SPECIAL REPORT BRITAIN'S HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES BECOMING INDEPENDENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005400100002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

OCI No. 0309/66A
BRITAIN'S HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES BECOMING INDEPENDENT
CEN.TR ,C #:INTELLIGEN E " A ENC
DI'REpTORATE; OE INTELL.I ENCE
30 September 1966
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BRITAIN'S HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES BECOMING INDEPENDENT
The scheduled independence of Bechuanaland on
30 September, Basutoland on 4 October, and Swaziland
within the next two years brings new potential for
political conflict in racially troubled southern Af-
rica. The manner in which surrounding white territo-
ries, especially South Africa, exert their influence to
keep friendly governments in these vulnerable black
states could increase international pressure for
action against the white redoubt. All are now ruled
by traditionalist governments that are keenly aware
of their dependence on South Africa and are anxious
to keep relations smooth. They nevertheless face
opposition elements which press for policies in
keeping with radical independent African states to
the north. Much will depend on whether South Africa's
new Prime Minister Vorster manages the same subtlety
that Vorwoerd did in influencing developments in
the territories.
International Implications
For Britain, withdrawal
removes one element of friction
with Pretoria. Long ruled by
the British High Commission in
Pretoria (hence the collective
term "High Commission Terri-
tories"), the areas have been
the object of annexation ambi-
tions by successive South Af-
rican governments. Britain, how-
ever, has kept its promise not
to incorporate them into South
Africa without their consent.
During its rule, Britain had
to balance the reality of Pre-
toria's overwhelming local power
with the growth of local African
nationalism and pressures from
the Commonwealth and elsewhere.
The territories' strategic
location for any future hostile
action against South Africa,
Rhodesia, or Mozambique has
already made them targets for
influence by those wishing to
destroy white rule in southern
Africa. For some time to come,
however, awareness of their de-
pendence on South Africa will
lessen the domestic appeal of
a hostile policy toward Pre-
toria. The general reluctance
of major powers to take effec-
tive measures against South Africa
also makes the new states anxious
to head off any confrontation.
However, given the possibility
of an increasing South African
bluntness in pursuing its vested
interests in the territories,
the desire of most African
states to use any issue to
club the Pretoria government,
and the likelihood of UN mem-
bership for the new states,
any local conflict may quickly
have wide-ranging international
repercussions.
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Bechuanaland: Botswana
Botswana, as Bechuanaland
is to be called on becoming
independent on 30 September,
is an arid, Texas-sized coun-
try of only half a million
people who live under almost
continuing threat of famine.
Eighty percent of these people
live in the extreme eastern
part of the country along a
narrow, railroad strip. Only
about 14,000 earn regular wages
--almost all from the govern-
ment. Most people combine sub-
sistence farming with the rais-
ing of cattle of poor quality,
subject to periodic drought
and disease. The livestock
contribute over 80 percent of
the value of exports, which go
mainly to the UK and South Africa.
At least 30,000 Botswana
work in mines and on farms in
South Africa, some residing there
permanently and transmitting some
of their earnings to relatives
back home. The country has coal
and copper deposits, but these
remain unexploited for lack of
the necessary infrastructure.
Botswana has, at most, 40 Af-
rican university graduates and
its secondary schools graduate
only about 100 students an-
nually. British grants have
roughly equalled domestic gov-
ernment revenues in recent
years. A sizable portion of
public revenue comes from South
Africa in the form of rebates
from a customs-union pool in
which all the former High Com-
mission Territories participate.
Botswana's politics have
much the same characteristics
as its economy--predominantly
traditional with small pockets
of modern activity. President
Seretse Khama, de facto para-
mount chief of the Bamangwato
(the largest of the country's
eight major tribes), was once
denied the royal office because
of his marriage to an English
secretary. The marriage was
considered improper by the re-
gent--his uncle--for reasons
of tribal tradition, and by the
British because of concern
over disturbing relations with
South Africa. Nonetheless,
Khama's claim to royalty is
still widely respected, and it
has helped the meteoric rise
and sustained strength of his
Democratic Party.
