WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005300090001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/03/31 CIA-RDP79-00927A005300090001-6
1 July 1966
OCI No. 0296/66
ARMY review(s):
completed.:'
State Dept.
review
completed
Copy NO. 4 9
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EDT) 30 June 1966)
VIETNAM
Political activity in Saigon this week generally cen-
tered on preparations for September's elections and on
forthcoming cabinet changes. Government differences
with the Buddhists subsided somewhat in importance.
The scene of major fighting shifted from South Vietnam's
western highlands to the northern and central coastal
plain. US aircraft bombed North Vietnamese POL storage
facilities estimated to comprise 70 percent of the
DRV's bulk petroleum storage capacity.
INDONESIAN CONGRESS NEARS ADJOURNMENT
Having endorsed Suharto's mandate and named General
Nasution as its chairman, it has probably completed the
major action expected of it.
SHAKE-UP IN CHINA'S SECOND-ECHELON LEADERSHIP
Thirty-one of the 73 officials who filled key party
and military posts on 1 April, when politburo member
Peng Chen fell, have not since appeared in public.
CHOU EN-LAPS VISIT TO RUMANIA ENDS IN DISPUTE
The Chinese Communist premier not only achieved no
substantive agreement, but openly clashed with his
hosts.
Europe
WARSAW DEMONSTRATIONS HIGHLIGHT CHURCH-STATE STALEMATE 8
The antiregime, prochurch demonstrations in Warsaw last
weekend have sharpened the dilemma both sides face--
how to maintain their basic positions without generat-
ing a full confrontation on the popular level.
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FRENCH NON-COMMUNIST LEFT MOVES TOWARD COOPERATION WITH 9
COMMUNISTS
However, overtures to this end by erstwhile presidential
candidate Francois Mitterrand are not being enthusiastical-
ly welcomed by the Communists, who fear they may be
used in the upcoming legislative election campaign and
then discarded afterward.
NATO DEVELOPMENTS
France now says it will "subordinate" its forces to
NATO in wartime but insists that the details are for
the military--not the politicians--to work out. There
is also doubt as to how the French will react to Bonn's
declaration offering an interim arrangement to allow
French troops to remain in Germany.
Middle East - Africa
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN YEMN
Recent conferences among Yemeni republican tribal groups
may lead to a governmental reshuffle with anti-Egyptian
overtones. Cairo seems content to stand by for the
moment, possibly while gauging the progress of the
Kuwaiti mediation effort.
BRAZZAVILLE REGIME AND ARMY ELEMENTS IN SHOWDOWN
Army officers had been increasingly dissatisfied over
the radical regime's persistent downgrading of their
influence.
KENYA GETTING TOUGH TOWARD SOMALIA
Nairobi appears determined to stamp out dissident
activity by Somali insurgents in northeastern Kenya.
A political crisis in Mogadiscio will keep pressure
high for firmness toward Kenya.
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Western Hemisphere
ARGENTINE GENERALS OUST PRESIDENT ILLIA
The generals, who believe Illia was leading the coun-
try toward anarchy and economic disaster, ousted him
in a bloodless coup
BRITISH HONDURANS PROTEST TERMS OF INDEPENDENCE AGREEMENT 15
Rioters are demonstrating against what they consider
a sellout to Guatemala, which has long asserted a claim
to the colony and is negotiating with the British on
the terms for its independence.
GUATEMALA RETURNS TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE
President Mendez, who will be inaugurated on 1 July,
will have a difficult term at best, inasmuch as reforms
which might alleviate the country's economic and social
problems would cost him armed forces support.
DOMINICAN PRESIDENT BALAGUER TO BE I14AUJGURATED
Security forces, anticipating extremist efforts to up-
set the 1 July ceremony, are taking precautions to pro-
tect inaugural participants--including Vice President
Humphrey. Balaguer's inaugural speech and his cabinet
appointments remain well-kept secrets.
BOLIVIAN ELECTIONS STILL ON
Continued incidents of violence are probable, but at
this late date only a chaotic situation or the assas-
sination of assured presidential victor Barrientos
would be likely to cause cancellation of the 3 July
voting.
CHILEAN AND COLOMBIAN LEADERS PRESS HEMISPHERE ECONOMIC TIES 19
Recent remarks by Chile's President:Frei.and visiting
Colombian President-elect Lleras indicate that they
intend to press for Latin American economic unity and
closer economic cooperation with the US.
FIDEL CASTRO RESUMES NORMAL ACTIVITIES
On 29 June Castro delivered his first speech since 1
May. His speaking manner and over-all demeanor were
characteristic of his public appearances over the past
seven years.
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Far East
V I ETNAM
Political activity in Saigon
this week generally centered on
preparations for the September
elections and on forthcoming gov-
ernmental changes. Differences
between the government and the Bud-
dhist Institute subsided somewhat
in immediate importance.
The government has begun to
brief provincial officials on the
application of the recently promul-
gated law under which a constitu-
ent assembly will be elected in
September. It is not yet clear
whether any military officers will
be candidates, although a military
member of the Directorate has been
put in charge of political activ-
ity for the armed forces. Polit-
ical and religious groups appear to
be organizing for the elections
along traditional lines, with no
significant new alliances evident
thus far. Government leaders rec-
ognize that the Buddhist Institute
and some Catholic factions oppose
the elections, but are hoping that
indirect persuasion will change
the attitude of these recalcitrant
groups before September.
