirement
imposed by Ayub's military regime
in 1960, some of the most promi-
nent civilian politicians of the
1950s are returning to political
activity and this is changing the
cast of personalities with whom
Ayub must cope. Some of these so-
called EBDOnians--a term derived
from the initials of the enabling
order which automatically expired
on 31 December 1966--are joining
his Pakistan Muslim League, and
to this Ayub will have to adjust.
The more active ones, however, are
returning to the opposition.
Mumtaz Daultana--a former pro-
vincial chief minister and possibly
the most important of the EBDO-
nians--appears to be having some
success in uniting the center and
rightist opposition in West Paki-
stan. He may hope to unite all
anti-Ayub factions on the basis of
their opposition to the current in-
direct electoral system--one of the
few issues on which they agree.
However, Daultana has not yet been
able to reach an agreement with
the extreme leftist National Awami
Party, nor has he yet devised a po-
sition on provincial autonomy ac-
ceptable both to West Pakistanis
and to the Awami League, which ad-
vocates near independence for East
Pakistan. If Daultana succeeds in
uniting antiregime elements, Ayub
could face his greatest political
challenge in several years.
Among Ayub's more immediate
problems which are subject to op-
position exploitation has been the
high price of food. This has been
an important cause of two major
strikes--one of port workers in
Karachi, the other a rail strike
which temporarily paralyzed trans-
portation in West Pakistan. Al-
though the government moved quickly
to force union leaders to agree to
a settlement, recognized labor
leaders lost control of union mem-
bers to leftist agitators who may
have been under Communist direc-
tion. The government found it nec-
cessary to make large-scale arrests,
to fire on strikers, and to use
troops to run the trains before the
strikers began returning to work.
Another, more transitory
problem has been a dispute between
ultraconservative religious lead-
ers and an Ayub-appointed committee
as to the exact day on which this
year's Ramadan fast ended. Ayub
retaliated by "detaining" five of
the Muslim leaders, and the arrests
appear to have increased popular
dissatisfaction.
The continued arrival of for-
eign aid grain is improving the
food situation, and resentment
over the Ramadan confusion will
disappear fairly soon. However,
other problems are bound to arise,
any of which would help a revivi-
fied opposition to whittle away at
Ayub's still great political
strength.
SECRET
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET
EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA TO VISIT UNITED STATES
Emperor Haile Selassie ar-
rives in Washington on 13 February
for long-sought talks with Presi-
dent Johnson. He is deeply con-
cerned with developments in the
Horn of Africa and the Red Sea
basin which he apparently sees
as a Somali-Arab-Communist con-
spiracy and a threat to the
Ethiopian empire.
The Emperor's foremost con-
cern remains his archenemy, the
Somali Republic, which has designs
on the Somali-inhabited terri-
tories of Ethiopia and is support-
ing guerrilla activities there.
He is worried not only about that
country's Soviet-supplied mili-
tary buildup but also about its
designs on French Somaliland,
which is to decide in a 19 March
referendum whether or not to
with France.
Another concern is the Egyp-
tian and Communist presence in
Yemen and the threat this poses
to near-by Aden when the British
depart next year. Traditionally
wary of Muslim encirclement, the
Emperor's fears have been height-
ened by stepped-up Arab, Somali,
and Communist aid to Eritrean and
other dissidents
within his
em-
pire.
The Emperor
may sound
out US attitudes
regarding
pos-
sible Ethiopian
courses of
ac-
tions after the
referendum
in
Lassim
Berbera
Hargeisa Bender Beil
Page 24
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
`'"~ SECRET
French Somaliland. He has al-
ready made it clear that he could
not countenance a loss of French
control to other than Ethiopian
hands. In the event of a "no"
vote, he may attempt a pre-emp-
tive military take-over.
additional arms for his army,
navy, and air force, although he
may be angling for even stronger
US backing. Ethiopian officials
have already presented a large
shopping list of hardware valued
at an estimated $161 million.
Meanwhile, through bribery
and propaganda support, he is
aiding the French campaign to
achieve a "yes" vote. The French
are currently optimistic they
will achieve this by a small ma-
jority, but they do not discount
a surprise. French, Ethiopian,
and Somali referendum maneuvers
make any estimate hazardous.
