WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005000080001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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downgrading and declassification
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(Information as of noon EDT, 30 September 1965)
VIETNAM
Last week Hanoi devoted unusual attention to setting
forth its position on a negotiated settlement. It re-
asserted that the Liberation Front "must have its de-
cisive say" if there are to be any talks, but did not,
as in the past, rule out participation by the Saigon
government. The North Vietnamese stressed, however,
that the US must accept Premier Pham Van Dong's basic
"four points" for a final settlement. A tougher at-
titude was evident in Hanoi's statement that captured
US pilots henceforth would be tried as "criminals" not
covered by the Geneva conventions on prisoners of war.
Evidence suggests that an increase of the North Viet-
namese fighter force may be under way, and there now
are 22 confirmed SAM sites in the DRV. The pace of
the war in South Vietnam quickened last week.as the
Viet Cong abandoned what has been for months an es-
sentially defensive posture.
PAKISTAN-INDIA -CHINA
India and Pakistan have both violated the cease-fire
and are maintaining diametrically opposed positions on
the diplomatic front. India has emerged from the re-
cent conflict in a relatively strong military posture
which has increased its determination to resist any
effort to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. The Chinese
Communists are still saying that their retreat from
their 16 September ultimatum came as a result of In-
dian compliance and are warning that accounts must be
settled with India.
The Communist World
SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM
Kosygin's speech dealt more with extensive changes pro-
posed in the administration and management of Soviet
industry than with the details and timing of their im-
plementation. Brezhnev made two speeches--one summing
up the discussion of Kosygin's report, another on con-
vening the 23rd party congress. The two leaders' shar-
ing of top billing at the plenum argues strongly against
recent reports that one of them would be demoted.
Page
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MOSCOW MAKES CLEAR TO BONN'THAT EAST'GERMANS COME FIRST 12
The Soviets took the occasion of the presence in the
USSR last. week of State Secretary Carstens of West
Germany and Walter Ulbricht's delegation from East
Germany to make clear that no rapprochement between
Moscow and Bonn can be expected now.
MORE COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID FOR CAMBODIA
More Communist economic aid will be offered to Cam-
bodia during Prince Sihanouk's current tour of China,
North Korea, the USSR, and Eastern Europe.
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO ALGERIA CONTINUES
Recent deliveries of materiel and the departure of
large numbers of Algerian trainees for the USSR indi-
cate that Moscow is providing significant
aid to the new Boumedienne regime.
military
RHODESIA MAY DECLARE INDEPENDENCE THIS MONTH
Prime Minister Ian Smith will talk to Harold Wilson
next week, but British officials are pessimistic.
SOUTH AFRICA BUILDING NEW AIRFIELDS
Pretoria claims the installations are for civilian
use, but they appear designed as protection against a
potential threat from the north.
REBELS
SLOWING GOVERNMENT MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN CONGO
18
The
the
mercenaries are meeting resistance in a
rebel stronghold along Lake Tanganyika.
move on
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JORDAN AND LEBANON SEEK JET FIGHTERS FROM FRANCE
Both countries are resisting strong pressure from
the United Arab Command to buy MIG-21s.
20 25X6
Europe
IMPACT OF THE COMMON MARKET CRISIS ON EURATOM
France's continued boycott of the European communities'
decision-making machinery threatens to delay alloca-
tion of funds urgently needed for the 1966 research
and development program. It is also complicating a
move by the US to substitute a single US-EURATOM treaty
for the bilateral accords it has with EURATOM members
for the exchange of nuclear fuels.
FRENCH COMMUNISTS ENDORSE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
Their support for Socialist-backed Francois Mitterrand
is their first significant collaboration with parties
of the democratic left since 1947, but Mitterrand's
pro-NATO and pro-EEC platform may lead many Communist
militants to oppose him and thus fragment the left.
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STEPHANOPOULOS WINS GREEK PARLIAMENTARY VOTE
The new prime minister now has until mid-November,
when Parliament reconvenes, to show some progress in
solving Greece's many problems.
Western Hemisphere
PANAMANIAN REACTION TO JOINT STATEMENT ON CANAL
Panamanians generally reacted with guarded optimism
to the joint canal statement by Presidents Johnson and
Robles on 24 September, many believing that final judg-
ment must await implementation of the treaty details
under discussion. Robles, however, feels he now can
deal effectively with his opponents in the legislature.
PRESIDENT VERSUS MILITARY IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The interim regime of Hector Garcia Godoy appears to
have lost the confidence of the military and has made
little progress in collecting rebel arms or eliminat-
ing the rebel zone in the capital.
INSURGENCY IN NORTHERN MEXICO
An outlaw band apparently dispersed by security forces
last week was only one of several leftist groups agitat-
ing in Chihuahua and other northern states, exploiting
long-standing discontent among peasants who have derived
virtually no benefit from Mexico's economic advances.
BOLIVIAN CRISIS EASES
Most mines now are operating normally, and the junta is
holding discussions with representatives of the miners
to try to reduce resentment of its reform program.
Basic dissatisfaction is deep-seated, however, and vio-
lence could be renewed in the mining area at any time.
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VIETNAM
Last week Hanoi devoted un-
usual attention to setting forth
its position on a negotiated
settlement. The key document
was a Foreign Ministry memoran-
dum of 23 September which of-
fered neither concessions nor
hope that talks are likely in
the near future. The state-
ment was apparently intended to
clarify Hanoi's position and keep
alive a public dialogue with cne
us.
