WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0
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RIPPUB
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S
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33
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December 21, 2016
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July 10, 2008
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1
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Publication Date: 
March 18, 1966
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SUMMARY
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Approved IA For Release 2008/07/10 C-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 18.[arch 196.6 'j, l o 0281/60 IVI Imo/ W_ - 0.0 GROUP I Excluded fronn outornofic State Dept. review ,completed copy No. DIA review completed; CENTRAL INTELLIGE1 Y OF IC OF` CURRENT INT L I N 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Nw~ SECRET (Information as of noon EST, 17 March 1966) VIETNAM The dismissal of General Thi as I Corps commander has led to unrest in South Vietnam and provided the op- portunity for new Buddhist agitation against the Ky government. The intensity of fighting declined slightly this week, after extensive allied operations and the loss of the A Shau Special Forces camp last week. Moscow supported a Communist "Vietnam solidarity week," using the occasion for new propaganda jabs at the Chinese Communists. Page EXPANSION OF INFILTRATION ROAD NETWORK IN LAOS PANHANDLE 4 The Communists in the past year have constructed roads more than doubling the mileage of truckable routes in the Laotian panhandle for infiltration into South Vietnam, and this work is continuing. CHINA'S LIU SHAO-CHI TO VISIT PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN 7 Peking is attempting to recoup recent Chinese set- backs in South Asia by sending its chief of state on a round of official visits in late March and early April. GOVERNMENTAL CHANGES STRENGTHEN BULGARIAN CHIEF ZHIVKOV 8 In a move to consolidate his leadership of both party and government, Todor Zhivkov has retained the premiership and reshuffled and expanded the cabinet. FAILURES IN ALBANIAN AGRICULTURE MAY FORCE CHANGES 9 Albania's per capita grain supplies should reach a new low this year. The shortage may have been a cause for recent party policy announcements aimed at agriculture and friendship overtures toward European nations. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 SECRET Asia-Africa INDONESIAN SITUATION REMAINS UNCLEAR Sukarno's delegation of authority to General Suharto is vague, and the army continues cautious in asserting its power. THAI INSURGENTS MAINTAIN HIGH LEVEL OF ACTIVITY Communist subversives are apparently becoming bolder in northeast Thailand as acts of terrorism against villagers and low-level officials continue. INTERNAL TROUBLES KEEP INDIAN GOVERNMENT ON DEFENSIVE Riots, communal clashes, a tribal revolt, and continued economic gloom have the government scrambling for emergency solutions. EAST PAKISTANIS CALLING FOR GREATER AUTONOMY So far, opposition to the central government has been limited to talk for the most part, but bitterness is increasing and could lead to trouble. COMMUNIST MILITARY ATD ACTIVITIES The USSR and Czechoslovakia are actively implementing military aid arrangements with non-Communist countries. MODERATES DEAL HEAVY BLOWS TO KENYAN LEFTISTS President Kenyatta has ousted Communist diplomats and newspapermen sponsoring leftist Vice President Odinga. The governing party also dropped Odinga from his second-ranking party post. LITTLE MOVEMENT IN RHODESIAN SITUATION No tanker with oil for Rhodesia has arrived at Beira, and the new storage and pumping facilities at the Mo- zambique port are not finished. It seems unlikely that Zambia will impose a broad trade boycott. ,,SECRET Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 SECRET NIGERIAN REGIME FACES MOUNTING PRESSURES General Ironsi's military government in Nigeria is holding its own, but may encounter trouble from dis- satisfied army elements and ousted politicians. FRANCE AND NATO There has been a variety of reactions among NATO members to De Gaulle's withdrawal of French forces from NATO assignment and removal of headquarters from France. The difficulty in getting agreement among the 14 on a simple statement of support for the Alliance indicates the problems that will influence future NATO decisions. CATHOLIC-LIBERAL COALITION IN BELGIUM The more conservative outlook of the new government under Paul Vanden Boeynants is likely to be demon- strated in its approach to controlling the rapid rise in the budget deficit. Western Hemisphere GUATEMALAN ELECTION ROUNDUP 22 Revolutionary Party candidate Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro will probably be chosen president when congress meets on 5 May. ALLEGED COUP PLOTTERS NAMED TO HEAD URUGUAYAN MILITARY 23 General Mario Aguerrondo, who has been associated with elements favoring a coup, has been appointed military commander of the Montevideo area, which includes the majority of Uruguayan Army troops. POLITICAL IMPACT OF CHILEAN COPPER SITUATION 24 President Frei has blamed the Tri-Continent Conference in Havana for encouraging subversives to provoke violence in order to hinder his economic reform pro- gram. BOLIVIA INCHES TOWARD ELECTIONS Four parties have been inscribed on the electoral rolls and seven others have asked for recognition. Nevertheless, some government officials believe the presidential elections may have to be postponed beyond 3 July. SECRET Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 Mar 66 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 25X6 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 smv, SECRET The dismissal of General Thi as I Corps commander last week ap- pears to be developing into a con- frontation between South Vietnam's Buddhist leadership and the Ky government. Initial unrest following the announcement of Thi's removal took the form of school boycotts, strikes, and orderly demonstrations in sev- eral northern cities. These appeared to be inspired by some local of- ficials loyal to Thi and by generally restive elements in the area. How- ever, on 12 March the Buddhist In- stitute in Saigon capitalized on the first public breach in the unity of the current military regime by issuing a communique aimed at hastening the return of civilian government. By 14 March, agitation in Hue had begun to reflect the themes of the Buddhist communique, which urged a return of all generals who participated in the overthrow of .the Diem government in 1963, the confinement of the military to strictly military matters, and the formation of a civilian government to carry on the Vietnamese social revolution. Demonstrations and strikes supporting the communique and the reinstatement of General Thi con- tinued in Hue and Da Nang on 15 and 16 March, involving uniformed military personnel, local officials, and Buddhists. On 16 March, a peaceful gathering of about 10,000 persons assembled in Saigon to