WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005000060001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 17, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

6.1 X44 V M
e 2006/03/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A00 0060001-2
17 September 1965
OCI No. 0307/65
Copy No. C
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE]
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
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005000060
7 L I Excluded from automatic
,wngroding and declassification
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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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SECRET
Although pro-Soviet Commu-
nists apparently had some ex-
pectation that the North Viet-
namese party delegation now
touring France might offer new
suggestions for opening nego-
tiations on the Vietnam war,
thus far there has been no in-
dication that this has happened.
In its propaganda, the DRV
continues to express confidence
in the Communists' ability to
defeat the US militarily. At
the same time, several recent
statements and articles by prom-
inent North Vietnamese have been
noticeably defensive regarding
regime policies on the prosecu-
tion of the war. Both politburo
member Troung Chinh and army
chief of staff Van Tien Dung are
among the authors of such arti-
cles. They attempt to justify
the party's decisions over the
past years, particularly those
decisions which have led to the
current situation. The tenor
of Chinh's article suggests that
he may be answering criticism
from foreign Communists con-
cerning current DRV policy in
prosecuting the war.
The deleterious effect the
US air strikes are having on the
North Vietnamese populace is
apparently causing growing con-
cern to Hanoi. Its most explicit
statement of anxiety over public
morale in some time was contained
in a domestic broadcast on 11
September discussing conditions
in the Viet Bac Autonomous Re-
gion in northeastern North Viet-
nam. The broadcast expressed
dissatisfaction with evacuation
practices in that area, imply-
ing that the air strikes have
caused local residents to take
to their heels with little re-
gard to planned evacuation pro-
cedures. Cadres and state em-
ployees were urged to "explain
things" to the people in order
"to reassure them."
The broadcast also reflected
the regime's long-standing dis-
trust of the minority racial ele-
ments who live in the Viet Bac
area. It warned that "cadres
and people" are not yet fully
aware of the "tricky, dangerous
schemes of the enemy," or of
the "nature of sabotage waged
by the US" against North Vietnam.
All provinces were instructed
to counter the "erroneous views"
allegedly spread through the
area by the "enemy" and to "smash
in time all counterpropaganda
arguments."
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ther analysis of
hotography has d sc ose
a new SAM site, the 19th, about
8 miles southwest of Hanoi. The
site was in the.early to middle
stage of construction with par-
tially revetted launch pads and
three hold revetments noted.
No central guidance revetment
was visible, nor was any missile-
associated equipment seen at the
site.
Military Activity in the South
Retention of the initiative
by US and Vietnamese Government
forces, and the relative absence
of large-scale Viet Cong activ-
ity continue to characterize
the military situation in South
Vietnam-l.; ` A slight decrease in
the .over-al1":tempo"of, --activity-
ha resulted , in , lower numbers' of
casualties on both sides.
In the I Corps area, two
joint Vietnamese-US operations
south of Chu Lai in Quang Ngai
Province and south of Da Nang
in Quang Nam Province resulted
in more than 300 Viet Cong killed.
Enemy activity in the I Corps
consisted primarily of sabotage
to the railroad between Da Nang
and Hue and of harassing activ-
ity directed against US marines
near Da Nang Air Base.
In II Corps area, the de-
barkation of the First US Cav-
alry (Airmobile) Division in
Qui Nhon will be completed early
next week. Division headquarters
will be established at An Khe,
and the division's 15,000 combat
troops will be employed in areas
near Route 19, leading from Qui
Nhon into the central highlands.
Viet Cong activity is at a low
level in II Corps, but is ex=
pected to pick up.
The only Viet Cong battalion-
size attack during the past week
occurred in the III Corps prov-
ince of Binh Duong on 13 Septem-
ber, and resulted in over 40 gov-
ernment casualties. In the same
province, but farther north, a
large government operation in-
volving 5,000 Vietnamese, US,
Australian, and New Zealand
troops is now under way in a
Viet Cong base area believed to
harbor as many as 10,000 enemy
troops. The operation is sched-
uled to last from eight to ten
days. No significant contact
with the Viet Cong has yet been
established.
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Both government and Viet
Cong forces continued to oper-
ate at a low level of activity
in the southernmost IV Corps
area. The increased use of
57-mm.and 75-mm.recoilless
rifles by the Viet Cong in the
delta area during the past two
weeks, however, points to an
ample supply of this type of
ammunition.