On conditions for negotia-
tions, the memorandum specified
only that the Liberation Front
(NFLSV) "must have its decisive
say." It did not, as in the
past, rule out participation by
the Saigon government. The
memorandum also reasserted
Hanoi's adherence to Premier
Pham Van Dong's basic "four
points," insisting that the US
must "solemnly" declare its ac-
ceptance of these before a po-
litical settlement "can be con-
sidered." Thus, Hanoi contin-
ued to distinguish between what
it considers conditions for
negotiations--inclusion of the
NFLSV--and its conditions for
a final settlement--US accept-
ance of the four r.oints.
Four days later, Hanoi radio
rebroadcast in English a discus-
sion on a political solution
which had been serialized in a
Vietnamese rublication last July.
The article, by Reunification
Chairman Nguyen Van Vinh, por-
trayed Hanoi as flexible but em-
phasized aspects it considers
most important in any settle-
ment--for example, that the US
recognize the principle of a
single unified Vietnam. Vinh
also stated categorically that
there will be no withdrawal of
Communist military units from
South Vietnam to the North com-
parable to the regroupment of
1954. In general, however, Vinh
told the US that present Viet-
namese demands represent a much
"lower price than even the Geneva
agreements." There are, he said,
no conditions attached to the
timing of US troop withdrawal so
long as the US agrees to with-
draw.
On the treatment of US pris-
oners, however, Hanoi talked
tough. A broadcast quoting a
Foreign Ministry letter to the
Red Cross said that US pilots
captured in North Vietnam are re-
garded as "criminals" to be
tried for violation of North
Vietnamese law and not covered
by the Geneva conventions on
prisoners of war. The announce-
ment followed closely the Libera-
tion Front's execution of two
American prisoners and an accom-
panying threat that lenient
treatment of POWs by the Viet
Cong was directly related to
treatment of VC prisoners.
Peking's hard line toward n
negotiated settlement is un-
changed. There was no official
comment on the 23 September DRV
Foreign Ministry communique on
the subject. The China News
Agency summary, which carried
almost the full communique,
omitted passages which implied
that the Vietnamese Communists
were receiving substantial
punishment in the war, and a
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,catement that the Vietnamese (appearance to the MIG-15-17 crate
people "eagerly want peace." +delivered there 25X1
There now are 22 confirmed
SAM sites in North Vietnam: site
20 was discovered
at Phu Ly; site 21
about seven miles west o
Hai hon
ana si e
In the Thanh )FYI
In his speech to the party
plenum on 29 September, Brezhnev
routinely promised that Soviet
aid would continue. He reiterated
Moscow's standard position that
the future development of US-
Soviet relations depends on
whether the US abandons its "ag-
gressive attacks" on socialist
countries.
Military Developments in DRV
An increase of the North Viet-
namese fighter force may be under
way. Photography
showed 24 aircraft-size crates
at Phuc Yen Airfield similar in
suspected of harboring missile
defenses.
Last week the Viet Cong,
after months of remaining in an
essentially defensive posture and
confining their operations pri-
marily to small-scale harassments,
sharply accelerated their activity,
particularly in the central
coastal province of Binh Dinh and
in the provinces 'west and south
of Saigon.
The heaviest fighting in-
volved two separate engagements
between regimental-strength gov-
ernment and Viet Cong troops along
a hotly contested 20-mile stretch
of Route 1 near the Phu Cu Fass
in Binh Dinh. Upwards of 1,000
Viet Cong were estimated to have
been killed, primarily as a result
of aerial bombardment in support
of the ground forces; cumulative
friendly losses were 250 killed,
wounded, and missing.
Also during the week, a VC
unit estimated at battalion
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strength ambushed a company of
Vietnamese regulars in Quang Nam
Province, inflicting nearly 100
casualties and capturing 40 weap-
ons. In another battalion-size
attack the Viet Cong overran a
hanger battalion outpost at the
provincial capital of Iiao Trai,
it, Hau Nghia 25 miles west of
;,aigon. The Rangers sustained
more than 125 casualties and
lost 100 weapons. Several sharp
attacks have also been made re-
cently against scattered govern-
ment paramilitary outposts in
dol_ta provinces south of Saigon.
The military leadership in
;aigon, meanwhile, is reportedly
planning personnel changes in
the government and command struc-
ture to increase efficiency and
integrity. Three cabinet mem-
bers, two of whom have had per-
sonal differences with Premier
Ky, are marked for replacement,
along with a number of senior
officers, the most important be-
ing General Nguyen Huu Co, who
would remain minister of war
but give up his title as chief
of the Joint General Staff. In
a press conference hinting at
these impending changes, Ky
strongly emphasized that his
government would continue its
policy of executing convicted
Viet Cong agents, despite the
Communist retaliatory killing
of two American military captives
last week.
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The week since 22 Septem-
ber, when the Indo-Pakistani
cease-fire went into effect,
has been marked by constant
violations along the whole
Kashmir - West Pakistan border.
As far as can be determined,
these violations reflect attempts
by both sides to establish a
presence in areas not previously
fully occupied by their troops
and thereby to acquire maximum
bargaining positions for with-
drawal. negotiations.
In Kashmir and along the
Punjab border, where major mili-
tary forces oppose each other,
scattered incidents have oc-
curred but apparently without
extensive trading of territory.
Farther south, Pakistan has
complained about Indian attempts
to clear small areas in Rajas-
than State that are held by
Pakistan. The Indian Army
there appears to be actively
trying to oust Pakistani forces
from their positions regardless
of the cease-fire.
Major General Bruce Mac-
Donald, Canadian commander of
the new United Nations India-
Pakistan Observer Mission
(UNIPOM) which is to patrol
the Pakistani-Indian border
south of Kashmir proper, has
not yet effectively established
a line of observers along the
front. Thus, he is not yet
able to fudge the accuracy of
Indian and Pakistani charges
and countercharges of cease-
fire violations. Unless he
can move quickly, he may find
himself bogged down in a morass
of conflicting claims which
will dash any hope of effecting
withdrawals behind national
boundaries in the near future.