Haile Selassie's main pitch
to the US apparently will be for
TALKS BEGIN BETWEEN UNION MINIERE AND CONGOLESE
Congolese President Mobutu
and Union Miniere have both shown
somewhat greater willingness to
resolve their dispute, but many
important issues remain to be
ironed out.
Union Miniere, reportedly
under considerable pressure from
the Belgian Government and from
other Belgian firms with inter-
ests in the Congo, gave its
blessing late last week to a
proposal for a new international
"association" to mine and market
the Congo's copper under contract.
Membership in the "association"
apparently would be offered to
several international mining
firms, but Union Miniere, even
though nominally excluded from
participation, would probably
continue to dominate the group
through its control of European
mining personnel in the Congo.
A representative of a firm as-
sociated with Union Miniere pre-
sented the proposal to Mobutu
during a meeting on 6 February.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET
Mobutu had earlier turned
down terms very similar to this
proposal and had refused to con-
sider a place in mining and mar-
keting for either Union Miniere
or its associates. Nonetheless,
at. the 6 February meeting
he indicated a willingness to
use the new proposal as a basis
for negotiations.
Although the two sides are
in. direct communication for the
first time since early December,
there probably will be many ups
and downs in their talks. There
are indications, for example
that they take divergent views
of the "association's" purpose.
Mobutu sees the association as
a stopgap until he can work out
alternative arrangements, whereas
the Union Miniere group says
it will cooperate only if the
Congolese agree to a long-term
contract.
ALGERIA HOLDS COMMUNAL ELECTIONS
The successful holding of
Algerian communal elections on
5 February--the first balloting
for local officials since inde-
pendence five years ago--is the
Boumediene regime's first achieve-
ment toward putting the country's
administration on a firm founda-
tion. The regime may now consider
it possible to hold elections for
departmental councils and ulti-
mately for a national assembly.
The elections were conducted
in an atmosphere of apparent calm.
Despite the poor weather, the
turnout reached as high as 90
percent in some rural areas and
55 percent in Algiers. The regime
had made an intensive effort over
the last three -months to arouse
interest in the elections, to
ex?plain their purpose, and to
introduce candidates. The higher
participation in rural areas was
due to efforts of local gendarmes
apparently ordered to make sure
the people voted. Also, candi-
dates were better known person-
ally.
The country's sole politi-
cal party, the National Libera-
tion Front, was assigned the
task of preparing the electoral
lists, basing selection of can-
didates on demonstrated ability
as well as on party militancy.
Some choice, however, was pro-
vided by listing two nominees
for each seat.
These elections are the
final step in the broad program
of communal reform, embodied in
a Communal Charter adopted by
the Revolutionary Council early
in January. The regime's aims
are twofold: to stimulate and
encourage participation in gov-
ernmental affairs at the Grass-
roots level, and to shift the
central government's massive
administrative and financial
burdens to the local level.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
``WV SECRET -wov
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Much of the political activity in the hemi-
sphere last week was related to the forthcoming
inter-American meetings in Buenos Aires.
The chief task of one of those assemblies--
the 11th Meeting of Foreign Ministers--will be to
choose a date, site, and agenda for the proposed
inter-American summit conference. Most countries
are now reconciled to having the meeting in mid-
April at Punta del Este, Uruguay, but a consensus
on details of an agenda will be harder to find.
Chile, Colombia, and Mexico still insist that an
agenda be spelled out before their presidents
commit themselves to attend. The Colombian foreign
minister has suggested a month's delay in the
meeting, even if an agenda agreement is reached.
Attendance of several other presidents remains
uncertain. Haiti's Duvalier may stay home for fear
of not being allowed to return should he leave.
Barrientos of Bolivia needs some face-saving agree-
ment on his demand that Bolivia's aspirations for
an outlet to the Pacific be discussed.
One of the matters that was slated for discus-
sion at the second of the Buenos Aires meetings--
the Third Special Inter-American Conference, con-
voked to revise the OAS Charter--has been dropped.
Brazil's proposal to "institutionalize" the Inter-
American Defense Board--an independent body with
only advisory powers--by making it a formal OAS
mechanism ran into such determined opposition from
Mexico and Chile that Brazil backed off.
