SPECIAL REPORT THE COMMUNIST-FRONT PARTY IN FINLAND'S GOVERNMENT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-00927A005400040003-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79-00927A005400040003-8.pdf | 1.04 MB |
Body:
ase-2.006110111": CIA-F DP '9-40927A(YO54,C10640C 13-8
19"August 1906
THE-COMMUNIST-FRONT PARTY IN FINL INDS G( VERNM NT
GROUP I Excluded rom- vtdr t-i~c
downgrcadfng and declossificericsn
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8
SECRET
THE COMMUNIST-FRONT PARTY I N FINLAND'S GOVERNMENT
The Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL),
a Communist-front electoral organization, has
scored a major breakthrough by gaining representa-
tion in the new coalition cabinet. The return of
the SKDL to cabinet responsibility--for the first
time since 1948--makes Finland the only West Euro-
pean country to have Communist representation in its
government since the-cold war began.
Under the watchful eyes of its non-Communist
coalition partners and controlling only three rel-
atively minor cabinet posts, the SKDL's opportuni-
ties to take advantage of its improved position will
be limited, at least for the time being. This de-
velopment,however, may have an impact elsewhere in
Europe, particularly in Denmark and Sweden, where
minority Social Democratic governments will be in-
creasingly tempted to cooperate with Communists and
radical Socialists in order to prevent further ero-
sion of their electoral strength.
Origins
The Finnish People's Lemo-
cratic League (SKDL) was founded
in 1944 barely a month after Fin-
land had sued for an armistice
terminating its involvement in
World War II. The league has
since gradually evolved from a
tactical alliance of Communists
and left-wing Socialists, whose
objective was to prepare the
way for a Communist seizure of
power, into an electoral front
organization in which Communist
domination is being increasingly
questioned and challenged by
both its leaders and the rank
and file.
The initiative to form
the SKDL came from the Finnish
Communist Party (FCP), outlawed
Page 1
in 1930 but recognized as a bona
fide "democratic" party under
the terms. of the armistice of
September 1944. The FCP's
newly won legal status was sub-
sequently formalized by the 1947
peace treaty between Finland
and the Soviet Union, but through-
out the postwar period the party,
as such, has never chosen to ap-
pear on the ballot and has pre-
sented its candidates under the
SKDL label.
The Immediate Postwar Years
In organizing the SKDL as
a collaborative movement bring-
ing together Communists, left-
wing-Socialists, and assorted
like minded elements the FCP
had as its immediate objective
a working alliance of these
SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug 66
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-R,DP79-00927A005400040003-8
SECRET
'OMPONLNIS Cl- HNNISH
tOP1_FS DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE ( SKDL
groups under its guidance and
control. From the beginning,
the SKDL's principal target has
been the Social Democratic
Party (SDP), Finland's most ef-
fective non-Communist political
grouping and traditionally the
FCP's bitter rival for the al-
legiance of labor. In the im-
mediate postwar years, the Com-
munists felt they had a psycho-
:Logical advantage in being iden-
tified with the victorious Soviet
Union, while the Social Democrats
were to some extent discredited
for having participated in Fin-
land's wartime coalition govern-
ments. The Communists thus had
reason to hope that the Social
Democrats could be effectively
neutralized by consolidating
labor within a united front
opposed to "fascism and mili-
tarism"--a slogan with consider-
able appeal.
In retrospect it appears
that the Communists at first
envisaged the SKDL essentially
as a temporary instrument for
obtaining quick control of the
government. This seems to be
borne out by the fact that it
was not until 1949 that the SKDL
formulated an official program.
During these years, however, the
political situation stabilized
to a degree, and the likelihood
of Soviet military action in
support of a Communist take-over
diminished considerably. As
the prospect of riding into
power via a popular-front organ-
ization receded, the Communists
were compelled to revamp their
strategy toward a more extended
period of struggle. Some Com-
munists,however, had still not
Claimed total membership in 15166 145,000-
Finnish Communist Parity, 84,000
Finnish Women's Democratic-League 730,000
AAodemic Socialist Society 1,000
Other SKDL members
Totc figure includes some1multiple counting of members
belonging to more than ore of the affiliated organizations.