The Political Situation
During the past week, the
government followed through on
decisions reached at a 2 Septem-
ber meeting of the military Di-
rectorate concerning a military
congress and a civilian advisory
council. A military congress
of some 2,000 officers was held
in Saigon on 11 September and
was generally regarded as a suc-
cess. Following a morning of
speeches by Chief of State
Thieu, Premier Ky, and War Min-
ister Co, the afternoon session
was left open for frank com-
ments from the lower-ranking of-
ficers regarding the military
government's performance to
date. The government plans to
convene similar congresses in
the future, with the aim of en-
abling all Vietnamese officers
to participate at one time or
another.
The military Directorate,
according to its secretary gen-
eral, hopes to complete the for-
mation of a civilian advisory
council of about 100 members by
1 November. The council will in-
itially serve as an advisory
body to the cabinet, and is to
be composed of one member elected
by each provincial and munici-
pal council, with the balance
chosen from religious and pro-
fessional groups, trade unions,
and recognized political parties.
The directorate hopes, by care-
ful selection of the latter mem-
bers, to ensure the council's
reliability despite the possi-
ble emergence of troublemakers
from the provincial and munici-
pal councils.
Government recourse to mil-
itary operations which resulted
in the peaceful surrender last
week end of some 400 armed dis-
sidents from the tribal autonomy
movement, FULRO, has posed a pos-
sible danger of fostering new re-
sentment among hitherto loyal
tribesmen. To mitigate this
danger, the government on 15 Sep-
tember staged a local ceremony,
attended by Premier Ky, to re-
ceive an oath of allegiance from
those who surrendered. Despite
this and other contemplated steps
to alleviate minority grievances,
prob-
the long-standing tribal, I
lem is likely to persist)
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A major article on Soviet
cultural policy by Pravda chief
editor Aleksey Rumyan sev may
be symptomatic of serious dif-
ficulties within the Soviet lead-
ership. In his first signed ar-
ticle since February (only his
second since assuming the editor-
ship last November) Rumyantsev
presented a strong defense of
the liberal element among the So-
viet intelligentsia, and explic-
itly attacked Izvestia for its
criticism last month of fiction
which portrayed the darker side
of life in the USSR.
The editorial policies of
Pravda and Izvestia may diverge
on occasion, u 3t is highly
unusual for one to attack the
other. In previous instances
when the two papers began snip-
ing at one another--for example,
during the Khrushchev-Malenkov
contest for power in 1953 and
1954--it became apparent that
the debate was evidence of the
factional warfare behind the
scenes. Rumyantsev's present
criticism of Izvestia may thus
again reflect a developing power
struggle.
The possibility that politi-
cal infighting may be involved
is given further weight by a re-
port that party secretary temichev,
who is in charge of ideological
matters, had apologized for re-
cent attacks on the liberal
writers. Demichev's last re-
ported activity as secretary for
ideology was in August when he
sharply criticized and extracted
an apology from the controversial
economist Abel Aganbegyan, al-
legedly for having painted in
his statistics too black a pic-
ture of the Soviet economic sys-
tem.
Rumyantsev's liberal line
is an abrupt change from the
carping at liberal writers which
has characterized the Soviet press
for the last six weeks. The
switch is reminiscent of the
abrupt shifts in Soviet cultural
life which were induced by Khru-
shchev's personal interventions
and which his successors had
promised to eschew.
It is unlikely that Rum-
yantsev took such a major step
without the assurance of support
from someone in the Kremlin.
It is equally unlikely that this
has been forthcoming from such
cultural conservatives as Suslov
and Polyansky. Of the current
leadership, only Mikoyan has
been clearly identified with a
relatively liberal cultural
policy. Podgorny, who was
briefly associated with Rum-
yantsev in the Kharkov party
organization, delivered a Navy
Day speech on 24 July with several
elements in common with Rumyantsev's
article, including emphasis on
"individual creative initiative"
in economic management. Of the
other leaders, only Brezhnev
has displayed a faint flicker
of cultural liberalism.
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Rumyantsev's attacks on
Izvestia may also be related to
the pro lem of its chief editor-
ship--vacant since May. At the
time of Khrushchev's ouster last
fall, there was some evidence
of jockeying in the leadership
for control over appointments
to head the major mass media
outlets. Some similar pulling
and tugging may be in progress
now.
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CEAUSESCU VISIT REFLECTS IMPROVED RUMANIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS
The 3-11 September meetings
in Moscow between Rumanian and
Soviet leaders apparently re-
sulted in some improvement in
Soviet-Rumanian relations. Both
sides professed unity on most
international issues, particu-
larly the Vietnam crisis. The
Rumanians, however, took the
occasion to reaffirm strongly
their independent policies within
the Communist world.
