WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 27, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

WEEKLY
CE1`~TRAL Ii~ITELLIG~I`4ICE A~EIVC~Y
SECRET
GRQUP t Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassificatian!
Approved For Release 2008/05/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1
DIRECTORATE OF fNT'ELLIGENCE
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SECR~; T ~
(Information as of noon EDT, 26 May-1966)
.Page
VIETNAM
Buddhist and "struggle force" leaders in Hue and
Saigon are continuing to denounce both the US and
the Ky government, despite the collapse,. of rebel
resistance in Da Nang. Communist propaganda is en-
couraging the dissidents to focus opposition on a-nti-
Americanism rather than on the more limited objective
of bringing-down the Saigon go~,~ernment. Government.
troops, meanwhile, have maintained pressure on elusive
Communist units in widespread sections of -South Viet-..
nam, and the scale of military activity has returned=
to the relatively high levels of mid-March. The Com-
munists continue to move substantial numbers. of
trucks on key roads in the Laotian infiltration cor-
ridor.
POWER STRUGGLE MAY BE UNDER WAY IN .CHINA
The trend of recent propaganda attacks suggests that
Peng Chen, a member of the inner circle of Mao~s
advisers, may be the target of this power play.
JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TOWARD MORE INDEPENDENCE 7
It hopes to gain domestic support and end the in-
ternational isolation that has resulted from its
close identification with Pel~irag.
INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA PLAN PEACE TALKS
Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Razak and.Indonesian
Foreign Minister .Malik are slated to meet. in Bangkok.
in the next few days for offic3:a1 ta~.ks aimed at
ending confrontation.
Europe
USSR PUSHES INTERNATIONAL FISHING ~~PERATIONS
Moscow?s. worZcLwide fishing. operations have met with
new protests from free world countries whose tra-
ditional fishing grounds have roeen increasingly
penetrated by the highly mobile Soviet fleets.
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~~~~~
EFFECTS OF US INITIATIVES ON EASTERIi EUROPEAN REGIMES
Divided counsels and internal conflict are becoming
evident in nearly all the regimes on how to respond
to US "bridge-building" initiatives, suggesting that
any responses forthcoming will be gradual and limited
to the economic field.
WARSAW PACT'S 11TH ANNIVERSARY SHOWS UNITY IN DIVERSITY 12
Despite Rumania's efforts to reduce the authority of
the Warsaw Pact over its members, most other Eastern
European countries have restated their support of it.
There are, however, indications that many of them might
welcome a re-examination of intrapact relationships..
NATO CRISIS: UNSETTLED ISSUE OF FRENCH TROOPS IN GERMANY 13
De Gazelle's curt and peremptory response to Bonn's
aide-memoirs on conditions under which France may
keep troops in Germany evidently paves the way far
exploratory talks on this contentious issue in the
NATO crisis .
NEW DISORDERS OVER LINGUISTIC ISSUE IN BELGIUM
The latest flare-up in the long-smoldering controversy
between Flemish- and French-speaking Belgians was
caused by efforts by the Flemings tca bar the French
language from Louvain University.
RAILWA Y DISPUTE MAY COMPLICATE RHODESIAN SITUATION
The current railway dispute between Zambia and
Rhodesia has at least temporarily deprived Zambia of
transportation for most of its foreign trade. It
also complicates Britain's efforts to reach a peace-
ful settlement of the Rhodesian rebellion.
NIGERIA MOVES TOWARD UNITARY GOVERNMENT
General Ironsi this week abolished political parties,
unified the civil service, and dissolved the Nigerian
federation, the strongest moves pet taken toward a
unitary government.
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SECRL~ T ``
UGANDAN CRISIS PRESAGES CONTINUING INSTABILITY
Ugandan President Obote~s attempt to bring th.e rich
Buganda region under central g~wernment control has
erupted in violence. Prolonged instability may re-
suit.
SYRIA REGIME SEEKING CLOSER TIES WITH ARAB "PROGRESSIVES"
The Baathist government is engaged in talks with
Egypt and Algeria a.nd claims it also intends to con-
tact "progressive"--presumably Communist--elements..:
within Syria.