Khama formed his party in
1962--two years after the first
political party was organized.
An oxford-educated member of
the traditional "establishment,"
Khama wants to slowly erode
the political power of chiefs
and otherwise modernize Bots-
wana's political and social
institutions along with its
economy. At the same time, he
recognizes the dangers to so-
cial and political stability
inherent in a rapid introduction
of modern ideas and practices.
Khama also believes that mili-
tant African nationalism, as
voiced by opposition party
leaders, is inappropriate for
his poor and vulnerable coun-
try. However, he has tried to
cultivate an image of himself
among members of the organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU)
as a fellow African national-
ist doing his'best under the
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circumstances. Thus, Khama gives
asylum to South African refu-
gees so long as they do not
launch provocative operations
against the Pretoria govern-
ment, and he has condemned
Rhodesia's white rebellion
without stopping minor oil
shipments from South Africa
to Rhodesia across Botswana.
He is aware that any such dis-
ruption could lead to the con-
struction of a direct rail
link between the two white-
ruled countries and bring ad-
verse economic consequences
to Botswana.
Botswana's three opposi-
tion parties--the Peoples Party,
the Independence Party, and
the National Front--suffer
from the liabilities common to
parties in all three of the for-
mer High Commission Territories.
The radicalism of their leaders
appeals only to a small following
in the few towns. Constant bicker-
ing among the leaders on matters
unrelated to policy has led to
periodic splits into factions
and then into separate parties.
The parties' occasional finan-
cial sponsors in radical Afri-
can and Communist countries
have apparently become disillu-
sioned.
Khama's Democratic Party,
profiting from its divided op-
position, the respect for its
royal leader among the major-,
ity traditionalist citizens,
and the organizing abilities of
its deputy leader, Vice President
Quett Masire, won 80 percent of
the vote in the general elections
of March 1965 and an equally over-
whelming victory in municipal coun-
cil elections last June. President
Khama, therefore, leads Botswana
into independence with a majority
of 28 seats in' the 31-member leg-
islature.
Nevertheless, Khama's gov-
ernment faces potential opposi-
tion from several sources. Al-
though he has avoided promises
of unattainable economic and
other advances: after independence,
even limited development plans
will stir great expectations
which cannot ;be satisfied. More-
over, latent tribal and other
parochial interests could emerge
at any time to-disrupt the politi-
cal calm. Certain chiefs have
started to realize how suavely
the Democratic! Party is ma-
neuvering traditional authori-
ties out of positions of power
in the new political insti-
tutions. Dr. Kenneth Kama,
the National Font's skillful
secretary general who returned
to Botswana inn; 1965 from grad-
uate study in London and six
years residence in eastern
Europe, has tried to bring to-
gether the unhaippy chiefs and
the bickering opposition lead-
ers.
The presehce of South Af-
rican refugees' also poses prob-
lems. Not only do they tend to
compete among themselves along
the lines of their squabbles in-
side South Africa, but they com-
petitively support the more
militant leaders of opposition
parties in the: other two former
High Commission Territories.
Finally, African radicals as well
as Communist powers have shown
interest in using Botswana as a
base for activities against South
Africa.
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Basutoland: Lesotho
Lesotho, as Basutoland will
be called following its inde-
pendence on 4 October, is almost
totally dependent economically
on South Africa, which surrounds
it geographically. Nearly half
of the country's adult males work
in South African mines and other
enterprises. As with Botswana,
Lesotho receives much of its
public revenue through its cus-
toms arrangements with South Af-
rica. Its only promising eco-
nomic development prospect is
the long-discussed oxbow River
scheme, whereby Lesotho would
sell water and hydroelectric
power to South Africa.
Most of the roughly 860,000
Lesotho who do not work in South
Africa live a traditional life
on subsistence farms. Wool, mo-
hair, and hides comprise the ma-
jor exports. Lesotho has no
known significant mineral re-
sources; its poor communications
and transportation system could
not exploit any deposits that
might be discovered. The country
could possibly become self-suffi-
cient in food with improved culti-
vation techniques. However, a
major impediment to agricultural
development is the absence of
individual land ownership. Accord-
ing to traditional law, the para-
mount chief owns all land.
