WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005100050001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 10, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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and 4e.~lttsSificQ4ion
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(Information as of noon EST, 9 December 1965)
VIETNAM
Viet Cong activity has fallen below the record level
of the previous week, but the general offensive tempo
of the past six weeks is being sustained. The Saigon
government, under continuing political pressure from
various circles, is again planning to form a national
advisory council of some 80 members drawn from reli-
gious, regional, and political groups. Peking is main-
taining its propaganda support for Hanoi, but is play-
ing down a new Sino-Vietnamese aid pact which is less
generous than previous offers. The Soviets have stepped
up their propaganda support for the North Vietnamese.
MOSCOW HOLDS TO TOUGH LINE IN TALKS WITH BRITISH
Soviet leaders made it plain to visiting British For-
eign Secretary Stewart that they attach crucial impor-
tance to the unresolved problems in Europe and indicated
their frustration over the limits the Vietnam conflict
imposes on political initiatives.
CHANGES IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
As a result of this week's first substantial recasting
of the Soviet hierarchy since Khrushchev's removal, a
new political balance seems to be taking shape in the
party presidium. The pivotal change appears to be that
affecting the role of party secretary and former police
chief Aleksandr Shelepin.
SOVIET BLOC PRESSES POLEMICAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST PEKING
Moscow's East European allies, which heretofore avoided
open polemics, now are condemning Chinese obstinacy, re-
flecting Moscow's improved relationship with the European
Communists and Peking's increasing isolation.
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COMMUNIST CHINA'S TRADE WITH THE FREE WORLD UP SHARPLY
China's non-Communist trade partners will account for
more than two thirds of its total trade in 1965. The
ratio next year may be even higher because of Peking's
continued need for grain and fertilizer imports and its
preference for Western industrial equipment.
EASTERN EUROPE BELATEDLY RETALIATES AGAINST US TRAVEL BANS
The delays in taking action against US travel restric-
tions levied in November 1963 were due mainly to pres-
sures within the regimes to seek improved relations with
the US and to the lingering hope that the US would in
due course rescind its bans.
SOME HOPE FOR PROGRESS IN INDIA-PAKISTAN DISPUTE
Renewed efforts are being made to bring about a com-
plete cessation of armed clashes along the border, as
well as a troop withdrawal. Both governments now have
agreed to meetings which could produce some results.
MANEUVERING CONTINUES IN INDONESIA
The army's anti-Communist campaign shows no sign of
letting up, and Sukarno still refuses to ban the party.
SINGAPORE DEFERS RESUMPTION OF INDONESIAN TRADE
The question will be reviewed at a joint UK-Malaysia-
Singapore meeting on 14 December. Singapore apparently
still plans to go ahead eventually, however.
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES' ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR THE UAR
The Communist regimes now have pledged almost $1 bil-
lion for projects under the Egyptian development plan
which went into effect last July. Communist trade with
the UAR also continues to increase.
DISTURBANCES IN CHAD
Recent incidents by Muslim dissidents have revealed the
ineffectiveness of the local security forces. A new
French offer of military aid to President Tombalbaye's
Negroid, Christian government will be some time taking
effect.
SE SECRET
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Nwf we
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NEW CONGO GOVERNMENT SEEKS CLOSER TIES WITH BELGIUM
Belgium's influence in the Congo appears to have been
strengthened by the Mobutu coup. Brussels is consider-
ing more military and economic aid despite domestic,
pressures for budget stringency.
INCREASING AFRICAN OUTCRY AGAINST LONDON'S RHODESIA POLICY 17
There is a rare degree of accord among moderate as well
as radical African states that the Rhodesian situation
must be reversed whatever the consequences, but t
differ on how to proce
Europe
THE FIVE REMAIN FIRM AGAINST FRANCE IN EEC CRISIS
During the Council of Ministers meeting last week, the
Five reaffirmed their unwillingness to tamper with the
community treaties or deal with Common Market problems
outside the institutional framework.
FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
A poll taken shortly after the first ballot gives De
Gaulle 60 percent of the vote on the second, but the
additional nationwide publicity afforded Mitterrand in
the coming campaign could lower De Gaulle's majority
in the 19 December runoff.
GREEK POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATIONS MAY WORSEN
The political weakness of the Stephanopoulos government
is hindering its efforts to deal with Greece's economic
problems. Failure in this sphere may in turn weaken it
still further.
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Western Hemisphere
ELECTION ATMOSPHERE BUILDING IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
President Garcia Godoy has named two moderates to the
body that will oversee the 1 June elections.. Despite a
continuing ban on political activities, the parties of
Joaquin Balaguer and Juan Bosch are jostling for advan-
tage. Agitation by government workers over Christmas
bonuses is a new problem for the President.
BRAZIL'S POLITICAL PICTURE IMPROVED
The President's ability to overrule military opposition
to the inauguration of the Guanabara governor has prob-
ably strengthened his authority over the armed forces.
GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT FACES CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE
Its inability to cope with recent terrorist kidnap-
pings has resulted in a further loss of confidence
within business and financial circles
HAITI'S DISMAL OUTLOOK--WITH OR WITHOUT DUVALIER
Since coming to power eight years ago, Francois Duval-
ier has throttled even the most rudimentary forms of
political dialogue in Haiti and few persons there are
qualified to replace him. His eventual disappearance
from the scene may inaugurate a period of violence and
bloodshed. The extent of the turmoil probably will de-
pend on whether he is removed by natural causes, coup,
or assassination--and on the ability of his would-be
heirs to consolidate power and forestall a collapse of
public order.
SE 1CIV
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Viet Cong activity has
dropped from the record level of
the previous week, but the gen-
eral offensive tempo of the past
six weeks is being sustained.
Large-scale Communist activ-
ity during the past week was fo-
cused in South Vietnam's central
coastal provinces and northwest
of Saigon, with major attacks
reported in Phu Yen, Binh Duong,
and Quang Nam. A Viet Cong force
estimated at battalion strength
on 4 December overran a hamlet
several miles north of Tuy Hoa,
capital of Phu Yen. Two days
later, enemy forces slightly
north of Tuy Hoa attacked a gov-
ernment militia company and skirm-
ished with a relief force before
breaking contact.
In Binh Duong Province, US
troops conducting a search oper-
ation near the abandoned Michelin
rubber planation on 5 December,
killed 236 Communists during sev-
eral hours of severe fighting.
Quang Nam Province was also the
scene of major fighting on 8
December, when two government
battalions were heavily engaged
20 miles south of Da Nang. Ini-
tial reports on this battle listed
some 200 government casualties;
Viet Cong losses were not immedi-
ately known.
Communist pressure in the
Saigon area included the bombing
of a US enlisted men's billet in
Page 1
downtown Saigon, which resulted
in 8 killed (1 US) and 139 wounded
(72 US). Small-scale attacks and
the assassination of local offi-
cials also continued near Saigon
as well as in the delta area,
where increased incidents of
sabotage were reported along
Route 4. Continued enemy sabo-
tage has forced the government
to consider closing railroad serv-
ice between Nha Tranga.nd Da Nang.
The Political Situation
In South Vietnam
A public memorandum to vis-
iting US Senator Mansfield last
week reflected the continuing
dissatisfaction of South Vietnam's
Catholic community with the Ky
government. Signed jointly by
Leaders of northern Catholic ref-
uagees and southern Catholics, the
communiqud stated that the Ky
government has not yet satisfied
the widely held aspiration for a
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\ NO~trH4DQnq hOl
-....y Tchepu%e
E ` 'Pakse
'f, Sa,avane
Qusnt Ti,
Hum.
Nang
\ hu Lai
PHNOM PENH
in ong
Rt:?
