WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 18, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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18.[arch 196.6
'j, l o 0281/60
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GROUP I Excluded fronn outornofic
State Dept. review
,completed
copy No.
DIA review
completed;
CENTRAL INTELLIGE1 Y
OF IC OF` CURRENT INT L I N
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(Information as of noon EST, 17 March 1966)
VIETNAM
The dismissal of General Thi as I Corps commander has
led to unrest in South Vietnam and provided the op-
portunity for new Buddhist agitation against the Ky
government. The intensity of fighting declined
slightly this week, after extensive allied operations
and the loss of the A Shau Special Forces camp last
week. Moscow supported a Communist "Vietnam solidarity
week," using the occasion for new propaganda jabs at
the Chinese Communists.
Page
EXPANSION OF INFILTRATION ROAD NETWORK IN LAOS PANHANDLE 4
The Communists in the past year have constructed roads
more than doubling the mileage of truckable routes in
the Laotian panhandle for infiltration into South
Vietnam, and this work is continuing.
CHINA'S LIU SHAO-CHI TO VISIT PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN 7
Peking is attempting to recoup recent Chinese set-
backs in South Asia by sending its chief of state
on a round of official visits in late March and early
April.
GOVERNMENTAL CHANGES STRENGTHEN BULGARIAN CHIEF ZHIVKOV 8
In a move to consolidate his leadership of both
party and government, Todor Zhivkov has retained the
premiership and reshuffled and expanded the cabinet.
FAILURES IN ALBANIAN AGRICULTURE MAY FORCE CHANGES 9
Albania's per capita grain supplies should reach
a new low this year. The shortage may have been a
cause for recent party policy announcements aimed
at agriculture and friendship overtures toward European
nations.
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Asia-Africa
INDONESIAN SITUATION REMAINS UNCLEAR
Sukarno's delegation of authority to General Suharto
is vague, and the army continues cautious in asserting
its power.
THAI INSURGENTS MAINTAIN HIGH LEVEL OF ACTIVITY
Communist subversives are apparently becoming bolder
in northeast Thailand as acts of terrorism against
villagers and low-level officials continue.
INTERNAL TROUBLES KEEP INDIAN GOVERNMENT ON DEFENSIVE
Riots, communal clashes, a tribal revolt, and continued
economic gloom have the government scrambling for
emergency solutions.
EAST PAKISTANIS CALLING FOR GREATER AUTONOMY
So far, opposition to the central government has been
limited to talk for the most part, but bitterness is
increasing and could lead to trouble.
COMMUNIST MILITARY ATD ACTIVITIES
The USSR and Czechoslovakia are actively implementing
military aid arrangements with non-Communist countries.
MODERATES DEAL HEAVY BLOWS TO KENYAN LEFTISTS
President Kenyatta has ousted Communist diplomats
and newspapermen sponsoring leftist Vice President
Odinga. The governing party also dropped Odinga
from his second-ranking party post.
LITTLE MOVEMENT IN RHODESIAN SITUATION
No tanker with oil for Rhodesia has arrived at Beira,
and the new storage and pumping facilities at the Mo-
zambique port are not finished. It seems unlikely that
Zambia will impose a broad trade boycott.
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NIGERIAN REGIME FACES MOUNTING PRESSURES
General Ironsi's military government in Nigeria is
holding its own, but may encounter trouble from dis-
satisfied army elements and ousted politicians.
FRANCE AND NATO
There has been a variety of reactions among NATO
members to De Gaulle's withdrawal of French forces
from NATO assignment and removal of headquarters
from France. The difficulty in getting agreement
among the 14 on a simple statement of support for the
Alliance indicates the problems that will influence
future NATO decisions.
CATHOLIC-LIBERAL COALITION IN BELGIUM
The more conservative outlook of the new government
under Paul Vanden Boeynants is likely to be demon-
strated in its approach to controlling the rapid
rise in the budget deficit.
Western Hemisphere
GUATEMALAN ELECTION ROUNDUP 22
Revolutionary Party candidate Julio Cesar Mendez
Montenegro will probably be chosen president when
congress meets on 5 May.
ALLEGED COUP PLOTTERS NAMED TO HEAD URUGUAYAN MILITARY 23
General Mario Aguerrondo, who has been associated
with elements favoring a coup, has been appointed
military commander of the Montevideo area, which
includes the majority of Uruguayan Army troops.
POLITICAL IMPACT OF CHILEAN COPPER SITUATION 24
President Frei has blamed the Tri-Continent Conference
in Havana for encouraging subversives to provoke
violence in order to hinder his economic reform pro-
gram.
BOLIVIA INCHES TOWARD ELECTIONS
Four parties have been inscribed on the electoral
rolls and seven others have asked for recognition.
Nevertheless, some government officials believe the
presidential elections may have to be postponed
beyond 3 July.
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The dismissal of General Thi
as I Corps commander last week ap-
pears to be developing into a con-
frontation between South Vietnam's
Buddhist leadership and the Ky
government.
Initial unrest following the
announcement of Thi's removal took
the form of school boycotts, strikes,
and orderly demonstrations in sev-
eral northern cities. These appeared
to be inspired by some local of-
ficials loyal to Thi and by generally
restive elements in the area. How-
ever, on 12 March the Buddhist In-
stitute in Saigon capitalized on
the first public breach in the unity
of the current military regime by
issuing a communique aimed at
hastening the return of civilian
government. By 14 March, agitation
in Hue had begun to reflect the
themes of the Buddhist communique,
which urged a return of all generals
who participated in the overthrow
of .the Diem government in 1963,
the confinement of the military to
strictly military matters, and the
formation of a civilian government
to carry on the Vietnamese social
revolution.
Demonstrations and strikes
supporting the communique and the
reinstatement of General Thi con-
tinued in Hue and Da Nang on 15
and 16 March, involving uniformed
military personnel, local officials,
and Buddhists. On 16 March, a
peaceful gathering of about 10,000
persons assembled in Saigon to
listen to a ranking member of the
national Buddhist hierarchy reiterate
the demands of the 12 March com-
munique.
Although the Buddhist leaders
in the past have often been at odds
with one another, the reorganization
of the Ky cabinet last month may have
generated enough resentment among
them to cause the two principal
factions to unite for joint action.
