WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005000090001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 8, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

25X1:
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downgrading and decPassi?i cation
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05000090001-9
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EDT, 7 October 1965)
VIETNAM
At least nine missiles were fired on 5 October at US
aircraft attacking the vital transportation lines link-
ing Hanoi with China to the northeast. One plane was
shot down. Most of the SAMs came from an unconfirmed
site on Cat Ba Island off the coast east of Haiphong.
The same day the Chinese claimed they too downed one
of four US aircraft allegedly over Chinese territory.
North Vietnamese commentary on negotiations continues
to stress that the US must accept Premier Pham Van
Dong's four points before there can be any "political
settlement" of the war. In the South, Viet Cong mili-
tary activity is still at a relatively high level, and
the political situation in the northern provinces re-
mains unsettled.
Page
The Communist World
SOVIET INDUSTRIAL REORGANIZATION ENHANCES BREZHNEV'S POSITION 5
The Supreme Soviet, which met last week to enact the
industrial reorganization presented at the party cen-
tral committee plenum several days earlier, also made
several top-level appointments which appear to reinforce
Brezhnev's influence in the hierarchy.
TITO'S VISIT TO BULGARIA 7
Despite persistent basic policy differences between the
Bulgarian and Yugoslav regimes, state relations have im-
proved somewhat in the past year. Tito's visit--his
first since 1947--was to re-establish contacts between
the two national parties.
NEW ELEMENTS IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP
Two tough veteran revolutionaries--Tao Chu, chief of
the party's central-south regional bureau, and army
Chief of General Staff Lo Jui-ching--have reached posi-
tions which will make them important figures in the
event of a struggle for the succession after Mao goes.
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PEKING BACKS AWAY FROM AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE
It now is extremely doubtful that the long-heralded
Second Afro-Asian Conference will be held as scheduled
in Algiers on 5 November.
Asia-Africa
THE INDIA-PAKISTAN SITUATION
Violations of the cease-fire have declined, but neither
India nor Pakistan has withdrawn its forces from forward
positions. Pakistan is still trying to keep the Kashmir
issue in the public eye, and continues to infiltrate
guerrilla forces into Indian-held Kashmir. The Indians
are increasingly insistent that the issue is not nego-
tiable. Economic repercussions of the fighting are be-
coming more apparent. Peking and New Delhi have
stepped up diplomatic countercharges, and the Chinese
also are evincing irritation over Pakistan's recent
actions.
THE COUP IN INDONESIA
The army, having countered a leftist coup on 1 October,
is for the time being firmly in control of Indonesia.
The question remains as to whether it now will follow
President Sukarno in a conciliatory political settle-
ment or whether it will insist on major moves against
the Communists.
ADDITIONAL SOVIET ECONOMIC AID FOR BURMA
A new Soviet economic aid offer, details of which re-
main to be worked out, resulted from Premier.Ne Win's
recent visit to Moscow. Past Soviet aid totals only
about $14 million. Peking has provided six times as
much.
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NASIR RESHUFFLES CABINET IN EGYPT
His removal of the left-leaning All Sabri from the pre-
miership may have been intended in part to placate the
US. Nasir probably hopes that the new cabinet under
Zakariya Muhieddin, who evidently will concentrate on
internal problems, will increase efficiency and revivify
the nation's spirit.
RHODESIAN INDEPENDENCE AT ISSUE IN LONDON
As the talks between Harold Wilson and Rhodesian Prime
Minister Ian Smith opened, their positions seemed as
conflicting as ever.
ANTI-TSHOMBE POLITICIANS JOIN IN CONGO
20
A new party led by the interior minister has won one
of the four top positions in Parliament. The coerce-
naries'off ensive against rebels in Fizi is moving slowly.
MAJOR PARTIES CLASH IN NIGERIAN REGIONAL ELECTIONS
21
A conservative alliance seems ahead by a small margin
because it controls the electoral apparatus, but the
frustrated progressive opposition may resort to violence.
NYERERE TIGHTENS CONTROL IN TANZANIA
Following an overwhelming election victory, President
Nyerere has assumed control of foreign affairs himself
and is balancing off rival radical factions.
Europe
COMMON MARKET EDGING TOWARD HARDER LINE WITH FRANCE
The other five members still hope to end the crisis in
the EEC before the mere passage of time does serious
damage to the organization, but they appear increas-
ingly unwilling to accept De Gaulle's terms.
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BRITISH LABOR PARTY CONFERENCE SHOWS FIRM WILSON CONTROL 24
Prime Minister Wilson's successes in strengthening the
economy and controlling the Labor Party organization
have dissipated Conservative hopes for an early return
to power.
Western Hemisphere
DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT STILL CHALLENGED FROM LEFT AND RIGHT 25
Left- and right-wing forces continue to block progress
is establishing the authority of the provisional govern-
ment and returning the country to normal conditions.
OPPOSITION GAINS IN BRAZILIAN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS 26
Supporters of former President Kubitschek have ap-
parently won the elections in Guanabara and Minas
Gerais, causing a strong reaction within the military.
GUEVARA'S FALL FROM POWER IN CUBA
Guevara has been dropped from the leadership apparently
because his opposition to Castro's views on ideology
and practical policies, particularly the economic ones,
made him too dangerous and disruptive an influence.
His whereabouts remains a mystery.
PROBLEMS OF BOLIVIAN JUNTA INCREASING
Dissatisfaction among the miners remains, additional
political disturbances are threatened, and some mili-
tary officers are urging political changes.
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The North Vietnamese again
demonstrated their acute sensi-
tivity to attacks on the vital
lines of communication between
Hanoi and the Chinese border to
the northeast by reacting vigor-
ously to a US air strike in that
area on 5 October. At least
nine missiles were fired while
US Air Force and Navy planes were
conducting strikes against im-
portant bridges and an ammuni-
tion depot near Kep. One US
aircraft was shot down by a mis-
sile--the fifth lost to a SAM
thus far.
A Chinese Communist news
release claimed that Chinese
fighters shot down one of four
US aircraft which allegedly
penetrated Chinese airspace the
same day.
At least seven of the mis-
siles fired on 5 October were
seen to come from Cat Ba Island,
off the North Vietnamese coast
east of Haiphong. This prob-
able SAM site has not yet been
confirmed by photography. A
navy pilot acting as coordinator
for one of the strikes reported
seeing another missile being
launched from an area southwest
of Kep Airfield. This site also
lacks photographic confirmation.
