WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005000040001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 3, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Copy . No
SUMMARY
NTRA LNT LLIGEN E AGI NCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review, completed
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8 September 1965
OCI No. 0305/65
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EDT, 2 September 1965)
Page
VIETNAM
The Saigon government has issued a warning against dem-
onstrations 1
but has taken no direct measures so far to
curb the student protest movement in several northern
cities of South Vietnam. There was only one major ground
battle last week between Viet Cong and Vietnamese-US
forces, but the almost daily USAF B-52 Stratofortress
bombing missions against Viet Cong strongholds marked
the increased use of strategic air power in the South.
Statements from Peking last week revealed no change in
its hard line toward a negotiated settlement, and the
Chinese have begun to protest to the British against
alleged US use of Hong Kong as a "base of operations"
for the war in Vietnam.
NORTH VIETNAM MOBILIZING POPULACE BEHIND WAR EFFORT 5
A large-scale mobilization of able..bodied manpower dur-
ing the past few months, aside from the morale-building
factor, seems intended primarily to funnel labor into
repairing bomb damage and portering cargo around damaged
routes. It is also clearly designed to provide a pool
for a rapid build-up of the armed forces if required.
United Nations
GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS AT LOW EBB
Soviet criticism of the US draft treaty has brought
negotiations on nonproliferation of nuclear arms to a
standstill. The talks are expected to end in time to
prepare a report for presentation to the UN General
Assembly when it reconvenes on 21 September.
The Communist World
PEKING CREATES TIBET AUTONOMOUS REGION
Although opposition to Chinese rule is still substantial
in Tibet, Peking is evidently embarrassed by the failure
of its policy there and seems determined to establish at
least the facade of an "autonomous government."
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AGRICULTURAL PROSPECTS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Grain crop prospects this year are not promising in the
USSR, Eastern Europe, China, and North Korea, but are
good in North Vietnam. Most Communist countries will
probably be net grain importers in the 1965-66 crop year.
KASHMIR FIGHTING ESCALATES FURTHER
Following New Delhi's sharp response to Pakistani guer-
rilla activities in Indian Kashmir, Pakistan has moved
more directly into the fray with its own regular armed
forces.
INDONESIA PERSISTS IN PRO-COMMUNIST MOVES 14
Sukarno's government is indoctrinating the Indonesians
in leftist totalitarianism, and his friendship with
Peking flourishes. Harassment of Americans and US
installations continues.
NE WIN MAINTAINS CONTROL IN BURMA 15
City dwellers are unhappy over economic stagnation and
increased government controls, and lingering insurgency
remains a problem. The military regime, however, is not
now threatened.
FACTIONAL RIVALRIES SNAG RESHUFFLE OF LAOTIAN CABINET 16
Premier Souvanna's deputy is demanding several posts
for his followers, and other leaders are pressing their
claims. Government forces reportedly have recaptured
an important position in the north.
SOUTH KOREA CRACKS DOWN ON FOREIGN POLICY CRITICS 18
Demonstrations against the agreements to normalize rela-
tions with Japan persisted even after their ratification
in Seoul, and the regime is trying to end the controversy.
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MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD REAPPEARS IN EGYPT.
The once-powerful organization may again be plotting
and using violence to express discontent with.Nasir's
rule.
Europe
GREEK CROWN COUNCIL MEETS ON POLITICAL CRISIS
King Constantine is not bound to accept the council's
advice, but each successive failure to form a govern-
ment has eroded his prestige.
COST-SHARING PROBLEMS IN NATO
When the North Atlantic Council reconvenes next week,
it faces the need for early action on such financial
problems as funding this year's NATO infrastructure
program and transporting some headquarters units to a
military exercise in Turkey.
Western Hemisphere
SETTLEMENT REACHED IN DOMINICAN CRISIS
The rebels and Imbert's military chiefs have endorsed
the OAS Act of Reconciliation, and Hector Garcia Godoy's
provisional government is to be installed on 3 September.
The settlement, however, is only an initial step toward
reconstruction.
AGITATION AGAINST THE BOLIVIAN JUNTA INCREASING 25
Student demonstrations and brief mine strikes in the
past week were ostensibly called over economic issues,
but their primary goal is to embarrass the junta and
set the stage for its eventual overthrow.
INCREASING COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN BRAZILIAN LABOR MOVEMENT 26
Recent union elections in Guanabara and Sao Paulo demon-
strate renewed Communist strength, partly as a result
of rising living costs and high urban unemployment.
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DISORDER THREATENS IN COLOMBIA
Mounting economic and political problems could shake
the Valencia regime. Castro-Communist groups are active,
and key factions of the Conservative Party are threaten-
ing to withdraw from the coalition government.
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Political activity in South
Vietnam during the past week con-
tinued to focus on the student
protest movement centered in Hud
and other northern cities. The
movement has not gained signifi-
cant momentum, and attempts to
coordinate a similar protest in
Saigon have thus far been unsuc-
cessful. However, a public rally
in Hue on the morning of 29 Au-
gust--although attended mostly
by students--resulted in a work
stoppage affecting public trans-
portation and market activity.
