CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SPECIAL REPORT BANDITRY AND INSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005300120007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORT

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BANDITRY AND INSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA
"La violencia," as Colombians call
the public
disorder which has plagued their country
since
1948,
has claimed 150,000 lives, disrupted the
social
and
economic health of many parts of the country, and
provided a background for political unrest that re-
sulted in the overthrow of two governments. The
rural violence began as a contest between Colombia's
two traditional parties, the Liberal and Conserva-
tive. It soon degenerated, however, into unbridled
criminality characterized by savagery and sadism.
During the past four years it has lost ground be-
fore a determined government campaign of military
pressure and civic action.
Communist insurgency is related to the crimi-
nal violence but distinct from it and more danger-
ous. Several groups have engaged in insurgency,
but so far with little success,and the Communist
Party has placed its principal emphasis on legal
action. There have been recent indications, how-
ever, that the party now may be planning greater
stress on guerrilla warfare and that it may have
international backing for a larger effort. if
this develops, insurgency, which is not now con-
sidered a threat to stability in Colombia, may de-
velop new dimensions.
.Political Violence and Banditry
Political violence is common
in Colombian history. Following
a model of widespread banditry
during the colonial period, it
erupted frequently during the
nineteenth century in the form
of coups, revolutions, and civil
wars, as well as banditry. In
1930 sporadic guerrilla warfare
broke out between partisans of
the two traditional parties but
died out in the wider interest
generated by the border war with
Peru in 1932. The assassination
of popular Liberal leader Jorge
Eliecer Gaitan in 1948 again
brought tensions to fever pitch,
set off five days of mass destruc-
tion in Bogota and other cities,
and gave new impetus to rural
strife.
Pent-up frustrations and
hatreds found release in an orgy
of violence far beyond the con-
trol of scattered public security
forces. Conservative and Liberal
groups formed in the countryside
with almost religious fervor to
attack each other with the most
brutal disregard for life. The
armed forces, which became in
effect instruments of the ruling
Conservative Party, were used for
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INSURGENCY AREAS IN COLOMBIA
Operational area of Communist Party
of Colombia (PCC;
Operational area of Army of National Liberation (ELN)
Area of activity by Workers-Students-Peasants Movement
(MOECj
Proposed area of operation of pro-Peking PCC splinter (PCC?ML)
O STATUTE MILES 300
Colombian Army patrol
in Communist guerrilla territory
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ruthless repression of the Lib-
erals. Bandits, who were liable
to summary execution, were de-
fined as all those over 16 years
of age who hid or fled from the
armed forces. During this time
no area of the country was free
from violence. The rural vio-
lence disrupted transportation,
and food shortages, economic dis-
location, and inflation increased
in severity.
A military coup in 1953 put
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in power
to end the political and economic
chaos. There was a temporary
respite from disorder, but Rojas'
gradual adoption of authoritarian
methods brought a resurgence.
Rojas was overthrown in 1957 as
a result of his failure to over-
come the country's complex prob-
lems. The leaders of the Con-
servative and Liberal parties
agreed to a 16-year truce, em-
bodied in the National Front
agreement, which was approved by
a plebiscite and put into effect
in 1958. The agreement called
for alternation of the presi-
dency between two parties and
parity of representation in
Congress and departmental (state)
and municipal (county) legisla-
tive bodies.
Violence once again dimin-
ished. The Liberal and Conserv-
ative partisan groups tended
to settle down in specific re-
gions, and the old guerrilla chiefs
became more or less peaceful lo-
cal leaders. Organized bandit
gangs, composed of criminals who
had earned a living for years
by looting and robbery, continued
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to operate, however. To this
day, although with dwindling
frequency, these groups have en-
gaged in cattle rustling, theft
of coffee crops, the "protection
racket," kidnaping for ransom,
armed robbery, hijacking, and
similar activities. They have
established reigns of terror in
the areas in which they operated.