listen to a ranking member of the national Buddhist hierarchy reiterate the demands of the 12 March com- munique. Although the Buddhist leaders in the past have often been at odds with one another, the reorganization of the Ky cabinet last month may have generated enough resentment among them to cause the two principal factions to unite for joint action. At present, the Buddhists are apparently probing for weak spots in military unity. The ruling mili- tary Directorate will meet on 18 March to determine how to handle SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 k 1 - . : j X - 4 V l-P d ItSavannakhet CAMBODIA Ul Sarevane r . PHNOM PENH L y ( '~ayNmh CAPITAL MILITARY REGION \ J J VIETNAM 1 Tchepotie' SOUTH VIETNAM 18 MARCH 1966 I ECCRJ T Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 SECRET the Buddhist threat. Should ag- itation continue to grow, the government may be faced with a choice of bending to Buddhist demands or adopting a harsh pol- icy. In the past, the Buddhists have proved extremely adroit in turning repressive measures into exploitable political issues. Military Operations The intensity of fighting declined slightly this week, af- ter extensive allied operations last week and the loss of the A Shau Special Forces camp on 10 March. On 12 March the Viet Cong launched a mortar attack on a training center for People's Action Teams and an adjacent air strip at Vung Tau, resulting in about 50 allied casualties and slight damage to the installa- tions. Two days later, South Vietnamese troops outmaneuvered enemy forces attempting to am- bush a government convoy in Quang Ngai Province, and killed 75 Viet Cong. On 15 March, a two-battalion enemy attack on government troops in Dinh Tuong Province was unsuccessful. Some enemy contact was established later by a government reaction force, resulting in moderate cas- ualties to both sides. Allied activity--in the Viet Cong "War Zone D" strong- hold north of Saigon, in the coastal provinces of Binh Dinh and Phu Yen, and in Darlac Prov- ince--generally encountered only sporadic enemy opposition this week. US forces operating in Bien Hoa Province on 15 March clashed with an enemy force of unknown size, while other US units skirmished with an esti- mated platoon of Viet Cong in Darlac Province. Following Operation MASHER/ WHITE WING, which resulted in over 1,800 Viet Cong killed dur- ing a six-week period, elements of the US First Air Cavalry Divi- sion initiated a new search-and- destroy effort in northeastern Binh Dinh Province last week, Little contact has been reported thus far, and Operation HARRISON, in adjacent Phu Yen Province, also continued with little enemy resistance. Bloc "Solidarity Week" The Communists launched a "week of solidarity with Viet- nam" observance on 12 March, in a follow-through of a resolution adopted by the leftist Tri- Continent Conference in Havana last January. Moscow propaganda devoted considerable attention to the solidarity week, boast- ing at length of Soviet economic and defense assistance to the Vietnamese. Hanoi Radio re- ported that special Vietnam ral- lies had been held in the larger Soviet cities and in the capitals of all the Soviet republicans. The Soviet propaganda seemed at least partly calculated to un- dercut Chinese Communist charges that Moscow's aid to the Vietnam- ese had been insignificant. In a familiar indirect reference to SECRET Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 SECRET Peking's steady refusal to par- ticipate in programs of unified bloc action on Vietnam, Moscow insisted that the solidarity week was an illustration of the "co- hesion and unity of action on the part of all Communists in the struggle against imperialism." Chinese propaganda has given lim- ited mention to the solidarity week, and no Chinese rallies have been reported. Chinese propaganda contin- ues to support the Vietnamese war, however, asserting that the Communist side is winning and that the US is intent on expand- ing the conflict to China. On 10 and 11 March the Peking press carried reports hailing the "vic- tories" won by the Viet Cong, de- claring that the "brilliant vic- tories" of the Vietnamese Commu- nists in the past two months are "eloquent proof that people's war can defeat US imperialism." There are indications that Hanoi's continued military and political cooperation with the Soviet Union is irritating the Chinese. There have also been in- dications in Chinese propaganda that Peking fears increased So- viet influence in Hanoi might produce a weakening of the North Vietnamese determination to con- tinue the war. There is cur- rently no evidence, however, that Peking seriously doubts Hanoi's present intent on this score, or has diminished in any way the extensive military co- operation with the DRV already under wa EXPANSION OF INFILTRATION ROAD NETWORK IN LAOS PANHANDLE During the past year, the Communists have constructed roads more than doubling the mileage of truckable roads in the Laotian panhandle for infiltration into South Vietnam, and this work is continuing. The first objective of the stepped-up construction program, which began in mid-1965, was the extension of truckable roads from the Tchepone area, nearly halfway down the panhandle, to the north- ern border of Cambodia. A con- tinuous north-south road consist- ing of routes 92 and 96 has been completed to the latitude of Attopeu. From this north- south link., routes 922, 165, and SECRET Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 Mar 66 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Mu G a Pass N' I rte/ Mahaxay Ban Se yang N'Sng Road - Bypass road Unimproved trail Ban Bad Saravane 16 Ban Ph AREA OF MAIN ~anouang Nam havane\ 3' ODI1A -- Road - Road under construction ---_---. Track or trail 0 28 SF. riv F W Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 SECRET an unnumbered road at the lati- tude of Attopeu run cast toward the South Vietnamese border and connect with trails crossing into South Vietnam. A second objective--toward which most current construction is directed--is to provide al- ternates or bypasses to exist- ing roads in order to make the infiltration network less vul- nerable to interdiction. Mu Gia Pass, through which virtually all truck traffic enters Laos from North Vietnam, has been pro- vided with at least two by- passes around a choke point heav- ily bombed during the past year. Between the pass and Tchepone, Route 911 was completed as an alternate for Route 23 just as the current dry season began. A bypass around Tcheponc, through which all southbound traffic is now channeled, is being con- structed to link routes 911, 9, and 92. Another route from North Vietnam into the panhandle, con- necting North Vietnamese Route 101 with Laotian Route 911, is under construction and may be completed in a matter of weeks. on the manner in which the con- struction work is organized. ele- namese Army regiments are cur- rently responsible for mainte- nance of the routes through Mu Gia Pass. have reported that North Vietnam- ese Army units are engaged in road work to the