At present, the Buddhists are
apparently probing for weak spots
in military unity. The ruling mili-
tary Directorate will meet on 18
March to determine how to handle
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Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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k 1 - . : j X - 4 V l-P d
ItSavannakhet
CAMBODIA
Ul Sarevane
r
.
PHNOM PENH
L y
(
'~ayNmh
CAPITAL MILITARY REGION \ J
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VIETNAM
1 Tchepotie'
SOUTH VIETNAM
18 MARCH 1966
I ECCRJ T
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the Buddhist threat. Should ag-
itation continue to grow, the
government may be faced with a
choice of bending to Buddhist
demands or adopting a harsh pol-
icy. In the past, the Buddhists
have proved extremely adroit in
turning repressive measures into
exploitable political issues.
Military Operations
The intensity of fighting
declined slightly this week, af-
ter extensive allied operations
last week and the loss of the
A Shau Special Forces camp on
10 March.
On 12 March the Viet Cong
launched a mortar attack on a
training center for People's
Action Teams and an adjacent air
strip at Vung Tau, resulting in
about 50 allied casualties and
slight damage to the installa-
tions. Two days later, South
Vietnamese troops outmaneuvered
enemy forces attempting to am-
bush a government convoy in
Quang Ngai Province, and killed
75 Viet Cong. On 15 March, a
two-battalion enemy attack on
government troops in Dinh Tuong
Province was unsuccessful. Some
enemy contact was established
later by a government reaction
force, resulting in moderate cas-
ualties to both sides.
Allied activity--in the
Viet Cong "War Zone D" strong-
hold north of Saigon, in the
coastal provinces of Binh Dinh
and Phu Yen, and in Darlac Prov-
ince--generally encountered only
sporadic enemy opposition this
week. US forces operating in
Bien Hoa Province on 15 March
clashed with an enemy force of
unknown size, while other US
units skirmished with an esti-
mated platoon of Viet Cong in
Darlac Province.
Following Operation MASHER/
WHITE WING, which resulted in
over 1,800 Viet Cong killed dur-
ing a six-week period, elements
of the US First Air Cavalry Divi-
sion initiated a new search-and-
destroy effort in northeastern
Binh Dinh Province last week,
Little contact has been reported
thus far, and Operation HARRISON,
in adjacent Phu Yen Province,
also continued with little enemy
resistance.
Bloc "Solidarity Week"
The Communists launched a
"week of solidarity with Viet-
nam" observance on 12 March, in
a follow-through of a resolution
adopted by the leftist Tri-
Continent Conference in Havana
last January. Moscow propaganda
devoted considerable attention
to the solidarity week, boast-
ing at length of Soviet economic
and defense assistance to the
Vietnamese. Hanoi Radio re-
ported that special Vietnam ral-
lies had been held in the larger
Soviet cities and in the capitals
of all the Soviet republicans.
The Soviet propaganda seemed
at least partly calculated to un-
dercut Chinese Communist charges
that Moscow's aid to the Vietnam-
ese had been insignificant. In
a familiar indirect reference to
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Peking's steady refusal to par-
ticipate in programs of unified
bloc action on Vietnam, Moscow
insisted that the solidarity week
was an illustration of the "co-
hesion and unity of action on the
part of all Communists in the
struggle against imperialism."
Chinese propaganda has given lim-
ited mention to the solidarity
week, and no Chinese rallies have
been reported.
Chinese propaganda contin-
ues to support the Vietnamese
war, however, asserting that the
Communist side is winning and
that the US is intent on expand-
ing the conflict to China. On
10 and 11 March the Peking press
carried reports hailing the "vic-
tories" won by the Viet Cong, de-
claring that the "brilliant vic-
tories" of the Vietnamese Commu-
nists in the past two months are
"eloquent proof that people's
war can defeat US imperialism."
There are indications that
Hanoi's continued military and
political cooperation with the
Soviet Union is irritating the
Chinese.
There have also been in-
dications in Chinese propaganda
that Peking fears increased So-
viet influence in Hanoi might
produce a weakening of the North
Vietnamese determination to con-
tinue the war. There is cur-
rently no evidence, however,
that Peking seriously doubts
Hanoi's present intent on this
score, or has diminished in any
way the extensive military co-
operation with the DRV already
under wa
EXPANSION OF INFILTRATION ROAD NETWORK IN LAOS PANHANDLE
During the past year, the
Communists have constructed roads
more than doubling the mileage of
truckable roads in the Laotian
panhandle for infiltration into
South Vietnam, and this work is
continuing.
The first objective of the
stepped-up construction program,
which began in mid-1965, was the
extension of truckable roads from
the Tchepone area, nearly halfway
down the panhandle, to the north-
ern border of Cambodia. A con-
tinuous north-south road consist-
ing of routes 92 and 96 has
been completed to the latitude
of Attopeu. From this north-
south link., routes 922, 165, and
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Mu G a
Pass
N' I
rte/
Mahaxay
Ban
Se yang N'Sng
Road
- Bypass road
Unimproved trail
Ban Bad
Saravane
16
Ban Ph
AREA
OF
MAIN
~anouang
Nam
havane\
3'
ODI1A -- Road
- Road under construction
---_---. Track or trail
0 28
SF. riv F W
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an unnumbered road at the lati-
tude of Attopeu run cast toward
the South Vietnamese border and
connect with trails crossing into
South Vietnam.
A second objective--toward
which most current construction
is directed--is to provide al-
ternates or bypasses to exist-
ing roads in order to make the
infiltration network less vul-
nerable to interdiction. Mu Gia
Pass, through which virtually
all truck traffic enters Laos
from North Vietnam, has been pro-
vided with at least two by-
passes around a choke point heav-
ily bombed during the past year.
Between the pass and Tchepone,
Route 911 was completed as an
alternate for Route 23 just as
the current dry season began. A
bypass around Tcheponc, through
which all southbound traffic is
now channeled, is being con-
structed to link routes 911, 9,
and 92. Another route from North
Vietnam into the panhandle, con-
necting North Vietnamese Route
101 with Laotian Route 911, is
under construction and may be
completed in a matter of weeks.
on the manner in which the con-
struction work is organized.
ele-
namese Army regiments are cur-
rently responsible for mainte-
nance of the routes through Mu
Gia Pass.
have reported that North Vietnam-
ese Army units are engaged in
road work to the east of Sara-
vane, deep in the panhandle, and
other units are probably workin
in other locations.
have also revealed that some
mechanized equipment is being
employed.