IRAQI POWER GROUPS DISSATISFIED WITH PRIME MINISTER
Prime Minister Bazzaz is still hanging on, largely
because rival factions seem unable to act
Western Hemisphere
DOMINICAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN NEAJRS END
The outcome of the 1 June election remains uncertain
and may in the end depend on su~~h imponderables as
the weather, which could keep riural voters from the
polls. Many observers feel, however, that Joaquin
Balaguer may at least have caught up with Juan Bosch.
SEC'RE ~~'
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POLITICAL CONFLICfi GAUSES pUSTER OF BRAZILIAN ARMY COMMANDER
24
General Alves Bastos was relieved of command of the
Third Army apparently because of a recent speech in
which he strongly criticized. administration policies.
COIdMUNIST EFFORTS TO UNIFY URUGUAYAN LABOR MOVEMEi~T
25
The Uruguayan Communist Party is likely soon to or-
ganize and control a unified Labor confederation.
There is no effective opposition to the Communist ef-
forts, which are also aided by worker discontent over
economic conditions.
ECUADOR'S PELA5C0 RETURNS TO POLITICAL SCENE
The four-time president is testing the waters in prep-
sratio nfor $ passible drive to replace interim
President Yerovi--whether by legal means ar not re-
mains uncertain...
~~~~~~
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`'`~ SE CRE T
V1'fTIVAM
Buddhist and "struggle force"
leaders in Hue and Saigon are con-
tinuing their opposition to the Ky
government, despite the collapse
of rebel armed resistance in Da
Nang.
After government action was
temporarily stalled by confusion
among government commanders: in
Da Nang, Saigon troops on 19 May
began moving in on sectors held
by "struggle" forces. Street
fighting erupted, and gradually be-
came more severe during the next
several days as government tanks
and aircraft were utilized. Armed
resistance in the city finally
collapsed on 23 May with the
surrender of two main pagodas which
had been serving as dissident
command posts.
Although precise casualties
resulting from the action at Da
Nang are not known, antigovernment
elements probably suffered close
to 150 killed and 700 wounded
during the nine days of resistance.
Government forces captured former
a supporter of the antigovernment
movement, this week declared his
loyalty to the Saigon government.
Thus far, however, he has been
unable or unwilling to take any
positive action in the face of the
strong dissident leadership in Hue,
including Buddhist monk Tri Quang
and former I Corps commanders Thi
and Dinh.
The Buddhist leadership in Hue
and Saigon maintained its all-out
opposition to the Ky government this
week through speeches, communiques,
and demonstrations. In Hue, Tri
Quang continued his efforts to
enlist US support. However, as the
Ky government gained momentum
following the Da Nang defeat, there
was increasing criticism of the US
political position in the public
remarks of Quang and other "struggle"
leaders. This resumption of anti-
Americanism, beginning with a
hunger strike before the US Consul-
ate, and culminating in the sacking
and burning of the USIS library
by militant students, has led the
consulate to consider the evacuation
of most US citizens and employees
from the Hue area. 25X1
overnmen ea ers plan to maintain
martial law in Da Nang until an
effective administration--including
a responsible police force--can be
re-established.
They will also apparently
attempt to induce defections among
the rebellious First Division in
northern I Corps before making any
move on the remaining dissident
stronghold of Hue. First Division
commander General Nhuan, formerly
Numerous demonstrations against
the government occurred in Saigon
during the week, but crowd ds-
persal tactics and a cordon around
the Buddhist Institute by government
security forces have prevented any
massive, Buddhist-sponsored spec-
tacle thus far.
Communist Exploitation
Liberation Front propaganda
last week concentrated on
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~__ __
Ai :v9l Ll~`A RY
ui Nhon
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5.a 5 i ~ , x,+om.+,rs
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`"~ SE GRE T =""
encouraging the dissidents to focus
opposition on anti-Americanism
rather than on the more limited
objective of trying to bring down
the Saigon government.
