WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005200080001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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1 April:1966
,wzl, OCT. No, 0283/66
State Dept. review,
completed
DIA review
completed.
Copy No.
1' 7'F L INTELLI N E AGENCY
OFFICE CAF CURT ENrt INTELLIGENCE
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(Information as of noon EST, 31 March 1966)
VIETNAM
The Ky government attempted this week to gain the
support of religious and political elements for its
compromise plan for civilian government. In the
northern part of South Vietnam, however, continuing
antigovernment activity took on more anti-US overtones.
In combat, the Viet Cong suffered some of their
heaviest losses of the war but maintained a high
rate of activity. North Vietnamese and Liberation
Front delegations are attending the Soviet Party
Congress, but Hanoi appears to be attempting to steer
a middle-of-the-road course. The Communists are ex-
panding their attacks on US "war crimes" in Vietnam.
GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS
Western delegates at Geneva seem to be adopting the
Soviet theme that the possibility of West German
participation in a NATO nuclear force is the chief
obstacle to a nonproliferation treaty.
Page
BREZHNEVtS REPORT TO THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS
The Soviet leader's keynote address indicated plans
to continue along present lines in foreign policy
matters. Domestically, Brezhnev intends to reassert
the moral authority of the party in Soviet life.
Economic guidelines included faster development of
consumer goods and services.
SOVIETS EASING TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON US ATTACHES 8
Soviet officials are permitting US military attaches
to make trips previously rejected. The travel re-
laxations appear to be part of a Soviet trend toward
freer exchange with the US than in the, recent past in
some military matters.
CROP PROSPECTS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 9
The USSR and Eastern Europe can expect fair harvests
of winter crops. Prospects are poor in Communist China
and North Vietnam, and China's grain shortage will be
further aggravated.
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EASTERN EUROPEAN MILITARY BUDGETS INCREASE
All Communist countries of Eastern Europe except
Hungary and Albania will increase their military
expenditures in 1966, according to published budgets.
Yugoslavia has scheduled the largest increase.
ALBANIAN REGIME RESHUFFLES GOVERNMENT
Communist Party chief Hoxha has strengthened his and
the party's hold over the government administrative
machinery by an extensive government reorganization.
CHINESE EARTHQUAKES CAUSE EXTENSIVE LOSSES
Three recent earthquakes in northern China apparently
have resulted in heavy loss of life and extensive
property damage. A supply line to Vietnam may have
been damaged.
CHINESE VISITORS ENTHUSIASTICALLY WELCOMED IN PAKISTAN 15
The Ayub regime has treated the Chinese Communist
visitors--President Liu Shao-Chi and Foreign
Minister Chen Yi--correctly ans cautiously, but the
public reaction has been enthusiastic.
INDIA ATTEMPTING TO IMPROVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY
Although not developing nuclear weapons, India is
seeking to ensure the availability of fissionable
material for any future weapons program.
REVISED INDONESIAN CABINET ANNOUNCED
The new lineup is a compromise which pleases no one,
but army chief Suharto and his civilian colleagues
believe it will temporarily serve their purposes.
SE+C'1ET
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SOVIET RELATIONS WITH MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONS IMPROVING
The USSR has recently taken steps toward better
relations with several Middle Eastern countries.
A number of new economic and military agreements
can be expected in the next few months.
GENERAL SUNAY ELECTED PRESIDENT OF TURKEY
The 66-year-old Sunay's election by the Grand Na-
tional Assembly was virtually unopposed and should
help to restore confidence and stability both within
the government and throughout the country.
Europe
DURABILITY OF NEW ITALIAN GOVERNMENT UNCERTAIN
Premier Moro's latest center-left coalition faces
the same power struggles and differences among
Christian Democrats which brought down the last
Italian government.
NATO IDENTIFIES PROBLEMS IN FRENCH CONFRONTATION
A 29 March meeting by the 14 allies and a study by
SACEUR have identified some political and military
problems raised by French moves against NATO.
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Western Hemisphere
DOMINICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 23
The outlook for elections on 1 June remains promising,
but there is still no certainty that Bosch will run.
NEW PRESIDENT NAMED IN ECUADOR POLITICAL CRISIS 24
President Yerovi will face the same problems, chiefly
in the economic field, which the preceding military
junta failed to solve. Current instability will
probably force the postponement of elections scheduled
for 3 July.
UNREST, ANTIGOVERNMENT CRITICISM INCREASE IN BRAZIL 26
A two-party political system has been officially
approved, but new unrest and sniping from both left
and right are reducing chances for political stability
in the near future.
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The military government under
Premier Ky attempted this week
to gain the support of various
religious and political elements
for its compromise plan for even-
tual civilian government. In the
northern part of the country,
however, unchecked antigovernment
activity took on increasing anti-
American overtones.
Late last week the military
Directorate agreed to the crea-
tion of a constitutional prepara-
tory committee whose sole respon-
sibility would be to draft a con-
stitution for a national referen-
dum. The inclusion of elected
provincial and municipal council
members on the committee was the
major concession to the Buddhists,
who have demanded that some form
of popular representation be uti-
lized in the transition to civil-
ian government.
The government effort to ob-
tain support from religious sects
has thus far had little success
among Catholic leaders. The liai-
son bureau of Saigon's Catholic
archdiocese on 29 March issued
a moderately worded communique`
on civilian government, which
served to tone down earlier criti-
cisms of the Ky government made
by the militant Father Quynh.
The US Embassy reported, however,
that a number of Catholics appar-
ently are having serious doubts
about the ability of the Ky gov-
ernment to survive current Bud-
dhist pressures, and prefer not
to be associated too closely with
it.
The attitudes of the various
Buddhist leaders toward the gov-
ernment plan continue to vary.
Buddhist Institute chairman Tam
Chau has made no direct public
statement on the compromise, but
has attempted to exert a moderat-
ing influence on the Buddhists in
Saigon. However, at least one
other ranking monk in the capital
does not appear to favor the com-
promise, and one small street
demonstration occurred in Saigon
for the first time last weekend.
On 31 March, some 3,000-4,000
persons attended another antigov-
ernment meeting, and further
demonstrations inspired by mili-
tant Buddhists in the capital re-
main a distinct possibility.
However, the center of agita-
tion continues to be in I Corps, in-
spired by the militant Buddhist
followers of Tri Quang and abetted
by the disgruntled supporters of
former corps commander General
Thi. Speeches and radiobroadcasts
in Hue and Da Nang during the week
rejected the government's compro-
mise offer. Moreover, increas-
ingly strong criticisms of the
US political position in Vietnam
became evident. Student agita-
tors seized on incidents involv-
ing US personnel in Hue and Da Nang
on 26 and 30 March, increasing
tensions in the area. Although
Tri Quang apparently has suffi-
cient influence to halt the pro-
test activities should he so de-
cide, there are no signs that the
agitation will soon abate.
