WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005400110001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 7, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Copy No.
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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(Information as of noon EDT, 6 October 1966)
VIETNAM
South Vietnam's constituent assembly continues to
undertake additional projects, but has so far avoided
controversy with the government. Military activity
shifted to the coastal highlands of Binh Dinh Province.
Government leaders are preparing for the Manila con-
ference scheduled for late October. Buddhist moderate
Tam Chau has begun negotiating with the government
without approval from the militants, raising the pos-
sibility of a formal organizational split. Hanoi,
still balancing relations between Peking and Moscow,
was unusually active in meetings with its Communist
allies.
ANNIVERSARY OF INDONESIAN COUP ATTEMPT
The major feature of the occasion was the trial of
President Sukarno's chief lieutenant, former foreign
minister Subandrio, for his role in the abortive
coup. Student demands that Sukarno himself face trial
seem to have exceeded army guidelines.
NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS IN PEKING
All major pronouncements during the regime's 17th
anniversary indicate continuing preoccupation with
internal problems. The absence of important foreign
dignitaries provided new evidence of Peking's isolation.
Europe
EXCELLENT CROP PROSPECTS FOR USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE
This year's wheat crop in the USSR, in excess of 65
million metric tons, is above average and approaches
the record set in 1964. East European prospects are
also generally good to excellent.
Page
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WEST CONFRONTED BY POLISH-CZECH NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS OFFER
Public offers by Poland and Czechoslovakia at last
month's IAEA conference to place their nuclear fgacil-
ities under IAEA inspection--provided West Germany
does the same--have introduced a new element into the
debate over nuclear safeguards.
CONGO MUTINEERS STILL AT LARGE
The approximately 2,500 Katangans who left Kisangani
(Stanleyville) are seeking negotiations that will per-
mit their return home.
NIGERIAN CRISIS DEEPENS
Widespread violence in the North seems checked for the
moment but might resume at any time. The disorders may
negate modest progress made in constitutional talks
that adjourned on 3 October for three weeks.
ALGERIA HIT BY SEVERE DROUGHT
Summer grain harvests are less than half of normal,
threatening a famine and a further depression of gen-
eral economic conditions.
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UN FACING DIFFICULTIES OVER SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
Forty-nine Afro-Asian members of the UN have tabled a
resolution on South-West Africa that, if passed, will
result in a head-on confrontation with the Republic
of South Africa.
25X6
Western Hemisphere
COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN URUGUYAN LABOR
The Uruguyan Government, trying to halt the latest
round of Communist-inspired labor agitation, expelled
four Soviet officials
BRAZIL ELECTS COSTA E SILVA PRESIDENT
Retired Marshal Arthur da Costa e Silva, the only
candidate, was elected president by the Brazilian Con-
gress on 3 October. Only one opposition congressman
ignored his party's decision to boycott the indirect
election.
THE SITUATION IN GUATEMALA
A change in leadership of the Guatemalan Communist
Party's action arm, the FAR, may enhance the party'
control over its guerrilla wing,
UNEXPLAINED BOMBINGS IN COSTA RICA
A recent series of ten small--but unexplained--bombings
in and around San Jose has created alarm among public
security officials although the public has taken the
incidents calmly so far.
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25X1
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SOUTH VIETNAM 7OCTOBER 1966
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Far East
VIETNAM
The Constituent Assembly
South Vietnam's Constituent
Assembly continues to undertake
projects in addition to drafting a
constitution, but thus far has
avoided controversy with the gov-
ernment. In working sessions on
30 September and 1 October, the as-
sembly created a subcommittee to
deal with flood relief in the delta
region south of Saigon, and decided
to send messages to various inter-
national groups including the United
Nations. It also adopted a resolu-
tion urging the government to re-
lease political prisoners under de-
tention, but left it to the govern-
ment to decide who merited amnesty.
In line with the assembly's con-
stitution drafting function, sub-
committees have begun work on pro-
cedural rules for the assembly and
an examination of the credentials
of its elected deputies. Work on
the constitution itself, however,
will probably not begin for several
weeks, as subcommittees have only
begun to draft procedure rules and
examine the credentials of the
elected deputies.
Political maneuvering is con-
tinuing among the assembly deputies
and may intensify along regional
lines as a result of a controversy
within Premier Ky's cabinet this
week. Although the incident has
apparently now been settled within
the cabinet by the resignation of
Health Secretary Nguyen Ba Kha, it
heightened long-standing regional
antagonisms. Several southern min-
isters, including the civilian dep-
uty premier, held Kha responsible
for the temporary arrest of a
southern subcabinet official by
police chief Loan, a northerner.
