WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 6, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO053000100011 4
6 May 1966
~ OCI No. 0288/66
State Dept. review
completed review(s)
completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGiE
-C F
N, -AGENCY
C)1R CTORAT ' O I N"f`E~I, IUEIVC
Copy No,
SECRET.
]"; OUP"f Exciud d from aOtorl
l4 vn~rpdir and' dec{assificat
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
lope SECRET %Mwe
(Information as of noon EDT, 5 May 1966)
VIETNAM
Preparations for the constituent assembly elections
continue to dominate South Vietnamese politics. The
Buddhists, still envisaging greater power for the as-
sembly than that anticipated by the Ky regime, are
maneuvering to maintain as much control as possible
over selection of candidates. Military operations
were generally light this week. The Communists, mean-
while, appear to be moving substantial amounts of sup-
plies along the newly completed roads into the Laos
panhandle and to be laying new track to raise the capac-
ity of the rail line which handles the bulk of bloc
aid deliveries through China to North Vietnam.
CHINESE SURFACE VIETNAM AID FIGURES IN ATTACK ON MOSCOW 5
Peking's latest blast, apparently triggered by
Malinovsky's recent charges that China was interfering
with Soviet shipments of military equipment to North
Vietnam, asserts that the Soviets shipped only 43,000
tons to Hanoi via China last year. This figure is
close to current intelligence estimates.
CHINA WELCOMES ALBANIAN PREMIER 6
Peking provided its "biggest and most spectacular
welcome," apparently to obscure the fact that its
chief May Day guest was from the world's smallest
Communist state.
THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER TENSIONS INCREASING
Cambodian efforts to repel attacks by Khmer Serei dis-
sidents operating from neighboring Thailand have led
to almost daily fighting between Thai and Cambodian
border forces.
INDONESIA CONTINUES ANTILEFTIST TREND
Djakarta's new leaders are continuing efforts to
divorce Indonesia from Sukarno's control and leftist
policies.
SECRET
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
SECRET
SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN MAY DAY PARADES
While no new military hardware was paraded in Moscow,
the East Germans displayed for the first time the
longer range version of the Soviet Scud surface-to-
surface missile.
GERMAN NOTE SETS STAGE FOR BARGAINING ON FRANCE'S NATO ROLE 9
The other NATO members have generally endorsed the Ger-
mans' tough position toward the French, but some of
them,notably the Canadians and Scandinavians, do not
appear ready to put up a firm stand against France.
FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER IN EASTERN EUROPE 11
Couve de Murville's visit last month to Rumania and
Bulgaria was part of France's effort to stress its
independent policies toward Eastern Europe. Next to
come are French naval visits to Black Sea ports, De
Gaulle's visit to the USSR this summer, and perhaps
further travels by Couve in Eastern Europe this year.
WARSAW PACT POLITICAL COM11ITTEE TO MEET THIS SUMMER 12
This would provide a timely opportunity for Soviet and
East European leaders to review their general European
policy in the light of NATO developments, French contacts
with bloc countries, and De Gaulle's visit to the USSR
this summer.
FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SPACE ORGANIZATION STILL IN DOUBT 13
The uncertainty arises mainly because the UK, which en-
couraged European space cooperation in the first place,
is now having second thoughts about the costs. Tenta-
tive US offers of aid seem to have renewed UK interest.
WEST-EAST GERMAN SPEAKER EXCHANGE POSTPONED 15
An East German move to postpone an exchange of West
and East German party spokesmen affords both sides
additional time to consider the complex political and
legal implications of the meetings.
POLISH HARASSMENT OF MILITARY ATTACHES 16
The month-long secret police harassment of US, and later
Dutch and UK, military attaches is attributable at least
in part to the Gomulka regime's unusual concern about
recent signs of domestic instability and tensions.
&7A!j SECRET
Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
"Wil SECRET %we
Middle East - Africa
SOVIET JET FIGHTER EXPORTS TO NON-COMMUNIST ASIA AND AFRICA 17
Beginning last August, the USSR has sent a total of
some 140 of its newer model MIG fighters to Egypt,
Algeria, Iraq, Indonesia, India, and Afghanistan, and may
soon export the SU-7 Fitter fighter-bomber outside the
bloc also. Older model MIGs are still being delivered
too.
SYRIAN REGIME PUSHING CLOSER TIES WITH MOSCOW
The two-month-old Baath military regime probably hopes
this will help bolster its own internal position.
The USSR has made its first new economic commitment to
Syria since 1957.
NEW INCIDENTS ON ISRAEL'S BORDERS
The Syrian-supported Fatah terrorist group has sabo-
taged Israeli installations, Israel has retaliated,
and Jordan's and Syria's border units have clashed
with Israel's.
NASIR SPEECH PERILS YEMEN PEACE PROSPECTS
Nasir's bellicose May Day speech, directed mainly at
King Faysal, will further impede a personal reconcilia-
tion between the two leaders, which must underlie any
progress toward an effective peace.
ALGERIA MODERATES 'POLICIES UNDER BOUMEDIENE
Bournediene's government has shifted Algeria's course
toward the center from the far left of Ben Bella.
0 Im I", Z3
ZT'v
Page iji ' WEEK) pMMARX 6 Ma y
6 ;
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
SECRET
INSTABILITY CONTINUES IN CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) REGIME 22
While jockeying between extremist forces and the
less radical President continues, there seems to
be a general desire to keep open the door for French
economic aid.
Western Hemisphere
BOLIVIAN ELECTION PREPARATIONS
The junta has extended the registration deadline for
this July's elections in an effort to draw out some
opposition to Rene Barrientos. Junta leaders doubt
that a government elected without opposition can long
endure.
DEVELOPMENTS IN ECUADOR
After a month in office, the interim regime of Provi-
sional President Yerovi remains weak, unwilling to
tackle problems, and tolerant of Communist activities.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The Inter-American Peace Force has largely withdrawn
from Santo Domingo, where its duties have been assumed
by Dominican police and army units. The provisional
government is trying to get the IAPF out of the country
before an elected government takes office on 1 July.
iteantivhile, political verbiage and violence have picked
up as the election campaign enters its final month.
STUDENT STRIKE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MEXICO
The violence last week was the culmination of a strike
begun on 14 March to force a change in the university
administration, but the problems it brought to light
seem to have broader implications affecting national
politics.
NEW COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT
The newly elected Lleras will begin his four-year
term this August under fairly propitious circumstances
for Colombia and will probably have several quiet months
to begin coping with the country's economic problems.
SECRET
Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
Preparations for the constit-
uent assembly elections continued
to dominate the political scene
this week in South Vietnam. The
secretary general of the ruling
Directorate has moved ahead with
plans to convene a committee of
approximately 34 people to draft
an election law. The committee
is tentatively composed of ten
representatives from the four
corps areas and the Saigon region,
a few legal technicians, and sev-
eral notables representing vari-
ous religious and political groups.
The Buddhist clerics appar-
ently do not view the drafting of
election laws with much concern.
Instead, they seem to be organiz-
ing their efforts toward maintain-
ing as much control as possible
over the selection of candidates.