east of Sara- vane, deep in the panhandle, and other units are probably workin in other locations. have also revealed that some mechanized equipment is being employed. Most of the infiltration roads have unimproved dirt sur- faces in widths sufficient for use by full-size trucks. Some sections which pass through terrain where the water table is high, or is otherwise dif- ficult, have been surfaced with logs or gravel. The system is nevertheless still generally subject to damage by rai SECRET Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 Mar 66 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 SECRET Peking is attempting to re- coup recent Chinese setbacks in South Asia by sending chief of state Liu Shao-chi on state visits to Pakistan and Afghanistan in late March and early April. This will be Liu's second ex- posure to the free world. His only previous trip outside the Communist bloc was a lackluster "good-will" junket to Indonesia, Cambodia, and Burma in the spring of 1963. His colorless and rather wooden performance at that time was only partially offset by the efforts of his pretty and viva- cious wife. Liu's upcoming stops have been billed by the Chinese as "friendly visits," but no details have been released. The inclusion in the party of Foreign Minister Chen Yi suggests that there will be wide- ranging discussions of issues af- fecting Chinese relations with the two countries. The inclusion of the wives of Liu and Chen is prob- ably calculated to promote an im- pression of friendly informality. The exact dates of Liu's trip have not been announced, but he is expected to arrive in Pakistan on 24 March and in Afghanistan in the first week of April. The trip to Pakistan probably is prompted by Chinese concern over Rawalpindi's improved rela- tions with Washington, Moscow, and New Delhi. Peking no doubt hopes that the visit will assist in producing friction between Rawalpindi and Washington, and thus nullify to some degree the effects of President Ayub's visit to the US last December. Peking is also concerned about the strengthened Soviet position in South Asia, highlighted by the successful intermediary role of Moscow in the Tashkent agreement of January. Chinese eagerness to have Liu visit Afghanistan at this time is probably explained by Peking's concern over the Afghan prime minister's recent apparently successful trip to the Soviet Union and by the desire to give the trip more prominence by hav- ing stops in more than one coun- try. It is expected that there will be some discussion of utiliza- tion of the $28-million Chinese credit granted in 1965. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 SECRET Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov has moved to consolidate his leader- ship of both party and government. Despite reports to the contrary, he has apparently decided for the time being to retain the premier- ship. In addition, ministerial changes made at the 11-12 March session of the National Assembly seem designed to enhance his con- trol. Zhivkov probably concluded that his ability to strike a com- promise between the "hard-line" and "nationalist" elements within the regime might be impaired if he relinquished his government post. He may also have reasoned that his recently launched program to develop broader contacts with the non-Communist world, while simultaneously maintaining good CHANGES IN BULGARIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (CABINET) 12 Match 1966 Ministry or Committee Chairman (Premier) First Deputy Chairman Deputy Chairmen A,griculturel- Construction Finance Foreign Affairs Foreign Trade Interior Internal Trade Justice National Defense National Education Public Health and Social Welfare Transportation 2 Communications 2 Architecture and Public Works} Ministers without Portfolio (Committees Whose Chairmen Hare Ministerial Rank) Chemistry and Metallurgy Cultureand Art Science and Technical Progress State Planning State Security State Control a Food Industry Forests and Industry Labor and Wages Light Industry Machine Building Power and Fuel Zhlvkov, Todor Zhivkov, Zhivko Kubadinski, Poncho Mikhaylov, Ivan Tadorov, Stanko Tsolov, Tano Groshnov, Morin Popov, Dimitur Bushey, Ivan Budinov, Ivan Dikov, Diko Takov, Peko Dzhurov, Dobri Gonev, Gancho Ignotov, Kiril Avramov, Luchezor Pavlov, Georgi Popov, Ivan Poshev, Apostol Solokov, Angel Stafanov, Ninko Dimitrov, Atonas Dokov, Moko Mishev, Misho Belcheva, Dana Ivanov, Morly Popov, Konstantin 1. formerly Ministry of Aprkuttvral Production 2. Ministry of tromportollon and Comrrwnicottons sprit Into Ire minblrtes. 3. Fornierty State Committee for Cetntruction and Archttecturs. 4. Formerly Committee for Party and State Control. L 30 ECRET Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY Kubadinski, Poncho Kubodinski, Poncho Bronkov, Georgi Grlgorov, Mitko Krustanov, Lyubomir Mateev, Evgeni Tonchev, Stoyan Newly R#4#0 to 14 e' Pink Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 SECRET - `'"10 relations with Moscow, would have been jeopardized. The changes in the cabinet are designed to strengthen Zhiv- kov's personal position and to unite the government behind his policies. Evgeni Mateev, who has been critical of Zhivkov's new system of management and planning of the economy, was dropped as minister without port- folio. The warning this implies will not be lost on other mem- bers of the central committee who may be inclined to oppose Zhivkov's economic policies, which will be discussed at a party plenum this month. The elevation to ministerial rank of the chairmen of six government committees dealing with economic matters, also reflects Zhivkov's desire to develop more support for innovations in the economic system. The replacement of Petur Vutov as chairman of the State Committee for Culture and Art with Pavel Matev, chief editor of the monthly organ of the Bul- garian Writers Union, Septemvri, probably is meant to give support to Zhivkov's conservative cultural policies. In this connection, Mitko Grigorov was released from his post as minister without port- folio, probably so that he could devote more time to his party job which includes supervision of cultural affairs. Zhivkov also paid new lip service to the coalition. of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Agrarian Union by appointing top Agrarian leaders Petur Tanchev and Stoyan Tonchev as deputy pre- mier and minister of communica- tions, respectively. Svetla Daskalova, whose father and hus- band are prominent Agrarian lead- ers, was elected minister of justice. Since the political life of the Agrarian leaders de- pends on their complete subser- vience to the Communist Party leadership, it can be assumed that these members of the govern- ment will actively support Zhiv- kov's policies FAILURES IN ALBANIAN AGRICULTURE MAY FORCE CHANGES Albania's per capita supplies of grain--the main staple in a poor diet--will probably reach a new low this year, after a downward trend for the last five years. The adverse impact of this shortfall on an already marginal food situation and on