Inside Kashmir, sporadic
guerrilla activity continues.
India claims the right to hunt
down and dispose of infiltrators,
for whom Pakistan disclaims re-
sponsibility. New Delhi argues
that unless Pakistan admits to
sponsoring them, the infiltra-
tors must be considered an in-
ternal Indian security problem
which can be settled without
reference to the cease-fire.
Pakistan apparently does not
intend to strengthen an guer-
rilla forces in Kashmir
The Diplomatic Front
While the UN military ob-
server groups are trying to
stabilize the fighting front,
India and Pakistan continue to
hold diametrically opposed posi-
tions on the diplomatic front.
India is willing to withdraw
its troops behind national
boundaries and the 1949 UN
cease-fire line, provided the
withdrawal is not related in
any way to the question of a
permanent settlement in Kashmir.
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Pakistan is unwilling to with-
draw any troops from present
battle lines unless assured
that the United Nations is
making progress toward a per-
manent solution.
if the West Pakistani public--
enraged by lack of progress--
vented its spleen in demonstra-
tions which resulted in damage
or danger to foreign properties
and lives.
India has emerged from the
recent conflict in a relatively
strong military posture, and
self-confidence has replaced
most of the feelings of infe-
riority generated by the Chi-
nese invasion of 1962. State-
ments by Indian leaders, from
President Radhakrishnan and
Prime Minister Shastri on down,
make it clear that India has
no intention of considering a
plebiscite in Kashmir and that
New Delhi will stand pat on
its present position. Shastri
is backed by buoyant public
opinion, at least temporarily.
Pakistani President Ayub
is in a less enviable situation.
Having led his people to believe
that Pakistan was on the verge
of a great military victory at
the time of the cease-fire, he
now either has to force prog-
ress toward a permanent settle-
ment or explain to his people
why he has failed. Unlike
Shastri, Ayub cannot stand pat
and await developments. Since
Pakistan has acquired no new
bargaining counters against
India in the past month, Ayub's
task is difficult. His means
of putting pressure on the
great powers to support him
are also limited and would
risk antagonizing the very
countries on whom he must count
most strongly for assistance.
This would be especially true
The Soviet Stand
The Soviet Union continues
to support UN efforts to alle-
viate the South Asia crisis,
while leaving open Premier Kosy-
gin's offer to participate at
some future date in a summit
meeting between Ayub and Shastri.
Moscow has publicly praised
the acceptance of the Security
Council call for a cease-fire
and has reported Indian and
Pakistani acceptances "in prin-
ciple" of Kosygin's offer, along
with Ayub's insistence that
"adequate preparations" be made
at the Security Council. Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko in his
24 September speech at the UN
General Assembly avoided specific
mention of Kosygin's offer
and called simply for new ef-
forts by both countries to find
a "sensible solution" to the
problems between them.
The US Embassy in Moscow
has concluded that the present
Soviet objective is to try to
achieve a mutually acceptable
settlement by working through
the UN Security Council, with
the prospect of a summit meet-
ing in the USSR arising only
if the principal issues at dis-
pute have already been resolved.
The Chinese Angle
The Chinese Communists have
continued their effort to explain
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that their retreat from their
ultimatum of 16 September re-
sulted from alleged Indian com-
pliance with their demands. In
two diplomatic notes broadcast
on 24 September the Chinese as-
serted that intruding Indian
L.roops had been withdrawn "within
the specified. time limit" set
by Peking, and claimed that in
the face of a stern warning"
the Indians had "stealthily de-
molisher.' or abandoned" military
WO ?-!%5 constructed on the Chinese
side of the :Jilrkim boundary.
The notes contained a de-
taile-' _?efutation of New Delhi's
charges that Chinese troops had
intruded aggressively across the
vino-Indian frontier, portraying
the situation as one in which
Communist forces were responding
defensively to Indian provoca-
tions. Apparently in an attempt
to maintain some pressure on
New Delhi, the Chinese reiter-
ated earlier warnings that, if
the Indians keep up their in-
trusions, New Delhi will have
to "bear all the consequences."
They asserted that so long as
Indian aggression against Paki-
stan continues, China will "not
cease to support Pakistan ...or
the people of Kashmir.."
Apparently stung by the
anti-Chinese demonstration in
New Delhi, Peking issued a third
note on 26 September claiming
that its actions during the
Kashmir crisis had "punctured"
Indian aggression and asserting
that the "ugly farce" staged in
New Delhi could not hide the
wretched picture of Indian troops
"fleeing in panic" from the Chi-
nese side of the Sikkim frontier.
This note reminded the In-
dians that accounts between Pe-
king and New Delhi must still
be settled and warned once again
that "there is a limit to every-
thing."
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The Communist World
SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM
Premier Kosygin's speech to
the Soviet party central committee
on 27 September indicates that
extensive changes are planned in
the administration and management
of Soviet industry. He dealt
more with the proposed remedies
to problems in this area, how-
ever, than with the details and
timing of their application. Al-
though the success of this pro-
gram is therefore difficult to
predict, the attempt to inject
new, decentralizing techniques
while improving central control
will not be accomplished without
considerable difficulty.
Kosygin's program for re-
forming the industrial sector of
the economy contains a number of
proposals to foster productivity
and to increase both industrial
growth and national income.
These measures are designed to
improve the performance and the
production of the individual
economic units while at the same
time ensuring that paramount na-
tional interests are maintained.