0131 - tc,RE!
entirely given up hope of at-
tracting large numbers of non-
Communists to the SKDL, and out
of deference to this group, the
1949 program was nonideological.
and made no reference to "social-
ism."
The Organization of the SKDL
In addition to its own
membership, the SKDL includes
the FCP, the Finnish Women's
Democratic League, and the
Academic Socialist Society.
Even though almost two thirds
of the SKDL's'145,000 members
are estimated to be non-Commu-
nists, the FCP has dominated
the organization and key posts
within the SKDL have tradition-
ally been filled by Communists.
Recently, however, in order to
appease restive nonparty mem-
bers in the SKDL, the leadership
has sought to' play down or camou-
flage the role of the Communists.
The SKD]'s organizational
network presently comprises
over 2,000 loyal groups embrac-
ing some 60,000 members, in
addition to its affiliated or-
ganizations. The SKDL's elec-
toral appeal, however, is
SECRET
Page 2 SPECIAL REPORT
19 Aug 66
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8
%NOV NNW
SECRET
substantially greater than these
figures suggest.
The SKDL in Postwar Government
In the first postwar elec-
tions in 1945, the SKDL polled
almost one fourth of the vote
and gained 49 of the 200 seats
in parliament. Under these cir-
cumstances the SKDL could not be
denied a voice in the government,
and was given one cabinet posi-
tion. A coalition was formed of
the three leading parties--the
Center (Agrarians), the Social
Democrats, and the SKDL--with
the respected conservative leader
and banker, Juho Paasikivi, as
prime minister. Paasikivi's
tenure was brief. Elected presi-
dent in March 1946, he was suc-
ceeded as prime minister by the
SKDL leader, Mauno Pekkala. Al-
though not himself a Communist,
Pekkala proceeded to appoint
loyal party members to head such
sensitive ministries as interior,
which controlled the police, and
communications, which controlled
radio.
During the next two years,
the Communists deliberately en-
couraged uncertainty and tension
throughout the country by organ-
izing civil disorders and labor
unrest. They infiltrated into
both the security and regular
police apparatus as the first
step toward achieving control.
However, despite the advantageous
position from which the Communists
were able to operate and the in-
itially favorable psychological
climate, they became increasingly
aware that they could not re-
alistically expect to be able
Page 3
to take over the government by
parliamentary means.
It is still not entirely
clear how far planning for a
coup had proceeded, nor is it
known to what extent Moscow was
privy to and approved such plans.
In March 1948, shortly after the
Communist coup in Czechoslovakia,
the Communist minister of inte-
rior, Yrjo Leino--who apparently
was motivated by strong nation-
alist feelings--indicated, prob-
ably deliberately, to Finnish
military authorities that "dis-
turbances" might be pending that
could develop into something even
more serious. The regular police
and the military acted immedi-
ately by disarming the security
police and bringing in troops.
Shortly thereafter parliament
undertook an examination of
Leino's conduct while in office,
which culminated in a vote with-
drawing confidence from the in-
terior minister and the ouster
of Leino and the other Communists
from the government. In the
elections later in 1948, the
SKDL's parliamentary strength
dropped from 49 to 38 seats.
The SKDL in Opposition
The SKDL began its opposi-
tion role by bitterly attacking
the new Social Democratic gov-
ernment. The Communists ac-
tively encouraged, and probably
instigated, many illegal strikes
which contributed to labor un-
rest. They also strongly op-
posed the stabilization program
worked out between the Social
Democrats and the Agrarians to
combat the deteriorating eco-
nomic situation.
SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug 66
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8
Approved For Release 006/10111: CIA-RDP79-00927A005400040003-8
SECRET
Despite what seemed des-
tined to be the SKDL's permanent
exclusion from the government,
the party retained considerable
political influence through its
consistently demonstrated elec-
toral strength, and even gained
seven seats in the 1958 elec-
tions.
The Finnish Communists now
joined with the Soviet Union in
an unrelenting attack on the
government of veteran Social
Democratic leader Fagerholm.
Their accusations of "rightist"
leanings and insincere protesta-
tions of friendship with the
Soviet Union eventually compelled
Fagerholm to resign in late 1958
after the Soviets withdrew their
ambassador and threatened to cut
off trade. Moscow's action was
a crude attempt to isolate the
Social Democrats and discredit
them in the eyes of the voters,
thus hopefully forcing cabinet
cooperation between the SKDL and
President Kekkonen's Center
Party.