Although the Liberation Front
urged the rebels to continue the
fight and promised to step up its
own attacks on government troops,
no meaningful Viet Cong support
actions materialized in the troubled
area around Da Nang and Hue. The
apparent failure of the Communists
so far to achieve any real success
in exploiting the unrest in I Corps
is probably due in part to their
inability to infiltrate enough
trained political cadres among the
Buddhists or tie military units in
South Vietnam.) -I
Military Activities
Allied and Vietnamese troops
have continued their pressure on
elusive Viet Cong and North Viet-
namese Army units in widespread
sections of South Vietnam, as the
scale and intensity of military
activity has returned to the rela-
tively High levels of mid-March.
Province. After ten days of inter-
mittent fighting, four battalions
of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division
had killed 256 Viet Cong and sus-
tained casualties of 64 killed and
168 wounded.
Northwest of Saigon, six bat -
talions of the US 1st Infantry Di-
vision killed 103 Viet Cong and
captured vast quantities of enemy
supplies and equipment as Operation
WAHIAWA continued in Hau Nghia
Province. Meanwhile, three success-
ful Vietnamese Government search-
and-destroy operations in the delta
provinces of Kien Giang and Go
Cong, and in northern Quang Tri
Province, resulted in combined Com-
munist losses of 250 killed, 34
captured, and 81 weapons seized.
Viet Cong activity during the 25X1
week was highlighted by a series
of battalion-sized or larger at-
tacks against Vietnamese paramili-
tary troops on security patrols
near a government special forces
camp along the Cambodian border
in Binh Long and Pleiku provinces,
and in central coastal Phu Yen
Province. Enemy terrorists were
particularly active southwest of
Saigon, murdering 19 civilian canal
workers and wounding 16 others in
a single action near the capital
of An Giang Province.
Recent heavy contact between
goverment forces and substantial
numbers of Communist troops in
northernmost Quang Tri Province
The major US action of the
week--Operation CRAZY HORSE--was
targeted against large-scale Commu-
nist troop concentrations threaten-
ing a Vietnamese/US Special Forces
camp near the Vinh Thanh Valley,
northeast of An Khe, in Binh Dinh
)indicate
tie possi~resence there of
newly infiltrated forward elements
of the 312th North Vietnamese Divi-
sion. One of the division's three
subordinate infantry regiments--the
S'E CRS; T
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a~~ ~~
SflUT~~ASTERN LAGS
Road
.?????_?- Unusable road
--- Track or trail
141st--has already been confirmed
in Phuoc Long Province.
Supply Movement in Laos
The Communists are continuing
to move substantial numbers of trucks
on key roads in the northern section
of the Laotian infiltration corri-
dor. Between 18 and 22 May,
trained observers reported approxi-
mately 150 trucks traveling south
on Route 911. Farther north, ob-
servers reported both northbound and
southbound truck traffic in the Mu
Gia Pass area between 17 and Z1 May.
Heavy rains and air strikes
halted truck traffic an Route 23
for two weeks in early May, accord-
ing to village informants. The
Benr
Giang
loss of Route 23, however, will have
only a marginal effect an Communist
supply movements since the main bur-
den of north-south traffic in this
area has been assumed by Route 911.
Farther south, the combination
of rain and air strikes also ap-
pears to have disrupted roads in
the panhandle. Recent photography
indicates that Route 92 and its al-
ternate were both cut by landslides
in the vicinity of Ban Bac. Swol-
len rivers have made a vital ford
unusable on the Se Kong River in
the same area. Continued interdic-
tion of this road. could force the
Communists to use porters and
other less efficient means of trans-
port.
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`~ SE G''RE T
POWER STRUGGLE MAY BE UNDER WAY IN CHINA
Signs are growing that China's
leaders may be locked in a behind-
the-scenes power struggle. This is
implied by the mounting sharpness
of attacks on "antiparty elements"
and "right opportunists within the
party,"'`builcling up to a charge on
19 May that these people had been
plotting to seize the leadership
of the party central committee.
Specific charges have so far
been leveled only at a few lesser
officials, all members or former
members of the Peking city party
and government apparatus. They
.include--Teng To, a party secretary,
Liao Mo-sha, a recently dismissed
department head; Li Chi, head of
the propaganda department; and Wu
Han, vice mayor of Peking. Since
15 May the role of the Peking city
party committee itself has been
called into question, increasing
the possibility that its first
secretary and responsible officer,
Peng Chen, is the real target of
this power play.