Government Changes
The government hopes to an-
nounce its new cabinet on 1 July.
One significant realignment, which
stresses the importance of rural
pacification, will elevate Revo-
lutionary Development chief Gen-
eral Thang to the status of a "su-
perminister," responsible for the
ministries of interior, public
works, and agriculture. One cab-
inet minister with close ties to
the Buddhist Institute is ex-
pected to be removed.
Meanwhile, "watchful waiting"
and some uneasiness continue to
characterize public reaction to
devaluation and other economic re-
form measures announced on 18 June.
As expected, some adverse reaction
has developed including a strike
by construction workers in the Sai-
gon area, but no definitive trends
relating to the over-all success
or failure of the reforms are yet
evident.
Moderate and militant Bud-
dhist leaders within the Buddhist
Institute apparently remain un-
able to resolve their differences
over continuing opposition to the
Ky government. After raiding the
institute compound last week, the
government made some conciliatory
moves toward the moderates, but
no accord has yet been reached.
Military Situation
The scene of major fighting
shifted during the past week from
South Vietnam's western highlands
to the northern and central
coastal plain.
Northwest of Hue, in Thua
Then Province, two US Marine bat-
talions conducting search-and-de-
stroy Operation JAY trapped battal-
ion-sized or larger elements of the
6th North Vietnamese Army (PAVN)
Regiment against an inlet on the
South China Sea. Supported by heavy
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 July 66
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NORTHg
~..' VIETAThi' "-,
f ~-S V,et 1,i*.. Sac Gang ---.
BURY
s 0UTr41u,Hoa
kVIETNAM.
CAPITAL
MILITARY REC,
The Indochina -South China Area(
NW
11 CORPS
PiS6' II
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tactical air strikes, artillery,
and naval gunfire, US forces killed
92 Communists while sustaining only
moderate casualties.
In Phu Yen Province, eight US
battalions continued to press Op-
eration NATHAN HALE against two
PAVN regiments near the provincial
capital of Tuy Hoa. The 12-day
ground sweep has thus far taken
more than 400 Communist lives and
has seriously disrupted enemy
plans--gleaned from captured docu-
ments--for a major regimental as-
sault against a nearby US/Vietnam-
ese Special Forces camp.
South Vietnamese forces en-
joyed mixed success during the con-
duct of two large-scale search-and-
destroy operations in the Mekong
Delta. Southwest of Saigon, gov-
ernment regulars lost 30 killed and
72 wounded in two days (26-27 June)
of heavy fighting in Dinh Tuong
Province, but rallied on 28 June
by killing 82 Viet Cong during a
one-day sweep in southernmost An
Xuyen Province.
The two major Communist-
launched attacks this week were
notably unsuccessful. A 29 June
battalion-sized ambush against a
Vietnamese Marine battalion in
convoy along coastal Route 1, north-
west of Hue, was beaten off, with
enemy losses of 202 killed, versus
50 government troops killed and 84
wounded. A regimental-strength
attack the next day against ele-
ments of the US lst Infantry Divi-
sion conducting EL PASO II north of
'Saigon in Binh Long Province was
also repulsed with only moderate
'Friendly losses, against more than
:300 Viet Cong killed.
Air Strikes on North's POL Dumps
US Air Force and Navy aircraft
conducted several coordinated
strikes against major North Vietnam-
ese POL storage facilities begin-
ning on 29 June. Pilots reported
that heavy damage was inflicted on
the installations at Hanoi, Hai-
phong, Do Son, Bac Giang, and Viet
711ri. No definitive assessment
could be made from the initial
bomb damage photography, however,
because of heavy smoke and flame
rising from the targets. These
facilities were estimated to com-
prise some 70 percent of North
Vietnam's bulk petroleum storage
capacity.
Two US aircraft were lost to
ground fire during the attacks. At
].east five other air force aircraft
were damaged--three by flak and two
in an aerial engagement with four
North Vietnamese MIG-17 fighters--
but all these returned safely to
their bases. One of the DRV
fighters was shot down.
Hanoi's initial propaganda
reaction to the strikes stressed
that the attack provided a great
victory for the North Vietnamese
air defense which, Hanoi claimed,
shot down seven US aircraft dur-
ing the raid.
DRV Airfield Construction
Analysis of low-level photog-
raphy confirms 25X1
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that construction previously ob-
served at Yen Bai in northwest
North Vietnam is an airfield. The
area of grading and leveling now
is about 10,500 feet long. If con-
struction continues at the present
rate, this airfield will probably
be ready for use by the end of the
year.
More Soviet Helicopters to DRV
Four more MI-6 Hook helicop-
ters have arrived in Hai hon
I I North Vietnam
now ias six or these heavy-duty
helicopters--the first two arrived
in early March and have since been
operating from Hanoi/Gia Lam Air-
field.
These helicopters could
play a significant role in logis-
tic operations or in the tacti-
cal deployment of weapons systems
such as surface-to-air missiles.
The Hook is capable of moving
more than 70 troops or 17,000
pounds of cargo for a distance
of over 300 miles. There is no
evidence at present, however, to
indicate what use the North Viet-
namese might make of these new
aircraft.