,Quang Nga,
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NWO SECRET
Rumania has not directly re-
taliated, but soon after the US
levied its ban the Rumanians re-
fused a US request to lift prior-
notification requirements for
travel by US diplomatic personnel
stationed in Bucharest. This re-
fusal may have been regarded by
the Rumanians as a sufficient, if
indirect, gesture of reciprocity.
US personnel in Eastern Europe
are not seriously hampered by the
restrictions--some of which merely
extend border area restrictions
binding everyone or cut off ac-
Renewed efforts are being
made to bring about a complete
cessation of armed clashes along
the Indo-Pakistani border, as
well as a troop withdrawal. Both
India and Pakistan now have agreed
to meetings which could produce
some results.
Prime Minister Shastri and
President Ayub will meet under
Soviet auspices in Tashkent, prob-
ably in early January. Indian
leaders have stated that Shastri
is willing to discuss all issues
:between India and Pakistan, in-
cluding--but not exclusively--
Kashmir. There is some hope that
initial steps toward a settlement
may be possible.
President Ayub is making
preparations for his mid-December
visit to the US. (Shastri's pro-
posed US visit will probably not
occur until early next year.)
Page 12
Ayub's entourage reportedly will
include some of the more anti-
Western members of his govern-
ment, which could indicate
that he is not prepared to make
major foreign policy changes.
However, he may merely want these
men along to share political
responsibility for any decisions
reached.
UN efforts to effect a
troop withdrawal have made no
25X1
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occurring regularly in the south-
ernmost area of the front.
However, the UN secretary gen-
eral's representative, Chilean
Brigadier General Marambio,
has just begun his first round
of discussions with Indian and 25X1
Pakistani officials and may be
able to obtain some limited
agreement.
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SE CR .LJ T I
US RESTRICTIONS OF NOVEMBER 1963
Areas barred to Bulgarian, Czechoslovak,
Hungarian, Polish, and Rumanian diplomats
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RESTRICTIONS ON t. Isra bul
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EASTERN EUROPE BELATEDLY RETALIATES AGAINST US TRAVEL BANS
All the Soviet bloc countries
of Eastern Europe except Rumania
have finally, and probably reluc-
tantly, taken measures in retalia-
tion for the travel restrictions
placed on bloc diplomatic personnel
in the US in November 1963. The
delays in taking action--ranging
from seven months in the case of
Poland to two years in the cases of
Czechoslovakia and Hungary--were du.:
mainly to pressures within each
regime to seek improved relations
with the US and to the lingering
hope that the US would in due course
rescind its restrictions. In all
cases the Eastern European restric-
tions are provisional in that they
will remain in effect only as long
as the US travel ban.
Unlike the others, Hungary,
which reciprocated in November of
this year, extended its travel ban
to certain nondiplomatic as well as
diplomatic US personnel. This
slightly more stringent restriction
may reflect the strained atmosphere
caused by the Vietnam war.
The Czechs appear finally to
have decided to reciprocate--as of
1 December 1965--in direct response
to a more recent US measure. In
mid-November the US informed the
Czechs that the US-Czech financial
claims settlement which had been in
negotiation for nearly ten years
and initialed last year would have
to be scrapped and completely re-
negotiated.
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COMMUNIST CHINA'S TRADE WITH THE FREE WORLD UP SHARPLY
Chinese Communist trade with
the free world this year is expected
to rise about 25 percent to a record
peak of roughly *2.5 billion--more
than two thirds of Peking's total
trade. The ratio next year may be
even higher because of China's con-
tinued need for large grain and
fertilizer imports and the regime's
preference for Western industrial
equipment.
Grain imports for 1965 will
total about 6 million tons, worth
more than $400 million. Fertilizer
imports, more than double those of
1964, will reach about $140 million
in value. Imports of industrial
equipment and products, including
steel, synthetic fibers, and con-
struction and transportation equip-
ment, are also up.
China's trade with Japan has
increased dramatically this year.
Total value both ways is expected
to reach about $450 million, a rise
of 45 percent over last year--as a
result of which Japan will probably
replace the USSR as Peking's lead-
ing trade partner. It is expected
that Chinese imports from Japan--
mainly industrial goods--and exports
of agricultural products, coal, and
iron ore will expand further in
1966.
China's sales of textiles,
nongrain foodstuffs, and low-
priced manufactures have again
boosted its trade with Southeast
Asia. With Hong Kong, China's lead-
ing source of foreign exchange,
net trade earnings are expected
to reach about $400 million this
year, which will be an increase of
20 percent over last year and a
new record high.
China's trade with Western
Europe is also on the rise. The
attendance of top-ranking Chinese of-
ficials at the recent large French
industrial fair in Peking, the big-
gest Western trade exhibition so
far held in China, suggests that
Peking wants to increase it further.
During the year, China has pur-
chased such items as merchant
ships, aircraft, industrial equip-
ment, and complete industrial plants
in Western Europe. In its largest
single deal with the non-Communist
world to date, it bought more than
1,000 heavy-duty trucks from France
valued at $30 million. Another
recent Chinese purchase was $3
million worth of large-diameter
pipe-making equipment from Italy.
Numerous other contracts for in-
dustrial goods and plants are
under negotiation in Western
Europe.
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Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET lao,
Moscow and its supporters
are pressing their efforts to
exploit Peking's adamant stand.
In a brief but direct attack on
the Chinese Communist leaders, a
6 December Izvestia article
stressed that inese obstinacy
"hampers the struggle against
imperialism and helps the aggres-
sor."
There is some evidence that
China is continuing to obstruct
the passage of Soviet military
aid to North Vietnam. Moscow
will surely attempt in private
interparty briefings to play up
charges of such interference as
the most graphic "proof" of the
dire consequences of Peking's in-
transigence.
The Soviets, however, del-
egated to the regimes of East-
ern_ Europe the task of replying
directly to last month's People's
Daily - Red Flag philippic.e -
Pooles, Czechs, Ifungarians, and
Bulgarians recently joined the
East Germans in roundly condemn-
ing the Chinese. Poland's party
daily, for example, referring to
the "absurd accusations" made by
People's Daily, asserted that
"Fo nonsense can justify China's
refusal to cooperate in defense
of a nation that is bleeding
under bombs."
Such open polemics--here-
tofore generally avoided by East
European leaders--reflect Moscow's
more effective working relation--
ship with them, and also the de-
gree to which the Chinese have
become isolated.
The East Europeans appear
satisfied with "methodical en-
deavors" by the Soviets to con-
sult--often at the highest level--
on problems of mutual importance.
Their support of Moscow against
the Chinese assault reflects the
confidence of the East European
regimes in their increasingly
successful attempts to assert
their independence from the
USSR and contrasts with their
past concern over Peking's charges
that they are "dancing to the
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Soviet, citing poor health, and
was succeeded by Nikolay Podgorny,
who apparently had been second
in command to Leonid Brezhnev on
the party secretariat. According
to Moscow rumors, Shelepin, who
was relieved as a deputy premier
and chairman of the Party-State
Control Committee "to devote all
his time and ener7ies to party
central committee work" will
move into Podgorny's old position.
The decision to make these
shifts apparently was approved at
an unheralded plenum of the party
central committee on 6 December.
At this meeting the central com-
mittee replaced the joint Party-
State Control Committee which
Shelepin headed with a kind of
popular inspectorate called the
"Committee of People's Control,"
which appears to be of lesser
importance. The Supreme Soviet
formalized this action and ap-
pointed Pavel Kovanov, one of
Shelepin's deputies on the old
committee, as its chairman.