Two influential spokesmen have
declared that their Buddhist in-
stitute will not run its own can-
didates, but will support the
"best" men, meaning those most
amenable to the Buddhists. There
is some evidence that the bonzes
may press for the selection of
several candidates from each
province, rather than from elec-
toral districts based on popula-
tion. They apparently believe
this will improve Buddhist elec-
tion chances.
There continues to be a con-
flict of views between the govern-
ment and the Buddhists over the
powers of the constitutent assem-
bly to be elected.
In spite of continuing spo-
radic Catholic and VNQDD (Nation-
alist Party) demonstrations dur-
ing the past week, there is little
evidence that the non-Buddhist
groups are capable of allying
themselves into a force cohesive
enough to counter the well-organ-
ized Buddhist effort to influence
the elections.
Military Situation in
South Vietnam
Allied contact with the Viet
Cong was generally light this
week, after a flurry of action
last weekend.
Viet Cong battalion-size
attacks were launched against
government outposts in Phuoc Tuy
and Binh Long provinces on 29
April, but resulted in only light
casualties on both sides. Enemy-
initiated activity thereafter re-
mained small in scale and gen-
erally was scattered, with some
concentration of incidents noted
in the delta area south of Saigon.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
SECRET
C H I N
}
P'mg.yuan
-~t
Tien-yangM "?^?
~P'u-erh Meng-ttu , ' :% _~..
~.~..r fJ1.(La i ~: 4
. ~'? N (~-9,'Y1 t+ang Sorb
Phong' VI ETNAI
Saly (Son La.
Lang Prabang a 1J rhanh Hoa
HAINAN
'qri Bayard
L A O S t J,
Lm-Chou
A
Wachow,
Canton
'Nan-nmg
1 ,.Mmg-mmg
al o;i X ,
Samneuaa ` ? Ffts}phong
ti VggNTIANE
N aiternate road
1oN-'?. ft. 912
u
e~
48 Hang
f_
Chu Lai
\
e,:}uang "gar
Konlum; i
MI-G KN(:
unc'wo tL' x.>
iPml
kVicTNAtq
/~oauta
.+..i ; han Rang yOperati?{i, _
Bran Hoa - iftK1+[{11U~
?-,, ~~(inh
y .--L SAIGON / Phan Thiel
The Indochina -South China Area
IV CORPS
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
1WW
Sao
SECRET
US troops conducting Opera-
tion BIRMINGHAM in Tay Ninh Prov-
ince clashed with an estimated
battalion of Viet Cong for some
five hours on 30 April near the
Cambodian border. US casualties
were six killed and nine wounded;
Viet Cong losses totaled 31
killed. Allied forces, supported
by B-52 Stratofortress strikes,
continued to press their offen-
sive in this area during the rest
of the week, but with little
enemy contact. However, informa-
tion from a Viet Cong defector
indicates that the Viet Cong
273rd Regiment may be moving into
Tay Ninh Province to assist local
enemy forces in the defense of
Viet Cong installations there.
Cumulative enemy losses resulting
from BIRMINGHAM since 23 April
are 82 killed and nine captured.
Numerous enemy base camps and
supplies were destroyed and large
quantities of supplies were
seized. Allied casualties thus
far total 41 killed (39 US) and
163 wounded (137 US).
Elsewhere, allied activity
continued with little opposition,
although US forces in operations
MAILI and GEORGIA, in Hau Nghia
and Quang Nam provinces respec-
tively, reported brief skirmishes
with enemy units on 3 and 4 May.
Communist Supply Effort
The Communists appear to
be moving substantial amounts
of supplies along the newly com-
pleted roads into the Laos Pan-
handle. Friendly observers
positioned near Route 912, the
new road linking North Vietnam
with Laos, counted 86 trucks
moving into Laos during the pe-
riod 16-22 April. This rapid ex-
ploitation of the new route sug-
gests that the Communists are
anxious to replenish their stock-
piles in the Laos - South Viet-
nam border area prior to the
onset of the rainy season.
More MIGs Downed
Two more North Vietnamese
fighters were shot down by US
aircraft on 29 and 30 April,
bringing the total number of DRV
aircraft downed since 23 April
t:o six. One and possibly two
US aircraft have been lost as
a, result of the air engagements.
Since 30 April, North Viet-
namese fighters have reacted
daily to US strike activity but
no engagements have occurred.
Floor weather has restricted the
number of sorties flown over the
DRV and may account, in part,
for the absence of fighter en-
gagements.
DRV Rail Line Converted to
Standard Gauge
portions of the Hanoi-Ping-
hsiang rail line, which handles
the bulk of overland deliveries
of bloc aid, is being equipped
with a third rail which will en-
able the line to carry either
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
SECRET
standard- or meter-gauge rolling
stock. Elimination of the neces-
sity for transloading at Ping-
hsiang; will both raise the capac-
ity of the line and speed up
freight movement.
a three-mile section rom ep
northward, but considerable work
has been under way on large seg-
ments of the line between Kep
and Ping;-hsing for some time,
including realignment and other
improvements. The addition of
a third rail will probably be
part of the improvement over the
entire segment of the line. One
other new rail line under con-
struction in North Vietnam is
believed to be standard gauge.
This line will connect Kep and
the Thai Nguyen industrial com-
plex, providing an alternate
jail connection between Kep and
Itanoi.
DRV Premier's Speech
Premier Pham Van Dong's
speech last month to the Na-
tional Assembly, the complete
text of which was received this
week. was not only a pep talk to
the assembled delegates but also
a relatively frank admission of
the difficulties created by the
US bombing raids. The premier
confessed that the allocation of
manpower resources to meet war-
time priorities had been a real
problem for the DRV. Ile admitted
that the North Vietnamese had
been forced to mobilize large
segments of the population to
keep the transportation routes
open and to strengthen civil de-
fensee and antiaircraft defenses.
Dong asserted that the problem
of keeping the transportation
routs open was given first prior-
ity and that manpower resources
were strained to such an extent
that at times local provincial
officials have had to throw in
local manpower reserves on a
temporary basis.
The premier praised his
people for their past efforts,
but warned that conditions could
get worse and that North Vietnam
would fight on even ii invaded
by the US. He spoke of building
Lighting villages" to counter
the invasion. Construction of
such "villages" is frequently dis-
cussed in the press. They appar-
ently are fortified rural areas
defended primarily by local armed
forces.
SECRET'
Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
lka*f Now
SECRET
CHINESE SURFACE VIETNAM AID FIGURES IN ATTACK ON MOSCOW
Peking's denunciation on 3
May of Soviet claims that China
has been interfering with over-
land shipments of Soviet military
equipment to North Vietnam as-
serts that only 43,000 tons were
sent during 1965. This figure--
the first specific information
from a Communist source concern-
ing the level of Soviet military
assistance to Hanoi--is close
to the latest intelligence es-
timate of the actual military
tonnage sent over the Chinese
transportation system by the
Russians last year.
US military shipments to
South Vietnam--for both US and
South Vietnamese forces--amounted
to more than 12.5 million tons
during the same period, and con-
tinued at an even higher rate
during the first quarter of 1966.
The Chinese claim that Soviet
shipments of military equipment
have continued to lag and assert
that in the first three months of
this year the USSR actually used
only 556 of the 1,730 rail cars
the Chinese had made available
for military aid shipments at
Moscow's request.
