SPECIAL REPORT CASTRO'S CUBA TODAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005400100003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

Release 2006/08/24 CIA- P7,0x0 27A'0054. , 1 3:0 1.
1
30 Septeiiber :1966
'?OCI No 03ODJ66,B
rl"a K4 IL
IMPIA Y AYTE LSE
0
 Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
 Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00 AO05400100003-1
minds and hearts of the over-
whelming majority of the popula-
tion.
In the ensuing years, the
image of the romantic Robin Hood
of the Sierra Maestra has become
tarnished, but Castro has
been able to maintain and even
strengthen his political posi-
tion through maneuvers designed
either to elicit popular support
or to develop and reinforce those
institutions by which he controls
the masses. He often uses an al-
leged threat of imminent attack
by "imperialist" forces from the
US to unite the people behind
him and shift attention from
disturbing domestic problems.
His internal security apparatus
ruthlessly suppresses any oppo-
sition, real or imagined. Through
his hypnotic oratory, he holds
out to the Cuban people the
pledge of a brighter future and
then resorts to the convenient
scapegoat of US "imperialism"
when the promises do not become
reality.
In a more practical vein,
Castro has placed himself at the
head of the three most important
institutions in Cuba. Besides
his job as first secretary of
the Cuban Communist Party, he is
commander in chief of the armed
forces and prime minister of the
government. He has so integrated
these three institutions that
none functions independently of
the other two. His appointment
of his most faithful supporters,
mostly 26th of July Movement
veterans, to key positions is a
further guarantee of his secu-
SE CRE T
rity. Such a power structure,
based on Soviet financing and
substantial popular support and
acquiescence, has provided the
regime with a high degree of po-
litical stability.
However, so powerful is the
Castro mystique and so important
is he to the regime that his
sudden removal from the scene
through death or permanent in-
capacitation would place a se-
vere strain on the Cuban polit-
ical machinery. Although Castro
has already designated his
younger brother, Raul, currently
minister of the armed forces and
second secretary of the Cuban
Communist Party, as his succes-
sor, ambitious members of the
Cuban hierarchy could be expected
ultimately to challenge Raul's
authority in the event of Fidel's
demise.
The Cuban Communist Party
The Cuban Communist Party
(PCC), which evolved from the
United Party of the Socialist
Revolution during the latter's
reorganization in the fall of
1965, provides Fidel Castro with
the machinery through which he
governs. As Cuba's sole polit-
ical party, it has a membership
of over 50,000. On the national
level, it is organized on famil-
iar Communist lines--a central
committee of approximately 100
members, a secretariat, a polit-
ical bureau, and six standing
committees. Provincial, re-
gional,' and local party direc-
torates comprise the middle
and lower levels of the party
SECRET
Page 3 SPECIAL REPORT
30 Sep 66
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
 Approved For Releas "2006/08124: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05AQp100003-1
CEN IA+1., C~.OM ;! w
OF THE CU AN C0 YaN U NIS1 P4 J Y
Capt. Jota'ABRAtfrES Fernandez
M
R
J O
Maj. Guillermo GARCIA Fria
Lazao PENH Gonzalez
aj.
ogp
ACEVEDO Gonzalez
Ma
Maj. Julio A. GARCIA Oliveira
Capt. AntstAo PEREZ Herrero
j. Armando ACOSTA Cordaro
Moj. Pedro M. GARCIA P?loez
Maj. Fausttgo PEREZ Hernande
Mal. Juars V. ACE NA Nunez
S
ve
A I
R
RevIGARCIA Pelaez
z
Moj. Waifrsio PEREZ Rodri
e
re
~I
RE risto
M
J
Elena GIL lzquierdo
guez
Mai. Manuejl PINEIRO L
d
aj.
uan ALMEIDA Basques
M
J
Fabio GROBART
osa
a
Mai. Lizardo PROENZA S
h
at.
ose M. ALVAREZ Bravo
C
(
Maj. Orestes GUERRA Gonzalez
anc
ez
Jose RAMIRIfZ Cr
z
apt. Em
jto ARAYT,rONE$ Navsero
C
f
J
Mal. Raul GUERRABermejo
u
Capt. El ias& RE YES Rodri
op
.
osEARTEAGA Hernandez
Fl
i
Secundino GUERRA Hidalgo
guez
Capt. JorgieRISQUETV
ld
Moj.
av
n BRAVO Pardo
Armando HART Davalos
a
es
Raul ROA G{rrd
Ramon CAI.CINESCiordillo
M
l
i
Maj. Joel IGLESIAS Leyva
a
Blur ROCA C+alde
io
aj. Ju
ia
i. T. CAMACHO Ayuilero
M
Li
o
Mai, Omar H. ISER Mojena
r
Carlos Rofcrel RODRIGUEZ
aj.
n
CARRERJikS Rodriguez...