Of all the former High Com-
mission Territories, Lesotho has
the most unstable political sit-
uation, with a three-cornered
power contest. This situation
results from the breakdown of
the traditional alliance of clans
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under a paramount chief having
limited powers.
Prime Minister Leabua Jona-
than's National Party is tradi-
tionalist in its base of support
and in its attitude toward run-
ning the country. The National
Party is hostile to the radical-
ism of other African governments
and to the activism of political
refugees from South Africa. It
is willing to establish normal
relations with Pretoria on the
basis of virtual vassalage. The
six-year-old party holds only 32
of the 60 seats in the legisla-
ture, however, and has never won
a majority of the popular vote.
In the latest general elections,
held in 1965, it received only a
42-percent plurality. Jonathan, a
popular chief of a Basuto sub-
tribe, was defeated and had to
arrange a by-election in a safe
constituency to return to the
legislature.
The strongest opposition
comes from the radical Congress
Party, which holds 25 seats.
The Congress Party uses the slo-
gans and money of radical Afri-
can and Communist governments,
and is anxious to test how far
Lesotho could flaunt African na-
tionalist colors without bringing
retribution from Pretoria. The
party's approach appeals to urban
wage earners, to the small but po-
litically active urban "intelli-
gentsia," and to African civil
servants who resent the govern-
ment's favoritism toward its own
supporters. Congress Party leader
Ntsu Mokhehle, for all his radi-
calism and willingness to use out-
side Communist support, is
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determined to keep control of the
party in his own hands. Ever
since 1961, when Communists among
South African refugees tried to
take over the party in hopes of
controlling Lesotho for future
operations against South Africa,
Mokhehle has made a clear distinc-
tion between his relationship with
Communists outside and those within
his country.
followers for violence unless
Lesotho's independence constitu-
tion gave him exteno:ive powers.
Since Britain rejected his de-
mands, however, he teems to be
considering an accofnmodation
with Jonathan's govrnment, per-
haps realizing that,, after in-
dependence, Jonathah can count
on South Africa to help his se-
curity forces.
The third side of Lesotho's
political triangle is formed by
the Marema-tlou Freedom Party
(MFP) and by the paramount chief
of the country, Motlotlehi Mosho-
shoe II. Originally, the MFP
was a tribal "establishment" party,
differing from the National Party
primarily on the basis of person-
ality clashes, old feuds, and po-
sitions taken regarding Mosho-
shoe's right to the paramount
chieftaincy in 1960. The MFP
gained some strength between 1962
and :L964 from its lucrative as-
sociation with Communist elements
among South African refugees and
from its ties with less radical
modernists, but that association
contributed to the party's poor
showing in the 1965 elections.
The MFP has since broken its left-
wing connections, and many of its
chiefs have gone over to the ruling
National Party.
Ill will reportedly has ex-
isted between Moshoshoe and Prime
Minister Jonathan since 1960 when
Jonathan is said to have tried to
prevent the young Oxford student's
accession to the chieftainship.
Perhaps with an eye on the Kabaka's
ouster early this year in Uganda,
Moshoshoe probably believes that
his royal office may be in jeop-
ardy after the British leave.
He threatened to appeal to his
Swaziland
Swaziland, which might be
known as Ngwane when it achieves
independence, is th least po-
litically advanced of the former
High Commission Tertritories but
the only one with the potential
for economic viabilLty. Never-
theless, it too is Subject to
economic and political pressure
from South Africa, t~rhich sup-
plies almost all of the country's
capital investment 4:nd manage-
rial skill.
As in the rest, of black Af-
rica, most of Swaziland's roughly
390,000 people live; on subsist-
ence farms. Many make temporary
wage employment either in their
own country or in Sjouth Africa,
however, and a larger percentage
than in Botswana or!Lesotho are
permanently employee in budding
local industries and services.
The country has one; of the largest
asbestos mines in the world, and
a rich iron ore deposit is being
mined by a South African group.
