WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005400080001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 16, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Copy No. 9 5 0
State Dept. review completed.)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRE`CTC RAr,TE OF INTELLIGENCE;
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GROUP I Excluded from Qutorootic
downgrading ond,declas$iFitgt on
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(Information as of noon EDT, 15 September 1966)
VIETNAM
The large voter turnout for South Vietnam's election
of a constituent assembly on 11 September demonstrated
the government's organizational ability and dealt a
sharp blow to Viet Cong prestige. Buddhist opposition to
the election also proved ineffectual. Allied military
operations made little contact with Communist forces
this past week, and combat activity was generally light
despite the stepped-up Viet Cong antielection terrorism.
DUTCH-INDONESIAN CLAIMS DISPUTE SETTLED
This removes the major obstacle to expanded economic
and cultural relations between the two countries.
CHINA'S RED GUARDS SHIFT ATTACK TO LOCAL PARTY FIGURES
The Guards have shifted from general denunciations of
antisocialist and capitalist tendencies to more specific
attacks on veteran officials in municipal, provincial,
and regional party committees throughout China. This
is further evidence that the new leadership is using the
Guards in its move against opponents in the party ap-
paratus.
Europe
USSR MAINTAINS FOREIGN PURCHASING PROGRAMS
Despite the USSR's continuing need to import grain,
which may at times force reductions in its programs to
buy Western industrial machinery and plants, these
programs are no longer held up pending the outcome of
the harvest.
MOSCOW RENEWS CALL FOR EUROPEAN PARLEY
A 12 September Izvestia editorial again boosting the
idea of an all-European security conference indicates
Moscow's continued interest in keeping this proposal
open.
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Middle East - Africa
INCREASING POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION IN SYRIA
The recent wave of arrests and charges of plotting re-
flect the increasing political fragmentation of the
radical Baathist military regime. Labor leaders have
inaugurated a series of arrests of business officials.
Continued religious and ideological rivalries will
promote further instability.
THE NEW EGYPTIAN CABINET
Nasir's appointment of Muhammad Sulayman to head a
cabinet of technicians appears to be a victory for the
more doctrinaire "Arab Socialist" elements in the
Cairo regime. Cairo's official line is that the cab-
inet change is merely a move toward more efficiency in
the economic realm.
FRANCE'S RELATIONS WITH NORTH AFRICA 11
While Paris has moved toward a rapprochement with Tunisia
and has made progress in settling its imbroglio with
Algeria, the Ben Barka affair threatens to create serious
diplomatic difficulties with Morocco.
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CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS BEGIN IN NIGERIA
Representatives of Nigeria's four regions and of the
federal territory of Lagos met this week for talks on
the country's future. Terrorist bombings on the eve
of the conference added to the tension, but most del-
egates appeared determined to press for some form of
loose association which would prevent the country
from breaking up into separate states.
SOUTH AFRICA'S NEW PRIME MINISTER
Prime Minister Vorster's reputed inflexibility will be
tested in the near future by several impending foreign
policy issues. His lack of experience in international
affairs also is a handicap.
Western Hemisphere
PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT HOPEFUL ON TREATY TALKS
Robles is determined to complete a canal settlement
with the US before the issue is caught up in the cam-
paign for Panama's 1968 presidential election.
GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT DECLARES WAR ON EXTREMISTS
His public address threatening stern action against ex-
tremists of both left and right has eased the prevail-
ing climate of insecurity and may temporarily halt
rightist charges that his government is Communist in-
fested.
PROTESTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN ARGENTINA'S 17
UNIVERSITIES CONTINUE
The student agitation that has persisted since the
regime assumed direct control of the country's eight
national universities in late July intensified during
the past week.
CONTINUED MALAISE IN ECUADOR
The public has been apathetic about next month's con-
stituent assembly elections, and preparations for the
voting have proceeded slowly. The government continues
to have problems with its finances and with labor, and
President Yerovi has again threatened to resign.