Soviet treatment of the
visit provides further evidence
of Moscow's adjustment to Ruma-
nian nationalism and its desire
to improve relations with Bucha-
rest. The Russian leaders clearly
recognize that East European re-
gimes will continue to follow
policies best serving their na-
tional interests. As long as
the USSR's long-range foreign
policy goals are not jeopardized
by any precipitate Rumanian move,
the Soviets appear reconciled to
this new relationship and eager
to exploit any benefits they may
derive from it.
The joint communique con-
tained repeated references to
both sides' adherence to the
principles of equality and non-
interference. It has become in-
creasingly obvious that recent
trends have left the Russians
with little choice but to abide
in large measure by these prin-
ciples. This has helped to al-
leviate a good deal of the re-
cent tension in Soviet-Rumanian
relations, and has also strength-
ened Moscow's defense against
Chinese charges that the USSR is
still determined to "wield the
baton" in Eastern Europe.
The Russians welcome Ru-
manian leader Ceausescu's rel-
atively strong attack on US
policy in Vietnam and his ap-
peals for unity in the Commu-
nist world. Moscow can be ex-
pected to play up such state-
ments as an endorsement of So-
viet policies which have been
bitterly criticized by Peking.
Ceausescu also endorsed for the
first time the South Vietnamese
National Liberation Front as 25X1
the only "lawful representative
of the South Vietnamese people."
ince the
oscow visit, Ceausescu has
already visited Sofia, and will
receive Yugoslavia's President
Tito in October. Ceausescu also
may be planning a trip to Commu-
nist China, ossibly as early
as Novem
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COMMUNIST CHINA'S TRADE WITH JAPAN REACHING NEW HIGHS
Despite Peking's recent
coolness toward the Sato govern-
ment in Tokyo, Sino-Japanese
trade continues to boom. Trade
this year will probably top
$400 million, a new record.
Trade during 1966, currently the
subject of high-level negoti-
ations, is expected to reach
about $500 million, which would
probably make Japan China's num-
ber one trade partner.
Political considerations in
the past have had a major impact
on the level of Sino-Japanese
trade. For example, commerce was
almost shut off following the
1958 "flag incident" when a
Chinese Communist flag was torn
town at an exhibit in Japan.
China now is buying a
variety of industrial goods--
such as small plants, steel,
fertilizer, and construction
equipment--and is selling agri-
cultural products, coal, and
iron ore to Japan. This trade
is currently running about 30
percent higher than in the cor-
responding period in 1964, and
accounts for more than 10 per-
cent of China's total trade.
Trade next year may even
exceed expectations if Tokyo is
able to offer government-backed
credits to China, a step it has
hesitated to take in view of
pressure from Nationalist China,
another important Japanese trade
partner. At present, large-scale
Chinese purchases of industrial
plants and products have come to
a standstill over the credit
issue. Earlier this year,
Peking canceled contracts for a
$30-million synthetic-fiber
plant and a cargo ship when
Japanese Government credit sup-
port was not forthcoming.
Plant sales and other
deals requiring Japanese Govern-
ment-backed credits will probably
be major topics at the trade
meeting now under way in Peking.
These negotiations are under the
Liao-Takasaki trade agreement,
a quasi-official five-year
economic pact concluded in late
1962. Trade through this chan-
nel, which has accounted for al-
most half of Chinese-Japanese
trade in the last few years, is
expected to be at the $250 mil-
lion level next year. The re-
maining trade is carried on be-
tween China and Japanese firms
which Peking has designated as
friendly.
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Asia-Africa
THE INDIAN-PAKISTANI WAR
As fighting continues along
the Indian - West Pakistani bor-
der, conflicting claims and coun-
terclaims of military successes
further cloud the picture of ac-
tual developments in the subcon-
tinent's undeclared war.
The two sides have engaged
in a seesaw battle five to ten
miles across the border from Jam-
mu in Kashmir southwest to the
Kasur area of West Pakistan.
Ground encounters have been gen-
erally inconclusive, with both
sides sustaining extensive losses
in equipment and personnel.
The heaviest fighting thus
far has occurred near the Paki-
stani city of Sialkot, which has
suffered considerable damage from
several days of intense artillery
fire. Fighting continues on the
outskirts of the city, where the
Indians claim to have "achieved
their objectives" and the Paki-
stanis claim to have halted the
Indian advance.
The Lahore front, where In-
dians earlier this week reportedly
beat back the Pakistani counter-
attack, remains relatively quiet,
the opposing forces apparently
having fought to a standstill with
little progress registered by ei-
ther side. Indian Defense Minis-
ter Chavan, in a conversation
with Ambassador Bowles on 13
September, discounted any inten-
tion on the part of his govern-
ment to capture Lahore itself.
