SPECIAL REPORT NEW SOVIET DOCTRINE RECOGNIZES POSSIBILITY OF NONNUCLEAR WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005000120002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 29, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

NEW SOVIET DOCTRINE RECOGNIZES POSSI8ILtTY Off' NONNUCLEAR WAR
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NEW SOVIET DOCTRINE RECOGNIZES POSSIBILITY OF NONNUCLEAR WAR
There are increasing indications that the So-
viet leaders, believing that they are faced with
a continuing nuclear stalemate and a growing US
capability for "flexible response," have modi-
fied the doctrine that a future war involving
great powers can only be nuclear and have up-
graded the role of general-purpose--i.e., non-
strategic--forces. The most recent sign came
from the USSR's leading authority on military
strategy, Marshal Sokolovskiy. In a conversa-
tion-with the US Army attache at a 6 October Mos-
cow reception, Sokolovskiy stated that the USSR
has refined the military doctrine put forth in
the 1962 and 1963 editions of his treatise, Mil-
itary Strategy, to include the possibility oT a
nonnuc eater war. He went on to say that the nu-
clear stalemate between the US and the USSR
necessitates a constant updating of views on the
relative roles of missile and ground forces.
Process of Transition
Soviet policy for the de-
velopment and employment of gen-
eral-purpose forces has clearly
been in the process of transition
recently. A year ago the general-
purpose forces appeared to be the
stepchild of Soviet military pol-
icy. A policy of troop reduction
was in force, the ground forces
command structure had been re-
vamped--eliminating the influ-
ence of Marshal Chuykov, a power-
ful advocate of a policy of main-
taining strong theater forces--
and the prospects were good that
a further curtailment of defense
allocations for general-purpose
forces was in store.
Opposition to these measures
was strong in the military, but
Khrushchev seemed determined to
override this opposition and to
force acceptance of his defense
policy prescriptions--including
the view that the general-pur-
pose forces should be tailored
to the limited role of exploit-
ing strategic nuclear attacks.
With Khrushchev gone, these pre-
scriptions and this view have
lost their sponsor while the in-
fluence of military leaders who
had long contested Khrushchev's
policies has increased percepti-
bly.
High-Level Military Statements
An illustration of this
trend is afforded by a series
of public and private statements
by Soviet military officers on
the ground force issue since the
beginning of this year.
In January an article in
Red Star indicated that the
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SOME SOVIET STATEMENTS ON MILITARY DOCTRINE
UP TO SPRING 1965
"War now would at once become total, worldwide;
and its outcome would depend not on the actions
of troops stationed along the line dividing the
combatants, but on the use of nuclear-missile
weapons...."
--Khrushchev, February 1962
"Essentially, the argument is over the basic
ways in which a future war will be conducted,
whether this is to be a ground war with the
employment of nuclear weapons as a means of
supporting the operations of the ground forces,
or a fundamentally new war in which the main
means of deciding strategic tasks will be
nuclear-missile weapons.
--Marshal Sokolovskiy, Second Edition,
Military Strategy, August 1963
"Concerning means of warfare, a war will be
a nuclear-missile war.
--Colonel General Shtemenko, Deputy Chief
of General Staff, February 1965
SINCE SPRING 1965
"We are convinced that the superiority in
manpower and material will be on our side,
irrespective of whether war is to be waged
with the use of nuclear weapons or without
them."
--Marshal Malinovskiy, Minister of Defense,
May 1965
The appearance of nuclear means of
armed struggle...does not mean, of course,
that any possibility of a war employing
conventional means of armed struggle is
now quite out of the question....
--General of the Army Yepishev, top
political officer, Ministry of 'Defense,
May 1965
..We consider it premature to 'bury' the
infantry, as some do."
--Marshal Malinovskiy, May 1965
"Some people thought they could do away
with ground forces, but they found out they
couldn't do this."
--Marshal Chuykov, Commander of Ground
Forces, August 1965
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regime was still temporizing on
the issue of whether to reaffirm
or disavow Khrushchev's troop-re-
duction policy. The effect of
this vacillation was to stimulate
agitation within military circles
over the issue.
On 17 February, Marshal
Sokolovskiy gave a press inter-
view in which he stated--accord-
ing to both the original TASS re-
port and the reports of Western-
ers who were present--that the
size of the Soviet armed forces
had been reduced to 2,432,000 men,
the level that Khrushchev had
set as the goal of his major troop
reduction policy in 1960. What
Sokolovskiy meant to achieve by
this statement is obscure, but it
is clear that his statement was
unauthorized and that it ruffled
military opinion.
