CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SPECIAL REPORT PERONISM IN ARGENTINA A CONTINUING STRUGGLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 27, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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PERON I SM I N ARGENTINA: A CONTINUING STRUGGLE
The Peronism movement in Argentina, which grew
up around the charismatic personality of "el Lider"
Juan Peron during his ten-year dictatorship (1946-
55), has remained, since his overthrow, a major un-
settling factor in Argentine political life. Largely
because of the continuing disapproval of the mili-
tary, who remember the excesses under Peron, the move-
ment has only occasionally been able to participate
openly in Argentine political affairs. Today, how-
ever, it stands a good chance of becoming integrated
into the mainstream of national politics. A moder-
ate "neo-Peronist" faction that believes in Peronism
without Peron and is trying to overcome the move-
ment's unsavory past is growing in strength and in-
fluence--although still subject to strong challenge
by the orthodox faction, as shown by a recent pro-
vincial election. Conversations between the neo-
Peronists and military leaders indicate that the
generals may be ready to accept the movement as rep-
resented by the moderates.
Origins and Ideology
The Peronist movement, about
a third of the body politic, has
its base in the working class--
the "shirtless ones" who were
awakened by Peron and who provided
him with solid electoral majori-
ties. It also has its adherents
in the middle class. Its philos-
ophy has been clouded in the mys-
ticism of Peron's ambiguous terms,
such as "social justice" and
"third force," but the emerging
new leaders of the movement,
strong trade unionists, are prob-
ably more inclined to support
free enterprise with some govern-
ment control than any kind of so-
cialism. They also favor the un-
limited participation of organized
labor in politics. The movement
harbors fringe elements ranging
from ultraleftists and Castroites
to the extreme orthodox sycophants
of Peron's pro-Nazi days, but the
leadership and overwhelming ma-
jority of the rank and file are
nationalistic and opposed to in-
ternal Communism.
The movement has a well-de-
served reputation for violence
and subversion. Deprived of a
legal political voice after Peron's
overthrow by the military, the
Peronists have emulated their
].reader's frequent resort to vio-
lent tactics while he was in
power, and often have used strikes
and mob violence to make their
point to the nation. The move-
ment's labor base and its history
of alliance when necessary with
leftist elements have kept away
the middle and upper classes first
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alienated during Peron's tenure.
Peronism's traditional enemy has
been the military, whose leaders
first put Peron in power and
later removed him. Hard-line
military opponents of Peronism
see any form of it as a threat
to the state which must be out-
lawed, but the "legalist" mili-
tary leaders now in control may
be seeking a more moderate ap-
proach.
Peron and Today's Peronists
Since Peron's abortive ef-
fort to return to Argentina in
December 1964, on which occasion
he was detained at the airport
in Rio de Janeiro and returned
to his exile in Spain, there has
been no serious threat that the
ex-dictator will relocate either
in his former homeland or in the
neighboring area. Even President
Stroessner of Paraguay, who once
gave Peron refuge after his over-
throw, would no longer welcome
him. Peron lives in comfort in
Madrid and transmits orders to
his Argentine lieutenants through
letters, couriers, and frequent
meetings with subordinates who
travel to Madrid for audiences
with him.
The outlook for finding an
acceptable role for Peronism in
Argentine politics is brightened
by the fact that, for the first
time since the rise of Peron,
a moderate leadership is develop-
ing in the movement which may
lead it to become fully integrated
into the national life. The ag-
ing (71) ex-dictator, whose re-
turn was anticipated for so many
years, has been unable from his
exile to maintain complete con-
trol of the movement. His seri-
ous tactical blunder in ordering
his followers to cast blank bal-
lots in the 1963 presidential
elections alienated many Peron-
ists, and the efforts of his
attractive third wife, Isabelita,
to reunite the movement have
failed. It is not yet clear,
however, whether a majority of
the rank-and-file Peronists will
finally give their support to
the moderates, or to the ortho-
dox Peronist leadership. There
are some who fear that Peron will
soon die and there are some who
fear that he won't, but his pass-
ing from the scene will probably
have only a transitory effect on
the struggle.