Podgorny's election to the
presidency as a replacement for
the retiring Mikoyan indicates
that he has lost influence in
the party secretariat and may
soon lose his membership in that
body. His political standing
appears to have suffered since
late spring. His new duties--
largely ceremonial--should ef-
fectively exclude him from be-
coming involved, as formerly,
in matters of party personnel
and appointments..
Mikoyan's retirement has
been rumored for many months.
Although it can be believed
that, in view of his age and
long service, honorable retire-
ment offered him an attractive
course, it may also be that his
resignation was not entirely
voluntary. Although he remains
for now on the presidium, he
clearly has withdrawn from the
front line, and it is probable
that his influence, which has
been over the years by and large
a moderating one, will, now
count for far less in the high-
est councils.
In other high-level per-
sonnel actions the central com-
mittee reinstated Vladimir
Shcherbitsky as a candidate
member of the party presidium
and named Ivan Kapitonov to the
party secretariat. Shcherbit-
sky's added honor has been ex-
pected since October of this
year when he was brought back
as Ukrainian premier. He had
been relieved of both positions
by Khrushchev in 1963 and is
reportedly close to Brezhnev.
Kapitonov appears to be a be-
lated replacement of Vitaly
Titov, Khrushchev's party per-
sonnel chief who was transferred
out of Moscow last April. Kapito-
nov has been doing similar work
in the Russian Republic (RSFSR)
for the past year.
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Nftffiol
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MOSCOW HOLDS TO TOUGH LINE IN TALKS WITH BRITISH
During their recent talks
in Moscow with British Foreign
Secretary Stewart, Soviet lead-
ers made it plain that they at-
tach crucial importance to the
unresolved problems in Europe
and indicated their frustration
over the limits the Vietnam con-
flict imposes on political ini-
tiatives.
According to UK Ambassador
Harrison, the Soviet leaders re-
ceived Stewart with.a personal
warmth which contrasted with the
relative coolness of Soviet pub-
lic treatment of the visit. In
keeping with Moscow's intention
to avoid public divergence from
Hanoi's position, the Soviet
press repeatedly emphasized that
British policy in Vietnam pre-
vented the development of closer
ties. Foreign Minister Gromyko,
however, went out of his way in
private to express the desire
for "very friendly relations"
and an increase in all kinds of
contacts;
On the question of European
security, Premier Kosygin stressed
that "nuclear sharing" would
strengthen NATO and lead to in-
creased tension in which a non-
proliferation agreement would be
more difficult to achieve. Gro=
mykQ, however, left the UK repre-
sentatives with the impression
that the USSR has a continuing
interest in such an agreement.
He told Stewart that the USSR
is still willing to discuss this
subject outside the existing dis-
armament forums.
Although the Russians re-
cently have been playing up the
risks posed by alleged US mili-
tary actions in Laos, they did
not discuss this question with
Stewart in any detail. On Viet-
nam, Gromyko reiterated Moscow's
standard position that it is not
empowered by North Vietnam to
speak on this subject. The
British received the strong im-
pression that he was upset by
his lack of maneuverability on
Vietnam.
CHANGES IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP
The first substantial re-
casting of the Soviet hierarchy
since the removal of Khrushchev
in late 1964 was undertaken in
Moscow this week. As a result,
a new political balance now
seems to be taking shape in the
ruling party presidium. The piv-
otal change appears to be that
Page 6
affecting the role of party
secretary and former police
chief Aleksandr Shelepin.
Anastas Mikoyan, who turned
70 last month, stepped down as
titular chief of state at the
9 December session of the Supreme
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Dec 65
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Chinese retaliation. It may,
however, reflect genuine concern
that US military operations in
Vietnam will lead to inadvertent
or unintentional attacks on Chi-
nese installations.
The Soviets stepped up their
propaganda support for Hanoi this
week. Acting in its capacity as
Geneva co-chairman, the USSR on
8 December published a draft note
which condemned US actions in
Vietnam and warned that they are
"fraught with extremely dangerous
consequences." The note was rou-
tine in content and demanded
"strict observance of the 1954
Geneva agreements and an end to
the bandit war." In addition, on
the domestic scene the Soviets
have mounted a vociferous cam-
paign of rallies expressing sol-
idarity with the DRV. Soviet
gestures included orderly demon- 25X1
strations in Moscow timed to
coincide with the release of its
co-chairman note
The Communist World
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political framework based on rep-
resentative institutions. The
memorandum concluded that a gov-
ernment lacking such a popular
base could never hope to match
the Communists politically.
The government's ruling mili-
tary Directorate is apparently
nearing agreement on the formu-
lation of a national advisory
council of about 80 members to
be selected from the various re-
ligious, regional, and political
groups. Major tasks which may
be assigned to the council in-
clude the drafting of a consti-
tution and laws governing elec-
tions and political parties.
Government leaders at present
are refusing to comment publicly
on this development, but plan to
present the council late next
month.
Page 3
Hanoi's Relations With
Peking and Moscow
Chinese protestations of
"all-out support for North Viet-
nam" were undercut this week by
the low-keyed treatment of a new
Sino-Vietnamese economic aid
agreement. The aid agreement,
signed in Peking by DRV polit-
buro member Lae Thanh Nghi, was
treated cautiously by both Hanoi
and Peking. It lacked the ex-
pressions of close support and
friendship which normally accom-
pany such pacts, and, in contrast
to Peking's announcement of grants
last July, this agreement mentioned
only loans. Le Than Nghi left for
Moscow on 6 December.
Peking is continuing its
propaganda support for Vietnam.
A People's Daily editorial of 3
Decem er encouraged the Vietnamese 25X1
to continue the war and appeared
to be assuring the Viet Cong that
they will be able to destroy any
number of troops and modern weap-
ons which the US may commit.
On 2 December the same jour-
nal charged US aircraft with straf-
ing Chinese fishing boats in the
Tonkin Gulf on 18 and 25 November.
The article warned the US not to
take "lightly" Chinese protests
over such incidents. Although
sharp in tone, the article did
not go beyond previous general
warnings or threaten specific
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Maneuvering between Sukarno
and the Indonesian Army continues,
with no solution in sight.
Sukarno still resists pres-
sure to outlaw the Communist
Party (PKI). His speech on 4
December was "defiant, confident,
and totally unreconstructed,"
according to the US Embassy. Em-
phasizing that the revolution
must hold to its leftist course,
the President warned that any
party disruptive of national
unity would be banned. The PKI,
however, was never named. Su-
karno cited only the Catholic
and Christian parties and a small
army-backed organization.
Sukarno's address to the
People's Provisional Assembly on
6 December struck a different
note. Pleading guilty to a cer-
tain neglect of Indonesian eco-
nomic development, Sukarno com-
plained of being "pushed and
prodded" by anti-Communist ele-
ments. "If you do not accept my
leadership any more, all right,
kick me out," he challenged.
Members of the rubber-stamp
assembly may feel called upon to
respond with some expression of
support, but the army may well
benefit ultimately from Sukarno's
open admission that he no longer
fully controls the machinery of
government. Possibly to avert
such an effect,- Sukarno specifi-
cally took credit for the deci-
sion to set up a military tri-
bunal to try persons directly
implicated in the abortive coup
of 1 October.
In a speech the same day,
Defense Minister Nasution under-
lined the army's determination
to eliminate the PKI. Criticiz-
ing the resurgence of Communist
elements after the PKI-led re-
volt of 1948, he argued that the
organization and its activities
must be stamped out to prevent
a future attempt to take over.
Djakarta area commander
General Umar has followed four
other area commanders in banning
the PKI and its affiliates. Sig-
nificantly, the order specifi-
cally referred to the party's
central organization as well as
its local units. Although de-
cided upon in advance, Umar's
decree was published only a few
hours after Sukarno's speech
demanding a free hand, and can
be read as symptomatic of the
army's refusal to change course.