The problem of restoring
governmental authority in I Corps
will continue even if national
religious and political figures
agree to the government's plan
for civilian control. Thus far,
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 Apr 66
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the government has not engaged in
a test of strength there, but Pre-
mier Ky has publicly stated that
strong measures will soon be used
if the agitation continues.
a South Vietnamese armored compound
near the capital of Binh Duong Prov-
ince. A Viet Cong force wearing gov-
ernment uniforms managed to infil-
trate the compound, and killed or
wounded some 90 government troops
and captured an M-41 tank while los-
ing about 70 killed. A US force
searching the area the following
day sustained casualties of five
killed and 15 wounded during a clash
with an enemy unit. Viet Cong losses
were unknown, and at the end of the
week, the tank still remained in
enemy hands.
Military Developments in
South Vietnam
A record number of allied op-
erations last week inflicted heavy
losses upon the Viet Cong. The VC
in turn maintained a high level of
military initiative.
During the week ending 26 March,
enemy casualties totaled 2,237
killed or captured, the second most
costly week of the war for the Viet
Cong. Several highly successful
allied operations contributed to
this total. South Vietnamese troops
operating in the delta provinces of
Kien Tuong, Vinh Binh, and Ba Xuyen
reported some 600 Viet Cong killed
or captured. Korean marines operat-
ing in Binh Dinh Province inflicted
nearly 400 casualties on the enemy.
In adjacent Quang Ngai Province, US
marines killed more than 600 Viet
Cong during the week. In addition
South Vietnamese and US forces also
initiated successful engagements in
Darlac and Phu Yen provinces, re-
spectively.
Later this week, US and South
Vietnamese forces engaged heavy
Viet Cong concentrations in Quang
Ngai and Quang Tri provinces. On
30 March, elements of the US lst
Cavalry Division conducting Opera-
tion LINCOLN in Pleiku Province
encountered strong enemy opposition
south of Chu Pong Mountain, the
scene of a major battle with North
Vietnamese troops last November.
Enemy activity this week was
highlighted by a night attack on
Despite recent heavy enemy
losses, there are indications of
enemy build-ups and expected offen-
sives in Quang Ngai Province and in
long-dormant Viet Cong Military Re-
gion VI. Other reports suggest that
enemy forces which have been inactive
in the central highland provinces of
Pleiku and Kontum for the past sev-
eral months are now preparing for
offensives against Special Forces
camps in the area.
Peking-Hanoi Relations
Vietnamese attendance at the
Soviet 23rd Party Congress in the
face of the Chinese boycott appar-
ently does not foreshadow any major
change in Sino-Vietnamese relations.
Both Hanoi and Peking have been mak-
ing an obvious effort in the past
few days to demonstrate that their
ties remain on a close, friendly
basis.
Peking may take some consola-
tion from the fact that hard-liner
Le Duan heads the Vietnamese dele-
gation. He stopped in Peking for
three days en route to Moscow, and
although the Chinese were unques-
tionably angered by this most recent
display of Vietnamese independence,
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they treated him very courteously.
In his address to the congress, Le
Duan took a tough line on continu-
ing the Vietnam war, asserting that
the Vietnamese could eventually win
regardless of the extent or nature
of the American military effort.
The Chinese have encouraged Hanoi
in this view, while Moscow report-
edly has cautioned the Vietnamese
about the formidable obstacles in-
volved in overcoming the growing
US military power. Less palatable
to Peking was a letter of greeting
from the Hanoi party central com-
mittee to the congress which stressed
the need for unified action in the
Vietnam war. Although the Viet-
namese have long stressed this
point, they have generally down-
played it in recent months follow-
ing Peking's public assertions that
there is no possibility of Joint
Sino-Sovict action on Vietnam.
Other aspects of Soviet policy also
came in for indirect praise by Le
Duan, but on balance it does not
appear that his address marked any
basic change from Hanoi's middle-
of-the-road position between Peking
and Moscow.
Other evidences of the contin-
uing Vietnamese-Chinese cooperation
on the war in Vietnam can be seen
in the arrival in Hanoi of Peking's
minister of communications with his
associates on 28 March. This high-
level technical group follows
closely on the heels of a Chinese
railway delegation which spent about
a month in the DRV apparently work-
ing out arrangements for improving
transportation services between
China and North Vietnam.
A Liberation Front delegation
is also attending the Soviet
Party Congress. Their attendance,
in the face of Chinese opposition,
once again demonstrates the close
control which Hanoi exercises over
the Front. The Front delegates have
never before formally attended a ma-
jor Communist event such as a for-
eign party congress.
Hanoi Charges US With
"War Crimes"
The Vietnamese Communists ap-
pear to be expanding their propa-
ganda attacks on "US war crimes" in
Vietnam. Hanoi published a formal
White Paper on 24 March replete with
"documentary evidence" of the civil-
ian devastation created by the US
bombing of North Vietnam. It in-
cludes pictures, testimonials, and
detailed chronologies of place names
and dates, all designed to prove
that the US has concentrated its a
tacks on civilian targets.
The campaign against US war
crimes has been building up for about
a month during which Hanoi has in-
creased the number of its complaints
to the ICC of US "atrocities" against
the Vietnamese civilian population
and has published a series of Nhan
Dan editorials on the same subject.
In the South, the Front has stepped
up its charges against the alleged
US use of antipersonnel gas and de-
foliant chemicals. Liberation Front
President Nguyen Huu Tho has spoken
out on this subject recently, and on
20 March, the Front announced the es-
tablishment of a special "Committee
to Denounce US War Crimes in South
Vietnam." This committee is charged
with "investigating evidence" and
producing documents for distribution
"at home and abroad." Both Moscow
and Peking have added the weight of
their propaganda agencies to provide
wider dissemination of this theme.
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The oft-repeated Soviet con-
tention that the possibility of
West German participation in a
NATO nuclear force rules out suc-
cessful negotiation of a non-
proliferation treaty, as drama-
tized by the Soviet rejection of
the revised US draft treaty, has
also been advanced by some of
the Western members of the Eight-
een Nation Disarmament Committee
(ENDC) in Geneva.
Both the UK and Canadian
delegates, in a recent meeting
of the four Western members, vig-
orously accused Bonn of using
the problem of nuclear sharing
to delay such a treaty. The UK
delegate said that it is in NATO's
interest to produce a plan for
nuclear sharing which is compat-
ible with nonproliferation
whether Bonn likes it or not. The
Italian delegate concurred with
the view that Bonn is holding up
the treaty and commented that if
West Germany gets a role in nu-
clear sharing, Rome wants one too.
To counter anti-German prop-
aganda, which has come chiefly
from the Soviet Union and East
Europe, West Germany has recently
circulated a note stating its
position on disarmament. The
note would allow for a NATO nu-
clear force by specifying that
any nonproliferation treaty
should preclude assignment of nu
clear weapons only to the na-
tional control of a nonnuclear
state. It also suggests a non-
aggression pact with the Soviet
Union and East Europe.
