SPECIAL REPORT THE COMMUNIST-FRONT PARTY IN FINLAND'S GOVERNMENT

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-00927A005400040003-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A005400040003-8.pdf1.04 MB
Body: 
ase-2.006110111": CIA-F DP '9-40927A(YO54,C10640C 13-8 19"August 1906 THE-COMMUNIST-FRONT PARTY IN FINL INDS G( VERNM NT GROUP I Excluded rom- vtdr t-i~c downgrcadfng and declossificericsn Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8 SECRET THE COMMUNIST-FRONT PARTY I N FINLAND'S GOVERNMENT The Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL), a Communist-front electoral organization, has scored a major breakthrough by gaining representa- tion in the new coalition cabinet. The return of the SKDL to cabinet responsibility--for the first time since 1948--makes Finland the only West Euro- pean country to have Communist representation in its government since the-cold war began. Under the watchful eyes of its non-Communist coalition partners and controlling only three rel- atively minor cabinet posts, the SKDL's opportuni- ties to take advantage of its improved position will be limited, at least for the time being. This de- velopment,however, may have an impact elsewhere in Europe, particularly in Denmark and Sweden, where minority Social Democratic governments will be in- creasingly tempted to cooperate with Communists and radical Socialists in order to prevent further ero- sion of their electoral strength. Origins The Finnish People's Lemo- cratic League (SKDL) was founded in 1944 barely a month after Fin- land had sued for an armistice terminating its involvement in World War II. The league has since gradually evolved from a tactical alliance of Communists and left-wing Socialists, whose objective was to prepare the way for a Communist seizure of power, into an electoral front organization in which Communist domination is being increasingly questioned and challenged by both its leaders and the rank and file. The initiative to form the SKDL came from the Finnish Communist Party (FCP), outlawed Page 1 in 1930 but recognized as a bona fide "democratic" party under the terms. of the armistice of September 1944. The FCP's newly won legal status was sub- sequently formalized by the 1947 peace treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union, but through- out the postwar period the party, as such, has never chosen to ap- pear on the ballot and has pre- sented its candidates under the SKDL label. The Immediate Postwar Years In organizing the SKDL as a collaborative movement bring- ing together Communists, left- wing-Socialists, and assorted like minded elements the FCP had as its immediate objective a working alliance of these SECRET SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug 66 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-R,DP79-00927A005400040003-8 SECRET 'OMPONLNIS Cl- HNNISH tOP1_FS DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE ( SKDL groups under its guidance and control. From the beginning, the SKDL's principal target has been the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Finland's most ef- fective non-Communist political grouping and traditionally the FCP's bitter rival for the al- legiance of labor. In the im- mediate postwar years, the Com- munists felt they had a psycho- :Logical advantage in being iden- tified with the victorious Soviet Union, while the Social Democrats were to some extent discredited for having participated in Fin- land's wartime coalition govern- ments. The Communists thus had reason to hope that the Social Democrats could be effectively neutralized by consolidating labor within a united front opposed to "fascism and mili- tarism"--a slogan with consider- able appeal. In retrospect it appears that the Communists at first envisaged the SKDL essentially as a temporary instrument for obtaining quick control of the government. This seems to be borne out by the fact that it was not until 1949 that the SKDL formulated an official program. During these years, however, the political situation stabilized to a degree, and the likelihood of Soviet military action in support of a Communist take-over diminished considerably. As the prospect of riding into power via a popular-front organ- ization receded, the Communists were compelled to revamp their strategy toward a more extended period of struggle. Some Com- munists,however, had still not Claimed total membership in 15166 145,000- Finnish Communist Parity, 84,000 Finnish Women's Democratic-League 730,000 AAodemic Socialist Society 1,000 Other SKDL members Totc figure includes some1multiple counting of members belonging to more than ore of the affiliated organizations. 0131 - tc,RE! entirely given up hope of at- tracting large numbers of non- Communists to the SKDL, and out of deference to this group, the 1949 program was nonideological. and made no reference to "social- ism." The Organization of the SKDL In addition to its own membership, the SKDL includes the FCP, the Finnish Women's Democratic League, and the Academic Socialist Society. Even though almost two thirds of the SKDL's'145,000 members are estimated to be non-Commu- nists, the FCP has dominated the organization and key posts within the SKDL have tradition- ally been filled by Communists. Recently, however, in order to appease restive nonparty mem- bers in the SKDL, the leadership has sought to' play down or camou- flage the role of the Communists. The SKD]'s organizational network presently comprises over 2,000 loyal groups embrac- ing some 60,000 members, in addition to its affiliated or- ganizations. The SKDL's elec- toral appeal, however, is SECRET Page 2 SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug 66 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8 %NOV NNW SECRET substantially