The Chinese blast--delivered
in the form of a Foreign Ministry
statement--is in answer to a
speech by Soviet Defense Minister
Malinovsky on 21 April when he
repeated earlier Soviet assertions
that the Chinese were impeding
the flow of Russian military aid
to North Vietnam. Peking's vio-
lent response suggests that the
Chinese are increasingly discom-
fited by Moscow's charges which
they first sought to rebut in
detail on 15 January by broad-
casting the text of an official
memorandum given to the Soviet
ambassador earlier that month.
It probably also reflects concern
over the reaction to Moscow's call
for "unity" at the 23rd Soviet
Party Congress in March. The
'Foreign Ministry statement spe-
cifically mentions the Soviet
party meeting and admits that
"not a few people" had been taken
in by the Russian "posture for
unity against imperialism."
Despite Chinese protesta-
tions that all Soviet shipments
destined for North Vietnam have
been forwarded "with priority,
at high speed, and free of
charge," there are indications
that Peking has in fact made
difficulties which have slowed
down the pace of deliveries.
The Foreign Ministry statement
points out that Soviet shipments
of military equipment could have
been sent by sea. Peking notes
that Moscow was able to send
military goods to India in this
way and observes spitefully
that although Cuba is far away
from the Soviet Union the Rus-
sians could ship rockets and
nuclear weapons "to and from"
SECRET
6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
SECRET
Peking has touted it-s re-
ception for Albanian premier and
politburo member Mehmet. Shehu--
who arrived in China on 26 April
--as the "biggest and most spec-
tacular welcome" ever given a
foreign visitor. The main effect
of the visit thus far, however,
has been to point up China's
isolation in the world Communist
movement. Shehu--representing
the world's smallest Communist
state and party with only about
53,000 members--was the principal
guest at the Chinese May I)ay
celebration.
According to Chinese news
reports, Shehu has talked with
every major Chinese leader ex-
cept Nlao Tse-tung, but it appears
that little of substance has
been achieved. The presence of
Abdul Kellezi, an experienced
foreign trade negotiator, in the
Albanian delegation suggests
that the private talks dealt
extensively with Albanian needs
for the 1966-70 plan.
Although the Chinese appar-
ently have met previous aid
commitments of about a quarter
of a billion dollars, mostly
in the form of credits, the
assistance has not satisfied all
Albanian needs. There have been
reports that Tirana is dissatis-
lied with the kind of aid the
Chinese can provide and has re-
cently attempted to improve
economic ties with selected
Eastern and Western countries.
Further information may be pro-
vided if a communique is issued
when Shehu, now touring the prov-
inces, leaves China.
In public statements, lead-
ers of both sides have lashed out
at the Soviet Union and repeated
the now-standard Chinese formula-
tions concerning Vietnam--demand-
ing immediate US withdrawal and
recognition of the "Liberation
Front" as the sole representative
of the South Vietnamese people.
An anti-Soviet speech by Chinese
chief of state Liu Shao-chi at a
banquet on 28 April was so viru-
lent that East European diplomats--
with the exception of the Rumanian
and Yugoslav representatives--
walked out. No one from the Soviet
Embassy had been invited.
At a mass rally for the
Albanians, Premier Chou En-lai
disparaged Soviet aid to Hanoi as
meager in quantity and inferior
in quality. He once again criti-
cized Moscow for alleged "behind-
the-scenes efforts to promote
peace talks" and charged that
Soviet leaders were "collaborat-
ing" with the US.
TEIAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER TENSIONS INCREASING
Tension is increasing along
the 400-mile Thai-Cambodian bor-
der as both countries move up
reinforcements in reaction to
recent skirmishes.
The current round of border
disturbances began late last year
when dissident Cambodian members
of the Khmer Serei (Free Cambodia)
organization launched a series of
SECRET
Page (3 WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 May 66
'25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
SECRET
attacks from Thailand against
isolated Cambodian outposts. The
dissidents hoped to establish a
Khmer Serei foothold on Cambod-
ian territory from which to
gather support for a move to oust
Prince Sihanouk. Both Bangkok and
Saigon are opposed to Sihanouk's
neutralist policies and have long
supported the Khmer Serei dissi-
dence as a means of undermining
and harassing Sihanouk's regime.
The practical effect of the
Khmer Serei attacks was to heighten
tension along the Thai-Cambodian
border since some of the return
fire from Cambodian forces struck
regular Thai border defense posi-
tions. This created a situation
in which fighting between Cambod-
ian and Thai forces has become
almost a daily occurrence. The
attacks also reinforced Sihanouk's
darkest suspicions concerning the
territorial ambitions of his
neighbors.
Although the fighting has in-
volved only small numbers of
troops in isolated areas thus far,
more serious incidents may be in
the offing. Cambodia has deployed
several newly formed battalions to
sensitive areas.
Sihanouk has also been
talking of retaliatory raids into
Thailand, and there have been re-
ports of minings in Thai terri-
tory in the past week. So far the
Thais have actea more cautiously
in strengthening their border
forces, but there are some indica-
tions that they may be prepared
i n n s A N
V
KHMER S...,
ATT
ACKS
f --, Y!!4ur tmpte e'
/ a Gem ong.
s o U T H
V I E A l
A M
to move more forcefully in the
coming months.
As long as Bangkok contin-
ues to show restraint, the bor-
der situation will probably not
get out of hand militarily.
Its political impact is likely
to be more lasting, however.
Sihanouk's recent statements
concerning a closer political
accommodation with the Commu-
nists were accompanied by
bitter references to Cambodian
lives lost fighting the Thais
and their Khmer Serei "lackeys."
They demonstrate once again how
his sense of isolation and his
dependence on his Communist 25X1
"friends" are increased by de-
velopments on the Thai border.
SECRET
6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
SECRET
INDONESIA CONTINUES ANTILEFTIST TREND
Djakarta's new leaders are
continuing efforts to divorce
Indonesia from Sukarno's control
and leftist policies.
The next phase of the cam-
paign to strip President Sukarno
of prestige and real power will
apparently take place at a meet-
ing of the provisional Peoples
Consultative Assembly (MPRS)--
the nation's "policy determining"
body, which in the past has been
a Sukarno rubber stamp. In a
speech on 29 April, General Nasu-
tion strongly urged that the MPRS,
now purged of its leftist members,
revoke Sukarno's lifetime term
of office and his title of "Great
Leader of the Revolution." Other
leaders, however, have expressed
reluctance to move this far and
may intend the session merely
to criticize Sukarno's former
policies, while allowing him to
retain the trappings of power.
Sukarno is strongly opposing
the convening of the MPRS ands
Gen-
era u ar o has temporarily
postponed the mid-May opening of
the session in order to avoid a
direct confrontation with the
President. In view of the heavy
publicity already given to the
convening of the MPRS, it seems
unlikely that Sukarno will be
able to delay its meeting indef-
initely.
Sukarno is still maneuver-
ing to regain the initiative,
but without visible success.. On
28 April he appointed a number
of discredited leftists to the
Supreme Advisory Council--an in-
significant body with little
function. The announcement of
the appointments was greeted by
heavy public criticism and a meet-
ing of the body scheduled for
May has already been canceled.