Most Western delegations
believe the note puts the Germans
in a better light on certain
disarmament issues, but some are
disturbed that the disarmament
recommendations are not tied in
with the substance of the pres-
ent Geneva talks. At Geneva the
note will probably bring about
renewed discussion on some sort
of plan similar to Gomulka's
proposal for the denucleariza-
tion of Central Europe. There
will also be a call for nonag-
gression pact discussions. The
Soviets will probably use the
note as the basis for an attack
on West Germany and on Western
nonproliferation policy.
In the ENDC, article-by-
article discussion of Soviet and
US versions of a nonprolifera-
tion treaty has yet to begin.
The Soviet rejection of the re-
vised US draft, dissension among
the Western delegations on nu-
clear sharing, and weariness of
the delegates after two months
of fruitless debate hinder se-
rious negotiations now.
The Soviets have indicated
that they favor a recess at the
end of April. Furthermore,
Gromyko told Lord Chalfont in
late February that the Soviets
are disappointed with the ENDC
proceedings and think there
might be some value in private
discussions between foreign
ministers. The British have
implied that they would like a
trilateral foreign ministers'
talk on disarmament outside Ge-
neva.
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The Communist World
BREZHNEV'S REPORT TO THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS
Brezhnev's report at the
opening session of the 23rd Soviet
Party Congress included a sober
and measured review of the course
of Soviet foreign policy during
the 17 months since Khrushchev's
removal. It reflected a sense of
quiet progress and suggested that
the Soviet leadership intends to
continue along present lines,
avoiding any major new initiatives.
Brezhnev indicated once again
that Moscow anticipates little
progress on important East-West
issues so long as the US is engaged
in Vietnam and that, for the time
being, the USSR intends to focus
its efforts on strengthening its
economic and diplomatic relations
with the nonaligned world--tactics
which also serve to increase Pe-
king's isolation.
In describing US-Soviet rela-
tions, Brezhnev maintained a reason-
ably temperate attitude. On Viet-
nam, there was a clear implication
that Moscow hopes to preserve free-
dom of maneuver rather than be
drawn more deeply into a situation
in which it might be confronted
with difficult and unforeseen
choices. Brezhnev directly equated
the "worsening" of US-Soviet rela-
tions with US actions in Vietnam,
and stressed the USSR's desire to
"develop" relations if the US "dis-
continues its policy of aggression."
Brezhnev's reaffirmation of
support for North Vietnam was en-
tirely orthodox if not indeed de-
liberately subdued. For example,
in speaking of US escalation of the
Vietnam war, Brezhnev merely as-
serted that this would be met with
"mounting support" from the Soviet
Union and "other Socialist friends
and brothers."
Sino-Soviet Relations
In his only direct reference
to the Chinese, Brezhnev spoke in
passing of the "unsatisfactory"
state of Sino-Soviet relations.
He restated Moscow's desire for
Communist unity, and, for the rec-
ord only, Moscow's readiness to
meet at the summit with the Chinese
leaders to discuss the differences
between them. In other passages
however, Brezhnev, by firmly up-
holding Soviet positions which the
Chinese have consistently rejected,
notified Peking that Moscow is not
prepared to give ground. His at-
titude reflected confidence stem-
ming from the increasing isolation
of the Chinese.
In turning to European secu-
rity, the German problem, and the
disarmament question, Brezhnev re-
peated Soviet positions routinely.
Again the Soviet leader-seemed to
indicate that the USSR intends to
mark time on these central East-
West problems so long as policy
within the Western alliance is in
f lux.
Brezhnev's account of Soviet
relations with the nonaligned world,
and particularly with the nations
on the Soviet periphery, strongly
suggests that the USSR intends to
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continue to improve and consolidate
ties with these countries. Brezh-
nev's assessment of the present So-
viet position in these areas was
cast in fairly realistic and care-
fully graduated terms. For example,
he spoke of the "traditional friend-
ship" with India which has grown
stronger still, distinguishing this
from a "certain improvement" in re-
lations with Pakistan.
Domestic Problems
Brezhnev made clear that the
present leaders are intent on re-
asserting the moral authority of
the party in all walks of Soviet
life. The implication is plain
that, in their view, the decade
which began with Khrushchev's den-
igration of Stalin has witnessed
an erosion of this authority. Brezh-
nev's remedy, it seems, is to com-
plete the process of dismantling
Khrushchev's organizational schemes,
to restore earlier institutions
and symbols, and to require tighter
party discipline and control.
Accordingly, the Bureau for
the RSFSR which Khrushchev set up
in 1956 to oversee party affairs
in the giant Russian Republic will
be abolished and its functions re-
turned to the secretariat. The
ruling party presidium will again
be called the Politburo as it was
under Lenin ana Stalin, and the
title General Secretary, used by
Stalin from 1922 until 1934, is to
be given the party first secretary.
The restoration of the name
Politburo and the title General
Secretary are described as a re-
turn to "Leninist" forms, and tech-
nically this is so. Indeed, the
party leaders may have convinced
themselves that they are merely
bringing back the best of old forms
while rejecting the worst, but the
Soviet public and particularly the
intelligentsia are more likely to
have Stalin in mind than Lenin.
There may be apprehension that
these forms could ultimately again
embody some of Stalin's repression,
a concern which would not be dis-
pelled merely by the almost apolo-
getic attempts of Brezhnev and
others at the congress to represent
the changes as routine adjustments.
The reinstitution of the All-
Union Party Conference, proposed
by Brezhnev, may make it easier to
"adjust" the make-up of the Central
Committee in the four-year inter-
val between congresses and thus
strengthen the hand of the ruling
group. The discontinuance of the
all-union conferences and the change
in name from Politburo to Presidium
were both introduced by Khrushchev
at the 19th Party Congress in 1952.
Another of Khrushchev's inno-
vations, the provisions in party
rules requiring a fixed percentage
of turnover in membership of lead-
ing party bodies, is to be abolished.
These provisions have been under
fire for over a year on the grounds
that they forced replacement of ex-
perienced officials.
Culture and Economy
In his first major statement
on cultural policy, Brezhnev took
a predictably doctrinaire line,
calling for "party-mindedness" and
a "class approach," although he
made an effort to balance this by
rejecting "arbitrary" interference.
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The economic section of Brezh-
nev's report was largely a recapit-
ulation of the draft of the 1966-
70 plan published last month. Brezh-
nev did note for the first time,
however, that during this period
the minimum wage will be raised
significantly--from 40 to 60 rubles
per month--and that a guaranteed
monthly wage for collective farmers
will be "gradually" introduced to
bring their pay up to the level of
state farm workers.
Brezhnev's outline of the basic
guidelines for economic development
during 1966-70 emphasizes that
heavy industry will retain its
priority position, but consumer
goods and services will be developed
at faster rates than before. He
also emphasized that overcoming the
backwardness of Soviet agriculture
will be a major objective during
the coming five years, and that
strengthening the defense capacity
of the USSR will be accomplished
"in every way."