greater than these figures suggest. The SKDL in Postwar Government In the first postwar elec- tions in 1945, the SKDL polled almost one fourth of the vote and gained 49 of the 200 seats in parliament. Under these cir- cumstances the SKDL could not be denied a voice in the government, and was given one cabinet posi- tion. A coalition was formed of the three leading parties--the Center (Agrarians), the Social Democrats, and the SKDL--with the respected conservative leader and banker, Juho Paasikivi, as prime minister. Paasikivi's tenure was brief. Elected presi- dent in March 1946, he was suc- ceeded as prime minister by the SKDL leader, Mauno Pekkala. Al- though not himself a Communist, Pekkala proceeded to appoint loyal party members to head such sensitive ministries as interior, which controlled the police, and communications, which controlled radio. During the next two years, the Communists deliberately en- couraged uncertainty and tension throughout the country by organ- izing civil disorders and labor unrest. They infiltrated into both the security and regular police apparatus as the first step toward achieving control. However, despite the advantageous position from which the Communists were able to operate and the in- itially favorable psychological climate, they became increasingly aware that they could not re- alistically expect to be able Page 3 to take over the government by parliamentary means. It is still not entirely clear how far planning for a coup had proceeded, nor is it known to what extent Moscow was privy to and approved such plans. In March 1948, shortly after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Communist minister of inte- rior, Yrjo Leino--who apparently was motivated by strong nation- alist feelings--indicated, prob- ably deliberately, to Finnish military authorities that "dis- turbances" might be pending that could develop into something even more serious. The regular police and the military acted immedi- ately by disarming the security police and bringing in troops. Shortly thereafter parliament undertook an examination of Leino's conduct while in office, which culminated in a vote with- drawing confidence from the in- terior minister and the ouster of Leino and the other Communists from the government. In the elections later in 1948, the SKDL's parliamentary strength dropped from 49 to 38 seats. The SKDL in Opposition The SKDL began its opposi- tion role by bitterly attacking the new Social Democratic gov- ernment. The Communists ac- tively encouraged, and probably instigated, many illegal strikes which contributed to labor un- rest. They also strongly op- posed the stabilization program worked out between the Social Democrats and the Agrarians to combat the deteriorating eco- nomic situation. SECRET SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug 66 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8 Approved For Release 006/10111: CIA-RDP79-00927A005400040003-8 SECRET Despite what seemed des- tined to be the SKDL's permanent exclusion from the government, the party retained considerable political influence through its consistently demonstrated elec- toral strength, and even gained seven seats in the 1958 elec- tions. The Finnish Communists now joined with the Soviet Union in an unrelenting attack on the government of veteran Social Democratic leader Fagerholm. Their accusations of "rightist" leanings and insincere protesta- tions of friendship with the Soviet Union eventually compelled Fagerholm to resign in late 1958 after the Soviets withdrew their ambassador and threatened to cut off trade. Moscow's action was a crude attempt to isolate the Social Democrats and discredit them in the eyes of the voters, thus hopefully forcing cabinet cooperation between the SKDL and President Kekkonen's Center Party. This strategy was only par- tially successful, for instead of cooperating with the SKDL, Center leaders such as President Kekkonen proceeded to strengthen their ties with the USSR and annoyed the Finnish Communists by portraying the Center as the only political group in Finland enjoying Moscow's favor. Riding the wave of Finno-Soviet friend- ship, the Center came to dominate Finland's political life, sur- viving such setbacks as the crisis in Soviet-Finnish rela- tions in late 1961 when Moscow invoked the 1948 Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and sought defense consultations with Finland. The elections in early 1962 were a victory for the Center at the expense of the badly divGided Social Demo- crats and the SKDL. During the ensuing four years, both the SKDL and the Social Democrats remained in a kind of political limbo, a situ- ation that did not change until 1964, when Social Democratic gains in the municipal elections foreshadowed their re-emergence as a political power. This and stirrings within these two parties portended new alignments and relationships on the Finnish political scene. FCP Dissension--Early Years From the end of World War II until 1956 the Finnish Com- munist Party was a disciplined and monolithic party presided over by harshly intolerant Sta- linist leaders,, many of whom had lived and trained in the Soviet Union. The FCP was long one of Moscow's most faithful support- ers, accepting without question every twist in the Soviet Commu- nist line. The "sheep-like about-face tutns of the party leadership in't:he past 17 years" became, in fact:, one of the main subjects of criticism within the party. Khrushch6v's 1956 debunking of Stalin shock both the FCP and the SKDL. While a majority fell into line and accepted a ban on discussion of pre-1956 activity, a small group criticized the dictatorial methods of the party leadership. These differences SECRET SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug 66 