economic development probably accounts in part for recent pol- icy announcements directed at agriculture. The shortage may also have helped induce the re- gime to make its reported recent overtures toward bettering rela- tions with selected Eastern and Western European countries. Fur- thermore, Albanian leaders may be disappointed with the level of economic aid expected from Peking, especially with China's limited ability to fill rising grain needs. SECRET Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 SECRET 273 ALBANIA'S GRAIN SUPPLY Kilograms Por Capita 225 66 1965 57-61 62-63 63-84 64-65 6r A,.roge ._ it SELECTED YEARS Food shortages have become more severe in the past year. Bread. which supplies 80 percent of the calories in the meager Albanian diet, and other basic foods are rationed. Since 1964. the state has taken a higher share of the grain harvest, thereby forcing even farm workers to obtain bread from central baker- ies. With a population increase of percent per year, Albania has been unable to increase arable land per capita or to boost livestock numbers beyond prewar levels. Moreover, the yields of basic food crops have not increased. The regime's concern over agri- culture's poor performance, espe- cially in grain output, and its in- decision on how to cope with this and other economic problems, may ex- plain its failure to publicize either production results for 1965 or the goals of the fourth five-year plan (1966-70). Some 5,000 party, mili- tary, and government workers were recently sent to the countryside to help boost grain production and man- age agriculture enterprises. A party decision of 4 March purporting to abolish harsh bureau- cratic treatment of its people may be intended to secure greater coop- eration from the collectivized peasantry, More important changes, such as providing greater incentives to farm workers, may be forthcoming. Because of prolonged drought, the production of grain in 1965 is estimated to have been below the 1957-61 average level and possibly 15 percent or more below the 1964 level. Imports of food grains, sup- plied solely by Communist China since 1962, have not been sufficient to raise the per capita supply of grain to the 1957-61 average level. The Albanians now need increased imports of grain for the current 1965;166 consumption year. These have not materialized, and a seri- ous bread shortage could develop before the 1966 harvest. Albania has also failed to complete a number of industrial projects intended to increase agricultural production (e.g. fer- tilizer plants). This circumstance, as well as the general expansion of East-West economic relations in Europe, suggests that the Al- banians will look to both Eastern and Western Europe for more techno- logical aid. Nevertheless, Chi- na's ability to supply grain im- ports and other economic aid will continue to have a vital ef- fect on both internal and external policies in Albania. SECRET Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 SECRET *to INDONESIAN SITUATION REMAINS UNCLEAR The situation in Indonesia is murky following Sukarno's vague delegation of authority to Gen- eral Suharto last week. On 12 March President Su- karno, under army pressure, signed an order instructing Su- harto to take all necessary measures to preserve order and ensure Sukarno's personal safety. Hours later, Suharto issued his first order under this mandate, officially banning the Indone- sian Communist Party (PKI), a move which Sukarno up to then had steadfastly resisted. The army apparently forced this showdown in order to fore- stall a reported plan by Sukarno to dismiss Suharto and other ranking army officers. Tension had been steadily mounting in Djakarta in the wake of army- encouraged antigovernment agita- tion which had virtually para- lyzed the government. Sukarno, however, is now claiming that Suharto exceeded his authority in banning the PKI. Sukarno is demanding that the army forgo its plans both to oust pro-Communist cabinet min- isters, including its principal target, Foreign Minister Sub- andrio, and to name a new pro- army cabinet. The President is also trying to erode support for Suharto within the armed forces but does not appear to have had any significant success. In the face of this resist- ance, the army has been cau- tious in asserting its power. Rather than move directly against pro-Communist cabinet ministers, the army apparently intends, through further mass demonstra- tions, to generate popular de- mand for their resignations. This indirect tactic is de- signed to allow Sukarno to save face by "acceding to the wish of the people" rather than hav- ing to accept an army fait ac- compli. However, it may also give the President the time and maneuvering room he needs to regain the initiative. SECRET Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 SECRET During the first two months of 1966, Thai Communists have sustained a high level of sub- versive activity reached in late 1965. This activity still con- sists mainly of acts of terrorism against villagers and low-level officials, most clashes between police and insurgents resulting from police suppression opera- tions. There are indications, how- ever, that the insurgents in the northeast are becoming bolder. Recent reports claim that on two occasions Communists attacked armed officials in an attempt to kill informants who were under government protection. Also, groups of 20 to 40 armed men en- tered villages on two separate instances and summoned all the people to hear long harangues against the Thanom government and the US. In the Bangkok area, re- ports indicate that the clandes- tine Voice of the Thai People is reaching a wide audience among university students. Although students reportedly discount the content of these broadcasts as largely propaganda, interest in them is increasing. Attacks against government corruption and charges that Thailand is sub- servient to US interests receive a sympathetic hearing. Government reaction to the insurgency problem to date has mainly emphasized armed sweeps in the troubled areas. Such operations were conducted in three northeastern prov- inces during January and Febru- ary. These sweeps, which met only slight armed resist- ance, resulted in the arrest of over 300 suspects, includ- ing several who were listed as known subversive leaders. Two of these sweeps were attempts to restore government pres- tige in areas where insurgents had virtually nullified official authority. In an effort to improve government influence in the countryside, a political ac- tion committee was established for the northeast on 21 Febru- ary. The committee, which will operate under the Counter- subversion Operations Com- mand, is designed to handle political aspects of the sub- version problem, including regaining the loyalty of vil- lagers in subverted areas and punishing ineffectual local of- ficials. The new committee's program is aimed at filling the political vacuum which has facilitated subversion in the countryside. Up to now this aspect has been largely ignored by