PEKING'S SETBACKS IN INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005200080002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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Of all China's recent reverses abroad, probably
the most serious has been the elimination of pro-
Communist elements from positions of power in Dja-
karta. The struggle between Sukarno and the army
appears all but resolved, and it is clear that events
of the past six months have drastically reduced In-
donesia's usefulness to Peking in both the govern-
ment and party spheres. The anti-Communist generals
appear to be consolidating their position, and the
course of events cannot now easily be reversed. Three
Chinese consulates and the New China News Agency of-
fices have been closed ?and an exodus of Chinese Com-
munist diplomats and technicians is under way.
The pro-Chinese policies of Sukarno are being
discontinued, and Peking's staunch supporter, Foreign
Minister Subandrio, is under arrest. Indonesia can
no longer front for the Chinese in the international
arena or run interference at international gatherings.
The pro-Chinese Indonesian Communist Party has been
weakened and driven underground, and its fate may be
giving Communists elsewhere second thoughts about
too close identification with Peking.
Chinese losses in Indonesia
assume the proportions of a ma-
jor diplomatic debacle when
viewed in light of the close
ties that existed between Peking
and Djakarta prior to last Oc-
tober's abortive coup. Sino-
Indonesian relations had never
been better than they were in
mid-1965. The growing mutuality
of interests led Sukarno to talk
of Indonesia as part of a new
Asian "axis." Sukarno was giv-
ing the pro-Peking Indonesian
Communist Party (PKi) an ever
more influential voice in gov-
ernment affairs, and Djakarta's
foreign policy had increasingly
come to coincide with that of
Communist China, especially in
applying pressure to the US and
British positions in Southeast
Asia.
Peking played assiduously
upon Sukarno's anti-Western bias,
his international ambitions, and
his assessment that the West's
strength in Southeast Asia was
declining while China's in-
creased. The Chinese exploited
Indonesian pretensions with an
adroit combination of flattery
and top-level personal diplomacy.
Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister
Chen Yi repeatedly visited In-
donesia, and Chief of State Liu
Shao-chi made his first foray
outside the bloc when he visited
Djakarta in April 1963. Liu's
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trip served to dramatize Peking's
support for Indonesia's confron-
tation with Malaysia and may
well have accelerated the PKI
shift to consistent and explicit
support for Peking in the Sino-
Soviet dispute.
Sino-Indonesian relations
in both government and party
spheres became progressively
warmer during 1964, culminating
with Chen Yi's November visit
and a new $50-million credit,
$10 million of which was in much-
needed unrestricted hard currency.
The following spring Chou shared
center stage with Sukarno at the
festivities marking the 10th an-
niversary of the Bandung Confer-
ence, and politburo member Peng
Chen headed the Chinese delega-
tion to the PKI anniversary cele-
brations. By last summer there
were almost constant visits to
China by lower level Indonesian
officials, and it was not uncom-
mon for several different minis-
terial-level groups to be tour-
ing mainland China at the same
time.
Even when relations were
at their best, however, Peking
probably did not fully trust Su-
karno or regard Sino-Indonesian
relations in other than a context
of short-term expediency. Su-
karno remained strongly nation-
alistic, and his consuming ego-
tism appears to have kept him
confident that he could charm
and manipulate the Chinese Com-
munists, rather than the reverse.
Indonesia's withdrawal from
the United Nations in January
1965 was an initiative that ap-
pears to have been taken inde-
pendently of Peking, but it was
a move promptly and resoundingly
applauded by the Chinese. Su-
karno had long been talking of
a Conference on Newly Emerging
Forces (CONEFO), and coincident
with Indonesia's withdrawal from
the UN, Peking gave the CONEFO
project a shot in the arm.
Last spring China was as-
sisting in the construction of
a complex of office buildings in
Djakarta, and both Chinese and
Indonesian officials implied
that they hoped to create in
CONEFO a rival to the UN organiza-
tion. The Chinese technicians
have now been withdrawn, and Su-
karno's pet project remains a
jumble of partially completed
cinder-block buildings.
Front Groups
CONEFO never got off the
ground, and the close working re-
lationship in other front groups
and international forums where
the Chinese and Indonesians were
associated has come to an end.
This has been a serious loss to
China.
Peking could usually count
on the Indonesians to second Chi-
nese motions or front for Peking's
representatives in the devious
maneuverings that often mark the
proceedings of front gatherings.