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A005400040003-8 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8 SECRET were further sharpened during the Hungarian uprising later that year. The ferment within the party again surfaced in 1961, when the Finnish non-Communist press re- ported the existence of an "op- position" element within the party that supposedly had sym- pathizers in the SKDL parlia- mentary group. Although the Communists flatly denied the re- ports, the opposition element apparently did exist and dissi- dent members from all sections of the country had reportedly held a secret meeting and dis- cussed future activities. How- ever, there was still little public criticism of the party line by this group, which con- tinued to accept party disci- pline. The top leadership, un- der the tight control of authori- tarian, old-guard chairman Aimo Aaltonen and Secretary General Ville Pessi, appeared to ignore the rising discontent. Although the dissidents were not effectively organized, they were nevertheless agreed that the "leadership dominance" of the party must be changed, as well as the party program which they saw as clinging to outmoded dogma. They pointed to the outcome of the 1964 municipal elections in which the SKDL lost ground to the Social Democrats in the urban centers where both were competing for the working- class vote. This outcome defi- nitely confirmed to the young progressives in the "liberal" group that the FCP leadership and its policies were responsible for the lack of electoral gains and for keeping the SKDL on the sidelines of government. Dissension Increases Khrushchev's ouster in No- vember 1964 and the passive and unquestioning acceptance of Mos- cow's version of the episode by the FCP leadership brought the controversy into the open again. In an unprecedented move, the principal press organ of both the FCP and the SKDL, Kansan Uutiset, printed a seriesof art icles debating party policies on various topics, including a criticism of FCP Secretary Gen- eral Pessi for his support of Khrushchev's removal. Chairman Aaltonen took strong measures to discourage pressure from FCP's younger elements to liberalize the party. Widespread interest in the press discussion nevertheless enabled the liberals to force a special session of the central committee in October 1965. A manifesto was issued somewhat modifying party doctrine to conciliate the liberals. The concessions by the old- guard Stalinists were probably due in part to the influence brought to bear by the deputy chairman of the CPSU who visited Finland at this time. At a closed meeting of the politburo, the CPSU official supported mod- ernization of the FCP and said he hoped that younger talent would be brought into the leader- ship. Without some gestures to the liberals, the CPSU apparently feared that the increasingly divisive conflict between the SECRET Page 5 SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug 66 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A0400040003-8 SECRET two factions of the FCP might lead to a permanent split in the party and weaken the Soviet Un- ion's ability to influence po- litical developments in Finland. Part Congress tion during which cuntrol can be expected to sh f't gradually to younger hands.' With seasoned trade unionists in leadership posts, the party is expected to place even greater emphasis on activities dirocted to the trade union movement. The manifesto only partially met the demands of the growing number of critics who prepared to press their cause at the par- ty's 14th Congress in January 1966. A concerted effort to oust the Stalinist leaders at this time assumed more urgency in view of the need to adopt a platform on which the SKDL could more successfully challenge the Social Democrats with upcoming parliamentary elections. The outcome was a compromise between the two factions. The liberals were successful in re- placing the chairman and vice chairman by Aarne Saarinen and Erkki Salomaa, both trade union- ists, and in getting committees established to reconsider party programs. Although the old guard retained the important secretary generalship and maintained its control over the party adminis- tration, the liberals increased their representation on the im- portant central committee and politburo. Saarinen so far has not clearly identified himself how- with either faction. He is, ever, reported to be completely independent of CPSU influence. The party thus appears to have entered a period of transi- Current S]L-FCP Relations The question of the role of the SKDL axed its relationship to the FCP has: been controver- sial in both organizations. Be- cause the FCP'insisted on com- plete control,! SKDL members who did not belong to the FCP felt they were shunted aside and given a subordinate role. The more liberalll inclined FCP leaders, within eye to possi- ble future cooperation with the Social Democr t:s and perhaps even the Cent:;r Party, felt the FCP should bu.41d up SKDL pres- tige and powe' to a point where it could lead; the whole leftist workers' movement. The pro- Stalinists argued that the SKDL lacked the albility to be the vanguard of the working class, a role they ollaimed should be exclusive tolthe FCP. The old guard probably feared that SKDL - Social Democratic coop- eration mightt, weaken Communist control of the SKDL as well as undermine the conservative wing in the FCP dispute. Some SKDL parliamentary members were ! among the early sympathizers; with the burgeon- ing liberal opposition group in the FCP. In'an apparent attempt SECRET Page 6 SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug 66 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A005400040003-8 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8 to mollify the malcontents, the FCP leaders in