Measures of the
Valencia Administration
President Valencia, who was
inaugurated in 1962, early ad-
dressed himself to eliminating
the national disgrace, as it was
by then considered by many Colom-
bians. Since the beginning of
his administration the Colombian
arraed forces and police have
carried out vigorous operations
against bandit gangs, combining
military action with civic ac-
tion and psychological warfare.
The success of these cam-
paigns is illustrated by the fact
that in 1962 there were 2,919
deaths attributed to rural vio-
lence while in 1965 the figure
was down two thirds to 1,079.
The first six months of 1966 have
shown a corresponding drop. The
figures also show a sharp rela-
tive increase in bandit deaths
and a relative decrease in deaths
of victims of banditry. By Janu-
ary 1966 there remained only 15
active bandit gangs, of which 9
were Communist.
Communist Influence
In Rural Areas
In 1934 Victor Merchan, a
Communist, organized a group of
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peasants in an area near the
town of Viota, about 50 miles
southwest of Bogota. By 1940,
Communist control of the area
had become absolute, and it was
"administered" by the Colombian
Communist Party as the "independ-
ent Republic of Tequendama."
Communist militia still control
the area, and it is only recently
that the government has had any
influence in the enclave. It
is still considered completely
safe by the PCC, which uses it
as a meeting place (the Tenth
Congress of the PCC was held
there in January 1966), the site
of the PCC training school, and
a safe haven for fugitives.
Because of its usefulness
along these lines the area has
not been used to mount offensive
operations, which would invite
government retaliation. Govern-
ment policy has been directed
toward slowly eroding Communist
control rather than direct mili-
tary action, which would result
in loss of life and thus dis-
credit the government. There
are probably now about 50 armed
militia in Viota.
Another enclave at Sumapaz,
farther to the south, has had a
similar history; however, it has
not been as tightly sealed as
has Viota. There are possibly
300 inactive but organized guer-
rillas in Sumapaz.
Beginning in the early
1950s the PCC began propagandiz-
ing among Liberal bandit gangs
in the departments of Tolima
and Huila with a view toward
establishing a third enclave.
The party won a number of the
bandits to the Communist cause,
among them Manuel Marulanda
(Tiro Fijo) and Ciro Trujillo,
now the two most important Com-
munist guerrilla leaders.
However, although their
sympathy was won it was not pos-
sible to establish an enclave,
and the PCC was indecisive as
to what to do with the bandits.
Also, ideological conversion was
not enough to transmute the
bandits into insurgents. Al-
though they now called themselves
Communists, they continued to act
more from motives of profit than
from political convictions.
The lack of reliable
communications and the need for
decentralization imposed by
security consideration also con-
tributed to weak PCC control
over the Communist bandit-guer-
rillas. The PCC leaders in Bo-
gota and the bandit groups in
the mountains have maintained
loose contact, but in general
each group has gone its own way.
Active Communist banks now
exist in southern Colombia in
the Marquetalia, Riochiquito,
El Pato, Guayabero, and Medellin
del Ariari regions. The Colom-
bian Army, which estimates that
there are from 200 to 300 Commu-
nisteffectives in this area of
southern Colombia, has kept up
steady pressure on them since
1964 as an extension of its anti-
bandit campaign. Military opera-
tions and civic action programs
have limited the freedom of ac-
tion of the guerrillas and whittled
away at their strength and influence.
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Differences Over
Communist Tactics
Colombia's PCC followed
normal Communist procedure dur-
ing the 1950s. Power was to be
achieved through legal means or
by a coup at an appropriate time.
Emphasis was on obtaining a mass
following in the cities, with
formation of a united front and
penetration of labor and student
groups. The success of Castro
in Cuba, however, led many Com-
munists and Communist sympathiz-
ers in Colombia to a desire for
more aggressive action. They
pointed out that the traditional
methods had been successful no-
where in Latin America and had
little prospect of ever being
successful. They contended that
guerrilla warfare was the only
way for Communism to come to
power in Latin America. The Cu-
bans had proved that it was pos-
sible and had pointed the way.