Mai
E
CAS
t
Maj. Rienerio JIMENEZ Loge
Moj. Orlandis RODRIGUEZ Puerto
.
rnet
a
(LA$ Palenzeela
l-l-
Ma
B
Maj. Rolando KINDELAN Bles
Basilio RODRGUEZ Rodri
u
l.
e
CA$TILLA Mai
M
id
l
Jose LLANUSA Gobel
g
ez
Ursino ROJAP Santest
b
aj. F
e
CASTRO kuz
Mo
R
Maj. Antonio E. LUSSON Battle
e
ar,
Mai. Antonia SANCHEZ Di
j.
aul CASTRO Ruz
Ma
A
t
Manuel LUZARDO Garcia
az
Celia SANCHEZ Mondul
j.
ngs
Joel CHAVECO Hernandez
Mel
F
HOI
Maj. Jose B. MACHADO Ventura
ay
Maj. Aldo SANFAMARIA C
d
d
.
aure C
N Mediavillo
O
m
i CI N
Isidoro MALMIERCA Paoli
ua
ra
o
Haydee SAN'j'AI IA Cuodrad
d
H
l
an
FUECZOS Gorriaorr
M
Juan MARINELLO Vidaurreta
o
art
e
Mai. Rene las SANTOS P
aj. Leopaddo CIIJTRAS Fria
M
b
c
Miguel MARTIN Perez
once
Clementine SRFIA Robl
d
al. A
el
rdo CQ .OME Iborro
R
Ma
i"
Jose MATAR Frayne
e
o
Maj. Jose R.`SILVA Berro
j.
oul
URBELO Morales
Capt. Joaquin MENDEZ Cominches
a
Lionel SOTO
'Prieto
Moj. SergiaDLL VALLE Jimenez
Me
Maj. Raul MENDENDEZ Tomassevich
I
Maj. Eddy SLJNOL Ric
d
l. Manuel DIAZ-Gonzalez
J
l
Arnold* MILIAN Castro
ar
o
It. Julio TAR AU C
till
oe
DOMECH Benitez
Os
ld
D4-
Mal. Carlos MIR Morrero
as
o
Maj. Diocles'TCRRALBAS G
l
va
o
TICO$.Tarrodo
M
Mal. Pedro MIRET Prieto
onza
ez
Felipe TORIRES Trujill
aj. Victgr E? DRFrKE Cruz
Vil
Maj. Jesus MONTANE Oropesa
o
Maj. Ramiro yAI
DES Me
d
mo ESPf' GuiIlpys de Castro
Ma
M
Jose NARANJO Morales
.
nen
ez
Capt. AnibalVELAZ Sua
j.
anuel E. FAJARDO Sotamoyor
Marc
l
Fk"
`
MCI. Arnaldo OCHOA Sanchez
rez
Mai. Roberto VI ERA E
t
ad
e
o
i
tIANDZ Font
Maj. Mario OLIVA Perez
s
r
a
Alfredo YA1IIJ M
l
f
Maj. Occar,EERNANDEZ Mail
Ma
'
Mai. Filiberto OLVERA Mayo
c
u
Mai. Luis A
ZAYAS O
h
l. Harolo
PERRER Martinez
Maj. Ramon PARDO Guerra
.
c
oa
POLITICAL BUREAU
Fidel CASTRO Ruz
Raul CASTRO Ruz
Osvaldo DORTICOS Torrado
Juan ALMEIDA Basques
Ramiro VALDES Menendez
Armando HART Davolos
Guillermo GARCIA Fria
Sergio DEL VALLE Jimenez
r,4;1RN A'FAIRS COMMITTEF
t-ni Cienfr-.- Chnirman
Raul Roa Foreign Minister
Mai. Manuel Pineiro Chief of Foreign Intelligence
Jose Motor Ambassador to Hungary
Haydee Santomaria Secretary General of the
Organizing Committee of the
Latin American Solidarity
Organization
Rafael Avila Gonzalez
Pelegrin Torras (Secretary)
(ONS1iiT10NA~ STUDIES COMMITTEE
Ygco Roco Chnirman
Alfredo Yabur Minister of Justice
Jose Naranjo Havana Provincial Party Secretory
1 'IOMIC COMMITTEE
O?svaido Dartiens Chairman
Maj. Foure Chomon Minister of Transportation
Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez Minister without Portfolio
Joel Domenech Minister of Industries
Mai. Raul Curbelo Vice President of the National
Institute of Agrarian Reform
`.'= ATION COMMITTEE
tUmcrca Hart i~haiiman
Jose Llanusa EducAton Minister
Lionel Soto Directbr of the Schools of
Maj. Ramiro Valdes Interior[Mi nister
Mol. Sergio del Valle Armed Barnes Vice Minister
TABOR COMiMIETEF
laz c Penn ~h^;rmarf
Bas! lio Rodriguez Ministerl of Labor
Miguel Martin Secretory General of the
Cuban Workers Organization
Conrodo Becquer Secretar. General of the
Ursinio Rojas
sto Guerra
;tLRETA MAT
Raul CASTRO Aux
Osvaldo DORTTCOS Tornado
Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ
National Union of Sugar
Inclu>(try Workers
CTC Fin sane Secretary
Havana Provincial CTC Secretary
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
 Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A005400100003-1
SECRET
structure while the basic party
unit is the standard cell or Nu-
cleus of Active Revolutionaries.