Hanoi. Comment on Negotiations
Hanoi continued its public
commentary on negotiations this
week. Although the comments
reflected no change in its basic
terms on a political settlement,
the frequency with which the
subject was discussed suggests
an effort to justify the DRV's
position,and to counter any
impressions that it is unyield-
ing or negative. The discussion
may also represent a continua-
tion of what Hanoi considers a
public dialogue with the US.
Following last week's of-
ficial Foreign Ministry memoran-
dum which re-emphasized the
DRV's insistence on its four-
point proposal of last April,
Premier Pham Van Dong this week
restated DRV terms for a set-
tlement on two separate oc-
casions. At a Hanoi reception
celebrating Communist China's
National Day on 1 October, the
premier demanded not only Ameri-
can recognition of the four
points but also that the US
"prove it by practical deeds"
before any talk about a politi-
cal solution can take place.
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In an interview with an
Egyptian journalist on the 5th,
broadcast by Radio Hanoi, the
premier returned to the less
precise language of the 23 Sep-
tember DRV memorandum on negotia-
tions, asserting that the US must
"declare" its acceptance of the
four points before a "political
settlement can be considered."
The Liberation Front (NFLSV),
has again joined in the commen-
tary on negotiations after sev-
eral weeks of ignoring the sub-
ject. An NFLSV central committee
statement of 29 September con-
demned US "acts of aggression"
and said that there can "be no
contact or political solution"
as'long as they continue. On 2
October, in a statement to the
Red Cross on prisoner-of-war
treatment, the front used the
POW issue to try to pressure the
US into direct talks with it.
The statement said "as long as
the US refuses to recognize the
NFLSV as the only authority com-
petent to settle all questions
concerning South Vietnam there
can be no basis for any contact
to discuss prisoners of war."
Peking Maintains Hard Line
Peking continues to mani-
fest its hard line on Vietnam.
In a four-hour press conference
on 29 September, Foreign Minis-
ter Chen Yi attempted to refur-
bish the image of a resolute
and formidable China--an image
which has been dimmed by Peking's
failure to follow through pub-
licly on its commitments to North
Vietnam. He declared that China
was ready for an invasion by the
US and its henchmen, including
the Soviet Union. Chen asserted
that the war in Vietnam was go-
ing well for the Viet Cong and
reiterated Peking's opposition
to negotiations except on its
own terms.
On 3 October Premier Chou
En-lai reformulated the Chinese
position on assisting the Viet-
namese Communists in what ap-
pears to be another effort to
harden Peking's public warnings
without actually increasing the
Chinese commitment. Chou de-
clared that if the US presses
ahead along the "dangerous path'
of war expansion, China "will
unhesitatingly" join the "Indo-
chinese people" in "completely
driving the US aggressors out
of Indochina and the whole of
Southeast Asia."
The Chinese treatment of
the alleged shootdown of the US
aircraft over China on 5 October
followed the pattern of pre-
vious such incidents and re-
flected no escalation of Peking's
earlier open threats. New China
News Agency quoted a responsible
official of the Chinese Defense
Ministry as declaring that the
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US "air intrusion" was "another ex-
tremely serious war provocation" and
another step toward "imposing war on
the Chinese people in disregard of
the repeated warnings, of the Chinese
Government." The official, however,
concluded with the standard warning
implying that China would not take
the initiative in provoking a war,
declaring that if the "US dares to
come, we will dare to hit back."
South Vietnam 25X1
In a major address on 1 Octo-
ber reviewing his first 100 days in
office, Premier Ky characterized
the military situation as improved,
and spoke of plans for social
and economic betterment in the fu-
ture. Several cabinet changes were
also announced, including the eleva-
tion of General Co to deputy premier
for pacification, in addition to his
duties as minister of war. The si-
multaneous announcement of a new
secretary for rural construction
and subsequent discussions of rural
pacification with US Embassy offi-
cials indicate a renewed interest
by the Vietnamese Government in
this key aspect.
The political situation in
northernmost I Corps, meanwhile,
remains unsettled. Buddhist re-
sentments have focused on the ci-
vilian chief of Quang Tri Prov-
ince--a Catholic and Dai Viet party
member. Further nonviolent pres-
sure for his removal seems likely,
according to the US consul in Hud.
For the first time, I Corps com-
mander General Thi has been openly
criticized by militant students in
Hud. A newspaper published by
these elements also criticized US
policies and military presence in
South Vietnam. This may foreshadow
a. renewed antigovernment campaign,
although the student group respon-
sible presently does not have a
large following.
Despite record high casualties
during the past two weeks, Viet
Cong military activity continues
at a relatively high level, includ-
ing several recent battalion-size
attacks. Heavy fighting flared
again during the week in the Phu Cu
Pass area of Binh Dinh Province--
the scene of two major engagements
during the previous week. Further
heavy fighting in this area seems
likely in view of the concentration
of government and Communist forces,
including probable elements of the
North Vietnamese 325th Division.
Viet Cong forces are also show-
ing increased resistance to US Army
and Marine patrols in Bien Hoa Prov-
ince and near Da Nang. Meanwhile,
the number of incidents in the delta
area south of Saigon continues at a
hi h level.
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SECRET
SOVIET INDUSTRIAL REORGANIZATION ENHANCES BREZHNEV'S POSITION
The USSR Supreme Soviet,
meeting last week to enact the
industrial reorganization pre-
sented by Premier Kosygin at the
party central committee plenum
several days earlier, also made
several top-level appointments
which appear to have a political
overtone. Belying rumors which
had been widely current, Kosygin
and party First Secretary Brezhnev
emerged from the meetings with
their positions intact. Brezhnev,
in particular, has managed to re-
inforce his influence in the
Kremlin hierarchy.
The Supreme Soviet swept
away the system of regional eco-
nomic councils (sovnarkhozy) es-
tablished by Khrushchev and
created 28 vertically organized
industrial ministries. The USSR
Council of Ministers remains an
oversize body of 100 members,
despite the shuffling of minis-
terial personnel. Changes at the
deputy premier level, the actual
locus of governmental power,
should have the effect of strength
ening Brezhnev politically.
Dmitry Polyansky, a close
associate of Brezhnev and a. major
architect of the agricultural
program put forward by the first
secretary last March, was pro-
moted from deputy to first deputy
premier, a post he now shares
with Kirill Mazurov. His eleva-
tion, together with the promotion
earlier in the week of Fedor
Kulakov--believed to be close to
Polyansky--constitutes a reaffir-
mation of the regime's commitment
to a new approach in agriculture.