As the Sino-Soviet dispute deep-
ened in the early 1960s, Peking's
representatives at such meetings
became increasingly strident in
their attacks on Moscow, and the
Indonesians, along with the Japa-
nese, provided a reliable pro-Chi-
nese claque.
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When the Afro-Asian Soli-
darity Organization (AAPSO)
met at Moshi, Tanzania, in Feb-
ruary 1963, it became clear
that Peking hoped to promote
rival "international democratic
organizations" under its own
control, and Djakarta came to
play a key role in this effort.
With a strong assist from the
Indonesians the pro-Peking Afro-
Asian Journalists Association
(AAJA) was set up in 1963.
The same year the prepara-
tory committee for the Soviet-
dominated World Federation of
Democratic Youth was to meet in
Djakarta, but Sukarno, with
obvious encouragement from Pe-
king, quietly canceled the
gathering and substituted a
Youth Solidarity Conference
tailored to trumpet his own
anti-Malaysian propaganda--
neatly upstaging the Soviets.
The Chinese also sought to
bypass the USSR by establishing
a rival to the Moscow-dominated
World Federation of Trade Un-
ions, and the initiative pur-
ported to come from Indonesia.
This effort, however, ran into
serious difficulties. The Jap-
anese backed off, and the Afro-
Asian Trade-organization was
stillborn in Djakarta in late
1963.
Although Sino-Indonesian
efforts to create independent
fronts continued, there were no
conspicuous successes last year.
The latest developments in In-
donesia, moreover, have dealt
a serious blow to those front
groups which maintained offices
in Djakarta. At least three
have pulled out and set up shop
in Peking. Shortly after the
October coup, several employees
of the Afro-Asian Journalist
Association's secretariat in
Djakarta,were arrested, and a
campaign of petty harassment
made day-to-day operations nearly
impossible. In December, right-
wing journalists physically took
over the secretariat's offices,
and the AAJA announced that its
secretariat was withdrawing
"temporarily" to Peking. The
Indonesian Committee for Afro-
Asian Solidarity (IAASC) has also
pulled out.
The authorities in Djakarta
recently revoked the passports
of the pro-Chinese IAASC repre-
sentatives,and it appears an
IAASC-i - ile will be set up in
Peking.
The Malayan Na-
tional Liberation League (MNLL),
an offshoot of the outlawed
Malayan Communist Party, set up
a mission in Djakarta more than
a year ago. This, too, has re-
cently been shut down, and a
new MNLL office has just opened
in Peking.
The Indonesian Communist Party
The PKI has been badly
mauled and. is now outlawed. Some
of its leaders may also have at-
tempted to seek asylum in China.
Party chairman Aidit was killed
after the coup attempt last fall,
as were his deputy Njote and many
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lesser party leaders. Victims
of the massacres that followed
the coup are reported to number
in the hundreds of thousands.
While many reports are undoubt-
edly exaggerated, a quarter of
a million leftists may well have
been killed, and the Communist
party apparatus has been dealt
a blow from which it is not
likely to recover very soon.
Moreover, General Suharto gives
every indication that repression
3 the PKI will continue and
at Chinese Communist diplo-
mats' contacts with party mem-
bers will be restricted.
Last summer the PKI was the
largest Communist party support-
ing Peking in the Sino-Soviet
dispute. With a claimed member-
ship of 3 million and with an
additional 12 million in closely
aligned front groups, the PKI
was larger and more influential
in its own country than any pro-
Moscow nonbloc party. Echoing
Chinese Communist party pro-
nouncements, PJ~I leadersrspeeches
provided ready-made copy which
was regularly reprinted and re-
broadcast by Peking propagandists.
PKI leaders were outspoken in
their criticism of Khrushchev's
moves toward an anti-China con-
ference, and they steadfastly
refused to attend the so-called
"consultative" meeting convened
in Moscow in March 1965 by Khru-
shchev's successors.
The PKI, now in complete
disarray, is not worth exploiting,
and the party's dramatic eclipse
may also in a different and
broader sense prove a setback
for Peking in the international
Communist movement. Communists
abroad sympathetic to Peking may
begin to have second thoughts
about too close identification
with the Chinese.
It is still impossible to
determine the extent of Chinese
involvement in the coup attempt
Peking's
reaction after 1 October suggests
that the timing took the Chinese
by surprise.