February 1965 ap- pointed a nonparty member, Ele Alenius, former second vice chairman of the SKDL, to be SKDL's secretary general, a po- sition formerly held only by FCP members. It is Alenius' view that the SKDL, whose majority membership is non-Communist, must evolve toward genuine au- tonomy, asserting its own prin- ciples of working for "modern socialism" independently of FCP decisions. Despite the concession of Alenius' appointment, little actual progress has been made toward freeing the SKDL from FCP domination. The SKDL re- mains financially dependent on the FCP. Communist representa- tion on its executive board and in its parliamentary group re- mains large. The long-standing practice persists of having the SKDL parliamentary delegation Page 7 SECRET take guidance from the FCP in- stead of from its own organiza- tion. However, the outlook for the liberals appears fairly prom- ising. Although all but two or three of the 41 SKDL members of parliament returned in the elec- tions last March are Communist Party members, the majority of these are identified with the liberals. Furthermore, liberals have taken over almost all of the functionary posts in the SKDL, and perhaps up to 80 per- cent of the SKDL rank and file and its affiliates are opposed to the old-line faction of the FCP. For the foreseeable future, there is likely to be continued friction between the FCP and the SKDL, as the latter becomes more unwilling to accept FCP guidance in either party or government affairs. The March 1966 Elections The Communists had reason to view the quadrennial national elections in March with some ap- prehension, even though a sem- blance of harmony had been re- stored as a result of the party congress. The SKDL's performance in the 1964 local elections of- fered little hope for major gains in 1966. In addition, the "elec- tion alliance" between the SKDL and a dissident left-wing, Social Democratic splinter party dis- pleased many Communists who re- garded this as a tactic that would weaken their own parlia- mentary position for the sake of gains by an ally of dubious reli- ability. SECRET SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug 66 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8 Approved For Rel! e 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A0400040003-8 SECRET In the election campaigning, party spokesmen focused primarily on domestic economic problems such as inflation, unemployment, and the housing shortage, but they found it difficult to exploit these issues effectively at a time when Finland was enjoying a period of unprecedented prosper- ity. Moreover, their uninspired technique of using old complaints and pat solutions had little ap- peal for the new, young voters. Foreign policy was not a major issue but both the SKDL and the Center sought to exploit it by suggesting that they enjoyed a special relationship with Moscow and by reminding the electorate of the long history of hostility between the Social Democrats and Moscow. The election outcome proved to be a landslide victory for the Social Democrats, who emerged as the single largest party in parliament, and a setback for the SKDL, which polled fewer votes than in 1962 and lost six of the 47 seats it had held in parlia- ment. Negotiations for the New Government In the discussions between Social Democratic chairman Paasio and President Kekkonen about the composition of the new government, Kekkonen made it clear that he favored a government that was as broadly based as possible. This was interpreted by the So- cial Democrats to mean that he expected the SKOL to be included. Paasio, faced with the Cen- ter's disinterest in cooperating with the Social Democrats in a two-party coalition, and recalling Moscow's reaction in 1958 when a Social Democratic - dominated cabinet was formed, apparently concluded that!it would be ad- visable to try ';; for a "big three" coalition. Furthermore, Soviet officials in Helsinki had let it be known that they too favored a coalition of the "workers" par- ties and the Canter. Despite strong opposition among their rank and file, the leadership of the non-Communist parties began negotiations with the SKDL over the new government's program and the apportionment of cabinet posts.; At an early stage in the talks, the Social Democratic and the Center representatives had decided that: the Communists would in any c4se be denied such sensitive post:$ as the foreign ministry, defense, interior, and education, and'were determined to allot to them the most politi- cally disadvantageous portfolios. This objective was facilitated by the Communists themselves, who were extremely eager to enter the cabinet and accepted three relatively minor posts, associate minister of finance, minister of transport and public works, and minister of social affairs. Social Democratic and Center leaders are inclined to minimize the possible dangers their solu- tion may entail. However, by gaining entry into the cabinet the Communists have achieved one of their primary objectives--co- operation on the governmental level with "a].1 constructive forces" except:'the Conservatives. SECRET Page 8 SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug: 66 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A005400040003-8 SECRET Current SKDL Strategy And Prospects The SKDL will probably con- centrate on consolidating its renewed respectability as a gov- ernment party. As representa- tives of a party that has only recently emerged from some 18 years of political isolation, it would not be in their interests at this time to take any actions that would risk the fall of the government and lead to new cabi- net negotiations from which the SKDL might be excluded. For this reason, party strategists are likely to con- tinue to concentrate their ener- gies