In June, Marshal Rotmistrov,
a leading ground forces spokesman,
in a private discussion with the
US military attach#, took pains
to convey the impression that the
Soviet ground forces were not be-
ing reduced but were being
strengthened. He implied that
the figure for the size of the
ground forces given by Sokolovskiy
in Febuary was too low.
A similar dispute arose con-
cerning an article by Colonel-
General Shtemenko, a deputy chief
of the General Staff, which was
published in the Sunday supplement
of Izvestia on 9 February. Al-
though the content of the article
was conspicuously innocuous, its
title--"The Queen of the Battle-
field has Yielded Her Crown"--was
provocative. It was apparently
regarded as a hint of some policy
in the making and a direct chal-
lenge to prevailing professional
views of the role and importance
of the ground forces. In any
event, a rejoinder came from
Pravda two months later. Report-
nng on a speech by Marshal Rotmis-
trov in its issue of 15 April,
Pravda observed that the marshal
Had-"convincingly criticized
views which have slipped into
the press that allegedly 'the
queen of the battlefield--the
land forces--is relinquishing
her crown to the rocket weapons."'
It seems clear in retro-
spect that the vacillations mir-
rored in these two disputes marked
a turning point in an internal
Soviet debate over ground forces
policy. Marshal Chuykov vir-
tually confirmed this interpreta-
tion in a conversation with the
US military attachd in August.
Commenting on his own reinstate-
ment as commander in chief of
the ground forces, Chuykov stated:
"Some people thought they could
do away with the ground forces
but found out they couldn't
do this." Chuykov's reinstate-
ment is, in itself, one of the
strongest indications that a
major policy reversal has oc-
curred. Not only has Chuykov's
advocacy of a strong ground
force been unequivocal but also
his bold defense of his views
published at the time of his
departure from the post in 1964
made his return highly unlikely,
except in the context of a change
of policy.
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There is some indication
that the current trend in ground
forces policy rests on a new ap-
preciation of the possible uses
of theater forces for conven-
tional warfare in a situation of
nuclear stalemate. In his con-
versation with the US military
attachd in June, Marshal Rot-
mistrov noted that the growth
of nuclear capabilities in both
the US and the USSR was creating
a situation in which deterrence
would be as binding on one side
as on the other. In these cir-
cumstances, he implied, the role
of the Soviet ground forces might
become a decisive factor in the
strategic equation. Retaining
the capability to overrun Europe
in 60 to 90 days, in either a
nuclear or nonnuclear situation,
they would serve to keep Europe
hostage. Rotmistrov's reference
to a period of 60 to 90 days ap-
pears to imply a conventional
rather than a nuclear war scenario
because it is far out of line
with the 100-kilometers-per-day
rate of advance called for by
recent nuclear war doctrine.
Changes in TO&E
Some changes in organiza-
tion and equipment of the general-
purpose forces which have been
effected over the past year or
two can be explained for the most
part in terms of the existing
nuclear war doctrine. Neverthe-
less, some of these changes also
serve to improve the capabilities
of the general-purpose forces
for conventional operations.
There are some indications, for
example, that the complements of
conventional artillery as-
signed to Soviet units may be
increasing. There are also in-
dications that some Soviet tank
armies in East Germany have been
reorganized to add motorized
rifle divisions to their table
of organization. These are the
kinds of changes that might be
anticipated if the USSR were to
readjust its forces to take more
account of the requirements for
conventional war.
The new Soviet emphasis on
airborne and amphibious forces can
be explained both by the require-
ments posed by nuclear war and
by the possibility that the So-
viet authorities wish to enhance
their conventional war capabili-
ties. However, the development of
these forces adds significantly
to the latter capabilities. The
re-establishment of the marine
forces in 1964 may represent a
first step toward meeting a So-
viet requirement for a capabil-
ity to intervene directly in dis-
tant, limited military actions.
Competition for
Available Resources
A vigorous controversy
over the issue of defense al-
locations has been discernible
in statements by various lead-
ers over the past several months.
With the new emphasis on the
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importance of conventional forces,
prospects would appear good that
the general-purpose forces will
be well provided for in current
planning.
At the same time, the USSR
is facing very heavy demands for
increased resources on all fronts,
not all of which can be satis-
fied simultaneously. There are
growing pressures on the stra-
tegic and defensive forces, as
well as on the space program, at
a time when the USSR has under-
taken extensive commitments in
both industrial reform and ag-
riculture improvements.
Thus the trend toward the
enlargement and improvement of
the general-purpose forces which
now is discernible in Soviet mil-
itary policy will clash with
other priority claimants for na-
tional resources.
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