Most of the infiltration
roads have unimproved dirt sur-
faces in widths sufficient for
use by full-size trucks. Some
sections which pass through
terrain where the water table
is high, or is otherwise dif-
ficult, have been surfaced with
logs or gravel. The system is
nevertheless still generally
subject to damage by rai
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Peking is attempting to re-
coup recent Chinese setbacks in
South Asia by sending chief of
state Liu Shao-chi on state visits
to Pakistan and Afghanistan in
late March and early April.
This will be Liu's second ex-
posure to the free world. His
only previous trip outside the
Communist bloc was a lackluster
"good-will" junket to Indonesia,
Cambodia, and Burma in the spring
of 1963. His colorless and rather
wooden performance at that time
was only partially offset by the
efforts of his pretty and viva-
cious wife.
Liu's upcoming stops have been
billed by the Chinese as "friendly
visits," but no details have been
released. The inclusion in the
party of Foreign Minister Chen Yi
suggests that there will be wide-
ranging discussions of issues af-
fecting Chinese relations with the
two countries. The inclusion of
the wives of Liu and Chen is prob-
ably calculated to promote an im-
pression of friendly informality.
The exact dates of Liu's trip
have not been announced, but he is
expected to arrive in Pakistan on
24 March and in Afghanistan in the
first week of April.
The trip to Pakistan probably
is prompted by Chinese concern
over Rawalpindi's improved rela-
tions with Washington, Moscow,
and New Delhi. Peking no doubt
hopes that the visit will assist
in producing friction between
Rawalpindi and Washington, and
thus nullify to some degree the
effects of President Ayub's
visit to the US last December.
Peking is also concerned about the
strengthened Soviet position in
South Asia, highlighted by the
successful intermediary role of
Moscow in the Tashkent agreement
of January.
Chinese eagerness to have
Liu visit Afghanistan at this
time is probably explained by
Peking's concern over the Afghan
prime minister's recent apparently
successful trip to the Soviet
Union and by the desire to give
the trip more prominence by hav-
ing stops in more than one coun-
try. It is expected that there
will be some discussion of utiliza-
tion of the $28-million Chinese
credit granted in 1965.
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Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov has
moved to consolidate his leader-
ship of both party and government.
Despite reports to the contrary,
he has apparently decided for the
time being to retain the premier-
ship. In addition, ministerial
changes made at the 11-12 March
session of the National Assembly
seem designed to enhance his con-
trol.
Zhivkov probably concluded
that his ability to strike a com-
promise between the "hard-line"
and "nationalist" elements within
the regime might be impaired if
he relinquished his government
post. He may also have reasoned
that his recently launched program
to develop broader contacts with
the non-Communist world, while
simultaneously maintaining good
CHANGES IN BULGARIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (CABINET)
12 Match 1966
Ministry or Committee
Chairman (Premier)
First Deputy Chairman
Deputy Chairmen
A,griculturel-
Construction
Finance
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Trade
Interior
Internal Trade
Justice
National Defense
National Education
Public Health and Social Welfare
Transportation 2
Communications 2
Architecture and Public Works}
Ministers without Portfolio
(Committees Whose Chairmen
Hare Ministerial Rank)
Chemistry and Metallurgy
Cultureand Art
Science and Technical Progress
State Planning
State Security
State Control a
Food Industry
Forests and Industry
Labor and Wages
Light Industry
Machine Building
Power and Fuel
Zhlvkov, Todor
Zhivkov, Zhivko
Kubadinski, Poncho
Mikhaylov, Ivan
Tadorov, Stanko
Tsolov, Tano
Groshnov, Morin
Popov, Dimitur
Bushey, Ivan
Budinov, Ivan
Dikov, Diko
Takov, Peko
Dzhurov, Dobri
Gonev, Gancho
Ignotov, Kiril
Avramov, Luchezor
Pavlov, Georgi
Popov, Ivan
Poshev, Apostol
Solokov, Angel
Stafanov, Ninko
Dimitrov, Atonas
Dokov, Moko
Mishev, Misho
Belcheva, Dana
Ivanov, Morly
Popov, Konstantin
1. formerly Ministry of Aprkuttvral Production
2. Ministry of tromportollon and Comrrwnicottons sprit Into Ire minblrtes.
3. Fornierty State Committee for Cetntruction and Archttecturs.
4. Formerly Committee for Party and State Control.
L 30 ECRET
Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Kubadinski, Poncho
Kubodinski, Poncho
Bronkov, Georgi
Grlgorov, Mitko
Krustanov, Lyubomir
Mateev, Evgeni
Tonchev, Stoyan
Newly R#4#0 to
14 e' Pink
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relations with Moscow, would have
been jeopardized.
The changes in the cabinet
are designed to strengthen Zhiv-
kov's personal position and to
unite the government behind his
policies. Evgeni Mateev, who
has been critical of Zhivkov's
new system of management and
planning of the economy, was
dropped as minister without port-
folio. The warning this implies
will not be lost on other mem-
bers of the central committee
who may be inclined to oppose
Zhivkov's economic policies,
which will be discussed at a
party plenum this month. The
elevation to ministerial rank of
the chairmen of six government
committees dealing with economic
matters, also reflects Zhivkov's
desire to develop more support
for innovations in the economic
system.
The replacement of Petur
Vutov as chairman of the State
Committee for Culture and Art
with Pavel Matev, chief editor
of the monthly organ of the Bul-
garian Writers Union, Septemvri,
probably is meant to give support
to Zhivkov's conservative cultural
policies. In this connection,
Mitko Grigorov was released from
his post as minister without port-
folio, probably so that he could
devote more time to his party
job which includes supervision of
cultural affairs.