With his promotion,-Polyan-.
sky now outranks in the Council
of Ministers Aleksandr Shelepin,
another of the ambitious younger
leaders, who now is the sole
party presidium member serving
in the council below the rank
of first deputy premier. More-
over, the speeches of both
Kosygin and Brezhnev at the
plenum contained no mention, as
might have been expected, of
Shelepin's party-state control
apparatus. Indeed, Brezhnev's
call for a large role for pri-
mary party organizations within
the new ministerial system,
suggests that the power of Shele -
pin's organization may be weak-
ened.
Nikolay Tikhonov, one of
three newly appointed premiers,
has old ties with Brezhnev.
In the past a deputy chairman
of Gosplan, he now is probably
serving as minister without
portfolio, much as Polyansky has
served for three years. The two
other new deputy premiers, Nik-
olay Baybakov and Vladimir
Kirillin, have no obviously close
connections with any of the top
leaders. Baybakov, however, was
chairman of Gosplan from 1955-
1957, a period when Kosygin be-
came involved in central planning
prior to his chairmanship of
Gosplan in 1959 and 1960. Kiril-
lin has had important positions
in both the party and government.
The election of Brezhnev
to the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet gives him a formal govern-
ment post from which he can
SECRET
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USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
CHAIRMAN
A. N. K.Aygi.
GLPUTY CHAIRMAN
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Approved
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
V. A. Kirillin
IILI UIY CHAIRMAN
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 Approved For Relee 2007/03/06SICLP-6927A000090001-9
participate in high-level meet-
ings with leaders of other gov-
ernments. Khrushchev, before
he became premier in 1958, used
the same device. Conceivably,
this might be preliminary to
Brezhnev's also taking the post
of chairman of the Supreme Soviet
Presidium should Mikoyan, as
persistently rumored, retire
from that post on his 70th birth-
day in November.
Some differences in emphasis
and approach to policy questions
can be detected in Kosygin's
and Brezhnev's speeches at the
plenum. The program launched
there shows, however, that there
is unity enough in the collective
leadership to enable it to act 25X1
decisively on pressing current
TITO'S VISIT TO BULGARIA
The major accomplishment of
Yugoslav President Tito's 22-27
September official visit to Bul-
garia--his first since 1947--
was to re-establish contacts be-
tween the two national parties.
Such contacts had remained in
abeyance despite limited improve-
ment of state relations in the
past year.
The essential problem has
been the conservatism of the Bul-
garian party hierarchy, many of
whose members fear the possible
divisive effects of Yugoslav doc-
trinal unorthodoxy on the Bulgar-
ian party. Their apprehensions
will not quickly disappear.
Although Yugoslav-Bulgarian
economic relations were not
stressed in the joint communiqud
signed at the end of the visit,
increased economic cooperation
apparently figured prominently
in the talks. When addressing
itself to the international scene,
the communiqud reflected positions
more identifiable with Belgrade
than with Sofia. Thus, the moder-
ate references to US aggression
in Vietnam contrasted sharply
with Sofia's customary hard stand
on this issue. The communiqud
also repeatedly stressed the Yug-
oslav position that "national
peculiarities" require different
approaches to Communism, and made
no reference to the unity of "the
socialist movement."
There were also gains for
Sofia., however. Tito's visit to
Bulgaria, as well as the one by
Rumanian party chief Ceausescu
earlier in September, probably
strengthened Bulgarian party boss
Zhivkov's domestic position. By
inviting two such independent-
minded leaders, Zhivkov may have
been responding in part to Soviet
advice to improve Sofia's external
posture in the wake of the anti-
regime conspiracy discovered last
April. The visits also are con-
sonant with Zhivkov's efforts
over the past 20 months to promote
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the normalization of relations in
the Balkans and to ease Sofia's
political isolation from her
neighbors.
Nevertheless, strains in
Yugoslav-Bulgarian ties are still
apparent, and basic policy differ-
ences persist. Friction periodi-
cally arises over the Macedonian
minorities resident in each coun-
try. In addition, Yugoslav diplo-
mats in Sofia have frequently
complained that while it is rela-
tively easy to establish innoc-
uous contacts such as sending Yu-
goslav musicians to Bulgaria, it
is quite difficult to develop con-
tacts in the journalism and pub-
lishing fields, and particularly
to exchange political information.
These long-standing difficulties
are unlikely to be easily or
quickly resolved.
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NEW ELEMENTS IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP
Two tough veteran revolu-
tionaries--Tao Chu, chief of the
party's central-south regional
bureau, and army Chief of Gen-
eral Staff Lo Jui-ching--are be-
coming increasingly important
figures in the Chinese Communist
regime. They have a strong back-
ground in party, propaganda, or
security work and are probably
representative of the kind of
men being groomed for major
leadership roles. Each is 58,
several years younger than most
of the 71-year-old Mao Tse-tung's
immediate lieutenants.
Neither man is on the polit-
buro, the Chinese equivalent of
the Soviet presidium, but this
may mean merely that they were
second-ranking offi
cials in 1958, when
formal additions
were last made to
the body. Both
would almost cer-
tainly be included
in a public listing
if a new one were
issued today.
Tao Chu, a
former political
commissar in the
army, was secretary
of the Kwangtung
provincial party committee in
the 1950s. In 1961 he was named
first secretary of the central-
south bureau, one of six newly
created and powerful regional
bureaus of the party. He ac-
quired a major government posi-
tion for the first time in De-
cember 1964 when he was named
vice premier.
In the summer of 1965 Tao
emerged as an influential party
figure of national importance
when half a dozen articles pre-
senting his views on agriculture
and various aspects of culture,
obviously mirroring views held
by Mao Tse-tung, were published
in authoritative newspapers and
journals in Peking. Such ex-
posure of an individual's name
in national publications is un-
precedented in recent years, and
apparently reflects an effort to
build up Tao's stature as a party
leader capable of formulating
concrete policies which put Mao's
high-flown and nebulous precepts
into practice.
Tao's articles urge a greater
role for politics
in agriculture--a
prescription that
allegedly will
bring about a "new
great leap forward"
throughout China--
and adoption of an
extremely stiff
anti-intellectual
line in cultural
affairs. Tao's
exhortation demand-
ing a political
solution to rural
problems was fol-
lowed closely by the establish-
ment of a new central committee
unit named the Political Work
Department for Agriculture and
Forestry. Its formation com-
pletes a process begun in 1964
to establish an army-style polit-
ical structure throughout the
economy.