On the one hand, enterprises
are to be granted more managerial
independence in their internal
operations, to develop more ef-
fective incentives, and to em-
ploy on an increasing scale the
so-called economic "levers" of
price, profit, credit, and bo-
nuses. The financing of invest-
ment at the plant level is to be
accomplished more from internal
resources and bank credits with
a corresponding reduction in
direct, nonrepayable grants from
the state. On the other hand,
Kosygin specified that the central
authorities would determine such
controls over the enterprises as
the over-all sales volume, the
basic product mix, the wage fund,
the level of profits and the
rate of profitability, and the
tax contribution to the state
budget. He also called for closer
adherence by the manufacturing
plants to the provisions of the
still-unannounced next five-year
plan (1966-70).
Kosygin recognized the crit-
ical importance of meaningful
prices in the success of his pro-
posed innovations, but he did
not say how he proposed to change
the present system of setting
prices by administrative fiat.
In postponing again the long-
delayed revision of wholesale
prices scheduled for January
1966, however, he acknowledged
that the prices to be introduced
in 1967-68 would incorporate basic
reforms. During the interim
period some changes in prices
will be made so that enterprises
can operate on a profit basis.
In the administrative por-
tion of his report Kosygin
stated that 20 ministries will
be established with "all the
rights" for managing production
in their respective branches of
industry. Although this will en-
tail the dissolution of Khru-
shche''s system of regional economic
councils, Kosygin indicated that
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Soviet Ministerial Structure
EXISTING MINISTRIES
(19 ministries existing prior to
central committee plenum,
27 September 1965.)
Defense
Foreign Affairs
Health
Culture
Higher and Secondary Specialized Education
Communications
Finance
Railways
Maritime Fleet
Agriculture
Foreign Trade
Civil Aviation
Re-established in March 1965
General Machine Building
Aviation Industry
Defense Industry
Radio Industry
Electronics Industry
Shipbuilding Industry
'..Medium Machine Building
PROPOSED ADDITIONAL MINISTRIES
(16 former state committees for specific
branches of industry apparently are to be
transformed into 20 new ministries.)
Heavy, Power, and Transport Machine Building
Construction, Road Building, and Communal
Machine Building
Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building
Electrotechnical Industry
Instrument Building, Means of Automation, and
Control Systems
Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building
Machine Tool and Tool Manufacturing Industry
Ferrous Metallurgy
Nonferrous Metallurgy
Coal Industry
Chemical Industry
Petroleum Extraction Industry
Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry
Timber, Cellulose-Paper, and Woodworking
Industry
Construction Materials Industry
Light Industry
Foodstuffs Industry
*Meat and Dairy Industry
*Motor Vehicle Industry
*Machine Building for Light and Food Industries,
and Household Machine Building
*(Industries for which separate government authorities
would be established for the first time.)
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some degree of local authority
will be retained by asserting
that the ministerial system must
be combined with "correct terri-
torial planning." A stronger
role for Gosplan, the state
planning body, is also provided
for in Kosygin's speech.
Kosygin did not speak in
detail on the crucial question
of resource allocation in this
report. He nevertheless observed
that the share of national in-
come devoted to consumption will
be increased "in the next few
years." Although this might be
achieved by higher prices for
consumer goods than by a real
growth in consumer welfare, Kosy-
gin stated that, "retail prices
can only be reviewed in the sense
of lowering them."
The absence of a timetable
for implementing Kosygin's pro-
posals may mean that little, other
than the return to a ministerial
form of administration, will be
done in the near future. In
fact, he implied that planning
for 1966 was too far advanced to
enable substantial changes dur-
ing the coming year. The regimes
repeated admonitions against
hasty, ill-conceived actions will
probably reinforce its caution
in extending greater autonomy
to the industrial enterprises
while trying to improve central
control and guidance at the same
time.
Brezhnev shared top billing with
Kosygin at the plenum by giving
two speeches--one summing up
the discussion on Kosygin's re-
port, and another on convening
the 23rd party congress. In the
summing-up speech Brezhnev en-
dorsed Kosygin's proposals, ad-
mitted that this year's wheat
harvest was well below last
year's, and noted that relations
with the United States had "a
clear tendency toward freezing."
The substance of Brezhnev's sec-
ond speech and the date and
agenda of the congress are not
yet available.
The central role at the
plenum played by the two top
leaders argues strongly that
recent reports and rumors that
one or the other will be de-
moted were unfounded. The
only personnel actions taken
by the plenum were the pro
forma removal of Vitaly Titov
from the secretariat--last April
he was made party second sec-
retary in Kazakhstan--and the
election to the secretariat
of the party's current agri-
cultural department chief,
Fedor Kulakov, replacing Khru-
shchev's protegd Polyakov. Kula-
kov is believed to be close to
presidium member Polyansky,
who in turn is one of the
Brezhnev clique on the presid-
ium.
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The Soviets took the occa-
sion of the presence in the
USSR last week of State Secre-
tary Carstens of West Germany
(FRG) and Walter Ulbricht's dele-
gation from East Germany (GDR)
to make clear that no rapproche-
ment between Moscow and Bonn
can be expected now, and that
better Soviet-FRG relations in
the future could not come about
at the expense of the GDR.
Carstens, the first high-
ranking FRG official to visit
the USSR in a.decade, went to
Moscow ostensibly in connection
with Bonn's entry in an inter-
national chemistry exposition
there, but primarily to commence
a dialogue with the Soviets.
He met with Foreign Ministry,
trade, and cultural officials.
The Soviets presumably did not
want to close the door to the
FRG but, at the same time, did
not indicate that they want to
open it any wider. The Ulbricht
visit was apparently timed de-
liberately to coincide with the
Carstens talks in order to fore-
stall any misgivings the conver-
sations might have raised in
Eastern Europe, especially in
Poland and Czechoslovakia, and
to dramatize to the West Ger-
mans the primacy of Soviet re-
lations with the GDR.
