WEEKLY SUMMARY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
34
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 27, 2008
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 27, 1966
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1.pdf2.07 MB
Body: 
WEEKLY CE1`~TRAL Ii~ITELLIG~I`4ICE A~EIVC~Y SECRET GRQUP t Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassificatian! Approved For Release 2008/05/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 DIRECTORATE OF fNT'ELLIGENCE 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 SECR~; T ~ (Information as of noon EDT, 26 May-1966) .Page VIETNAM Buddhist and "struggle force" leaders in Hue and Saigon are continuing to denounce both the US and the Ky government, despite the collapse,. of rebel resistance in Da Nang. Communist propaganda is en- couraging the dissidents to focus opposition on a-nti- Americanism rather than on the more limited objective of bringing-down the Saigon go~,~ernment. Government. troops, meanwhile, have maintained pressure on elusive Communist units in widespread sections of -South Viet-.. nam, and the scale of military activity has returned= to the relatively high levels of mid-March. The Com- munists continue to move substantial numbers. of trucks on key roads in the Laotian infiltration cor- ridor. POWER STRUGGLE MAY BE UNDER WAY IN .CHINA The trend of recent propaganda attacks suggests that Peng Chen, a member of the inner circle of Mao~s advisers, may be the target of this power play. JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TOWARD MORE INDEPENDENCE 7 It hopes to gain domestic support and end the in- ternational isolation that has resulted from its close identification with Pel~irag. INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA PLAN PEACE TALKS Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Razak and.Indonesian Foreign Minister .Malik are slated to meet. in Bangkok. in the next few days for offic3:a1 ta~.ks aimed at ending confrontation. Europe USSR PUSHES INTERNATIONAL FISHING ~~PERATIONS Moscow?s. worZcLwide fishing. operations have met with new protests from free world countries whose tra- ditional fishing grounds have roeen increasingly penetrated by the highly mobile Soviet fleets. SECRET 27 May.- 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 ~~~~~ EFFECTS OF US INITIATIVES ON EASTERIi EUROPEAN REGIMES Divided counsels and internal conflict are becoming evident in nearly all the regimes on how to respond to US "bridge-building" initiatives, suggesting that any responses forthcoming will be gradual and limited to the economic field. WARSAW PACT'S 11TH ANNIVERSARY SHOWS UNITY IN DIVERSITY 12 Despite Rumania's efforts to reduce the authority of the Warsaw Pact over its members, most other Eastern European countries have restated their support of it. There are, however, indications that many of them might welcome a re-examination of intrapact relationships.. NATO CRISIS: UNSETTLED ISSUE OF FRENCH TROOPS IN GERMANY 13 De Gazelle's curt and peremptory response to Bonn's aide-memoirs on conditions under which France may keep troops in Germany evidently paves the way far exploratory talks on this contentious issue in the NATO crisis . NEW DISORDERS OVER LINGUISTIC ISSUE IN BELGIUM The latest flare-up in the long-smoldering controversy between Flemish- and French-speaking Belgians was caused by efforts by the Flemings tca bar the French language from Louvain University. RAILWA Y DISPUTE MAY COMPLICATE RHODESIAN SITUATION The current railway dispute between Zambia and Rhodesia has at least temporarily deprived Zambia of transportation for most of its foreign trade. It also complicates Britain's efforts to reach a peace- ful settlement of the Rhodesian rebellion. NIGERIA MOVES TOWARD UNITARY GOVERNMENT General Ironsi this week abolished political parties, unified the civil service, and dissolved the Nigerian federation, the strongest moves pet taken toward a unitary government. Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY ~7 May 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 SECRL~ T `` UGANDAN CRISIS PRESAGES CONTINUING INSTABILITY Ugandan President Obote~s attempt to bring th.e rich Buganda region under central g~wernment control has erupted in violence. Prolonged instability may re- suit. SYRIA REGIME SEEKING CLOSER TIES WITH ARAB "PROGRESSIVES" The Baathist government is engaged in talks with Egypt and Algeria a.nd claims it also intends to con- tact "progressive"--presumably Communist--elements..: within Syria. IRAQI POWER GROUPS DISSATISFIED WITH PRIME MINISTER Prime Minister Bazzaz is still hanging on, largely because rival factions seem unable to act Western Hemisphere DOMINICAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN NEAJRS END The outcome of the 1 June election remains uncertain and may in the end depend on su~~h imponderables as the weather, which could keep riural voters from the polls. Many observers feel, however, that Joaquin Balaguer may at least have caught up with Juan Bosch. SEC'RE ~~' Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 May 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 ~~~~~ POLITICAL CONFLICfi GAUSES pUSTER OF BRAZILIAN ARMY COMMANDER 24 General Alves Bastos was relieved of command of the Third Army apparently because of a recent speech in which he strongly criticized. administration policies. COIdMUNIST EFFORTS TO UNIFY URUGUAYAN LABOR MOVEMEi~T 25 The Uruguayan Communist Party is likely soon to or- ganize and control a unified Labor confederation. There is no effective opposition to the Communist ef- forts, which are also aided by worker discontent over economic conditions. ECUADOR'S PELA5C0 RETURNS TO POLITICAL SCENE The four-time president is testing the waters in prep- sratio nfor $ passible drive to replace interim President Yerovi--whether by legal means ar not re- mains uncertain... ~~~~~~ page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 2? May X66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 `'`~ SE CRE T V1'fTIVAM Buddhist and "struggle force" leaders in Hue and Saigon are con- tinuing their opposition to the Ky government, despite the collapse of rebel armed resistance in Da Nang. After government action was temporarily stalled by confusion among government commanders: in Da Nang, Saigon troops on 19 May began moving in on sectors held by "struggle" forces. Street fighting erupted, and gradually be- came more severe during the next several days as government tanks and aircraft were utilized. Armed resistance in the city finally collapsed on 23 May with the surrender of two main pagodas which had been serving as dissident command posts. Although precise casualties resulting from the action at Da Nang are not known, antigovernment elements probably suffered close to 150 killed and 700 wounded during the nine days of resistance. Government forces captured former a supporter of the antigovernment movement, this week declared his loyalty to the Saigon government. Thus far, however, he has been unable or unwilling to take any positive action in the face of the strong dissident leadership in Hue, including Buddhist monk Tri Quang and former I Corps commanders Thi and Dinh. The Buddhist leadership in Hue and Saigon maintained its all-out opposition to the Ky government this week through speeches, communiques, and demonstrations. In Hue, Tri Quang continued his efforts to enlist US support. However, as the Ky government gained momentum following the Da Nang defeat, there was increasing criticism of the US political position in the public remarks of Quang and other "struggle" leaders. This resumption of anti- Americanism, beginning with a hunger strike before the US Consul- ate, and culminating in the sacking and burning of the USIS library by militant students, has led the consulate to consider the evacuation of most US citizens and employees from the Hue area. 25X1 overnmen ea ers plan to maintain martial law in Da Nang until an effective administration--including a responsible police force--can be re-established. They will also apparently attempt to induce defections among the rebellious First Division in northern I Corps before making any move on the remaining dissident stronghold of Hue. First Division commander General Nhuan, formerly Numerous demonstrations against the government occurred in Saigon during the week, but crowd ds- persal tactics and a cordon around the Buddhist Institute by government security forces have prevented any massive, Buddhist-sponsored spec- tacle thus far. Communist Exploitation Liberation Front propaganda last week concentrated on SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SIUMMARY 27 May 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 ~__ __ Ai :v9l Ll~`A RY ui Nhon n ~ 7s i 5.a 5 i ~ , x,+om.