The government has taken no
direct measures against the stu-
dent movement thus far. Premier
Ky, however, on 31 August stated
that the government was prepared
to take stern measures against
troublemakers. Replying indi-
rectly to student demands for the
removal of Chief of State Thieu,
Ky announced that no individual
is responsible for policy but
that it is determined by the
collective leadership of the
Directorate.
The continued unity of the
military leadership, however, de-
pends largely on General Thi, who
is responsible militarily for
the northern provinces where most
of the unrest exists. Thi has
advocated a wait-and-see policy
regarding the student movement.
The Military Situation
After sustaining heavy cas-
ualties during the two previous
weeks, Viet Cong forces last
week managed to avoid major con-
tact with Vietnamese Government
and US forces. The only excep-
tion to this was in Phong Dinh
Province, when the rapid deploy-
ment of government troops on 27
August resulted in heavy fight-
ing with a Viet Cong battalion
during daylight hours. Govern-
ment casualties were high, but
Viet Cong losses were probably
greater.
Viet Cong activity elsewhere
was characterized by attacks on
lightly defended towns and gov-
ernment outposts. During the
night of 30-31 August, a force
estimated at battalion size at-
tacked and destroyed a government
Regional Forces outpost at An
Hoa in Quang Ngai Province. Ten
defenders were killed and eight
wounded. The delta region south
of Saigon was again subjected to
a series of small-scale attacks.
Enemy activity in the central
highlands was notably light.
Government and US military
activity during the week was
highlighted by several unopposed
road-clearing operations. A joint
operation secured Route 19 between
Qui Nhon and An Khe to safeguard
the deployment of the US First
Cavalry (Air Mobile) Division,
scheduled to arrive in Vietnam
later this month. Government
forces also reopened Route 21
from the coastal city of Nha Trang
to the provincial capital of Ban
Me Thuot, and Route 14 between
Ban Me Thuot and the provincial
capital of Gia Nghia.
The past week also marked
the increased use of strategic
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air power in South Vietnam. USAF
B-52 Stratofortresses from Guam
flew almost daily saturation
bombing missions against Viet
Cong targets in the Quang Tin -
Quang Ngai Province border area
and in the enemy War Zone "D"
stronghold northeast of Saigon.
shoulder to the end to defeat
US imperialist aggression."
This message was the first
such top-level Chinese statement
which omitted the qualifications
"if needed" or "if requested."
By dropping the usual caveat,
Peking is probably attempting to
increase the impact of its threat
to intervene without actually
extending its commitment.
SAM Site at Ningming Air Base
Photography
reveals a probable six-position
surface-to-air missile site at
the new Chinese air base at
Ningming near the DRV border.
Five of the positions are vis-
ible and all appear occupied;
two missiles on transporters
Communist Political Developments
Peking is still showing no
indication of any softening in
its hard line toward a negotiated
settlement of the Vietnam prob-
lem and has reiterated its pub-
lic pledge to send volunteers to
Vietnam in somewhat more positive
and threatening terms. On 1 Sep-
tember Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-
chi, Chu Te,and Chou En-lai, in
a joint message to DRV party and
state leaders commemorating the
20th anniversary of the founding
of the DRV, stated flatly that
the Chinese people "are deter-
mined to join the Vietnamese
people to fight shoulder to
Peking has also reiterated
its "firm opposition" to UN con-
sideration of the Vietnam prob-
lem. Its news agency on 1 Sep-
tember denounced as "distortions"
and "fabrications" reports in the
French weekly New Observer that
the Chinese haU_Fo v s ing
French Minister of Cultural Af-
fairs Andre Malraux in early Au-
gust that once Peking regained
the Chinese seat in the UN Secu-
rity Council, the UN would prove
an appropriate forum for discus-
sions on Vietnam.
Hanoi also took a hard line
on negotiations. In a 31 August
address marking the 20th anniver-
sary of the DRV, Premier Pham Van
Dong drew an implicit analogy be-
tween the war against the French
and the current situation, assert-
ing that until military defeats
convinced the French they could
not win in Vietnam, they had used
negotiations and agreements for
their own ends. He clearly implied
that the Viet Cong position is
not yet strong enough to make ne-
gotiations with the US advanta-
geous for the Communists.
The rather somber tone of the
speech also suggests Hanoi does
not expect the Viet Cong to at-
tain a position strong enough for
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negotiation in the near future.
Customary boasts of imminent
success were missing from Dong's
claims of a victory by "libera-
tion forces" at Chu Lai, and he
repeated the line that the Viet-
namese are prepared to fight
"five, ten, 20 years or even
longer."
On 1 September, Peking made
its second formal protest to
London within a week concerning
alleged US use of Hong Kong as
a "base of operations" for the
war in Vietnam. The UK chargd
in Peking was handed a sharply
worded note which asserted that
British support of US "aggres-
sion" in Vietnam indicated a
policy of "deliberate hostility"
to the Chinese people and was
"intolerable" to the Chinese
Government.