The latest report on infiltra-
tion from MACV provides further
evidence that movement of North
Vietnamese into the South reached
a new high of some 24,275 during
the first five months of 1966. Of
this number, MACV lists 10,300 as
confirmed and the remainder as
either probable or possible. By
comparison, MACV estimates that
about 22,000 men infiltra
Vietnam in all o
INDONESIAN CONGRESS NEARS ADJOURNMENT
The Indonesian congress (MPRS),
the nation's highest policymaking
body, is still in session but has
probably completed the major ac-
tion expected of it. Having en-
dorsed President Sukarno's 11 March
transfer of executive power to
General Suharto and having unan-
imously named General Nasution
as MPRS chairman, the members have
gone into committee sessions and
will probably adjourn on 4 July.
General Suharto apparently
feels that the MPRS action both af-
firmed and strengthened his mandate
and gave the army all the authority
it needs for the time being. In a
press interview on 27 June, Suharto
made clear that he plans no imme-
diate action to strip Sukarno of
titular authority. He will prob-
ably continue, however, to counte-
nance anti-Sukarno propaganda de-
signed to reduce the President's
prestige and discredit his policies.
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Although the MPRS clearly is
being stage-managed by the military
leadership, speech-making and dis-
cussion sessions from 22 to 26 June
indicated that some differences of
opinion are permitted. The National
Party (PNI) took a generally pro-Su-
karno line; the opportunistic Moslem
Nahdatul Ulama (NU)--the only other
large recognized party--moved away
from the pro-Sukarno line it has
been taking for the past few weeks
toward the strongly anti-Sukarno pos-
ture of the minor parties.
Now that his authority has
been confirmed by the MPRS, Suharto
probably hopes to move against left-
ist military and civilian elements
in East and Central Java. He has re-
placed the army commanders in both
provinces, where pro-Sukarno senti-
ment has been vigorously expressed
in recent weeks and where an effec-
tive Communist underground could de-
velop unless remedial steps are
taken. Suharto has appointed one
of his closest and most trusted ad-
visers, Major General Sumitro, to
the East Java post and a strong anti-
Communist personality, lr~leneral,
Surono, to Central Java.
SHAKE-UP IN CHINA'S SECOND-ECHELON LEADERSHIP
There are mounting signs that
the political turmoil in Peking has
produced 4 massive shake-up of key
officials just below politburo rank.
A host of officials dropped
out of public view before or about
the time of the fall of politburo
member Peng Chen in March or April.
While failure to make public ap-
pearances is not an infallible guide
to a leader's standing, it is
usually a good one. Appearances
enhance a leader's stature and
serve to remind subordinates, who
are often kept in the dark about
such things, that he still exercises
authority. Of the 73 officials
who filled key party and military
posts before 1 April, about the
time that Peng Chen fell, 31 are now
out of view (see chart). On 1 Jan-
Page 5
uary 1966, only 15 of the 73 had
one unreported for as much as three
months.
The recent unsettled political
scene has produced considerably more
pressure than usual for a leader to
do what he can to establish that he
is in good standing. The Peking
press has been adding to these pres-
sures by demanding that responsible
officials "personally" take charge
of the current ideological purifica-
tion drives in their own domains.
Such demands could foreshadow charges
of malfeasance against officials who
can be represented as not complying.
'.Phis was the technique used to bring
down Peng Chen. It would seem to
establish the general proposition
that, when political shortcomings
are publicized in a leader's domain
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Possible Shake-Up of Key Party and Military
Groupings in Communist China
This chart considers the status of only those men who
;t>peored to ions the active power structure in March 1966,
j .,t before the foil of politburo member Peng Chen. Some,
:.fro hold multiple posts, ara counted in more than one groping.
PARTY
Politburo
Secretariat
MMtr,bars Still
In Good Standing
Members who
May Be in Trouble
Heads of Central
Committee Dept-
Level Organs
Regional
Bureau
Chiefs
Provincial
First
Secretaries
Military Affairs
Committee of the
Central Committee
Chief and
Deputy Chiefs
of Staff
Minister and
Vice Ministers of National
Defense
Heads of
Major Service.
and he is not represented as engag-
ing in the necessary clean-up ac-
tion, he is in trouble. At the
moment, at least eight provincial
leaders and two department heads in
the central committee have been
implicated by this type of indirect
attack. In all these cases the of-
ficial concerned has been out of
sight for months.
An indication that the fate
of such men has not been entirely
settled was provided by Peoples
Daily on 24 June. It urged leading
officials who are under criticism
not to lose heart if the "masses
post a few big-character posters"
(i.e. make public accusations), but
to try to clear themselves. Since
Peoples Daily had attempted unsuc-
ces sfully earlier this year to de-
fend Peng Chen, its presentadvice
may not be very reassuring to
those under attack. Moreover, only
a few days earlier the Peking press
had applauded the use of such post-
ers as "detectors of monsters" who
will "turn pale with fear and break
into a cold sweat at the sight of
them."
Description of the "freaks and
monsters" under attack indicate
that they, like Peng Chen, may be
accused of harboring bourgeois re-
visionist sentiments and of working
against the party and Mao Tse-tung.
This does not fit well with the
background of the men involved.
Almost to a man, those whose status
is now in question are hard-line
men with an unswerving record of
devotion to Mao and his dogmatic
policies.