+,rs Approved For Release 2008/05/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 `"~ SE GRE T ="" encouraging the dissidents to focus opposition on anti-Americanism rather than on the more limited objective of trying to bring down the Saigon government. Although the Liberation Front urged the rebels to continue the fight and promised to step up its own attacks on government troops, no meaningful Viet Cong support actions materialized in the troubled area around Da Nang and Hue. The apparent failure of the Communists so far to achieve any real success in exploiting the unrest in I Corps is probably due in part to their inability to infiltrate enough trained political cadres among the Buddhists or tie military units in South Vietnam.) -I Military Activities Allied and Vietnamese troops have continued their pressure on elusive Viet Cong and North Viet- namese Army units in widespread sections of South Vietnam, as the scale and intensity of military activity has returned to the rela- tively High levels of mid-March. Province. After ten days of inter- mittent fighting, four battalions of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division had killed 256 Viet Cong and sus- tained casualties of 64 killed and 168 wounded. Northwest of Saigon, six bat - talions of the US 1st Infantry Di- vision killed 103 Viet Cong and captured vast quantities of enemy supplies and equipment as Operation WAHIAWA continued in Hau Nghia Province. Meanwhile, three success- ful Vietnamese Government search- and-destroy operations in the delta provinces of Kien Giang and Go Cong, and in northern Quang Tri Province, resulted in combined Com- munist losses of 250 killed, 34 captured, and 81 weapons seized. Viet Cong activity during the 25X1 week was highlighted by a series of battalion-sized or larger at- tacks against Vietnamese paramili- tary troops on security patrols near a government special forces camp along the Cambodian border in Binh Long and Pleiku provinces, and in central coastal Phu Yen Province. Enemy terrorists were particularly active southwest of Saigon, murdering 19 civilian canal workers and wounding 16 others in a single action near the capital of An Giang Province. Recent heavy contact between goverment forces and substantial numbers of Communist troops in northernmost Quang Tri Province The major US action of the week--Operation CRAZY HORSE--was targeted against large-scale Commu- nist troop concentrations threaten- ing a Vietnamese/US Special Forces camp near the Vinh Thanh Valley, northeast of An Khe, in Binh Dinh )indicate tie possi~resence there of newly infiltrated forward elements of the 312th North Vietnamese Divi- sion. One of the division's three subordinate infantry regiments--the S'E CRS; T Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 May 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 a~~ ~~ SflUT~~ASTERN LAGS Road .?????_?- Unusable road --- Track or trail 141st--has already been confirmed in Phuoc Long Province. Supply Movement in Laos The Communists are continuing to move substantial numbers of trucks on key roads in the northern section of the Laotian infiltration corri- dor. Between 18 and 22 May, trained observers reported approxi- mately 150 trucks traveling south on Route 911. Farther north, ob- servers reported both northbound and southbound truck traffic in the Mu Gia Pass area between 17 and Z1 May. Heavy rains and air strikes halted truck traffic an Route 23 for two weeks in early May, accord- ing to village informants. The Benr Giang loss of Route 23, however, will have only a marginal effect an Communist supply movements since the main bur- den of north-south traffic in this area has been assumed by Route 911. Farther south, the combination of rain and air strikes also ap- pears to have disrupted roads in the panhandle. Recent photography indicates that Route 92 and its al- ternate were both cut by landslides in the vicinity of Ban Bac. Swol- len rivers have made a vital ford unusable on the Se Kong River in the same area. Continued interdic- tion of this road. could force the Communists to use porters and other less efficient means of trans- port. Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 May 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 `~ SE G''RE T POWER STRUGGLE MAY BE UNDER WAY IN CHINA Signs are growing that China's leaders may be locked in a behind- the-scenes power struggle. This is implied by the mounting sharpness of attacks on "antiparty elements" and "right opportunists within the party,"'`builcling up to a charge on 19 May that these people had been plotting to seize the leadership of the party central committee. Specific charges have so far been leveled only at a few lesser officials, all members or former members of the Peking city party and government apparatus. They .include--Teng To, a party secretary, Liao