This strategy was only par-
tially successful, for instead
of cooperating with the SKDL,
Center leaders such as President
Kekkonen proceeded to strengthen
their ties with the USSR and
annoyed the Finnish Communists
by portraying the Center as the
only political group in Finland
enjoying Moscow's favor. Riding
the wave of Finno-Soviet friend-
ship, the Center came to dominate
Finland's political life, sur-
viving such setbacks as the
crisis in Soviet-Finnish rela-
tions in late 1961 when Moscow
invoked the 1948 Treaty of
Friendship and Mutual Assistance
and sought defense consultations
with Finland. The elections in
early 1962 were a victory for
the Center at the expense of
the badly divGided Social Demo-
crats and the SKDL.
During the ensuing four
years, both the SKDL and the
Social Democrats remained in a
kind of political limbo, a situ-
ation that did not change until
1964, when Social Democratic
gains in the municipal elections
foreshadowed their re-emergence
as a political power. This and
stirrings within these two
parties portended new alignments
and relationships on the Finnish
political scene.
FCP Dissension--Early Years
From the end of World War
II until 1956 the Finnish Com-
munist Party was a disciplined
and monolithic party presided
over by harshly intolerant Sta-
linist leaders,, many of whom had
lived and trained in the Soviet
Union. The FCP was long one of
Moscow's most faithful support-
ers, accepting without question
every twist in the Soviet Commu-
nist line. The "sheep-like
about-face tutns of the party
leadership in't:he past 17 years"
became, in fact:, one of the main
subjects of criticism within the
party.
Khrushch6v's 1956 debunking
of Stalin shock both the FCP and
the SKDL. While a majority fell
into line and accepted a ban on
discussion of pre-1956 activity,
a small group criticized the
dictatorial methods of the party
leadership. These differences
SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug 66
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A005400040003-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8
SECRET
were further sharpened during the
Hungarian uprising later that
year.
The ferment within the party
again surfaced in 1961, when the
Finnish non-Communist press re-
ported the existence of an "op-
position" element within the
party that supposedly had sym-
pathizers in the SKDL parlia-
mentary group. Although the
Communists flatly denied the re-
ports, the opposition element
apparently did exist and dissi-
dent members from all sections
of the country had reportedly
held a secret meeting and dis-
cussed future activities. How-
ever, there was still little
public criticism of the party
line by this group, which con-
tinued to accept party disci-
pline. The top leadership, un-
der the tight control of authori-
tarian, old-guard chairman Aimo
Aaltonen and Secretary General
Ville Pessi, appeared to ignore
the rising discontent.
Although the dissidents
were not effectively organized,
they were nevertheless agreed
that the "leadership dominance"
of the party must be changed,
as well as the party program
which they saw as clinging to
outmoded dogma. They pointed to
the outcome of the 1964 municipal
elections in which the SKDL lost
ground to the Social Democrats
in the urban centers where both
were competing for the working-
class vote. This outcome defi-
nitely confirmed to the young
progressives in the "liberal"
group that the FCP leadership
and its policies were responsible
for the lack of electoral gains
and for keeping the SKDL on the
sidelines of government.
Dissension Increases
Khrushchev's ouster in No-
vember 1964 and the passive and
unquestioning acceptance of Mos-
cow's version of the episode by
the FCP leadership brought the
controversy into the open again.
In an unprecedented move, the
principal press organ of both
the FCP and the SKDL, Kansan
Uutiset, printed a seriesof
art icles debating party policies
on various topics, including a
criticism of FCP Secretary Gen-
eral Pessi for his support of
Khrushchev's removal.
Chairman Aaltonen took
strong measures to discourage
pressure from FCP's younger
elements to liberalize the party.
Widespread interest in the press
discussion nevertheless enabled
the liberals to force a special
session of the central committee
in October 1965. A manifesto
was issued somewhat modifying
party doctrine to conciliate the
liberals.