Indian objectives, he said, were
rather to lessen Pakistani pres-
sures on Kashmir and to dispel
the assumption that India can be
"pushed around."
In Kashmir, the Indians have
apparently completed the linkup
in the Uri-Poonch salient. This
would give them control of some
150 square miles of territory pre-
viously on the Pakistani side of
the cease-fire line and improve
the Indian lines of communication,
Both India and Pakistan con-
tinue to claim success in destroy-
ing enemy air bases and to deny
similar enemy claims. Throughout
the week, the two nations have
carried out air raids, including
two Indian attacks on Peshawar
and a Pakistani raid on a base just
north of Calcutta.
Both countries remain reluct-
ant to extend the fighting to the
borders of East Pakistan. Rela-
tive quiet reigns in this area,
broken only by intermittent shell-
ing. Chavan has emphasized that
India has no quarrel with East
Pakistan. Further air raids from
East Pakistan, however, or humiliat-
ing defeats for India on the west-
ern front could lead to Indian
retaliation against that rela-
tively indefensible, densely pop-
ulated territory,
Supply Problems
Although the war goes on un-
abated, supply and equipment prob-
lems appear to be increasingly
serious, especially for Pakistan.
The Pakistanis have appealed to
all countries for aid but have had
little success in obtaining anything
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Lahore'
Kasur.
BHUTAN
Cooch Behar
Chittagong
2.5X1
KABUL *
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C.1 JAMMU & KASHMIR
-Z (S'.-'? d--)
rE-F Peshawar RAWALPINDI
Sialkot`y
English Rangpur INDI A
Bazar
EAST
PAKISTAN
INDIA Dacca
,Jessore
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concrete. Any help which may be
forthcoming from their CENTO
allies, Turkey and Iran, is not
expected to contribute signifi-
cantly to the Pakistani effort.
A shortage of oil is becom-
ing a critical factor for the
Pakistanis. Most recent esti-
mates hold that present reserves
are adequate for only a few more
days if tankers expected in Ka-
rachi do not arrive soon.
settlement would be nothing more
than a return to a situation they
believe was to India's advantage.
U Thant's latest suggestion--
an eight day cease-fire during
which time he would attempt to
find a solution agreeable to both
sides--was accepted by India but
rejected by Pakistan.
Soviet Pronouncements
Indian problems do not ap-
pear to be as immediate, but food
shortages and transportation dif-
ficulties are creating internal
pressures which could hamper the
war effort.
Communal and religious dis-
turbances have not gotten out of
hand thus far but the potential
remains as the war drags on and
tensions increase. Both coun-
tries have taken pains to keep
Hindu-Muslim conflicts.from
erupting.
The UN Role
UN Secretary General Thant
has returned from his peace mis-
sion, which failed to bring about
a cease-fire but clarified the
Indian and Pakistani political
objectives with regard to Kash-
mir.
Both sides have expressed
willingness to accept a cease-
fire, but preconditions--among
which is Pakistan's insistence on
a plebiscite in Kashmir--have pre-
vented any agreement. The Pakis-
tanis fear that a cease-fire with
no guarantee of a future Kashmir
The recent spate of Russian
pronouncements is highlighted by
a note of urgency as well as ex-
pressions of Soviet willingness
to do whatever possible to facili-
tate an early cease-fire. On 11
September, the Soviets released
Premier Kosygin's latest letters
to this effect, which had been
sent on 4 September to both Indian
Premier Shastri and Pakistani
President Ayub.
The second official TASS
statement within a week was re-
leased on 13 September. Besides
repeating Moscow's offer of its
"good offices" if desired by both
sides, TASS sharpened the USSR's
indirect criticism of Peking's
attitude toward the crisis. TASS
condemned those whose "incendiary
statements" help to aggravate the
situation, and called on "the
whole world" to warn such third
parties that they assume "grave
responsibility" for their actions.
The trend of events has ap-
parently heightened Chinese Com-
munist concern. After a brief
lull during which Peking was
probably assessing the latest
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military developments, the Chi-
nese acted to turn up the pres-
sure on New Delhi with a new and
even more threatening note de-
livered to the Indian charge in
Peking on 17 September.
The note, which Peking im-
mediately broadcast, repeats
earlier charges--made most re-
cently on 8 September--concern-
ing alleged Indian intrusions
into Chinese territory along the
Sikkim frontier. The latest
warning verges on an ultimatum
with the demand that India must
"dismantle all its military works
of aggression on the Chinese
side of the China-Sikkim boundary,
or the boundary itself within
three days of the delivery of
the.note." Earlier warnings set
no time limit for Indian com-
pliance with Chinese demands.