Page 1
This incident as well as another
reported instance of heavy-handed-
ness by a northern official, how-
ever, are being discussed by
southern assembly delegates and
could heighten their suspicion of
the northern-dominated military
leadership.
South Vietnam Military
The scene of major fighting
in South Vietnam during the past
week shifted from northernmost
Quang Tri Province to the Commu-
nist-infested coastal highlands
of central Binh Dinh Province.
Elements of the US lst Air
Cavalry Division engaged a possi-
ble regimental-size Viet Cong/
North Vietnamese Army force during
the opening phase of Operation
IRVING, a 15-battalion search-and-
destroy ground sweep targeted
against units of the Communist
610th Division in the Phu Cat Moun-
tain area of Binh Dinh Province.
By week's end, the running battle
that began on 1 October had re-
sulted in enemy losses of 314
killed, 191 captured, and 463 sus-
pects apprehended, as against US
casualties of nine killed and 52
wounded.
To the north, six US Marine
battalions continued to press
their two-month-old offensive--
Operation PRAIRIE--against the
9,400-man North Vietnamese Army
324B Division just south of the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating
North and South Vietnam. Although
no major engagements occurred, evi-
dence continued to mount of an in-
tensive enemy logistics, infiltra-
tion, and troop buildup effort in
Quang Tri Province.
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Several enemy documents re-
cently captured in Quang Tri Prov-
ince by US Marines have provided
additional insight into the mission
of North Vietnamese units in north-
ernmost South Vietnam. The docu-
ments give the general impression
that the 324B Division has two ma-
jor objectives. The first is to
prepare an impenetrable defensive
stronghold between the DMZ and
Route 9. The second is to take
some limited offensive action south
of Route 9, both to draw US forces
outside of their fortifications and
to try to "develop liberated areas
and corridors." The documents in-
timated that a large body of as-
yet-uncommitted North Vietnamese
Army forces had secretly moved into
the area.
The Manila Conference
Government leaders are pre-
paring for the seven-nation con-
ference scheduled to be held in
Manila. late in October. Of partic-
ular concern to military leaders is
the proposed discussion of a joint
policy on a negotiated settlement.
In recent public statements, Premier
Ky and. Foreign Minister Do stressed
that the inclusion of the Viet Cong
as a separate party at negotiations
is unacceptable, although Do indi-
cated that they might be included
as part of a North Vietnamese del-
egation. Premier Ky also told
newsmen on 1 October that the 1954
Geneva Accords were no longer use-
ful as a basis for any settlement.
Buddhist-Government Cooperation
After making no progress
since mid-September toward resolv-
ing his difficulties with militant
Buddhists, moderate Institute
chairman Tam Chau has begun to ne-
gotiate with the government with-
out their approval. On 2 October,
government officials publicly
turned over to Tam Chau the Vien
Hoa Dao pagoda, the Institute's
formal headquarters which had
been under government supervision
since duly. Eleven Buddhist
"struggle" prisoners were also re-
leased in Chau's custody at the
ceremony. Militant Buddhists, who
did not attend, reacted by declar-
ing that a scheduled national Bud-
dhist congress--which was intended
to patch up differ6nces between
Institute leaders--would now be
useless, raising once again the
possibility of a formal organiza-
tional split between militant and
moderate Buddhists;
Hanoi's Relations With Other
CommunAts
Hanoi was unu.Sually active
this week in meetings with its Com-
munist allies. Featured in DRV
propaganda were a joint communique
with the CzechosloVakian Communist
Party, the celebration of Chinese
National Day, the signing of a new
aid agreement with 'the Soviets, and
the announcement that a delegation
from the Bulgarian Communist Party
would soon visit Hanoi.
Throughout all the publicized
activity, Hanoi reaffirmed its basic
policy of balancing its relations
between Peking and Moscow. The com-
munique with the Czechs was largely
pro forma and uninformative, with
Hanoi once again endorsing the So-
viet-sponsored principle of bloc
unity in aid to North Vietnam. As
a counterbalance, almost the entire
North Vietnamese leadership, led
by Ho Chi Minh, turned out on 30
September for the Hanoi celebra-
tions of Chinese National Day, and
the DRV press gave the anniversary
extensive coverage.! The signing of
the new Soviet aid .pact pact on 3 Octo-
ber was also well publicized and,
although no details were given,
Hanoi commented appreciatively on
the nature and extent of the assist-
ance.