On 27 April the leftist lead-
ership of the large Indonesian
Nationalist Party (PNI) was swept
from office by the party's na-
tional convention and replaced
by moderates. The PNI, long domi-
nated by its left wing, has been
a natural and attractive target
for Communist infiltration since
the 1 October coup attempt. The
purge of the party's leadership
was carefully supervised by the
Indonesian Army, which prevented
some leftist delegates from at-
tending.
In a further indication of
the new political atmosphere in
Djakarta, Foreign Minister Malik,
during a visit last week by a
South Korean emissary, agreed to
a resumption of relations with
Seoul. A South Korean consulate
general is expected to be estab-
lished in Djakarta in the near
future.
In a Bangkok meeting be-
tween Malik and Philippine For-
eign Minister Ramos on 30 April
and 1 May, Indonesia apparently
succeeded in obtaining a further
delay in Manila's proposed rec-
ognition of Malaysia. The new
Indonesian leaders hope to con-
vince Sukarno to de-emphasize
the anti-Malaysia policy before
totally committing themselves
to this line of action. Manila
now apparently intends to rec-
ognize Malaysia during the first
week in June. Djakarta plans
to announce formal recognition
of Singapore a few days later.
SECRET
Page S WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
`oe SECRET
Europe
No new military equipment
was displayed in the Moscow May
Day parade.
Neither Air Marshal Sudets,
commander in chief of Soviet Air
Defense Forces (PVO), nor Air
Marshal Savitsky, commander of
PVO Aviation, were seen with
the other high-ranking Soviet
officers on the reviewing stand,
and US attaches were told only
that Sudets was fulfilling a
"temporary" assignment. Both
Savitsky and Sudets lost their
positions on the party central
committee last month, and it is
likely that either the men or
their military positions have
been downgraded within the So-
viet military establishment.
Europe.
The East Germans held a May
Day military parade in East Ber-
lin, their second consecutive
violation of quadripartite agree-
ments prohibiting the presence
of German military forces in
the city. The parade included
the long-range (150 miles) ver-
sion of the Soviet Scud surface-
to-surface tactical missile, the
first identification of this
missile in East European armed
forces. An East German tele-
vision commentator boasted that
East German "medium-range" mis-
siles could hit any US base in
The German note delivered
to Paris on 3 May has set the
stage for bargaining on which
France's future role in NATO
may,hinge. The note takes the
position that in view of France's
intention to withdraw its forces
from commitment to NATO on 1
July, Paris may no longer sta-
tion forces in West Germany un-
der the 1954 conventions. Al-
though Bonn offers to negotiate
a new arrangement based on"equal-
ity and reciprocity," France
would have to accept a defined
role for these forces and agree
to their recommitment to NATO
in time of war. Moreover, the
note implies that agreement is
also contingent on other issues
--such as continued Allied use
of French airspace.
This tough position--sub-
stantially unchanged from the
original German stance--was gen-
erally endorsed by the other
Allies on 29 April. Whether all
of them are in fact ready to ac-
cept the confrontation this po-
sition may lead to is difficult
to say as the Canadians and
Scandinavians have questioned
the appropriateness of parts of
the reply.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
SECRET
The distrust between Bonn
and Paris is evidently growing.
Foreign Minister Schroeder told
Ambassador McGhee in a "candid
conversation" on 29 April that
he believes De Gaulle's basic
objective to be the same as the
USSR's--to push the US out of
Europe. Schroeder said that De
Gaulle has a "talent for destroy-
ing what has been achieved,"
and for him a fitting role for
France requires getting the US
out of Europe, keeping the UK
out, and controlling Germany.
Preparations for the nego-
tiations on other aspects of
France's disengagement from NATO
are proceeding slowly--and under
pressure from new warnings from
French officials. According to
a high Foreign Ministry official,
Do Gaulle may remove all French
custodial personnel from SHAPE
if talks on the relocation of
NATO installations are not under
way by 1 July. The official
also said that Do Gaulle would
never accept the American pro-
posal to stretch out the with-
drawal of US forces over a two-
year period, although he might
allow "a little additional time"
if some forward motion toward
settlement of the withdrawal is-
sue were made soon.
France also has officially
informed the US and the UK that
permission for overflights of
French territory will be granted
on a month-to-month basis. In
an oral comment to the British,
the French observed that if NATO
negotiations did not progress
satisfactorily, overflights
might have to be reduced.
Meanwhile, some friction
may be in the making among the
other 14 NATO members over con-
flicting views on whether and
how the present crisis over
Franch should be used to effect
some streamlining of NATO. Brit-
ain's NATO delegation is reportedly
under instruction to sell a
scheme which, according to Am-
bassador Cleveland, is "funda-
mentally at variance" with pres-
ent US thinking. Among other
things the plan would downgrade
SACEUR by transferring his plan-
ning functions to a new military
committee.
The UK had previously given
consideration to calling for
creation of a separate NATO nu-
clear command under an American,
thus opening the positions of
SACEUR and SACLANT to Europeans.
They have now decided to leave
this matter to the Special Com-
mittee of Defense Ministers
studying nuclear sharing arrange-
ments. Britain likewise seems
now to be actively campaigning
for the transfer of the North
Atlantic Council--and the new
military committee--to London.
SECRET
Page 1.0 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
SECRET
Foreign Minister Couve de
Murville's 25-30 April visit to
Rumania and Bulgaria was part of
France's effort to stress its
intention of pursuing independent
initiatives toward the USSR and
Eastern Europe. This spring's
activity will be capped by De
Gaulle's trip to the USSR from
20 June to 2 July, and Couve is
expected to travel to Warsaw,
Budapest, and Prague later this
year.
Couve's trip will be fol-
lowed by visits by French naval
vessels to Rumanian and Bulgar-
ian ports early this month (see
map). These too will have the
effect of emphasizing French in-
dependence, coming as they do at
the time of the French military
withdrawal from NATO. Couve's
trip also occurs at a time when
several East European regimes
may be considering closer ties
with Western Europe.
Officially Couve's trip was
in return for visits to France
by the Bulgarian and Rumanian
foreign ministers in 1964 and
1965. Couve stressed France's
satisfaction with the five-year
trade agreement concluded with
Rumania last year. He also in-
dicated that France plans to
conclude a commercial and cul-
tural accord with Rumania and
that French economic cooperation
might go beyond the letter of
the agreements.
Although the Bucharest visit
appears to have produced little
tangible result, it probably
served to enhance Rumania's na-
tionalist image. It also per-
BLACK SEA PORTS TO BE VISITED BY
FRENCH SHIPS THIS MONTH
7 7
ROMAN
U i S S R
'lKaf .k,.
4 C?ns
tanra
?Sof Vor
c RSA -' le /, I .k.
T U
Ankara
mitted an exchange of views on
the Vietnam situation and on
France's and Rumania's attitudes
toward NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
respectively.
The Bulgarians reportedly
made a concerted effort to show
that they have better relations
with France than with other
Western countries. They an-
nounced decisions to sign fur-
ther agreements for cultural ex-
changes and scientific and tech-
nical cooperation and to nego-
tiate a consular convention.