By focusing attention on
the Sikkim border Peking is
probably seeking to underscore
the potential threat of a Chinese
military thrust down the Chumbi
Valley which, if successful,
would cut the main Indian com-
munication line with Assam and
the North East Frontier Agency
(NEFA). It does not limit pos-
sible Chinese probes to Sikkim
itself, however, and warns that
the Indians must immediately halt
"intrusions" along the entire
length of the frontier.
It is difficult to see how
India can satisfy these Chinese
demands. In previous diplomatic
exchanges concerning similar Chi-
nese allegations, New Delhi has
claimed that Peking's charges were
baseless and asserted that places
cited by the Chinese could not be
found on any map. Having set a
time limit for Indian compliance
and thus limited their freedom of
maneuver it seems likely that the
Chinese plan to follow their ulti-
matum with some military action--
at a minimum with aggressive pa-
trolling probes along or across
the border.
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ANTI-AMERICAN CAMPAIGN GROWS IN INDONESIA
Another wave of anti-Ameri-
canism in Indonesia coincides
with further pressures against
political moderates. The Com-
munists spearheading the anti-
American agitation are getting
increasing support from other
groups eager to prove their na-
tionalistic and revolutionary
fervor.
emons ra ons against
American consulates in both
Surabaya and Medan on 13 Septem-
ber included demands that the
government send all Americans
home.
Sukarno continues to accuse
the US of subversive plots. In
a recent speech he claimed that
Indonesia had become neocolonial-
ism's "main target in Asia." Two
Americans, a missionary formerly
stationed in West Irian and a
Pan American Airways employee,
are being held and interrogated.
One is charged with helping West
Irian rebels, the other with in-
sulting the Indonesian Government.
On 1 September Sukarno or-
dered the police to expunge
hypocrites, foot draggers, false
elements and deviators in every
field." Several days later he
expressed considerable dissatis-
faction with the armed forces
establishment as a whole and
warned police and service heads
to "integrate with the people."
Subsequently various political
and military officials--in an
effort to shore up their posi-
tions with Sukarno--have uttered
their own denunciations of ob-
structionists and have variously
promised everything from more ef-
ficient action to a major purge.
The International Anti-For-
eign Military Bases Conference--
scheduled to be held in Djakarta
from 10 to 15 October and once os-
tensibly unofficial--is taking on
a totally official appearance.
Sukarno plans to address it twice,
and Subandrio has promised the
preparatory committee full gov-
ernment support.
The preparatory committee
chairman claims that over 500
delegates from 72 countries are
expected. Major targets of the 25X1
conference reportedly will be
bases in Okinawa, the Philippine
Vietnam and Hong Konff_J
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A new Soviet-Yemeni mili-
tary aid agreement is reported
to have been concluded recently.
Direct Soviet military aid
to Yemen since November 1962,
when the first arms agreement
was concluded, has amounted to
$60 million, mainly ground
forces equipment--small arms,
tanks, self-propelled guns,
vehicles, and artillery--but in-
cluding a variety of miscellaneous,
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RHODESIANS AGAIN THREATEN
Rhodesian Prime Minister
Smith, whose attitude is appar-
ently toughening, is again
threatening a unilateral declara-
tion of his country's independ-
ence from Britain. Although his
threats cannot be disregarded,
they may be an effort to dragoon
London into granting a further
measure of de facto independence
to his white minority govern-
ment in Salisbury.
Since coming to power last
October, Britain's Labor govern-
ment has stood adamant against
total independence for Rhodesia
as long as the 93-percent Afri-
can majority lacks a substantial
voice in the government. Smith,
backed by the white electorate,
has pushed hard for independence.
Confronted with London's threat
to impose sanctions, he retreated
from unilateral action in favor
of negotiations, no matter how
dim the prospect of their suc-
cess.
On 11 September, however,
Smith told the British high com-
missioner in Salisbury that there
was "no longer any hope of a
negotiated settlement." Earlier,
he had told the Rhodesian Parlia-
ment that independence was "im-
minent" and that "nothing will
stop us."
The current issue is whether
Rhodesia can send its own ac-
credited diplomats abroad. In
July, the Rhodesian Government
announced it intended to establish
a diplomatic mission in Lisbon--
important because of its control
of neighboring Mozambique and
Angola. Britain has warned the
TO DECLARE INDEPENDENCE
Portuguese that Rhodesian rep-
resentation must be through the
ITK Embassy. It has told the
Rhodesians that if they persist
in their course, the UK will
expel Rhodesian representatives
from its embassies in Washing-
ton, Bonn, and Tokyo.