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Tao Chu has a harsh, color-
ful style that evidently appeals
to Mao Tse-tung. In a recently
published speech to a group of
theatrical workers he asserted
that a "little coercion" of in-
tellectuals is a good thing.
Noting that people generally con-
demn Emperor Chin Shih Huang Ti
for burning books and burying
scholars alive 2,200 years ago,
he defended the right of the
Communists to do "the same sort
of thing," in order to consoli-
date their rule and their ideo-
logical position. In the same
speech Tao declared flatly that
he was imposing a total ban on
performance of traditional plays
and opera in the central-south
region. He said: "Only revolu-
tionary modern plays now will be
allowed to be written and pro-
duced. Is that not too crude
and arbitrary? No. Man is like
that. Sometimes he has to be
put under pressure."
According to a Soviet prop-
aganda blast at Chinese leaders
made in 1963, Tao Chu once cal-
lously advised a visiting Czech-
oslovak official to accept phil-
osophically the possible loss
of his entire country in a thermo-
nuclear war, and to think in-
stead of the benefits such a war
would bring to the world Commu-
nist movement.
Lo Jui-ching is not a the-
oretician like Tao Chu, but his
numerous positions and influence
in the army, party, and security
apparatus make hint one of the
most powerful men in China. He
,is chief of general staff of the
People's Liberation Army (PLA);
secretary general of the mili-
tary affairs committee, the
party's supreme organ for making
military policy; a member of the
party's key secretariat; and a
vice premier. Lo was minister
of public security from 1949 to
1959, and there is evidence
that he is still actively involved
in public security work.
In addition, Lo Jui-ching
has to function as a de facto
military commander most of the
time since his superior, Minis-
ter of National Defense Lin Piao,
is chronically ill. Lo rather
than Lin usually represents the
military at ceremonial affairs
and often makes important mili-
tary pronouncements.
Both Tao and Lo appear to
be Mao's personal favorites and
are not closely associated with
the other leaders. Both appear
to have reached positions which
will make them important figures
in the event a struggle develops
over the succession after Mao
goes.
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PEKING BACKS AWAY FROM AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE
It now is extremely doubtful
that the long-heralded Second
Afro-Asian Conference will be
held as scheduled in Algiers on
5 November. There is a marked
lack of enthusiasm among most
moderate African and Asian na-
tions and a growing resentment
of heavy-handed Chinese efforts
to stage-manage the proceedings.
This is evident even among the
more militant and radical na-
tions that are normally sympa-
thetic to Peking.
Algeria, the host country,
has not yet issued formal invita-
tions, and the 15-nation prepar-
atory committee has not met since
late June when it announced post-
ponement of the conference until
November. Officials in Algiers
have indicated both publicly and
privately that they would just
as soon the whole thing were
postponed or dropped altogether.
The Chinese also now appear to
be having doubts about the de-
sirability of the conference.
The Chinese had hoped to
duplicate their success at Ban-
dung ten years ago, but have re-
cently become disenchanted be-
cause it now is clear that they
would not be able to control the
Algiers conference. Peking has
adamantly insisted that the
Soviet Union be excluded and
that all participants agree on
an explicit condemnation of "US
imperialism."
On both issues Peking ap-
pears to have received resound-
ing rebuffs. The UAR endorsed
Soviet attendance in the communi-
qud at the conclusion of Nasir's
visit to Moscow on 1 September,
although the Egyptians are not
anxious that the conference be
held next month.
Foreign Minister Chen Yi
apparently came a cropper during
his visits to Algeria, Guinea,
and Mali in early September and
seems to have antagonized his
hosts in all three countries.
In Bamako he reportedly railed
against Moscow's "defection to
the imperialists," and lectured
angrily on Mali's shortcomings
as a socialist state.
Chen appears to have bee
n equally
tactless in Guinea, and
both
visits ended without the
custom-
ary joint communiqud, ap
parently
as a result of sharp dif
ferences
over the Afro-Asian Conference.
In Algeria, Chen is reported
to have castigated officials for
inviting the UN Secretary General
as an observer, and in his wide-
ranging press conference on his
return to Peking he delivered a
virtual ultimatul that China
would not attend an Afro-Asian
gathering at which the Soviets
were seated.
25X1
25X1
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Violations of the cease-fire
have declined and both India and
Pakistan now seem willing to see
the incidents along the front fur-
ther reduced. Neither has with-
drawn its forces from forward po-
sitions, however, and tensions re-
main high.
President Ayub has issued
strict instructions to Pakistani
troops to observe the cease-fire,
and Pakistani officers reportedly
now are more willing to comply.
The Pakistanis continue, however,
to stress the extreme fragility
of the cease-fire arrangement in
an effort to keep the Kashmir is-
sue before the public eye. They
have most recently alleged an
Indian build-up for an attack
near Ferozepore.
Infiltration of Azad (free)
Kashmir forces into Indian-held
Kashmir apparently continues.
Pakistani newsmen in Azad Kashmir
reported recently that they had
observed several companies of men
without insignia who were described
by a local official as being reg-
ular Azad Kashmir units trained
as guerrillas and preparing to in-
filtrate Indian lines. Although
India continues mopping-up efforts,
upwards of 3,000 infiltrators, who
began their intrusions in early
August, are believed still at
large behind Indian lines in Kash-
mir.
The UN observer mission which
is to supervise the cease-fire is
still far from
fully operational,
and
fewer than half it
s members
have
arrived. The US
Embassy in
New
Delhi reports the
impression
that
the UN operation
is still
wobbly, uncertain, and ineffec-
tive. The embassy states that
strong and creative leadership
by General MacDonald and his mis-
sion is needed at the various
points of conflict, since Indian
politicians and civil servants
seem poorly informed and some-
what baffled as to how to pro-
ceed.
There is still no sign of
give by either side on the basic
issue underlying the recent con-
flict--Kashmir. Pakistani offi-
cials stress that progress on this
issue is vital if peace is to be
maintained on the subcontinent.
The Indians, on the other hand,
are increasingly insistent that
the Kashmir question is not nego-
tiable. Backed by a buoyant pub-
lic opinion and obviously reflect-
ing a sense of having "won" the
war, Prime Minister Shastri, Con-
gress Party boss Kamaraj,and De-
fense Minister Chavan have all
taken an adamant public position
on this issue in the past week.
Chavan and Kamaraj in addition
have reflected Indian sensitiv-
ity to possible Western pressure
on India to compromise. Kamaraj
has declared that any power which
aids Pakistan is an "enemy" of
India, and Chavan has threatened
to "go it alone" if the West seeks
to cut off aid to India.