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Far East
VIETNAM
The large voter turnout for
South Vietnam's election of a
constituent assembly on 11 Sep-
tember demonstrated the govern-
ment's organizational ability
and dealt a sharp blow to Viet
Cong prestige. The climax in
Communist terrorism designed to
disrupt the voting resulted in
nearly 200 casualties during a
24-hour period beginning on
election eve. However, neither
this nor the boycott by militant
Buddhists made a significant dent
in the voter turnout. Four
fifths of the nation's 5,288,000
registered voters went to the
polls. While about two thirds
of Saigon's voters cast ballots,
the turnout was considerably
higher in government-controlled
areas in the provinces.
There has been no evidence
of significant election irregu-
larities favoring specific can-
didates in any area, but there
may have been some government
pressure to get out the vote in
the provinces. Some voters an-
ticipated trouble with the
government after the election if
they could not prove they had
voted. However, the large turn-
out was a tribute to the govern-
ment's over-all effort, including
its extensive pre-election in-
formation programs and its secu-
rity provisions during the polling
period.
effective popular mandate when
it begins its constitution draft-
ing duties on 26 September. The
117 delegates include several
nationally known politicians
from the Saigon area. Southerners
and Buddhists will form plurali-
ties in terms of regional and
religious background, with
Catholics also well represented.
Nearly half the delegates are
business and nongovernment pro-
fessional men. Thirty-six gov-
ernment personnel--18 military
men and 18 civil servants--were
also elected.
Militant Buddhist antielec-
tion hunger strikes conducted in
Saigon and several other cities
attracted little public attention,
and no serious Buddhist efforts
were made to disrupt the voting.
On election day, moderate Bud-
dhist leader Tam Chau broadcast
an appeal urging the faithful
to the polls, and voting was
brisk in strong Buddhist areas
in Saigon. Invalid ballots,
which the people were urged to
cast by the Buddhists as an al-
ternative to an outright boycott,
averaged about ten percent in
Hue and Da Nang, where militant
Buddhist influence is particu-
larly strong. Elsewhere, they
constituted less than five per-
cent of the total.
Because of the successful
election, the constituent assem-
bly can claim a relatively
Since the election, there
has been no apparent change in
the attitude of the militants
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THUA
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toward the government, but other
Buddhists have been clearly look-
ing for a compromise settlement.
Buddhist Institute policy appears
to be once more in a state of
flux.
Communist Reactions
Communist propaganda reac-
tion to the successful election
employed the same note of deri-
sion that characterized pre-
election treatment.
A Viet Cong radio commentary
doggedly reiterated the claim
that the Liberation Front con-
trols 10 million of the country's
14 million people, and described
the government's voter registra-
tion total of more than 5 million
as fraudulent and the assembly
as meaningless.
In several lengthy commen-
taries, Hanoi news media con-
demned the election as a "farce"
and pointed to a series of al-
leged irregularities in the elec-
tion process to demonstrate that
it was "rigged up by the US and
the Thieu-Ky clique." Moreover,
the DRV media attempted to dis-
count the validity of the election
by claiming that the Liberation
Front was "the only one genuine
representative of the South Viet-
namese people."
Both Peking and Moscow propa-
ganda quoted from the Hanoi com-
mentaries on the election and
went on to claim that it was a
"fraud concocted with figures"
and a "farce directed by Ameri-
can bayonets."
Military Operations
Allied military operations
seeking out Communist forces
made little contact during the
past week, with combat activity
generally light despite the
stepped up Viet Cong antielec-
tion terrorism.
There are indications that
the 610th North Vietnamese/Viet
Cong Division has once again be-
gun offensive tactics in Binh
Dinh Province after avoiding con-
tact with allied forces for over
two months. Recent enemy attacks.
against government forces and
outposts in the northeastern part
of the province have been attrib-
uted to this "Yellow Star" Divi-
sion.
Five battalions of the US
1st Cavalry Division have launched
a large search-and-destroy opera-
tion in the northeastern part of
Binh Dinh. This operation, known
as Operation THAYER, is attempting
to locate and destroy elements
of the 610th, which has an esti-
mated strength of 11,880 men.