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ANNIVERSARY OF INDONESIAN COUP ATTEMPT
The focus in Djakarta this
week has been on the trial of
former foreign minister Suban-
drio, once President Sukarno's
chief lieutenant. Subandrio,
who has been in prison since
March, appeared in court on 1 Oc-
tober, the anniversary of last
year's abortive coup.
His trial had been delayed
partly to permit General Suharto
and his civilian colleagues to
structure their anti-Sukarno
campaign and to build the polit-
ical context in which they wished
Subandrio to appear as the ac-
cused. Although the delay may
have caused some loss in the
trial's dramatic impact, it has
enabled the government to exploit
Subandrio as a representative of
misgovernment and not solely as
another figure in the murder of
the six generals last year.
Students who had been dem-
onstrating against Sukarno dur-
ing most of the month of Septem-
ber now have surfaced demands
that he too face trial. Their
activity involved violence on at
least one day, and both their
pace and their demands appear to
have exceeded guidelines laid
down for them by the army. A
series of conferences between
army and student leaders seems to
have achieved an understanding,
at least for the time being, that
student activity will continue
but on a considerably lower
scale.
The anniversary passed
quietly in East and Central Java,
where left-wing elements have re-
sisted the anti-Sukarno campaign.
The Subandrio trial is being
given wide publicity in the hope
that its revelations will reduce
the President's still considerable
prestige in these areas.
In North Sumatra, currently
the main center of anti-Chinese
activity, the anniversary also
passed without incident. A Chi-
nese ship sent by Peking to Me-
dan, North Sumatra, has picked up
about 1,000 of some 7,000 Chinese
refugees gathered there. Although
it arrived on 21 September, Indo-
nesia had refused for security
reasons to let the ship dock un-
til 2 October or to allow the
crew to go ashore. Several Chi-
nese officials, however, were per-
mitted ashore to examine the refu-
gees' documentation.
Harassment of indigenous Chi-
nese during the past year has been
a by-product of Djakarta's anti-
Peking foreign policy. The pro-
Peking policy espoused by Sukarno
and Subandrio is another aspect
of the former regime that is be-
ing held up for severe censure in
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NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS IN PEKING
All major pronouncements from
Peking on the occasion of the re-
gime's 17th anniversary indicate
continuing preoccupation with the
struggle within the Chinese lead-
ership. Only perfunctory atten-
tion was given to foreign affairs
and the economic picture. Pro
forma and unconvincing claims were
made that the "situation abroad is
excellent," that a "new all round
leap forward is emerging" at home,
and that the harvest is "good."
The dominant theme of Lin
Piao's keynote speech at the 1
October review and of editorials
in the major party journals was
the continuing and apparently
broadening drive against powerful
but errant party officials. The
editorials stressed that the "cul-
tural revolution" is aimed not
only at outright enemies within
the party who will be ruthlessly
"crushed," but also at less cul-
pable officials who will merely
be criticized and presumably de-
moted. These latter officials
are said to have a "very poor
understanding" of Mao's cultural
ideas, to "fear" them, and to
resist them by "practicing fac-
tionalism consciously or uncon-
sciously."
One senior official against
whom such charges almost certainly
are being made is Liu Shao-chi,
Mao's former party deputy. Al-
though Liu appeared prominently
as chief of state at the 1 Octo-
ber review, he has been publicly
demoted from second to eighth
place in the party structure.
Other officials
who may be in the same category
are party general secretary Teng
Hsiao-ping, two regional bureau
chiefs who probably owed their
appointments tp Teng, and economic
planner Po I-pb, who has past as-
sociations with Teng. All four
reportedly have been criticized
in wall posters displayed by Red
Guard vigilantes in Peking.
New Leadership Possibly Unsure
The slow, hesitant develop-
ment of the drive against do-
mestic opponents suggests that
the new leadership is unsure and
divided. It is probable that Mao
and his new team, an uneasy al-
liance of disparate forces, are
unable to reach agreement on their
goals, how to reach them, or who
can be trusted. The Peking press
is claiming--probably with some
truth--that the campaign is tak-
ing so long because it is encoun-
tering considerable resistance.
The lackluster turnout of
guests from abroad provided new
evidence of the extent to which
Peking has become isolated in the
international; community. There
were no important foreign digni-
taries present--from either Com-
munist states!cr free world coun-
tries. In past. years, the Chinese
have been able to display at least
one foreign chief of state. This
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time the top-ranking guest was
the president of the Somali na-
tional assembly.