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CHINA IflDIfl- PAKISTA(1 ORDER OF BATTLE
IAIFINDI
(1949)
ind "~..~ ? io
W. ,PAKIS 'A o 6
11-1 X " 14
Par'cistan?s forces number 67.000
in the Kashmir area and 64,000
opposite northwest India.,, j
Indian forcesnunaber 100,01 in Kabrttir.
nd 150,b60 in northt ,est Indict,
ullundur
Tithwc
azilka
PAKISTAN INDIA
Infantry div on n
Infantry brigade l
l=1 Armored division ? 25 5? 75
(t] Armored brigade j MILES
Approximate territory (App - -- -11,
Miles)
uccupleu on cc .epr I I
Ka'r
FatuhawaIa
25X1
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Attempts to make progress on
the Kashmir issue within the UN
have also made little progress.
Secretary General Thant says that
last week Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko was "somewhat" negative
concerning a proposed four-power
Security Council committee to as-
sist Thant in implementing the re-
cent Security Council resolutions.
UN Under Secretary Bunche, describ-
ing the idea as "moribund," attrib-
uted Moscow's stand to India's
"stiff opposition." The Soviets
probably are also concerned that
their participation in such a com-
mission wouldgive Peking new am-
munition to charge US-Soviet col-
lusion.
Satisfied that a cease-fire
of sorts has been effected, the
Soviets will probably now move
cautiously and avoid any initia-
tives which run the risk of alien-
ating Pakistan or especially India.
Recent Soviet protests concerning
the organization and financing of
the UN cease-fire observer mission
seem intended to underscore the
standard Soviet contention that
only the Security Council--with
its big-power veto--has the au-
thority to establish the guide-
lines of UN "peacekeeping" opera-
tions.
Economic repercussions of the
recent conflict are becoming more
apparent in both India and Pak-
istan and are likely to multiply.
The military confrontation has
caused disruptions in both land
transport and ocean shipping.
Production cutbacks or shutdowns
in many factories have increased
unemployment. A tight credit
situation is also evident in
Pakistan, and in parts of west-
ern India rice and wheat rations
have been cut.
On the Sino-Indian border
there has been almost no activ-
ity on the ground, but both sides
have stepped up the tempo of dip-
lomatic charge and countercharge.
Almost daily Peking and New Delhi
exchange notes alleging frontier
incursions.
Sino-Pakistani relations ap-
pear on the surface to be as warm
as ever, and Peking is evidently
seeking to consolidate and in-
crease its ties with Rawalpindi.
The Chinese, however, are evinc-
ing signs of irritation with re-
cent Pakistani actions. They
were probably angered by Paki-
stan's reported last-minute re-
quest that they not intervene,
and they doubtless find Paki-
stan's agreement to a cease-fire
under UN auspices particularly
allin
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The Indonesian Army, having
countered a leftist coup on 1 Oc-
tober, is for the time being
firmly in control of the country.
It would like to use the opportu-
nity to take major steps against
the Communists, including the
banning of their party and prob-
ably the execution of party lead-
ers.
particularly outraged the army
because it involved the torture
and murder of six of the army's
top generals.
President Sukarno, however,
in the interest of national unity
and fearing the political ascend-
ency of the army, has asserted
that the present situation is a
political problem that requires a
political solution and that he
wishes to settle it himself. In
a statement following a cabinet
meeting on 6 October at Bogor Pal-
ace, he stressed the need to avoid
divisiveness in Indonesia's polit-
ical life or between the military
services. He apparently hopes to
return the Communist Party to the
favorable political position it
enjoyed before 1 October.
The major question is whether
the army will follow Sukarno in
a conciliatory political settle-
ment or whether it will insist on
anti-Communist action.
The coup was carried out by
a group which called itself the
"30 September movement" and was
led by Lt. Col. Untung of Sukar-
no's palace guard. The action
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Meanwhile the PKI is trying
to undercut the army's efforts to
move against it by denying com-
plicity in the coup. The party--
officially silent since 1 October
--has issued a statement on 5
October through its information
bureau declaring that the PKI
central committee did not par-
ticipate in the 30 September
movement and that the coup group
did not request the approval of
party members whose names were
included in the short-lived "Rev-
olutionary Council." The party
fully supports the "message of
President Sukarno"--presumably
his call to preserve unity and
not take revenge--and calls on
all members and sympathizers to
help carry it out.
Although the army has tried
to suppress the statement, it
has become public knowledge.
Subandrio alluded to it on 6 Oc-
tober, and the world press is
reporting it. Internally it may
take a few days to filter down
to lower levels in view of pres-
ently disrupted party communica- 25X1
tions. Militant PKI elements in
Central Java meanwhile are engaged
in skirmishes with the army. \
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01.L:4 ET
ADDITIONAL SOVIET ECONOMIC AID FOR BURMA
More Soviet economic aid
will be extended to Burma as a
result of Premier Ne Win's re-
cent visit to Moscow.
Burma's minister of mines,
now touring the USSR studying min-
ing and fishing industries, in-
dicated that Soviet aid may be
forthcoming for such enterprises
in Burma. The USSR may also pro-
vide aid for industrial construc-
tion, oil exploration, and geo-
logical surveys. However, details
of the new Soviet credit remain
to be worked out.
Total Soviet economic aid
extended to Burma since 1956 has
amounted to only about $14 mil-
lion, accounted for mainly by
the Kyetauktaung dam, a techni-
cal institute, a hospital, agri-
cultural equipment, and a hotel.
Most of these projects have bees,
completed except for the dam, a
modest project which is in the
final stages of construction.
Several other Soviet aid projects
agreed to in the mid-1950s were
canceled by Burma as uneconomic.
By way of comparison, the
Chinese aid effort in Burma totals
$84 million, one of Peking's
largest economic aid commitments
in the free world. Chinese aid
projects include paper, textile,
and plywood plants, bridges, sugar
mills, and irrigation projects.
Other Communist economic aid to
Burma has been provided by Poland,
which recently extended a $10-
million economic credit and Czech-
oslovakia, which has supplied a
small amount of agricultural
equipment.
NASIR RESHUFFLES CABINET IN EGYPT
President Nasir, in pursuit
of a plan nourished since his
re-election in March, last week
designated Zakariya Muhieddin
to form a new cabinet to increase
efficiency and revivify the na-
tion's spirit. The regime evi-
dently intends to concentrate on
solving internal problems. No
changes in foreign policy have
been announced, but Cairo may be
considering a reduction of its
involvement in expensive foreign
operations.