In the most significant ter-
roist incident of the week fol-
lowing the election, a force of
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Sep 66
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about 150 Viet Cong attacked a
civilian construction company
motor pool on the outskirts of
Saigon on 14 September. Two Viet-
namese civilians were killed, six
others were wounded, and one
Australian was captured. As many
as 50 trucks may have been de -
st;=royed by grenades or satchel
charges causing damage which may
exceed one million dollars.
DUTCH- INDONESIAN CLAIMS DISPUTE SETTLED
The Dutch-Indonesian claims
settlement of 7 September removes
the major obstacle to expanded eco-
nomic and cultural relations be-
tween the two countries.
The Netherlands' claim for
its seized property was scaled
down during prolonged negotiations
from over $1 billion to $167 mil-
lion. The Dutch simultaneously
declared their willingness to ex-
tend further economic aid to Indo-
nesia.
The settlement reflects the
pressure of Dutch business circles
on the Cals government to clear
the way for business expansion in
Indonesia. Nevertheless, Dutch
interests are expected to go slow
in investing in businesses requir-
ing any considerable importation of
capital equipment into Indonesia
until the Djakarta regime becomes
more firmly established than at
present.
Since the final settlement
of the West Irian issue in 1962,
and the subsequent transfer of the
territory to Indonesian control,
relations between the two countries
have improved considerably. Dip-
lomatic relations, which had been
broken in 1960, were reopened in
1963. Trade has expanded and, in
fact, in the first quarter of 1966
a single Dutch firm purchased over
half of Indonesia's total exports.
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CHINA'S RED GUARDS SHIFT ATTACK TO LOCAL PARTY FIGURES
The tactics of Communist
China's Red Guards have shifted
from general denunciations of
antisocialist and capitalist
tendencies to more specific at-
tacks on veteran officials in
municipal, provincial, and re-
gional party committees through-
out the country. In many in-
stances, beleaguered local party
leaders have fought back by or-
ganizing popular resistance.
Disorders are said to have
taken place in at least 15 cities
in all parts of China. Accordin
to press accounts,
E7 municipal party officials
in the Kwangsi city of Kuei-lin
managed to organize a counter-
demonstration of 100,000 local
people when Red Guards attempted
to arrest a vice mayor. Troops
were called in to put down the
disturbance.
Serious clashes,
involving several deaths and at-
tacks on important party figures,
were also reported in Sian, Lan-
chou, and Harbin.
There are no indications
yet that leading party officials
in any of these trouble spots
have been disciplined by Peking,
but this is probably only a mat-
ter of time. In the only public
acknowledgment of the new disor-
ders, the People's Daily declared
in an editorial on 11 September
that "responsible persons in
some localities and some units
have openly defied" directives
from the central committee and
Mao Tse-tung. It said that such
persons have "incited a number of
workers and peasants who have not
known the truth to oppose and
antagonize the revolutionary
students." The editorial then
called on workers and peasants
to avoid being drawn into fight-
ing against the Red Guards for
any pretext. The main job of
these Red Guards, it said, re-
peating recent statements by Lin
Piao, is to bring down "those in
authority who are taking the
capitalist road."
These startling events and
pronouncements are further evi-
dence that the new leadership is
using the Red Guards in its move
against opponents in the regular
party apparatus throughout the
country.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Sep 66
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Eu rope
USSR MAINTAINS FOREIGN PURCHASING PROGRAMS
Despite the USSR's continu-
ing need to import grain, which
may at times force reductions in
its programs to buy Western in-
dustrial machinery and plants,
these programs are no longer held
up pending the outcome of the
harvest.
The USSR plans to import
during the next 12 months one
third of the 9 million tons of
Canadian wheat it bought in June
under a 3-year pact and is seek-
ing supplemental quantities else-
High-ranking Soviet offi-
cials have indicated that grain
imports will have to be continued
until the agricultural reform an-
nounced in 1965 has become fully
effective. Grain purchases for
the next few years apparently
will cost at least $200-300 mil-
lion annually.