Bangkok. SECRET Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 SECRET Leftist-instigated rioting in Calcutta, Hindu-Sikh communal clashes in the Punjab, a revolt of Mizo Hill tribes, and con- tinued economic gloom have kept the Gandhi government on the de- fensive during the past few weeks. None of the crises has proved unmanageable, but their combined effect has forced New Delhi into a continual scramble for emergency solutions. Opposi- tion elements can be expected to make the most of New Delhi's discomfiture,with general elec- tions less than a year away. West Bengal State was quiet again late this week after two weeks of rioting in which 37 persons died. The disorders in and around Calcutta were sparked by leftist opposition parties, particularly the state's two Com- munist units. The Bengali left- ists have been negotiating ar- rangements for a 1967 electoral alliance. Their agitation over the government's food policy ap- pears to have been more a test of their joint strength than a reflection of real food short- ages. The food supply situation will worsen in West Bengal, as elsewhere, in the spring and sum- mer, and the leftists will prob- ably redouble their efforts to discredit the Congress Party's state and national governments. Indian forces have regained the initiative against tribal rebels in the Mizo Hills District of Assam State. Several thousand Mizo guerrillas, who had launched raids against government installa- tions on 1 March, have been driven from the district's major administrative centers by a bri- gade of Indian Army reinforce- ments. Flushing them from their jungle encampments throughout the district will be a more difficult matter, however. Meanwhile, there are indications that the neigh- boring Naga tribes may renew their own ten-year-old armed struggle for independence. Hindu-Sikh communal rioting broke out in the Punjab and in Delhi itself last week following a Congress Party decision to bow to demands by the Sikh re- ligious minority for a separate Punjabi-speaking state. The party had earlier refused to ap- prove a division of the Punjab, where Hindi and Punjabi have been coequal official languages. It gave in, however, when it ap- peared that the Sikhs' most in- fluential leader, Sant Fateh Singh, might well follow through with a threatened self-immolation over the issue. Hindus in the predominantly Sikh northwestern Punjab are Pun- jabi speakers themselves, but they demonstrated violently against a partition, which they fear will lead to Sikh domina- tion. The state unit of the Hindu extremist Jan Sangh party fanned the flames, despite urg- ings by the party's national leaders for moderation. Troops have been alerted, but police appear to be gradually restoring order without their help. Tem- pers could flare again when New Delhi begins the complex task of SECRET Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 SECRET implementing the Congress Party recommendations. Although less dramatic, In- dia's economic woes still con- front the Gandhi government with its most challenging problems. Indian leaders are now confident that widespread starvation can be avoided, but the task of dis- tributing emergency grain will severely tax the government's INDIA AND PAKISTAN meager administrative resources. Foreign-exchange shortages may force a curtailment of indus- trial production this summer, and unemployment will probably rise. Both Congress and opposi- tion party leaders in Madras State recently told US officials that economic issues will strongly influence the 1967 election re- sults in their state, and the same is probably true elsewhere. SECRET Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 SECRET Agitation against the na- tional government is increasing in East Pakistan. In addition, there is a growing divergence of views on policies toward the government to be followed by op- position political leaders in both East and West Pakistan. Although opposition leaders in East Pakistan are in agreement with their West Pakistani coun- terparts on some issues, greater East Pakistani autonomy has re- cently become a major theme of the easterners' campaign. The Bengali majority of East Pakistan has little in com- mon with the West Pakistanis, other than Islam and a fear of India. President Ayub Khan's efforts to draw the two segments of his country closer together have had little success, and last September's war with India in- tensified differences. Many Bengalis feel that East Pakistan has no vital interest in Kashmir, the cause of the war. They think that India, either exploiting its military victory or trying to offset its military defeat, would have invaded East Pakistan had the war not ended in a draw. Ayub is accused of having placed East Pakistan in great danger with his Kashmir policies without providing an adequate defense having left only one weak division in East Pakistan during the fighting. Bengali discontent is rein- forced by alleged economic dis- crimination, fear that the gov- ernment has designs against Bengali culture and language, and a general feeling that the country is being run for the benefit of its Western province. Measures designed to bolster the Ayub regime--although not intended to work against East Pakistan-- are often viewed as attempts by Ayub and other West Pakistanis to dominate East Pakistan. Eastern opposition leaders are growing increasingly bold in their criticism of the govern- ment. Currently the most vocal is Majibur Rahman, who has pro- posed a six-point program which would eliminate the central gov- ernment's taxing power and limit its responsibilities to defense and foreign affairs. Another of the several competing opposi- tion parties is now following his lead by advocating a very similar seven-point program. The opposition has hinted at general strikes, and Majibur Rah- man claims to have 2,000 men ready to go to jail. Student demonstrations led to minor vio- lence in late February. Other- wise, opposition to the central government has been limited to talk so far, but recently increased bitterness combined with tradi- tional Bengali attitudes could lead to trouble. SECRET Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 Mar 66 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 SECRET COMMUNIST MILITARY AID ACTIVITIES The USSR and Czechoslovakia are actively implementing mili- tary aid arrangements with non- Communist countries. Recent comments by the So- viet military attache in Cairo suggest that, in addition to the 48 MIG-21 Fishbed limited all- weather jet fighters delivered in the last few months, Egypt will soon receive the SU-7 Fitter fighter-bomber. This aircraft, never before sent outside the bloc, was included in the major Soviet-Egyptian arms pact of 25X1 late 1964. Syrian military aid nego- tiations with China late last year may have succeeded in stir- ring Moscow into taking the ac- tion vainly sought by several Syrian delegations sent to Mos- cow to work out deliveries under the 1964 arms pact. A Soviet arms delivery apparently took place recently, the first noted in many months. Soviet