SOVIETS EASING TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON US ATTACHES
The Soviet Government is now
allowing US military attaches to
make trips to areas of the USSR
heretofore described usually as
temporarily restricted. This de-
velopment is another manifestation
of the apparent Soviet desire to
engage in a freer exchange with
the US in some military matters.
The Soviet military has been co-
operating recently in military
publications procurement and has
also expressed interest in the ex-
change of films, attache visits,
and maneuver observers.
Since the first of the year,
US military attaches have been al-
lowed to take ten trips to destina-
tions usually refused "for rea-
sons of a temporary nature." Two
of these were rail trips which had
been restricted for several years.
The US Defense Attache Office in
Moscow comments that the Soviets
may be watching the travel of their
attaches in the US and may be re-
ciprocally relaxing US attache
travel within their own security
limitations.
US attaches also have been
told that after the Ministry of De-
fense foreign liaison office (OVS)
approves a trip, it will no longer
be necessary to arrange transporta-
tion and accommodations through the
official diplomatic aid directorate.
This statement, by an OVS official,
was linked to a complaint that So-
viet military attaches in the US
were told what hotels to use and
how to travel.
The improvement in relations
between US and Soviet military rep-
resentatives over the past several
months has been accompanied by an
effort on the part of the Soviet
officers to convey an impression
of a change in their views on US
policy in Vietnam and on the Chi-
nese Communists. High-ranking So-
viet military officials have ex-
pressed a relatively pacific atti-
tude toward the US and other non-
bloc countries. They have gone out
of their way to disassociate the
USSR from Chinese aggressiveness
and to de-emphasize the Soviet de-
fensive commitment to China. Moscow
appears to be using this private
avenue as a convenient means of
maintaining comparatively cordial
contact with the US despite the gen-
eral deterioration in Soviet-US re-
lations as a result of Vietnam.
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Early March prospects for win-
ter crops in the Communist coun-
tries are fair in the USSR and
Eastern Europe and poor in Commu-
nist China and North Vietnam.
In the USSR, the area planted
to winter grains is about one tenth
less than planned, and winter wheat
is down by some 15 to 20 percent.
In the principal agricultural re-
gions, including the New Lands,
soil moisture reserves are normal
or better. The early spring and
ample precipitation in the south-
ern regions are favoring the de-
velopment of winter crops while
permitting spring planting earlier
than usual. However, irrigated
crops, particularly cotton, in
Central Asia could be adversely
affected by a water shortage.
In Eastern Europe the yield
prospects for the winter grain
crops are less favorable than a
year ago in all countries except
Czechoslovakia. The present con-
dition of these crops ranges from
average in the northern countries
to below normal in the Balkans. A
plus sign at present is the early
start of field work which should
contribute to more timely planting
of spring crops this year compared
with last.
The prospects are unfavorable
for Communist China's winter grains,
which account for about 20 percent
of the country's total grain har-
vest. The winter wheat crop in
particular probably will be no bet-
ter than the very poor harvest of
last year. The status of other
winter grains is better, but the
acreage planted to these crops ap-
pears to be less than in 1965 in
many areas.
A poor winter wheat crop this
year will further aggravate China's
grain supply situation, particularly
in the north where wheat is the
main staple of the diet. China has
already purchased 1.5 million tons
of wheat from Canada for July-De-
cember delivery, and talks are
scheduled with Argentina, Austra-
lia and France in the near future.
As both Argentina and Australia
have little grain available for ex-
port, however, China probably will
have to rely more on Canada and
such higher cost secondary suppliers
as France and Mexico.
Prospects for North Vietnam's
early rice crop--usually about one
third of the annual crop harvest--
are poor and the sown acreage is
probably below normal. Similar
prospects are held out for tubers,
corn, and other rice substitutes
now in the field, which account for
about 80 percent of the annual pro=
duction of such crops. Favorable
weather this spring and summer
could partially compensate for this
situation, which is presumably the
result of poor weather and bad agri-
cultural management.
In Cuba, sugar production this
year will total an estimated 5 to
5.5 million tons. This compares
to last year's harvest of 6 million
tons and the plan for 1966 of 6.5
million tons. The anticipated
lower output is the result of a re-
duced use of fertilizer and an ex-
growing season.
tremely severe drought during the
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 Apr 66
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SECRET
The published 1966 military
budgets of all East European Com-
munist countries except Hungary
and Albania reveal planned in-
creases over 1965 appropriations.
Yugoslavia has scheduled the
largest increase--33 percent--and
East Germany may have scheduled
an increase of as much as 18 per-
cent. The other countries have
admitted increases of between
five and ten percent. Hungary
for the second straight year has
reduced its military budget, this
time by almost ten percent, and
Albania has announced planned re-
ductions.
There has been considerable
variation in the pattern of ad-
mitted military appropriations
during the 1960-65 period. During
1960-63, these appropriations
generally showed annual increases.
Those of 1964 were generally
lower, but there was no consist-
ent pattern in 1965. Annual
changes in military expenditures
probably reflect military pur-
chases made during the preceding
year, rather than plans for the
budgeted year. One of the major
reasons for larger expenditures
is increased purchasing of mis-
siles, supersonic aircraft, and
armored equipment from the Soviet
Union, indicative of the policy
of placing greater reliance on
the military capabilities of the
individual Warsaw Pact member
countries. Such purchases are
usually made on credit and so
probably do not show up until af-
ter the purchases have been made.
According to the Yugoslav
Government, the increase for 1966
is required as a necessary ad-
justment to price increases re-
sulting from the new economic re-
forms, and not to pay for any
new undertakings. The percent-
age of defense to total expendi-
tures is much larger in Yugosla-
via than in the other countries
because the federal budget actu-
ally accounts for little more
than half of total government ex-
penditures, and does not include
most investment expenditures.
The considerable inflation
suffered by Rumania, as well as
the recent armed forces pay raise,
have probably reduced over-all
operational funds for the mili-
tary. Rumania may also have re-
duced its forces during 1965.
The Hungarian reduction
probably reflects in part the
recent reorganization of the
army and a possible cutback in
the size of the ground forces.
The Hungarian regime claims that
modernization of existing equip-
ment and increases in defense
capacity will proceed despite the
budget reduction. The reason for
the Albanian reduction is not
clear at this time.
It is believed that these
figures understate the level of
real spending--especially in
East Germany--because some mili-
tary expenditures are included
elsewhere in the budget and sub-
sidies on some items purchased
SE '1 ET
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Nvo# %01
SECRET
EASTERN EUROPE: BUDGETED MILITARY EXPENDITURES
1965
1966
1966
MILITARY EXPENDITURE
PLANNED
PLANNED
PERCENTAGE
as PERCENTAGE of
COUNTRY
CHANGE FROM
TOTAL BUDGET
(and currency)
(in millions)
(in millions)
1965
1965 1966
ALBANIA
288
272
-5.6
8.6
7.7
(Leks)
BULGARIA
(Leva)
230
252
+ 9.6
7.4
6.5
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
10,206
10,831
+6-1
8.8
7.1
(Crowns)
EAST GERMANY
2 800
less than
+17.9
4.6
less than
(DM)
3,300
5.0
HUNGARY
(Forints)
5,757
5,219
-9.3
5.9
5.5'
POLAND
(Zlotys)
23,459
25,276
-1-7.7
8.1
9.0
RUMANIA
(Lei)
4,540
4,790
+5.5
4.6
4.5
YUGOSLAVIA
(Dinars)
381/750
506,740
+32.7
46.7
58.4
by the military are not included
in the military budgets. The
inclusion of internal security
expenditures in the military
budgets of some countries, how-
ever, offsets this to some ex-
tent.