This need to use scarce hard
currency to finance grain pur-
chases detracts from other So-
viet buying programs. This year,
however, Moscow has continued
contracting for Western indus-
trial plants throughout the pre-
harvest period. Heretofore there
had been a noticeable slackening
of purchasing activity in late
summer while the harvest is as-
sessed.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Sep 66
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MOSCOW RENEWS CALL FOR EUROPEAN PARLEY
A 12 September Izvestia edi-
torial again boosting the idea of
an all-European security confer-
ence indicates Moscow's continued
interest in keeping this proposal
open. The previous day's issue
had referred to the security issue
as the topic of recent talks be-
tween Brezhnev and East Germany's
Walter Ulbricht.
Through a recent series of
diplomatic demarches to various
West European countries, the So-
viets have sought--with a notable
lack of success--to project an
image of sincerity and flexibility
on the subject of European secu-
rity. There are no signs, however,
that Moscow is preparing any sig-
nificant departure from the seven-
point pronouncement put forth after
the Warsaw Pact meeting this sum-
mer at Bucharest. The Bucharest
declaration--which the 12 Septem-
ber Izvestia editorial cited--
called for a phased abolition of
the NATO and Warsaw Pact military
organizations and for reductions
of the two German armies in a
troop-reduction package that would
include foreign troop withdrawals.
The Soviets repeatedly have made
clear, however, that the existence
of "two German states" with their
present boundaries is to be a point
of departure, not for discussion,
in any talks on new security ar-
rangements for Europe.
The Izvestia editorial went
further in clarifying fying Moscow's
view of the US role in European
security than any Soviet statement
since the idea of a conference was
revived at the 23rd Soviet Party
Congress in March. The editorial
rejected the idea that the US would
be deprived "fully of the rights to
take part in the solution of Euro-
pean problems." Izvestia charged,
however, that Was in~inggton wants to
deny Europeans the right to solve
their own problems, and reiterated
the idea of a round-table confer-
ence of "all European states" as
the first step to be taken. Pre-
viously, Soviet spokesmen have
given the impression publicly that
the US had no part to play, while
acknowledging privately that US
views must be considered and that the
US must be a party to any settle-
ment of European security problems.
This latest Soviet overture
is cast in terms which are bound
to elicit a West German rejection.
Bonn has long insisted that it will
not participate in any European
talks at which East Germany is pres-
ent and Washington is not. The ap-
proach by the Soviets thus is in keep-
ing with the line Moscow has pur-
sued in recent months of encourag-
ing the impression that is is will-
ing to engage in fruitful discus-
sions of European security, while
portraying Bonn (backed by Washing-
ton) as the sole obstacle to get-
ting such discussions under way.
Moscow is trying to generate pres-
sure on Washington and Bonn to
abandon plans for a West German
role in NATO nuclear-sharing ar-
rangements rather than prejudice
the prospect of detente with the
Soviet Union.. It is clear that the
issue of West German access to nu-
clear weapons, rather than European
security per se, is the paramount
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Middle East - Africa
INCREASING POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION I N SYRIA
The recent wave of arrests
and charges of "imperialist-
backed" plotting in Damascus re-
flect the increasing political
fragmentation of the radical
Baathist military regime.
Leaders of the Syrian Gen-
eral Confederation of Labor Un-
ions have taken advantage of the
uncertain situation to inaugurate
a series of arrests of "reaction-
ary" officials within national-
ized business establishments. A
number of these officials have
been brutally beaten by union
goon squads. Although the govern-
ment is said to oppose the cam-
paign, it apparently feels too
weak at the moment to put a stop
to the purges.
The regime claimed last week
that it had crushed two reaction-
ary coup attempts within 48 hours.
Major Salim Hatum, the commando
leader who had triggered the Feb-
ruary coup which brought the pres-
ent junta to power, was accused
of plotting in collusion with mem-
bers of the ousted moderate faction
of the Baath Party. He has fled to
Jordan with a number of his lieu-
tenants and was granted political
asylum.
Several members of the former
regime had escaped from prison two
weeks ago. They have not yet sur-
faced, but presumably are in Leba-
non. They may try to set up a new
international Baathist organiza-
tion. Such a step would pose se-
rious problems for the Syrian re-
gime in its own efforts to elect a
new international leadership of
the party and maintain its legiti-
macy as a Baathist government.