There is little question
that Peking was anxious to have
the PKI gain a predominant posi-
tion in the Indonesian Govern-
ment. It seems likely that
around the beginning of last
year the Chinese began to be con-
cerned about the "succession"
problem in Djakarta--specifically
how to ensure that the Indonesian
Communists would come out on
top in the struggle for power
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After the coup the Indone-
sian military claimed to have
discovered large caches of Chi-
nese arms, but there was little
mention of this during the
trials held early in 1966. More-
over, many of the Communists who
did attempt to resist during the
post-coup skirmishing were poorly
armed. The Indonesian Army prob-
ably greatly exaggerated the re-
ported caches as part of their
campaign to implicate Peking di-
rectly in the coup preparations.
The armed forces are known to
have deliberately circulated re-
ports of Chinese involvement and
appear to have been very suc-
cessful in mobilizing the strong
anti-Chinese-popular sentiment
in Indonesia. The desire to
avoid any move which might fan
such feelings may have been one
of the principal reasons why
Peking moved cautiously in the
weeks immediately following the
coup.
Peking's Reaction to the Coup
Public Chinese reaction to
the 1 October coup was slow in
coming and was such as to sug-
gest that Peking was determined
to wait cautiously until the di-
rection of events in Indonesia
became clear. The first public
notice taken by the Chinese was
a message from Liu Shao-chi and
Chou En-lai to Sukarno on 3 Oc-
tober. It stated that they had
learned from Djakarta broadcasts
that Sukarno was in good health
and expressed the hope that under
Sukarno's leadership Indonesia
would continue opposing "imperial-
ism" and "colonialism."
The Chinese omitted any
reference to the coup attempt
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or its aftermath, and everyone
reading the message in isola-
tion would have been left ig-
norant that anything unusual
had occurred in Djakarta. The
message was probably intended
as a token of support for Su-
karno, and Peking at this time
clearly hoped to strengthen his
determination to oppose mili-
tary moves against the PKI.
The wording, however, appeared
designed to avoid antagonizing
the army, since the Chinese at
this time apparently still -felt
they might be able to work with
the military if the latter suc-
ceeded in consolidating power.
The first significant Chi-
nese response was a Peking note
on 18 October which protested
the entry and search of the Chi-
nese counselor's office in Dja-
karta by Indonesian troops.
The protest note--obviously
prompted by the event itself--
accused the Indonesian Govern-
ment of "condoning the increas-
ingly unruly anti-Chinese ac-
tivities." Nonetheless, Peking
still maintained its cautious
wait-and-see position, and the
note contained no specific
criticism of the military lead-
ership.
On that day the New China News
Agency (NCNA) released a long
roundup summarizing develop-
ments since the coup in terms
hostile to the military leader-
ship. On 20 October NCNA flatly
asserted that "Indonesia's army
authorities" and Indonesian
"rightists" were attempting to
"sabotage" relations between
Peking and Djakarta and that
they were "catering to the needs
of the US imperialist and its
lackeys."
From this point there were
increasingly violent student
demonstrations against Chinese
consular facilities, and Peking
responded with additional harsh
notes of protest. With their
strongest asset, the PKI, shat-
tered and Sukarno absorbed in
fighting for his political life,
the Chinese Communists really
had little means of influencing
the sitution. Throughout the
past winter they saw no alterna-
tive but to continue their vehe-
ment propaganda criticism of the
Indonesian military and to main-
tain a steady drumbeat of diplo-
matic protest.
By 19 October, however,
the Chinese had apparently con-
cluded that the Indonesian Army
was determined to continue its
anti-PKI, anti-Chinese campaign
and that nothing would be lost
by openly attacking the army.
The Chinese probably take
a very dim view of the immediate
future in Indonesia and it seems
unlikely that Peking is counting
on any significant improvement
in the situation for some time.
General Suharto's assumption of
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power in March appears to have
been accepted by the Chinese
as one of the "twists and turns"
in the path toward eventual
revolutionary victory.
China's three consulates
and the NCNA office in Indonesia
have been forced to close and
an orderly exodus of Chinese
technicians has started. The
activities of Chinese diplomats
and consular officials have
been severely restricted and
they now must get police permis-
sion even for visits to Indonesian
government offices. There are no
indications, however, that Peking
intends to be provoked into a for-
mal break with Indonesia, and the
Chinese are probably settling down
for a period of "correct" though
far from cordial relations with
the military government while
waiting for what Peking regards
as an "inevitable" chance for better.
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