Mo-sha, a recently dismissed department head; Li Chi, head of the propaganda department; and Wu Han, vice mayor of Peking. Since 15 May the role of the Peking city party committee itself has been called into question, increasing the possibility that its first secretary and responsible officer, Peng Chen, is the real target of this power play. Peng Chen is a member of Mao's inner circle of advisers. Neither Peng nor the second secretary of the city party committee, Liu Jen, has been seen in public since 29 March. In fact, Peng is the only important politburo figure who has not appeared in recent weeks and who failed to see the Albanians during their recent visit. The authoritative journal Red Flag. charged on 15 May that par~Ey ournals published by the Peking city committee had been serving as tools of the "antiparty elements" for years. Red Flag went on to warn that those who have been ac- tively supporting these elements-- Tc~ng To, Wu Han, et al.--and directing Peking party organs to cover up for them with "sham crit- icism" will not be able to conceal themselves much longer. Embroider- ing this theme, a provincial broad- cast on 21 May demanded: "What has the Peking municipal party commit- tee been doing all this time?" The official People's Daily .was even more pointed. It asserted that someone in the committee w~~s supporting and protecting Tang and his friends. "Who and to what end and with what ambi- ti.on?" the daily wanted to know. The attacks have been devel- oX~ed slowly and with care. They point unmistakably at Peng but ? strop short of naming him. This suiggests -that the attackers are st:i11 not entirely sure of their ground or that they want to impli- cate other men and do not want to bring Peng down just yet. The cir- cu~.mstances also suggest that this is not a case in which a unified leadership under Mao is purging an errant comrade. In the past when Mao has found such a step necessary, he has moved first and published afterward. A power struggle at the level where Peng operates means a-loss of effectiveness by Mao Tse-tung, who in the past has managed to keep -the top leadership notably stable. Tt also raises doubts about Liu Shoo-chi's capacity to move in and exert leadership as the designated successor to Mao. Peng had been counted as one of Liu's main S`E CRE T 27 May 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 - SECRE ~' ~" Peng Chen (second from left) shares spotlight with Mao Tse-tun g, Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk, and Liu Shao-chi at ?ctober 1965 9Jational liay celebration. ?eng and his possible rival l eng Hsiao-ping (second and third from left) conferring with !Jew Zealand 'communist Party leaders on 7 March 196b, three weeks before Pen g's last public appearance. supporters within the radical group which dominates the party structure. Teng Hsiao-ping, who ranks third in Peking's power struc- ture, is logically the instigator of these veiled attacks on Pengs Teng, an old rival of Peng's, -the powerful general secretary of the party, is highly ambitious, and has conducted purges of top leaders before. If Teng is behind the attacks and if: they are successful, Teng mighi, be en- 25X1 couraged to strike out at other potential competitors, such as sECR E~T Page 6 WEEKLY SUMB4ARY 27 May 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 SE G1Z11 T JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY MOUES TOWARD 1V[ORE INDEPENDENCE Japan's Communist Party is adopting a more "independent" line in an attempt to gain do- mestic support and end the in- ternational isolation that has resulted from its close identi- fication with Peking. Party publications are stressing the desirability of "autonomy and independence." On 11 May the party newspaper Aka- hata criticized both Peking's "doctrinairism" and Moscow's "modern revisionism." In a recent gesture of in- dependence, a high-level dele- gation led by Secretary General Miyambto apparently told the Chinese that the JCP supported the Soviet proposal for united actions by-all anti-imperialist forces against US "imperialism" in Vietnam. As a result, no joint communique came out of the several-weeks' talks in Peking. Although the JCP followed Peking in boycotting the 23rd Soviet party congress,;:Miyarnot'o returned to Japan still calling for the "solidarity of all socialist na- tions" in Vietnam. The JCP is also showing a new interest in the Communist parties of Eastern Europe, par- ticularly now in Rumania, where a party delegation has arrived for an extended goodwill visit. The Japanese