Religious as well as personal
and ideological rivalries have
played a large part in the recent
intraregime conflicts. Hatum, a
member of the minority Druze sect,
has opposed the ascendancy of mem-
bers of the rival minority Alawite
sect within the military. The
Sunni Muslims--who constitute a
majority of the Syrian population--
resent the present influence within
the army of both minority groups.
The curfew imposed last week
has been lifted, and Damascus is
calm for the moment. Nevertheless,
the continuing conflicts will pro-
mote further instability, and the
situation remains extremely fragile.
However, any military faction which
comes out on top will maintain an
anti-Western posture and Syria's
present close ties with the USSR
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THE NEW EGYPTIAN CABINET
Nasir's dumping of the Muhi
al.-Din cabinet last. weekend and
the appointment of Muhammad Sidqi
Sulayman, former High Dam minis-
ter, to head a cabinet of tech-
nicians appears to be a victory
for the more doctrinaire "Arab
Socialist" elements in the Cairo
regime.
The timing of the cabinet
change seems significant. Former
prime minister Muhi al-Din and
former minister of finance and
economy Qaisuni had been holding
conversations with officials of
the International Monetary Fund
and with Western financial repre-
sentatives about additional sup-
port for Egypt's sagging economy.
Both men had the confidence of
the Western financial community,
a factor noticeably lacking in
their replacements. Nasir seems
to be unwilling to pay the in-
ternal political price necessary
for him to reach agreement with
the IMF and World, Bank. He ap-
pears to be reverting to an em-
phasis on more industrialization,
greater central direction, and
"Arab Socialism."
The Soviets think that Su-
layman is an efficient adminis-
trator based on their contacts
with him as High.Dam minister,
and Cairo may hope that his ap-
pointment will loosen up Moscow's
purse strings. Moscow, however,
has indicated nc;particular en-
thusiasm for the,change, possibly
an indication that they may
be concerned over its economic
implications.
Cairo's official line is
that the cabinet change signifies
no political shift, but a move
economic realm.
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FRANCE'S RELATIONS WITH NORTH AFRICA
The current trial in Paris
of suspects in the disappearance
of exiled Moroccan opposition
leader Mehdi Ben Barka may have
more serious diplomatic conse-
quences than France's earlier im-
broglios with Algeria and Tunisia.
Relations with Algiers and Tunis
are now coming back to normal,
but a complete break with Rabat
is a fair possibility.
French-Moroccan relations
cooled sharply early in 1966 when
Paris publicly took the position
that the Ben Barka "killing" was
directed by Moroccan Interior
Minister Oufkir. At that time,
King Hassan supported Oufkir's
denials of involvement and re-
fused to cooperate in the prelim-
inary investigation. Quai offi-
cials are hopeful that, even if
Oufkir is convicted in absentia
at the trial, the decision will
be ignored by both governments.
French circles in Rabat are more
pessimistic, however, and fear
that the government there will
come under nationalistic pressure
to react strongly to an attack on
a Moroccan minister, break diplo-
matic relations, and nationalize
farm properties owned by French
interests.
A variety of short-term
problems have been plaguing
Paris' relations with Algiers.
Negotiations on mutual financial
and economic claims broke down in
April. Algeria nationalized
French mining properties and took
over properties abandoned by
French nationals. France then
blocked its untied aid to Al-
geria, and Algeria stopped pay-
ments on its current debts to
France.
Algeria's unwillingness to
discuss outstanding claims item
by item may be tempered by the
upcoming French National Assembly
debate on the budget, which in-
cludes proposed aid to Algeria
for 1967.
Since Tunisia nationalized
French-owned agricultural lands
in May 1964 without provision
for full compensation, French
economic aid has been cut off and
technical assistance curtailed.
In the spring of 1966, France be-
gan to "defrost" its relations
by granting tariff-free quotas
for certain Tunisian exports, ex-
tending a long-term loan, re-
newing a cultural and technical
protocol, and signing a social
security agreement.