Strains in Foreign Relations
Increasing strain in rela-
tions between Peking and the
other Communist countries was
pointed up during Lin Piao's
speech. Diplomats representing
the USSR, Bulgaria, East Germany,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
and Mongolia walked out when he
charged that the Soviet Union
was "colluding" with the US to
promote peace talks on Vietnam.
This attack--the first time the
Chinese have used National Day
celebrations as a forum for ex-
plicit anti-Soviet polemics--
shows how far Peking's go-it-
alone attitude toward the rest
of the Communist world has de-
veloped.
There were no party-to-
party greetings from Hungary,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bul-
garia. Congratulatory messages
from other Communist states were
pro forma. Only Hanoi even men-
tioned the "cultural revolution,"
which was the central theme of
the celebration.
Pronouncements on foreign
policy indicated no change in
the caution displayed during the
past year. Lin Piao and Chou
En-lai again promised support
for Vietnam in standard general-
ities. The People's Daily ac-
count of the celebration, which
summarized the main points of
Lin's speech, did not mention
Vietnam but noted only the the
Chinese people "together with
the revolutionary people of all
countries" would carry on the
struggle against the US "to the
end." Chinese references to a
possible confrontation with the
US were cast in defensive terms
--declaring that Peking's armed
forces and people were ready if
the US "imposed" war on China.
Economic Aspects
On economic issues, National
Day pronouncements suggest that
the main concern of the leader-
ship has been to reduce the dis-
ruptive effects of the "cultural
revolution" on economic produc-
tion. Exaggerated or misleading
claims were made in routine propa-
ganda items on the eve of the
holiday, but these were ignored
in the more authoritative state-
ments. Peking's failure nine
months after the nominal begin-
ning of the third five-year plan
to issue guidelines for the econ-
omy suggests disagreement over
objectives. It also suggests
awareness that the economy is not
producing enough over current
needs to back stepped-up economic
growth.
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Eur0p
EXCELLENT CROP PROSPECTS FOR USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE
The outlook for the 1966
harvest in the USSR and Eastern
Europe is excellent. In the
USSR, according to preliminary
US estimates, the harvest will
approach the record set in 1964.
This year's wheat crop in the
USSR, which is already in, will
be in excess of 65 million metric
tons, above average and well
above last year. East European
prospects are also generally
good and are excellent in the
Balkans.
The USSR had varied weather
in the early spring. However,
abundant rainfall and increased
use of mineral fertilizers in
European USSR, together with ex-
cellent harvesting weather in the
New Lands, combined to produce
a well above average grain crop.
Total East European breadgrain
production is expected to be only
slightly below the high level
reached in 1965 (31 million
metric tons), and the output of
coarse grains, especially corn,
will exceed both 1965 and the re-
cent annual average.
In both the USSR and Eastern
Europe, sugar beets, potatoes,
vegetables, and sunflowers have
done well. Soviet cotton pro-
duction, however, probably will
be below the record established
last year. In Eastern Europe,
the most outstanding improvement
over 1965 is in the spring-
planted crops of Czechoslovakia
and the Balkans, with both Yugo-
slavia and':Bulgaria predicting
a record harvest for 1966.
The favorable outlook for
feed grainland roughage is prom-
ising for livestock production
at least through the first
quarter of 1967. In the USSR,
state procurements of meat, milk,
and eggs for the first eight
months of 1966 have been well
above those for the same period
in 1965.
The excellent Soviet wheat
crop indicates that the USSR's
contracts to import almost four
million metric tons of wheat in
the 1967 consumption year (1
July - 30 June) are aimed at re-
plenishing stocks and fulfill-
ing part of its export commit-
ments to Eastern Europe and
Cuba. East European grain-im-
port requirements in the 1967
consumption year are expected
to fall several hundred thou-
sand tons below the 8.5 to 9.0
million metric tons imported
in the 1966 consumption year.
East Germany, Poland, and Czech-
oslovakia, however, will continue
to be major importers. Record
harvests in Yugoslavia and Ru-
mania may provide each with an
exportable surplus of one million
tons of corn. Rumania and Bul-
garia reportedly have offered
a small quantity of wheat to
free world countries.