may join the Ruma- nians in calling for greater autonomy for national parties within the international Commu- nist movement. Lately, the JCP has stressed the example set by Rumania, North Korea, and Cuba in standing up to one or both of the two major Communist powers and asserting their national in- dependence. There are indications that the Japanese .Communists will expand their role in interna- tional fronts not controlled by Peking, while dropping out of-- or being excluded from--those where Peking calls the tune. Recent difficulties with Moscow, however, plus painful memories of Soviet dictation to the party in the 1950s, militate against a rapprochement- with the Soviet party. The JCP will probably remain on most matters closer to Peking ideologically. tion with the JCP. The new line may well in- crease the JCP's presently cir- cumscribed influence in Japanese politics. A new "Japanese look" will aid it in working through broad popular movements and in joint action with other polit- ical parties, where it can exert meaningful influence. Peking, on the other hand, may now work with receptive ele- ments in the Socialist and rul- ing Liberal Democratic parties, 25X1 which might net it greater gains than were available in associa- SE CR.~; T WEEKLY SUtYIMARY 27 May 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release ~2r0~r0,~8/~0t5/27 : rC~IA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 +.7.C:r i.,~r~~i j INDt)NESIA A(~D NiI~LA`~SIA PLA(~ PEASE T1~LKS Malaysian Deputy .Prime Minis- ter Razak and Indonesian foreign Minister Malik are slated to meet in Bangkok in the next few days for official talks aimed at end- ing confrontation. In recent weeks Malik and other Indonesian leaders have pub- licly declared their firm inten- tion to put an end to the three- year-old paramilitary campaign, On 23 May, Radio Indonesia an- nounced that President Sukarno,. who has been urging the continua- tion of confrontation, had "agreed" to the peace talks. At Bangkok, Malik will re- portedly abandon Indonesia's oft- stated demand for a reascertain- ment of public opinion in Malay- sian Borneo. In order to reach a settlement, however, he will still need some "face-saving" de- vice and the Bangkok talks will provide a test of Indonesian eagerness for a formal settlement and Malaysian flexibility. On the domestic front, plan- ning is again under way for an early convening of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS)--Indonesia's "policy deter- mining body." An earlier sched- uled 12 May meeting of the body was indefinitely postponed in the face of opposition from Sukarno, Responding to strong student agitation, the Indonesian Parlia- ment on 23 May recommended. to President Sukarno that the MPRS be convened on 1 .Tune. In a pub- lic statement the same day Gen- eral Suharto stated that the MPRS would meet "sometime" in June,. The regime hopes to use the session to discredit Sukarno further and possibly to rescind his life-time term of office. Peking is attempting fro make propaganda capital out of the continuing anti-Chinese atmos- phere in Indonesia. Lurid atroc- ity stories are being given wide dissemination and "indignation rallies" have been held in a half-dozen Chinese cities. To discredit the new anti-Communist government in Djakarta and im- prove China's image among Chinese in Southeast Asia, Peking also appears to be making preparations to repatriate some Overseas Chi- nese from Indonesia. In a note on l8 May, Peking announced it would send ships to Indonesia in "the near future" and proposed immediate bilateral talks to work out detailed repatriation arrangements.. Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 `'~ SEC'.RE T Europe USSR PUSHES INTERNATIONAL FISHING OPERAT[ONS The USSR has indicated that it intends to continue vigorous expansion of its world-wide com- merical fishing activity. This has met with protests from free world countries whose tradi- tional fishing grounds have been penetrated by the increasingly mobile Soviet fishing fleets. The USSR has announced that, during the next five years, it plans an increase of at least 50 percent in the catch from its ocean fleet operations--which in 1965 accounted for 80 percent of the 5.7-million-ton total Soviet catch. The Soviets have turned aside protests--lodged recently Soviet Fishing Operations URUGUAY by the US fishing industry and by the governments of Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Argentina--and have stated that they intend to exploit fishing grounds outside territorial waters. Soviet re- search ships are actively seek- ing to determine which grounds are most promising. In the past few years the USSR has already expanded its fishing operations to far-flung grounds in the western hemi- sphere, the Indian Ocean, and other African waters. These operations frequently have been assisted by agreements to es- tablish fishing fleets, ports, uaR SENEGAL .YEMEN /~/ GUIN Ei, /~~ GHANA SOMALI -.