Organization and Leadership
One of the most serious ob-
stacles to the integration of
the Peronists into normal polit-
ical activity has been their
lack of unity and organization.
Ambiguous and contradictory or-
ders from their exiled leader
in past years kept them disor-
ganized. Peron maintained his
grip on the movement, despite
arbitrary actions, cavalier
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treatment of lieutenants, and
near total disregard for his fol-
lowers. Peron was careful to
avoid giving independent power
to any single leader within Ar-
gentina and often played off one
group against another. He gave
the movement the character of a
"class" in opposition to constitu-
tionality and legality rather
than a political force in opposi-
tion to the government in power.
Peron tried to unite all
Peronist groups under one secre-
tariat in the fall of 1965, thus
reducing the individual powers
of some of the less obedient lead-
ers, but this effort failed. In
April 1966. Peron's wife and
emissary, who was to have carried
out the reorganization, admitted
that she had had no success.
At present, therefore, there
is no unified council that com-
mands the total movement within
the country. Technically, the
Superior Peronist Command which
grew up in the early years of
Peron's exile still exists, but
it is only a sounding board for
the orthodoxy. In both major
sectors of the movement's activi-
ties, labor and political, a
polarization has taken place
dividing the leadership between
those who still take their orders
from Madrid--the orthodox--and
those who seek a more moderate
approach, directed by Peronist
leaders in Argentina--the neo-
Peronists. The rank and-file
are awaiting the outcome of the
struggle, and local leaders at
all levels still command their
individual followings.
Labor remains the foundation
of the Peronist movement. Almost
half of Argentina's working force
is unionized, a situation unusual
in Latin America, and the unions
are, generally speaking, con-
trolled by Peronists. The union's
central organization, the General
Confederation of Workers (CGT),
became one of the focal points
for the movement under Peron,
and it was "intervened" (taken
over) by the military government
that succeeded the dictator.
In 1959, under President Frondizi,
the Peronists were allowed to
return to the CGT, which they
have dominated ever since.
In February 1966 the CGT
witnessed a struggle for power
between its orthodox Peronist
secretary general, Jose Alonso,
and Augusto Vandor, head of the
powerful Metallurgical Workers
Union and perhaps the most power-
ful neo-Peronist in the nation.
The neo-Peronists, also now
labeled Vandorists by some, won
the fight, and Alonso and his
supporters decided to form their
own group, amounting to only 18
unions of the total 62. Vandor
is now trying to consolidate
his hold on the CGT and it seems
likely that he will be able to
do so. Vandor also commands the
allegiance of some non-Peronists
and his strength and prestige
appear to be growing.
Since the days of Peron,
when Peronist electoral strength
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amounted to over 5.0 percent of the
total vote, there has been no
sure way to measure the voting
strength of the movement. The
Peronists have never been able
to form a united front when they
were permitted to participate in
elections. Estimates based on
the results of provincial elec-
tions and interpolations of na-
tional returns give them from
one fourth to one third of the
electorate.
In both provincial and na-
tional elections, Peron has pre
scribed a common party line but
in no case was there absolute
obedience, nor was the movement
able to unite behind a single
party banner. His orders to vote
"in blank" in the 1963 presiden-
tial election turned out to be
a disastrous defeat for Peron.
Only about half the movement, or
15 percent of the electorate,
followed orders, while the rest,
jealous of their right to partic-
ipate positively in the election,
cast their ballots for Arturo
Illia and the Radicals or for
ex-President Aramburu.
The Peronists in the legislature,
calling themselves the Justicial-
ists, decided to vote as a bloc
and elected Paulino Niembro, a
moderate and close associate of
Vandor, as chairman. The bloc
was united at first, but in March
1966 the split that infected the
CGT spread to the legislature.
Sixteen of the Peronist deputies
formed their own bloc declaring
their allegiance to the orthodox
wing of Isabelita and Jose Alonso
and condemning Vandor for ignoring
Peron's orders. This political
split has hampered Peronist ef-
forts in local and provincial
elections.