Peng Chen is a member of Mao's
inner circle of advisers. Neither
Peng nor the second secretary of
the city party committee, Liu Jen,
has been seen in public since 29
March. In fact, Peng is the only
important politburo figure who has
not appeared in recent weeks and
who failed to see the Albanians
during their recent visit.
The authoritative journal Red
Flag. charged on 15 May that par~Ey
ournals published by the Peking
city committee had been serving
as tools of the "antiparty elements"
for years. Red Flag went on to
warn that those who have been ac-
tively supporting these elements--
Tc~ng To, Wu Han, et al.--and
directing Peking party organs to
cover up for them with "sham crit-
icism" will not be able to conceal
themselves much longer. Embroider-
ing this theme, a provincial broad-
cast on 21 May demanded: "What has
the Peking municipal party commit-
tee been doing all this time?"
The official People's Daily .was
even more pointed. It asserted
that someone in the committee
w~~s supporting and protecting
Tang and his friends. "Who and
to what end and with what ambi-
ti.on?" the daily wanted to know.
The attacks have been devel-
oX~ed slowly and with care. They
point unmistakably at Peng but ?
strop short of naming him. This
suiggests -that the attackers are
st:i11 not entirely sure of their
ground or that they want to impli-
cate other men and do not want to
bring Peng down just yet. The cir-
cu~.mstances also suggest that this
is not a case in which a unified
leadership under Mao is purging an
errant comrade. In the past when
Mao has found such a step necessary,
he has moved first and published
afterward.
A power struggle at the level
where Peng operates means a-loss
of effectiveness by Mao Tse-tung,
who in the past has managed to keep
-the top leadership notably stable.
Tt also raises doubts about Liu
Shoo-chi's capacity to move in and
exert leadership as the designated
successor to Mao. Peng had been
counted as one of Liu's main
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- SECRE ~' ~"
Peng Chen (second from left) shares spotlight with Mao Tse-tun g, Cambodia's
Prince Sihanouk, and Liu Shao-chi at ?ctober 1965 9Jational liay celebration.
?eng and his possible rival l eng Hsiao-ping (second and third from left)
conferring with !Jew Zealand 'communist Party leaders on 7 March 196b,
three weeks before Pen g's last public appearance.
supporters within the radical
group which dominates the party
structure.
Teng Hsiao-ping, who ranks
third in Peking's power struc-
ture, is logically the instigator
of these veiled attacks on Pengs
Teng, an old rival of Peng's,
-the powerful general secretary
of the party, is highly ambitious,
and has conducted purges of top
leaders before. If Teng is
behind the attacks and if: they
are successful, Teng mighi, be en- 25X1
couraged to strike out at other
potential competitors, such as
sECR E~T
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SE G1Z11 T
JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY MOUES TOWARD 1V[ORE INDEPENDENCE
Japan's Communist Party is
adopting a more "independent"
line in an attempt to gain do-
mestic support and end the in-
ternational isolation that has
resulted from its close identi-
fication with Peking.
Party publications are
stressing the desirability of
"autonomy and independence." On
11 May the party newspaper Aka-
hata criticized both Peking's
"doctrinairism" and Moscow's
"modern revisionism."
In a recent gesture of in-
dependence, a high-level dele-
gation led by Secretary General
Miyambto apparently told the
Chinese that the JCP supported
the Soviet proposal for united
actions by-all anti-imperialist
forces against US "imperialism"
in Vietnam. As a result, no
joint communique came out of the
several-weeks' talks in Peking.
Although the JCP followed Peking
in boycotting the 23rd Soviet
party congress,;:Miyarnot'o returned to
Japan still calling for the
"solidarity of all socialist na-
tions" in Vietnam.
The JCP is also showing a
new interest in the Communist
parties of Eastern Europe, par-
ticularly now in Rumania, where
a party delegation has arrived
for an extended goodwill visit.