Little is known about new ap-
pointments. Peng Chen was replaced
in early June as first secretary of
the Peking city party organization by
a man believed to be a protege of
party general secretary Teng Hsiao-
ping. The only key appointment an-
nounced since then is a new deputy
director of the general political
department (the party's control ap-
paratus in the army). This man
served under Teng Hsiao-ping in
Southwest China in the early 1950s.
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CHOU EN-LAI'S VISIT TO RUMANIA ENDS IN DISPUTE
Chinese Communist Premier
Chou En-lai's eight-day visit to
Rumania exposed the flimsiness
of the two countries' claim to a
close relationship. It achieved
little or no agreement on sub-
stantive issues and ended in an
open clash with Rumanian party
boss Ceasescu. Chou, however,
fared better in Albania and Pak-
istan, the other two stops on
his tour.
Rumania has used its rela-
tionship with China to underscore
its neutrality in the Sino-Soviet
rivalry and thus to advance its
independence of Moscow. China
has encouraged Rumanian inde-
pendence as a tactic in its strug-
gle with Moscow, and cited ties
with Bucharest to counter asser-
tions that Albania is its only
friend in Eastern Europe. The
usefulness of these tactics for
both Rumania and China was re-
duced by Chou's visit.
There was little effort to
hide the differences between
Chou and Ceasescu as the 16-24
June visit came to an end. In-
stead of the customary communi-
que, brief unilateral statements
were issued from Bucharest and
Peking which mentioned no sin-
gle item of agreement. In his
farewell remarks, Chou. described
the talks merely as "useful" and
"frank," a clear indication of
their unsatisfactory nature.
Rumania's refusal to allow
Chou to use Bucharest as a plat-
Page 7
form for an attack on Soviet
"revisionism" combined with Chi-
nese intransigence on Vietnam,
apparently triggered the dispute.
Discord became public when the
two leaders arrived over two
hours late at a friendship rally
which had been billed as the
climax of the visit. Disagree-
ment was apparently so sharp
that prepared speeches had to be
discarded and innocuous extem-
poraneous remarks substituted.
The Albanian portion of
Chou's trip, 24 to 28 June, was
more congenial. Although it was
uneventful, it shed light on the
difficulties in Bucharest. In a
speech honoring Chou, Albania's
Premier Shehu clearly referred
to the Rumanians when he charged
that "certain people consider
themselves neutral in this life
and death struggle.... Neutrality
...merely favors modern revi-
sionism."
The key to Sino-Pakistani
relations is shared enmity toward
India. During Chou's two-day
stop in Rawalpindi, en route
home, he probably sought assur-
ances that recent Pakistani for-
eign policy developments do not
portend a major shift toward
the West. The Chinese are un-
doubtedly concerned over the re-
cent ouster of pro-Chinese for-
eign minister Bhutto, and a re-
sumption of large-scale American
economic assistance, particularly
Pakistan.
since the Chinese have begun a
sizable military aid program to
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Europe
WARSAW DEMONSTRATIONS HIGHLIGHT CHURCH-STATE STALEMATE
The antiregime, prochurch
demonstrations in Warsaw last
weekend have sharpened the di-
lemma both sides face--how to
maintain their basic positions
without generating a full con-
frontation on the popular level.
The church cannot trans-
late its manifest popular sup-
port into political action be-
cause the regime would not hesi-
tate to use force to restrain
it. The government, however,
fears that overly repressive
methods would touch off extensive
rioting and that direct action
against Cardinal Wyszynski would
make a martyr of him.
There are indications of
rising concern in the Roman
Catholic hierarchy and among
party and nonparty elements
alike that both sides have mis-
handled the situation and that on
occasion they have engaged in
unnecessary provocations.
Both sides realize that
Polish national interests dic-
tate an eventual settlement,
possibly with a new church-
state agreement, but the imme-
diate situation may worsen as
each side probes the other's de-
termination. The regime may im-
pose additional restrictions on
the church millennium celebra-
heighten tension and could lead
to worse popular outbursts.
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FRENCH NON-COMMUNIST LEFT MOVES TOWARD COOPERATION WITH COMMUNISTS
Francois Mitterrand, lately
a candidate for the French pres-
idency, is moving his non-Commu-
nist Federation of the Democratic
and Socialist Left toward closer
cooperation with the French Com-
munist Party (PCF). Mitterrand's
immediate goal is to strengthen
the federation for the legisla-
tive elections which must be
held by next March but could
take place sooner.
Mitterrand'has publicly em-
phasized that "nothing comes
ahead of the union of the left,
which evidently includes the Com-
munist Party." His present
"shadow cabinet" includes no Com-
munists but he has opened the
way for PCF representation in a
government of the "left" by say-
ing "we will not contest elec-
tions with the support of popu-
lar forces in order to form a
majority the next day without
them." Mitterrand's movement to
the left has been endorsed by
Guy Mollet and Rene Billeres,
the leaders of the Socialist and
Radical Socialist parties which
make up most of the Mitterrand
federation.
The PCF's reaction has been
wary, and it is going ahead with
plans to run its own candidates
in the first round of the elec-
tions. The PCF argues that the
left must agree on electoral
tactics and a program before a
true alliance is possible. Never-
theless, the PCF has welcomed
the opportunity to cooperate
with the federation and has
sought to facilitate cooperation
by playing down doctrinal dif-
ferences.