Cells, organized in all fac-
tories, work centers, state
farms, and military units, are
composed of party militants and
membership candidates who have
effectively demonstrated their
loyalty to Fidel Castro. The
cells, numbering over 5,000, are
made up of from five to 200 mem-
bers each. Party members and
candidates must pay dues ranging
from one to four percent of their
monthly salaries and they receive
in return official favors and
special consideration.
Party officials below the
provincial level are "elected"
by local assemblies within each
jurisdiction from a list of can-
didates named by the party upper
echelons. Provincial party of-
ficials, however, are directly
appointed by the national organi-
zation.
The heart of the PCC is the
central committee and the key to
the central committee is the
eight-man political bureau. This
bureau, which sets party poli-
cies, is composed of party first
secretary Fidel Castro, second
secretary Raul Castro, President
Osvaldo Dorticos, organization
secretary Armando Hart, and four
military officers. The latter
four, all veterans of the Sierra
Maestra campaign, have scant ex-
perience in government and are
probably included in the polit-
buro to give strong representa-
tion to the military. Altogether,
almost two thirds of the members
of the central committee and a
fourth of the party rank and
file are military personnel. This
close political-military inte-
gration seems aimed at prevent-
ing any polarization of the re-
gime's two most important bul-
warks.
The party secretariat is
responsible for administering
the policies established by the
politburo while the six standing
committees function in a support
and advisory capacity. The Con-
stitutional Studies Committee
is charged with drafting a "so-
cialist" constitution to replace
the Fundamental Law of Cuba of
7 February 1959 which-is cur-
rently in use. This committee
will also lay the groundwork
for a new judicial system pat-
terned after the Soviet example,
and will probably plan the first
PCC congress, to be held late
this year or in 1967. Blas Roca,
long head of the Communist Party
in pre-Castro days, is the com-
mittee chairman.
Although the Committee for
Revolutionary Orientation (COR)
predates the formation of the
PCC and'is ostensibly an inde-
pendent organ, it is a de facto
subordinate of the central com-
mittee. The COR oversees propa-
ganda dissemination and also
supervises and coordinates party
indoctrination through repre-
sentatives on provincial, re-
gional, and local party directo-
rates.
SECRET
30 Sep 66
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A005400100003-1
 Approved For Re_lmse 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927Ag1w.. 400100003-1
SECRET
The party's youth organiza-
tion, the Union of Young Commu-
nists (UJC), is responsible for
grooming the "most exemplary"
Cuban youth for party membership.
The organization claims a member-
ship of about 80,000 Cubans be-
tween the ages of 14 and 27. A
junior version of the group is
the Union of Communist Pioneers
which organizes and indoctrinates
children between the ages of 6
and 13, preparing them for the
UJC. The growing regimentation
of the people is evident in plans
to have 70 percent of Cuba's
children enrolled in the Pioneers
by January 1967.
The Party: Apparatus for
One-Man Rule
While theoretically an or-
gan of collective management, the
PCC has developed into an appa-
ratus for one-man rule--it is the
political framework that Castro
lacked when he replaced Batista
in January 1959. He borrowed it
from the "old" Communist Party
and when the "old" Communists
tried to retrieve it, he reshaped
it, gave it a new name, and
called it his own. It is the
machinery by which he governs and
its operation is simple. Castro
dominates the politburo in stand-
ard totalitarian fashion; the
politburo dominates the central
committee and central committee
dominates the party; and the
party, through its integration
in all organs and aspects of Cu-
ban life, dominates the nation.
This integration, still in prog-
ress, ensures that no other in-
stitution will have the strength,
the organization, or the leader-
ship to act against the regime.
Castros supremacy within
the party is unchallenged. Those
who might have been able to
threaten his hold on the reins,
such as
Ernesto "Che" Guevara,
Camilo
Cienfuegos, and Huber
Matos,
have
disappeared from the
scene.
The
so-called "old"
versus
"new"
controversy, which
allegedly pittdd the pre-Castro,
or "old" Communists against the
pro-Castro, or"new," Communists,
has been stifled. With Castro's
savage denunciation of "old"
Communist Anibal Escalante in
March 1962 and the reorganiza-
tion of the original party in
late 1965, the dispute has be-
come dormant and factionalism in
the regime appears to be at an
all-time low. While more than
15 "old" Communists are members
of the central ;committee, they
are effectively outweighed by an
overwhelming preponderance of
Castroite members. Moreover,
the all-important politburo is
composed solely of men who served
with Castro's July 26th Movement
during the Batista administra-
tion.