Premier Zhivkov accepted Couve's
invitation to visit France and
extended an invitation to De
Gaulle to visit Bulgaria. Ap-
parently Couve made some accom-
modation to Bulgaria's desire
to export more of its manufac-
tured products to France; his
v:is t was promptly followed by
the arrival of a French trade
delegation.
SECRET
6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
SECRET
WJUSAW PACT POLITICAL COMMITTEE TO MEET THIS SUMMER
Moscow reportedly will con-
vene a meeting of the Warsaw Pact
Political Consultative Committee
at Bucharest early in July. It
would provide a timely opportunity
for Soviet and East European
leaders to review their general
European policy in the light of
NATO developments, French con-
tacts with bloc countries, and
De Gaulle's visit to the USSR
in June.
The Warsaw Pact's political
body may deal with the question
of greater participation by the
East European states in the staff
work of the Pact, but Moscow
would be especially careful to
avoid divisive issues at this
time of disunity in NATO. The
Political Consultative Committee
may also consider the expediency
of renewing Eastern bloc pro-
posals on European security. The
idea of a pan-European conference
to discuss collective security
in Europe was broached at the
committee's last meeting in
January 1965. Lately, Soviet and
Eastern European officials have
again been giving currency to
this well-worn proposal. Foreign
Minister Gromyko tested Italian
reaction to this idea during his
recent visit to Rome.
Western alliance. The Russians
apparently want to foster the
belief that their dialogue with
De Gaulle will further his grand
design of a new Europe, free
from US hegemony and the threat
of war.
At the same time, the So-
viets have an eye fixed on Bonn
and there are indications that
concern over the growing influ-
ence of West Germany is mounting
in Moscow and Eastern Europe.
The Russians have warned repeat-
edly that any increase in West
Germany's role in NATO nuclear
affairs would be met with an
"appropriate response" from the
Warsaw Pact.
The results of Moscow's
talks with De Gaulle and the re-
action of Washington and Bonn
to his moves undoubtedly will
weigh heavily in Warsaw Pact
political discussions.
The discussions will also
provide an opportunity for the
Russians to demonstrate East
European support for Moscow's
Vietnam policy and to undercut
Chinese allegations of Russian
perfidy. However, no striking
initiative on Vietnam appears
likely to emerge from the meet-
These explorations comple-
ment Soviet encouragement of De
Gaulle's divisive role in the
ing.
SE CET
Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
%W SECRET VM*
Last week's ministerial
meeting of the European Launcher
Development Organization' (ELDO)*
adjourned until 9-10 June with
the future of the organization
still in doubt. At stake may be
the extent to which European
space developments will be car-
ried out multilaterally or through
emphasis on national programs with
greater military implications.
Uncertainty over ELDO's fu-
ture has arisen principally be-
cause of Britain's concern over
its share of the cost of providing
a European satellite launcher,
ELDO-A. The ELDO-A program is al-
ready two years behind schedule
and the cost may be double the
original estimate of $196 million.
Britain's share of ELDO costs is
about 40 percent. ELDO-A, the
only project to which ELDO is now
firmly committed, is a booster
whose obsolescence makes it in-
creasingly unattractive.
The other ELDO members hope
that the organization will sur-
vive, while recognizing that its
potential is small compared to
American and Soviet programs.
They hold that ELDO will create
the technological basis for fu-
ture space cooperation both within
Europe and with the US--and pos-
sibly with the USSR--and will
serve as a commercial stimulus
for Europe's scientific industries.
Pressures even within Britain are
not uniform. Some scientific
circles favor a Europe-wide ap-
p-roach, and an "independent"
European capability to launch
communications satellites.
There is also recognition of
the embarrassment to Britain of
abandoning a project it origi-
nally pressed the others to
accept--largely in order to re-
trieve its investment in the
Blue Streak rocket, which was
to become ELDO-A's first stage.
The possibility of using
ELDO-A to launch communications
satellites is behind a proposal
now being studied by the mem-
bers to spend an estimated
$90-$240 million to boost the
launcher's capacity. Decisions
on this proposal, and on an
equatorial launch site (the
choices are French Guiana, Port
Darwin in Australia, and an
Italian-proposed offshore base)
are expected to be made at
ELDO's June meeting.
The US has meanwhile made
tentative soundings on an offer
*Mem eUrs are the UK, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Australia, a nonpaying member whose contribution is the
use of its Woomera Range for launching facilities.
SECRET
SUMMARY 6 May. 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
SECRET
of assistance to the European
group, and the initial responses
have all been favorable. Prime
Minister Wilson's decision to
"stay the execution" of ELDO was
reportedly due to his interest
in the possibility of US coop-
oration. The US Embassy in
Paris believes the technologi-
cal and political benefits of
US cooperation could be deci-
sive in determining ELDO's fate.
SECRET
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 6 May 66
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
SECRET
An East German move to post-
pone an exchange of West and East
German party spokesmen affords
both sides additional time to con-
sider the complex political and
legal implications of the meet-
ings.
The proposed meetings grew
out of an exchange of letters be-
tween the East German Communist
party (SED) and the West German
Social Democratic Party (SPD)
early this year. In response
to an SED initiative, the SPD
suggested that Chairman Willy
Brandt and two deputy chairmen
begin the dialogue by addressing
a mid-May meeting in the East
German city of Chemnitz with a
return appearance of East German
leaders in West Germany the fol-
lowing week.
During "technical" dis-
cussions between SED and SPD
representatives on 29 and 30
April, however, the East Germans
suggested postponing the meet-
ings until July. They also held
to their original choice of Essen
as the site for their speaking
engagement in West Germany
rather than Hanover as desired
by the SPD.
Contacts of this sort are
consistent with the East German
claim that reunification must
be sought by the Germans them-
selves. The reasons for seek-
ing a postponement are not en-
tirely clear. In view of the
SPD insistence on full media
coverage for the meetings, the
East Germans may want more time
in which to evaluate the political
impact of the talks on the East
German population.
On the West German side, the
delay affords time for Bonn to
consider the legal problem aris-
ing from the apparent technical
culpability under West German law
of top East German leaders for
various actions such as their or-
ders to shoot persons attempting
to flee East Germany.
SPD leaders think such ex-
changes offer a significant op-
portunity to bring the two Ger-
manys closer..Many leaders of West
Ge=rmany's ruling Christian Demo-
cratic Union, however, are un-
enthusiastic. They are wary of
raising false hopes among the
population and unleashing a
flood of contacts which could
result in a significant upgrading
of the East German regime. Thus,
although formally approving the
talks, the government may not be
especially anxious to clear away
legal obstacles that may arise.
Sensing an unusual recep-
tiveness among West Germans to
increasing contacts with East
Germany, the SPD is eager that
the talks begin. A prolonged
delay could prove embarrassing
to the party. Should public
enthusiasm wane, opponents
would be encouraged to step up
their criticism of the SPD in-
itiative, possibly representing
it as new evidence of an adven-
turist tendency in Socialist
policy.
SECRET
6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
SECRET
POLISH HARASSMENT OF MILITARY ATTACHES
The month-long Polish secret
police harassment of US military
attaches has slackened since 21
April, but the Poles broadened
their harassment campaign to in-
clude the Dutch and the British
military attach6s. At least a
partial explanation for these ac-
tions is the Gomulka regime's un-
usual concern about and preoccu-
pation with recent signs of do-
mestic instability and tensions.