Gaullist attempts to get
votes from the left electorate,
which will surely be stepped up
with De Gaulle's trip to the So-
viet Union, have also encouraged
the PCF and the federation toward
cooperation. Leaders of both
groups acknowledge this common
threat.
Some elements of Mitter-
rand's federation--notably,So-
cialist leader Gaston Defferre
do not favor his move to the
left, and Jean Lecanuet, leader
of the non-Gaullist center group-
ing, has extended the welcome
mat to dissatisfied federation
leaders. It is doubtful many
will accept his offer, however.
Even Defferre has endorsed Mit-
terrand as head of the federa-
tion at least through the elec-
tions.
The long-term significance
of Mitterrand's move is far from
clear. He, Mollet, and its other
backers undoubtedly see the move
as a way of facilitating elec-
toral alliances on the key sec-
ond round of the assembly elec-
tions when most of the seats will
be filled. Even a united left
is extremely unlikely to win an
assembly majority, however, so
the federation leadership can af-
ford to be free with its promises
of postelection cooperation.
Continuing PCF concern that it
will be used in the election and
then discarded is probably the 25X1
best evidence that no irrevo-
cable commitment to a "popular
front" et exists
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NATO DEVELOPMENTS
The formal withdrawal on 30
June of French personnel and mil-
itary units from NATO assignment
has underscored the continuing
uncertainty over France's future
military cooperation with the
Alliance.
At the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) on 28
June, the French representative
said that France was willing to
"subordinate" its forces to NATO
command in wartime and to arrange
a mission and role for these
forces. He avoided, however, any
specific details on such arrange-
ments and reiterated the French
position that these were pri-
marily military matters to be ne-
gotiated between SACEUR and the
French chief of staff--not in the
political forum of the NAC.
The Germans on 30 June of-
fered the French a declaration
on a transitional arrangement for
stationing French forces in Ger-
many following French withdrawal
from the NATO military structure.
The text of the declaration was
changed after the French indi-
cated they would not accept it
as originally worded. It now
reads that a German "representa-
tive" rather than a German general
will be assigned to French
headquarters in West Germany to
represent the sovereignty of the
Federal Republic. The Germans
also toned down their statement
on the mission of the French
forces.
There is still some doubt,
however, how the French will re-
act to the German statement.
French officials still maintain
that the 1954 London-Paris Agree-
ments provide a legal basis for
the stationing of French troops
in Germany, and that the German
declaration is unnecessary. In
objecting to this German approach
a French official said that it
would not facilitate the ulti-
mate solution of the French
troop question.
Meanwhile, the Netherlands
Government appears to be moving
toward formally accepting the
Headquarters, Allied Forces Cen-
tr-al Europe (AFCENT), on its ter-
ritory. The Germans also have
indicated a desire to have AFCENT.
However, the appointment of Ger-
man General von Kielmansegg to
replace the French general as com-
mander of AFCENT appears to make
the Netherlands the more likely
host for AFCENT inasmuch as the
Dutch have said that they would
accept a German general in that
command only if it is located out-
side German
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Middle East - Africa
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN YEMEN
As Kuwaiti mediation efforts
and Egyptian indecision have in-
creasingly paralyzed all govern-
ment action in Yemen, anti-Egyp-
tian movements now developing
among Yemeni republican groups
may presage a new reshuffle of
the present regime along more lib-
eral lines.
During the last three months
a number of republican political
movements have sprung up in the
usual Yemeni garb of a conference
of leaders. All these recent
meetings have had certain aims in
common: the removal of President
Sallal, continuation of the gov-
ernment's "republican" guise, es-
tablishment of some kind of
broadly based government, and the
withdrawal of Egyptian troops.
The republican conferences
are largely gatherings of leaders
from various tribes. In the most
recent meeting an important tri-
bal chief played a leading role.
This course of events appears
somewhat analogous to the tribal
conference at Khamir in the spring
of 1965, which led up to a brief
period of more liberal rule.
Party lines within the re-
publican ranks are becoming con-
fused. Ardently pro-Egyptian
and cautiously anti-Egyptian lead-
ers alike have become almost per-
manent residents of Cairo, while
seeking to gain Nasir's favor.
Cairo in fact seems unde-
cided on policy in Yemen. Al-
though Nasir has publicly prom-
ised substantial Egyptian troop
reductions, the British decision
to evacuate the Aden base by
1968 may be delaying the Egyp-
tian withdrawal from Yemen. The
Egyptians presumably hope to be
able to bring maximum influence
to bear on an independent South
Arabia.
The Kuwaiti mediation ef-
forts in Yemen may account for
further Egyptian hesitation.
So far the mediation has not
accomplished more than giving
the Egyptians and the Saudi
Arabians a channel to use with-
out resuming direct negotia-
tions. Neither Nasir nor Fay-
sal appears to have softened
his views substantially in the
first round of exchanges. In-
deed, the strong Egyptian press
criticism of King Faysal's
visit to the US will undoubtedly
further complicate his relations 25X1
with Nasir and may spell an end
to the entire mediation effort.
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BRAZZAVILLE REGIME AND
A long-developing showdown
between the dominant political
leadership of the radical Congo
(Brazzaville) regime and impor-
tant elements of the 1,700-man
army came to a head this week.