Despite the limitations in-
volved in using official budget
expenditure figures to indicate
total military spending, they 25X1
probably indicate general na-
tional trends in the levels of
such expenditures.
SECRET
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ALBANIAN REGIME RESHUFFLES GOVERNMENT
The Albanian Government has
undergone its most extensive reor-
ganization since 1954. By combin-
ing several ministries, abolishing
others, and instituting a wholesale
reassignment of responsibilities,
Communist Party chief Enver Hoxha
apparently has strengthened his own
and the party's hold over the gov-
ernment's administrative apparatus,
as well as attempted to reduce the
excessive bureaucracy.
The changes probably are an
aftermath of recent factional dis-
putes among the hierarchy--some
members of which apparently attrib-
ute the country's poor economic
progress to Albania's relative iso-
lation from the world.
These moves were also undoubt-
edly intended to help overcome the
country's economic ills which
largely result from Communist Chi-
na's apparent inability to fill the
gap created by the Soviet Union's
suspension of relations with Al-
bania in 1961.
The regime may have determined,
moreover, that it must increasingly
rely on its own efforts to fill
this gap completely. Apparently
reflecting the belief that Commu-
nist China will not be forthcoming
with increased aid, the press has
more and more referred to the need
for Albania to build the economy
through its "own efforts." Albania
can be expected to continue its
attempts to improve economic ties
with selected Eastern and Western
countries.
The governmental changes, an-
nounced on 17 March, included abo-
lition of the position of first
deputy premier and a reduction of
functional ministries from 17 to
12. The once-powerful State Con-
trol Commission was abolished and
a newly created State Inspectorate
was assigned a reduced number of the
Control Commission's former respon-
sibilities.
The changes do not appear to
forecast an immediate downgrading
of any of the top leaders, or a
marked change in Albania's domes-
tic or foreign policies. Premier
Shehu has retained his position
and apparently remains the number
two man in the regime, although he
appears to be the target of con-
siderable criticism recently aimed
at the government's administrative
apparatus. Although stripped of
the title of first deputy premier,
Beqir Balluku, who reportedly has
opposed Hoxha's policies of close
association with Communist China
at the expense of the country's
relations with the Soviet Union
and the rest of the world, remains
a deputy premier and minister of
defense. His authority may have
been curtailed, however, by the
party's decision at a 4 March
plenum to abolish the rank system
in the armed forces and the secret
police and to reintroduce in the
armed services a system of polit-
ical commissars at the lowest lev-
els.
Other significant changes in-
cluded the release of several im-
portant leaders from their govern-
mental responsibilities so they
could devote full time to party
work.
E 'RE's'
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ALBANIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (Cabinet)
Chairman (Premier)
X First Deputy Chairmen
Agriculture
Begir Balluku
Adil Carcani
Hoki Toska
Piro Dodbiba
x Communal Economy
Communications
Construction
x Culture and Art
Education & Culture
Finance
Foreign Affairs
? Mike Qirko
Shinasi Dragoti
Thoma Deljana
Aleks Verli
? Nesti Nose
X Foreign Trade
Trade
Kico Ngjela
X Forestry and Waters
Industry and Mines
Koco Theodhosi
X Mining and Geology
Interior
Kadri Hasbiu
Justice
Bilbil Klosi
National Defense
Begir Balluku
Public Health
Ciril Pistoli
State Planning
Committee
Spiro Koleko
State Inspectorate
? Unnamed
PREVIOUS
INCUMBENT
X Manush Myftiu
Begir Balluku
Spiro Kolleka
X Abdyl Kellezi
Koco Theodhosi
x Pieter Kosta
x Tonin Jakgva
X Fadil Pacrami
x Behar Shtylla
X Vasil Kati
x Peti Shamblli
X Xhafer Spahiu
x Zenel Hamiti
Koco Theodhosi
X State Control Committee Shefget Peci
Minister Without
Portfolio Shefget Peci
X Abolished or combined with other ministries
? New cabinet minister
X Dropped from cabinet
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SECRET
Earthquakes whichrocked an
area of northern China on 8, 20,
and 22 March apparently have
caused extensive loss of life
and damage to property and live-
stock. Chinese news media have
acknowledged the severity of the
disaster but have provided no
specific information on the losses
incurred. The center of the af-
fected area is in the vicinity
of Hsingtai--a town some 200 miles
southwest of Peking on the Peking-
Canton railroad.
The first two quakes had a
force at epicenter of about six
on the Richter scale of nine--
and the 22 March quake measured
about seven. No casualty figures
have been announced, but they
probably run into tens of thou-
sands.
all available means of ranspor a-
tion were being used to move the
injured to hospitals in Peking.
Cadres and army units have
been mobilized to provide food,
shelter, medical supplies, and
building materials and to assist
in repairs. Probably many struc-
tures which survived the 8 March
shock collapsed in the stronger
22 March tremors. The main
north-south railroad was prob-
ably damaged. This could tem-
porarily disrupt the movement
of supplies from the USSR and
North China to Vietnam, neces-
sitating the use of other, longer
rail routes.
Although details probably
will never be revealed, the fre-
quency and intensity of the trem-
ors suggest that losses of life
and property have been devastating.
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Asia-Africa
VOW
Phase one of Liu Shao-chi's
state visit to Pakistan has
ended with a carefully worded
communique which affirmed Sino-
Pakistani friendship and prom-
ised mutual support on several
key issues but did not include
attacks against the US. Peking's
disappointment over Pakistan's
caution has probably been coun-
terbalanced to some extent by
the enthusiastic public recep-
tion given to the Chinese chief
of state.
The visit, in return for
one by President Ayub to China
in March 1965, is in two phases.
The first began on 26 March when
Liu and Chinese Foreign Minis-
ter Chen Yi arrived in the West
Pakistani city of Rawalpindi,
continued in Lahore and Karachi,
and ended on 31 March with a de-
parture for Peking. Liu is
scheduled to complete the second
phase of his visit to Pakistan
with a two-day stay in Dacca,
capital of East Pakistan, begin-
ning on 15 April. This rather
awkward arrangement eliminates
the need to fly over Indian ter-
ritory.
Pakistani leaders have also
denied that the developing Sino-
Pakistani friendship is causing
basic changes in Pakistan's for-
eign policy. Foreign Minister
Bhutto, regarded as a leading
advocate of improved relations
with Peking, told reporters on
29 March that the Chinese visit
signified no change in Pakistan's
orientation, particularly its
friendship and alliance with the
United States.