Despite his statements and
threats, Smith probably would
prefer to continue negotiations
with the UK. He has agreed to
hold talks in Salisbury with
British Commonwealth Relations
Secretary Bottomley in mid-
October. He has implied that he
would not declare independence
at least until after the talks
but has said nonetheless that
the two governments would have
to reach a decision "one way or
the other" during Bottomley's
visit. In late October, fol-
lowing payment for the tobacco
crop--Rhodesia's principal for-
eign exchange earner--Salisbury
would be best able to withstand
economic sanctions.
The pressures are great on
both sides to postpone a con-
frontation. Smith, who is shrewd
if not always cool-headed,
genuinely fears the consequences
of sanctions. For its part,
the Wilson government, in trouble
at home, would not want to be-
come embroiled in a question
which is not popular in Britain.
Furthermore, in applying sanc-
tions and upsetting trade with
Rhodesia, London would lose the
advantages of its favorable trade
balance with Salisbury--at a 25X1
time when Britain suffers from
a serious balance-of-paymonts
deficit.
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Europe
GREEKS STILL TRYING TO FORM GOVERNMENT
Greek politicians are still
seeking to break the deadlock
over forming a government that
followed King Constantine's dis-
missal of Prime Minister Papan-
dreou two months ago.
The King is expected to turn
for a second time to Stephan Ste-
phanopoulos, who was deputy pre-
mier in Papandreou's Center Union
cabinet. Five weeks ago Stephan-
opoulos abandoned a brief effort
to head a government when his
soundings pointed to failure. To
succeed this time, he needs the
backing of the two former opposi-
tion parties, the right-of-center
National Radical Union and the
small, conservative Progressive
Party, plus the support of seven
or eight more Center Union depu-
ties than have yet defected from
Papandreou.
The National Radical Union
leader has agreed to support him
and the Progressive Party prob-
ably will follow suit. The
palace is reported to believe
that about ten additional Center
Union deputies will back Stephan-
opoulos when the vote comes and
give him a majority.
If Stephanopoulos once again
fails, the King will probably
turn to a nonpolitical figure to
seek a mandate, perhaps Harilaos
Mitrelias, the president of the
Council of State, an administra-
tive court.
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EEC AFTER DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE
De Gaulle's 9 September press
conference has raised the prospect
of an indefinite extension of the
Common Market crisis. Although he
did not completely close out the
possibility of a settlement, De
Gaulle indicated that his terms
for resuming the "Brussels negotia-
tions" were a government-to-gov-
ernment agreement on the agricul-
tural financing issue and agree-
ment to reduce, if not to do away
with, the authority of the com-
munity's institutions.
De Gaulle's conditions amount
to a demand that the treaties of
Rome and Paris be fundamentally re-
vised, despite his personal under-
taking in 1958 to uphold them. The
EEC Commission's power of initia-
tive, the supranational nature of
the commissioners' office, and the
community's progress to majority
voting which De Gaulle so strongly
attacked are all firmly provided
by these treaties.
Ambassador Tuthill has noted
that even if the present commis-
sioners were replaced as Paris de-
sires, the new ones would be
equally bound to uphold the commu-
nity treaty, and any "gentlemen's
agreement" to prevent majority vot-
ing would have no validity at law.
As for the common agricultural pol-
icy, De Gaulle's stand on community
powers has made it more difficult
for the others to meet French de-
mands, since community financing
of that policy would require ad-
ministration by effective institu-
tions.
France's dismayed partners in
the community are far from agreement
on what to do. Dutch officials be-
lieve the Netherlands will not try
to maintain the EEC at the price of
"removing its essence," and The
Hague apparently will work for a
hard common front against France.
Moreover, Italy and all three Bene-
lux states may feel it necessary to
reaffirm their support for the commu-
nity out of fear of the effects of
De Gaulle's nationalism. The US Mis-
sion has reported that Benelux sources
were "clearly shocked" because of the
possible consequence in West Germany
of De Gaulle's assertion of freedom
from treaty commitments. Even the
German permanent delegate has noted
the "obvious attraction to certain
Germans" of De Gaulle's doctrine.
A digging-in to defend the sanc-
tity of obligations under the Rome
Treaty, however, seems certain to be
opposed by some within the member
countries who would wish to avoid
the risks involved. In Bonn both
Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minis-
ter Schroeder have reservations
about the principle of supranation-
ality and might seek some accommo-
dation to the French short of vio-
lating the treaties. Moreover, the
difficulty France's partners face in
standing firm against it and the po-
litical unacceptability to them of
giving in entirely are likely to
lead to a revival of talk about 25X1
Britain's role in Europe, an EEC-
EFTA rapprochement, or a bigger and
wider European free trade
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LABOR PARTY DEFEATED IN NORWAY
The Norwegian Labor Party's
defeat in national elections on
12-13 September paves the way
for formation of Norway's first
elected nonsocialist government
in some 30 years.