The Japanese may join the Ruma-
nians in calling for greater
autonomy for national parties
within the international Commu-
nist movement. Lately, the JCP
has stressed the example set by
Rumania, North Korea, and Cuba
in standing up to one or both
of the two major Communist powers
and asserting their national in-
dependence.
There are indications that
the Japanese .Communists will
expand their role in interna-
tional fronts not controlled by
Peking, while dropping out of--
or being excluded from--those
where Peking calls the tune.
Recent difficulties with Moscow,
however, plus painful memories
of Soviet dictation to the party
in the 1950s, militate against
a rapprochement- with the Soviet
party. The JCP will probably
remain on most matters closer
to Peking ideologically.
tion with the JCP.
The new line may well in-
crease the JCP's presently cir-
cumscribed influence in Japanese
politics. A new "Japanese look"
will aid it in working through
broad popular movements and in
joint action with other polit-
ical parties, where it can
exert meaningful influence.
Peking, on the other hand, may
now work with receptive ele-
ments in the Socialist and rul-
ing Liberal Democratic parties, 25X1
which might net it greater gains
than were available in associa-
SE CR.~; T
WEEKLY SUtYIMARY 27 May 66
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+.7.C:r i.,~r~~i j
INDt)NESIA A(~D NiI~LA`~SIA PLA(~ PEASE T1~LKS
Malaysian Deputy .Prime Minis-
ter Razak and Indonesian foreign
Minister Malik are slated to meet
in Bangkok in the next few days
for official talks aimed at end-
ing confrontation.
In recent weeks Malik and
other Indonesian leaders have pub-
licly declared their firm inten-
tion to put an end to the three-
year-old paramilitary campaign,
On 23 May, Radio Indonesia an-
nounced that President Sukarno,.
who has been urging the continua-
tion of confrontation, had
"agreed" to the peace talks.
At Bangkok, Malik will re-
portedly abandon Indonesia's oft-
stated demand for a reascertain-
ment of public opinion in Malay-
sian Borneo. In order to reach
a settlement, however, he will
still need some "face-saving" de-
vice and the Bangkok talks will
provide a test of Indonesian
eagerness for a formal settlement
and Malaysian flexibility.
On the domestic front, plan-
ning is again under way for an
early convening of the Provisional
People's Consultative Assembly
(MPRS)--Indonesia's "policy deter-
mining body." An earlier sched-
uled 12 May meeting of the body
was indefinitely postponed in the
face of opposition from Sukarno,
Responding to strong student
agitation, the Indonesian Parlia-
ment on 23 May recommended. to
President Sukarno that the MPRS
be convened on 1 .Tune. In a pub-
lic statement the same day Gen-
eral Suharto stated that the
MPRS would meet "sometime" in
June,. The regime hopes to use
the session to discredit Sukarno
further and possibly to rescind
his life-time term of office.
Peking is attempting fro make
propaganda capital out of the
continuing anti-Chinese atmos-
phere in Indonesia. Lurid atroc-
ity stories are being given wide
dissemination and "indignation
rallies" have been held in a
half-dozen Chinese cities. To
discredit the new anti-Communist
government in Djakarta and im-
prove China's image among Chinese
in Southeast Asia, Peking also
appears to be making preparations
to repatriate some Overseas Chi-
nese from Indonesia. In a note
on l8 May, Peking announced it
would send ships to Indonesia
in "the near future" and proposed
immediate bilateral talks to
work out detailed repatriation
arrangements..
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`'~ SEC'.RE T
Europe
USSR PUSHES INTERNATIONAL FISHING OPERAT[ONS
The USSR has indicated that
it intends to continue vigorous
expansion of its world-wide com-
merical fishing activity. This
has met with protests from free
world countries whose tradi-
tional fishing grounds have been
penetrated by the increasingly
mobile Soviet fishing fleets.
The USSR has announced
that, during the next five years,
it plans an increase of at least
50 percent in the catch from its
ocean fleet operations--which in
1965 accounted for 80 percent of
the 5.7-million-ton total Soviet
catch. The Soviets have turned
aside protests--lodged recently
Soviet Fishing Operations
URUGUAY
by the US fishing industry and
by the governments of Ecuador,
Peru, Chile, and Argentina--and
have stated that they intend to
exploit fishing grounds outside
territorial waters. Soviet re-
search ships are actively seek-
ing to determine which grounds
are most promising.