No progress was made on
renewing Soviet-FRG trade and
cultural agreements because of
Moscow's continued refusal to
extend them to West Berlin, and
Carstens' refusal to compromise.
This apparently was the chief
point on which Carstens probed
for a change in Moscow's posi-
tion. He also renewed the in-
vitation to Kosygin to visit
the FRG. Kuznetsov gave a non-
committal reply, and such a
visit does not seem likely in
the near future.
Soviet anti-FRG propaganda
continued unabated during Car-
stens' stay. At a Soviet-GDR
friendship rally in Ulbricht's
honor, Brezhnev charged that
the FRG is "ready to stake every-
thing" on gaining access to nu-
clear arms, and that such a de-
velopment would evoke "appro-
priate measures" from the Warsaw
Pact.
states.
Although the FRG had not
expected much, the absence of
any visible signs of improved
Soviet-FRG relations undoubtedly
pleased Ulbricht, who has always
been fearful that Moscow might
deal with the FRG behind his
back. Aside from expressions
of esteem and loyalty, however,
the only substantive result of
the Ulbricht visit appears to
be the creation of a USSR-GDR
bilateral economic commission
like those established by the
Soviets with other East European
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More Communist economic aid
will be offered to Cambodia during
Prince Sihanouk's current tour of
China, North Korea, the USSR and
Eastern Europe.
The Chinese reportedly will
commit themselves to a 200-bed hos-
pital, industrial equipment, and
several small factories. In addi-
tion, talks covering additional aid
for Cambodia's next five-year plan
are likely to take place during Si-
hanouk's. visit. A number of Chi-
nese economic groups are to be sent
to Cambodia to study improving and,
in some cases, enlarging Chinese-
aided projects now in place.
Up to now, the Chinese have
granted Cambodia about $50 million
in economic assistance, accounting
for about two thirds of all its
Communist economic aid. This as-
sistance has been used to help fi-
nance such projects as cement, tex-
tile, and paper plants and agricul-
tural programs, and to provide tech-
nical assistance on the railroad
connecting the capital with the new
port of Sihanoukville. Except for a
textile plant and a glassware factory
valued at $14 million, all the proj-
ects under the Chinese aid program
have been completed. In addition
Peking is augmenting its military
aid which now includes small arms
for 27,000 Cambodian troops.
Moscow will probably also con-
tribute more aid. At present the
Soviet program in Cambodia is con-
centrated mainly on the Kamchay
hydroelectric dam, a $12-million
effort which is in the initial
stage of construction. Czecho-
slovakia, which may also be ap-
proached for additional assistance,
has provided about `5 million for
industrial undertakings. North
Korea will reportedly offer token
assistance--its first economic as- 25X1
sistance for Cambodia--in such
fields as irrigation, mining, and
light construction.
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SOVIET MILITARY AID TO ALGERIA CONTINUES
Recent deliveries of Soviet
military materiel and the de-
parture of large numbers of Al-
gerian trainees for the USSR
indicate that Moscow is provid-
ing significant military aid to
the new Boumedienne regime in
Algeria.
So far an estimated $75
million worth of Soviet mili-
tary equipment has been deliv-
ered under an October 1963 So-
viet-Algerian military aid
agreement. Deliveries have in-
cluded MIG jet fighters, IL-18
jet light bombers, AN-12 trans-
port aircraft, motor torpedo
boats, artillery, and medium
tanks.
The absorption of this
equipment by the armed forces
has been slow because of the
fighter-bomber.
to-air missiles and the SU-7
lack of adequately trained
personnel. However, in an at-
tempt to cope with this problem,
more than 600 Algerians have
been sent to the USSR this year
to undergo military training.
In May a military delega-
tion headed by Boumedienne, then
defense minister, signed a "tech-
nical aid agreement" which prob-
ably covered additional training
and may also include more sophis-
ticated weaponry such as surface-
DEPARTURES OF ALGERIAN MILITARY
PERSONNEL FOR TRAINING IN THE USSR
Jun'63 Dec'63 Jun'64 Dec'64 Jun'65 Sep'65
SEMIANNUAL TOTALS
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RHODESIA MAY DECLARE INDEPENDENCE
There is mounting evidence
that Prime Minister Ian Smith
will unilaterally declare inde-
pendence for Rhodesia this month,
unless Prime Minister Wilson can
dissuade him in talks scheduled
for next week in London.
Last week Smith requested
an immediate meeting with Wilson,
stating that the matter was too
urgent to wait until the sched-
uled visit of Commonwealth Rela-
tions Secretary Bottomley to
Salisbury on 13 October. Al-
though Wilson will not see him
until 7 October, Smith plans to
arrive in London several days
earlier to prepare for the talks
and to meet with Bottomley. The
UK High Commissioner in Salis-
bury has returned to London for
consultation.
Smith had previously stated
his desire to negotiate independ-
ence gradually with the UK. How-
ever, he has apparently decided
during the past few weeks that
it will be politically impossi-
ble for him to postpone the
final decision any longer.
Pressures from within
Smith's Rhodesia Front party for
immediate action are high. Pro-
ponents of a unilateral declara-
tion of independence (UDI) are
becoming increasingly vocal, and
one anti-UDI government official
already has been prematurely re-
tired. Two Rhodesian cabinet
ministers are in London now and
another will accompany Smith,
which may further restrict Smith's
maneuverability.