Prime Minister Muhieddin
has been a close and loyal as-
sociate of Nasir's since the
1952 revolution, and he is ex-
pected to administer Nasir's
policies faithfully. Previously
head of Egypt's security service
as well as a vice president,
Muhieddin will probably tighten
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SECRET
up the regime's surveillance
and control of subversive groups
like the Muslim Brotherhood,
which has recently re-emerged
as a focus of public discontent
and disorder.
The retention of a highly
qualified group of economic min-
isters implies that the economic
rationality they have recommended
may now gain greater acceptance.
In the past Nasir's concern for
rapid economic growth and for
influence in world affairs fre-
quently led him to reject the
advice of his economists. Now,
however, Egypt's precarious
economic position is forcing
him to face realistically this
greatest threat to his regime.
Former prime minister Ali
Sabri has been appointed sec-
retary general of the flounder-
ing Arab Socialist Union (ASU),
Egypt's sole legal political
organization. Nasir created
this state party to instill revo-
lutionary consciousness and fer-
vor in the people, and hopes
that the energetic, ideologically
oriented Sabri can provide the
forceful leadership the ASU needs
if it is to have any chance of
overcoming the apathy that has
gripped it since its inception
in 1962.
The shift of the left-lean-
ing Sabri to a position of es-
sentially internal significance
may have been motivated in part
by a desire to placate the US
from whom Nasir desperately needs
to obtain a new PL-480 food as-
sistance agreement. Without
this aid, which has amounted to
$150 million annually, Egypt's
economy would have to undergo
sharp cutbacks, slowing growth
and leadin to public disaffec-
tion.
RHODESIAN INDEPENDENCE AT ISSUE IN LONDON
As Harold Wilson and Rho-
desian Prime Minister Ian Smith
opened talks this week in London,
the Wilson government appeared
determined to talk tough.
The British. prime minister,
with the full support of his
cabinet, will threaten severe
economic sanctions if Rhodesia
makes a unilateral declaration
of independence (UDI) as expected
within the next few weeks. Al-
though a definite course of ac-
tion apparently has not been de-
cided on, US Embassy officials
in London believe that a UK em-
bargo on Rhodesia's major ex-
port crop, tobacco, would be a
virtual certainty, and that
this might in turn lead to a
wide-scale trade embargo.
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The UK is concerned lest
sanctions provoke Rhodesian re-
taliation against Zambia, from
which the UK imports 50 percent
of its copper. Zambia relies
on Rhodesia for coal, rail ac-
cess to the sea, and electric
power. Zambia's moderate presi-
dent Kenneth Kaunda would pre-
fer to continue his policy of
restraining the Rhodesian na-
tionalists based in Zambia and
avoiding an open conflict with
Rhodesia. However, a UDI would
put him under heavy pressure
from domestic militants and from
the Organization of African Unity,
which would probably call for a
government in exile for the na-
tionalists and military action
against Rhodesia.
The Rhodesian security
forces are considered fully ca-
pable of preventing widespread
insurgency, and only a compre-
hensive and sustained embargo
by the UK and other Western na
tions would seriously endanger
the Rhodesian econom .
ANTI-TSHOMBE POLITICIANS JOIN IN CONGO
Intensive political maneu-
vering following the opening of
the Congolese Parliament has
led to an open challenge to
Premier Tshombd.
On 1 October, Interior Min-
ister Nendaka announced the for-
mation of a new group--the Congo-
lese Democratic Front (FDC) to
oppose Tshombd's national coali-
tion, Conaco. Tshombd's oppo-
nents had been attempting to
organize such a voting bloc
since early last month. An FDC
candidate narrowly defeated a
Conaco man for the Senate presi-
dency. However, Tshombd-sup-
ported candidates won the Senate
vice-presidency and both top
positions in the more powerful
Chamber of Deputies. Conaco is
still the largest voting bloc
in Parliament, but Congolese
political alliances are fragile.
Meanwhile, Colonel Hoare's
offensive against the rebels'
Fizi redoubt on the northwestern
shores of Lake Tanganyika is
still proceeding slowly.
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MAJOR PARTIES CLASH IN NIGERIAN REGIONAL ELECTIONS
All four major Nigerian par-
ties are involved in a campaign
for regional parliamentary elec-
tions to be held in the country's
Western Region on 11 October. The
conservative, incumbent party
appears to hold a slight edge by
virtue of its control of the
election machinery and its back-
ing by the group which dominates
the federal government. The
frustrated opposition may resort
to violence.
The Western Region has
been politically unsettled since
1962 when a split in the then
ruling Action Group brought an
unpopular splinter party to power.
This splinter, now known as the
Nigerian National Democratic
Party (NNDP),probably would not
win a majority of the 94 par-
liamentary seats in a fair elec-
tion. Its major liability is
the serious economic situation
in the West--once the federation's
richest region--brought on mainly
by the decline in the price of
cocoa, the state's main crop.
In an effort to retain
power, the NNDP has turned to
general pressure tactics and
apparently to electoral rigging.
It has banned all public meet-
ings and demonstrations. On
30 September the electoral com-
mission announced that 15 NNDP
candidates had been returned
unopposed. The opposition is
challenging this in the courts,
and may yet turn to more dras-
tic measures. A similar devel-
opment in the federal elec-
tions last December resulted in
a boycott and a major political
crisis.
Sporadic violence has al-
ready been reported in the West,
although the region has been
flooded with police and army
units. Despite federal Prime
Minister Balewa's promise to
use whatever force is necessary
to maintain order, a major up-
rising would seriously tax fed-
eral security forces and could
severely strain the federation
itself.
The election pits the NNDP,
allied with the Northern Region's
powerful conservative Northern
People's Congress (NPC), against a
progressive alliance of the Action
Group and the National Convention
of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) which
controls the Eastern and Mid-
Western Regions.
Barring a major upheaval,
the postelection period will
probably see defections to the 25X1
winning side and possibly the
West's return to a virtual one-
party system such as prevails
in the other three regions
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NYERERE TIGHTENS CONTROL IN TANZANIA
President Nyerere, strength-
ened by the outcome of Tanzania's
national elections late last
month, has tightened his control
of the government. His reorgan-
ized cabinet reflects his deter-
mination to concentrate on domes-
tic development and may presage
a period of improved relations
with the US.