Such attitudes were encour-
aged by the Cubans. The PCC
leaders clung to the old posi-
tion, however, and various groups
espousing a Marxist guerrilla war
began to develop. Among the more
important of these are the Work-
ers-Students-Peasants Movement
(MOEC), the Army of National
Liberation (ELN), and the Commu-
nist Party of Colombia - Marxist/
Leninist (PCC-ML).
The MOEC, formed in 1959,
has been violence-oriented from
its beginning. It has received
some support from Cuba and has
been es ecial close to the Chi-
nese.
Although the MOEC, with
from 200 to 300 activists, is
believed to have potential for
guerrilla warfare, its violence
has so far been largely confined
to urban terrorism on a small
scale. At present it is largely
inactive and divided into sev-
eral factions competing for lead-
ership, but it could join forces
with one or more of the other
leftist groups.
In 1963 the Youth of the
Liberal Revolutionary Movement
(JMRL) broke from its parent or-
ganization, the MRL, a moderate-
leftist branch of the Liberal
Party, to set up an independent
movement to work for Marxist "so-
cialism." At the same time the
ELN was established as the armed
wing of the JMRL and immediately
exhibited its character of vio-
lence by a series of bombings in
Bogota and other cities.
_JlIn January 1965 it car-
ried out a successful attack
against the small town of Sima-
cota in the Department of Santan-
der. The raid, however, was not
followed up, and ELN guerrilla
activity was relatively quiescent
until early 1966, when a series
of clashes with government au-
thorities occurred.
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At this time, rebel priest
Camilo Torres joined the ELN guer-
rillas. While a faculty member at
National University in Bogota,
Torres had begun a reform movement
which became increasingly leftist
oriented. In mid-1965 his politi-
cal activities brought him into
direct conflict with the church
hierarchy, and the dispute be-
came a cause celebre which vaulted
him into prominence as a national
leader. His decision to join the
ELN gave the guerrillas a brief
psychological and propaganda
boost, but ELN activities practi-
cally ceased with the death of
Torres during a clash with an
army unit in February. The ELN
may now have as few as 50 men
in the field.
The PCC-ML was formed in
1964 by members of the PCC who
broke with the party over the is-
sue of "armed struggle" versus
the "peaceful way" to power. The
PCC-ML immediately sought Chinese
recognition and support. Recogni-
tion was quickly granted, but the
Chinese have been niggardly with
The PCC-ML is attempting
to organize guerrilla warfare,
but its leaders are now criti-
cized for the same vices of in-
decision and bureaucracy for
which they had previously criti-
cized the PCC leaders. In its
turn, the PCC-ML has been wracked
with dissension and schism. It
is estimated to have a very
limited potential for guerrilla
action in the coming months.
Faced with the formation of
competitive Marxist organizations
and the defection of many party
members, the PCC has developed a
line which it considers original.
The Colombian theses had appar-
ently crystallized by August 1965,
when Secretary General Gilberto
Vieira-White wrote in Problems of
Peace and Socialism: "In Co~Tom a,
partisan warfare is not yet the
principal form of struggle. The
peasants' guerrilla movements are
maintained and developed in cer-
tain specific regions, particularly
those which have suffered attacks
by the army.... In regions where
the guerrilla movement has sprung
up and been maintained it has be-
come the principal form of strug-
gle and the axis around which mass
action is developed, broadened,
and strengthened."