The balloting was marked
by a swing to the center par-
ties and sizable defections by
Labor's supporters to the
splinter neo-Communist Social-
ist People's Party (SPP). The
SPP, which received about 6 per-
cent of the vote--more than
double its share--in 1961, si-
phoned off enough votes in Labor
strongholds to assure victory
for nonsocialist candidates.
Labor also appears to have been
the victim of a trend to the
right by younger voters, a de-
velopment of particular benefit
to the Liberals and the Center
party.
The campaign was fought
principally on domestic issues
such as housing, inflation, and
the efficiency of state-run in-
dustries. The four nonsocialist
parties, like Labor, in varying
degrees all support Norway's
ties with NATO, while only the
SPP and the Communists advocate
withdrawal from NATO and adop-
tion of a neutral foreign policy.
A new element in the cam-
paign was a pre-election pledge
by the nonsocialists--Conserva-
tives, Liberals, Center, and
Christian People's Party--to co-
operate in a coalition govern-
ment if they secured a majority
in parliament. They have emerged
with a comfortable majority, con-
trolling 80 of the 150 seats--al-
though they gained only a fraction
in percent of total vote as com-
pared with 1961. Labor dropped
from 74 to 68 seats, but still
retained its plurality by a wide
margin.
The outlook for the prospec-
tive four-party coalition is un-
certain, not least because of the
compromise and accommodation which
will be necessary to bring and to
keep the parties together. The
coalition will represent diver-
gent interests such as farmers,
business groups, religious ele-
ments, and radical intellectuals,
and the leaders of the new govern-
ment will be hard pressed to main-
tain discipline and reconcile the
conflicting demands of these
groups. John Lyng (Conservative),
Bent Roeiseland (Liberal), and
Per Borten, a Center (agrarian)
leader, are the most likely candi-
dates to head the new government.
Labor will probably be con-
tent for the time being to remain
in opposition, assessing its own
performance in the election and
strengthening itself for a fu-
ture return to power. It will
probably have frequent opportuni-
ties to exploit tensions among 25X1
he government. parties.
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COMPOSITION OF NORWEGIAN STORTING (PARLIAMENT)
FOLLOWING ELECTIONS 12 -13 SEPTEMBER 1965
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Western Hemisphere
CANADA BEGINS CAMPAIGN FOR NOVEMBER ELECTION
On 8 November Canada will
hold its third national election
in four years. The campaign is
beginning in an atmosphere of
popular disinterest, and no one
issue is likely to dominate. Al-
though recent opinion polls show
a strong Liberal lead over the
Tories, a third of the electorate
are reported undecided how they
will vote.
Prime Minister Pearson ap-
pears confident that his Liberal
government's popularity has grown
sufficiently to enable it to in-
crease its parliamentary strength
by about 20 seats, winning major-
ity control. In the present Par-
liament the Liberals have 127
seats, the Conservatives hold 92,
and the remaining 42 seats are
divided among smaller parties.
Pearson apparently intends
to focus his campaign on his gov-
ernment's legislative record in
the social welfare field, the
current economic prosperity, and
the recent advantageous wheat
sales to the Soviet Union.
Opposition leader John Dief-
enbaker, who at 70 is probably
running his last campaign, has
already served notice that he
will renew charges of inef-
ficiency and corruption in gov-
ernment. As in past campaigns,
he will probably try to exploit
the concern of some Canadians
over the extent of US control
of Canadian industry and the
tendency of the Pearson govern-
ment to follow the US in for-
eign affairs.
Each leader is already
charging the other with en-
dangering national unity, and
this divisive subject is likely
to assume greater prominences
the campaign progresses.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Fears are mounting in the
Dominican Republic that Presi-
dent Garcia Godoy is compromising
his central position by too many
concessions to aggressive left-
ist forces. Moderate and con-
servative civilians share the
feeling of armed forces leaders
that the provisional President's
efforts to gain the support of
Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolu-
tionary Party and more extremist
rebel elements have encouraged
the left to step up its announced
second, or political, phase of
the revolution.