Citing visits of US Navy
ships, military aircraft, and
armed forces personnel to Hong
Kong, the Chinese demanded that
the British immediately take ef-
fective steps to stop all activ-
ities of "US aggressor forces"
there. The note warned that if
the British allow the colony to
be drawn into the Vietnam war,
the UK "must bear full responsi-
bility" for the consequences.
Peking apparently is attempt-
ing to raise fears in the UK and
elsewhere that further escalation
of the war in Vietnam could re-
sult in Chinese reprisals in
other areas. The Hong Kong au-
thorities have already reacted
by requesting that the US re-
strict its use of the colony as
a rest and recreation area for
US forces in Vietnam.
Soviet party chief Brezhnev
issued a sharp and personal de-
nunciation of President John-
son's Vietnam policy on 27 Au-
gust at a Kremlin dinner honor-
ing visiting Egyptian President
N-asir. Brezhnev quoted President
Johnson as asserting "with satis-
faction" that the destruction of
schools, hospitals, and the ir-
rigation network in the DRV is
"in accord with the planned ob-
jective" and accused the US of
attempting to starve the North
Vietnamese into submission.
North Vietnamese politburo
member Hoang Van Hoan concluded
his two-week official visit to
the USSR with the expected
flourish of expressions of deep
gratitude for the "magnanimous
help"--both political and ma-
terial--supplied b Moscow to the
ietnamese.
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A large-scale mobilization
of able-bodied manpower--appar-
ently designed to give as many
of the people as possible a
feeling of active participation
in the defense of their country
--has taken place in North Viet-
nam during the past few months
in reaction to the US air at-
tacks on the DRV and to the in-
creased pace of fighting in the
South. The evidence available
thus far, however, does not in-
dicate that a massive military
draft call has been issued.
Rather, the mobilization appears
intended mainly to funnel labor
into repairing bomb damage and
into portering cargo around
routes damaged by air attack.
On the military side, the
move is clearly intended to pro-
vide for a rapid build-up of the
armed forces if required. For
the present, it appears that
this will be accomplished in
large part by substantially in-
creasing the size of the militia
and other paramilitary organiza-
tions. The regime is putting
increased emphasis on the train-
ing of such "home guard" units,
probably to create a sizable re-
serve. There are an estimated
3.9 million men between the
ages of 15 and 49 in the DRV.
newspaper stressed the importance
of a rapid expansion in the
strength of the militia and
"self-defense" forces, assert-
ing that they constitute the
"mainstay" in the countryside
in the defense with light arms
against US air attacks. One
editorial stated that these
forces also constitute a large
pool to replenish the regular
armed forces.
e regime has been encouraging
young men to join the "three
ready" movement: ready to fight,25X1
ready to join the army, and ready
to go anywhere the government
sends them. Hanoi radio has
also carried numerous reports
of women taking over men's work,
thus freeing the men for mili- 25X1
tary service.
Several editorials'in early
August in the DRV's daily army
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as mobilization for "defense
service" probably covers the
organization of repair and por-
tering teams.
A major step in this cam-
paign was the establishment in
early July of so-called "Youth
Work Brigades." Reports indicate
that large numbers of youths have
been enrolled in these brigades
by patriotic appeals and promises
of preferential treatment after
the war. These brigades will
probably be of considerable help
in keeping essential transport
moving throughout the DRV. I I
The meeting in Geneva of the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee (ENDC) reached a low ebb
this week, with little if any
progress being made and with time
running out. The talks are ex-
pected to end in time to prepare
a report for presentation to the
United Nations General Assembly
when it reconvenes on 21 Septem-
ber.
The Soviet Union has strongly
criticized the US draft treaty on
nonproliferation of nuclear arms
on the grounds that it would not
prevent West Germany from acquir-
ing such weapons through a NATO
nuclear force. The draft also
caused problems in the Western
camp. Britain continued to op-
pose articles that might under
some circumstances permit drop-
ping the nuclear power veto over
decisions on the use of nuclear
weapons by a future Allied force.
Former West German Chancellor
Adenauer called the treaty an
"instrument of delivering Europe
into the hands of the Soviet
Union."
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The only other significant
proposal before the ENDC is the
Italian proposal that nonnuclear
states declare that they will
not manufacture or acquire nu-
clear weapons and will not seek
or receive assistance from other
states in the manufacture of such
weapons. After a certain period
of years the signatories will
meet to consider extension of the
declaration, depending on progress
made toward international agree-
ments on nonproliferation and re-
duction of nuclear arsenals. The
Italian plan provides an escape
clause whereby signatories will
regain freedom of action should
a nonnuclear state acquire nuclear
weapons.
Rome intends to present this
plan at the final sessions of the
ENDC after consulting with the four
Western members of the ENDC, West
Germany, and the NATO Council.
Later it will be presented to the
UN General Assembly. Delegates
have been discussing this proposal
informally and generally approve
it if it does not interfere with
negotiations on the nonprolifera-
tion treaty.