Zhivkov also paid new lip
service to the coalition. of the
Bulgarian Communist Party and
the Agrarian Union by appointing
top Agrarian leaders Petur Tanchev
and Stoyan Tonchev as deputy pre-
mier and minister of communica-
tions, respectively. Svetla
Daskalova, whose father and hus-
band are prominent Agrarian lead-
ers, was elected minister of
justice. Since the political
life of the Agrarian leaders de-
pends on their complete subser-
vience to the Communist Party
leadership, it can be assumed
that these members of the govern-
ment will actively support Zhiv-
kov's policies
FAILURES IN ALBANIAN AGRICULTURE MAY FORCE CHANGES
Albania's per capita supplies
of grain--the main staple in a
poor diet--will probably reach
a new low this year, after a
downward trend for the last five
years. The adverse impact of
this shortfall on an already
marginal food situation and on
economic development probably
accounts in part for recent pol-
icy announcements directed at
agriculture. The shortage may
also have helped induce the re-
gime to make its reported recent
overtures toward bettering rela-
tions with selected Eastern and
Western European countries. Fur-
thermore, Albanian leaders may
be disappointed with the level
of economic aid expected from
Peking, especially with China's
limited ability to fill rising
grain needs.
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273
ALBANIA'S GRAIN SUPPLY
Kilograms Por Capita
225
66
1965 57-61 62-63 63-84 64-65 6r
A,.roge ._ it
SELECTED YEARS
Food shortages have become more
severe in the past year. Bread.
which supplies 80 percent of the
calories in the meager Albanian diet,
and other basic foods are rationed.
Since 1964. the state has taken a
higher share of the grain harvest,
thereby forcing even farm workers
to obtain bread from central baker-
ies. With a population increase of
percent per year, Albania has been
unable to increase arable land per
capita or to boost livestock numbers
beyond prewar levels. Moreover, the
yields of basic food crops have not
increased.
The regime's concern over agri-
culture's poor performance, espe-
cially in grain output, and its in-
decision on how to cope with this
and other economic problems, may ex-
plain its failure to publicize either
production results for 1965 or the
goals of the fourth five-year plan
(1966-70). Some 5,000 party, mili-
tary, and government workers were
recently sent to the countryside to
help boost grain production and man-
age agriculture enterprises.
A party decision of 4 March
purporting to abolish harsh bureau-
cratic treatment of its people may
be intended to secure greater coop-
eration from the collectivized
peasantry, More important changes,
such as providing greater incentives
to farm workers, may be forthcoming.
Because of prolonged drought,
the production of grain in 1965 is
estimated to have been below the
1957-61 average level and possibly
15 percent or more below the 1964
level. Imports of food grains, sup-
plied solely by Communist China
since 1962, have not been sufficient
to raise the per capita supply of
grain to the 1957-61 average level.
The Albanians now need increased
imports of grain for the current
1965;166 consumption year. These
have not materialized, and a seri-
ous bread shortage could develop
before the 1966 harvest.
Albania has also failed to
complete a number of industrial
projects intended to increase
agricultural production (e.g. fer-
tilizer plants). This circumstance,
as well as the general expansion
of East-West economic relations
in Europe, suggests that the Al-
banians will look to both Eastern
and Western Europe for more techno-
logical aid. Nevertheless, Chi-
na's ability to supply grain im-
ports and other economic aid
will continue to have a vital ef-
fect on both internal and external
policies in Albania.
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INDONESIAN SITUATION REMAINS UNCLEAR
The situation in Indonesia is
murky following Sukarno's vague
delegation of authority to Gen-
eral Suharto last week.
On 12 March President Su-
karno, under army pressure,
signed an order instructing Su-
harto to take all necessary
measures to preserve order and
ensure Sukarno's personal safety.
Hours later, Suharto issued his
first order under this mandate,
officially banning the Indone-
sian Communist Party (PKI), a
move which Sukarno up to then
had steadfastly resisted.
The army apparently forced
this showdown in order to fore-
stall a reported plan by Sukarno
to dismiss Suharto and other
ranking army officers. Tension
had been steadily mounting in
Djakarta in the wake of army-
encouraged antigovernment agita-
tion which had virtually para-
lyzed the government.
Sukarno, however, is now
claiming that Suharto exceeded
his authority in banning the
PKI. Sukarno is demanding that
the army forgo its plans both to
oust pro-Communist cabinet min-
isters, including its principal
target, Foreign Minister Sub-
andrio, and to name a new pro-
army cabinet. The President is
also trying to erode support for
Suharto within the armed forces
but does not appear to have had
any significant success.
In the face of this resist-
ance, the army has been cau-
tious in asserting its power.
Rather than move directly against
pro-Communist cabinet ministers,
the army apparently intends,
through further mass demonstra-
tions, to generate popular de-
mand for their resignations.
This indirect tactic is de-
signed to allow Sukarno to save
face by "acceding to the wish
of the people" rather than hav-
ing to accept an army fait ac-
compli. However, it may also
give the President the time and
maneuvering room he needs to
regain the initiative.
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During the first two months
of 1966, Thai Communists have
sustained a high level of sub-
versive activity reached in late
1965. This activity still con-
sists mainly of acts of terrorism
against villagers and low-level
officials, most clashes between
police and insurgents resulting
from police suppression opera-
tions.
There are indications, how-
ever, that the insurgents in the
northeast are becoming bolder.
Recent reports claim that on two
occasions Communists attacked
armed officials in an attempt to
kill informants who were under
government protection. Also,
groups of 20 to 40 armed men en-
tered villages on two separate
instances and summoned all the
people to hear long harangues
against the Thanom government and
the US.
In the Bangkok area, re-
ports indicate that the clandes-
tine Voice of the Thai People is
reaching a wide audience among
university students. Although
students reportedly discount the
content of these broadcasts as
largely propaganda, interest in
them is increasing. Attacks
against government corruption
and charges that Thailand is sub-
servient to US interests receive
a sympathetic hearing.
Government reaction to
the insurgency problem to date
has mainly emphasized armed
sweeps in the troubled areas.
Such operations were conducted
in three northeastern prov-
inces during January and Febru-
ary. These sweeps, which
met only slight armed resist-
ance, resulted in the arrest
of over 300 suspects, includ-
ing several who were listed as
known subversive leaders. Two
of these sweeps were attempts
to restore government pres-
tige in areas where insurgents
had virtually nullified official
authority.