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WEST CONFRONTED BY POLISH-CZECH NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS OFFER
Public offers by Poland and
Czechoslovakia during last month's
conference in Vienna of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to place their nuclear fa-
cilities under IAEA inspection--
provided West Germany does the
same--have introduced a new ele-
ment into the debate over nuclear
safeguards. The offers, endorsed
by the Soviet delegation, were
set in the context of European
disarmament and were accompanied
by reminders of Bonn's "nuclear
pretensions." A parallel offer
by East Germany seems to have
been merely another effort to
gain international recognition,
since it was conditioned on mem-
bership in IAEA.
Soviet bloc propaganda pur-
poses would clearly be served
if West Germany were to reject
outright the East European initi-
atives, and this may be a major
motive behind them. The bids
nevertheless raise the possibil-
ity of applying IAEA safeguards
in East Europe and of challeng-
ing Soviet intransigence on out-
side inspectors. Soviet dis-
pleasure reportedly stifled
tentative Polish and Czech in-
terest last year in accepting
IAEA safeguards, but the current
offer was reportedly endorsed by
Moscow at the Warsaw Pact confer-
ence last July. Indeed, Moro-
khov, the Soviet member of the
IAEA board, had told the US dele-
gate that "each socialist coun-
try would decide for itself
whether facilities would be sub-
mitted for safeguards."
At the Vienna conference,
some Western delegations were
inclined to accept the East Euro-
pean overtures at face value,
viewing them as a possible break-
through in both EURATOM and East
European resistance to IAEA inspec-
tion. Although particularly skep-
tical of East Germany's motives,
Bonn apparently intends to retain
some flexibility and has delayed
replying, merely reminding the
Poles and Czechs that German fa-
cilities are already fully safe-
guarded under EURATOM.
Despite the EURATOM commis-
sion's initially negative reac-
tion, the whole issue will likely
be intensively discussed by the
six EURATOM countries. Although
the commission--largely under US
urging--has not ruled out the
ultimate objective of a single
international safeguard system,
both EURATOM and the US have
taken the position that EURATOM
inspection is equivalent to that
of IAEA. The French, in particu-
lar, have always opposed any IAEA
intrusion into the EURATOM pro-
gram.
EURATOM thus is likely to
find itself being pulled in dif-
ferent directions. The community,
which may come under some inter-
national pressure to respond posi-
tively to the East European of-
fers, might see some possibility
of using this issue to gain of-
ficial East European recognition
for EURATOM. On the other hand,
EURATOM will have to consider
whether acceptance of interna-
tional safeguards would conflict
with its own objectives of estab-
lishing a truly supranational
system among its own members.
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The US Mission to NATO has
pointed out that the new offers
may play a role in the current
NATO effort to find ways for im-
proving East-West relations,
which, along with European se-
curity and nonproliferation, will
again be before the North Atlan-
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Middle East - Africa 25X1
CONGO MUTINEERS STILL AT LARGE
Approximately 2,500 mutinous
Katangan soldiers who left Kisan-
gani (Stanleyville) two weeks ago
have moved to the Lubutu-Punia
area en route to Katanga. They
have so far held their own against
the government forces, including
mercenaries, that have been sent
to force their surrender.
Although Mobutu would like
to end this mutiny, which is ty-
ing up a good part of the Congo-
lese Army and virtually all of
the mercenary forces, he is ap-
prehensive lest the Katangans
stir up other troubles if allowed
to return home. Nevertheless, in
spite of his repeated demands for
their unconditional surrender,
Mobutu has declared a cease-fire
while the mercenary commanders
try to arrange a settlement.
Meanwhile, Mobutu continues
his moves against suspected Euro-
pean opponents. On 5 October he
announced his intention to close
all consulates in the Congo and
to break relations with Portugal.
The break with Portugal apparently
was designed to buttress his image
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as an African nationalist and to
give emphasis to his charges in the
UN Security Council that Lisbon was
allowing his enemies to use Angola
as a staging area. By closing the
consulates, he probably seeks to
put further pressure on the Belgians,
who have long been one of Mobutu's
prime targets despite his dependence
upon their aid. Mobutu has told Am-
bassador Godley that US consulates
would be reopened upon application
to the Congolese aovernment.
KINSHASA
(LE-LDVILLP
CBNT N
UDAN
SUDAN
M?dndaka
VI-t
ANGOLA
Kari..iha?