The Indonesians are appar-
ently trying to lessen Soviet
bloc concern over the anti-Com-
munist cam a n
Indonesian embassies throughout 25X1
Eastern Europe have been told
to stress that Indonesia's left-
ist foreign policies will con- 25X1
tinue regardless of internal
political changes.
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SINGAPORE DEFERS RESUMPTION OF INDONESIAN TRADE
A direct confrontation be-
tween Singapore and Malaysia was
narrowly averted last week when
Singapore agreed to defer its
publicly announced plan to re-
sume barter trade with Indonesia,
originally scheduled for I Decem-
ber. The question will be re-
viewed again at the meeting of
the UK-Malaysia-Singapore Com-
bined Defense Council on 14 De-
cember.
In the interim, however,
Singapore apparently intends to
go ahead with a new plan to begin
trade by means of two large ves-
sels anchored in international
waters. Malaysian Prime Minis-
ter Rahman, who strongly opposed
the earlier plan to use a Singa-
pore island site for the trade,
may acquiesce in this new ar-
rangement. Such a scheme would
not permit a high volume of
trade, however, and Singapore
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is
unlikely to accept it as a per-
manent solution to the present
impasse.
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES' ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR THE UAR
Hungary's recent agreement
to extend an additional $42
million worth of credits to the
COMMUNIST BLOC COMMITMENTS UAR concludes a series of new
TO UAR'S NEW DEVELOMIINT PLAN aid agreements by Communist
E t?
t
Total Communist Countries $950 Million
gyp s
countries to suppor
current development plan. Al-
most $1 billion now has been
pledged for projects under this
plan, which went into effect
N 359 last July. In addition, about
37 B Igaria $200 million is available for
C 40 R4 mania use by the UAR in unexpended
funds from earlier bloc credits.
H j 42
tagary Western aid commitments to the
e _ _ _ .. ..7..., a,.a ~ma11 in rnmfarl cnn_
49994
As in the past, Soviet as-
sistance will be concentrated
mainly in the UAR's metallurgi-
cal and petroleum industries.
Other allocations include those
for the electric power industry
and a large land reclamation
project. The Eastern European
countries are to assist in the
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establishment of a variety of small
factories, including cement plants
and textile mills, and in the de-
velopment of the UAR's mining in-
dustry. To date, the Chinese credit
has not been allocated for specific
projects.
Although most of the new credit
agreements carry a long-term repay-
ment period of 10-12 years, the USSR
for the first time included medium-
term credits of 5 years in its aid
package.
The volume of trade between
the Communist countries and the UAR
continues to increase, although
their share in the UAR's total
trade remains at about 27 percent.
In 1964 total trade with the Commu-
nist countries amounted to $401
million, compared with $377 million
in 1963 and $325 million in 1962.
Negotiations for new five-year trade
agreements now have been completed
with most of the East European coun-
tries, and protocols covering ex-
changes in 1966 project further in-
creases in trade.
Egyptian cotton export commit-
ments to the Communist countries
appear to be on the rise again.
During the past cotton export sea-
son (September 1964 - August 1965),
total sales to these countries
amounted to 625,485 bales--about 60
percent of total UAR cotton sales,as
compared with only 50 percent during
the 1963-64 season--the target the
UAR tries to maintain for cotton
exports to the bloc.
Negotiations for a new Soviet-
Egyptian long-term trade agreement,
originally scheduled to begin in
October, have been. delayed, possi-
bly because Cairo wants first to
complete a review of economic
projects now in progress. To al-
leviate Egypt's financial burdens,
Moscow probably will not insist
that Egypt make hard-currency pay-
ments in its trade with the USSR.
The USSR extended a similar con-
cession in its agreement with the
UAR for 1965.
Recent antigovernment incidents
caused by Muslim elements in. Chad
have pointed up the ineffectiveness
of the local administration and se-
curity forces and heightened moder-
ate President Tombalbaye's peren-
nial doubts about the loyalty of
Chadian Muslims.
The government has quieted the
disturbances for the present, but
the 4,200-man security forces, weak-
ened by the partial withdrawal of
French personnel last winter, would
probably be unable to handle either
a major uprising or scattered, si-
multaneous disturbances. France,
which still maintains about 1,000
troops at Fort Lamy, has promised
more military aid, but it will be
some time before a well-trained
security force can be created.
Tombalbaye, who represents
the Negroid, Christian-animist
tribes dominating the government,
has long viewed Chad's Muslims as
a threat to his regime and has
progressively reduced their par-
ticipation in it. The Muslims,
who make up slightly more than
half the population, resent their
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limited role and have been par-
ticularly hostile to the appoint-
ment of southerners to admini-
strative posts in predominantly
Muslim northern and eastern Chad.
Last month Muslim tribesmen
in Mangalmd, northeast of Fort
Lamy, killed a National Assembly
deputy, a high official, and six
policemen in what Tombalbaye
called a "misunderstanding." The
tribesmen--some 1,500 strong and
armed with spears and machetes--
were protesting government plans
to impose what they considered
unjust taxes.
leaders, including two cabinet
ministers.
Mangalmd and Adrd now are
quiet, but the government faces
growing problems near Lake Chad,
as well as in the east. These
two areas, deteriorating eco-
nomically, were once centers of
powerful Islamic potentates in
which, until about ten years
ago, tribal chieftains received
large financial subsidies. It
is believed that many of the
chieftains now stirring up
trouble there seek a return to
their former privileged system.
Another incident occurred
during the first week in Novem-
ber when a lightly armed band of
Sudan-based Chadian political
dissidents crossed the frontier
and attacked the administrative
headquarters at Adrd. After
killing two National Guardsmen
and wounding another, the dissi-
dents withdrew to Sudan, leaving
behind tracts inciting the popu-
lation to revolt and accusing
the government of "selling out
to France and Israel."
There appears to be no di-
rect connection between the two
incidents, although the dissi-
dents from Sudan, who are also
Muslim, may have been exploiting
the Mangalmd uprising. Tombalbaye
reacted first by accusing unnamed
officials in Fort Lamy of exploit-
ing tribal dissidence to further
their personal ambitions, and
then by arresting three Muslim
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NEW CONGO GOVERNMENT SEEKS
Belgium's influence in the
Congo appears to have been strength-
ened as a result of the coup staged
by armed forces chief Mobutu on 25
November.
Since he ousted President
Kasavubu, Mobutu has appointed Bel-
gians to key positions in his en-
tourage and has asked Brussels to
provide a coordinator for the
various government ministries. He
evidently intends to continue work-
ing closely with Belgium, partic-
ularly in military affairs.
Mobutu stated, when Brussels
first suggested discretion in their
relations, that one of his chief
reasons for taking over the govern-
ment was to establish the same kind
of relationship with Belgium that
ex-French and ex-British colonies
had with their mother countries.
The key Belgian military of-
ficial in the Congo is asking
Brussels to increase the military
personnel assigned to the Congo
from 300 to 1,000. He also wants
a cadre of 30 to 50 Belgians with
each army battalion.
CLOSER TIES WITH BELGIUM
interests have been working with
officials in Brussels to clarify
the particularly weak points in
the Congolese economy and to
come to an agreement on what the
Belgian Government can do to
help. Company representatives
in the Congo have expressed con-
fidence in Mobutu and intend to
support him fully despite pessi-
mistic appraisals of the present
state of the Congo economy.