The Cubans have discovered,
however, that it is as difficult
to create an effective Communist
party as it has been to bring
socialism to the island. The
shortage of qualified techni-
cians has become a serious stum-
bling block onboth counts. Cas-
tro pointed out in his speech of
29 August that the party cadre
is not fulfilling its intended
role as the "main driving force"
SECRET
Page 6 SPECIAL REPORT
30 Sep' 66
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
 Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
SECRET
MINISTRY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
ARMED FORCES
(MINFAR)
Minister: Maj. Raul. Castro Ruz
First Vice Minister, Maj. Juan Almeldo
Chief of Staff: Maj. Belo-in. Castilla Me,
Total Strength; 294,000
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE AND
REVOLUTIONARY AIR FORCE
(DAAFAR)
Chief: Maj. Dlocles Torralbas
Total Strength: 12,000
REVOLUTIONARY AIR FORCE
(CRAF)
Chief: Maj. Enrique Carreras
Strength: 4,000
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE
Chief: Maj. Pedro Oropeze
Strength: 8,000
NAVY (MGR)
Chief: Maj. Aldo Santamario
Chief of Staff: Maj. Ernigdio Baez Vigo
Strength: 7,000
EASTERN NAVAL DISTRICT,.. WESTERN NAVAL DISTRICT
Santiago de Cuba Mariel
POPULAR DEFENSE MILITIA ? .
Chief: Capt. Felipe Guerra Mato.
Strength: 100,000
CENTRAL ARMY
Chief: Maj. Rogelio Acevedo
Strength: 40,000
EASTERN ARMY
Chief: Maj. Abelerdo Colome
Strength: 45,000
ISLE OF PINES MILITARY REGION
Chief: Maj. Antonio Sanchez Diaz
Strength: 6,000
WESTERN ARMY
Chief: Maj. Raul Menendez
Tomassevich
Strength: 84,000
behind the Cuban revolution. PCC
organizing secretary Armando
Hart spelled out this problem on
19 September when he admitted
that the party organization is
"extraordinarily weak" because
of the low technical knowledge
of the party cadres. Hart said
that all too often PCC incompe-
tents have been "supervising"
economic production, and that
this is one reason for Cuba's
continued poor economic perform-
ance.
The Military Establishment
Thanks to Soviet and Czech-
oslovak assistance, Cuba has one
of the largest and most modern
military establishments in Latin
America. Roughly four percent of
the entire population is either
on active duty, in the ready re-
serve, or in the militia. Young
men from 16 to 26 are subject to
draft and must serve for three
years unless exempted because of
physical or mental disability,
or deferred as students. The
Cuban forces are equipped with
such sophisticated armament as
surface-to-air and short-range
surface-to-surface missile sys-
tems, guided missile - firing
surface craft, and rocket-armed
MIG jet fighter planes. The mis-
sion of the armed forces is bas-
ically to defend against internal
insurrection and external as-_
sault.
SECRET
Page 7
SPECIAL REPORT 30 Sep 66
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
 Approved For Releas 2006/08124: CIA-RDP79-00927AO054QQ100003-1
SECRET
Inventory of Arms and Equipment
JET FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
Fidel Castro is commander
in chief of the military estab-
lishment and. his brother, Raul,
heads the Ministry of the Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces (MINFAR).
The army is made up of active
duty personnel and a ready re-
serve that is capable of mobili-
zation within a few hours. To
keep records, service equipment,
and conduct training, the ready
reserve unit=s apparently main-
tain skeleton cadres on active
duty; reservists on inactive
duty train one night a week and
one Sunday per month. The navy
and the air/air defense force
have their own headquarters sub-
ordinate to MINFAR, but the army
is controlled directly by the
Operations I)irectorate of the
MINFAR General Staff. There is
no army headquarters between it
and the four major field com-
mands--the Eastern Army, Central
Army, Western Army, and Isle of
Pines Militaty Region.
48 MIG-15 Fagot 11 MIG-19 Farmer
10 UMIG-15 Midget 35to40 MIG-21 Fishbed
26 MIG-17 Fresco
12 Komar-class guided missile boats
6 Kronstadt-class submarine chasers
6 SO-1- class submarine chasers
12 P-6 motor torpedo boats
12 P-4 motor torpedo boats
5 patrol escorts
62 miscellaneous patrol and servicecraft
4 coastal defense cruise Missile sites with 8 launchers
and 50 (est.) antiship Kennel missiles
23 surface-to-air missile sites with 162 launchers,
290 transporters, and 600 (est.) SA -2 Gu ideline
missiles
60 SS-N-2 cruise missiles for Komar-class guided
missile patrol boats
100 ground-to-ground varient Kennel missiles with
41 launchers
TANKS, SELF-PROPELLED GUNS,
AND OTHER ARMORED VEHICLES Total 1, 045
JS-2, T-54-55, and T-34 tanks
SU-100 assault guns
armored. personnel carriers
armored scout cars with antitank guided missiles
FIELD ARTILLERY AND ANTITANK GUNS -Total 1,230
57-mm. antitank guns
76-mm., 85-mm., and f,22-mm, field guns
75-mm., 105-mm., 122-mm., and 152-mm. howitzers
ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS --- Total 1,475
12.7-mm. (quad)
14.5-mm. (quad)
25-mm., 30-mm. (twin)
37-mm., 57-mm., 85-mm., and 100-mm.