Evidence of domestic trou-
bles is provided by a widened po-
lice alert ordered in Poznan on
14 April after discovery of anti-
regime and prochurch pamphlets
which were said to have been
printed at the Cegielski works.
The traditionally militant work-
ers of this large factory sparked
the June 1956 "bread and freedom"
riots. Cegielski workers already
were reportedly disaffected be-
cause of forced contributions
for Vietnam relief. A measure
of the regime's alarm over these
developments is reflected by the
19 April visit to the plant of
politburo member and Defense Min-
ister Spychalski, who represents
Poznan in parliament.
A leading party editor re-
cently suggested to the US am-
bassador that the harassment of
the attachhs was related to
church-state tensions, and ob-
served without clarification
that there seemed to be some
"monkey business" going on. He
may have been referring to the
influence on party leaders of
hard-line secret police officials
who now, as in past periods of
domestic difficulties, have
sharply increased the vigilance
of the security apparatus. Be-
cause of deep-seated suspicions
about the activities and influ-
ence on the population of West-
ern diplomatic personnel, such
heightened vigilance often has
included harassment of them with-
out regard to the possible ad-
verse consequences.
The provocations against
Western attaches are probably
also intended to demonstrate
anew to party leaders the effi-
ciency and zeal of the secret
police. They have recently had
one spectacular failure in ex-
ercising control over dissidents
in the party.
Underlying the harassment
may also be an element of reac-
tion to US interest in Polish
domestic affairs, such as the
church's millennium celebrations.
In view of all these circum-
stances the regime probably will
not relax its close vigilance
until this period of domestic
insecurity is over.
SECRET
Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
SECRET %m e
Last August the USSR began
exporting its limited-all-weather
jet fighter--the MIG-21FL--to
non-Communist countries. Since
then, about 140 have been sent
outside the bloc. This model,
replacing the MIG-21 Fishbed day
fighter, is the only currently
produced Soviet jet fighter now
being exported to nonbloc coun-
tries. The USSR may soon, how-
ever, begin the export of its
SU-7 Fitter fighter bomber.
Egypt, which received the
first MIG-21FL exports to the
free world, now has at least 61.
The most recent delivery took
place in April.
During the last month Al-
geria received two shipments of
MIG-21FLs giving it an inventory
of ten of this model. Algerian
personnel who have undergone
training in the USSR are now re-
turning home. Completion of
training courses has often been
associated with the introduction
of major quantities of new mili-
tary equipment. Some of these
trainees apparently are asso-
ciated with the new fighters,
and others with surface-to-air
missile and naval programs in
Algeria.
Despite cool relations be-
tween Iraq and the USSR for the
past year, an Iraqi team is ne-
gotiating in Moscow for a new
arms agreement which will prob-
ably include additional MIG-21FLs.
Deliveries of major military
equipment under an earlier So-
viet-Iraqi military aid pact
were completed in December and
January when 18 MIG-21FLs and
two MIG-21 trainers arrived in
Basra.
Indonesia and Afghanistan
received the MIG-21FL during
Fate 1965 and it is believed
that the 38 MIG-21s delivered
to India earlier this year had
a limited-all-weather capability.
The USSR is still exporting
reconditioned MIG-15 Fagot and
MIG-17 Fresco jet fighters. Pro-
duction of these models ended
in the mid-1950s. Somalia re-
ceived two MIG-15s and four MIG-
].7s in December 1965 and may
have received three more air-
craft as part of the military
aid shipment which arrived in
N[ogadiscio in April.
The USSR recently agreed to
supply 5 MIG-17s to Cambodia in
an attempt to regain an influen-
tial position in Phnom Penh.
These aircraft are part of a
$2-million arms agreement con-
cluded in March.
SECRET
6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
SECRET
SYRIAN REGIME PUSHING CLOSER TIES WITH MOSCOW
The two-month-old Baath mil-
itary regime in Syria is making
a strenuous effort to cement
closer ties with the Soviet Un-
ion, which it probably hopes
will help to bolster its own
shaky internal position.
A major economic agreement
which was signed in Moscow on
22 April will provide $150-175
million in Soviet credits for
construction of Syria's long-
planned Euphrates Dam project.
The Syrian delegation which ne-
gotiated the loan--the first new
Soviet commitment to Syria since
1957--was greeted warmly by Mos-
cow and the pact was enthusias-
tically publicized in both capi-
tals. At the same time, the So-
viot press has joined the Syr-
ians in reporting on alleged US
plotting against the "progres-
sive regime" in Damascus.
The secretary general of the Syr-
ian Communist Party, Khalid Bak-
dash, has been allowed to take
up residence in Damascus. The
regime may still be unwilling
to allow domestic Communists
real freedom of action or to
recognize the party as a legal
organization. The one Communist
brought into the cabinet in
March, Minister of Communica-
tions Sami Attiyah, is a compara-
tive nonentity. He had already
served under a more moderate
Baath regime as a member of Syr-
ia's quasi-legislative body.
The present Syrian regime
has taken no new initiatives in
the way of a domestic economic
program, probably because it
still is preoccupied with fac-
tionalism within its own ranks.
In three years of Baathist rule,
Syria's economy has already been
largely nationalized.
NEW INCIDENTS ON ISRAEL'S BORDERS
A new cycle of terrorism,
retaliatory raids, and border
clashes along Israel's borders
with Jordan and Syria has raised
tensions in the area.
Following a period of rela-
tive calm, the Syrian-supported
Fatah organization perpetrated
three separate acts of sabotage
beginning on 11 April. Israel,
in retaliation, raided alleged
Fatah bases in Jordan on 29 and
.10 April. Israeli border units
also have recently clashed with
Jordanian troops once and with
S'ECRE
Page 1 S W1.EKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
SECRET sow
Syrian units twice, most recently
on 1 May.
Fatah, an Arabic acronym for
the "Palestine Liberation Movement,"
was formed about 1958 by Pales-
tinians who were disgusted with
the inaction of Arab governments
on "liberating" their homeland
from Israel. It operates inde-
pendently of the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization sponsored by
the Arab League. Fatah's objec-
tive apparently is to force an
Arab showdown with Israel by pro-
voking Israeli retaliation.
Fatah continues to operate
mainly from clandestine bases in
Jordan despite that country's ef-
forts to suppress it, but it has
also used Lebanese territory.
Syria has provided training facil-
ities and a propaganda outlet.
Syria probably hopes to enhance
its image as an aggressive cham-
pion of the Palestinian cause and,
by contrast, to embarrass the other
Arab states which are more timid
about antagonizing Israel. The
Israeli Government holds the Jor-
danians responsible for not curb-
ing Fatah more effectively.
While the situation along the
Syrian border remains tense, the
possibility of further incidents
along the Jordanian border has
been reduced by King Husayn's de-
cision not to retaliate "at this
time." Despite high Jordanian
casualties--reportedly 11 dead and
five wounded--Husayn has resisted
heavy domestic pressure to react
because of Israel's preponderant
military strength. However, should
he fail to respond to any future
Israeli raids, he would risk po-
litical trouble at home and propa-
25X1
ganda assaults on his Arab patriot-
ism from Cairo and other Arab
capitals.