The interrelationship be-
tweenBelgian business and Congo
politics was highlighted shortly
before the 25 November coup by a
statement of a director of Bel-
gium's largest holding company,
Societe Generale. In reply to
Foreign Minister Spaak's request
that the companies refrain from
politicking in the Congo, the
director said it would be well
nigh impossible to undo the es-
tablished custom of subsidizing
provincial politicians.
Belgian consideration of
requests for more military and
economic aid, however, is limited
by the economic climate in Brus-
sels. The rate of economic growth
The need for new Belgian
military help is accentuated by the
imminent departure of the English-
speaking mercenaries.
In the economic sector, heads
of the Belgian companies with Congo
has slipped badly in Belgium
this year. The government faces
a. projected record outlay in its
1966 .budget, moreover, and must
seek new tax revenue to make up
INCREASING AFRICAN OUTCRY AGAINST LONDON'S RHODESIA POLICY
The special ministerial-level
meeting of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa
from 3 to 5 December demonstrated
that the white Rhodesians' in-
dependence bid has aroused African
emotions to an unprecedented ex-
tent. Representatives from many
moderate states appeared as deeply
affected as radical activists, and
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there was a rare degree of ac-
cord that Africa must try to re-
verse the situation whatever the
consequences. It was evident,
however, that considerable dif-
ferences exist as to means to
be adopted, especially in the
military sphere.
The delegates called for a
complete economic embargo of
Rhodesia and agreed on a variety
of measures designed to press
Britain to take stronger action
against the Smith regime. They
publicly declared, e.g., that
all OAU states--including nine
Commonwealth members--will break
relations with London if it has
not ended the Rhodesian rebellion
by 15 December.
Zambia was authorized to
call on "friendly powers" for
troops in an emergency, but
Ghana and other activists failed
to gain approval for any imme-
diate deployment of OAU troops.
There was widespread apprecia-
tion, fostered by some of the
realistic military advisers
present, of the many practical
difficulties involved. Many
feared such symbolic actions
would only disclose the OAU's
military weaknesses.
The delegates did authorize
the special "Committee of Five,"
created at the OAU summit con-
ference in Accra last October,
to work out sabotage and sub-
versive action plans. The com-
mittee would face frustrating
problems in dealing with the
divided Rhodesian African Na-
tionalists, but might in time
foment incidents that would pre-
cipitate a dangerous escalation
of the situation. Provision was
also made for an early meeting
of the regular OAU defense com-
mission, apparently for longer
term, more basic planning.
The Addis meeting revealed
a general African disbelief
both in the efficacy of London's
economic sanctions and in the
likelihood of more meaningful
UK action by 15 December. There
was also a consensus that Africa
would have to turn to other
powers for help. Increased
pressure on the US is the most
likely initial result, but it
was apparent that the African
officials who attended the meet-
ing were already anticipating
having to turn to the Communists
for help.
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Most African countries are
prepared to enforce the economic
embargo against Rhodesia, but
are becoming doubtful about the
wisdom of their ultimatum to the
UK. Only Tanzania's Nyerere is
publicly committed to a sever-
ance of relations, and in this,
as in last year's Congo crisis,
he is far ahead of the African
mainstream. Nevertheless, if
Britain fails to respond with
some convincing action, other
leaders will feel obliged to
make at least some gesture to-
ward breaking relations.
The Zambian foreign minis-
ter nominally concurred in the
decisions at Addis Ababa, but
President Kaunda will strive to
avoid actual measures so drastic
as to provoke crippling repri-
25X6
sals from Rhodesia. He is
likely to heed London's strong
warnings against a total em-
bargo.
Zambian spokesmen are dis-
couraging deployment of OAU
troops to their country, while
reaffirming Zambia's right to
accept foreign troops over
British objections. Kaunda is
especially anxious to avoid
Zambia's direct involvement in
paramilitary operations by Rho-
desian nationalists, although
Zambian leaders are openly en-
couraging nonviolent resistance
in Rhodesia.
Zambia does not intend to
break relations with Britain
and may dissuade other Common-
wealth states by pointing out
that a breakaway by Tanzania,
Kenya, or Zambia would deprive
Britain of facilities needed
for suppressing the Smith re-
gime.
The movement of RAF units
to Zambia now is almost complete.
They include Javelin all-weather
jet fighters as well as special
RAF airfield defense forces.
British officials are in
Zambia negotiating the possible
stationing of infantry troops,
and the UK has one battalion in
the UK and another in Swaziland
on alert. British officials are
pessimistic that any agreement
can be reached. Kaunda is in-
sisting that the UK forces occupy
the Rhodesian side of the Kariba 25X1
dam, but the UK is willing to
station them only on the Zambian
side "at this time."
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THE FIVE REMAIN FIRM AGAINST FRANCE IN EEC CRISIS
At the EEC Council of Minis-
ters meeting last week the Five
held firm on their common posi-
tion opposing France's condi-
tions for resolving the commu-
nity impasse. Although concerned
about keeping open the possibil-
ity of discussions with France,
the Five reaffirmed their unwill-
ingness to tamper with the com-
munity treaties or deal with
Common Market problems outside
the framework of EEC institutions.
In a public communique the Coun-
cil specifically mentioned Brus-
sels as the site for the extra-
ordinary Council session which
France is again being invited
to attend.
The Five decided to instruct
Council President Colombo to com-
municate their position to French
Foreign Minister Couve de Mur-
ville in Rome this week. More-
over, they agreed privately to
avoid bilateral talks on the EEC
with the French and make future
contacts exclusively through the
Council president. This approach
would still leave open the pos-
sibilities of discussing the "ap-
plication" of majority voting
and the "style" with which the
Commission will exercise its
functions, but in light of the
Council discussions it seems
doubtful that the Five would or
could agree to any concessions
which violate the form of the
Rome treaties and the treaty-
assigned role of the Commission.
It remains to be seen whether
the French Government, faced
with a firm position of the Five
which coincides with apparent
domestic concern over De Gaulle's
European policy (see next ar-
ticle), will soften its Common
Market demands.
An immediate problem for
Paris will be whether to approve
by "written procedure" the EEC
and Euratom budgets passed by
the Council. The 17.8-percent
increase approved for the EEC,
although substantially less
than the Commission asked, is
considerably more than the French
were previously willing to con-
sider. Should the French vote
"no," the Five reportedly will
hold a Council session to con-
sider adopting the budget by
majority vote. They have also
agreed to proceed on 1 January
1966 with the scheduled 10-percent
cut in internal tariffs, even
without parallel French action.
Policies for the Kennedy
Round trade and tariff negoti-
ations, to be reviewed by the
Council in January, may force the
Five into a confrontation with
France. Although the Commission
is still unwilling to provoke
French ire by pointing to mount-
ing difficulties in the Geneva
negotiations, community offi-
cials have privately admitted
the necessity for new negotiat-
ing instructions. The Germans
and Dutch are increasingly eager
to move ahead on this front,
which in practical terms may
mean employing the majority vot- 25X1
ing rule after 1 January 1966
to revise the Commission's Ken-
nedy Round mandate.
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FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Despite De Gaulle's rela-
tively poor showing in France's
presidential election on 5 Decem-
ber, he is expected to win the
runoff against Francois Mitter-
rand on 19 December. A poll con-
ducted by the French Institute
of Public Opinion shortly after
the first ballot gives De Gaulle
a comfortable 60 percent of the
vote on the second ballot. The
campaign, which officially opens
on 10 December, will give Mitter-
rand additional nationwide ex-
posure, however, and could lower
De Gaulle's majority.
Both men are expected to re-
tain their first-round supporters.
RESULTS OF FIRST ROUND OF FRENCH
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
5 DKEMBER 1965
ther candidate in a press con-
ference on 9 December. The bulk
of his Catholic-oriented voters
will probably opt for De Gaulle
rather than for the Communist-
backed Mitterrand.