Garcia Godoy is proceeding
with his intention of creating a
broadly based regime by filling
government positions with both
political neutrals and persons
representing a wide variety of
party loyalties. Several sus-
pected leftist extremists have
been named to sensitive posi-
tions, especially in the legal
field. For example, the new at-
torney general until recently
was president of the Communist-
dominated lawyers' association
Leftist forces are making
a determined drive to improve
their positions in the govern-
ment's bureaucracy, educational
institutions, and labor organi-
zations by pressuring for the
removal of moderates and conserv-
atives from key posts.
The provisional government
has made little progress to date
on collecting arms and bringing
law and order to the rebel zone
in Santo Domingo. The return of
rebel combatants to their homes
in the provinces has begun, but
the returning rebels have assumed
the role of conquering heroes--
a tactic that could easily provoke
clashes with wary army and po-
lice units.
In addition to its concern
over the issue of Communist in-
filtration of the government,
the military is displeased over
the timing and handling of General
Wessin's ouster from the country
on 9 September. The lack of ap-
propriations to pay troops and
meet necessary operational ex-
penses is also causing concern
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Page 21 WEEKLY SU
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CUBA'S CHE GUEVARA STILL MISSING
Six months after his disap-
pearance from the Cuban scene,
Ernesto "Che"" Guevara's status
and whereabouts remain a mystery.
He has apparently not fallen
permanently from grace, since his
name and role in Cuba's recent
past are still featured promi-
nently in regime media. His wife
is regularly accorded positions
of honor at important celebra-
tions, and Guevara's picture was
prominently displayed at the 26
July ceremonies. Castro has
lauded him publicly and said in
June that Guevara will reappear
at a time of his own choosing.
No explanation for Guevara's
disappearance is completely satis-
factory. There seems to be no
good reason why his death or se-
rious illness would be concealed.
There is not one firm report to
substantiate press reports which
have placed Guevara in almost
every Latin American country,
fomenting revolution at Castro's
behest. Furthermore, it seems
unlikely that Castro would risk
being caught meddling so blatantly
in other countries.
The fact that Guevara dis-
appeared shortly after his re-
turn from Africa suggests that
some aspect of this much-publi-
cized junket displeased Castro.
For example, while Guevara was
in Africa, Castro announced plans
to reward outstanding sugar
workers. Guevara, an exponent
of moral as opposed to material
incentives, reacted by sharply
criticizing the Yugoslavs for
their use of workers' bonuses
and revision to "capitalist
methods." Again, Guevara's in-
cautious references to the So-
viet Union's economic interven-
tion and poor advice may have led
Castro to subject him to a tem-
porary discipline in the hope
of bringing his ideas into con-
formity.
Because of the steady and
favorable publicity he has been
receiving, the stage is set
for Guevara's return to public
view at some time. He is not
likely, however, to regain the
influenc e he once exercised.
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Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 Sept 65
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Peruvian President Bela-
unde's decision to form a con-
gressional cabinet appears to
be aimed at effecting a more
harmonious relationship between
the executive and legislative
branches. The wide gap hereto-
fore existing between the presi-
dency and the opposition-domi-
nated Congress has often impeded
constructive lawmaking and led
to opposition accusations that
the President and his party,
as represented in Congress, were
not in accord.
With the exception of the
three armed forces ministers,
all members of the new cabinet
hold congressional seats which
they may continue to occupy but
without the right to vote. Seven
of the new ministers, four sena-
tors,and three deputies belong
to Belaunde's Popular Action
Party (AP). The two remaining
civilian portfolios are held
by deputies of the Christian
Democrat Party, political ally
of the AP. None of the new
cabinet members has even held
a ministerial post.
The minister of public
health, Senator Daniel Becerra
de la Flor, also heads the
cabinet as prime minister.
Becerra is a distinguished
physician, a personal friend of
Belaunde, and reportedly an
able politician. His relations
with all sectors of the AP are
good and his appointment has
been favorably received by the
opposition parties.
Three of the new ministers
(foreign affairs, government,
and finance) have in the past
been suspected of Communist or
far-leftist associations. Re-
cent information on their pres-
ent political complexion is frag-
mentary. The US Embassy in Lima
reports that their records in the
legislature since 1963 appear to
be of a conservative or moderate
nature.
Rumors of an impending cabi-
net change began to circulate
last week.
Despite public and
private enials by opposition
congressmen, cabinet members
apparently persisted in the belief
that an interpellation and censure
were planned. President Belaunde,
assured by the opposition leader-
ship that no censure would occur,
encouraged his cabinet to meet
the congressional request. On 13
September, however, all cabinet
members resigned.
Ranking military officers
reportedly had no plans to inter-
fere in the political contest
between the cabinet and Congress
and they may be pleased to see
a new trio heading the ministries
of War, Navy, and Air, thus clear-
ing the way for a er of top-
level promotions.
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