The navy is similarly or-
ganized into:Eas-tern, Central,
and Western naval districts, and
the Isle of Pines area. Cuba's
four coastal': defense cruise mis-
sile sites, three surrounding
Havana and the fourth at Sigu-
anea, are manned by the navy, as
is the coastal defense radar
system. The navy's major units
afloat, Komar-class guided mis-
sile boats, motor torpedo boats,
and submarine chasers, are usu-
ally based on the north coast at
Cabanas and Mariel in Pinar del
Rio Province and in Havana; on
the south coast at Cienfuegos;
and on the ::s:Le of Pines at
Siguanea.
SECRET
Page 8 SPECIAL REPORT
30 Sep 66
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
 Cuba
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
SAM SITES
SO 140
NAUTICAL MILES
HAVANA
I IGI ANEA
CRUISE MISSILE BASES
$AN A TONIO
DE LO BANGS
LA
so 100
NAUTI AL MILES
*AN JULIAN
MAJOR MIG AIRBASES
q eo foo
NAUYI AL MILES
I:AMAGIf F
4HOLG U IN
US Naval Base
US Naval Base
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
 Approved For Relatse 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AOj@&,400100003-1
SECRET
The Revolutionary Air Force,
equipped with about 130 jet
fighters, is headquartered at
Campo Libertad Airfield in Ha-
vana. The air defense force
has 22 SAM installations located
to provide protection for sensi-
tive areas. In addition, almost
1,500 antiaircraft artillery
pieces, some of which are radar
controlled, are sited through-
out the island. These weapons
are highly mobile and can be
used in an infantry support role
as well as against aircraft.
The popular defense militia,
a paramilitary organization made
up of both men and women, is esti-
mated to have only a limited com-
bat capability. In the event of
hostilities, it would probably be
used for local defense and secu-
rity duties, and would also serve
as a manpower reserve for the
regular forces. Workers are ex-
pected to volunteer for the
militia if they want to be con-
sidered for advancement or for
membership in the PCC; militia
duties consist mainly of drilling
and standing guard over radio sta-
tions, government offices, power
plants, communications facilities,
and other public buildings and in-
stallations.
operations along the coastline.
Training is a continuous proce-
dure and sometimes involves com-
bined air/navy/ground forces ma-
neuvers simulating an air-sea in-
vasion by the US,. The Cuban armed
forces are estimated to be capa-
ble of maintaining internal or-
der and successfully defending
the island against anything short
of a large-scale,. US-supported
external attack.
Morale in the armed forces,
except for some of the draftees
and the men of the labor bat-
talions, is apparently good, es-
pecially among the jet pilots of
the air force. 'Military life of-
fers many of the soldiers advan-
tages and opportunities they would
never have received otherwise--
adequate clothing, regular meals,
a small amount of spending money,
and for some, education in the
USSR. The uniform also carries
with it a certain degree of pres-
tige, particular]Ly if the wearer
is a member of one of the more
dramatic units such as a missile
battalion or the Frontier Brigade
facing the US Naval Base at
Guantanamo. Jet pilots have been
so affected by their own prestige
that their arrogant attitude has
reportedly created resentment
among their ground crews.
The Cuban armed forces are
developing into a capable mili-
tary organization. Several units
comprising the Fight Against
Bandits anti-insurgency forces,
have gained practical experience
in the field combating anti-Castro
bands that roamed the country-
side prior to 1965. Others have
engaged in firefights with small
groups of exiles attempting hit-
and-run attacks or infiltration
Members of" the armed forces
are subjected t:p a constant bar-
rage of political propaganda
against which, for lack of a
basic education, they are rela-
tively defenseless. PCC cells
in every military unit instruct
the ranks in the principles of
Communism. In addition, it is
their duty to encourage a high
state of combat: readiness. The
SECRET
Page 10 SPECIAL REPORT 30 Sep 66
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
 Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
SECRET
vast majority of the troops are
undoubtedly loyal to the regime,
and to Fidel Castro in particu-
lar. The same is true of the of-
ficer corps.
A new type of quasi-military
unit, the labor battalion, was
formed in the armed forces in
November 1965. Faced with a
labor shortage in the 1965-66
sugar harvest, Cuban authorities
killed two birds with one stone
by drafting clergymen, suspected
antiregime elements, riff-raff,
petty criminals, and perverts,
into Military Units for Aid to
Production. In some towns troops
reportedly went up and down the
streets picking up anyone who
could not produce proof of gain-
ful employment. Special targets
for induction were priests, minis-
ters, seminarians, and members of
the Jehovah's Witnesses sect.
These draftees live under guard
in prison-like encampments sur-
rounded by barbed-wire fences.
Discipline is severe and they
are rarely allowed to receive
visitors or to go home on pass.