Before the visit began,
Ayub assured the US ambassador
that he would not permit the
visit to be used by his guests
to embarrass Washington. In
toasts at the official banquets
Ayub has expressed his country's
gratitude for Chinese assistance
during and after the war with
India. He has avoided any ref-
erence to Vietnam despite Chi-
nese efforts to equate Indian
and US "aggression."
The Pakistani Government
by its previous actions, how-
ever, had assured the Chinese of
a warm public reception. The
inclusion of Chinese-supplied
military equipment in the Paki-
stan Day parade on 23 March and
publicity in the government-
controlled press regarding a
Chinese trade exhibit in Karachi
helped stimulate a favorable at-
titude.
These efforts may have been
unnecessary, however, as there
appears to exist a strong pro-
Chinese feeling throughout West
Pakistan, largely as a result of
earlier publicity given to ac-
tual or. rumored Chinese assist-
ance during and following the
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SECRET F_ _s
hostilities with India. When the
visitors arrived in Lahore on 29
March, they received a tumultous
welcome, with many of the placards
carrying anti-American slogans. US
officials in the city report that
among the people in that area the
story has persisted that somehow
the US was connected with the In-
dian action of last fall.
Public statements by Liu and
Chen were relatively restrained--
probably in deference to Pakistani
sensibilities. The Chinese lead-
ers made only brief and relatively
moderate references to Vietnam in
their speeches. They concentrated
instead on efforts to demonstrate
that Peking was not diplomatically
isolated and played up themes cal-
culated to bring a warm public re-
sponse.
The communique reflected this
approach. It repeated Peking's
support for Pakistan on the Kash-
mir issue and promised that the
Chinese would "unswervingly stand
at the side of the Pakistan people"
in their struggle to maintain in-
dependence and oppose "aggression."
In return the Chinese received a
renewed pledge of Pakistani sup-
port on the UN admissions question
and on the "two Chinas issue."
INDIA ATTEMPTING TO IMPROVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY
India is still concentrating
on the development of atomic en-
ergy for peaceful uses but is also
taking steps to ensure the avail-
25X1 ability of fissionable material
should a weapons development pro-
gram become necessary.
The power plant now under con-
sideration by India and Canada
Page 16
would be the second nuclear power
facility at Rajasthan. Reactors
supplied by Canada for the first
Rajasthan power plant, and by the
US for a power plant now under con-
struction in Tarapur, are subject
to reliable safeguards.
Of India's three research re-
actors, only the one at Trombay is
capable of producing plutonium for
nuclear.weapons. From the Trombay
reactor, provided by Canada with-
out adequate safeguards, India has
accumulated enough plutonium to
fabricate at least one nuclear de-
vice. It is estimated that India
could hold a test within a year
after a decision to embark on a
weapons program.
In the event of such a course
of developments, India would also
need to develop a delivery capabil-
ity. India might be able to pur-
chase Soviet bombers suitable for
a strategic role.
'EC~RET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 Apr 66
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lw~
SECRET
The revised Indonesian cabi-
net announced on 27 March is a
compromise which pleases no one,
but army chief Suharto and his
civilian colleagues believe it
will temporarily serve their
purposes.
In a radio address immedi-
ately after the announcement of
the new lineup, General Suharto
stated that the cabinet's composi-
tion is the "first and maximal
stage that we can reach under
present conditions." He asked
that the people give the cabinet
an opportunity to work.
departments and a group of deputy
ministers without portfolio whose
duties have not been announced.
Cabinet posts, including that of
Sukarno, again total an even 100.
The military is strongly
represented, holding 13 of 24
ministerial portfolios and 19 of
38 departments. Thirty-five min-
isters of the former cabinet, in-
cluding the 15 who were ordered
arrested, have been dropped. Al-
though opportunists remain, there
are no known pro-Communists in the
lineup, and relatively few minis-
ters report directly to Sukarno.
A compromise was required
by President Sukarno's continued
obstruction and by the reluctance
of General Suharto and others to
move directly against him. Su-
karno remains president and prime
minister, and the new cabinet
presidium includes six vice prime
ministers rather than three as
the formateurs had planned.
Three major figures--the
Sultan of Jogjakarta, General
Suharto, and Adam Malik--are the
fourth, fifth, and sixth vice
prime ministers, respectively.
They are preceded in rank by
three relatively ineffective and
opportunistic political party
leaders--Johannes Leimena, Idham
Chalid, and Ruslan Abdulgani.
These positions apparently are
a concession chiefly to Sukarno
and partially to the Nahdatul
Ulama, the large Moslem party.
Under the presidium is a
hodgepodge of ministries and
Key ministries and depart-
ments are grouped around Suharto,
Malik, and the Sultan, and indica-
tions are that whenever practica-
ble these three will act directly
and will bypass the cumbersome 25X1
cabinet mechanism.
Student and political groups
have strongly criticized the
cabinet revisions as inadequate.
Suharto and his colleagues hope
to prevent student demonstrations
for the time being.
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SECRET
The Soviet Union has re-
cently taken steps to improve
and consolidate relations with
several Middle Eastern states.
Several exchanges of delegations
have been arranged and a spate
of new agreements can be ex-
pected in the next few months.
Soviet-Iraqi relations have
been cool for the past year,
with Iraq's Kurdish policy the
main point of contention. How-
ever, the USSR has been fulfill-
ing its economic and military
aid commitments to Iraq by con-
tinuing to work, somewhat lan-
guidly, on a variety of aid
projects. It recently wound up
its 1964 military aid pact by
delivering 20 advanced jet fight-
ers. After considerable delay,
the USSR last week indicated
that it would receive a new arms
mission led by the brother of
the Iraqi president, and that
First Deputy Premier Kosygin had
invited Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz,
the prime minister, to visit
Moscow. It seems likely that new
economic and military arrange-
ments will be concluded and
that the USSR may be more re-
sponsive to some of the impor-
tant aid projects, particularly
water conservation, which Iraq
is eager to start.
The Soviet Union is again
focusing some attention on Syria.
Probably encouraged by the com-
position of the new Syrian Gov-
ernment which it has complimented
for containing "progressive" ele-
ments, the USSR apparently is
hinting at resumption of aid for
the major Euphrates Dam project,
originally surveyed by the USSR
nearly ten years ago.
Soviet softening toward
Syria probably has been in the
works for a few months. Although
Syrian military delegations visit-
ing Moscow in 1964 and 1965 seemed
to receive little satisfaction,
two shipments of arms, the first
noted in over a year, took place
in January and February.
The USSR has also recently
completed its first successful
economic bid in Jordan and will
supply some of the construction
material for the Mukheibeh Dam.
Moscow has followed Jordan's
economic development closely for
the past year and is offering
other types of assistance as
well.
In addition to these ven-
tures, the USSR recently agreed
to take part in the Egyptian
oil exploration program, and to
help Yemen set up a new airline.
The USSR is also increasing its
technical assistance personnel
in Yemen to pursue development
projects more vigorously.