Punia ?pm? Rw,,rvDn
~' ~(?isabe~M1Vi11e1 C
1;? ,~ \..o
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
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SECRET
NIGERIAN CRISIS DEEPENS
Belated exercise of leader-
ship by Northern authorities has
checked for now large-scale mob
violence against Easterners in
parts of the North, but new dis-
orders are likely to break out
there or elsewhere as refugees
are evacuated to their region of
origin. There is a danger that
tribal violence, until now di-
rected primarily at the hated Ibo
tribesmen, will spill over into
other tribal communities, leading
to a complete breakdown of law
and order.
A major factor in the dete-
riorating security situation is
the collapse of army discipline,
especially in the units in the
Northern region. Last week
Northern soldiers joined civilian
mobs--and occasionally the po-
lice---in hunting down, molesting,
and killing Ibos. By the time
the authorities moved to restore
order., probably more than 1,000
Ibos had been killed, and hundreds
more injured. Rumors of mass kill-
ings of Northerners residing in
the East apparently triggered the
disorders, but hard-line Northern
political elements may well have
had a hand in stirring up the
mobs.
The Nigerian Government will
probably need foreign help to re-
store discipline among the North-
ern troops. The cadre of offi-
cers is extremely thin, and it-
self contains mutinous elements.
Last weekend, Hausa and Tiv sol-
diers--both from the Northern re-
gion--fought against each other.
Both Supreme Commander Gowon and
Northern military governor Katsina
have hinted that they will request
British and American troops, as
well as technicians. London ap-
pears willing to send a team of
officers to find out what mili-
tary assistance is needed but will
not be put in a position where
British troops might be forced to
fire on Nigerians.
Nearly all Easterners have
now fled the North or are in the
process of doing so. The depar-
ture of civil servants and public
corporation employees--who were
the last to go--has created se-
vere staffing problems in essen-
tial services and in private busi-
nesses. There is considerable
fear among the expatriate commu-
nity and among certain non-Ibo
tribes that violence will turn
against them once all the Ibos
have left. No expatriates have
been harmed so far, but some Yoruba
tribesmen from the West have been
forced to flee.
Several retaliatory attacks
on Northerners resident in the
Ibo-ruled Eastern region have
strengthened the hand of Northern
extremists who wish to invade the
East. Eastern military governor
Ojukwu has ordered that all of
the non-Easterners in his region
be evacuated.
The spreading violence threat-
ens to negate the modest progress
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..~ SECRET
made at the Lagos constitutional
talks, which adjourned on 3 Oc-
tober for three weeks. Delegates
had reached some agreement on the
allocation of regional powers
within a new federal structure
but had not resolved the issue of
creating additional states. East-
ern governor Ojukwu remains
strongly opposed to any imposed
division of the oil-rich East
NIGERIA
into two or more states, and pres-
sure on him from Ibo elements who
believe secession is the only solu-
tion has undoubtedly increased.
At the same time, Supreme Commander
Gowon is probably subject to grow-
ing pressure from Northern ex-
tremists who have long favored a
military move against the East.
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Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
ALGERIA HIT BY SEVERE DROUGHT
A drought last winter has so
reduced this summer's grain har-
vests in Algeria as to threaten
a famine and a further depression
of general economic conditions.
The Boumediene government is
seeking to fill the gap with im-
ports, but has limited resources
with which to do this.
The summer's harvest of
wheat and barley, Algeria's two
main cereal crops, was less than
half of normal--an estimated
800,000 to 900,000 tons, in con-
trast to the 2.1-million-ton av-
erage of the past four years. An-
nual consumption has been running
at about 2.3 million tons, with
the difference between this and
the fluctuating production fig-
ures filled by imports, mainly
from the US and France. Even so,
availability of grain on a per
capita basis has been gradually
declining.
Algiers' early bids for for-
eign wheat in the current crop
year have had but a limited re-
sponse so far. The US has sold
112,000 tons. Of 200,000 tons
requested from France by the end
of 1966, Paris has sold only
40,000 but is promising to review
the situation by December. The
US Embassy in Paris reports that
France has "allocated" a total of
200,000 tons for cash sales to
Algeria. However, the French
hope to avoid any long-term cred-
its and that the US will provide
most of Algeria's needs beyond
what it can pay for in cash. The
chances of any :Large-scale aid
from France are reduced by the
suspension of negotiations since
last spring over financial
claims and counterclaims, and by
Algeria's nat:Lonalization of
French-owned mines.
The grain crisis hits Al-
geria at a time when its unfa-
vorable balance of payments has
gradually eroded hard-currency
holdings to the point that they
are now estimated at only $75
to 100 million. Algeria's ris-
ing earnings from oil, compris-
ing over half of the value of
its exports, have not mounted
rapidly enough to offset the
dwindling of French aid.