A survey taken by a Salis-
bury correspondent indicates that
a majority of the white elec-
torate expects UDI and is will-
ing to take the gamble, despite
last year's warnings from the
business community that the eco-
nomic consequences of such a
move could be dire. Smith told
UK officials that the tobacco
growers are anxious to learn
whether there will be UDI so
that they can prepare to with-
stand the threatened UK embargo
by planting alternative crops.
It appears that UDI can be
averted only if Wilson convinces
Smith and his cabinet that the
repercussions would be too severe
for Rhodesia to withstand. Wil-
son is expected to outline the
economic and political measures
which his government proposes
to take against an "illegal
rebellion against the crown.
Among those being considered
are the cessation of aid and
the exclusion of Rhodesia from
the London money market. Never-
theless, the British apparently
have not yet decided whether
to take any measures which might
upset economic relations seri-
ously at a time when London is
struggling with a serious def-
icit in its balance of pay-
ments.
British officials in Lon-
don and Salisbury are pessi-
mistic, and privately say that
the chances of UDI are high,
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SOUTH AFRICA BUILDING NEW AIRFIELDS
South Africa is nearing com-
pletion of a number of large air-
fields, apparently to protect its
own frontier and that of the Ter-
ritory of South-West Africa
against potential threats from
the north.
for completion within the next
few months.
The Verwoerd government
claims the South-West African
fields are for civilian use,
probably because the League man-
date, granted in 1920, forbids
the establishment of military
bases. The fields will facilitate
In the upper regions of the
Territory, Pretoria's controver-
sial mandate from the League of
Nations, at least four new fields
are under construction: at Ondan-
gua, Ruacana, and Grootfontein,
and at Katima Mulilo, near the
end of the Caprivi strip, border-
ing Zambia. Another airfield is
under construction in South Af-
rica itself, at Mkuze, just south
of Swaziland and Portuguese Mo-
zambique. The fields are over
7,000 feet long, paved, and due
administration of the regions in
which they are located, but Pre-
toria's avowals seem implausible.
At Grootfontein, for example, a
town of 5,000 already served by
a railroad, the field reportedly
will be 9,500 feet long. The
field at Katima Mulilo, which
Pretoria says is an "emergency
landing" strip for South African
Airways, is some 200 miles away
from th international
route.
REBELS SLOWING GOVERNMENT MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN CONGO
The Congolese Government
this week launched its campaign
to clear the rebel stronghold
around Fizi on Lake Tanganyika,
but rebel resistance has slowed
its progress. In Leopoldville,
the political tempo is picking
up, amid reports that President
Kasavubu and Premier Tshombd may
have reached a temporary truce
in their political feud.
The government's two-pronged
movement against the largest re-
maining rebel-held region is pro-
ceeding slowly. One government
force under mercenary commander
Hoare was landed. from barges onto
rebel-held territory.100.miles
north of Albertville. The major
force, moving overland, now is
some 75 miles north of Albert-
ville. These groups will at-
tempt to link up in the next few
weeks and then start sweep opera-
tions to clear the countryside.
Recent unconfirmed reports es-
timate that varying numbers--
from 15 to 300--of foreign volun-
teers are in the Congo, possibly
engaging in combat. No bodies
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have been found recently, how-
ever.
a few deputies from his Bakongo
tribal area.
On the political front,
the sparring continues behind
the scenes, while Parliament is
still being organized. Kasavu-
bu.'s supporters are apparently
making some inroads into the
parliamentary strength of Conaco
--Tshombd's political party--
but the premier probably still
retains a clear majority.
Tshombd is also making overtures
to some of Kasavubu's disen-
chanted supporters, including
Jordan and Lebanon are ne-
gotiating the purchase of Mirage-
III jet fighters from France.
The two Arab states have
been under strong pressure from
the Egyptian-dominated United
Arab Command (UAC) to obtain
Russian-built MIG-21 fighters,
in accordance with plans for
increasing Arab military strength
vis-a-vis Israel. The UAC allo-
cated money for aircraft pur-
chases from a joint Arab fund
established to finance the build-
up. Jordan and Lebanon, however,
want to avoid Egyptian and So-
viet penetration of their air
forces and, thus, would prefer
Western-manufactured planes.
Husayn has said that the
UAC is offering MIG-21s at the
exceptional bargain price of
only $280,000. The Egyptians,
who are middlemen for the pro-
posed transaction and are press-
ing hard for the purchase of
MIGs, may have cut the price of
the aircraft below that charged
by the Soviet Union.
The UAC seems certain to
object to Jordanian and Lebanese
deals with the French.
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France's boycott of the Eu-
ropean communities' decisiot.-making
machinery is likely to affect im-
portant FURATOM affairs this fall.
.3everal matters requiring action
of the Council of Ministers will
come up for attention. Overshad-
owing them all is the 1966 re-
search and development budget.
Approval of specific 1966 allo-
cations is urgently needed to
avoid delay in the research pro-
gram for next year.
Because the new five-year
allocation by research categories
was agreed on by all six members
last May, well before the Common
Market crisis, members of the
EURATOM Commission hope that the
next council meeting---projected
for late October or early Novem-
ber--can handle the 1966 budget
exercise as a routine question.
France has already indicated it
will not entertain any new or
important issues, and it prob-
ably will not attend the session
at all. If the French do not
attend, it is questionable whether
the other five will have the
courage to approve the budget and
refer it to the European Parlia-
ment, or, in that event, whether
France would pay its allotted
share.
A second important matter
requiring Council approval is the
amendment of the provisions of
the EURATOM Treaty which created
EURATOM's supply agency, the mem-
ber countries' purchasing agent
for special nuclear materials.
Because the Council failed to
confirm or revise these provisions
by 1 January 1965, as required
by the treaty, the French claim
the supply provisions are invalid
and the agency is "nonexistent."