De Gaulle's failure to win
an absolute majority on 5 Decem-
ber has ben given widely differing
interpretations by French polit-
ical figures. For one thing his
personal involvement in the cam-
paign did not attract as many
voters as expected away from the
parties they traditionally sup-
port, although he did get 4 mil-
lion more votes than did Gaul-
list candidates in the 1962 Na-
tional Assembly elections. Mit-
terrand, moreover, appears to
have had the solid support of
the Communist and Socialist par-
ties.
No. 0f Votes
of
Totat
Charles de Gaulle
10,828,521
44.63
Francois Mitterrand
7,694,005
31.71
Jean Lecanuct
3,777,120
15,56
Jean -Louis Tixier-Vignancour
1,260,208
5.19
Pierre Marcilhacy
415,017
1.71
Marcel Barbu
279 685
1.15
24,54,56
(Registered electorate;
28,914,581)
Mitterrand will probably gain
most of the diehard anti-Gaul-
list vote of the extreme right
which went to Tixier-Vignancour
on 5 December. Tixier person-
ally has already endorsed Mit-
terrand.
Third place finisher Jean
Lecanuet refused to endorse ei-
Also the campaign itself,
particularly in the last two
weeks, appears to have changed
many winds. De Gaulle's slide
in the public opinion polls in
the late stages was probably due
to the effective criticism of
his policies by attractive op-
position candidates. In regu-
lar television appearances, the
opposition offered not only al-
ternative policies but also
youthful and dynamic personal-
ities. Lecanuet's challenge to
De Gaulle on the issue of Europe's
future struck a responsive chord
among those voters who oppose De
Gaulle's policies in the EEC
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and NATO and was especially
damaging.
The election results will con-
tinue to be cited by French politi-
cians to prove their own particular
theses on why the French voter acted
as he did. It is clear, however,
that the picture of De Gaulle as
the indispensable man of France has
been severely shaken. The general
himself may not accept this
and is unlikely to alter his basic
policy goals, although he may mod-
ify his tactics or timing.
GREEK POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATIONS MAY WORSEN
The political weakness of the
Stephanopoulos government is hind-
ering its efforts to deal with
Greece's economic problems. Fail-
ure in this sphere may in turn
weaken it still further.
In September, Stephanoupoulos
came to power with a 152-148 vote
of confidence from Parliament.
Since then he has failed to gain
more support, and his backing may
in fact have fallen as low as 150
deputies, exactly half of Parlia-
ment. There appears to be no im-
mediate prospect of winning over
any of the followers of opposition
leader Papandreou.
The government has been hesi-
tant to undertake new policies of
any sort, and its weakness has en-
couraged the opposition to fight
at every turn. Parliament, which
reconvened in mid-November, has
done little more than elect some
of its officers, and several of
its sessions have ended in pande-
monium.
Stephanopoulos is under attack
on issues ranging from the organiza-
tion of the Greek Orthodox Church
to the return of exiled Communist
guerrillas, but it is his handling
of Greece's economic difficulties
Page 23
that may determine the future of his
government. The long political
crisis of last summer and the
unrealistic fiscal policies of the
Papandreou government added serious
budgetary problems to Greece's al-
ready worsening balance of payments.
In the past few weeks public
confidence in the economy has de-
clined rapidly. Private gold pur-
chases in a single day have sur-
passed earlier monthly totals, and
savings deposits, which were ris-
ing early in November, have fallen
sharply.
To halt the economic decline
Stephanopoulos is considering tax
increases and restrictions on ex-
penditures, but his slim majority in
Parliament will make their passage
difficult. Stephanopoulos appar-
ently believes US backing will be
necessary for his measures to have
any chance, and has asked for emer-
gency aid as an expression of sup-
port.
A parliamentary defeat of his
economic program might force
Sttephanopoulos to resign. Should
this happen, it would probably
cause a political impasse similar
to the one which paralyzed Greece
for mare than two months last sum-
mer. 25X1
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Western Hemisphere
ELECTION ATMOSPHERE BUILDING IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
President Garcia Godoy has
set 1 June 1966 for the election
of a new Dominican government and
has named two political moderates
to the body that will oversee the
selection of the administration
to take office early in July. His
actions, following quickly an
abortive rightist coup in Santi-
ago on 22 November, have allayed
fears that the provisional gov-
ernment might not survive and
that the choice of a four-year
government would be put off in-
definitely.
The political parties have
not had time to surface the "is-
sues" on which they will seek
popular endorsement, but Joaquin
Balaguer's Reformist Party (PR)
and Juan Bosch's Dominican Revo-
lutionary Party (PRD) are jostling
for advantage. Balaguer, in par-
ticular, has taken to the hust-
ings to stress the need for sta-
bility and a legal transition of
power. Replying to charges that
he is violating the ban on po-
litical activities, the PR presi-
dential candidate insists that
he has yet to begin a formal cam-
paign.
Balaguer has indicated pri-
vately his dismay over "the rebel
mystique" among the youths, many
of whom will vote for the first
time in June, and his alarm over
the degree to which Bosch's PRD
has infiltrated local jobs under
the auspices of the provisional
government. Balaguer fears that
PRD officeholders will resort to
chicanery to influence the elec-
tion outcome.
Bosch too has taken every
opportunity to put his views
before the public with newspaper
interviews and radiobroadcasts
but is loath to leave his heav-
ily guarded home for fear of his
life. He has charged that
"some" Dominican military and
police are "terrorizing" the PRD
rank and file.
There is speculation that
Bosch is toying with the idea
of not entering a PRD candidate
in the elections if the PR seems
likely to win the semblance of
a popular mandate. He report-
edly is convinced some gesture
toward the US is necessary if he
is to stand a chance of winning
and assuming office, but is un-
willing to forfeit extreme left-
ist support by making such an
overture. For the moment,
Bosch's adherents expect him to
take the stump against the con-
tinued presence of the In-
ter-American Peace Force even
though he senses that its de-
parture would make it unlikely
that any PRD government could
take office in the face of de-
termined opposition from the
Dominican right and the mili-
tary establishment.
The present, perhaps de-
ceptive, calm may be upset by
Garcia Godoy's decision to grant
only half the customary Christ-
mas bonus to government employ-
ees. Sugar workers have struck
over the issue, and employees
of other government-owned in-
dustries may follow suit. The
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sugar workers are backed by the
pro-US labor federation whose
leadership feels it must adopt a
more radical line in the face of
extremist efforts to cut into
the labor movement.
No progress has been made on
integrating former rebel military
personnel into the armed forces.
The arms-for-pay scheme has pro-
duced only modest results in col-
lecting perhaps 20 percent of
rebel weapons.
BRAZIL'S POLITICAL PICTURE IMPROVED
The possibility of a show-
down between President Castello
Branco and Brazil's hard-line
military officers has receded
with the inauguration of Guana.-
bara Governor Francisco Negrao
de Lima on 5 December. The Presi-
dent's ability to override mili-
tary opposition in this case has
probably strengthened his au-
thority over the armed forces,
at least temporarily.
In a. series of decisive
moves during the week preceding
the inauguration, the President
succeeded in checking the pres-
sure that had been building up
against Negrao de Lima among of-
ficers in the Rio de Janeiro
area.
The key
move by the government was the
assignment on 29 November of Gen-
eral Jura.ndyr Mamede, an out-
standing leader and confidant of
the President, to command the im-
portant Vila. Militar Garrison in
Rio.