Deliberations of the hemisphere's diplomats
in Buenos Aires next week could be interrupted by
demonstrations or attempted disturbances.
SECRET
Page 27 WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Feb 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRETI'
FRAUD CHARGED IN NICARAGUAN ELECTION
Preliminary returns give Gen-
eral Somoza a substantial lead in
Nicaragua's presidential
election on 5 February,
but official results are
being announced so slowly
that the opposition is
claiming fraud in the bal-
lot count.
regularities during the
voting were widespread,
mostly in rural areas.
Opposition electoral
judges in some instances
were prevented from tak-
ing their places or were
otherwise harassed. in
several areas ballots
were marked on the table
65666
PRESIDENT SOMOZA
cases no voting booth was
provided. Furthermore,
complaints of multiple vot-
ing were numerous.
`aOVIET-CUBAN ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDED
The USSR and Cuba signed their
1967 trade agreement on 1 Febru-
ary. The negotiations were pro-
tracted, probably because of So-
viet determination to hold down
the level of aid.
Last year when Cuba's poor
sugar crop reduced its deliveries
to the USSR, Moscow had to increase
its support to at least double the
$91 million it had already pro-
in front of the judges or even out-
side the polling station. In some
grained to finance the chronic im-
balance in its Cuban trade. ,'his
brought the total of Soviet eco-
nomic credits to Cuba since 1960
to more than ono billion dollars.
Significant financial assist-
ance will continue this year in
the form of the sugar subsidy.
The USSR has agreed to pay six
cents a pound for Cuban sugar--
more than three times the current
SECRET,
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
SI~,CRF'1`
market price--for up to 4 million
tons in 1967. Havana is unlikely
to meet this target, but the good
current crop may permit delivery
to the USSR of at least 3 million
tons---last year's export target.
Sugar deliveries probably are to
account for most of the 23-percent
growth in trade which the new
trade pact. establishes as a goal
for 1967.
The USSR remains Cuba's
chief source of foreign support
and accounts for half its $1.5-
billion foreign trade. China has
cut back its trade with Cuba, and
other Communist countries assist
Cuba reluctantly. The Polish
trade agreement this year, for
instance, specifies only that
trade will "equal" that for 1966.
Cuban-Soviet differences over
the aims of the aid program were
probably a factor in protracting
the negotiations, which began
last October. For several years
the USSR has provided large quan-
tities of specially designed
equipment and hundreds of tech-
nicians to improve Cuban agricul-
ture, but Havana. continues to
seek more aid for industrial
projects.
Any problems encountered dur-
ing the trade talks had no ef-
fect on Soviet military deliver-
ies. These have been increased
in recent months in an effort to
refurbish the Cuban armed forces,
and replace worn out or destroyed
e ui ment.
Recent ar-
rivals include eight new naval
ships--patrol craft and subchas-
ers.
S EC R ET
Page 29 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
- SECRET -
DOMINICAN PRESIDENT MOVES TO SHORE UP POLITICAL POSITION
Dominican President Balaguer
has been trying to shore up his
political position and has demon-
strated particular concern over
the solidarity of his military
and police support. He intends
to restore the pay of military
and police officers to the level
prevailing before the government
adopted austerity policies last
summer.
Balaguer's authorization of
a roundup of left-wing dissidents
on 22 January was partially in-
tended to show the military that
he could move firmly to curb anti-
government activities. Similarly,
his speech on 4 February portray-
ing plotting and subversion by
the Communists may have been in-
tended in part to reassure hard-
line military elements that he
is not blind to this danger.
Relations with opposition
elements acceptable to Balaguer
are also coming in for presiden-
tial attention. In an attempt to
isolate and weaken the militant
leadership of the left-of-center
Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD), Balaguer has named PRD
dissident Angel Miolan to be
Minister without portfolio. He
has also taken a relatively mod-
erate and flexible stand in deal-
ings with the left-of-center Rev-
olutionary Social Christian Party,
which has indicated its inten-
tions to keep its opposition ac-
tivities within bounds acceptable
to Balaguer.
Balaguer has taken some steps
to allay concern among moderates
over the sometimes arbitrary ac-
tions of the government. He has
publicly apologized to non-Commu-
nist dissidents who were caught
in the roundup of left-wingers
last month and now seems willing
to accept some of the secondary-
student demands that have led to a
protracted school boycott.