India, however, insists that
nuclear states must take the in-
itiative in steps toward disarma-
ment such as the comprehensive
test ban treaty, a freeze on nu-
clear weapons, and reduction of
existing nuclear stockpiles. The
Indian delegate maintains that
it is unrealistic to ask any
country to forswear the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons while
other countries continue to hold
them. Pressures are strong in
India to become a member of the
nuclear club for prestige reas-
ons as well as because of the
Chinese nuclear threat.
Many of the nonaligned dele-
gates had hoped to negotiate on
other disarmament issues such
as extending the test ban treaty
to underground testing, but with
only a few days left it seems
that such matters will be con-
sidered after the General Assem-
bly meets, F
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The Communist World
PEKING CREATES TIBET AUTONOMOUS REGION
The formation of the Tibet
Autonomous Region after a long
delay marks a new phase in Pek-
king's efforts to overcome re-
sistance to Chinese rule. The
choice of Minister of Public
Security Hsieh Fu-chih to lead
the Chinese delegation to the
inaugural ceremony in Lhasa on
1 September was clearly intended
to intimidate the Tibetans. By
sending Hsieh, a low-ranking
member of the central committee,
Peking also showed its displeas-
ure with the Tibetans. Men of
politburo rank had represented
Peking at the inauguration of
the three other autonomous re-
gions since 1949 (Sinkiang,
Ninghsia, and Kwangsi).
Normally Peking has ac-
corded "autonomy" to a region
populated by a non-Chinese eth-
nic minority only after mili-
tary and political opposition
to Chinese rule has ended. Po-
litical opposition in Tibet is
still substantial, but Peking
is evidently embarrassed by the
failure of its policy there and
seems determined to establish
at least the facade of an "au-
tonomous" government.
For about a year the Chi-
nese have been increasingly im-
patient with the sullen and
hostile Tibetans. Last Decem-
ber they deposed the Panchen
Lama, the resident spiritual
leader of Tibet, and also an-
nounced they would tolerate no
opposition to "reforms" they
intended to institute soon.
Preparations to raise Tibet
to full "autonomous" status were
initiated in 1956 but deferred
in 1957, 1960, and 1963, largely
because the Chinese were unable
to persuade adequate numbers of
respectable Tibetans to serve
as puppet officials. Peking
recently claimed that there are
16,000 Tibetan officials at
various levels of government,
but the Chinese probably consider
only a few trustworthy. Most are
apparently fresh recruits, for
in January 1965 the claim had
been made that Tibetan officials
numbered only 5,800. Last year
a journal in Peking published
the admission that it has been
found impossible to win over
older Tibetans. It also said
that even younger Tibetans are
hard to influence because, as
a group, they are "still under
the influence of the old ideol-
ogies and habits, particularly
the religious superstitions,
and they are confused on the
nationalities question and their
motherland." Until it is more
confident about the reliability
of Tibetan officials, Peking
probably will feel compelled to
retain Chinese in authority down
to the local level.
The Chinese undoubtedly will
also continue to maintain garri-
son forces in Tibet to contain
dissident actions that still oc-
casionally occur. Tibet has a
population of about 1.3 million,
but the proportion of adult males
is abnormally low, as a result
of heavy migration and savage
Chinese reprisals following the
1959 revolt. The estimated
60,000 Chinese troops stationed
in Tibet can probably keep any
disturbances in check.
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INDIA
Boundary shown on Indian maps'`,,
and Communist China
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AGRICULTURAL PROSPECTS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Grain crop prospects this
year are not promising in the
USSR, Eastern Europe, China, and
North Korea, but are good in
North Vietnam. Most Communist
countries will probably be net
grain importers in the 1965-66
crop year (July-June), and their
total imports from the free world
may be around 20 million tons.
Agricultural prospects in
the USSR are mixed. Total grain
production is estimated to be
10-15 percent below last year's
good harvest, and wheat produc-
tion probably will be down 10-20
percent, primarily because of
prolonged drought in the New
Lands. This may cause some re-
duction in the quality of bread,
but food shortages on the scale
of 1963-64 are unlikely. Since
1 July the USSR has purchased
7 million tons of wheat and may
need more, depending on the final
outcome of the 1965 harvest.
Livestock production, however,
is expected to be the best in
many years, and relatively good
crops of potatoes, sugar beets,
vegetables, and sunflowers are
anticipated.
In Eastern Europe the total
harvest is estimated to be about
5 percent below last year's good
crop. Bread-grain production
has increased in most of this
area, but the quality of wheat
will be low in the northern coun-
tries because of unusually wet
harvest conditions. Production
of most spring-planted grains is
not expected to be as good as in
1964, and in some areas local
shortages of bread and hoarding
of flour have been reported.
Contracts for grain deliveries
from the free world have reached
2.2 million tons, in addition
to standing agreements with the
USSR for an estimated 3 million
tons. Imports from all sources
could exceed last year's 9 mil-
lion tons. Although forage crops
are generally good, the probable
shortfall in output of feed grains
and potatoes will depress meat
production in 1966.
In Communist China the har-
vest of early grains is estimated
to be 10 percent below last year's.