- ~_ TANZANIA _ f ? Country receiving Soviet aid for fish+pg f~cili#ies Country offered Soraistance by attacking the pal- acE~, the traditional seat of the Oposition to Obote on the part of Bagandan and other po- litical leaders was vocal but ineffective. Obote cleverly played upon anti-Buganda feeling throughout most other areas of the country, while he sought with the support of the police and army to strengthen his re- gime. Bagandan opposition began to intensify in early May. Mutesa appealed to both the UK and the UN to help right the wrongs perpetrated by Obote. In mid-May the Buganda parliament gave Obote an ultimatum to remove SECRET 27 May 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Buganda government and prolonged distux-banees in Buganda are likely to result. Any action that Obotc may now take against the Kabaka will probably increase rather than diminish Bagandan resistance to the central govern- ment. Kampala is already iso- lated, and the Bagandans will probably continue to sabotage communications and all essential services. It appears unlikely that the Bagandan dissidents, who are virtually unarmed, can defeat the well-armed government security forces. However, they are prob- ably able to harass government forces sufficiently to make con- trol of the area difficult for the central government, Prolonged instability may also encourage other moderate political opponents of Obote, who have heretofore ac- cepted his take-over, to work against him, At present, however, there are no indications of any support for Buganda elsewhere in Uganda, SYRIA REGIME SEEKING CLOSER TIES WITH ARAB "PROGRESSIVES" The radical Baathist mili- tary regime in Syria has embarked on a series of efforts to build closer ties with ether "progres- sive" Arab governments. A Syrian economic delega- tion is now in Cairo to negotiate a trade and payments agreement with the Egyptian Government, the first such talks since the Syrian breakaway from the United Arab Republic in 1961. In contrast to stridently anti-Egyptian at- titudes of past Baathist govern- ments in Damaseus, the present one is giving its new contacts with Cairo prominent press cover- age. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Makhus is visiting Algiers to discuss the improvement of 5yrian- Algerian relations, which have been cool under previous Syrian regimes . Chief of State Nur al-Din Atasi announced in a speech on 23 February that the regime is attempting to contact all pro- gressive forces, on the domestic front as well as in other Arab nati Moscow, in a new effort to increase its awn influence among the radical Arab states, has en- couraged the regime to broaden its inter -Arab ties and has given Page `LO WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 liay 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 SEC'RE T "~ wide publicity to the current Syrian policy. It is still un- certain, however, whether Egypt's President Nasir will relinquish his long-standing hostility to the rival Baathist movement and respond to the Syrians' enthusiasm for a meaningful rapprochement. IRAQI POWER GROUPS DISSATISFIED WITH PRIME MINISTER Iraqi Prime Minister Bazzaz is still clinging to his posi- tion despite the open dissatis- faction of rival power factions. The war against the Kurds con- tinues unabated. Fighting in the frontier rE?gion has led to strained re- l~~tions with Iran, which is sup- porting the Kurds against the Iraqi Government. According to press reports, Iraqi planes this week bombed and heavily damaged ari Iranian village. Iranian ar.