In the past few years the
USSR has already expanded its
fishing operations to far-flung
grounds in the western hemi-
sphere, the Indian Ocean, and
other African waters. These
operations frequently have been
assisted by agreements to es-
tablish fishing fleets, ports,
uaR
SENEGAL .YEMEN
/~/ GUIN Ei,
/~~ GHANA
SOMALI
-.- ~_ TANZANIA _
f
? Country receiving Soviet aid for fish+pg f~cili#ies
Country offered Soraistance by attacking the pal-
acE~, the traditional seat of the
Oposition to Obote on the
part of Bagandan and other po-
litical leaders was vocal but
ineffective. Obote cleverly
played upon anti-Buganda feeling
throughout most other areas of
the country, while he sought
with the support of the police
and army to strengthen his re-
gime.
Bagandan opposition began
to intensify in early May.
Mutesa appealed to both the UK
and the UN to help right the
wrongs perpetrated by Obote. In
mid-May the Buganda parliament
gave Obote an ultimatum to remove
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Buganda government and prolonged
distux-banees in Buganda are
likely to result. Any action
that Obotc may now take against
the Kabaka will probably increase
rather than diminish Bagandan
resistance to the central govern-
ment. Kampala is already iso-
lated, and the Bagandans will
probably continue to sabotage
communications and all essential
services.
It appears unlikely that
the Bagandan dissidents, who are
virtually unarmed, can defeat the
well-armed government security
forces. However, they are prob-
ably able to harass government
forces sufficiently to make con-
trol of the area difficult for
the central government, Prolonged
instability may also encourage
other moderate political opponents
of Obote, who have heretofore ac-
cepted his take-over, to work
against him, At present, however,
there are no indications of any
support for Buganda elsewhere in
Uganda,
SYRIA REGIME SEEKING CLOSER TIES WITH ARAB "PROGRESSIVES"
The radical Baathist mili-
tary regime in Syria has embarked
on a series of efforts to build
closer ties with ether "progres-
sive" Arab governments.
A Syrian economic delega-
tion is now in Cairo to negotiate
a trade and payments agreement
with the Egyptian Government, the
first such talks since the Syrian
breakaway from the United Arab
Republic in 1961. In contrast
to stridently anti-Egyptian at-
titudes of past Baathist govern-
ments in Damaseus, the present
one is giving its new contacts
with Cairo prominent press cover-
age.
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister
Makhus is visiting Algiers to
discuss the improvement of 5yrian-
Algerian relations, which have
been cool under previous Syrian
regimes .
Chief of State Nur al-Din
Atasi announced in a speech on
23 February that the regime is
attempting to contact all pro-
gressive forces, on the domestic
front as well as in other Arab
nati
Moscow, in a new effort to
increase its awn influence among
the radical Arab states, has en-
couraged the regime to broaden
its inter -Arab ties and has given
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SEC'RE T "~
wide publicity to the current
Syrian policy. It is still un-
certain, however, whether Egypt's
President Nasir will relinquish
his long-standing hostility to
the rival Baathist movement and
respond to the Syrians' enthusiasm
for a meaningful rapprochement.
IRAQI POWER GROUPS DISSATISFIED WITH PRIME MINISTER
Iraqi Prime Minister Bazzaz
is still clinging to his posi-
tion despite the open dissatis-
faction of rival power factions.
The war against the Kurds con-
tinues unabated.
Fighting in the frontier
rE?gion has led to strained re-
l~~tions with Iran, which is sup-
porting the Kurds against the
Iraqi Government. According to
press reports, Iraqi planes this
week bombed and heavily damaged
ari Iranian village. Iranian
ar.~tiaircraft batteries subse-
qu~.ently opened fire on Iraqi
fighters violating Iranian air-
s~~ace .