In an effort to improve
government influence in the
countryside, a political ac-
tion committee was established
for the northeast on 21 Febru-
ary. The committee, which
will operate under the Counter-
subversion Operations Com-
mand, is designed to handle
political aspects of the sub-
version problem, including
regaining the loyalty of vil-
lagers in subverted areas and
punishing ineffectual local of-
ficials. The new committee's
program is aimed at filling
the political vacuum which has
facilitated subversion in the
countryside. Up to now this
aspect has been largely ignored
by Bangkok.
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Leftist-instigated rioting
in Calcutta, Hindu-Sikh communal
clashes in the Punjab, a revolt
of Mizo Hill tribes, and con-
tinued economic gloom have kept
the Gandhi government on the de-
fensive during the past few
weeks. None of the crises has
proved unmanageable, but their
combined effect has forced New
Delhi into a continual scramble
for emergency solutions. Opposi-
tion elements can be expected
to make the most of New Delhi's
discomfiture,with general elec-
tions less than a year away.
West Bengal State was quiet
again late this week after two
weeks of rioting in which 37
persons died. The disorders in
and around Calcutta were sparked
by leftist opposition parties,
particularly the state's two Com-
munist units. The Bengali left-
ists have been negotiating ar-
rangements for a 1967 electoral
alliance. Their agitation over
the government's food policy ap-
pears to have been more a test
of their joint strength than a
reflection of real food short-
ages. The food supply situation
will worsen in West Bengal, as
elsewhere, in the spring and sum-
mer, and the leftists will prob-
ably redouble their efforts to
discredit the Congress Party's
state and national governments.
Indian forces have regained
the initiative against tribal
rebels in the Mizo Hills District
of Assam State. Several thousand
Mizo guerrillas, who had launched
raids against government installa-
tions on 1 March, have been
driven from the district's major
administrative centers by a bri-
gade of Indian Army reinforce-
ments. Flushing them from their
jungle encampments throughout the
district will be a more difficult
matter, however. Meanwhile, there
are indications that the neigh-
boring Naga tribes may renew their
own ten-year-old armed struggle
for independence.
Hindu-Sikh communal rioting
broke out in the Punjab and in
Delhi itself last week following
a Congress Party decision to
bow to demands by the Sikh re-
ligious minority for a separate
Punjabi-speaking state. The
party had earlier refused to ap-
prove a division of the Punjab,
where Hindi and Punjabi have
been coequal official languages.
It gave in, however, when it ap-
peared that the Sikhs' most in-
fluential leader, Sant Fateh
Singh, might well follow through
with a threatened self-immolation
over the issue.
Hindus in the predominantly
Sikh northwestern Punjab are Pun-
jabi speakers themselves, but
they demonstrated violently
against a partition, which they
fear will lead to Sikh domina-
tion. The state unit of the
Hindu extremist Jan Sangh party
fanned the flames, despite urg-
ings by the party's national
leaders for moderation. Troops
have been alerted, but police
appear to be gradually restoring
order without their help. Tem-
pers could flare again when New
Delhi begins the complex task of
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implementing the Congress Party
recommendations.
Although less dramatic, In-
dia's economic woes still con-
front the Gandhi government with
its most challenging problems.
Indian leaders are now confident
that widespread starvation can
be avoided, but the task of dis-
tributing emergency grain will
severely tax the government's
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
meager administrative resources.
Foreign-exchange shortages may
force a curtailment of indus-
trial production this summer,
and unemployment will probably
rise. Both Congress and opposi-
tion party leaders in Madras
State recently told US officials
that economic issues will strongly
influence the 1967 election re-
sults in their state, and the
same is probably true elsewhere.
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Agitation against the na-
tional government is increasing
in East Pakistan. In addition,
there is a growing divergence
of views on policies toward the
government to be followed by op-
position political leaders in
both East and West Pakistan.
Although opposition leaders in
East Pakistan are in agreement
with their West Pakistani coun-
terparts on some issues, greater
East Pakistani autonomy has re-
cently become a major theme of
the easterners' campaign.
The Bengali majority of
East Pakistan has little in com-
mon with the West Pakistanis,
other than Islam and a fear of
India. President Ayub Khan's
efforts to draw the two segments
of his country closer together
have had little success, and last
September's war with India in-
tensified differences.
Many Bengalis feel that East
Pakistan has no vital interest
in Kashmir, the cause of the war.
They think that India, either
exploiting its military victory
or trying to offset its military
defeat, would have invaded East
Pakistan had the war not ended
in a draw. Ayub is accused of
having placed East Pakistan in
great danger with his Kashmir
policies without providing an
adequate defense having left
only one weak division in East
Pakistan during the fighting.
Bengali discontent is rein-
forced by alleged economic dis-
crimination, fear that the gov-
ernment has designs against
Bengali culture and language,
and a general feeling that the
country is being run for the
benefit of its Western province.
Measures designed to bolster the
Ayub regime--although not intended
to work against East Pakistan--
are often viewed as attempts by
Ayub and other West Pakistanis
to dominate East Pakistan.
Eastern opposition leaders
are growing increasingly bold
in their criticism of the govern-
ment. Currently the most vocal
is Majibur Rahman, who has pro-
posed a six-point program which
would eliminate the central gov-
ernment's taxing power and limit
its responsibilities to defense
and foreign affairs. Another
of the several competing opposi-
tion parties is now following
his lead by advocating a very
similar seven-point program.
The opposition has hinted at
general strikes, and Majibur Rah-
man claims to have 2,000 men
ready to go to jail. Student
demonstrations led to minor vio-
lence in late February. Other-
wise, opposition to the central
government has been limited to
talk so far, but recently increased
bitterness combined with tradi-
tional Bengali attitudes could
lead to trouble.
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COMMUNIST MILITARY AID ACTIVITIES
The USSR and Czechoslovakia
are actively implementing mili-
tary aid arrangements with non-
Communist countries.
Recent comments by the So-
viet military attache in Cairo
suggest that, in addition to the
48 MIG-21 Fishbed limited all-
weather jet fighters delivered
in the last few months, Egypt
will soon receive the SU-7 Fitter
fighter-bomber. This aircraft,
never before sent outside the
bloc, was included in the major
Soviet-Egyptian arms pact of
25X1 late 1964.