on the two goals that have consistently eluded them during the postwar period: persuading the Social Democrats to cooperate in a program of joint political action and achieving a more equally shared control of or- ganized labor. Since the formation of the new government, there have been renewed efforts to reunite the labor movement. An important step was taken at the June con- gress of the larger, leftist- controlled federation. A Social Democratic faction cooperated with the Communists in ousting the dissident Social Democratic groups from the leadership of the federation. This resulted in an even more influential role for the Communists in the top leader- ship and policy-making bodies of the organization. The Communists also succeeded in achieving in- creased possibilities for inde- pendent action by the important unions they control. Non-Communist observers in Finland have expressed some dis- may over these developments, since they will give the Communists an even more influential voice in formulating labor's programs and policies. The' other Communist goal-- united political action with the Social Democrats--remains more elusive because of the persistent historical animosity and sus- picion between the two groups. The Communists may derive some encouragement, however, from re- cent indications that a growing number of Social Democrats seem prepared to consider limited co- operation. A more immediate re- sult could be a drift of the So- cial Democratic left wing toward closer cooperation with the Com- munists and the existing dissident Socialist group, thereby creat- ing further tensions among the already disunited Social Demo- crats. In addition, the break- through scored by the SKDL in gaining government representa- tion is having an impact out- side Finland--particularly on Communist and SKDL relations with the CPSU, and on the prospects of other Scandinavian Communist or neo-Marxist parties. The relationship between the CPSU and its Finnish coun- terpart has traditionally been an extremely close one, reflect- ing both Finland's geographic proximity to the Soviet Union and the party's heavy subsidiza- tion by the CPSU. However, part of the trend toward moderniza- tion in the FCP consists of re- furbishing its public image as an independent group whose first SECRET Page 9 SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug 66 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A005400040003-8 Approved For Release,'p06/10/11 ?: CIA-RDP79-00927AO054QJL040003-8 SECRET allegiance is to Finland. With Moscow's consent, the present leaders of the Finnish party seem to recognize that in regard to internal party matters and domestic politics they are on their own to a much larger ex- tent than formerly. Since Soviet officials have indicated that they are reason- ably satisfied with the exist- ing political situation in Fin- land--and have stated as much to local Communists--the party leaders appear to have resigned themselves to the long pull of trying to reach their goals by working through parliament and the trade union movement. If necessary, Moscow is probably prepared to continue to assist the local Communists only to the extent of its ability to influ- ence political developments in Finland. There already have been indications, however, that it will be done in more subtle ways than the crude pressures and veiled threats at the govern- mental level which sometimes characterized Moscow's efforts in years past. Repercussions in Scandanavia The SKDL breakthrough is be- ing watched by many Western Euro- pean Socialist parties whose lead- ers are faced with increasing de- fections by their left-wing ele- ments. A more immediate impact is being felt in Sweden and Denmark, where long-entrenched Social Demo- cratic governments have seen the slow erosion of their parliamen- tary strength. In Sweden, Prime Minister Erlander is under pres- sure from his party's extreme left-wing to cooperate with the newly revitalized Swedish Commu- nist Party, which has made a strong comeback under its new, independent--minded leader, Carl- Henrik Hermannson. The left-wing faction maintains that during the Social Democrats' long tenure the party has become increasingly bourgeois and conservative in out- look, thereby abandoning to the Communists the large segment of the population that favors a more radical domestic economic program and a more active and "neutralist" foreign policy. This restiveness among the younger party members will be a decisive factor in the outcome of the 1968 elections and will determine whether the older, more conservatively inclined Social Democratic leadership will be pushed toward closer coopera- tion with the Communists. In Denmark, Prime Minister Krag's Social Democratic minor- ity government is under similar pressures. He faces the choice of turning leftward to the Marx- ist, anti-NANO, Socialist People's Party for parliamentary support --and perhaps even cabinet co- operation--or risk defections by the Social Democratic left wing if he moves toward accommoda- tion with the "bourgeois" par- ties. Krag has so far spurned the far left:, but domestic po- litical considerations may even- tually compel him to accept some form of cooperation. Domestic political develop- ments in both countries would determine the price the Commu- nists ask for such cooperation, but initially at least, their demands would be made to appear reasonable. Over the long term, however, the Social Democrats run the risk.of further blurring the lines dividing Socialists from Communists and thereby granting the latter an increased measure of acceptance and re- 25X1 s ectabilit SECRET --" SPECIAL REPORT 19 Aug 66 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8 SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05400040003-8