The early rice crop was above
average, but insufficient to com-
pensate for the very poor har-
vest of winter grains. Prospects
for the more important fall crops
are mixed. Growing conditions
are generally good in most of
the major rice-producing areas,
but the outlook for other late
grain crops is generally unsatis-
factory. China's foreign pur-
chases of wheat for delivery by
the end of June 1966 now equal
4.1 million tons, and total pur-
chases this crop year may well
exceed last year's imports of
5.3 million tons. All of China's
imports of wheat are from the
free world.
Grain production in North
Korea may be even lower than
the very poor harvest in 1964.
North Vietnam evidently has har-
vested another bumper spring
rice crop, but bombing attacks
have apparently interfered with
food distribution causina local
food shortages.
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Table 1. PRODUCTION OF GRAIN IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES (Million Metric Tons)
120
Total (excluding
immature corn)
USSR
GRAIN
EASTERN EUROPE
(including Albania
and Yugoslavia)
Bread grains
NORTH VIETNAM
RICE
Harvested
early summer
(excluding
tubers )
1963 1964 Forecast
1965
Not
avai labl
Not
f 1
1 - .r
We
Annual Average 1958-62 1963 1964 Forecast
1965
'Including tubers on a grain-equivalent basis of 4 metric tons of tubers
to I metric ton of grain.
Not
available
Forecast
1965
Table 2. COMMUNIST GRAIN IMPORTS FROM FREE WORLD
Information as of 15 August 1965, Thousand Metric Tons
Country 1963-64 Preliminary Contracts
1964-65 1965-66
(1 July-30 June) (1 July - 30 June)
USSR * 11,357 3,549 7,225
EASTERN EUROPE
Bulgaria
421
500
100
Czechoslovakia
501
850
380
East Germany
635
850
600
Hungary
704
300
Too
Yugoslavia
697
1,412
247
Total Eastern Europe 5,787 5,967 2,227
Total Bloc 22,998 14,878 13,522
Includes wheat or flour shipped to Cuba and Eastern Europe, 25X1
** More than 75% of total grain estimated to be wheat.
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Asia-Africa
KASHMIR FIGHTING ESCALATES FURTHER
The worsening situation in
Kashmir has moved into a new
stage in which wider and more
sustained hostilities have begun
along the 1949 cease-fire line.
The first stage began in
early August when Pakistan--frus-
trated by years of deadlock on
the Kashmir question--made good
its long-bruited threat to under-
take covert guerrilla warfare in-
side Indian Kashmir. The initial
Indian response was quick and to
the point in terms of direct op-
erations against the infiltrators
imposition of tightened security
measures aimed at dissuading any
sympathetic reaction among Indian
Kashmiris, and pressure on the
UN to issue a report critical of
Pakistan's activities.
bringing its regular armed forces
to bear on Indian units on both
sides of the old cease-fire line.
Armor and tactical air power have
already been committed by both
sides to fighting in the Chhamb
area.
Pakistan's actions sug-
gest an abandonment of the con-
cept which has called for a con-
tinuing disavowed guerrilla effort
in favor of more rapid escalation
and more direct confrontation.
On the Indian side, the re-
sponse continues to be confident
and measured, in sharp contrast
to the confusion which prevailed
earlier this year during the Rann
of Kutch confrontation. In part,
this reflects the Indian feeling
of being in a position of strength;
in part it grows out of Prime Min-
ister Shastri's growing confidence
in his own role, the result of a
conspicuous strengthening of his
political position in the inter-
vening months. There are warhawks
on the Indian side, but thus far
their influence has been muted.
The UN's failure to weigh
in against Pakistan led India to
undertake more direct military
action around mid-August. The
Indians tightened their controls
along the cease-fire line to cur-
tail continuing infiltrations and
began hitting out with consider-
able success at selected targets
on the Pakistani side of the line
in order to destroy the infiltra-
tors' bases and harass their lines
of communication. In the Uri-
Poonch area, India has tried with
apparent success to slice off a
salient of Pakistani territory.
The third stage has now be-
gun. In response to India's suc-
cessful counteractions, Pakistan
has moved openly into the fray as
an active and avowed protagonist,
Through it all, the UN has
been ineffectual, both in the
field in Kashmir, where a 45-man
observer group is being ignored
by both sides, and in New York,
where U Thant's efforts have been
hamstrung thus far by Indian and
Pakistani pressures.
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#.q Indian moves across the
Cease-fire Line
tPakistani moves across the
i-al
Cease-fire Line
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The Indonesian Government's
domestic and foreign policies
remain close to Communist objec-
tives. The government is train-
ing the Indonesian people for
participation in a highly devel-
oped leftist totalitarian system.
Cadres of university professors,
high-school teachers, government
officials, and leaders of non-
government organizations are be-
ing subjected to intensive and
lengthy indoctrination courses.
There is heavy emphasis on Marx-
ism, on the wisdom of supermortal
Sukarno, and on Nasakom--Sukarno's
acronym for the fusion of na-
tionalist, religious, and Commu-
nist thought in Indonesia.
The army, once an effective
brake on Communist growth, shows
progressively less inclination
and ability to cope with the Su-
karno-Communist drive. There is
new evidence of Communist pene-
tration of the military, and
high-level army resistance to the
creation of an armed force of
"workers and peasants" is vague
and ineffective.
