CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SPECIAL REPORT EUPHRATES RIVER DEVELOPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005300020002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 13, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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On 22 April the USSR agreed to undertake a proj-
ect to develop Syria's Euphrates River valley and to
extend a credit of $133 million. The agreement is
the first Soviet economic commitment to Syria since
1957. A $150-million aid credit extended in that
year included $70 million for the Euphrates develop-
ment plan, from which the Soviets withdrew in 1960.
The USSR is now involved in two of three major
Euphrates River development schemes. The other So-
viet-assisted one is a large multipurpose project in
Iraq. The third and largest project is a dam in
Turkey near the Syrian border., to be constructed with
Western aid.
With all three projects about to move into the
implementation stage, the three Middle Eastern coun-
tries will need to make new attempts at breaking
their long-standing deadlock over the division of
the Euphrates water.
Plans for the development
of the Euphrates Valley in north-
eastern Syria, the country's most
important agricultural area,
have been under study since 1948.
In 1955 .the World Bank conducted
a study of the project and esti-
mated the total cost, including
the cost of a dam, at about $200
million. The first step toward
realization of the project, how-
ever, did not occur until 1957
when the USSR extended the credit
for the Euphrates project.
Soviet engineers completed
a $1.3 million survey of the
project in 1960, while Syria was
a part of the UAR. Their esti-
mate of total cost approximated
that of the World Bank. Their
report, however, recommended lo-
cation of the dam at Tabga,,down-
stream from the site originally
considered by the World Bank.
At the Tabqa site, the Soviets
estimated that about 1.5 million
acres of land could be culti-
vated and about 600,000 kilo-
watts of electric power capacity
installed.
In March 1960, however, UAR
officials were informed that the
USSR did not intend to partici-
pate further in this project.
The Soviet intention to with-
draw was repeated to Syrian of-
ficials during a visit to Moscow
the following September to con-
clude additional protocols under
the 1957 Soviet aid agreement.
The Soviets have never disclosed
why they decided to withdraw,
but the inability of the three
riparian countries to settle on
distribution of the Euphrates
water was probably a major factor.
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EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY DEVELOPMENT
*Ankara
TURKEY
Tabgo`
SYRIA
Damascus ...4'
DAM SPECIFICATIONS
KEBAN TABQA
Height
(meters)
195
50
56
Width
(kilometers)
78
na
b.5
Capacity
(billion cubic meters)
30.6
12
11.3
Spillway capacity
(thousand cubic meters per second)
17.5
na
' ?a
Average annual water flow
(billion cubic meters)
18.7
25.3
27.4
Electric power capacity
(thousand kilowatts)
1085
700
j45
Cost
(million dollars)
330
250
140
USSR
hinofiyo
SAUDI
ARABIA
61178
CASPIAN
SEA
PERSIAN
GULF
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This was the only major aid com-
mitment to a less developed coun-
try on which the USSR has ever
reneged.
In June 1961 West Germany
concluded an economic aid agree-
ment with the UAR and allocated
$120 million for the construc-
tion of the Euphrates project.
The sundering of the Egyptian-
Syrian union in September 1961,
however, led Bonn to reconsider
the scope of its aid for the
project and to reduce its credit
to $87.5 million. Since that
time the Germans have dragged
their feet, largely because of
doubts over Syria's ability to
finance its share of the costs.
Nevertheless, they did conduct
a series of technical and feasi-
bility studies at a cost of
more than $6 million.
What may have concerned the
West Germans the most were the
questions raised concerning the
economic feasibility of the proj-
ect. A study completed by a
German engineer named Press rec-
ommended that the Euphrates proj-
ect be constructed in two stages.
The first stage would include
the construction of the main dam,
power stations with an annual
capacity totaling 200,000 kw.,
and irrigation facilities for
about 500,000 acres of land. This
stage would take five years to
construct and cost about $250
million. The West German credit
of $87.5 million applied only
to this stage. The second stage
would have required an addi-
tional ten years, during which
the electric power capacity would
be raised to 700,000 kw., and
the irrigated area to 1.5 mil-
lion acres. An additional $165
million would be invested during
this period, bringing the total
cost of the project to $415 mil-
lion.
A subsequent critical re-
view by a German firm, however,
stated that the Press report had
underestimated the total cost
of the project and overstated
its potential returns. The re-
view claimed that no allowance
was made for a variety of activ-
ities, such as grading of the
land, construction of roads and
concrete ditches for water dis-
tribution, and reallocation of
the land. The addition of
these activities, the review
stated, could raise the total
cost to about $720 million. More-
over, the 1.5 million acres of
land to be irrigated included
acreage of varying productivity.
It was estimated that only
500,000 to 600,000 acres could
be irrigated at moderate cost.
The rest would require larger
expenditures and some acreage
could not be cultivated at all,
regardless of the cost.