relations with Iraq remain unsettled, but an Iraqi military delegation which has been cooling its heels for sev- eral weeks after the USSR can- celed plans for receiving it, apparently plans to travel to Moscow in April for preliminary negotiations on a fifth arms agreement. Deliveries under the 1964 pact were completed with the arrival of 20 NIIG-21 air- craft in December and January, and Iraq recently bought 18 MI-4 helicopters which are now arriv- ing in Baghdad. Page 16 SE'RE' WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 Mar 66 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 swv SECRET Czechoslovakia has been more active in supplying arms to India. Deliveries of medium tanks and artillery to Bombay which began in February are con- tinuing. The USSR also has stepped up implementation of its contracts, and in the last month delivered 38 MIG-21 limited all- weather jets and some jet train- ers, along with amphibious tanks. The aircraft shipments complete the second Soviet-Indian jet fighter contract, and the USSR has now delivered 50 such air- craft. A contract for 36 more signed in 1965 remains to be fulfilled. MODERATES DEAL HEAVY BLOWS TO KENYAN LEFTISTS Moderate, pro-Western Kenya politicians, with President Ken- yatta's blessing, have struck two heavy blows at Vice President Oginga Odinga and his leftist-co- horts. Last week the government expelled six Communist diplomats and newspapermen known to have been funneling funds to Odinga, and on 15 March five more were told to go. Odinga himself lost his second-ranking post in Ken- ya's dominant KANU party in a party election over the weekend, and all his party candidates were soundly defeated. During the past year, the moderates have progressively stripped Odinga of power. Ken- yatta, however, had heretofore moved only cautiously, out of fear of provoking Odinga's Luo tribe, the second largest in Kenya and the principal ally of Kenyatta's Kikuyus in KANU. At the party elections Kenyatta for the first time joined directly in the fray and openly attacked Odinga and his followers. The moderates, their appe- tites whetted by their successes, SECRET WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 Mar 66 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 SECRET now will probably try to force Odinga out of the vice-presidency. Odinga's one consuming ambition is to succeed to the presidency, how- ever, and he is still a political force to be reckoned with. He re- mains a power in the Luo tribe, and with Communist help he has had ample funds to dispense to poli- ticians, youth organizations, and labor leaders. Odinga apparently plans to stay in KANU for the present, mainly to try to hold onto the vice- presidency. However, his followers are reported to be joining forces with former minister of housing Ngei, recently fired for corrup- tion. Ngei is a power in the Kamba tribe, and Odinga's backers ap- parently hope to establish a new Luo-Kamba party to fight the Kikuyu- dominated KANU. All indications are that the struggle will inten- sify as Kenya moves toward eneral elections in 1968. LITTLE MOVEMENT IN RHODESIAN SITUATION No tanker carrying petroleum for Rhodesia has arrived at the Mozambique port of Beira despite that such a shipment was imminent. Alternative storage and pump- ing facilities at Beira, which are to connect with the pipeline to Rhodesia's Umtali refinery and by- pass facilities owned by companies honoring the Rhodesian boycott, are still not finished. Tankers earlier rumored to be carrying Rhodesia- bound oil to Beira have unloaded at other ports. Britain is continuing its ef- forts to discourage oil deliveries at Beira and to find legal obstacles to establishing the new pumping facilities. Meanwhile, Rhodesia is still receiving petroleum from South Africa, and Britain believes increasing amounts recently have arrived from Lourenco Marques in Mozambique. Rhodesia's legal governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, who has figured prominently in London's plans for ending the Smith regime's rebellion, reportedly has told Prime Minister Wilson that he would resign if force were used to settle the Rhodesian issue. One Rhodesian official be- lieves Gibbs in any case will prob- ably not remain in the thankless job of governor for more than two more months. US and UK diplomats in Lusaka believe that London's economic ef- forts to end Rhodesian independence, which involve a broad Zambian trade boycott, may founder on Zambian re- luctance to provoke Rhodesian re- taliation. In a major foreign policy speech, President Kaunda only briefly referred to bringing down the Smith regime and devoted much of his talk to longer term plans to lessen economic dependence on Rho- desia. An apparent change in eco- nomic planning priorities conforms with Kaunda's statements, SECRET Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 SECRET General Ironsi's military regime in Nigeria is holding its own, but faces mounting pressure from dissatisfied army elements. In the key Northern Region, ousted politicians are trying to reassert themselves. Ironsi has neutralized most of the junior army officers who sparked the January coup by plac- ing them under "protective cus- tody," but he is under conflict- ing pressures as to the next step. The trouble seems to lie mainly with the noncommissioned officers, some of whom--especially Northern- ers--reportedly are threatening to rise against their superiors in revenge for the killing of Northern officers during the coup. Others resent the continued de- tention of Major Nzeogwu, the coup leader in the North. Ironsi continues to make conciliatory gestures toward the potentially troublesome North, where he is trying hard to enlist the support of traditional polit- ical and religious leaders. He showed great deference to the re- gion's Muslim leader--the Sultan of Sokoto--during the latter's well-publicized visit to Lagos on 12 March, and appointed the ex-governor of the North and a local chief to important posts. Nevertheless, the government appears either unable or unwill- ing to stop the maneuvering which the ousted Northern politicians have apparently engaged in since shortly after the coup. Politi- cal party activity has been strongly circumscribed in most MOUNTING PRESSURES of Nigeria, but in the North con- siderable leeway has been granted. The once powerful regional ruling party, the conservative Northern People's Congress (NPC), last week took advantage of the cere- 25X1 monial visit of many ex-ministers to the North and held a series of party meetings. The government is moving ahead with its purge of leading precoup personalities, with spe- cial emphasis on those who had enriched themselves at public expense. Last week it arrested four ranking Easterners--among them former regional premier Ok- para--and two high Midwestern Region officials. Some twenty officials of the former Western Region government are also under detention. No high offi- cials have yet been detained in the North. Most of the arrested poli- ticians have been charged with misappropriation