They receive no weapons training
and are used in strenuous agri-
cultural work, primarily in the
sugarcane fields. As of the spring
of 1966, there were only 11 such
camps, all in Camaguey Province
where labor is scarce, but the
system is spreading to other prov-
inces. While lamenting the need
for these labor units, Fidel Cas-
tro announced in his 29 August
speech that they would be in-
creased and would be used through-
out Cuba. Regular troops are
also used in the sugar harvest
and sometimes in construction
projects, but the conditions un-
der which they serve are quite
different from those of the labor-
unit unfortunates.
Internal Security
The Castro regime has been
effective in dealing with minor
and sporadic internal resistance.
Attempts at assassination and
isolated acts of sabotage have
been reported from time to time
but the Department of State Secu-
rity (DSE), the branch of the Min-
istry of the Interior that is
charged with counterintelligence
responsibilities, has achieved
such proficiency that its agents
have been able to penetrate the
occasional small groups bent on
subversion and to spoil their plots.
Larger scale resistance, in
the form of roving bands of dissi-
dents hiding in the hills and
mountains, seems to be a thing of
the past. Working in close coord-
ination, the DSE and the anti-in-
surgency units of the armed forces
liquidated the last of such bands
in early 1965. Those disaffected
elements of the populace that
would normally form the core of
an insurgent or underground move-
ment, recognizing their impotence
in the face of powerful and well-
organized organs of repression,
have chosen exile rather then re-
sistance.
The ubiquitous Committees
for the Defense of the Revolu-
tion, organized by the ministry
of the Interior in 1960 as civil-
ian vigilante teams for rooting
out real and suspected counterrev-
olutionaries, have undergone a
functional evolution. Originally
developed to provide the Cuban
security services with a network
SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT 30 Sep 66
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
 Approved F,Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00A005400100003-1
SECRET
of informants reaching into every
factory, block, and apartment
house, the civilian teams grad-
ually lost their raison d'etre as
the more professional government
and armed forces units systemati-
cally uncovered and eliminated al-
most all organized subversive ele-
ments. Rather than being dis-
banded, however, the vigilante
units were shifted from the minis-
try of the Interior to the Superior
Council of Urban Reform where
today, under the direction of na-
tional coordinator Luis Gonzalez
Marturelo, they perform such in-
nocuous low-level administrative
tasks as distributing health cards
and ration books, conducting in-
noculation campaigns and blood
donor drives, and mustering people
for rallies and demonstrations in
support of the regime. Their
transfer from the Ministry of the
Interior is a tribute to the ef-
fectiveness of the DSE and an
acknowledgment that internal secu-
rity is no longer a major problem
in Cuba.
Not infrequently, rumors come
out of Cuba, usually via the ref-
ugee route, announcing that a
purge is being carried out and
alleging that the Castro regime
has been seriously undermined or
divided and may be ready to col-
lapse.
The basis for many such
rumors has been the "rationaliza-
tion" campaign that began in early
1964 in the Cuban National Bank
and the Cuban Workers' Organiza-
tion. The campaign, conducted by
units known as Fight Against
Bureaucracy Commissions, is aimed
at increasing governmental effi-
ciency through eradication of
bureaucratic overempl.oyment and
duplication of effort:. As a na-
tural by-product of'their investi-
gations, the commissions sometimes
uncovered evidence c f embezzlement
or other administrative irregulari-
ties which resulted in discipli-
nary measures being taken against
the perpetrators.
In Havana Province, where
the bureaucratic fat was the
greatest, over 16,000 positions
had been eliminated; by the end
of March 1966. As of February
1966, more than 13,000 positions
had been abolished in the remain-
ing five provinces. Such exten-
sive changes are bound to raise
cries of "purge" but the purge is
largely administrative in nature
rather than political, and is not
motivated by concern for the re-
gime's stability.
The EcorooEZ
The economic Situation con-
tinues to be the Castro regime's
greatest problem. A series of
natural disasters has aggravated
troubles arising from mismanage-
ment, inefficiency, and low labor
productivity. Many personnel and
organizational changes, however,
are improving the situation in
some important sectors. The re-
gime's plans which'placed exces-
sive emphasis on industrial ex-
pansion were sharply revised in
1962 and 1963 and the basic im-
portance of agriculture to the
Cuban economy was again recog-
nized. Greatest stress is now
on increased sugar production.
By 1970 the regime, hopes to har-
vest an annual crop of ten million
metric tons. Special attention
SECRET
Page 12 SPECIAL REPORT
30 Sep 66
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
 Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
rr Nftpo~
SECRET
is also being given to develop-
ing the livestock and fishing
industries.
The total output of the econ-
omy today is about what it was
in 1957, the year of highest
prosperity during the prerevolu-
tion period. In per capita terms,
however, the economy had de-
teriorated and per capita income
in 1966 will be 10 to 15 percent
below that of 1957. With the ex-
pected recovery of sugar produc-
tion next year, this situation
will improve somewhat; neverthe-
less, per capita income will re-
main below the pre-Castro levels.