Hard-line leader Lieutenant
Colonel Francisco,Boaventura
Cavalcanti was arrested on 28 No-
vember after publishing an open
letter protesting the installa-
tion of the new governor. Despite
his popularity and widely recog-
nized qualities as a very capable
officer, the arrest failed to
arouse many open expressions of
sympathy.
Negrao de Lima's mandate
could be short-lived, however,
if a military court accedes to
a r:?equest for his arrest on
charges of collaborating with
the Communist Party. The admin-
istration seems virtually certain
to accept whatever decision the
court makes.
Although conditions have
improved, the government will
continue to face pressure to
adopt a more revolutionary out-
look, particularly with regard
to subversion and political cor-
ruption.
The regime's opponents are
seeking to pit the armed forces
against the government. Conserva-
tive leader Carlos Lacerda, for
example, has broken a temporary
silence with a strong attack
against the government in which
he accuses Castello Branco of hav-
ing..common interests with the.Com-
munists and of "demoralizing the
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
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GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT FACES CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE
Growing dissatisfaction
with the Peralta regime, espe-
cially among influential busi-
ness and financial circles,
threatens a new political crisis
in Guatemala.
Already concerned by Gua-
temala's worsening foreign ex-
change deficit and a commodity
scandal which has reflected ad-
versely on the integrity of prom-
inent members of the administra-
tion, the businessmen and finan-
ciers have begun to doubt the
regime's ability to cope with
terrorists who three times in
recent weeks have abducted mem-
bers of prominent Guatemala City
families for ransom.
elsewhere in the country.
The evident strain on Chief
of Government Peralta, coupled
with his own administration's
obvious lack of confidence in
him, may invite an early attempt
to oust the government.
To date, $180,000 in ran-
som has been paid furtively and
in the face of police protests.
The police, inept at best, have
been hampered by the refusal of
the families of the kidnap vic-
tims to cooperate in the investi-
gation or apprehension of the
criminals. The kidnapings,
-along with reported demands for
the payment of "protection fees,"
appear to be well planned and
professionally executed.
Yon Sosa's 13 November Move-
ment has been implicated in one
kidnaping, and the FAR--the
Guatemalan Communist Party's ac-
tion arm--is thought to be behind
another. It is not clear whether
the two groups are working to-
gether again after a split in
midyear or whether both have de-
cided to employ extortion tactics
to finance guerrilla operations
C ET
SE
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 10 December 19C5
Copy NO. 53
SPECIAL REPORT
HAITI'S DISMAL OUTLOOK-WITH OR WITHOUT DUVALIER
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
O F F I C, E OF C U R R E N T I N T L L I G E N C E
SECRET
GROUP I Excluded"From automatic
downgrading and deciassificatign
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Since coming to power eight years ago, Francois
Duvalier has throttled even the most rudimentary
forms of political dialogue in Haiti and few persons
there are qualified to replace him. His eventual
disappearance from the scene may inaugurate a period
of violence and bloodshed. The extent of the tur-
moil probably will depend on whether he is removed
by natural causes, coup, or assassination--and on
the ability of his would-be heirs to consolidate
power and forestall a collapse of public order. Con-
tending for power will be the bureaucracy, the inter-
nal security forces, Communists, and non-Communist
exiles. Whatever the immediate outcome, the politi-
cal situation will be extremely confused over the
succeeding weeks and even months.
Duvalier was elected Presi-
dent for a six-year term in 1957.
Four years later, in 1961, he
had himself "re-elected" for an
additional six years. He then
proclaimed himself "President
for Life" in 1964--an action
sanctioned by a controlled pleb-
iscite. The next step, accord-
ing to recurring rumors, will be
to proclaim himself emperor.
Only five of Haiti's more
than 30 chiefs of state have
lived out their terms and left
office voluntarily; three of
these served during the US occu-
pation from 1915 to 1934. The
Haitian Constitution of 1964
made no provision for a vice
president or for choosing a suc-
cessor to the president. Duvalier
has said that his 15-year-old son
will succeed him, with Mrs. Du-
valier serving as "regent" until
the boy reaches maturity.
SECRET
Page I SPECIAL REPORT
Duvalier has erected a facade
of legality around his regime,
but he has remained in power by
destroying or neutralizing all
sources of opposition. The only
legal political grouping is his
own National Unity Party. Govern-
ment and military leaders have
been rotated often to keep them
from developing personal follow-
ings or becoming potential rivals.
As a counterforce to the regular
military, Duvalier has set up his
own civil militia and secret po-
lice.
F
Two
small Communist parties, which
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operate more or less overtly,
comprise the only organized in-
ternal opposition. The politi-
cally apathetic majority--prob-
ably 90 percent of the popula-
tion--is illiterate, physically
and culturally isolated, and
exists on the fringe of starva-
tion. Many accept Duvalier's
grandiose claims to supernatural
powers and authority and believe
him the reincarnation of a voo-
doo deity.
Military and Security Forces
Duvalier depends for survival
on the armed forces (FAdH), the
civil militia, and the secret
police.
The FAdH numbers around
4,800 officers and men, including
ground, air, and coast guard per-
sonnel. It is primarily a na-
tional constabulary, with respon-
sibilities for internal security,
local police functions, and fire
fighting. Half of its total
strength is in Port-au-Prince,
the capital; the remainder is in
Slums in Port-au-Prince
49944
small, police-type units through-
out the country.
Duvalier has replaced most
of the FAdH's professional of-
ficers with less capable men who
are unqestionably loyal to him.
The FAdH is poorly equipped with
obsolescent hardware. Except for
two unarmed T-28 aircraft, a twin-
engine Cessna 310, and one C-47
transport--all illegally ac-
quired in 1964--no new equipment
has been purchased since about
1962. There are serious short-
ages of weapons, ammunition,
vehicles, ships, aircraft, and
logistical support of all kinds.
The FAdH has almost no capa-
bility for standard military oE-
erations in the countryside. In
mid-1964 two groups of rebels--
25 to 30 in one group and 13 in
another--eluded capture for over
two months before being over-
powered by sheer numbers. The
military forces might, however,
be more effective within Port-
au-Prince, where they would have
access to munitions stored in
the National Palace.
The 10,000-man civil militia,
the National Security Volunteers
(VSN), was created by Duvalier
and is personally loyal to him.
About one-third of its members
are armed, but with a motley col-
lection of pistols, revolvers,
and bolt-action rifles. The
group is poorly trained and could
not cope with a well-armed and
-trained enemy. However, their
uniforms and. their public train-
ing sessions add to Duvalier's
appearance of strength and help
to cow the populace.
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The secret police apparently
have no official name or status;
Haitians privately refer to them
as Ton Ton Macoute (TTM), a Creole
phrase meaning "bogeyman." The
TTMs are armed thugs, about 1,500
in number, who specialize in beat-
ings, murder, arson, pillage, ex-
tortion, and other violence. Oc-
casionally, the TTMs overstep
their rather broad authority and
Duvalier is forced to curb them.
However, he seems to find them too
useful to limit their power for
long.
The Economy
Haiti's GNP currently is esti-
mated at $300 million--equivalent
to about $60 per capita, the low-
est level in Latin America. There
is little prospect that the down-
ward trend of recent years will be
reversed.
When fiscal year 1965 ended
on 30 September, foreign exchange
reserves were very tight, and the
internal budgetary situation placed
additional pressure on the govern-
ment. Revenues were lower than
anticipated, at least partly be-
cause of theft by customs and tax
officials. The $28.2-million bud-
get approved for FY 1966 is about
$400,000 lower than last year's
and contains no provision for any
direct government investment.