This idea was more clearly
expressed and formally adopted by
the PCC in the political resolu-
tion of the party's Tenth Congress
in January 1966: "In Colombia
there is opening an original revo-
lutionary way, based on the use of
all the methods and forces of mass
struggle, combined according to
concrete local conditions and gen-
eral conditions. Peasant guerrilla
war is one of the highest forms of
mass struggle and only prospers and
grows where it is linked with the
masses. At present, although peas-
ant guerrilla war is not yet the
main form of struggle, it is be-
coming more important every day."
vuld
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Such a position serves a
number of purposes. Being so-
phisticated and ideologically
correct, it is persuasive and is
the soundest argument formulated
by any Latin American Communist
party for not rushing into guer-
rilla warfare. It keeps the PCC
within the limits of legality in
Colombia, permitting it to pur-
sue the other "methods and forces
of mass struggle," such as par-
ticipation in elections, labor
agitation, overt propaganda, etc.
It has not, however, preserved
the unity of the party.
It is difficult to judge
the sincerity of the PCC position.
The party gives considerable lo-
cal and international propaganda
support to the guerrilla move-
ment, but so far there has been
little evidence that it has pro-
vided any real guidance or sig-
nificant material help to the
guerrillas. The more knowledge-
able leaders may feel. that the
time is not yet ripe, and they
may be frightened by the serious
reverses suffered by their Vene-
zuelan neighbors, who had em-
barked on the path of armed in-
surrection. Bureaucratic lethargy
may also be an inhibiting factor.
Nevertheless, there have
been indications that the PCC
leaders ma take their olic
seriousl .
Page 7
The PCC leaders apparently
would like to take over the ELN,
even though they consider the
ELN leaders "adventurers." The
PCC leaders feel that with
proper reorganization, training,
and direction the ELN might be a
worthwhile insurgency force.
The ELN leaders, for their part,
undoubtedly would like to re-
ceive assistance from the PCC,
but they would probably resist
being taken over by the party.
Each group has something to of-
fer the other, and if their prob-
lems can be worked out, collab-
oration could become a reality
within the coming months, es-
pecially if there is pressure for
it from Cuba and the USSR.
In late April and early May
1966, Communist bandit leaders
in southern Colombia set up the
Colombian Revolutionary Armed
Forces (FARC), apparently with
the blessing of the PCC. The
formation of this group has been
given considerable publicity by
Radio Havana. Also, the Hanoi
radio reported on 9 June that the
deputy commander of the National
Liberation Front of South Vietnam
"warmly greeted" the formation of
FARC. Such propaganda support
suggests that the PCC may indeed
be making a serious effort to
step up guerrilla warfare in Co-
lombia and that this policy may
have international Communist back-
ing.
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All of the insurgent groups
have at one time or another been
interested in some form of coor-
dination of the various guerrilla
forces. The latest of these at-
tempts, worked out in early 1966,
was "Plan Aurora" (The Dawn)--
reportedly a plan of the ELN, the
MOEC, and the PCC-ML for coordi-
nated insurgency. During April
1966, however, leaders of the ELN,
reflecting on the failure of the
plan to achieve results, decided
to work only with the PCC.
In mid-1966 the public or-
der situation in Colombia ap-
pears bright. The bandit prob-
lem, which has plagued the coun-
try for years, is under control.
The leftist guerrillas are split
into several groups and are
either inactive or on the defen-
sive. The Colombian economy is
not strong, but it is relatively
stable and is making some prog-
ress. National elections were
held in March and in May in a
tranquil atmosphere, and no po-
litical crises exist at this
time. Poverty, inflation, and
other causes of unrest are pres-
ent but the people seem to have
rejected violence as a means of
solving their problems. The
armed forces are strong and
united behind the government.
They are reasonably enlightened,
and they have gained valuable
counterinsurgency experience
through years of combating guer-
rillas and bandits. As it ap-
pears now, the various insurgent
movements together or independ-
ently are capable at this time of
only limited urban violence or
isolated guerrilla actions.
Nevertheless, if the PCC is
really anxious to begin serious
insurgency through the FARC and
the ELN, and if the party re-
ceives substantial assistance
from Cuba or the USSR, the sit-
uAtinn could change
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