Nyerere's overwhelming per-
sonal endorsement at the polls
gave him freedom to make exten-
sive changes in his one-party
state. He has assumed the ex-
ternal affairs portfolio and
transferred his radical national-
ist foreign minister, Oscar Kam-
bona, to the Ministry of Regional
Administration. Nyerere is likely
to continue his policy of non-
alignment and his support for
southern African liberation, but
he may try to tone down his more
extremist countrymen in order to
improve Tanzania's image in the
West, particularly the US.
During the past year the
emphasis on supporting Congolese
rebels and other "liberation"
movements has drained the coun-
try's resources, jeopardized its
security, and strained relations
with Washington. Nyerere's ex-
pectations of Communist eco-
nomic aid have not been fulfilled,
and he has become increasingly
aware that only the major Western
powers can provide the bulk of
the aid he needs. His appoint-
ment of a top-notch, trusted
career officer to be the new
ambassador to Washington is in-
dicative of the impression he
is trying to create. The new
finance minister is an able,
long-time confidant of Nyerere.
Other changes have improved the
government's competence and
energy in the development field.
Nyerere apparently is con-
tinuing to balance the factions
represented on the one hand by
Kambona and on the other by
party leaders allied with Vice
President Kawawa. Those on the
Kawawa group resent the ambi-
tious Kambona, who was studying
in England while they were build-
ing the preindependence party,
and they have been maneuvering
to oust him as party secretary
general. By relieving the over-
worked and ailing Kambona of .
his foreign affairs role instead,
Nyerere has put him in a posi-
tion to control and consolidate
party and government structures
at the regional level.
At the same time the trans-
fer of Kambona's closest cohort
from the Ministry of Home Af-
fairs, which controls police,
refugee movements, and clandes-
tine arms, places all security
and defense under the Kawawa
faction which is as radical as
Kambona but more responsive to
Nyer er e .
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Europe
A more determined opposition
to De Gaulle's efforts to recast
the Common Market may be emerg-
ing from talks among France's five
EEC partners. The loose "coali-
tion" is still eagerly looking for
an end to the crisis before the
mere passage of time does serious
damage, but it appears unwilling
to accept De Gaulle's terms or
even the toned-down interpreta-
tions which some French officials
have been passing out.
New instructions which Bonn
has given its EEC delegation in
Brussels reject any revision of
the EEC treaty to diminish the
role of the commission or to elim-
inate the provisions for majority
voting. Bonn is willing to talk
about improving cooperation be-
tween the commission and the mem-
ber governments, but it is wary
of any formal understanding on
either issue. With respect to
financing the common agricultural
policy--the question which sparked
the French walk-out on 30 June--
the Germans will insist that sat-
isfaction of the French on this
be linked to progress on matters
of interest to the other members.
Although still under consid-
eration, Belgian Foreign Minister
Spaak's proposal for at least one
meeting of the Six without the
commission is also being treated
with greater caution. The Dutch
and the Germans are insisting
that any such meeting be in the
EEC framework, that it be a reg-
ular session of the EEC Council,
and that the commission be called
in on any discussion of matters
under its purview. The Italians
also want the five to reach agree-
ment on agricultural financing
before they talk to the French.
If the five decide to pro- 25X1
ceed with the Spaak offer, it is
questionable that the French will
accept, even thought
De Gaulle might welcome an agricul-
tural agreement just before the
French presidential elections on
5 December. When council Presi-
dent Fanfani met with French For-
eign Minister Couve de Murville
in New York on 29 September, Couve
was emphatic that the EEC treaty
must be "aylapted to the realities
of intergovernmental relations"
through gentlemen's agreements
negotiated in an intergovernmental
framework before an agricultural
settlement is reached. He also
made it clear that France would
not attend a meeting of the Six
during the electoral campaign.
The five thus face the
possibility that the French boy-
cott will continue until at
least early next year, and al-
though they are exasperated with
De Gaulle's blowing hot and cold,
it is uncertain how far their
courage will permit them to go.
Pressure to take pending commu-
nity decision, some with unavoid-
able deadlines, may be equaled
by pressures to avoid decisions
in hope something will turn up,
or out of fear that they might
provide De Gaulle the excuse to
leave the community. 25X1
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SEG~tE~`
BRITISH LABOR PARTY CONFERENCE SHOWS FIRM WILSON CONTROL
Prime Minister Wilson emerged
from the Labor Party's conference
last week with increAsed stature
as a national leader and a tight
grip on the party organization.
He successfully turned back left-
wing attempts to put the confer-
ence on the record criticizing the
government's foreign and domestic
policies. His success helped to
dispel the public's belief that
the trade unions and the party's
left wing exercise a veto over the
government's policies.
With the approach of a new
parliamentary session, Labor Party
supporters are increasingly opti-
inistic that the Wilson government
will remain in office despite its
extremely narrow majority in Com-
mons. The pound sterling's posi-
tion is stronger, and there is im-
provement in Britain's balance of
payments compared with the same
period last year.
As a result, the optimism
which filled Conservative Party
ranks following the election of
their new leader, Edward Heath,
has been dissipated. In addition,
faulty tactics by Heath--notably
in condemning out of hand the
government's new economic plan
which leading businessmen helped
to draft--have tarnished his pub-
lic image. The US Embassy in
London reports that Heath now
realizes that such attacks on
government policy have been too
broad and negative. He therefore
intends to use the Conservative
Party conference--opening next
week in Brighton--to spell out a
constructive prescription for
Britain's economic health and to
build the groundwork for a vig-
orous attack on the government's
program when Parliament assembles
on 9 November.
In the meantime two by-elec-
tions are expected, one in the
Tory stronghold of London/West-
minster and the other in the
Labor seat of Erith/Crayford.
Both results will be carefully
scrutinized to detect an shift
in 7 ty standings.
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Western Hemisphere
DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT STILL
Incidents in Santo Domingo
during the past week suggest that
Communist groups have begun car-
rying out their reported terror-
ist campaign to delay elections
and create anti-US sentiment by
provoking clashes between Domini-
cans and US troops. In four
separate incidents, six US sol-
diers and nine Dominicans were
wounded.
Former president Joaquin
Balaguer claims, however, that
the terrorist strikes are not the
work of extreme leftists or Com-
munists but rather of the "re-
actionary element," which hopes,
by spreading fear and panic, to
establish an atmosphere conducive
to a violent right-wing coup.
The Octo er
om ng of the offices of the pro-
rebel weekly magazine Ahora may
have been carried out by rightist
elements.
The propaganda chief of Juan
Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary
Party (PRD), Jose Pena Gomez, has
stressed to Ambassador Bennett
his concern over the mounting
pressures from the extreme left.