Sino-Indonesian friendship
flourishes. Foreign Minister
Subandrio reportedly will go to
Peking on 9 September, a visit
which follows within a month his
Chinese counterpart's appearance
in Djakarta. An economic dele-
gation is scheduled to go to
China this, month.
An "international antifor-
eign-military-bases conference"
is scheduled to be held in
Djakarta in mid-October. Indo-
nesia and China will try to use
this to stimulate enthusiasm
for the Algiers.Afro-Asian Con-
ference the following month. Su-
karno will also lobby for his
Conference of the Newly Emerging
Forces, scheduled to be held in
Djakarta in mid-1966.
The anti-Malaysia campaign
is largely unchanged. Singa-
pore's secession gave Indonesia
a psychological boost, and Dja-
karta aims to persist with its
confrontation policy until Ma-
laysian dismemberment is complete
and the British have left the area.
Harassment of Americans and
official US installations con-
tinues. The US consulate in Sura-
baya, East Java, in particular has
experienced mounting hostility,
including a mob attack on its of-
fices and an informal request that
the consul be declared persona
non grata.
Negotiations are under way
to purchase the refineries of
two of the three large Western
oil companies--Standard Vacuum
and Shell. Although oil opera-
tions are still relatively un-
hampered, the three companies
expect that in due course inter-
ference will greatly increase, 25X1
and they do not discount the pos-
sibility of a direct order of
expulsion. The American-owned
rubber companies are already
largely Indonesian operated, but
reduced proceeds are still oin
to the Parent firms.
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After over three years in
power as chairman of the Revolu-
tionary Council, General Ne Win
retains firm control of Burma de-
spite popular disgruntlement with
the country's economic stagnation.
Recent internal developments
reflect Ne Win's entrenched
position. Neither the Buddhist
clergy nor the general public re-
acted noticeably to the arrests in
late April of more than 100 monks
charged with illegal political
activity or with dealings in the
black market. The subsequent
arrest of former brigadier general
Aung Gyi, once Ne Win's chief
lieutenant, served to neutralize
him as a potential rallying point
for Burma's multitude of plotters
and insurgent groups. The July
anniversary of the 1962 student
riots at Rangoon University--the
only instance in which the Ne
Win regime has resorted to violent
suppressive tactics--passed
quietly despite a belated student
protest effort.
Ne Win has made little prog-
ress, however, in ending the
chronic insurgency practiced by
small groups of underground Com-
munists and disaffected ethnic
minorities. Last year's truce
between the government and a prom-
inent Karen insurgent leader is
in danger of breaking down. Other
uncoordinated insurgent activities
are hampering agricultural pro-
duction and require the attention
of a large portion of the army,
even though they do not seriously
threaten the government.
The lack of economic prog-
ress remains the military regime's
major problem. The Burmese have
failed to respond with any en-
thusiasm to the increasing gov-
ernment controls involved in
Ne Win's "Burmese Way to Social-
ism." Mismanagement of the com-
modity distribution system has
resulted in shortages of several
basic items. The subsequent
rationing of such goods caused
further public annoyance. Most
of the reorganizations and
changes, moreover, have occurred
in the modern sector of the
economy, and living standards of
the 85 percent of the people
who live in rural areas have
been little affected.
In foreign affairs, Ne Win
is maintaining strict neutrality.
In his visit to Communist China
in late July, Ne Win evaded
Chinese efforts to enlist his
support for their Southwest Asia
position. On Vietnam, the joint
communiqud expressed only mutual
"deep concern over the increas-
ingly grave situation," and
called for a return to the 1954
Geneva agreements. Chinese
leaders will probably fare lit-
tle better during their return
visit to Rangoon, which may
take place early this month.
To "balance" the Peking
visit, General Ne Win has accepted
an official invitation to tour
the USSR from 15 to 22 September.
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FACTIONAL RIVALRIES SNAG RESHUFFLE OF LAOTIAN CABINET
Premier Souvanna Phouma of
Laos is encountering problems
in his efforts to reshape his
cabinet to suit the leadership
of the various'political fac-
tions in the legislature elected
in July. His principal diffi-
culties apparently are with Dep-
uty Premier Leuam Insixiengmay,
who commands the support of a
sizable bloc of deputies and is
demanding several posts for his
own candidates. In addition,
Souvanna has to consider the
claims of the neutralist and
Sananikone factions, which are
also pressing for greater recog-
nition.
Regardless of the eventual
changes agreed upon by the con-
tending non-Communist groupings,
the Pathet Lao has made clear
its opposition to any cabinet
which may emerge. A recent
Pathet Lao broadcast condemned
the July elections as "deceit-
ful," and protested that the
new government instituted by
the National Assembly, whatever
its composition, would be "to-
tally illegal and invalid."
On the military scene,
rightist forces north of Ban
Ban claim to have recaptured
the strategic hill position of
Hua Muong, which had been lost
last winter. Key support in
this drive has been afforded by
large-scale US and Laotian close
air support operations. The re-
covery of this position, with
its 1,400-foot airstrip, would
significantly improve the govern-
ment's guerrilla capability against
Communist forces operating along
Route 6 southwest of Samneua town.