A drought as serious as
this year's affects both rural
and urban areas. Some 80 per-
cent of A1ger:La's farmers are
engaged in subsistence agricul-
ture; rural fatn:ine tends to drive
them into the cities, which are
already jammed, with the unem-
ployed and under-employed. Low
production on the modern, for-
merly French-owned, wheat-grow-
ing farms cuts into the demands
for services and supplies from
the urban centers, and accentu-
ates the difficulties. So far
there has been :Little active ex-
pression of discontent, but sev-
eral weeks ago'Boumediene in-
stalled a competent technician
with strong rural ties as his
new minister of agriculture.
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Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY 7 Oct 66
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SECRET
UN FACING DIFFICULTIES OVER SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
Forty-nine Afro-Asian mem-
bers of the United Nations have
tabled a resolution on South-West
Africa which, if passed by the
General Assembly, will result in
a head-on confrontation with the
Republic of South Africa and its
possible withdrawal from the UN.
The resolution states that
the General Assembly will take
over the South African mandate
and assume direct responsibility
for administration of South-West
Africa. It calls for a UN ad-
ministering authority to recom-
mend to the next General Assembly
a date for the territory's inde-
pendence, and requests the Secu-
rity Council to take the neces-
sary measures to enable the ad-
ministering authority to discharge
its functions.
Attempts by the West and
moderate Africans to win support
for a milder resolution have so
far failed. Liberia has a pro-
posal that it is reluctant to
table, doubting that it would get
African support. This proposal
provides for certain steps lead-
ing to the creation of a UN Com-
mission for South-West Africa
that would recommend to the as-
sembly ways in which the UN could
assert a presence in the terri-
tory. Another possibility is a
request for an advisory opinion
from the International Court. How-
ever, this would only be a hold-
ing action.
If the Afro-Asian resolution
is passed, the critical problem
would be organizing measures
for international enforcement.
The General Assembly has no such
powers and it would have to ask
the Security Council to compel
compliance. It is doubtful that
any measures short of the use of
force would obtain South Afri-
ca's compliance, and a resolu-
tion that could not be enforced
would only produce greater frus-
tration and anger among the Af-
ricans.
Britain finds itself in a
difficult situation on this is-
sue. It wants to avoid a row
with the Africans but, because
of the Rhodesian problem and
its own economic difficulties,
it also wants to avoid a con-
frontation with South Africa.
The UK will probably abstain on
the resolution. France prob-
ably will also abstain because
of concern about enforcement
measures and because of its
trade with South Africa. The
USSR will probably vote with
the Africans but is arguing
that rather than UN administra-
tion of the mandate, a strictly
African one would be preferable.
Despite the lack of support
from the major powers and the
legal and constitutional prob-
lems it raises, the Afro-Asian
resolution seems well on the way
toward passage. The sponsors
are likely to pick up some Com-
munist votes as well as some ad-
ditional support from other
Afro-Asians and possibly from
among the Latin Americans.
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SECRET W
COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN URUGUAYAN LABOR
The Uruguayan Government
acted vigorously on 4 October to
try to halt the latest round of
Communist-inspired labor agita-
tion. The National Council of
Government voted 7 to 2 to expel
four Soviet officials in Monte-
video whom it accused of inter-
fering in Uruguayan labor affairs.
The action was based on the Coun-
cil's belief that the Communist
Party of Uruguay (PCU) cannot af-
ford to continue leading strikes,
which it has been sponsoring
mainly for political purposes,
if the USSR suffers consequent
expulsion of its diplomatic of-
ficers. However, by expelling
the four Soviets simultaneously,
the government may actually have
reduced its leverage on the PCU.
Furthermore, the PCU probably
feels sure that unless Uruguay
breaks relations with all the
Communist bloc countries--which
is unlikely--the party will con-
tinue to receive the necessary
financial and propaganda support
to maintain its political and
labor activities.
The PCU position in labor
is exceptionally strong at pres-
ent. Party leaders, supported
by leftist trade unionists, ful-
filled a long-time goal on 2 Oc-
tober by establishing a nation-
wide labor confederation. They
united the unions of the Commu-
nist-dominated Uruguayan Workers'
Central with those of the Commu-
nist-created National Workers'
Convention (CNT), retaining the
latter's name. The new CNT en-
compasses much of organized labor
and can claim with considerable
authority to speak for the coun-
try's workers.