Syrian military aid nego-
tiations with China late last
year may have succeeded in stir-
ring Moscow into taking the ac-
tion vainly sought by several
Syrian delegations sent to Mos-
cow to work out deliveries under
the 1964 arms pact. A Soviet
arms delivery apparently took
place recently, the first noted
in many months.
Soviet relations with Iraq
remain unsettled, but an Iraqi
military delegation which has
been cooling its heels for sev-
eral weeks after the USSR can-
celed plans for receiving it,
apparently plans to travel to
Moscow in April for preliminary
negotiations on a fifth arms
agreement. Deliveries under the
1964 pact were completed with
the arrival of 20 NIIG-21 air-
craft in December and January,
and Iraq recently bought 18 MI-4
helicopters which are now arriv-
ing in Baghdad.
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Czechoslovakia has been
more active in supplying arms to
India. Deliveries of medium
tanks and artillery to Bombay
which began in February are con-
tinuing. The USSR also has
stepped up implementation of its
contracts, and in the last month
delivered 38 MIG-21 limited all-
weather jets and some jet train-
ers, along with amphibious tanks.
The aircraft shipments complete
the second Soviet-Indian jet
fighter contract, and the USSR
has now delivered 50 such air-
craft. A contract for 36 more
signed in 1965 remains to be
fulfilled.
MODERATES DEAL HEAVY BLOWS TO KENYAN LEFTISTS
Moderate, pro-Western Kenya
politicians, with President Ken-
yatta's blessing, have struck
two heavy blows at Vice President
Oginga Odinga and his leftist-co-
horts. Last week the government
expelled six Communist diplomats
and newspapermen known to have
been funneling funds to Odinga,
and on 15 March five more were
told to go. Odinga himself lost
his second-ranking post in Ken-
ya's dominant KANU party in a
party election over the weekend,
and all his party candidates
were soundly defeated.
During the past year, the
moderates have progressively
stripped Odinga of power. Ken-
yatta, however, had heretofore
moved only cautiously, out of
fear of provoking Odinga's Luo
tribe, the second largest in
Kenya and the principal ally of
Kenyatta's Kikuyus in KANU. At
the party elections Kenyatta for
the first time joined directly
in the fray and openly attacked
Odinga and his followers.
The moderates, their appe-
tites whetted by their successes,
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now will probably try to force
Odinga out of the vice-presidency.
Odinga's one consuming ambition is
to succeed to the presidency, how-
ever, and he is still a political
force to be reckoned with. He re-
mains a power in the Luo tribe,
and with Communist help he has had
ample funds to dispense to poli-
ticians, youth organizations, and
labor leaders.
Odinga apparently plans to
stay in KANU for the present,
mainly to try to hold onto the vice-
presidency. However, his followers
are reported to be joining forces
with former minister of housing
Ngei, recently fired for corrup-
tion. Ngei is a power in the Kamba
tribe, and Odinga's backers ap-
parently hope to establish a new
Luo-Kamba party to fight the Kikuyu-
dominated KANU. All indications
are that the struggle will inten-
sify as Kenya moves toward eneral
elections in 1968.
LITTLE MOVEMENT IN RHODESIAN SITUATION
No tanker carrying petroleum
for Rhodesia has arrived at the
Mozambique port of Beira despite
that such a shipment was imminent.
Alternative storage and pump-
ing facilities at Beira, which are
to connect with the pipeline to
Rhodesia's Umtali refinery and by-
pass facilities owned by companies
honoring the Rhodesian boycott, are
still not finished. Tankers earlier
rumored to be carrying Rhodesia-
bound oil to Beira have unloaded
at other ports.
Britain is continuing its ef-
forts to discourage oil deliveries
at Beira and to find legal obstacles
to establishing the new pumping
facilities. Meanwhile, Rhodesia
is still receiving petroleum from
South Africa, and Britain believes
increasing amounts recently have
arrived from Lourenco Marques in
Mozambique.
Rhodesia's legal governor, Sir
Humphrey Gibbs, who has figured
prominently in London's plans for
ending the Smith regime's rebellion,
reportedly has told Prime Minister
Wilson that he would resign if force
were used to settle the Rhodesian
issue. One Rhodesian official be-
lieves Gibbs in any case will prob-
ably not remain in the thankless
job of governor for more than two
more months.
US and UK diplomats in Lusaka
believe that London's economic ef-
forts to end Rhodesian independence,
which involve a broad Zambian trade
boycott, may founder on Zambian re-
luctance to provoke Rhodesian re-
taliation. In a major foreign
policy speech, President Kaunda only
briefly referred to bringing down
the Smith regime and devoted much
of his talk to longer term plans to
lessen economic dependence on Rho-
desia. An apparent change in eco-
nomic planning priorities conforms
with Kaunda's statements,
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General Ironsi's military
regime in Nigeria is holding its
own, but faces mounting pressure
from dissatisfied army elements.
In the key Northern Region, ousted
politicians are trying to reassert
themselves.
Ironsi has neutralized most
of the junior army officers who
sparked the January coup by plac-
ing them under "protective cus-
tody," but he is under conflict-
ing pressures as to the next step.
The trouble seems to lie mainly
with the noncommissioned officers,
some of whom--especially Northern-
ers--reportedly are threatening
to rise against their superiors
in revenge for the killing of
Northern officers during the coup.
Others resent the continued de-
tention of Major Nzeogwu, the
coup leader in the North.
Ironsi continues to make
conciliatory gestures toward the
potentially troublesome North,
where he is trying hard to enlist
the support of traditional polit-
ical and religious leaders. He
showed great deference to the re-
gion's Muslim leader--the Sultan
of Sokoto--during the latter's
well-publicized visit to Lagos
on 12 March, and appointed the
ex-governor of the North and a
local chief to important posts.
Nevertheless, the government
appears either unable or unwill-
ing to stop the maneuvering which
the ousted Northern politicians
have apparently engaged in since
shortly after the coup. Politi-
cal party activity has been
strongly circumscribed in most
MOUNTING PRESSURES
of Nigeria, but in the North con-
siderable leeway has been granted.