of funds, but some have been implicated in at- tempts to stir up dissension in the army. SECRET Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 Mar 66 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 SECRET On 11 March, De Gaulle follow- ed up his original letters to the other NATO nations with an explana- tory memorandum that sought to justify his withdrawing French forces from NATO assignment and re- moving headquarters from France. He mentioned no time schedule, how- ever, and left the way open for discussion of liaison arrangements between the French and NATO commands. In addenda to the US and Cana- dian memoranda, Paris also speci- fied that it would assume complete sovereignty over French territory and require that any foreign mili- tary elements be answerable only to French authority. Again, however, no timing was indicated, and each memorandum expressed a willingness to reach agreement on use of French facilities in the event of a con- flict involving both countries. Domestic opposition groups have already attacked De Gaulle's actions, but differences among them will lessen the impact of their challenge. Moreover, the French public has been conditioned to ex- pect a loosening of French ties with the alliance and to accept the Gaullist contention that NATO "in- tegration" is a form of American hegemony. Allied reaction has centered on British proposals for a joint declaration in support of the North Atlantic Treaty and an integrated military organization; establish- ment of a special North Atlantic Council (NAC) committee, without French participation, to deal with the problems arising from De Gaulle's move; and an early meeting of the 14 non-French NATO members at the ministerial level to frame a common policy toward France. The proposal for an early ministerial meeting has found no support among the other allies, who believe more time is required to establish a common position. Rather than establish a special committee, the NAC members agreed, with French concurrence, to author- ize their international staff and military committees to study the implications of De Gaulle's notes under close council supervision. It was agreed that the council would make no substantive decisions at this stage. The UK draft declaration in support of NATO, revised to meet objections from Canada, the Scan- dinavians, Turkey, and Portugal, was accepted by the 14 NATO dele- gates on 14 March, although several still had to obtain approval of their governments. The Italian Government was unable to give for- mal approval before being official- ly installed in office. but action is expected soon. To obtain unani- mous approval, it was necessary to agree that any member government would be free to issue official comments on the declaration. The difficulty in obtaining agreement on a simple statement of support for the Alliance and its integrated military structure SECRET Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 Mar 66 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Nftw SECRET 'Voi indicates the problems which will influence future decisions. The Scandinavian countries, for ex- ample, are worried about latent neutralist sentiment and the ap- peal of a separate Scandinavian defense alliance. Turkey and Greece view the difficulties with the French as a lever to obtain support in the Cyprus dispute. IThe Portuguese have held back eir support in view of NATO's failure to support them in their colonial problems in Africa and Asia. Most of the 14 also view with alarm the possibility that Germany will demand a more independent mil- itary role and the prospect that its position in the Alliance will grow stronger as France ceases ac- tive participation. These fears will be encouraged by a suggestion made by a high German official that the time may now be ripe to push ahead with an Alliance nuclear force. On the other hand, Chancel- lor Erhard has explicitly denied that Germany might seize on the French withdrawal as an excuse to transform its totally NATO-com- mitted military forces into a new Wehrmacht. Agreement of the Belgium Catholic and Liberal parties on 15 March to form a coalition with Paul Vanden Boeynants as prime minister foreshadows the estab- lishment of a more conservative government. Its outlook will probably be demonstrated first in its ap- proach to the country's central problem, that of reducing the rapidly rising national budget deficit. Catholics in the out- going government opposed Social- ist proposals to solve the prob- lem by raising taxes, and the business-oriented Liberals have just put themselves on record as sharing this view. Cuts in so- cial welfare expenses are expected, and political considerations will probably demand balancing cuts in the unpopular defense establish- ment, which could affect both NATO and Congo commitments. The government may be left more vulnerable to pressures for defense cuts by the departure from the cabinet of Socialist Paul Henri Spaak, foreign minister for 22 years since 1936 (except for 1958-61, 1949-54, and a few months in 1939). Spaak has maintained a broader view of Belgium's foreign responsibilities than is normal among Belgian political leaders. Some Catholic labor elements have voiced reservations over the more conservative policy implicit in their party's alliance with the Liberals. Auguste Cool, the most powerful man in the Belgian labor movement, said on 14 March, however, that the Catholic labor groups would back Vanden Boeynants SECRET Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 SECRET at least initially while follow- ing government labor policy closely. President of the Catholic Party since 1961, Vanden Boey- nants' political popularity is based on personal appeal rather than on the support of pressure groups from either the right or the left of his party. He is expected to present his cabi- net for parliamentary approval around 22 March. GUATEMALAN ELECTION ROUNDUP Revolutionary Party (PR) presidential candidate Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro is likely to become Guatemala's next presi- dent. Although he failed to cap- ture an absolute majority on 6 March, as required by the con- stitution, his party apparently won at least 29 of the 55 seats in the congress which will choose between the top two candidates after it meets on 5 May. The In- stitutional Democratic Party (PID) may have won 20 seats and the National Liberation Movement (MLN) six. Final figures from the elec- toral tribunal give Mendez 201,- 070 votes to 146,085 for Juan de Dios Aguilar of the government- backed PID. Ponciano of the MLN received 110,145. Conservative businessmen and military leaders, fearful that Mendez would allow Communists to return to power, have apparently been persuaded by Chief of Gov- ernment Peralta to accept the election results. In the meantime, Guatemalan security forces have curtailed the capabilities of the subver- sive movements to take advantage of the postelection void. Many leaders of the Communist Party and guerrilla organizations have been arrested, and at least four