The concessions by the old-
guard Stalinists were probably
due in part to the influence
brought to bear by the deputy
chairman of the CPSU who visited
Finland at this time. At a
closed meeting of the politburo,
the CPSU official supported mod-
ernization of the FCP and said
he hoped that younger talent
would be brought into the leader-
ship. Without some gestures to
the liberals, the CPSU apparently
feared that the increasingly
divisive conflict between the
SECRET
Page 5 SPECIAL REPORT
19 Aug 66
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A0400040003-8
SECRET
two factions of the FCP might
lead to a permanent split in the
party and weaken the Soviet Un-
ion's ability to influence po-
litical developments in Finland.
Part Congress
tion during which cuntrol can be
expected to sh f't gradually to
younger hands.' With seasoned
trade unionists in leadership
posts, the party is expected to
place even greater emphasis on
activities dirocted to the trade
union movement.
The manifesto only partially
met the demands of the growing
number of critics who prepared
to press their cause at the par-
ty's 14th Congress in January
1966. A concerted effort to
oust the Stalinist leaders at
this time assumed more urgency
in view of the need to adopt a
platform on which the SKDL could
more successfully challenge the
Social Democrats with upcoming
parliamentary elections.
The outcome was a compromise
between the two factions. The
liberals were successful in re-
placing the chairman and vice
chairman by Aarne Saarinen and
Erkki Salomaa, both trade union-
ists, and in getting committees
established to reconsider party
programs. Although the old guard
retained the important secretary
generalship and maintained its
control over the party adminis-
tration, the liberals increased
their representation on the im-
portant central committee and
politburo. Saarinen so far has
not clearly identified himself
how-
with either faction. He is,
ever, reported to be completely
independent of CPSU influence.
The party thus appears to
have entered a period of transi-
Current S]L-FCP Relations
The question of the role
of the SKDL axed its relationship
to the FCP has: been controver-
sial in both organizations. Be-
cause the FCP'insisted on com-
plete control,! SKDL members who
did not belong to the FCP felt
they were shunted aside and
given a subordinate role. The
more liberalll inclined FCP
leaders, within eye to possi-
ble future cooperation with the
Social Democr t:s and perhaps
even the Cent:;r Party, felt the
FCP should bu.41d up SKDL pres-
tige and powe' to a point where
it could lead; the whole leftist
workers' movement. The pro-
Stalinists argued that the SKDL
lacked the albility to be the
vanguard of the working class,
a role they ollaimed should be
exclusive tolthe FCP. The old
guard probably feared that
SKDL - Social Democratic coop-
eration mightt, weaken Communist
control of the SKDL as well as
undermine the conservative wing
in the FCP dispute.
Some SKDL parliamentary
members were ! among the early
sympathizers; with the burgeon-
ing liberal opposition group in
the FCP. In'an apparent attempt
SECRET
Page 6 SPECIAL REPORT
19 Aug 66
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A005400040003-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8
to mollify the malcontents, the
FCP leaders in February 1965 ap-
pointed a nonparty member, Ele
Alenius, former second vice
chairman of the SKDL, to be
SKDL's secretary general, a po-
sition formerly held only by FCP
members. It is Alenius' view
that the SKDL, whose majority
membership is non-Communist,
must evolve toward genuine au-
tonomy, asserting its own prin-
ciples of working for "modern
socialism" independently of FCP
decisions.
Despite the concession of
Alenius' appointment, little
actual progress has been made
toward freeing the SKDL from
FCP domination. The SKDL re-
mains financially dependent on
the FCP. Communist representa-
tion on its executive board and
in its parliamentary group re-
mains large. The long-standing
practice persists of having the
SKDL parliamentary delegation
Page 7
SECRET
take guidance from the FCP in-
stead of from its own organiza-
tion.
However, the outlook for
the liberals appears fairly prom-
ising. Although all but two or
three of the 41 SKDL members of
parliament returned in the elec-
tions last March are Communist
Party members, the majority of
these are identified with the
liberals. Furthermore, liberals
have taken over almost all of
the functionary posts in the
SKDL, and perhaps up to 80 per-
cent of the SKDL rank and file
and its affiliates are opposed to
the old-line faction of the FCP.
For the foreseeable future,
there is likely to be continued
friction between the FCP and the
SKDL, as the latter becomes more
unwilling to accept FCP guidance
in either party or government
affairs.