Through his statements and
actions Balaguer appears to be
consciously attempting to create
an impression that he is in
full control of political develop-
ments and is not threatened by
any serious unrest. His assidu-
ous cultivation of potential po-
litical allies seems to indicate 25X1
apprehension that challenges to
his government may be developing
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
W"I% SECRET %ftp
BRAZIL PROMOTING TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND USSR
The Brazilian trade mission
that has been touring Eastern Eu-
rope for several weeks has con-
cluded its talks there and moved
on to Western Europe and the US.
The mission, headed by Minister
of Industry and Commerce Martins,
is part of a major Brazilian ef-
fort to expand foreign trade.
Brazil has been sending about
six percent of its total exports
to the USSR and Eastern Europe
in recent years, but the volume
has been limited by Brazil's
restricted capacity to import
bloc products. Exports averaged
about $100 million annually dur-
ing 1964 and 1965, and rose to
nearly $70 million in the first
half of 1966.
In Moscow the Brazilians con-
cluded the first deal under last
year's $100-million credit agree-
ment with the Soviets. A $5-mil-
lion credit was extended to fi-
nance the construction of a petro-
chemical plant in the state of
Bahia.
Page 31
Brazil is in the market
for transport aircraft and, in
response to an earlier Soviet
invitation, is sending repre-
sentatives to Moscow to study
the aircraft industry. Bra-
zilian airlines' needs and the
recent trade and aid agreement
have increased the prospects
for the USSR's first sale of
aircraft in Latin America.
Three days of talks in War-
saw ended with the signing of a
trade protocol that should clear
the way for detailed negotia-
tions. There was further dis-
cussion of an earlier proposal
whereby Brazil would purchase
$30-60 million worth of Polish
merchant ships and pay for them
principally in coffee. If con-
cluded, it would be the largest
Polish shipbuilding deal with
any non-Communist country.
power complex.
complex and the Ilha Solteira
Exploratory trade talks
were also held in Czechoslovakia.
The two countries agreed to put
their trade on a hard currency
basis immediately. Both sides
indicated an interest in possi-
ble Czech participation in major
Brazilian development projects,
including the large US-financed
and -built Volta Redonda Steel
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
SECRET
Hard bargaining is likely
t:o be the order of the day when
foreign ministers of the Western
Hemisphere meet in Buenos Aires
on 15 February. Differences of
opinion are already apparent on
every item to be discussed at
these meetings, the Third Spe--
c_ial Inter-American Conference
and the 11th Meeting of Foreign
Ministers.
One major purpose of the
meeting is to make final deci-,
sions on amendments to the Charter
of the Organization of American
States (OAS). These amendments
were drafted by a special OAS
committee in Panama almost a
year ago, but the follow-up meet-
ing scheduled for August was
postponed because of the mili-
tary coup in Argentina. The most
controversial of these amendments
is one spelling out US undertak-
ings on economic aid, which the
ES opposes and other members are
eager to adopt.
Differences of opinion are
also likely over regional eco-
nomic integration. According
to a press report, the Chilean
foreign minister, who is one of
the strongest advocates of in-
tegration, may not attend be-
cause of political problems at
home. The US ambassador in San-
tiago, however, believes that
Valdes will go. If he stays
away, strong leadership for any
meaningful decisions on economic
cooperation may be lacking.
Planning for the inter-
American summit meeting may also
pose problems. Although most
members agree that the meeting
should be held at Punta del Fste,
Uruguay, from 12 to 14 April,
some countries find these dates
inconvenient because of govern-
ment changes and congressional
sessions. Furthermore, there
is some feeling that it is pre-
mature to set a time and place
before an agenda has been de-
cided on.
Observers have been invited
from Canada and the former Brit-
ish colonies of Jamaica, Trini-
dad and Tobago, Guyana, and Bar-
bados. Their presence may spark
at least informal discussion of
the advisability of enlarging
the organization, a prospect
that some present members view
with distaste. By the time the
meeting convenes, Trinidad and
Tobago may have applied for OAS
membership. Barbados, too, has
indicated its desire to loin
SECRET
Fage 32 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
HEMISPHERE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET NEXT WEEK
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/06/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600080001-4