have been executed. Stepped-up raids, searches, and arrests in the urban areas have kept the op- position off balance. Security forces activities over the past several weeks may well have sapped the will to fight of at least some of the marginal ter- rorists and guerrillas. Hard- core elements, however, may re- act with renewed violence to give public evidence that they can still perform effectively. Although the country is peaceful on the surface, Guate- malan stability will be seri- ously tried, at least until the new president is installed on 1 July. SECRET Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 SECRET ALLEGED COUP PLOTTERS NAMED TO HEAD URUGUAYAN MILITARY 25X1 DIA The announced appointment of controversial General Mario Aguerrondo as commander of Uru- guay's First Military Region (the Montevideo area which includes the majority of Uruguayan Army troops) has set off a spate of political maneuvering. Aguer- rondo, a militant member of the ruling Blanco Party, has in the past been associated with ele- ments favoring a coup. His pro- motion to general in 1964 was fought by the opposition Colorado Part Aguerrondo and several other of icers--including the newly appointed top army officer, the inspector general--were par- ticipating in a coup plot sched- uled to occur sometime after Al- berto Heber became president of the National Council of Govern- ment (NCG) on 1 March 1966. Ac- cording to their plan, Heber would take sole power, dissolve the NCG, and rule by decree. Aguerrondo has ties not only with Heber, but also with the Ruralist faction of the Blanco Party, as does new Inte- rior Minister Nicolas Storace. Storace has told US Ambassador Hoyt that if the popular will for reform is frustrated, he is prepared to stage a coup. All of the alleged military plotters, as well as Storace and Heber, are reportedly strongly anti- Communist. Most of them, how- ever, are members of the highly nationalistic Herrerista faction of the Blanco Party and have ex- pressed some anti-US views. Heber has further been character- 25X1 ized as mercurial and impulsive, SECRET Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 SECRET Last weekend's bloody clash between strikers and police has further confused the Chilean cop- per situation. It may, however, have moved the Frei government closer to action against Commu- nist subversion. The incident began when mem- bers of the Communist-'Socialist - led copper union at Anaconda's "El Salvador" mine met to regis- ter sympathy with workers at Braden's "El Teniente" mine who have been on strike for higher wages for more than two months. Because the meeting was a vio- lation of President Frei's back- to-work decree of b March, troops and national police were ordered to the scene. In the ensuing fight eight civilians were killed and 35 civilians and policemen were wounded. In discussing the affair on a nationwide radio-TV broadcast, Frei charged that Chilean sub- versive groups who attended the Tri-Continent Conference last January in Havana had formulated this illegal strike strategy. He said that these subversives had deliberately provoked vio- lence to prevent his administra- tion fromcarrying out reforms in a democratic fashion. This stance contrasts with Chile's earlier abstention on the OAS resolution which condemned the conference for promoting vio- lence in the hemisphere. Although Frei apparently still feels that the Communists are within their constitutional rights in exploiting the situa- tion, several leaders of his Christian Democratic Party (PDC) feel that the Communists' activ- ities constitute a plot against the government and are guerrilla actions lacking only in weap- ons. If the PDC leaders can find proof that Communist sub- versive groups were the direct cause of the incident, Frei may be persuaded to take action against the PCCh. With set- tlement of the strike at "El Teniente" delayed by the clash, he must find some way to demon- strate that he is master of the situation in order to maintain his reform program, which is based on copper industry re- form and increased production. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 vftol SECRET The Bolivian political situa- tion is as muddled as ever, although 3 July, the date now set for na- tional elections, is less than three months off. Four political parties have been inscribed on the electoral rolls by the newly or- ganized national electoral court, and seven others are awaiting recog- nition. Courts have been set up in all department capitals, and some registration material has been distributed to registrars. Never- theless, some government officials believe elections will have to be postponed because not enough time remains to organize the mechanics of the campaign. At the moment former junta co-president Barrientos, who re- turned to Bolivia on 4 March after a two-month absence, is the only apparent candidate for president, and even he refuses to commit him- self until he has had time to as- sess the situation. Since his re- turn he has been on the campaign trail trying to make up ground lost during his absence. He also has been touring military garrisons to ascertain the extent of military backing for his candidacy. Accord- ing to the La Paz press, Barrientos will not make an announcement on his candidacy until late March. In the meantime, opposition forces of both the left and right are either maneuvering to force a postponement of elections, or are trying to organize political al- liances strong enough to challenge Barrientos and his political ve- hicle, the Front of the Bolivian Revolution (FRB). Barrientos' most important task is to try to solidify the FRB which is composed of the Popular Chris- tian Movement (MPC), the Authentic Revolutionary Party (PRA), the So- cial Democratic Party (PSD), the Party of the Revolutionary Left (PIR), and the Chaco War Veterans. The front is beset with internal friction arising out of a leadership feud between Walter Guevara Arze of the PRA and Hugo Bozo, chief of the MPC. An even greater threat comes from an ill-defined rightist group, consisting of some military offi- cers and the Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB Calmly standing in the wings 25X1 is General Alfredo Ovando, now sole president of the military junta. Ovando may no longer view Barrientos as the inevitable can- didate, and might begin feeding Barrientos' fears about the weak- ness of his political support with the hope that he would agree to postpone elections. This tactic would be in keeping with both Ovando's basic misgivings about elections and his lack of confidence in the viability of constitutional government. Since Ovando has more to gain from a postponement of elections than Barrientos, an Ovando success would indicate an important change in the power bal- ance i.n Bolivi_a. SECRET Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY 18 Mar 66 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A005200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0 *fte SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200060001-0