The March 1966 Elections
The Communists had reason to
view the quadrennial national
elections in March with some ap-
prehension, even though a sem-
blance of harmony had been re-
stored as a result of the party
congress. The SKDL's performance
in the 1964 local elections of-
fered little hope for major gains
in 1966. In addition, the "elec-
tion alliance" between the SKDL
and a dissident left-wing, Social
Democratic splinter party dis-
pleased many Communists who re-
garded this as a tactic that
would weaken their own parlia-
mentary position for the sake of
gains by an ally of dubious reli-
ability.
SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug 66
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8
Approved For Rel!
e 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A0400040003-8
SECRET
In the election campaigning,
party spokesmen focused primarily
on domestic economic problems such
as inflation, unemployment, and
the housing shortage, but they
found it difficult to exploit
these issues effectively at a
time when Finland was enjoying a
period of unprecedented prosper-
ity. Moreover, their uninspired
technique of using old complaints
and pat solutions had little ap-
peal for the new, young voters.
Foreign policy was not a major
issue but both the SKDL and the
Center sought to exploit it by
suggesting that they enjoyed a
special relationship with Moscow
and by reminding the electorate
of the long history of hostility
between the Social Democrats
and Moscow.
The election outcome proved
to be a landslide victory for
the Social Democrats, who emerged
as the single largest party in
parliament, and a setback for the
SKDL, which polled fewer votes
than in 1962 and lost six of the
47 seats it had held in parlia-
ment.
Negotiations for the New
Government
In the discussions between
Social Democratic chairman Paasio
and President Kekkonen about the
composition of the new government,
Kekkonen made it clear that he
favored a government that was
as broadly based as possible.
This was interpreted by the So-
cial Democrats to mean that he
expected the SKOL to be included.
Paasio, faced with the Cen-
ter's disinterest in cooperating
with the Social Democrats in a
two-party coalition, and recalling
Moscow's reaction in 1958 when a
Social Democratic - dominated
cabinet was formed, apparently
concluded that!it would be ad-
visable to try ';; for a "big three"
coalition. Furthermore, Soviet
officials in Helsinki had let it
be known that they too favored a
coalition of the "workers" par-
ties and the Canter.
Despite strong opposition
among their rank and file, the
leadership of the non-Communist
parties began negotiations with
the SKDL over the new government's
program and the apportionment of
cabinet posts.; At an early stage
in the talks, the Social Democratic
and the Center representatives
had decided that: the Communists
would in any c4se be denied such
sensitive post:$ as the foreign
ministry, defense, interior, and
education, and'were determined
to allot to them the most politi-
cally disadvantageous portfolios.
This objective was facilitated by
the Communists themselves, who
were extremely eager to enter
the cabinet and accepted three
relatively minor posts, associate
minister of finance, minister of
transport and public works, and
minister of social affairs.
Social Democratic and Center
leaders are inclined to minimize
the possible dangers their solu-
tion may entail. However, by
gaining entry into the cabinet
the Communists have achieved one
of their primary objectives--co-
operation on the governmental
level with "a].1 constructive
forces" except:'the Conservatives.
SECRET
Page 8 SPECIAL REPORT
19 Aug: 66
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A005400040003-8
SECRET
Current SKDL Strategy
And Prospects
The SKDL will probably con-
centrate on consolidating its
renewed respectability as a gov-
ernment party. As representa-
tives of a party that has only
recently emerged from some 18
years of political isolation, it
would not be in their interests
at this time to take any actions
that would risk the fall of the
government and lead to new cabi-
net negotiations from which the
SKDL might be excluded.
For this reason, party
strategists are likely to con-
tinue to concentrate their ener-
gies on the two goals that have
consistently eluded them during
the postwar period: persuading
the Social Democrats to cooperate
in a program of joint political
action and achieving a more
equally shared control of or-
ganized labor.
Since the formation of the
new government, there have been
renewed efforts to reunite the
labor movement. An important
step was taken at the June con-
gress of the larger, leftist-
controlled federation. A Social
Democratic faction cooperated
with the Communists in ousting
the dissident Social Democratic
groups from the leadership of the
federation. This resulted in an
even more influential role for
the Communists in the top leader-
ship and policy-making bodies of
the organization. The Communists
also succeeded in achieving in-
creased possibilities for inde-
pendent action by the important
unions they control.