EURATOM's Commission has proposed
new,more liberal supply agency
provisions which have been en-
dorsed by the European Parliament,
but a Council vote is still re-
quired for their final approval.
This cannot be accomplished so
long as France continues its boy-
cott.
The French stand on the sta-
tus of the supply agency is com-
plicating action on a recent de-
cision by the US to substitute a
single US-EURATOM treaty for the
bilateral accords it has with
EURATOM members for the exchange
of nuclear fuels. All the mem-
bers except France have agreed
in principle to the substitution, 2501
and Belgium led the way last
July in accepting the termination
of its own bilateral.
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FRENCH COMMUNISTS ENDORSE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
The endorsement by the
French Communist Party (PCF) of
presidential candidate Francois
Mitterrand is its first signifi-
cant collaboration with the
parties of the democratic left
since 1947. Mitterrand, parlia-
mentary deputy of a left-wing
grouping called the Democratic
Assembly, had been endorsed
earlier by the Socialist Party.
The Communist support for Mit-
terrand will make it impossible
for the center parties to support
him and thus will spur their ef-
forts to find an acceptable can-
didate of their own to oppose
De Gaulle or his designated
heir in the December elections.
The PCF's support for Mit-
terrand came despite his failure
to negotiate a common program
with the Communists, a condi-
tion which the PCF'repeatedly
had stressed was the sine qua
non for its endorsement.
In the short run, support
for Mitterrand spares the PCF
from running a Communist can-
didate who might get a substan-
tially smaller proportion of
the total vote than the 21-25
percent the party won in pre-
vious national elections. In
the longer range, it could be
a step toward the "unity of
action" on the political front
long sought by the PCF.
Support for the Mitterrand
candidacy could lead to a frag-
mentation of the left, however,
since endorsement of a candidate
espousing a pro-NATO and pro-
EEC platform may be regarded as
capitulation to the non-Commu-
nist left by Communist militants
and by extreme leftists. A
substantial portion of these
voters may defect if the ex-
treme left splinter group, the
Unified Socialist Party (PSU),
decides to run its own candi-
date. A sizable defection to
a PSU candidate, added to the
prospect that some Communists
and leftists will cast their
ballots for the Gaullist candi-
date, could develop into a per-
manent loss for the PCF.
The center parties have
stepped up their efforts to
find a candidate. Like De Gaulle,
former premier Antoine Pinay,
the choice of many leading cen-
ter politicians, has failed
either to commit himself to run
or to make clear that he will
not be a candidate. The dead-
line for filing for the 5 Decem-
ber election is 16 November.
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Prime Minister Stephanopoulos
won a parliamentary vote of con-
fidence by a margin of only one
vote on 24 September, and more,
perhaps insurmountable, difficul-
ties lie ahead.
Stephanopoulos, in effect,
"bought" the last few votes he
needed by giving cabinet posts
to the most recent defectors from
ousted premier Papandreou's
party, the Center Union. He will
probably fill most of the remain-
ing cabinet positions within the
next week by appointing those who
had participated in the govern-
ments which premiers Novas and
Tsirimokos had attempted to form.
Dissatisfaction on the part of
supporters who were not given cab-
inet posts, or who did not receive
the consideration which they ex-
pected, could at any time cost
Stephanopoulos their support in
the National Assembly.
Personal conflicts among
cabinet members or policy dif-
ferences with the National Radi-
cal Union (ERE) and the Progres-
sive Party, which are represented
in the cabinet, might also make
the prime minister's position un-
tenable. The head of the ERE had
a dispute with Stephanopoulos dur-
ing the vote of confidence, and
an ARE public rally--as well as
rallies by the Center Union and
the Communist-front United Demo-
cratic Left (EDA)--has been for-
bidden by the government.
Parliament now is in recess
until mid-November. The interim
is likely to be marked by Center
Union and EDA demonstrations and
strikes. Papandreou has pledged
an "unrelenting struggle"--the
same slogan he used to come to
power a year and a half ago--to
overthrow Stephanopoulos. In this
struggle Papandreou may come to
depend even more on the support
of EDA.
Serious economic and social
problems, which have been held
in suspense for the last two
and on half months, as well as
such key issues as the Cyprus
situation will 'dd to Stephano-
poulos' difficulties. He is ex-
pected to ask for US economic
aid to tide him over.
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Western Hemisphere
PANAMANIAN REACTION TO JOINT STATEMENT ON CANAL
Panamanians generally re-
acted with guarded optimism to the
joint canal statement by Presi-
dents Johnson and Robles on 24
September. One widely held
view is that while many of Pan-
ama's long-standing demands
have been recognized, final
judgment must await implementa-
tion of the details under dis-
cussion.
President Robles is pleased
with being able to make the
statement and with the support
he has been promised by news
media, the Panama business com-
munity, and political leaders
in his coalition. Robles feels
that he now can deal effectively
with his opponents in the Na-
tional Assembly.
Not unexpectedly, the state-
ment has not silenced criticism
from former president Arnulfo
Arias and leaders of his mass-
based Panamenista Party (PP).
The radio station identified
with Arias broadcasts daily
diatribes against the govern-
ment and its "unpopular" and
"unproductive" canal talks. A
PP "manifesto" issued on 27
September strongly attacked the
joint statement as deception of
the Panamanian people.
Arias is in Panama City
to direct strategy and is evi-
dently determined to exploit
the "manifesto" to the fullest.
Foreign Minister Eleta, conced-
ing Arias' appeal to the country's
uneducated classes, is planning
an all-out radio and television
campaign to wean the educated
and "thinking" people away from
him.