In the Plaine des Jarres
area, the situation remains rela-
tively quiet, with government
and Communist forces facing each
other along Route 7 a few miles
east of Muong Soui. There have
been some indications that the
Communist troops have been suf-
fering severe supply shortages
as a result of the aerial inter-
diction of key supply routes from
North Vietnam.
Communist activity along the
network of roads and trails lac-
ing the panhandle area continues.
In the Mu Gia Pass area, North
Vietnamese troops are evidently
being used to repair sections of
Route 12 between the pass and the
Route 23 junction, while coolie
trains are moving supplies over
a trail bypassing damaged sections
of the road.
Farther south, a road watch
team counted some 700 Pathet Lao/
North Vietnamese troops walking
south 25 miles north of Muong
Phine between 25 and 31 August.
Approximately 3,200 Communist
troops have walked south
this oint sinc
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Following the National As-
sembly's ratification of the
agreements normalizing relations
with Japan on 14 August, the
South Korean Government has
launched a crackdown to end
persistent opposition to this
major foreign policy move. Jap-
anese approval is expected when
the Diet convenes next month.
First to feel the crack-
down were students who demon-
strated in Seoul and other
cities from 20 to 26 August.
They demanded the voiding of
the treaty ratification and
freedom from alleged US polit-
ical pressure, and called for
new assembly elections. Army
units finally were called on
to aid police in dispersing the
students. The government ar-
rested hundreds of demonstra-
tors, forced the expulsion or
suspension of many student
leaders, and appointed a new
education minister and presi-
dent of Seoul National Univer-
sity. Most colleges and uni-
versities in the capital sus-
pended sessions for a short
cooling-off period. Campus
leaders reportedly are planning
further rallies soon, however.
Disgruntled retired general-
grade officers have also felt
the crackdown. Eight were de-
tained on 28 August on charges
of "extreme criticism of the
government," and four were sub-
sequently indicted for defaming
the President. All belonged to
the increasingly active National
Council to Safeguard the Father-
land, which also includes clergy-
men, professors, and students,
and according to the government
intends to form a new conserva-
tive party as well as to incite
the public on the Japanese is-
sue.
In a further effort to
still the controversy, the Pak
regime recessed the National
Assembly when it convened for
its regular session on 1 Septem-
ber. This guards against the
chance that the opposition as-
semblymen might end their re-
cent boycott in order to regain
a forum for attacking official
policy.
The government is only be-
ginning broader efforts to cope
with the widespread hostility
toward improving relations with
Japan. In one move to blunt
criticism, it is drafting legis-
lation to prevent the illegal
flow of Japanese funds into
Korea. Critics remain concerned
over the prospects for official
graft in the handling of the
$800 million Japan will supply
in grants, long-term credits,
and private investments.
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Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 3 Sept 65
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Scattered reports indicate
that the Egyptian Muslim Brother-
hood, once a powerful Islamic
organization that engaged freely
in terrorist tactics, may be
once again plotting and using
violence to express its discon-
tent with the Nasir regime.
Although it constitutes no
threat to the deeply entrenched
regime, the brotherhood has sur-
vived all attempts at total sup-
pression and, as the most co-
herent body outside of official
control, is a source of continu-
ing trouble. It had been largely
inactive since 1954, when it was
ostensibly crushed following its
attempt to assassinate Nasir.
The brotherhood has presumably
retained a large number of loyal
followers attracted by its re-
ligious spirit and morality,
and its extremism.
In July, large numbers of
the brotherhood, along with some
Communists and army officers,
were arrested in connection with
a suspected coup plot. A re-
cent attempt to arrest a member
led to an armed clash in which
both police and civilians, pos-
sibly a sizable number, were
killed. Last week a crowd of
several thousand clashed with
police in Cairo after seizing
the coffin of Mustafa Nahas, the
last civilian premier of Egypt,
from his funeral procession. It
is probably that the brotherhood,
whose leadership was similar in
background to that of Nahas' Wafd
party, joined in this opportunity
to defy the government and ac-
claim Nahas a "leader of the
nation."
Nasir now has openly ac-
knowledged the brotherhood's
activities, and charged that
funds from members living abroad
are being sent into Egypt to
destroy the revolution. He may
be exaggerating the threat in
order to sidetrack public dis-
content.
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Europe
GREEK CROWN COUNCIL MEETS ON POLITICAL CRISIS
Following Greek premier
Tsirimokos' failure to win a con-
fidence vote on 28 August, King
Constantine summoned a crown
council of former premiers and
party leaders on 1 September in
a further attempt to end the
country's seven-week-old crisis.
The King is not bound to
follow the council's recommenda-
tions, and reports on his own
preferences point to several pos-
sibilities. He may next try for
a national coalition government
of all non-Communist parties, or
again offer the mandate to former
deputy premier Stephanopoulos,
in spite of the latter's failure
to receive sufficient parliamen-
tary support on an earlier "ex-
ploratory" mandate.