The once powerful regional ruling
party, the conservative Northern
People's Congress (NPC), last
week took advantage of the cere- 25X1
monial visit of many ex-ministers
to the North and held a series of
party meetings.
The government is moving
ahead with its purge of leading
precoup personalities, with spe-
cial emphasis on those who had
enriched themselves at public
expense. Last week it arrested
four ranking Easterners--among
them former regional premier Ok-
para--and two high Midwestern
Region officials. Some twenty
officials of the former Western
Region government are also
under detention. No high offi-
cials have yet been detained in
the North.
Most of the arrested poli-
ticians have been charged with
misappropriation of funds, but
some have been implicated in at-
tempts to stir up dissension in
the army.
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On 11 March, De Gaulle follow-
ed up his original letters to the
other NATO nations with an explana-
tory memorandum that sought to
justify his withdrawing French
forces from NATO assignment and re-
moving headquarters from France.
He mentioned no time schedule, how-
ever, and left the way open for
discussion of liaison arrangements
between the French and NATO commands.
In addenda to the US and Cana-
dian memoranda, Paris also speci-
fied that it would assume complete
sovereignty over French territory
and require that any foreign mili-
tary elements be answerable only to
French authority. Again, however,
no timing was indicated, and each
memorandum expressed a willingness
to reach agreement on use of French
facilities in the event of a con-
flict involving both countries.
Domestic opposition groups
have already attacked De Gaulle's
actions, but differences among them
will lessen the impact of their
challenge. Moreover, the French
public has been conditioned to ex-
pect a loosening of French ties
with the alliance and to accept the
Gaullist contention that NATO "in-
tegration" is a form of American
hegemony.
Allied reaction has centered
on British proposals for a joint
declaration in support of the North
Atlantic Treaty and an integrated
military organization; establish-
ment of a special North Atlantic
Council (NAC) committee, without
French participation, to deal with
the problems arising from De
Gaulle's move; and an early meeting
of the 14 non-French NATO members
at the ministerial level to frame
a common policy toward France.
The proposal for an early
ministerial meeting has found no
support among the other allies,
who believe more time is required
to establish a common position.
Rather than establish a special
committee, the NAC members agreed,
with French concurrence, to author-
ize their international staff and
military committees to study the
implications of De Gaulle's notes
under close council supervision.
It was agreed that the council
would make no substantive decisions
at this stage.
The UK draft declaration in
support of NATO, revised to meet
objections from Canada, the Scan-
dinavians, Turkey, and Portugal,
was accepted by the 14 NATO dele-
gates on 14 March, although several
still had to obtain approval of
their governments. The Italian
Government was unable to give for-
mal approval before being official-
ly installed in office. but action
is expected soon. To obtain unani-
mous approval, it was necessary to
agree that any member government
would be free to issue official
comments on the declaration.
The difficulty in obtaining
agreement on a simple statement of
support for the Alliance and its
integrated military structure
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indicates the problems which will
influence future decisions. The
Scandinavian countries, for ex-
ample, are worried about latent
neutralist sentiment and the ap-
peal of a separate Scandinavian
defense alliance. Turkey and
Greece view the difficulties with
the French as a lever to obtain
support in the Cyprus dispute.
IThe Portuguese
have held back eir support in
view of NATO's failure to support
them in their colonial problems
in Africa and Asia.
Most of the 14 also view with
alarm the possibility that Germany
will demand a more independent mil-
itary role and the prospect that
its position in the Alliance will
grow stronger as France ceases ac-
tive participation. These fears
will be encouraged by a suggestion
made by a high German official that
the time may now be ripe to push
ahead with an Alliance nuclear
force. On the other hand, Chancel-
lor Erhard has explicitly denied
that Germany might seize on the
French withdrawal as an excuse to
transform its totally NATO-com-
mitted military forces into a new
Wehrmacht.
Agreement of the Belgium
Catholic and Liberal parties on
15 March to form a coalition with
Paul Vanden Boeynants as prime
minister foreshadows the estab-
lishment of a more conservative
government.
Its outlook will probably
be demonstrated first in its ap-
proach to the country's central
problem, that of reducing the
rapidly rising national budget
deficit. Catholics in the out-
going government opposed Social-
ist proposals to solve the prob-
lem by raising taxes, and the
business-oriented Liberals have
just put themselves on record as
sharing this view. Cuts in so-
cial welfare expenses are expected,
and political considerations will
probably demand balancing cuts in
the unpopular defense establish-
ment, which could affect both NATO
and Congo commitments.
The government may be left
more vulnerable to pressures for
defense cuts by the departure from
the cabinet of Socialist Paul
Henri Spaak, foreign minister for
22 years since 1936 (except for
1958-61, 1949-54, and a few months
in 1939). Spaak has maintained a
broader view of Belgium's foreign
responsibilities than is normal
among Belgian political leaders.
Some Catholic labor elements
have voiced reservations over the
more conservative policy implicit
in their party's alliance with
the Liberals. Auguste Cool, the
most powerful man in the Belgian
labor movement, said on 14 March,
however, that the Catholic labor
groups would back Vanden Boeynants
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at least initially while follow-
ing government labor policy
closely.
President of the Catholic
Party since 1961, Vanden Boey-
nants' political popularity is
based on personal appeal rather
than on the support of pressure
groups from either the right or
the left of his party. He is
expected to present his cabi-
net for parliamentary approval
around 22 March.
GUATEMALAN ELECTION ROUNDUP
Revolutionary Party (PR)
presidential candidate Julio
Cesar Mendez Montenegro is likely
to become Guatemala's next presi-
dent.
Although he failed to cap-
ture an absolute majority on 6
March, as required by the con-
stitution, his party apparently
won at least 29 of the 55 seats
in the congress which will choose
between the top two candidates
after it meets on 5 May. The In-
stitutional Democratic Party
(PID) may have won 20 seats and
the National Liberation Movement
(MLN) six.
Final figures from the elec-
toral tribunal give Mendez 201,-
070 votes to 146,085 for Juan de
Dios Aguilar of the government-
backed PID. Ponciano of the MLN
received 110,145.
Conservative businessmen and
military leaders, fearful that
Mendez would allow Communists to
return to power, have apparently
been persuaded by Chief of Gov-
ernment Peralta to accept the
election results.