Soviet Re-entry
With Syrian frustration
over the lack of progress mount-
ing,and with diplomatic relations
with West Germany severed over
the latter's recognition of Is-
rael, discussions between Syrian
and Soviet officials apparently
were initiated in 1965 after
Iraq and the USSR had agreed to
construct a dam in Iraq.' In
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mid-December the director-general f cost of these surveys totaled
of the Syrian organization respon-4 about $8.4 million and was fi-
sible for the Euphrates project nanced under the 1959 credit.
visited Moscow.
The Soviet project will
form part of a complex of dams
and barrages designed to regu-
hrates
late the flow of the Eu
p
The Syrian coup in February River in Iraq. The complex
1966, which brought to power the will serve as a major source of
leftist faction of the Baathist irrigation water for much of
party, smoothed the way for So- the cultivated area in central
viet participation in the project. and southern Iraq. The Soviet
In March the Syrian President offer covers both a regulator
authorized his Communist minis- dam near Ash Shinafiya in south-
ter of communications, Samih At- ern Iraq and a major multipur-
tiyah, to negotiate with the USSR pose dam at Hadithah. The lat-
for assistance for a number of ter undertaking will provide
projects, including the Euphrates irrigation for about 750,000
Dam. In mid-April, Prime Minister acres.
Zuayyin visited Moscow and ob-
tained a Soviet credit of $133
million for the first stage of
The Turkish Project
the project, which includes the The largest of the three
dam, a power station, and -transmultipurpose schemes planned
mission lines. The credit will for the Euphrates River is a
be repaid over 12 years beginning high dam near Keban in Turkey,
one year after completion of the just south of the confluence of
project, at 2.5-percent interest. the Euphrates' two main sources.
Soviet Aid to Iraq
In March 1965 the USSR
agreed to provide $70 million to
Iraq for dam construction on the
upper Euphrates expected to
cost about twice that amount.
Some of this assistance may come
from still unobligated portions
of a $137.5-million credit ex-
tended in March 1959.
The USSR previously had un-
dertaken surveys for developing
the Tigris and Euphrates river
basin, for improvement of navi-
gation on the two rivers, and
for a drainage system with a 310-
mile canal to remove salinated
water to the Persian Gulf. The
The Keban project, primarily
for flood control and the pro-
duction of hydroelectric power,
will cost about $330 million,
with foreign exchange costs to-
taling $135 million to be fi-
nanced by a Western consortium.
The project will take about six
years to complete.
The government of Turkey
has indicated that its long-
range plans for developing the
Euphrates call for the construc-
tion of 77 dams of various sizes,
with 66 separate irrigation sys-
tems which would water 2.5 mil-
lion acres--compared with only
375,000 acres currently. Such
activity, however, is still far
in the future.
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The Problem of Riparian Rights
The USSR's agreement to sup-
port the Syrian Euphrates project
suggests that it will attempt to
move toward the construction stage
as rapidly as possible.. Conse-
quently, it will bring to a head
an issue which has been an irritant
in Turkish relations with the two
Arab countries--the division of
the Euphrates waters. The head-
waters of the Euphrates, as well
as most of the important tribu-
taries, lie in Turkey. River de-
velopment projects in Turkey
would immediately affect northern
Syria and, eventually, the flow
of water to Iraq. Discussions
among Iraq, Syria, and Turkey
concerning the amount of water
each country is entitled to draw
off have been in process for sev-
eral years with Soviet encourage-
ment but have achieved little
progress.
Iraq and Syria are not as
much concerned with the probable
flow of water during the period
when the Keban reservoir is being
filled, as with the longer term
problem of water loss through
further development of the Eu-
phrates headwaters in Turkey. Al-
though Turkey currently does not
use much of the estimated 26 bil-
lion cubic meters of Euphrates
water flowing into Syria annually,
its development plans envisioned
requirements rising to as much
as 17 billion cubic meters.
Another subject at issue be-
tween Turkey and the two Arab
countries is the scope of dis-
cussions. In talks with the
Syrians, the Turks have insisted
upon a comprehensive review which
would include the use of waters
of the Orontes River, the mouth
of which is in Turkey. The
Syrians, however, refuse to dis-
cuss the use of the Orontes, con-
tending that it is entirely a
Syrian river. Similar diffi-
culties exist with Iraq, which
:refused to include discussion
on the use of the Tigris River,
the source of which also lies
in Turkey.
The Soviet agreement to con-
struct the Euphrates project in
Syria is part of a continuing
effort to expand and consolidate
the USSR's influence in an area
stretching from Turkey and the
UAR to Pakistan and India. For
nearly two years Moscow has con-
centrated its new economic aid
commitments in this region. The
post-Khrushchev regime apparently
is convinced that this area
promises significant dividends,
particularly in the CENTO coun-
tries which have become increas-
ingly disaffected with their
close ties with the US.
Now that implementation of
the three projects on the Eu-
phrates may be accelerated, the
three countries may be compelled
to reach an agreement over the
use of the waters, and some kind
of joint planning may come to
be recognized as essential as
well as beneficial to the
riparian states. With Turkey
controlling the headwaters, a
system for timely withholding
and release of water to coincide
with downstream requirements is 25X1
imperative if the development
plans of Iraq and Syria are to
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