It is not yet clear whether army
units supporting the mutiny
which began on 27 June or the
civilian leaders have the upper
hand.
Prime Minister Noumazalay's
appeal to the army to turn in
its weapons and return to camp
has not been obeyed, and the
loyalty of troops patrolling the
streets is uncertain. Govern-
ment leaders have taken refuge
in a Brazzaville stadium, where
they are being protected by the
approximately 200 Cuban soldiers
of the Presidential Guard. Loyal
Cuban-encadred militia are also
guarding the radio station.
Neither of the opposing forces
appears willing to test its
strength by combat.
ARMY ELEMENTS I N SHOWDOWN
officers, but has not yet been
able to assert his authority over
one paracommando company, some
other elements of the army and
gendarmerie, and an undetermined
number of civilians--apparently
mostly northern fellow tribesmen
of the disciplined officer.
Army dissatisfaction with
the government has mounted over
the past several months. Army
officers have been resentful of the
MNR's persistent downgrading of
army influence and the building up
of paramilitary forces which oper-
ate under party control. Certain
army elements have strongly pro-
tested the use of Cuban recruits
in the Presidential Guard as well
as the arming of the party youth
wing and the urban militia. The
National Assembly's approval last
week of a decree establishing a
collective army command and a polit-
ical department in the army, as
called for by the MNR central com-
mittee last spring, probably also
added to army hostility.
The disturbances were
sparked by army resentment over
punitive action that the govern-
ment had taken against a popular
junior officer. The officer's
tribal brothers in the military
partially destroyed the head-
quarters of the government party,
the National Revolutionary Move-
ment (MNR). Soldiers led by para-
troopers seized Army Chief of
Staff Mountsaka, some of his
staff officers, and the head of
the security police. Prime Min-
ister Noumazalay has replaced
the army high command with po-
litically reliable junior
President Massamba-Debat, who
has in the past been the target of
army criticism, returns this week
to the country to face a situation
which could snowball into a genuine
military coup. Should the MNR hold
its own against the generally mod-
erate army, however, the militant
extremists in the regime will be
strengthened. A purge of the army
and a further reduction in army
influence would probably follow,
causing the regime to rely more than
ever on the Cuban- and Chinese Com-
munist-trained paramilitary forces
for its protection.
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lw~
fIr
SEGRE.
KENYA GETTING TOUGH TOWARD SOMALIA
The government of Kenya is
adopting an increasingly belli-
cose stance toward neighboring
Somalia. With recent national as-
sembly by-elections safely out of
the way it plans tough measures
to stamp out Somali insurgency in
northeastern Kenya.
Dissident activity has in-
creased sharply there in the past
two months as bands of Kenyan
Somalis, trained and equipped by
the Somali Army, have re-entered
Kenya. Their demolition of
bridges and attacks on military
outposts have demonstrated an im-
proved capability and greater ag-
gressiveness.
The Kenyatta government has
been irritated further by Somali
radiobroadcasts supporting former
vice president Odinga's opposi-
tion party in the by-elections.
Last week Nairobi severed commer-
cial relations with Somali and
prohibited Somali citizens and
airline flights from entering
Kenya. Kenyan propaganda broad-
casts to the border area have
also been stepped up.
Two weeks ago in a skirmish
200 miles inside the border Ken-
yan tribesmen speared to death
some 40 Somali guerrillas armed
with guns. Nairobi now is begin-
ning to train loyal tribesmen
for maintaining security within
Kenya and for possible guerrilla
attacks against Somalia.
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
Somalia, Ethiopia,
and Kenya
FR.
S0M.
ADDIS ABABA
SOMALIA
OGADISCIO
Area inhabited
by Somali people
Indian Ocean
The greater Somalia issue
was one of the factors in a po-
litical crisis in the Somali Re-
public this week. Prime Minis-
ter Abdirazak submitted his res-
ignation, but withdrew it under
pressure from President Aden,
Abdirazak probably can win an
early vote of confidence but may
have to promise an even more
militant stand against his neigh-
cally.
bors. He had already appeared
to be bowing to pressure, some
of it from the Soviet-trained
and -equipped army, to support
Somali minorities more energeti-
SE C. 101.
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Western Hemisphere
ARGENTINE GENERALS OUST PRESIDENT I LLI A
The Argentine Army, in a
carefully planned and well-exe-
cuted coup, removed President
Illia on 27 June, ending three
years of constitutional govern-
ment. The overthrow was swift
and bloodless and came after
weeks of rumors and speculation
that a coup was imminent.
Argentina's new president,
Lieutenant General Juan Carlos
Ongania, who was inaugurated on
29 June, established his reputa-
tion as a capable executive while
commander in chief of the arm
The gen-
erals prdecided to move
against Illiafbecause they con-
cluded that he would not actually
carry out the policy changes he
promised in cabinet meetings
earlier in June. The generals
may also have been concerned that
Illia was trying to promote dis-
unity among the top generals
through War Secretary Castro
Sanchez.
were constitutionalists
opposed in principle to military
involvement in government. How-
ever, they had made it known that
they considered the armed forces
the final arbiter in national af-
fairs and that they would not al-
low the government to lead the
country toward anarchy or eco-
nomic disaster. Although Illia
had made progress in solving some
of Argentina's pressing economic
problems, he was reluctant to take
repressive actions against strik-
ing workers or proscribe Peronist
participation in national elec-
tions. The military were concerned
at the disruption of public serv-
ices by strikes and the threat of
a Peronist victory in important
provincial elections that were
scheduled for March 1967.