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`~ S'ECRE'T
Western Hemisphere
DOMINICAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN NEARS END
The outcome of the 1 June elec-
tions in the Dominican Republic re-
mains uncertain. Joaquin Balaguer's
campaign has picked up and many ob-
servers feel a last-minute surge
in his favor has brought him at
least even with Juan Bosch. The
outcome may well depend on such
imponderables as the weather, which
could prevent many pro-Balaguer
rural voters from reaching the polls.
On the whole the campaign has been
rather dull and neither candidate
has seemed to generate great enthu-
siasm except among hard-core back-
ers.
Balaguer's energetic stumping
throughout the country during re-
cent weeks has given the campaign
of his Reformist Party (PR) a boost.
He has sought to reinforce his image
as a candidate of moderation who will
place primary emphasis on restoring.
law and order. He cited the April
1965 revolt, which he called "es-
sentially negative," as proof of
the futility of all violence.
In addition to the emphasis on
stability, Balaguer `s campaign
speeches have contained grandiose
promises of benefits to the rural
peasant and urban poor. In each
town he has visited Balaguer has
promised ptablic works to benefit
the locality.
Balaguer's entourage has
stepped up its attempts to link
Bosch with Communism. Last week
Balaguer's running mate said Bosch's
election would lead to a repetition
of the Cuban experience in the Do-
minican Republic.
Balaguer has continued his re-
fusal to make a deal with "third
force" presidential candidate Ra-25X1
fael Bonnelly and has succeeded
in wooing Bonnell su orters to
his candidac .
~~ Other Bonnelly-supporters
h~.ave already announced their
switch in allegiance. Bonnelly
may still announce his withdrawal
from the race at-the last minute.
Bosch continues to proclaim
the imminent victory of his party
but other statements suggest his
c,onf idence maybe shaky . He
seems to be laying the groundwork
f'or a possible refusal to accept
defeat by claiming his supporters
a~,re being subjected to bribery
a~.nd intimidation.
Sporadic campaign skirmishes
between opposing political fac-
tions continue to occur. The most
~~erious was what PR members claim
was an ambush of Balaguer`s cam-
Iaaign caravan in the eastern town
of La Romano on 19 May. Political
passions will probably heat up
during the last-days of the cam-
~~aign and some scattered inci-
dents are likely to take place on
Election day. Nevertheless, the
elections should be reasonably
i'ree of fraud and violence-since
I~rovisional President Garcia
C~adoy, top ranking security force
commanders, and the Central Elec-
i;ion-Board are determined to make
i.t so.
~,~'E ~'l~~L~; T
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~.~ CAE T
~Vho-ever the victor, the new
president will not have easy go-
ing. If Bosch wins, he will
face continued hostility of sub-
stantial se-gments of the mili-
tary and right-wing civilians.
Balaguer will be confronted by
opposition of at least the ex-
tremists of the left wing if the
victory is his, Either candi-
date will have to face social,
political, and economic prob-
1-ems so intractable that sig-
nificant progress toward their
solution over the next year or
two will be extremely difficult
POLITICAL CONFLICT CASES OUSTER OF BRAZILIAN ARMY COMMANDER
General Justino Alves Bastos
was relieved of command of Bra-
zil's Third Army on 19 May ap-
parently because of an intemper-
ate public speech in Pvrto Alegre
an 17 May in which he strongly
criticized President Castello
Branco's policies. In his speech,
Alves Bastos appealed to the press
to fight against establishment
of a dictatorship of the right
now that the danger of a dicta-
torship of the left had been
eliminated. He called the elec-
toral domicile law a "monstros-
ity" and severely criticized the
government's economic and finan-
cial policies.
Alves Bastos' frequently
expressed desire to be governor
of Rio Grande do Sul has been
frustrated by the domicile law,
which requires a candidate to
have been a state resident for
at least two years. Both Alves
Bastos and Se-cond Army commander
General Amaury Kruel, who has
aspired to be governor of Sao
Paulo, have been pressing the
government to change the law,
Both generals had important roles
in the overthrow of the Goulart
regime in 1964.
General Kruel, although he
has denied supporting Alves Bas-
tos, has been closely associated
with his position.