Production of export crops--
coffee, sugar, and cocoa--in-
creased this year, but their value
did not rise because world prices
declined. Projected increases in
the output of coffee and sugar in
1966 are unlikely to benefit Haiti
because of the likelihood that
world prices will continue low and
that sugar production will far ex-
ceed the quota set by the US--the
principal market for Haitian sugar.
Life for the peasants, who
comprise over 80 percent of Haiti's
population, has been even more dif-
fi.cult in the past year because of
a prolonged drought. Although the
peasants customarily exist at a
subsistence level, 1965 saw actual
cases of starvation. The small
middle class--especially the mer-
chants--also feels the effects of
the decline in the economy, in ad-
dition to exorbitant taxes, harass-
ing regulations, and arbitrary
"voluntary" collections.
Possible Opposition
Within the Government
Several men within the govern-
ment have figured in past plots
against Duvalier, or are described
as ready to take over when he dies.
Various alignments appear within
the palace entourage from time to
tim
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an nou g 25X6
ing clandestinely as the Haitian
Syndical Front (FSH). The PEP
presently has no newspaper; how-
ever, between 1962 and 1964 it
published the clandestine monthly
Voix du Peuple.
The PEP is recognized by the
international Communist movement
as the Haitian Communist party.
It is Moscow oriented; the amount
of financial assistance it receives
from Moscow, if any, is unknown,
and sympathizers; estimates
place the membership at around
200 and the number of fellow
travelers between 300 and 1,000.
The PEP is seeking adherents
mainly in labor ranks, and
formerly supported the Inter-
syndical Union of Haiti (UIH).
The UIH was disbanded by the
regime in December 1963 because
of its antigovernment propaganda,
d is thou ht to be operat-
Haiti's two Communist par-
ties--the Party of Popular Ac-
cord (PEP) and the Popular Party
of National Liberation (PPLN)--
are small, lacking in discipline,
and poorly indoctrinated. Their
split stems from personal rivalry
among the leaders, rather than
any real ideological differences.
There is no precise informa-
tion on the number of PEP members
A recent estimate places
the number of PPLN members at
around 300, with perhaps 500 to
1,000 sympathizers. The leader-
ship currently publishes no news-
paper, but during 1962 and 1963
it sought to win readers for a
monthly called Haiti-Demain among
the urban workers, peasan s, and
the very small middle class.
The PPLN has concentrated
on a succession of short-lived
youth fronts. One of the most
recent, taking its name from a
type of peasant attire, was called
the Caracoa Bleu. Organized
around the end of 1962, it report-
edly had about 400 members and an
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additional 500 or so sympathizers
who attended lectures, concerts,
and art exhibits which were used
as vehicles for Communist propa-
ganda. Caracoa Bleu became in-
active toward the end of 1964
and is thought to have been re-
organized early in 1965 under the
name Popular Youth League (LJP),
which continues to sponsor much
the same type of activities.
The PPLN suffered a setback
in July 1965, when the accidental
shooting of a member during an
arms training class enabled the
police to discover its meeting
place and arrest several members
--including some who possessed
extensive knowledge of party or-
ganization and activities. There
were follow-up arrests and several
party leaders hurriedly left the
country.
No direct contact between
Moscow and the PPLN has been de-
tected. It is Castro-oriented
and receives ideological guidance
from Radio Havana, which beams
one program in French and another
in Creole.
Over the past few years,
there have been unsuccessful at-
tempts to unite the PEP and PPLN
in something to be called the
United Democratic Front (FDU).
Radio Havana treats the FDU as
if it were an organized party
and has called on all "patriotic
Haitians" to join it to overthrow
Duvalier.
The Non-Communist Opposition
Most of the non-Communist
Haitian exile opposition is lo-
cated in New York and Miami, with
smaller groups scattered around
the Caribbean in Venezuela, Puerto
Rico, the Dominican Republic, and
perhaps in the Bahamas. Other
large groups of uneducated Haitian
workers in the Dominican Republic,
Cuba, and the Bahamas are not
active politically,
Of those with political pre-
tensions, about ten leaders in
New York have grouped their in-
dividual followings into the In-
ternational Haitian Union. It
is presently active and sponsors
a half-hour daily short-wave
broadcast to Haiti in Creole
over New York station WRUL. The
program consists of music, news,
and poetry, and carefully avoids
any direct reference to Duvalier
or his regime. Nevertheless,
.Duvalier has complained to the
US Government that these broad-
casts are inciting the Haitian
population to revolt.
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SECRET
There is almost certain to
be a complete breakdown of the
government and extensive disorder
when Duvalier leaves the scene.
For eight years "Papa Doc" has
silenced all political dialogue;
executed or exiled all potential
opposition; played on racial an-
tipathies; allowed the economy
to stagnate; permitted quasi-
military terrorist organizations
to exercise almost unbridled au-
thority over the populace; and
made no provision for a legal,
orderly transfer of power. The
way in which Duvalier goes--as
well as the ability of his would-
be successors to consolidate their
control--will determine the ex-
tent of the turmoil.
Duvalier's sudden death from
natural causes probably would
occasion the least public disor-
der, assuming that news of his
demise could be withheld long
enough to permit one or more of
his entourage to consolidate con-
trol over the militia, military,
and internal security forces be-
fore they fell upon one another.
If Duvalier were mentally
or physically incapacitated over
a long period of time, his hench-
men might be able to capitalize
on their positions within the
palace to supplant the ailing
dictator. The length of time
during which Duvalier was unable
to function or the choice of a
successor remained unclear would
determine the extent of dislocation
within the administrative bureauc-
racy.
A coup could also limit the
amount of attendant bloodshed.
The assumption of power by a
person or group closely identi-
fied with Duvalier would cause
less dismay to his rank-and-file
supporters. Those most closely
associated with the excesses and
brutality of the Duvalier regime
--for example, the militia and
the Ton Ton Macoutes--would
probably go along with it on
the assumption that there would
be no wholesale reprisals against
them. If however, the coup should
bring to power someone not in
sympathy with Duvalier, the situa-
tion would probably be radically
different. The militia and Ton
Ton Macoutes probably would re-
act by striking out at the
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long-suffering white and mulatto
population of Port-au-Prince out
of fear that these groups would
seek to exact revenge for their
mistreatment under Duvalier.
A public assassination of
Duvalier would be likely to occa-
sion a reign of terror, probably
limited to the capital but pos-
sibly extending to the rural areas.
Members of Duvalier's entourage
and the Haitian military would en-
joy less of an advantage in such
a situation, although they would
still have access to arms and muni-
tions stored in the capital. Pub-
lic disorder would be a major prob-
lem. The militia and Ton Ton
Macoutes probably would go on a
rampage in Port-au-Prince, both
to seize what they could in the
way of booty and to attempt to get
the jump on what would likely be
a vendetta against them. Moreover,
the deliberate racist policies of
Duvalier--setting up the majority
blacks against the minority elite
of whites and mulattoes--would
probably result in bloody racial
.turmoil, with the blacks seeking
vengeance and the whites and mulat-
toes fighting for their lives.
Either or both of Haiti's
Communist parties will try to
capitalize on the uncertainty and
turmoil. Concentrated in Port-
au-Prince, where the expected
power struggle and public disor-
der would be centered, the Com-
munists could only hope to improve
their fortunes during any vacuum
in national leadership and would
probably seek to prolong the choice
of a successor to Duvalier, pos-
sibly to make a stab at seizing
the top office themselves. To
seize a pre-eminent position, how-
ever, the Communists would require
the effective support of the mili-
tary, and probably the Ton Ton
Macoutes and the militia. There
is no indication that they could
garner such support.
Prospects
Barring a totally unfore-
seen development, there is no
indication that Duvalier will 25)
voluntarily leave the scene in
the immediate futLLJNC
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