The coup began late on 27
June after General Pistarini, the
army commander in chief, had con-
ferred with his staff and prob-
ably with Ongania. Pistarini an-
nounced the arrest of General
Caro, Illia's only ally among the
top generals, and repudiated the
authority of Castro Sanchez. This
left Illia with no military sup-
port. The president's futile ef-
fort to dismiss Pistarini was
merely a gesture and did not pre-
vent the generals from following
their operations order. The coup
brought no reaction from either
the Peronists or Illia's own Radi-
cal Party supporters.
The new government has dis-
missed the congress and taken over
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the provincial governments. It
quickly appointed new judges to
the Supreme Court but did not
immediately name a new cabinet.
No effort to hold elections is
likely until the regime can pro-
mulgate a new political party
statute that will effectively
control the threat of Peronism.
Reaction to the coup in
Latin America has been varied but
relatively mild. Venezuela has
condemned the coup and will break
relations in accord with its
Betancourt Doctrine--refusing to
recognize governments that come
to power through a coup.
Several other nations while
regretting the coup have indi-
cated that they will await fur-
ther developments before commit-
tin themselves.
BRITISH HONDURANS PROTEST TERMS OF INDEPENDENCE AGREEMENT
Popular feeling has been
aroused in British Honduras (Be-
lize) by opposition leader Philip
Goldson's premature disclosure
of an agreement the UK is nego-
tiating with Guatemala over in-
dependence for the colony--to
which Guatemala has long asserted
a claim.
Popular demonstrations which
began a few weeks ago are becom-
ing more violent. Demonstrators
on the evening of 27 June mobbed
the Guatemalan Consulate in Be-
lize City and burned a consulate
car. Later a group approached
Premier George Price's house but
was frightened off by police.
Other groups caused damage to a
cabinet minister's house and car.
Radio Belize--the country's only
station--was also attacked, sus-
taining minor damage. About 300
demonstrators participated in
rioting which was finally broken
up by police using tear gas.
This is the first such dis-
order in Belize since 1918. Most
off the violence can be attributed
to Goldson's scare tactics. Dur-
ing recent rallies he has ac-
cused Price of selling Belize
out to Guatemala. Goldson has
buttressed his argument by point-
ing to a stipulation in the
agreement making Guatemala re-
sponsible for Belize's defense
after independence. He has also
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British Honduras
disclosed that Guatemalan citi-
zens would have free entry to
Belize.
The agreement as it stands
is not unfavorable to the Bel-
zians, but Goldson and the op-
position appear determined to
sabotage it to prevent Price from
being credited with achieving
the country's independence.
Price's reassuring statements do
not seem to have allayed the ap-
prehension and confusion caused
by Goldson's disclosure, and the
premier may even be losing the
support of his own party on the
issue.
Guatemala has protested
the incident of 27 June and has
demanded that the United Kingdom
provide guarantees for the con-
sulate's safety. In the absence
of such guarantees, the Guate-
malan Government stated that it
might be unable to continue with
the mediation and would be forced
to take measures for the consu-
late's protection. Governor Stal-
lard proclaimed a curfew on 28
June in order to try and stem the
demonstrations.
Although the agreement will
probably be signed eventually,
signature may well be delayed
by the furor which Goldson has
raised.
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GUATEMALA RETURNS TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE
Guatemala's long struggle
to return to constitutional gov-
ernment ends on 1 July with the
inauguration of Julio Cesar Men-
dez Montenegro and Clemente Mar-
roquin Rojas as president and
vice president respectively.
Mendez' term will be difficult
at best. The reforms needed to
alleviate the country's serious
economic and social problems
would alienate the armed forces,
which now support him.
The inauguration will it-
self be an achievement. Terror-
ism from both ends of the politi-
cal spectrum has challenged Men-
dez' assumption of office. Commu-
nist-led leftists, at first hop-
ing for a champion in the new
president, now believe the Rev-
olutionary Party, which elected
him, no longer represents their
interests. They have concluded
that his regime in effect can be
no more than a continuation of
the military government. They
therefore promise to oppose it
until it falls.
Far rightists, on the other
hand, fear that Mendez' assump-
tion of power will signal a re-
turn to Communism reminiscent of
the
The fears of neither ex-
treme appear justified. Mendez
is inexperienced in practical
politics. His actions since his
election suggest, however, that
he will be moderate in his poli-
cies, and more open to advice
than was Colonel Peralta, the
retiring chief of government.
As a liberal, Mendez is not
likely to be quite as rough on
the Communists as the military
government. He probably hopes
to reduce their effectiveness by
solving the problems that make
Communism attractive. On the
other hand, Mendez' cabinet has
been chosen for the most part
from elements acceptable to the
military--the final arbiter in
Guatemalan politics.
Among the more pressing
problems facing Mendez is the
possibility of continued terror-
ism. Six kidnapings in the past
month and a half point up the
ability of the FAR--the Commu-
nist Party's action arm--to ter-
rorize at will, although it is
in no position to overthrow the
government.