RECENT ISRAELI-ARAB BORDER RAIDS AND CLASHES
- Israeli raids
4 Arab raids
Border clashes
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 May 66
LEBANON I)
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
SECRET
NASIR SPEECH PERILS YEMEN PEACE PROSPECTS
In his traditional May Day
speech President Nasir once more
resorted to bombast to cover his
frustration in failing to get
the Yemen problem settled on his
own terms. Despite his bellicos-
ity toward Saudi Arabia and his
other Arab "enemies" Nasir's ac-
tual moves are still in accord
with a defensive strategy.
Nasir's chief target was
King Faysal, whom he called the
"bearded one" and a "bird-brain"
who thought he could build a mod-
ern army and air force in Saudi
Arabia. "We will destroy
these... aircraft in five min-
utes," Nasir boasted. "They
will never be able to form an
army which can stand against us."
This speech was in large
part an extension of his previous
speeches in February and March,
but Nasir used stronger language
against Faysal and Saudi Arabia
than he had done before. Also
For the first time, he identi-
fied the Saudi border towns of
Jizan and Najran as "bases of ag-
gression," saying that should
further aggression occur, he
would not only strike them but
occupy them. In any event, they
were really Yemeni, he said,
having been stolen by the Saudis
in 1930.
Nasir's object in making
these statements, if indeed there
was one beyond impressing his
own admirers with an oratorical
display, may have been to in-
timidate the Saudis. However,
the taunts and jibes he hurled
at Faysal will serve to impede
further the kind of personal rec-
onciliation which must take place
between the two leaders if a
Yemen peace plan can ever be ef-
fective. At the moment, it ap-
pears the Kuwaiti mediation ef-
forts are going ahead despite
Saudi anger and Kuwaiti embar-
rassment with Nasir's speech.
CV
SECRET
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
SECRET
ALGERIA MODERATES POLICIES UNDER BOUMEDIENE
In the nearly 11 months
since he overthrew the radical
Ben Bella regime in Algeria,
Col. Houari Boumediene has at
least partially diverted the
country into a non-Marxist
course free of the Ben Bella
personalism. Boumediene and his
associates have sought to de-
velop a broad consensus, exclud-
ing only extremists like the
Communists and the Ben Bellists
on the left and the old-line
bourgeois and preindependence
politicians on the right.
Although the regime avows
its socialist character, it has
shifted from Ben Bella's far
left toward the center. The
dominant group within the gov-
ernment is made up of moderate
reformists favorably disposed
toward De Gaulle's France and
other nonsocialist countries.
At the same time, the government
maintains a practical, basically
nonideological relationship with
the USSR, which continues to
provide the bulk of equipment
and training for the Algerian
Army. Potential Soviet-financed
economic projects are being re-
appraised, however, with the
strong possibility that alter-
nate assistance will be solicited.
A slight warming in the po-
litical atmosphere occurred af-
ter Boumediene's December visit
to Moscow and the establishment
of party-to-party contacts by
a low-level delegation from Al-
geria's National Liberation
Front (FLN) in February. This
was all but canceled out, how-
ever, by the walkout of the high-
level FLN observer delegation
from the 23rd Soviet Party Con-
gress when it became evident
that the banned Algerian Commu-
nist Party would be represented.
Boumediene seems gradually
to have gained self-assurance
and to have somewhat consolidated
his position. He retains the
loyalty of the army, which re-
mains the most significant fac-
tor in the Algerian power equa-
tion. He has managed to balance
off rival cliques vying for au-
thority and favor. However,
the collegial system has brought
excessive dilly-dallying in de-
cision making and implementation,
resulting in widespread disil-
lusionment throughout the coun-
try, particularly among those
groups which expected the new
regime to give a lift to the
economy.
Boumediene's opponents are
largely the Communists and left-
ist intellectuals, but they are
divided and factionalized. The
30 April prison break of Hocine
A:it Ahmed, whose Kabylie-based
Front of Socialist Forces (FFS)
had challenged the consolidation
of personal power by Ben Bella,
has caused the Boumediene re-
g=ime to lose face. Although
A_Lt Ahmed probably will be un-
able to reactivate the FFS maquis
to any significant extent, the
political scene will remain
troubled so long as he is at
large. Moreover, the Algerian
Government would take a dim
view were Morocco, Tunisia, or
France to give him sanctuary.
The one inevitable result of the
escape is to arouse speculation
regarding Ben Bella, whose es-
cape would provide a real head-
ache for the regime.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
SECRET
INSTABILITY CONTINUES IN CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) REGIME
Political infighting in the
radical Congo (Brazzaville) re-
gime evidently has not yet re-
sulted in a clear-cut victory for
either the extremist forces or
for more moderate forces led by
President Massamba-Debat.
No successor has yet been
named to Premier Lissouba. who
resigned as of 15 April. There
are strong signs that it will be
Ambroise Noumzalay, generally re-
garded as one of the regime's
leading extremists. Massamba-
Debat's May Day speech neverthe-
less criticized those who would
apply a Soviet or Chinese form of
socialism to the Brazzaville
situation--a clear dig at the ex-
tremists.
Moderates and radicals alike
appear apprehensive over the pos-
sibility of an army coup, but
there are at present no indica-
tions that such a move is in the
offing. The army is itself split
into factions and is generally
passive.
Brazzaville leaders also ap-
pear disturbed by the govern-
ment's fiscal outlook. In his
speech Massamba-Debat pointed out
that the budgetary deficit must
be reduced so that necessary fi-
nancial assistance can be forth-
coming from abroad. He praised
French and Common Market assist-
ance on which the country is
heavily dependent and compared
it favorably with aid from the
Communist countries. He prob-
ably was mindful of upcoming fi-
nancial negotiations with the
French, who for their part, seem
to be basically gratified by cur-
rent trends within the regime.
The Bolivian military Junta
has extended from 3 May to 3
June the deadline for registering
candidates for the 3 July na-
tional elections in an attempt
to obtain greater participation.
Rene Barrientos Ortuno remains
the only presidential candidate,
and his electoral vehicle, the
Bolivian Revolutionary Front,
is the only political group that
so far definitely plans to par-
ticipate. This is a matter of
great concern to Barrientos and
junta president Ovando, who fear
widespread abstention by the po-
litical parties will prejudice
the legitimacy of a Barrientos
victory. They doubt that a gov-
ernment elected without opposi-
tion can long endure.
Specifically, the extension
is intended to give Victor Andrade
of the moderate faction of the Na-
tionalist Revolutionary Movement
an opportunity to rally the party
around his leadership, hold a
nominating convention, and in-
scribe candidates on the elec-
toral rolls. Andrade plans to
hold the convention in late May.