Tunisia took a major step in
July toward meeting the French
demand for compensation by agree-
ing to supply wine to France. The
proceeds of the transaction will
be credited to French landowners'
claims against Tunisia. The com-
pensation problem remains a
thorny one because estimates of
the extent of compensation due
vary considerably. Paris has
made clear that a request for aid
would be premature.
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CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS BEGIN IN NIGERIA,
Twenty-eight representatives
of Nigeria's four regions and the
federal territory of Lagos met
this week in the capital under
heavy security guard for talks on
the country's political and con-
stitutional future. Two terror-
ist bombings on the eve of the
Lagos conference added to the
psychological tension, but most
delegates appeared determined to
press for some form of loose as-
sociation which would prevent
fragmentation of the country.
In his opening speech Supreme
Commander Gowon suggested that the
conference rule out either the
complete breakup of the country
or the creation of a unitary
state. He offered four options:
a federal system with a strong
central government; a federation
with reduced powers at the center;
a confederation; and some "new"
form of association peculiar to
Nigeria. Gowon asked the dele-
gates to make broad recommenda-
tions consistent with the degree
of agreement reached in their
regions.
The East favors a loose fed-
eration with some common services
and a regionalized police and
army; the West a strong federation
of eight states, formed along
ethnic and linguistic lines; and
the North and Mid-West a federa-
tion. Since the North and East
appear to have the decisive in-
fluence, the conference will prob-
ably recommend some form of loose
federation comprising four vir-
tually autonomous regions. Never-
theless, resolution of such is-
sues as the structure and control
of the army will be difficult, as
will the matter of guarantees for
the security of the Eastern re-
gion's Ibo people, who have been
the principal victims of Northern
aggression. Redistribution of
oil revenues is also likely to
become a touchy question, with
the East insisting on a larger
share.
Both the North and East have
problems with minority groups
within their boundaries which are
pressing for greater autonomy or
the creation of smaller states
within the region. Eastern mili-
tary governor Ojukwu and his ad-
visers believe they have controlled
minority separatist sentiment by
agreeing to divide the East into
12 provincial units, each with
its own executive and administra-
tive authority. The region's cen-
tral government will have a bi-
cameral legislature based on
equality of representation from
each unit. In the North, mili-
tary governor Katsina has an-
nounced plans foz a devolution of
power to minority groups at the
provincial level.
Tension has eased somewhat
in the Northern capital of Kaduna
where unruly Northerner army ele-
ments have joined with civilians
in harassing and attacking Ibos.
No new incidents have been re-
ported there since last week.
Ibos continued their exodus from
Lagos and Kaduna, and any new
flare-up in Northern depredations
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GRAN,
DAHOMEY,j
Sokoto
against them or additional ter-
rorism in Lagos could seriously
jeopardize the constitutional
talks.
Northern military governor
Katsina's degree of control over
rank-and-file army elements in
Kaduna is uncertain, and Eastern-
ers continue to fear an invasion
NIGER
CAM,ERQQN
of their region by Northern
troops. In Lagos itself the army
is said to be extremely unpopular,
and it will have to do consider-
able image rebuilding if it is to
play the role of "referee" in Ni-
gerian politics which Gowon en-
visions for it once civilian gov-
ernment is restored.
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SOUTH AFRICA'S NEW PRIME MINISTER
South Africa's new prime min-
ister, John Vorster, was justice
minister in the late Hendrik Ver-
woerd's cabinet, and he is a neo-
phyte in the international field.
His handling of several foreign
policy issues in the near future
will indicate whether he intends
to pursue South Africa's objec-
tives with the subtlety which was
emerging in the last month of Ver-
woerd's tenure, or whether he will
operate more dogmatically, as
many observers believe.
South Africa will come under
attack in the United Nations later
this month over its relationship
with South-West Africa (its League
of Nations mandate) and over the
aid it has given Rhodesia in cir-
cumventing UN-backed economic
sanctions. Moreover, Vorster's
attitude toward the three former
British High Commission Territo-
ries will be closely watched as
two of them--Bechuanaland and
Basutoland--gain their independ-
ence under African governments
within the next month.