In the opening assembly
session on 1 October, Panamen-
ista deputies can be expected
to demand more specific infor-
mation on the treaty negotia-
tions. They will focus criti-
cism on the base rights and
status-of-forces agreements
and will demand to know what
economic benefits Panama will
receive. In addition, criti-
cism will probably emphasize
the need to cancel the 1903
Hay - Buneau Varilla Treaty
before negotiating a sea-level-
canal and status-of-forces
agreement. The prospective
president of this session of
the assembly believes the issue
of canal negotiations will be-
come more difficult for the
administration to handle unless
future progress is more rapid
than in the last 18 months.
Communist and extreme left-25X1
ist reaction to the joint state-
ment has been slow to material-
ize. f- I
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PRESIDENT VERSUS MILITARY IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Dominican military leaders, of armed rebels demanding "dona-
who have increasingly felt shuntedf tions to the revolution."
aside and abused by provisional
President Garcia Godoy, were on
the verge of withdrawing their
support from him on 28 September
and demanding that a new man be
appointed. Their fulmination was
triggered by his decision, with-
out consulting them, to name a
coordinating commission to im-
plement integration of rebel mili-
tary elements into the armed
forces and to transfer the na-
tional police to the Ministry of
Interior. Three members of the
eight-man commission were top
rebel military leaders under Caa-
ma no.
Meanwhile Santo Domingo re-
mains a divided city. Downtown
banks and stores are reluctant
to reopen while the political
situation remains unsettled and
until adequate police protection
is assured them. Extensive loot-
ing still is being reported, and
the few stores which have re-
opened have been visited by groups
The return of ex-President
Juan Bosch on 25 September has
added to the government's dif-
ficulties in restoring peace and
order. The military were gen-
erally opposed to his return
and particularly angered over
arrangements which they consid-
ered gave the impression of a
triumphal entry. Bosch immedi-
ately delivered an anti-US speech
in the rebel zone and urged a
purge of top military leaders
and the immediate departure of
all foreign troops. Since re-
turning, Bosch has made no men-
tion of whether he will be a
presidential candidate in the
elections scheduled for mid-1966.
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SECRET
INSURGENCY IN NORTHERN MEXICO
vn 23 September a group of
about 20 guerrillas raided a
garrison of Mexican Army troops
near Madera in the northern bor-
der state of Chihuahua. Five
soldiers and ten attackers were
killed in the skirmish.
Among those killed was the
leader of the band, Arturo Gamiz,
a fanatical extreme leftist who
has been operating in the moun-
tains of Chihuahua since early
1964. Gamiz had been arrested
in April 1964 for participating
in disturbances directed against
then president-presumptive Gus-
tavo Diaz Ordaz, and then re-
leased. Gamiz and his follow-
ers attacked a group of state
rural police in July 1964 and
had been charged with terrorist
activity and agitation among the
peasantry since that time. The
Mexican security forces' search
for the outlaws was stepped up
following a raid in June 1965
in which a soldier was killed.
Gamiz' group is only one
of several leftist groups agitat-
ing in Chihuahua and other north-
ern states, exploiting long-
standing peasant discontent
arising from miserable condi-
tions in the area. Agrarian
problems there have most re-
cently been aggravated by the
termination of the bracero pro-
gram under which many tens of
thousands of Mexican farm labor-
ers found seasonal employment
in the United States. The
bracero program formerly acted
as a safety valve for the seeth-
ing unrest among peasants who
have had practically no benefit
from Mexico's economic advances.
A recent increase in the fre-
quency of clashes between squat-
ters or bandits and security
forces has embarrassed the Mexi-
can Government.
Since his assumption of the
presidency in December 1964,
Diaz Ordaz has contended with
several actions on the part of
the extreme left. This latest
incident can be expected to
harden his intolerance of activ-
ity designed to embarrass his
administration. In the 23 Sep-
tember clash, the security
forces demonstrated their capa-
bility to cope with insurgency
and apparently broke the out-
law band by killing its lead-
ers and dispersing the others.
The corpses of the outlaws were
immediately interred in a secret
common grave to lessen the
chance of student-peasant dem-
onstrations at a "martyrs"'
f
uneral
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SECRET
BOLIVIAN CRISIS EASES
An uneasy calm has returned
to Bolivia since last week's
confrontation between security
forces and tin miners at the
Catavi - Siglo Veinte mining
complex. All mines now are op-
erating normally except for
Siglo Veinte, where sporadic
strikes and work slowdowns con-
tinue. The junta is holding dis-
cussions with representatives
of the miners to try to reduce
resentment of its reform pro-
gram, but basic dissatisfaction
is deep-seated and violence
could be renewed in the mining
area at any time.
future course of action, now have
turned their attention toward
university federation elections.
The major opposition politi-
cal parties were unable to ex-
ploit the unrest because of deep
internal splits over policy. All
denounced the "military solution"
to the mine problem, but none
was able to mobilize sizable con-
tingents for street action. Only
a handful of party extremists
took an active part in the stu-
dent demonstrations, and par-
ticipation by factory workers
failed to materialize.
The labor unrest did not
develop into a political crisis
because of the inability of the
student movements in La Paz and
others large cities to unite in
action against the junta. The
most threatening student action
was a march on the presidential
palace on 27 September which
resulted in injury to five per-
sons by gunfire. Student activi-
ties were otherwise confined to
strikes and denunciations. Stu-
dents in La Paz, split over a
The junta plans to restore
constitutional guarantees soon
in order to prepare a favorable
climate for elections which may
be held next June. Government
officials hope that by convok-
ing elections, the government
can bring the political parties
to devote their efforts to the
formation of viable coalitions
rather than plots to oust the
junta by violence.
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