In March 1965, the govern-
ment under the victorious Illia
permitted the Peronists to par-
ticipate in national elections
to choose about one third of the
Chamber of Deputies, the lower
house of the legislature. Peron-
ists, running under the banner
of the Popular Union (UP),cap-
tured 44 seats of the 96 contested
to give the movement a 52-seat
bloc in the 192-man lower house,
second in strength only to Illia's
Radicals with their 70-seat bloc.
Political eyes in Argentina
are focusing now on the national
elections scheduled for March
1967. About a third of the lower
house will-be up for election and
a, victory on the scale of their
1965 triumph could give the Peron-
ists undisputed control of the
chamber. In addition, most of
the major governorships are to
be filled, most notably that of
Buenos Aires Province. The elec-
tion of a hard-line Peronist,
Andres Framini, to that post in
1962 triggered the military over-
throw of President Frondizi.
The Peronists in the legisla-
ture have generally followed a
moderate political line in order
to win for themselves the image
of a loyal nonobstructionist op-
position. They supported the
government's 1965 budget bill and
their general behavior was more
responsible than many observers
expected. They united with other
opposition deputies to defeat the
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government's 1966 budget bill,
but then helped pass a responsible
opposition budget.
Subversion and Strong-Arm
Tact cs
Juan Peron himself became
the guiding hand behind the vari-
ous Peronist subversive groups
that grew up both inside and out-
side Argentina after the dicta-
tor's ouster. There were groups
directed by the Superior Peronist
Command and independent exile
groups in Paraguay and Uruguay.
After Peron's ouster, a subver-
sive command called the Division
of Operations was set up under
John William Cooke, an avowed
and violent extremist. The vari-
ous groups supported both terror-
ist activity and a plan for in-
surrection and overthrow of the
government with the goal of re-
turning Peron to power.
The subversive groups
drifted increasingly to the left
as they found support from Trot-
skyite and Castroite elements.
After the 1963 election defeat
Hector Villalon became the head
of the subversive effort, which
meant even closer ties with the
Communists. This move tended to
isolate the extremists within
Peronism, since the rank and file
as well as the majority of the
leadership was generally opposed
to close ties with Communism. At
present the Villalon-Cooke group,
calling itself the Peronist Revo-
lutionary Command, comprises only
a small fraction of the total
25X1 Peronist move ment.
F
Within the main body of Pe-
ronism,the enthusiasm for terror
and strong-arm tactics has dimin-
ished over the years. This may be
due in part to the policy of try-
ing to gain a respectable image
for Peronism, but it also reflects
the fact that the use of violence
has brought little success and,
even worse, the stern reaction of
the military.
In 1964, the Peronists de-
cided to implement the now-famous
"plan de lucha," variously trans-
lated as "battle plan" or "strug-
gle plan." The plan included the
occupation of factories by workers
and the taking of hostages in an
effort to force wage increases
and generally bring attention to
Peronist demands. The plan was
met by President Illia in a rea-
soned and firm way without the
use of repressive measures, and
it eventually died before its
completion. The "struggle" had
two important results. First,
it strengthened the convictions
of the moderate Peronists who
believe in more responsible ways
to power. Second, it reinforced
the views of those who are con-
vinced that no form of Peronism
is acceptable and that Peronists,
once in control, would help bring
back some of the more repressive
and terrible aspects of the Peron
dictatorship.
Subversion as a Peronist
policy is on the way out, but the
strike, the slowdown, and the
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street demonstrations are still
very much a part of the Peronist
bag of tools. Both of the main
Peronist factions could be ex-
pected to revert to the use of
violent tactics if the more mod-
erate policies do not bear fruit
and repressive steps are taken
to prevent Peronist participation
in the 1967 elections or to pre-
vent labor's efforts to gain
higher wages and benefits for the
workers.
The future of Peronism is
clouded by the struggle between
the two major factions. Signifi-
cantly, in the April 1966 Men-
doza Provincial election the
orthodox Peronists polled almost
twice as many votes as the more
moderate neo-Peronists. This was
a very surprising and unexpected
show of strength for the Alonso-
Isabelita wing. The effects of
this defeat on the neo-Peronists
are not yet clear, but it appears
that they will have to reappraise
their strategy as the 1967 elec-
tions draw closer.
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