Bastos has been replaced
by General Orlando Geisel, the
army's chief of personnel, a
competent officer who will prob-
ably reduce the Third Army's
involvement in southern Brazil-
ian polities. The smoothness
with which the change of com-
mand was carried out indicates
that neither the move against
Bastos nor one against Krue1
will affect stability. .The po-
litical aspirations of bath arE
widely known, and it is not
probable that either has signif-
icant military backing for his
ambitions,
27 May 66
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COMMUN l ST EFFORTS TO UNIFY UF,UGUAYAN -LABOR MOVEMENT
Unless economic conditions
improve or effective opposition
to Communist initiatives devel-
ops, the Uruguayan Communist
Party (PCU) is likely soon to
organize and control a unified
Uruguayan labor confederation.
On 21 May the heavily Com-
munist-influenced Center of Uru-
guayan Workers concluded a five-
day congress, with representa-
tives in attendance from most na-
tional and many international
labor organizations. The con-
gress, trading on genuine worker
grievances and widespread na=
ivete' concerning Communist in-
tentions and capabilities, re-
ceived support from independent
unions as well. It planned
strategy for "future struggles"
to solve Uruguay's recurrent
economic crises and called for
creation of a unified labor move-
ment.. Communist domination of
this key sector would increase
the danger of crippling strikes
and labor agitation and pose a
long-range threat to national
stability.
Most non-Communist labor
leaders are committed to unify-
ing the labor movement and ap-
parently hope that a confedera-
tion can be kept from falling
under PCU domination.. There is
little to prevent this, however,
because only the PCU appears
able to guide and manipulate
such a federation and is plainly
determined to do so. Leadership
of the prodemocratic unions is
scarce, divided, and self-seeking.
Although most Uruguayan
workers traditionally vote for
one of the two large democratic
political parties, there. has
bE~en a continuing turn toward
Communists or pro-Communists
f~~r labor leadership because
they produce results. The PCU
a:Lready controls Uruguay's two
l;~rgest labor federations, but
h;~,s newer been able to trans-
l;~,te this control into votes.
T'he Communists have, however,
apparently managed to secure
enough signatures to put their
constitutional reform project
for reorganizing the national
government on November's? ballot.
Recent successes in union
elections indicate-that the
Communist Party is gaining
strength at the expense of non-
communists. Tlie PCU has con-
centrated-its efforts- on key
unions, such as those represent-
ing transport and government
employees, which it has used to
paralyze government and private
economic activity with strikes.
Communist and pro-Communist
labor leaders have astutely ex-
ploited the worker's feeling
that he is bearing the brunt of
the government's attempts to
stabilize the economy. This ap-
proach may be even more success-
ful if a recently concluded
=standby agreement with the In-
ternational Monetary Fund re-
=~ults in a further decline in
consumer purchasing power.
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~~ ~~~
ECUADOR'S VELASCO RETURNS TO POL[T[CAL SCENE
Former Ecuadorean president
Velasco returned to Guayaquil from
exile on 24 May and, despite minor
opposition demonstrations, spoke
with vigor to a small crowd esti-
mated at 7,000. He depreciated
the Communist threat and-told his
audience that a fifth presidential
term for him would cure all the
nation's ills. Velasco was fol-
lowed on the platform by his ex-
tremist henchman, Manuel Aratijo
Hidalgo, who demanded a revolu-
tion "even if we are described as
Communists," and concluded by ask-
ing interim President Yerovi to
step down in favor of Velasco.
To thwart Velasco, the gov-
ernmen-t has approved the armed
forces" new antisubversion plan,
but the military have yet to evi-
dence a firm plan to oppose Velasco
openly if he should try to grab
power with mob support.
Velasco may attempt to gain
office legally by agitating for
direct election of the next presi-
dent. The government has issued
a call for the convening of a
constituent assembly on 3 November
to which Yerovi would deliver
power. Most politicians favor
having the assembly name the next
president in order to frustrate
Velasco's hope of a popular elec-
toral triumph.
The course Velasco takes
should become clearer after the
28 May convention, since by then
he presumably will have assessed
the extent of his support among
the masses and the military.
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