Non-Communist observers in
Finland have expressed some dis-
may over these developments, since
they will give the Communists an
even more influential voice in
formulating labor's programs and
policies.
The' other Communist goal--
united political action with the
Social Democrats--remains more
elusive because of the persistent
historical animosity and sus-
picion between the two groups.
The Communists may derive some
encouragement, however, from re-
cent indications that a growing
number of Social Democrats seem
prepared to consider limited co-
operation. A more immediate re-
sult could be a drift of the So-
cial Democratic left wing toward
closer cooperation with the Com-
munists and the existing dissident
Socialist group, thereby creat-
ing further tensions among the
already disunited Social Demo-
crats. In addition, the break-
through scored by the SKDL in
gaining government representa-
tion is having an impact out-
side Finland--particularly on
Communist and SKDL relations with
the CPSU, and on the prospects
of other Scandinavian Communist
or neo-Marxist parties.
The relationship between
the CPSU and its Finnish coun-
terpart has traditionally been
an extremely close one, reflect-
ing both Finland's geographic
proximity to the Soviet Union
and the party's heavy subsidiza-
tion by the CPSU. However, part
of the trend toward moderniza-
tion in the FCP consists of re-
furbishing its public image as
an independent group whose first
SECRET
Page 9 SPECIAL REPORT
19 Aug 66
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A005400040003-8
Approved For Release,'p06/10/11 ?: CIA-RDP79-00927AO054QJL040003-8
SECRET
allegiance is to Finland. With
Moscow's consent, the present
leaders of the Finnish party seem
to recognize that in regard to
internal party matters and
domestic politics they are on
their own to a much larger ex-
tent than formerly.
Since Soviet officials have
indicated that they are reason-
ably satisfied with the exist-
ing political situation in Fin-
land--and have stated as much
to local Communists--the party
leaders appear to have resigned
themselves to the long pull of
trying to reach their goals by
working through parliament and
the trade union movement. If
necessary, Moscow is probably
prepared to continue to assist
the local Communists only to the
extent of its ability to influ-
ence political developments in
Finland. There already have
been indications, however, that
it will be done in more subtle
ways than the crude pressures and
veiled threats at the govern-
mental level which sometimes
characterized Moscow's efforts
in years past.
Repercussions in Scandanavia
The SKDL breakthrough is be-
ing watched by many Western Euro-
pean Socialist parties whose lead-
ers are faced with increasing de-
fections by their left-wing ele-
ments. A more immediate impact is
being felt in Sweden and Denmark,
where long-entrenched Social Demo-
cratic governments have seen the
slow erosion of their parliamen-
tary strength. In Sweden, Prime
Minister Erlander is under pres-
sure from his party's extreme
left-wing to cooperate with the
newly revitalized Swedish Commu-
nist Party, which has made a
strong comeback under its new,
independent--minded leader, Carl-
Henrik Hermannson. The left-wing
faction maintains that during the
Social Democrats' long tenure the
party has become increasingly
bourgeois and conservative in out-
look, thereby abandoning to the
Communists the large segment of
the population that favors a more
radical domestic economic program
and a more active and "neutralist"
foreign policy. This restiveness
among the younger party members
will be a decisive factor in the
outcome of the 1968 elections
and will determine whether the
older, more conservatively inclined
Social Democratic leadership will
be pushed toward closer coopera-
tion with the Communists.
In Denmark, Prime Minister
Krag's Social Democratic minor-
ity government is under similar
pressures. He faces the choice
of turning leftward to the Marx-
ist, anti-NANO, Socialist People's
Party for parliamentary support
--and perhaps even cabinet co-
operation--or risk defections by
the Social Democratic left wing
if he moves toward accommoda-
tion with the "bourgeois" par-
ties. Krag has so far spurned
the far left:, but domestic po-
litical considerations may even-
tually compel him to accept some
form of cooperation.
Domestic political develop-
ments in both countries would
determine the price the Commu-
nists ask for such cooperation,
but initially at least, their
demands would be made to appear
reasonable. Over the long term,
however, the Social Democrats
run the risk.of further blurring
the lines dividing Socialists
from Communists and thereby
granting the latter an increased
measure of acceptance and re- 25X1
s ectabilit
SECRET --"
SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug 66
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8
SECRET
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8