None of these issues requires
any major initiative by South
Africa, and no significant change
of position is expected. However,
Vorster has tactical choices in
handling each one. On South-West
Africa, he can hide behind the
legalism of the recent Interna-
tional Court of Justice's decision
not to consider the case, or he
can flatly defy UN :involvement
there and further inflame the
African members. Vorster can con-
tinue Verwoerd's attitude of in-
nocent normalcy about South Af-
rica's continued trade with Rho-
desia, or he can more outspokenly
support the Smith regime and fur-
ther embarrass the, West. The rel-
atively conservat:iVe black govern-
ments in the High Commission Ter-
ritories can be discreetly sup-
ported and their economic depend-
ence on South Africa quietly main-
tained, or Vorster, can more bla-
tantly exert Pretoria's influence
there.
Should Vorster decide to take
a more rigid stance on foreign pol-
icy issues than his predecessor, he
would only compound his problems in
the international arena. His lack
of experience in international af-
fairs--an area almost completely
monopolized by Verwoerd--also is a
handicap.
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Western Hemisphere
PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT HOPEFUL ON TREATY TALKS
Panamanian President Robles
is optimistic over the current
round of canal negotiations with
the US, even though not all the
difficulties in the negotiations
have yet been overcome. He is
determined to complete a canal
settlement before the issue is
caught up in the campaign for Pan-
ama's 1968 presidential elections.
votes to win ratification, how-
ever, because he cannot always
count on the support of all dep-
uties in his coalition. More-
over, the assembly is notori-
ously subject to public and po-
litical pressures and much will
depend on the prevailing atmos-
phere when the settlement is
submitted.
EE ar
Tier this year, he said he would
not try to win public support
for the treaties if he were dis-
satisfied with the final draft
or thought that the majority of
Panamanians would oppose it.
In a recent meeting with
progovernment deputies to dis-
cuss strategy for the 1 October
opening of the regular session
of the National Assembly, the
President announced that 29
deputies were now aligned with
the administration. This margin
does not guarantee Robles the
Arias, who controls 11
of the 42 members in the legis-
lature, has repeatedly announced
his intention to obstruct any
canal accord reached by the Robles
regime. In addition, two leftist
deputies opposed to the govern-
ment can be expected to support
the Panamenista bloc.
Robles dismisses the prob-
ability of demonstrations insti-
gated by the Panamenistas or Com-
munists during the treaty debates.
He has said that he would not
hesitate to employ National Guard
units to maintain n,ser.
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GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT DECLARES WAR ON EXTREMISTS
President Julio Cesar Mendez
last week declared war on Gua-
temalan extremists of both the
left and right, describing force-
fully in a public address his
loss of patience with the pre-
vailing conspiratorial political
climate.
The speech was a reaction
to opposition attempts to dis-
credit his administration with
rumors that he is sympathetic
to Communist terrorist forces.
Calling his message a last
hopeful summons to peace and
concord, Mendez announced the
reinforcement of all security
forces and his readiness as
commander in chief to order them
into action against perpetrators
of any new wave of disorder.
The speech was well re-
ceived by press and public.
It eased the climate of inse-
curity and may temporarily halt
the rightist campaign to prop-
agandize the government's "in-
festation by Communists."
There is no reason to expect
that the address will affect
Communist insurgent activity.
In answer to the presiden-
tial warning, the Rebel Armed
Forces (FAR) --the Communist
act:Lon arm--issued a bulletin
accusing the government of
allying itself with the military
and the rightist in continued
exploitation of the lower classes.
The bulletin reiterated the FAR's
aim to seize power through long
revolutionary struggle, and its
intention to continue assassinat-
ing rightists responsible for the
"crimes" of the Peralta regime.
The FAR claimed that during the
past two months it had refrained
from attacking government secu-
ity forces, and that it would not
attack them unless provoked.