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`` SECRET *me
GENERAL SUNAY ELECTED PRESIDENT OF TURKEY
General Cevdet Sunay, for-
mer chief of the Turkish General
Staff, was elected the fifth
President of Turkey on 28 March,
replacing 71-year-old Cemal
Gursel, who was declared physi-
cally"unable to continue his
presidential duties." The 66-
year-old Sunay's election by the
Grand National Assembly--the Na-
tional Assembly and the Senate
combined--was virtually unop-
posed and should help to restore
confidence and stability both
within the government and through-
out the country.
Sunay's replacement as chief
of the General Staff by General
Cemal Tural has met with general
approval among the military and
should end the incipient strug-
gle for power in the top echelons
of the armed forces.
Sunay, who is pro-US and
pro-NATO, is basically committed
to democratic processes. He was
not a member of the inner mili-
tary circle responsible for the
coup in 1960, although he later
was in the Military Council which
ran the country during the early
postcoup period.. As chief of
the Turkish General Staff, he
has exercised a strong influence
in civilian government, while ac-
cepting the civilian leadership
of the prime minister. In con-
trast to his predecessor Sunay
has traveled extensively in West-
ern Europe and the Middle East.
The president of Turkey has
only limited veto power, but he
usually has great personal influ-
ence as the arbiter between po-
litical factions and between the
civil government and military
high command, which remains the
ultimate source of power in Turkey.
Sunay will probably have a re-
straining influence on the ex-
tremist wing of Prime Minister
Demirel's ruling Justice Party and
on impatient military elements.
However, a palace coup by the mil-
itary will remain a possibility
as long as the Demirel regime 25X1
fails to demonstrate an ability
to solve Turkey's pressing eco-
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``" SECRET
Some Italian Government
leaders, including President
Saragat, are predicting that
Christian Democratic (CD) Premier
Moro's third center-left coali-
tion--in which all CD factions
are represented--will endure until
the 1968 national elections.
Nevertheless, the new government
continues to be threatened by
the power struggles and factional
differences within the CD which
precipitated the recent crisis,
and by the fact that strong CD
elements continue to be lukewarm
or opposed to the center-left
legislative program.
Underlying the difficulties
within the CD is the fundamental
schism between the party's so-
called "integralists" and "Catholic
Democrats." The integralists,
led by Vice Secretary Piccoli and
Foreign Minister Fanfani, aim to
assure that real political power
in Italy remains with the CD,
and they oppose the anticipated
reunification of their two major
coalition partners--the Socialists
(PSI) and the Social Democrats
(PSDI).
The Catholic Democrats, as
represented by Moro, the CD left
wing, and some of the party's
largest faction--the Dorotei--
are prepared to share power with
the lay democratic forces and
favor a PSI-PSDI merger.
These strains within the
CD have intensified as the PSI
and PSDI have made progress
toward the reunification which
is anticipated for this fall.
Close PSI-PSDI coop-
eration during the government
crisis and impolitic statements
by leading members of both par-
ties on the prospect of the
reunified party's providing an
alternative to CD dominance
have added to CD fears.
There may be some clearer
indications of the extent of
the opposition to Moro when the
CD council meets in April.
Meanwhile, almost any issue in
the coalition's program could
still be used by parliamentary
CD snipers to bring down the
government if they thought
their broader political ob'ec-
tives would be served.
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NATO IDENTIFIES PROBLEMS IN FRENCH CONFRONTATION
The meeting of the 14 allies in the central European area, and
on 29 March identified the pri- reduce the facilities available
ority problems which must be dealt
with under consultative arrange-
ments recently defined. The prob-
lems include (a) possible reor-
ganization and streamlining of
the various NATO components; (b)
the consequences of French with-
drawal from the infrastructure in
general and the air defense ground
environment plan in particular;
(c) relocation of SHAPE, AFCENT,
and perhaps other facilities such
as the NATO Defense College; (d)
the financial implications of the
French moves and the share of any
costs to be assigned to the French
and (e) the military consequences
of the withdrawal of French forces
from NATO command.
These military consequences
are assessed by SACEUR in a letter
to the secretary general of NATO
which assumes that French terri-
tory and airspace will be denied
to NATO in both peace and war.
The letter holds that this denial
would in effect create two thea-
ters of operations divided by both
geographic and political barriers.
It is believed that Austria and
Switzerland would not compromise
their neutrality by allowing mili-
tary overflights.
SACEUR believes the French
action will increase the empha-
sis on forward defense capabili-
ties, decrease the capability of
reinforcing central Europe and
the flanks in time of tension or
aggression, increase the require-
ment for adequate forces in place
for peacetime training. All of
these factors will make success-
ful defense of central Europe
more difficult and, SACEUR be-
lieves, require earlier use of
nuclear weapons in case of hostil-
ities.
SACEUR's evaluation appears
to raise another vital question
not dealt with in the meeting of
29 March. This will be the need
for an early agreement on the
status of allied access rights in
France in both peace and war. Un-
doubtedly, this will be one of
De Gaulle's chief bargaining
points.
The 14 allies have settled
on informal meetings of their
North Atlantic Council repre-
sentatives as the main method
for coordinating their pol-
icies on the French problem. Ma-
jor policy decisions will still
be made in their capitals, and it
was agreed that certain subjects
will require prior discussion by
smaller groups. German officials
have been most insistent that the
future status of French troops
in Germany falls in this latter
category.
Meanwhile, France sent a
memorandum this week to its NATO
partners which include a more
specific timetable for proposed
actions. By 1 July 1966, French
officers in integrated commands
and French forces committed to
NATO will be withdrawn. SHAPE
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headquarters and most US forces and
facilities will have to be out of
France by 1 April 1967. The memo-
randum called for bilateral talks
between France and the appropriate
national authorities or SACEUR on
the mechanics of withdrawal. It
also said that liaison arrangements
between the French military command
and SACEUR would be appropriate and
that agreements covering the war-
time use of French territory and
facilities could be negotiated if
the other allies wished.
Western Hemisphere
The outlook for elections on
1 June remains promising. Domini-
can security force commanders are
contributing to the improved at-
mosphere by insisting that their
troops remain nonpartisan. National
Police Chief Morillo, for example,
has transferred an entire police
contingent accused of "political
involvement." The attorney general
is investigating allegations of
political violence, apparently in
response to charges that partisans
of Bosch and Balaguer have engaged
in intimidation.
Bosch remains noncommittal
about his election role, and there
are continuing indications that he
is not eager to run. Although he
has expressed optimism about the
electoral chances of his Dominican
Revolutionary Party (PRD), he has
reiterated that the party has not
yet decided to run. The decision
will be made by the PRD national
convention which begins on 9 April.
However, party members are going
ahead with campaign preparations as
if the PRD were going to run.
President Garcia Godoy re-
portedly fears the government would
not be able to protect Bosch should
he take to the hustings. The US
Embassy has noted that military
and civilian elements determined
to prevent Bosch's return to power
at any cost have a potential for
considerable violence.