At present, the economy de-
pends heavily on the largesse of
the Soviet Union and the other
Communist countries. In addi-
tion to $600 to $800 million in
military aid, Cuba, as of early
1966, had utilized nearly $1.1
billion in economic credits from
Communist countries, of which
more than $800 million was sup-
plied by the Soviet Union. The
USSR is also expected to help
Cuba out of difficulties caused
by the poor 1966 sugar harvest
by forgoing a large portion of
its quota of 3 million tons of
sugar and by providing additional
trade credits.
The 1966 sugar harvest to-
taled slightly less than 4.5 mil-
lion metric tons, about 1.5 mil-
lion below the 1965 harvest and
approximately 2 million below the
planned level. The poor crop was
caused mainly by the drought dur-
ing the growing season, but lack
of fertilizer and a decline in
the area of sugarcane available
for harvest also played a part.
Prospects for next year's
harvest are considerably brighter.
It has already been announced
that this harvest will start on
25 November and by December, 60
of the country's 152 mills will
be in operation. In December
1965, only three mills were op-
erating. The regime has opti-
mistically announced a goal of
6.5 million metric tons for 1967,
still somewhat below Cuba's rec-
ord of 7.2 million set in 1952.
Looking beyond 1967, the
Cubans continue to lay the basis
for trying to realize their goal
of 10 million tons of sugar in
the 1970 harvest. Construction
was begun in 1962 on dams and
canals for irrigation, flood
control, and drainage of areas
that can be reclaimed for agri-
cultural use. Over 1.5 million
acres of uncultivated lands are
scheduled to be cleared. Approxi-
mately 43,000 miles of roads
connecting the farmlands with
towns and seaports are to be
constructed. Port facilities
are being improved and railroads
are to receive new equipment. In-
creased quantities of fertilizer
are being imported from Europe,
as are large amounts of agri-
cultural machinery and construc-
tion equipment. Cuba is also
negotiating with several Euro-
pean countries for the purchase
of fertilizer plants. Invest-
ments are being increased to re-
pair and expand many of the sugar
mills and new mills will probably
be purchased in Europe. In the
field of education, emphasis con-
tinues to be placed on the train-
ing of agricultural technicians
and hydraulic engineers. Mechan-
ics to repair and maintain the
SECRET
Page .13 SPECIAL REPORT
30 Sep 66
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
 Approved For ease 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-0092705400100003-1
SECRET
heavy construction equipment are
also being trained, some of them
in France.
"Living Standard
The Cuban people have already
been told that in order to finance
these purchases and improvements
they are going to have to tighten
their belts and continue to make
sacrifices. This is not some-
thing new. Meat, rice, coffee,
and milk are all on the rationed
list. Many other food items are
very scarce or impossible to ob-
tain and food distribution is
poor. Fruit and poultry produc-
tion was damaged by hurricane Alma
and these are in short supply as
is fish, despite the rapid expan-
sion of the Cuban fishing fleet.
The limit of three pounds of rice
per month is particularly irksome
since rice has always been a basic
food in the Cuban diet. In an
effort to provide a replacement,
the regime is negotiating for
pasta and macaroni manufacturing
plants from Europe and has tried
through the press, radio, and
television to get the people to
change some of their eating hab-
its.
The shortage of spare parts
for automobiles and all types of
machinery and the wearing out of
electrical appliances is another
source of irritation to those
fortunate to have owned such
luxuries. The lack of adequate
housing has been aggravated by
the hurricanes that periodically
strike Cuba, and Castro himself
has admitted that it will be some
time before the housing situation
is appreciably improved. City-
wide power failures are becoming
Page 14
regular occurrenye:s in Havana;
this situation, however, will
probably be corrected when the
new power station at Mariel comes
into operation. Prices of most
consumer goods are high, and
poor services are getting worse.
These difficulti s are bound to
cause grumbling and lower morale.
The exodus of refugees and
defectors is evidence that all
is not well inside Cuba, but it
wnild be misleading to imply that
the domestic record of the Cas-
tro regime is without its eco-
nomic and social successes. Al-
though private automobiles are
fast disappearing from the streets
for want of repairs, public trans-
portation has improved consider-
ably, thanks to Leyland busses
imported from Britain. Medical
services, although poor, have
at last been made available in
the countryside.'' In pre-Castro
times such services were concen-
trated in the cities, primarily
Havana, and many 'rural areas were
entirely without medical support.
Educational facilities, too,
have been made widely available
to the rural areas and to the
poverty stricken.! The Ministry
of Education has!set a goal of
1,348,000 pupils In the various
levels of study during the 1966-
67 academic year,;, a previously
unheard of educational program.
Various sanitation and innocula-
tion drives have also benefited
the masses.
Relijion
The Roman Catholic Church,
the largest religious community
in the country, has lost the im-
portance it once held in Cuba.
SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT 30 Sep 66
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
 Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
4We N001
SECRET
While the regime theoretically
tolerates the practice of reli-
gion, in fact almost all religious
groups are the target of harass-
ment and denigration. The Jeho-
vah's Witnesses sect, in particu-
lar, has come in for severe treat-
ment and many of its members have
been denounced in the press as
US spies. Priests, ministers,
seminarians, and lay leaders, as
noted earlier, are being drafted
into the forced labor battalions
where they are thrown in with sex
perverts, drug addicts, and crimi-
nals. The Roman Catholic semi-
naries in Havana and El Cobre, the
Evangical Seminary in Matanzas,
and eight of the 26 Methodist
churches in Oriente Province were
closed early this year and many
pastors have been imprisoned for
"antigovernment activities."
The Catholic Church had already
been hard hit by the departure or
expulsion in 1961 of virtually
all of its foreign priests and
nuns, and priests now usually
must serve several parishes in-
stead of just one. Only the
Presbyterian Church seems to be
favored by the regime; the Cuban
branch may sever its ties with
its parent organization in the US
and become a national church un-
der the influence of several pro-
Castro ministers and the regime's
Office of Religious Affairs.
All religious groups are
forbidden to hold services or
processions outside church build-
ings and each congregation is re-
portedly required to get permis-
sion from the Interior Ministry
if it wishes to hold more than two
services per week. The Office of
Religious Affairs requires pastors
to register the names, addresses,
and places of employment of all
parishioners, and to file state-
ments on church finances. A less
subtle form of harassment has been
the practice since early 1966 of
blocking off streets bordering on
churches on Sunday mornings during
services and using them as sports
and recreation areas for school-
age children.
The
regime is likely to continue to
use steady pressure of this sort,
rather than blatant persecution,
to undermine religious influence.
Cultural Cuba
Culture in Cuba today is in-
creasingly being used as a tool
to shape the minds of the people.
The various art forms must carry a
socialist message or teach a revo-
lutionary lesson.
Former education minister and
third-ranking party official Ar-
mando Hart, in addressing the Ha-
vana University humanities faculty
on 5 June 1966, clearly identified
the Castro regime's position on
the role of culture; "All our ef-
forts in the field of art, litera-
ture, historical research, philo-
sophical inquiry, etc., should be
aimed at fighting imperialism and
the exploiters, at creating a
classless society and forming the
Communist man...."
I I 25X1
intellectuals in the 25X1
Cuban capital claim to be moving
toward what they themselves de-
scribe as a crisis. Originally,
SECRET
Page 15 SPECIAL REPORT 30 Sep 66
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1
 Approved For RIease 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927
05400100003-1
SECRET
most were staunch supporters of
the revolution but many are now
becoming progressively disillu-
sioned. A public expression of
dissent, in the form of a letter
to Fidel Castro and Armando Hart
signed by virtually the entire
membership of the National Writers
and Artists Union, was provoked
when a recent regime drive against
homosexuals resulted in the send-
ing of four of that organization's
members to the forced labor bat-
talions.
The government may be seek-
ing to release some of the pres-
sure on intellectuals by permit-
ting increased travel abroad.
Several have left Cuba on fellow-
ships and scholarships, a maneuver
probably designed to allow their
departure without an open break
with the regime.
In addition to experiencing
internal tensions, the Cuban cul-
tural world is being subjected
to external influences. There
has been a steady flow of artists,
musicians, dancers, vocal groups,
and other entertainers between
Cuba and the Communist countries
for several years. Through cul-
tural exchange agreements, Cubans
can watch television programs
produced in East Germany and
Czechoslovakia, see movies made
in Poland and the USSR, hear radio
programs recorded in Rumania and
Bulgaria, and visit exhibits from
North Vietnam and Hungary.
Even sports activities are
steeped in politics. Cuban teams
participating in international
matches are heralded as heroic
defenders of the revolution win-
ning great battles against the
"representatives of imperialism."
The new sports stadiums in Oriente,
Camaguey, and Las Villas, built in
disregard of the critical need for
other types of construction, are
an indication of rthe priority the
regime has assigned to sports.
The mass gymnastic exhibi-
tions so common tb political holi-
days in the Communist countries
have also become part of Cuban
life. During the:26 July festivi-
ties celebrating the 12th anni-
versary of the Mohcada Barracks
attack, more than .10,000 students,
youth groups, and armed forces
personnel took part in a massive
gymnastics spectabular.
Outlook
The political machine forged
by Fidel Castro is being developed
and refined until' eventually it
will absorb the vast majority of
the nation's population. Those
Cubans who cannot': conform to the
increasing regimentation have the
Varadero-Miami a:i~lift as an ef-
fective safety valve. Those who
do conform can expect greater
state encroachmen s on their per-
sonal lives and cbntinued eco-
nomic hardships fbr at least the
next few years.
The chances for a radical
change in leadership in Cuba are
remote. Castro his moved quickly
and effectively against any po-
tential threat to; his position
from within the regime and his
security forces h6ve been equally
vigilant in subduing and elimi-
nating any elements of resistance
within the population. Barring
Castro's death or disability, the
present regime will maintain an
unassailable hold on Cuba indefi-
nately.
SECRET
Page 16 SPECIAL REPORT 30 Sep 66
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A005400100003-1
 Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927 005400100003-1
SECRET
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400100003-1