Astute PCU exploitation of
soaring living costs, declining
real wages, and unpopular as-
pects of various constitutional
reform proposals has induced
unions previously unresponsive
to the Communists to affiliate
with the new CNT. Party spade-
work in the interior also paid
off in the affiliation of sev-
eral rural cooperatives and
unions. Other independent
unions are expected to join as
the new organization proves its
leadership ability.
The PCU has demonstrated
its capacity for disrupting
Uruguayan economic life on is-
sues that are more political
than economic. Its latest ma-
jor effort, a general strike on
15 September, nearly paralyzed
the country, and a subsequent
series of strikes and stoppages
has caused widespread incon-
venience and interrupted public
services in Montevideo.
The PCU expects to convert
labor support into votes in the
27 November general elections.
It believes that the government
will be reluctant to use repres-
sive measures against workers
with elections so near, but never-
theless hopes to provoke the au-
thorities into creating a few
martyrs, F_ I
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Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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BRAZIL ELECTS COSTA E S I LVA PRESIDENT
Retired Marshal Arthur da
Costa e Silva, the only candi-
date, was elected president by
the Brazilian Congress on 3
October, his 64th birthday. Only
one opposition congressman ignored
his party's decision to boycott
the indirect election.
Costa e Silva will take
office on 15 March 1967 for a
four-year term as successor to
President Castello Branco. He
will not, however, assume most
of the extraordinary powers granted
to Castello Branco by the 1964
revolution that ousted leftist
COSTA E SILVA
New President-Elect
of Brazil
The long interim prior
to Costa e Silva's inaugura-
tion has led to speculation
that the date would be moved
up. However, he has pointed
out that the period is none
too long for him to form a
government and establish
policies. Furthermore, he
intends to campaign until 15
November for progovernment
congressional candidates, and
also expects to spend part
of the time before 15 March
in travel abroad, possibly
including a trip to the US.
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Page 16
president Goulart. These powers--
including the right to dismiss
elected officials and deprive
them of their political rights--
expire on 15 March, although
many of the basic principles of
the revolution are expected to
be codified :Ln a new constitu-
tion that Castello Branco hopes
to have enacted by Congress be-
fore March..
In a speech following his
election, Costa e Silva reiter-
ated his desire to return Brazil
to fully democratic processes.
He also stressed his preoc-
cupation with alleviating
oppressive social and eco-
nomic conditions, saying
that the nation's greatest
problems center on "the ne-
cessities of man."
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THE SITUATION I N GUATEMALA
Guerrilla leader Luis
Turcios was killed this week
in an automobile accident.
On 3 October, the Communist
Party's action arm, the FAR,
announced that Cesar Montes
would replace Turcios as its
commander. Montes, a 24-
year-old former law student
who served as Turcios' dep-
uty, is believed to be a
member of the Communist
Party (PGT) and ideologi-
cally more disciplined than
Turcios. If so, the party's
control over its guerrilla
wing now may be enhanced.
Turcios had insisted on
maintaining the separate
identity of the FAR.
The FAR is disciplined
and well organized. Al-
though the change of leader-
ship may initially cause
some disorientation, it is 64092
not likely to have a sub-
stantial effect on the organiza-
tion's ability to carry on guer-
rilla activity.
CESAR.MONTES
New Leader of FAR
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SECRET
UNEXPLAINED BOMBINGS I N COSTA RICA
A series of ten bombings
in and around San Jose between
14 and 30 September has created
alarm among public security of-
ficials in Costa Rica. The au-
thorities have no clues to the
identity of the perpetrators.
Damage has been slight and no
injuries have resulted.
The latest incidents in-
clude detonation of a small bomb
at the base of an electric trans-
mission tower north of the capi-
tal on the evening of 29 Septem-
ber and two more bombings the
next night, one of which was the
first in a residential area.
The public has taken the inci-
dents calmly so far, but concern
is certain to mount if the bomb-
ings continue, especially if
there are deaths or injuries.
Costa Rican officials have tended
to accuse the Communist Popular
Vanguard Party (PVP). A policy
of terrorism would be uncharac-
teristic of the present PVP
leadership, but the incidents
might be an independent effort
by militant Communists within
the PVP or from another country.
The sophistication of the bomb-
ing devices and the planning in-
herent in each case lend weight
to a theory that the incidents
were carried out by persons
trained in demolition techniques.
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Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 7 Oct. 66
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