~tiaircraft batteries subse- qu~.ently opened fire on Iraqi fighters violating Iranian air- s~~ace . SEC'RE'T WEEKLY SUMMEIRY 27 May 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 `~ S'ECRE'T Western Hemisphere DOMINICAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN NEARS END The outcome of the 1 June elec- tions in the Dominican Republic re- mains uncertain. Joaquin Balaguer's campaign has picked up and many ob- servers feel a last-minute surge in his favor has brought him at least even with Juan Bosch. The outcome may well depend on such imponderables as the weather, which could prevent many pro-Balaguer rural voters from reaching the polls. On the whole the campaign has been rather dull and neither candidate has seemed to generate great enthu- siasm except among hard-core back- ers. Balaguer's energetic stumping throughout the country during re- cent weeks has given the campaign of his Reformist Party (PR) a boost. He has sought to reinforce his image as a candidate of moderation who will place primary emphasis on restoring. law and order. He cited the April 1965 revolt, which he called "es- sentially negative," as proof of the futility of all violence. In addition to the emphasis on stability, Balaguer `s campaign speeches have contained grandiose promises of benefits to the rural peasant and urban poor. In each town he has visited Balaguer has promised ptablic works to benefit the locality. Balaguer's entourage has stepped up its attempts to link Bosch with Communism. Last week Balaguer's running mate said Bosch's election would lead to a repetition of the Cuban experience in the Do- minican Republic. Balaguer has continued his re- fusal to make a deal with "third force" presidential candidate Ra-25X1 fael Bonnelly and has succeeded in wooing Bonnell su orters to his candidac . ~~ Other Bonnelly-supporters h~.ave already announced their switch in allegiance. Bonnelly may still announce his withdrawal from the race at-the last minute. Bosch continues to proclaim the imminent victory of his party but other statements suggest his c,onf idence maybe shaky . He seems to be laying the groundwork f'or a possible refusal to accept defeat by claiming his supporters a~,re being subjected to bribery a~.nd intimidation. Sporadic campaign skirmishes between opposing political fac- tions continue to occur. The most ~~erious was what PR members claim was an ambush of Balaguer`s cam- Iaaign caravan in the eastern town of La Romano on 19 May. Political passions will probably heat up during the last-days of the cam- ~~aign and some scattered inci- dents are likely to take place on Election day. Nevertheless, the elections should be reasonably i'ree of fraud and violence-since I~rovisional President Garcia C~adoy, top ranking security force commanders, and the Central Elec- i;ion-Board are determined to make i.t so. ~,~'E ~'l~~L~; T Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY- ~' 27 May 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 ~.~ CAE T ~Vho-ever the victor, the new president will not have easy go- ing. If Bosch wins, he will face continued hostility of sub- stantial se-gments of the mili- tary and right-wing civilians. Balaguer will be confronted by opposition of at least the ex- tremists of the left wing if the victory is his, Either candi- date will have to face social, political, and economic prob- 1-ems so intractable that sig- nificant progress toward their solution over the next year or two will be extremely difficult POLITICAL CONFLICT CASES OUSTER OF BRAZILIAN ARMY COMMANDER General Justino Alves Bastos was relieved of command of Bra- zil's Third Army on 19 May ap- parently because of an intemper- ate public speech in Pvrto Alegre an 17 May in which he strongly criticized President Castello Branco's policies. In his speech, Alves Bastos appealed to the press to fight against establishment of a dictatorship of the right now that the danger of a dicta- torship of the left had been eliminated. He called the elec- toral domicile law a "monstros- ity" and severely criticized the government's economic and finan- cial policies. Alves Bastos' frequently expressed desire to be governor of Rio Grande do Sul has been frustrated by the domicile law, which requires a candidate to have been a state resident for at least two years. Both Alves Bastos and Se-cond Army commander General Amaury Kruel, who has aspired to be governor of Sao Paulo, have been pressing the government to change the law, Both generals had important roles in the overthrow of the Goulart regime in 1964. General Kruel, although he has denied supporting Alves Bas- tos, has been closely associated with his position. Bastos has been replaced by General Orlando Geisel, the army's chief of personnel, a competent officer who will prob- ably reduce the Third Army's involvement in southern Brazil- ian polities. The smoothness with which the change of com- mand was carried out indicates that neither the move against Bastos nor one against Krue1 will affect stability. .The po- litical aspirations of bath arE widely known, and it is not probable that either has signif- icant military