Communist insurgency has in
fact focused almost exclusively
of late on its campaign of "ex-
ecution" and kidnapings. Illus-
trating the difficulties in com-
bating the Communists, Mendez
told the US ambassador that gov-
ernment forces had made no con-
tacts in a recent sweep of the
area of guerrilla activity. The
President recognize's that elim-
ination of the guerrillas is a
long-range problem and is at-?
tempting to correct the weak-
nesses of the security forces
and to improve their intelli-
gence capabilities. He expressed
awareness of discontent within
the military, but claimed it ex-
isted mainly among younger of-
ficers and was not of crisis
proportions.
Although Mendez has improved
his position for the moment, some
elements in the military are be-
lieved to be disappointed that he
has not issued "marching orders"
for action against the Commu-
nists but only stated his inten-
tion to do so if terrorism con-
tinues. Should Mendez fail to
act if the need arises, with the
same force with which he spoke,
discontent with the government
could rapidly rise.
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PROTESTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
I N ARGENTINA'S UNIVERSITIES CONTINUE
The government of President
Ongania continues to face stub-
born resistance in its efforts
to reform and check Communist
influence in Argentina's univer-
sities.
The student agitation that
has persisted since the regime
assumed direct control of the
country's eight national univer-
sities in late July intensified
during the past week. Demon-
strations became especially
strong in Cordoba, where clashes
with police resulted in the
death of a student leader on 12
September. A 24-day hunger
strike contributed to the un-
easiness in Cordoba and classes
at the university were finally
suspended indefinitely.
In Buenos Aires violence
broke out during a "march of
silence" organized by university
groups mourning the student's
death. Minor disorders occurred
in most of the other university
cities, although a nationwide
strike called earlier by the
recently outlawed Communist-dom-
inated Argentine University Fed-
eration failed.
For the first time impor-
tant labor groups began express-
ing open support for the students.
A brief work stoppage was called
by the Cordoba branch of the
powerful General Labor Confed-
eration (CGT) in sympathy with
the demonstrations there and
CGT representatives said they
would continue to support the
students.
After a drop-off in the num-
ber of resignations among uni-
versity professors, 64 faculty
members resigned from the Buenos
Aires medical school last week
in protest against government
policies.
Despite the resistance to
the intervention the government
is determined to continue with
its reform measures and with its
pledge to eliminate subversive
influences from the universities.
A newly formed advisory council
is to draft a higher education
law which will give administra-
tive control to the professors.
Students will no longer have a
strong voice in university gov-
ernment as they did under the
traditional principle of auton-
omy. In view of the unwilling-
ness on both sides to compromise,
the dispute over federal inter-
ference in the universities is
likely to pose a troublesome
problem for the Ongania regime
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CONTINUED MALAISE I N ECUADOR
Preparations for Ecuador's
16 October constituent assembly
election are moving ahead at a
slow pace. The general public
remains apathetic, and little
is being done to generate in-
terest. Some Ecuadorean poli-
ticians believe that the elec-
tion will have to be postponed
a month or two because of the
lack of preparation.
The parties have until 1
October to present their lists
of candidates to the provincial
electoral tribunals. Most are
experiencing difficulty in draw-
ing up their lists, particularly
where! coalitions are concerned.
Elections for the twelve func-
tional deputies to the assembly
are to be held between 23 Sep-
tember and 10 October. Most of
the various groups which these
deputies will represent have be-
gun to nominate their candidates.
sympathy strikes. The teachers
received part payment of overdue
allowances with the assurance that
all arrears would be paid by Novem-
ber. The strike, essentially for
back wages, points up just one
instance of the difficulty the
government is having in finding
funds to pay its employees. The
chiefs of the armed' services com-
plained last month that many mili-
tary units had no money for food
and that most vehicles were inop-
erative for lack of'spare parts
and tires. Military allowances
are said to be in arrears by sev-
eral months.
Yerovi was quite discour-
aged earlier this month over the
unfavorable political. and economic
situation, and characteristically
threatened to resign. Labor un-
rest, the resignation. of the fi-
nance minister, and.lpessimism
about the election put the gov-
ernment's stability in question
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In addition to electoral
problems, interim president
Yerovi has been having difficul-
ties with labor and, as usual,
government finances. The month-
long strike of Guayaquil school-
teachers ended on 11 September,
as did student demonstrations and
The next several weeks
will probably be unoasv ones in
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