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DOMINICAN PRESIDENT BALAGUER TO BE INAUGURATED
Joaquin Balaguer will be
inaugurated as Dominican presi-
dent on 1 July in ceremonies to
be attended by foreign digni-
taries including Vice President
Humphrey. Extreme leftists
have been discussing the possi-
bility of upsetting the inaugura-
tion, but they do not appear to
have firm plans for a large-
scale, organized protest. Never-
theless, some attempt to inter-
fere with the ceremonies--per-
haps by a terrorist act--or to
embarrass Vice President Hum-
phrey seems likely in view of
charges that Balaguer was fraud-
ulently elected and the intense
anti-Americanism of Dominican
extremists.
Although the security forces
are making preparations to en-
sure the safety of inaugural
participants, they are not fully
capable of offering protection
against all contingencies.
statements of intention might
have raised.
In his farewell talks,
provisional President Garcia
Godoy has been sounding very
much like a presidential candi-
date in the next election. F_
He has praised
his regime for dealing with a
situation in which it was "asked
to perform almost a miracle" and
has expressed satisfaction over
the accomplishment of his major
task, the holding of peaceful
elections and the orderly trans-
fer of power. Garcia Godoy has
claimed credit for what he feels
to be the "rehabilitation" of
the military--although it re-
mains to be seen whether there
has been any fundamental change
in the attitude of the armed
forces toward civilian power.
Balaguer's inaugural speech
and his cabinet appointments, to
be announced afterward, will of-
fer the first firm indication of
the new regime's intentions.
Both are well-kept secrets. Bal-
aguer's silence has contributed
to the preinaugural calm by pre-
venting his opponents from capi-
talizing on issues which any
Garcia Godoy feels his po-
litical stock received a further
boost with the withdrawal of the
first units of the Inter-Ameri-
can Peace Force on 28 June. Un-
der terms of an OAS resolution,
the force is to be pulled out
over a 90-day period with the
exact timing to be determined
by Balaguer and the OAS Commit-
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BOLIVIAN ELECTIONS STILL ON
The national elections on 3
July will be held in an uneasy
atmosphere. Incidents of vio-
lence are probable before and on
election day, but only a chaotic
situation-or the assassination
of the assured presidential vic-
tor, Rene Barrientos, would be
likely to cause cancellation of
the voting at this late date.
The army is on alert to guard
against disorder.
Barrientos' opponents have
been unable to stir up demon-
CHILEAN AND COLOMBIAN LEADERS
Chilean President Eduardo
Frei made a strong plea for Latin
American economic integra-
tion during a speech on 22 June
in honor of visiting Colombian
President-elect Carlos Lleras
Restrepo. Presumably, Frei ex-
pects Latin American chiefs of
state who attend Lleras' inaug-
uratioxl on 7 August to discuss
details of integration in prepa-
ration for the meeting of Western
Hemisphere chiefs of state that
has been proposed for late this
year or early 1967.
Frei suggested creation of
a high-level study group to pro-
pose policies covering regional
investment, multinational proj-
ects, and other matters of common
concern. He proposed that in ad-
dition to economic integration,
the meeting of hemisphere leaders
strations large enough to force
EL cancellation. Some groups now
urge abstention and blank voting
to reduce Barrientos' margin of
victory and undercut his claim
to a popular mandate. As many
as four of the six contending
parties may pull out of the race
at the last minute. The tradi-
tional manipulation of ballots
and voting irregularities, if un-
usually extensive, would also
cloud Barrientos' victory. F__~ 25X1
PRESS HEMISPHERE ECONOMIC TIES
should discuss regional arms con-
trol and agrarian reform.
Lleras, in his response,
agreed on these topics and added
that study should be devoted to
establishing a complementary eco-
nomic relationship between the
Latin American countries and the
United States.
The Colombian president-
elect is on a tour of Venezuela,
Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Panama.
In Venezuela he stressed Latin
American economic integration in
remarks closely paralleling
those made later by Frei. The
statements of the two leaders,
as well as Frei's past initiatives,
indicate that they intend to
press for a unified approach to
economic association in Latin
America and for greater economic
cooperation from the US.7--~ 25X1
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FIDEL CASTRO RESUMES NORMAL ACTIVITIES
Castro apparently has de-
cided to end his two-month period
of withdrawal from the Cuban
limelight.
On 27 June, Castro boarded
the ship returning Cuban athletes
to the island from the Carrib-
bean Games in Puerto Rico, al-
though he did not participate
in the formal welcoming cere-
monies for the team. The Cuban
Communist Party newspaper Granma
prominently featured pictures
of Castro congratulating the
athletes in its 28 June edition;
pictures of Castro had been un-
characteristically absent from
Cuban papers for about three
weeks.
Castro delivered his first
speech since 1 May on the eve-
ping of 29 June. He appeared
very relaxed and self-assured
during the 70-minute speech and
the ceremonies preceding it,
which were broadcast on island-
wide radio and television.
There was no sign of physi-
cal illness; mental illness would
not necessarily be obvious. Cas-
tro's speaking manner, however,
and over-all demeanor were char-
acteristic of his public appear-
ances over the past seven years.
Castro concentrated on charg-
ing the US with having harassed
the Cuban athletes at the Carib-
bean Games. He did not rebut
the rumors circulating about his
health and political position.
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