backing for his ambitions, 27 May 66 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 SE C'RE ~[' ~"'~ COMMUN l ST EFFORTS TO UNIFY UF,UGUAYAN -LABOR MOVEMENT Unless economic conditions improve or effective opposition to Communist initiatives devel- ops, the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU) is likely soon to organize and control a unified Uruguayan labor confederation. On 21 May the heavily Com- munist-influenced Center of Uru- guayan Workers concluded a five- day congress, with representa- tives in attendance from most na- tional and many international labor organizations. The con- gress, trading on genuine worker grievances and widespread na= ivete' concerning Communist in- tentions and capabilities, re- ceived support from independent unions as well. It planned strategy for "future struggles" to solve Uruguay's recurrent economic crises and called for creation of a unified labor move- ment.. Communist domination of this key sector would increase the danger of crippling strikes and labor agitation and pose a long-range threat to national stability. Most non-Communist labor leaders are committed to unify- ing the labor movement and ap- parently hope that a confedera- tion can be kept from falling under PCU domination.. There is little to prevent this, however, because only the PCU appears able to guide and manipulate such a federation and is plainly determined to do so. Leadership of the prodemocratic unions is scarce, divided, and self-seeking. Although most Uruguayan workers traditionally vote for one of the two large democratic political parties, there. has bE~en a continuing turn toward Communists or pro-Communists f~~r labor leadership because they produce results. The PCU a:Lready controls Uruguay's two l;~rgest labor federations, but h;~,s newer been able to trans- l;~,te this control into votes. T'he Communists have, however, apparently managed to secure enough signatures to put their constitutional reform project for reorganizing the national government on November's? ballot. Recent successes in union elections indicate-that the Communist Party is gaining strength at the expense of non- communists. Tlie PCU has con- centrated-its efforts- on key unions, such as those represent- ing transport and government employees, which it has used to paralyze government and private economic activity with strikes. Communist and pro-Communist labor leaders have astutely ex- ploited the worker's feeling that he is bearing the brunt of the government's attempts to stabilize the economy. This ap- proach may be even more success- ful if a recently concluded =standby agreement with the In- ternational Monetary Fund re- =~ults in a further decline in consumer purchasing power. SECRET Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 May 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 ~~ ~~~ ECUADOR'S VELASCO RETURNS TO POL[T[CAL SCENE Former Ecuadorean president Velasco returned to Guayaquil from exile on 24 May and, despite minor opposition demonstrations, spoke with vigor to a small crowd esti- mated at 7,000. He depreciated the Communist threat and-told his audience that a fifth presidential term for him would cure all the nation's ills. Velasco was fol- lowed on the platform by his ex- tremist henchman, Manuel Aratijo Hidalgo, who demanded a revolu- tion "even if we are described as Communists," and concluded by ask- ing interim President Yerovi to step down in favor of Velasco. To thwart Velasco, the gov- ernmen-t has approved the armed forces" new antisubversion plan, but the military have yet to evi- dence a firm plan to oppose Velasco openly if he should try to grab power with mob support. Velasco may attempt to gain office legally by agitating for direct election of the next presi- dent. The government has issued a call for the convening of a constituent assembly on 3 November to which Yerovi would deliver power. Most politicians favor having the assembly name the next president in order to frustrate Velasco's hope of a popular elec- toral triumph. The course Velasco takes should become clearer after the 28 May convention, since by then he presumably will have assessed the extent of his support among the masses and the military. Page 26 WEEI4LY SUMMARY 27 May 66 Approved For Release 2008/05/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 Approved For Release 2008/05/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1 SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2008/05/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005300040001-1