SEG..dRE l
Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
SECRET Ifto
The junta on 3 May declared
a general amnesty for all exiles
and political prisoners to neu-
tralize opposition charges that
the government is not providing
a free, democratic climate for the
elections. Actually, most of the
exiles had already returned to
Bolivia, including labor boss
Juan Lechin and former president
Tiernan Silos Zuazo--half brother
of Barrientos' vice-presidential
running mate, Luis Adolfo Silos
'Salinas. Some exiles, such as
Victor Paz Estenssoro, have
criminal charges pending against
them, and the government has 25X1
made it clear that it reserves
the right to arrest these people
should they return
After a month in office, the
interim regime of Provisional
President Yerovi in Ecuador re-
mains weak, unwilling to tackle
problems, and tolerant of Commu-
nist activities.
may return soon from Buenos Aires
to press his aspirations for
a fifth entry to the palace.
As maneuvering gains momentum
for probable September elections
to a constituent assembly,
politics will grow chaotic.
Government finances remain
critical. Yerovi has attempted
to meet the budgetary problem
primarily by firing employees
and curtailing services and
development, rather than by
politically unpopular revenue
measures. The usually stable
currency has declined sharply
as a result of a decree requir-
ing use of free market dollars
for certain categories of imports.
Although the important Rad-
ical Liberal Party appears dedi-
cated to the principle of no
presidential re-election, four-
time president Velasco Ibarra
has ~ re-
signed and been replaced by
Fausto Cordovez Chiriboga, a
25X6)X1
civilian with previous ministe-
rial and legislative experience.
Cordovez has often been mentioned
as a possible interim president
and presidential candidate of
the right.
The military has abstained
from political pressure, but
would be obliged to intervene
if Yerovi carried out his
threats to resign.
SECRET
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved- For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
SECRET
Peacekeeping duties in Santo
Domingo have now been assumed by
Dominican national police and
army units, and the Inter-Ameri-
can Peace Force (IAPF) has moved
most of its troops outside the
capital.
The provisional government
has begun an attempt to bring
about the IAPF's departure from
the country prior to 1 July when
an elected government is sched-
uled to take office. Without
prior consultation with the OAS
Committee in Santo Domingo,
President Garcia Godoy on 1 May
dispatched a personal represent-
ative to visit the heads of
state of the OAS member nations
in what Foreign Minister .Perez
announced as an effort to "pro-
mote unanimous meeting of minds
on the question of withdrawal."
The US Embassy views Garcia Go-
doy's unilateral move as an ef-
fort to assure his own political
future by appearing as the man
who restored Dominican sover-
eignty.
ary Party (PRD) with instigating
attacks on his followers by
young ruffians. He acknowledged
that some of his own supporters
have been guilty of similar tac-
tics.
The US Embassy reports that
Balaguer's campaign appears to
have picked up momentum and has
for the first time placed Bosch
and the PRD on the defensive.
Balaguer's Reformist Party has
come down hard on the issue of
the PRD's favored position in
the government-owned sugar in-
dustry and reiterated its fear
of fraudulent elections because
of alleged irregularities in the
issuing of identification cards
which are used as a voter regis-
tration device.
Political verbiage and vio
lence picked up considerably in
the past week as the campaign
entered its final month. Juan
Bosch and Joaquin Balaguer have
sharpened their speeches against
each other and party activists
have clashed in a number of iso-
lated incidents throughout the
country. One incident in the
Cibao Valley resulted in one
death and numerous injuries.
Balaguer has addressed himself
publicly to this problem, charg
ing Bosch's Dominican Revolution-
The Reformist Party is mak-
ing a strong pitch to the coun-
try's poorer rural elements by
sending campaigners to the inte-
rior. It is trying to appeal to
women by billing itself as the
party of peace.
Bosch's campaign is receiv-
ing a boost from the public pre-
diction by Dominican and foreign
observers that he will win, but
there are some indications that
the PRD may have trouble main-
taining its pace of recent weeks.
A press report from a knowledge-
able reporter has for the first
time hinted that Bosch may plan
to leave his well-guarded home
for the hustings in mid-May.
The much-discussed alli-
ance between Rafael Bonnelly,the
SECRET
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 May 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
SECRET
National Integration Movement
candidate, and Balaguer has not
come about as yet.~_
Under the threat of physical
harm, the rector of the National
University of Mexico and other
top university officials resigned
on 27 April. The violence that
erupted the previous day at Mex-
ico's largest educational insti-
tution was the culmination of a
student strike that had simmered
since 14 March. Students still
control some school buildings
and are using the leverage this
gives them to try to assure ap-
pointment of a new director sym-
pathetic to their demands for
administrative and curricular
changes.
Perhaps to counter the po-
litically embarrassing rumors
of its involvement, the govern-
ment gave heavy publicity to
charges against an extremely
weak Trotskyite group which it
a'Lleged had exploited the uni-
versity strike and sought to
"establish a Communist govern-
ment" in Mexico. The charges
may also be a harbinger of a
crackdown on this extremist ele-
ment, the members of which had
been troublesome during Presi-
dent Johnson's visit to Mexico.
Apparently inspired by the
student success at the National
University, students have struck
at the University of Puebla, de-
manding the resignation of the
rector there and certain other
officials. Other students
around the country have report-
edly pledged support for the
Puebla effort, and Puebla police
are alerted for violence. Should
this student activity continue
to spread, the government will
probably have to intervene, de-
spite the extreme reluctance of
elected officials to provoke the
displeasure of the politically
minded youth.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 1'6 May'66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
SECRET
Carlos Lleras Restrepo, who
was elected President of Colombia
on 1 May by a two-to-one major-
ity, will be in a favorable posi-
tion to carry out his moderate
reform programs.
According to nearly com-
plete but unofficial returns,
Lleras received about 1.7 mil-
lion votes against 700,000 for
Jose Jaramillo Giraldo, his only
opponent, who was backed by the
National Popular Al-
liance (ANP). Slightly
more than one third of
the eligible voters ex-
ercised their suffrage,
a larger percentage
than expected. The
vote for Lleras was
substantially higher
than that received by
President Valencia
four years ago, which
further strengthens
Lleras' mandate.
At the same time,
Jaramillo received
more votes than did the
ANP in the March con-
gressional elections.
This will permit the ANP to claim
that its strength is constantly
growing.
The newly elected Congress
convenes on 20 July, and Lleras
will be inaugurated on7 August.
By strict party definition Lleras
will lack the two-thirds major-
ity needed for important legis-
lation, but he appears confident
of his ability to build a work-
ing majority by attracting de-
fectors or splitting the opposi-
tion.
Lleras will begin his four-
year term in fairly propitious
circumstances: the problem of
violence which has plagued the
country for years is largely un-
der control, the political situa-
tion is stable, and economic con-
ditions have shown some improve-
ment. However, Lleras
can expect some serious
congressional opposition,
and his approach to eco-
nomic problems, which
remain serious, can be
expected to affect fu-
ture political stabil-
ity.
Lleras is himself
an economist who advo-
cates Alliance for Prog-
ress goals and who will
probably devote consid-
erable effort to solv-
ing such persistent
problems as unemploy-
ment, inflation, and
balance of payments. In
so doing he will be limited by
the interests of Colombia's pow-
erful conservative elite.
Nevertheless, Lleras prob-
ably will have several quiet
months in office to prepare his
administration to cope with
these problems.
SECRET
Page 26 WEEKLY SUMMARY
,.6 May. 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4
Vw SECRET
SECRE";f
Approved For Release 2008/06/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300010001-4