Pena Gomez painted a picture of
CHALLENGED FROM LEFT AND RIGHT
intense Communist effort to suc-
ceed to the PRD's pre-eminent
position in the rebel camp. He
said the Communists were especially
active in the labor field and had
taken over the leadership of the
PRD labor movement. Pena Gomez
termed the arms collection program
almost a total failure, although
he did indicate that rebel leader
Caamano has made a good try.
The program for integrating
rebel officers into the armed
forces remains stalled, although
27 rebels who individually requested
integration this week were
accepted at the ranks they held
in April and assigned to army
posts outside the capital.----~ 25X1
The hassle over control of
the University of Santo Domingo
continues unresolved. The post-
ponement of a scheduled meeting
of the university's governing body
until 9 October leaves the campus
in the hands of the Communist-
influenced insurgent university
council. The delay indicates the
weakness or disorganization of
the legitimate authorities, who
apparently still hope for force-
ful support from Garcia Godoy.
The President's intentions, how-
ever, remain unclear.
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SECHE
The slanted newscasting and
use of a rebel slogan on commer-
cial radiobroadcasting which re-
sumed on 4 October give little
indication that the stations in-
tend to abide by the political
truce called for in the institu-
tional act. Even the official
Radio Santo Domingo has been
critical of the US and the In-
ter-American Peace Force for the
continued occupation of several
public school buildings by IAPF
troops. Also, the continued
operation of the Voice of the
Dominican Armed Forces at the
San Isidro Air Base in defiance
of a government order to close
remains as a challenge to Garcia
Godoy's position as supreme
authorit of the armed forces.
I I
OPPOSITION GAINS IN BRAZILIAN
The gubernatorial elections
in Brazil on 3 October have re-
sulted in apparent victories in
the key states of Guanabara and
Minas Gerais by candidates con-
nected with forces in opposition
to the Castello Branco govern-
ment. In both states, nearly
complete returns show supporters
of former president Kubitschek
far ahead. The outcome may also
undercut the presidential as-
pirations of the incumbent gov-
ernors, Carlos Lacerda of Guana-
bara and Magalhaes Pinto of
Minas Gerais, who had campaigned
for other candidates.
The strong showing by Fran-
cisco Negrao de Lima in Guana-
bara and Israel Pinheiro in
Minas Gerais, both Social Demo-
crats, presents serious problems
for the administration. In ad-
dition to his close ties to
Kubitschek, Negrao de Lima has
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS
accepted Communist Party support
in the campaign.
The final results in the
other nine states involved prob-
ably will be unavailable for at
least several days, but incom-
plete returns show one or two
disturbing trends as far as the
government is concerned. The
strong showing in Alagoas of
Social Democrat Muniz Falcao, for
example, suggests a continuation
of corrupt local politics that
the administration has been de-
termined to eliminate.
Military leaders have re-
acted strongly to. the election
results, which they regard as
representing a resurgence of
leftist influences and corrup-
tion. President Castello Branco
is under pressure to take some
action that will "reassert the
authority" of the government.
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Ernesto "Che" Guevara has
been dropped from the Cuban
leadership, apparently because
his opposition to Castro's views
on ideology and practical poli-
cies, particularly the economic
ones, made him too dangerous and
disruptive an element. Guevara's
views on future Cuban economic
development, the part Cuba should
play in the Sino-Soviet dispute,
and Cuba's role as a catalyst
and supporter of revolutions in
Africa and Latin America all
seem to have been determining
factors.
Guevara was the chief arch-
itect of Cuba's economy and the
policy of accelerated industri-
alization at the expense of agri-
cultural production. By late
1963, the new industries had
proven inefficient and the Cuban
economy was in chaos. Soviet
advisers, among others, recom-
mended a "rationalization," with
heavy stress on agricultural
production, economic decentrali-
zation, and the use of material
incentives to increase produc-
tion. Castro has been imple-
menting this change, but Guevara
apparently continued to oppose
it.
By excluding Guevara and
four of his close associates
from the new central committee
of the Cuban Communist Party,
Castro has renounced the economic
policies they once represented.
In a speech on 28 September,
Castro revealed that he would
shortly explain Guevara's six
months' absence and constitute
a party central committee. When
the 100 members were announced
three days later, Guevara and
four of his proteges--two of
whom are still government minis-
ters and another a vice minis-
ter--had been excluded. No
other minister or high official
was so slighted. Moreover, the
new party's five-man economic
committee is headed by Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez--a long-time
opponent of Guevara's economic
policies.
In addition to following
precepts in internal matters
which reflected Chinese more
than Soviet inspiration, Guevara
apparently continued to press
for Castro's acceptance of the
more militant Chinese policies
in international affairs. Here,
too, Castro's policies have un-
dergone a significant shift,
however, and Guevara's views
have been ignored. Guevara's
disappearance last March, im-
mediately after his return from
Africa and Peking, suggests that
the positions he took there were
a factor in Castro's decision.
In another speech on 2 Oc-
tober, Castro read what he said
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was a letter from Guevara. Al-
though it specifically expressed
support for Cuba's foreign pol-
icy, it indicated differences
with the Cuban leader since the
early days of the revolution.
In an attempt to convey the im-
pression that his withdrawal
was voluntary, the letter said
Guevara was abdicating all of
alive.
his official positions in Cuba
because "other lands of the
world" demanded his efforts.
There is, however, no evidence
to support rumors which have
located Guevara in a number of
Latin American countries or in
the Congo. Inde.ed.there is no
concrete evidence to permit con-
jecture whether he is still
Despite its success in
quelling the September rebellion
in the mines, the Bolivian junta
faces multiplying problems. Dis-
satisfaction among the miners
remains, additional political
disturbances are threatened, and
some military officers are urg-
ing political changes.
In an attempt to pacify the
miners, the junta has offered
them a small basic wage increase.
Initial reaction to the proposal
appears to be favorable at some
mines
Trouble of another kind
may develop in Cochabamba this
week end in connection with a
meeting of top-level leaders of
the center-right Bolivian So-
cialist Falange (FSB).
Growing concern on the part
of ranking officers with mili-
tary involvement in politics
also presents a potentially
serious problem for the junta.
A group of senior officers re-
cently presented a memorandum
asking the junta to: (1) an-
nounce immediately the date for
elections; or (2) set up a mixed
cabinet including civilians; or
(3) turn the government over to
the supreme court. Barrientos
apparently dissuaded this group
from pressing the issue, but he
admitted to US Ambassador Hen-
derson that the memorandum is an
accurate reflection of a sentiment
which is spreading from officers
to the lower ranks.
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