The possible .pjolitical dis-
ruptions arising out of Swazi-
land's relatively m ;ore-developed
economy are mitigated by its hav-
ing the most cohesive tribal
structure of the three territo-
ries. Swaziland is' a traditional
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nation with a tight social pyra-
mid culminating in the paramount
chief, who has not only certain
political and economic powers but
ritual and spiritual ones as well.
The present paramount chief,
Sobhuza II, has skillfully used
the still-pervasive traditional-
ism of the Swazis, their sense
of being a distinct group, and
their continuing respect for his
office to build a strong polit-
ical party, the Imbokodvo Em-
abalabala (meaning "tough grind-
ing stone"). This party won all
eight of the legislative seats
chosen by African voters in the
most recent elections, held in
1964. Sobhuza and his Swazi Na-
tional Council of chiefs chose
eight other Legislative Council
members, and the whites, compris-
ing less than one percent of the
population, elected eight more
from their separate electoral
roll.
Formed only a few months
prior to the 1964 elections, the
Imbokodvo originally was a party
of the tribal "establishment,"
represented by the traditional
Swazi National Council, and was
allied to the United Swaziland
Association that represented lo-
cal white economic interests.
Shortly after the elections, how-
ever, the Imbokodvo began to ar-
ticulate more nationalistic de-
mands for a postindependence Swa-
ziland. The Paramount Chief's
party demanded an end to separate
legislative seats and voting rolls
for the races, parity of wages
for black and white workers,
more education and health facil-
ities, no special guarantee of
land ownership rights to whites,
and the ownership of all mineral
rights by the Swazi nation. The
imbokodvo also began to establish
youth groups and to bring the
trade unions into a federation
allied to the party.
At the same time, Sobhuza
welcomed back into the national
fold (as he thinks of the Imbo-
kodvo) those leaders of modernist
parties who saw the hopelessness
of opposition to the traditional
establishment and who believed
they could be more effective by
liberalizing the policy of the
traditional power structure from
within. One of these, Simon
Nxumalo, used his extensive per-
sonal contacts and reputation as
an African nationalist to win
favor for the Imbokodvo from
some of the more radical African
governments.
The fate of Swaziland's
only real left-wing group illus-
trates the territory's political
trends. The Ngwane National
Liberation Congress was formed
in 1963 following a factional
split in another opposition party.
The Congress commanded some sup-
port from the infant trade un-
ions and the urban unemployed.
One of its top figures, Dumisa
Dlamini, did much to intensify
a 1963 general strike which re-
quired the intervention of Brit-
ish troops--the only such crisis
in any of the three territories.
Within the past month, however,
both he and another Congress
leader have denounced the
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bickering within their party and
gone over to the Imbokodvo.
Paramount Chief Sobhuza
is alert to the possibility that
Diamini and other less radical
:modernists have joined the Im-
bokodvo with the idea of taking
it over for their own purposes,
So far, there is no indi-
cation that any of the modernists
have reached positions from
'which they could challenge Sob-
huza and the Swazi National Coun-
cil.
One of Sobhuza's emerging
problems is how to carry the
other chiefs along with his
plans for guided and limited
progress. He believes that the
Imbokoavo must stay ahead of
the Congress in championing the
modernist forces that will emerge
as economic development proceeds
and Swaziland becomes more in-
volved in the political prob-
lems of southern Africa.
A new constitution, nego-
tiated in London last summer,
provides the framework for po-
litical change between now and
independence, which is set to
come before 1969. The constitu-
tion curtails the powers of the
chiefs, but probably not so much
as to alienate ,;them from Sobhuza
and the Imbokodvo. They may be
somewhat reassured by the pow-
ers retained by! Paramount Chief
Sobhuza, who keeps the right to
appoint one fifth of the members
of the lower house and half of
the upper house;, to dissolve
parliament, and, perhaps most
important, to act as trustee of
land and minerals. Sobhuza is
66 years old, however, and any
successor might show less skill
in balancing the traditionalist
and modernist ei`lement 'n
independent country.
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