Rafael Bonnelly's "third
force," now dubbed the National
Integration Movement, is campaign-
ing busily but has gathered little
momentum. Bonnelly"s intention
with regard to elections remains
obscure, and there is a good chance
that he would throw his support to
Balaguer should a Bosch victory 25X1
seem imminent. Bonnelly privately
has stressed that his candidacy
would provide the appearance of com-
petition for Balaguer should Bosch
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The moderate, reformist mil-
itary junta which had ruled since
11 July 1963 has resigned, and
the armed forces high command,
in consultation with political
leaders, named Clemente Yerovi
Indaburu provisional president.
He took office on 30 March.
Yerovi, a widely respected
Guayaquil businessman-economist,
has been repeatedly mentioned
as a possible interim president
since March 1964. He has been
ambassador to the European
Common Market, delegate to the
UN, minister of economy, and
president of the National Plan-
ning Board. A political inde-
pendent, he is known for his
interest in development, and has
recently headed an AID-supported
small loan company.
opposition and to hold firm on
the announced plan for an orderly
transition to constitutional
government this summer, focusing
on elections on 3 July.
On 25 March university
students at Quito seized a mil-
itary truck and pilfered its
cargo of aerial photographic
supplies. When the school admin-
istration was unable to return
all of the stolen equipment, the
army occupied the university,
in part using semitrained con-
scripts who were unnecessarily
brutal. In ensuing clashes, a
student and a soldier were
killed, several persons injured,
and wholesale arrests made. In
retaliation, high school students
attacked an engineer barracks
on 26 March, killing a bystander.
The change of government
culminated a student-supported
commercial strike provoked by
export-import interests protest-
ing hikes in import duties. The
country's desperate economic
situation stems largely from
adverse international trade
developments rather than mis-
management by the military
junta. Tariff increases were
intended to ease the situation
and combat a threatened loss
this year of most of the country's
exchange reserves.
Resignation of the junta
resulted from a loss of will by
its members, who only last week
made an offer to yield office
which was rejected by the armed
forces. The military then vowed
its determination to contain
The crisis then deepened
with widespread press support
for students, labor, politicians,
and the commercial interests in
their insistence that the dic-
tatorial measures employed by
the military junta made its
continuation intolerable.
On 28 March the high com-
mand, the cabinet, and church
leaders met with the junta.
Cabinet resignations followed
and the decision was made that
the government would return
power to the armed forces who
would then consult with politi-
cians and select a provisional
executive. Early the next morn-
ing ambitious minister of defense
General Coba failed in a power
move, and General Telmo Vargas,
chief of the Armed Forces
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INID
ABU
MENTE YEROVI
..:.
.
General Staff, assumed de facto
authority. That afternoon
Yerovi was chosen, and the mil-
itary pledged him full support.
Widespread violence con-
tinued, however, as Communist
student elements attempted to
exploit the situation to achieve
a full-scale revolution. Taking
over Radio National in Quito,
they made inflammatory broad-
casts while striking transport
drivers blocked the streets and
incited violence. The security
forces, unwilling to provide
additional martyrs, adopted a
permissive attitude, but by the
evening of 29 March Vargas pro-
claimed a state of siege and
accepted the responsibility of
restoring order. During the
night in some parts of the
country extremists demonstrated
against Yerovi and demanded
far leftist Carlos Cueva in-
stead. Indecision due to com-
mand confusion among security
forces in outlying areas per-
mitted a vacuum to develop on
30 March which extremists
continued to exploit. At Cuenca
student-led agitators named
Cueva to the provincial gover-
norship. An extremist admin-
istration was installed at Loja.
The Guayaquil provincial build-
ing was briefly taken by Com-
munist-led students, but they
were expelled by marines.
Yerovi promised a non-
political cabinet, and transi-
tion to constitutional govern-
ment as soon as current voter
registration can be completed.
Conditions suggest, however,
that elections cannot be held
as early as originally planned.
Release of all political
prisoners--including dangerous
subversives--could exacerbate
unrest and make orderly polit-
ical life even more difficult.
The new President will face
the same problems, especially
in the economic sphere, which
plagued the junta and led to
its fall. Even if the military
remain united behind him, he is
unlikely to have the strength
to enforce necessary economic
measures in the face of the
success of vested interests
against measures decreed by
the junta. Furthermore, poli-
ticians will redouble their
efforts to gain advantage for
the future and, if denied,
will certainly try to topple
the new regime.
Acute instability, exacer-
bated by subversives, therefore
is likely to characterize the
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UNREST, ANTI-GOVERNMENT CRITICISM INCREASE IN BRAZIL
President Castello Branco's
efforts to instill stability and
order into Brazil's political struc-
ture are being weakened by a new
wave of public unrest and politi-
cal sniping from both left and
right. Continuing inflationary
pressures combined with the dis-
quiet of an election year tend to
magnify the difficulties facing
the government.
Castello Branco hopes that
the recent reorganization of the
political system will help dissi-
pate long-standing personal antag-
onisms while encouraging new party
loyalties. Brazil now officially
has a two-party system after fed-
eral approval last week of the pro-
administration National Renewal
Alliance (ARENA) and the opposi-
tion Brazilian Democratic Movement
(MDB); no other group met the 15
March deadline for registration.
The party reorganization seems
to have been a start toward reduc-
ing the chaos that predominated
when 13 parties existed, but per-
sistent personalism and factional-
ism make it unlikely that ARENA
and the MDB will soon become re-
liable, disciplined organizations.
The defeats suffered by ARENA can-
didates in recent elections of of-
ficers in the state legislatures of
Guanabara, Sao Paulo, and Pernam-
buco emphasize the regime's weak
position in those key states.
Growing unrest among univer-
sity students over the administra-
tion's educational and other poli-
cies is adding to the government's
problems. Antiregime demonstra-
tions, involving as many as 3-4,000
students, have occurred during the
past month in Rio de Janeiro, Sao
Paulo, and other major cities.
For the first time since the over-
throw of President Goulart in 1964,
leftist student leaders seem con-
fident of their ability to organ-
ize mass protests.
Castello Branco also faces
severe criticism from labor, whose
leaders are dissatisfied with the
almost total lack of effective
programs for workers. An adminis-
tration proposal to abolish job
tenure has shocked the unions.
Workers and businessmen alike are
pessimistic over the economic out-
look and the unrelenting inflation-
ary trend--the cost of living rose
9.4 percent during the first two
months of 1966 despite nearly two
years of government-imposed aus-
terity.
With presidential, congres-
sional, and important gubernato-
rial elections scheduled for the
latter half of this year, rightist
leaders such as Sao Paulo Governor
Adhemar de Barros, who has broken
with the government, and Carlos
Lacerda are increasing their at-
tacks on the regime. Castello
Branco continues to exercise re-
straint in handling his critics,
but if the present trend contin-
ues he may be encouraged to adopt
harsher methods rather than risk
arousing dissension among the
military, who are becoming dis-
turbed by the current unrest.
vim
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