In the meantime, Guatemalan
security forces have curtailed
the capabilities of the subver-
sive movements to take advantage
of the postelection void. Many
leaders of the Communist Party
and guerrilla organizations have
been arrested, and at least four
have been executed. Stepped-up
raids, searches, and arrests in
the urban areas have kept the op-
position off balance. Security
forces activities over the past
several weeks may well have
sapped the will to fight of at
least some of the marginal ter-
rorists and guerrillas. Hard-
core elements, however, may re-
act with renewed violence to give
public evidence that they can
still perform effectively.
Although the country is
peaceful on the surface, Guate-
malan stability will be seri-
ously tried, at least until
the new president is installed
on 1 July.
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ALLEGED COUP PLOTTERS NAMED TO HEAD URUGUAYAN MILITARY
25X1
DIA
The announced appointment
of controversial General Mario
Aguerrondo as commander of Uru-
guay's First Military Region (the
Montevideo area which includes
the majority of Uruguayan Army
troops) has set off a spate of
political maneuvering. Aguer-
rondo, a militant member of the
ruling Blanco Party, has in the
past been associated with ele-
ments favoring a coup. His pro-
motion to general in 1964 was
fought by the opposition Colorado
Part
Aguerrondo and several
other of icers--including the
newly appointed top army officer,
the inspector general--were par-
ticipating in a coup plot sched-
uled to occur sometime after Al-
berto Heber became president of
the National Council of Govern-
ment (NCG) on 1 March 1966. Ac-
cording to their plan, Heber
would take sole power, dissolve
the NCG, and rule by decree.
Aguerrondo has ties not
only with Heber, but also with
the Ruralist faction of the
Blanco Party, as does new Inte-
rior Minister Nicolas Storace.
Storace has told US Ambassador
Hoyt that if the popular will
for reform is frustrated, he is
prepared to stage a coup. All
of the alleged military plotters,
as well as Storace and Heber,
are reportedly strongly anti-
Communist. Most of them, how-
ever, are members of the highly
nationalistic Herrerista faction
of the Blanco Party and have ex-
pressed some anti-US views.
Heber has further been character- 25X1
ized as mercurial and impulsive,
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Last weekend's bloody clash
between strikers and police has
further confused the Chilean cop-
per situation. It may, however,
have moved the Frei government
closer to action against Commu-
nist subversion.
The incident began when mem-
bers of the Communist-'Socialist -
led copper union at Anaconda's
"El Salvador" mine met to regis-
ter sympathy with workers at
Braden's "El Teniente" mine who
have been on strike for higher
wages for more than two months.
Because the meeting was a vio-
lation of President Frei's back-
to-work decree of b March, troops
and national police were ordered
to the scene. In the ensuing
fight eight civilians were killed
and 35 civilians and policemen
were wounded.
In discussing the affair on
a nationwide radio-TV broadcast,
Frei charged that Chilean sub-
versive groups who attended the
Tri-Continent Conference last
January in Havana had formulated
this illegal strike strategy.
He said that these subversives
had deliberately provoked vio-
lence to prevent his administra-
tion fromcarrying out reforms
in a democratic fashion. This
stance contrasts with Chile's
earlier abstention on the OAS
resolution which condemned the
conference for promoting vio-
lence in the hemisphere.
Although Frei apparently
still feels that the Communists
are within their constitutional
rights in exploiting the situa-
tion, several leaders of his
Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
feel that the Communists' activ-
ities constitute a plot against
the government and are guerrilla
actions lacking only in weap-
ons.
If the PDC leaders can
find proof that Communist sub-
versive groups were the direct
cause of the incident, Frei may
be persuaded to take action
against the PCCh. With set-
tlement of the strike at "El
Teniente" delayed by the clash,
he must find some way to demon-
strate that he is master of the
situation in order to maintain
his reform program, which is
based on copper industry re-
form and increased production.
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The Bolivian political situa-
tion is as muddled as ever, although
3 July, the date now set for na-
tional elections, is less than
three months off. Four political
parties have been inscribed on the
electoral rolls by the newly or-
ganized national electoral court,
and seven others are awaiting recog-
nition. Courts have been set up
in all department capitals, and
some registration material has been
distributed to registrars. Never-
theless, some government officials
believe elections will have to be
postponed because not enough time
remains to organize the mechanics
of the campaign.
At the moment former junta
co-president Barrientos, who re-
turned to Bolivia on 4 March after
a two-month absence, is the only
apparent candidate for president,
and even he refuses to commit him-
self until he has had time to as-
sess the situation. Since his re-
turn he has been on the campaign
trail trying to make up ground lost
during his absence. He also has
been touring military garrisons
to ascertain the extent of military
backing for his candidacy. Accord-
ing to the La Paz press, Barrientos
will not make an announcement on
his candidacy until late March.
In the meantime, opposition
forces of both the left and right
are either maneuvering to force a
postponement of elections, or are
trying to organize political al-
liances strong enough to challenge
Barrientos and his political ve-
hicle, the Front of the Bolivian
Revolution (FRB).
Barrientos' most important task
is to try to solidify the FRB which
is composed of the Popular Chris-
tian Movement (MPC), the Authentic
Revolutionary Party (PRA), the So-
cial Democratic Party (PSD), the
Party of the Revolutionary Left
(PIR), and the Chaco War Veterans.
The front is beset with internal
friction arising out of a leadership
feud between Walter Guevara Arze of
the PRA and Hugo Bozo, chief of the
MPC. An even greater threat comes
from an ill-defined rightist group,
consisting of some military offi-
cers and the Bolivian Socialist
Falange (FSB
Calmly standing in the wings 25X1
is General Alfredo Ovando, now
sole president of the military
junta. Ovando may no longer view
Barrientos as the inevitable can-
didate, and might begin feeding
Barrientos' fears about the weak-
ness of his political support with
the hope that he would agree to
postpone elections. This tactic
would be in keeping with both
Ovando's basic misgivings about
elections and his lack of confidence
in the viability of constitutional
government. Since Ovando has more
to gain from a postponement of
elections than Barrientos, an
Ovando success would indicate an
important change in the power bal-
ance i.n Bolivi_a.
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