In any event, the King still
appears opposed to elections and
to the return to power of ousted
premier Papandreou.
Constantine's decision
probably will be announced this
week end.
Papandreou now is publicly
calling for elections within
45 days.
Pro-Papandreou demonstra-
tions continue and the King's
position in the dispute becomes
more precarious as each suc-
cessive failure to form a new
government further erodes his
prest e.
25
25
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COST-SHARING PROBLEMS IN NATO
When the North Altantic
Council reconvenes next week,
it will face the need for early
action on financial problems
that have been hanging fire for
many months.
Perhaps the most signifi-
cant matter on the agenda is a
reallocation of costs of the
NATO infrastructure program,
which has built almost $3 bil-
lion worth of installations and
facilities since it was adopted
in 1951. The US has been pro-
viding almost a third of the
funds in recent years for each
annual program, but its share
in utilization of the facilities
has been only about a fifth.
NATO "integration" is certain to
be seen as a further weakening in
the Alliance.
Another funding problem is
the cost of transporting certain
headquarters units of the Allied
Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force
to participate in a military ex-
ercise in Turkey. Last year
France approved the exercise,
named "Eastern Express," but re-
served on the transport costs.
In the interests of harmony the
US and UK then offered to furnish
free transport, but the exercise
had to be put off because of the
political tension over Cyprus.
This year the offer--described
as "an exception to the rule"--
has been withdrawn.
Early this year, the US
asked that its share of the 1965
costs be reduced to 25 percent
and its share of future programs
to 20 percent, but the US pro-
posal has been given a cool re-
ception by the other allies and
no agreement is in sight. Until
the dispute is settled, approxi-
mately $138.5 million worth of
construction which should have
been started in the spring is
being held up because no con-
tracts can be let. Continued
inability to settle differences
over a program which has been
held up as a model of effective
France now has charged the
US and UK with inconsistency, and
the US has pointed out that the
shoe should be on the other foot
since France had accepted common
funding for support units in the
case of a similar exercise in
Scandinavia.
A decision on this problem
is becoming increasingly urgent
because of Ankara's warning that
it attaches great importance to
holding t e, deferred exercise
this r
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Western Hemisphere
SETTLEMENT REACHED IN DOMINICAN CRISIS
Representatives of both
sides in the Dominican Republic
endorsed the OAS Act of Recon-
ciliation on 31 August, and the
provisional government is sched-
uled to be installed on 3 Sep-
tember.
The rebels, however, are
already misinterpreting some
of the provisions. Some are
viewing the changes regarding
the withdrawal of the Inter-
American Peace Force (IAPF) as
meeting rebel demands that it
be withdrawn rapidly, and state-
ments by Caamano have probably
contributed to this view.
Imbert evidently decided
to resign after seeing that
his efforts to remain in power
were hopeless. He made his
announcement on Monday night,
but only after a week of seek-
ing support among the military
for his regime's position and
sponsoring a mass rally to dem-
onstrate the nation's commit-
ment to anti-Communism. He and
most Government of National Re-
construction (GNR) members re-
fused to approve the Act of Rec-
onciliation.. Moreover, there
are already tentative indica-
tions that Imbert is consider-
ing taking a leading part in a
rightist coalition to prepare
for the elections to be held in
about nine months.
The signature of Imbert's
regime was, in effect, provided
by the GNR military chiefs and
Defense Minister Francisco Rivera
Caminero. They signed a decla-
ration appended to the act, pledg-
ing their firm acceptance both
of the OAS proposals and of Hec-
tor Garcia Godoy as provisional
president. It appeared that the
chiefs' actions did not command
the wholehearted support of Gen-
eral Wessin and other military
officers. Wessin seems to have
been involved on 29 August in a
mortar attack on the rebel zone
which provoked a firefight be-
tween the IAPF and the rebels.
The attack may have been designed
to disrupt negotiations.
The new provisional presi-
dent is a moderate who retained
the respect of both sides during
the arduous negotiations. A
former diplomat under Trujillo,
Garcia Godoy also served as for-
eign minister under Bosch. While
he has been receptive to US ad-
vice, he has stressed that his
new regime must be "truly inde-
pendent." He believes the de-
velopment of the country cannot
be left to extremists but should
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be channeled into "realistic"
social, economic, and military
reforms. Garcia Godoy may be
attacked, however, either be-
cause of his past association
with ex-President Balaguer's
Reformist Party or because of
his upper-class background.
Garcia Godoy's tentative
cabinet appointments are gen-
erally political neutrals who
are dedicated and apparently
competent. The new President
may keep the foreign ministry
post for himself and will appar-
ently retain Rivera as his de-
fense minister, at least for a
short period. The appointments
are designed to contribute to
what Garcia Godoy views as the
major functions of the pro-
visional regime: getting the
country going again and pre--
paring for the elections.
It appears that political
activity will begin almost im-
mediately despite provisions
in the settlement for a six-
month political truce. Rival
leaders of the major Dominican
Revolutionary Party are reportedly
planning to return--Angel Miolan
almost immediately and Juan Bosch
in mid-September. Neither one
has given any firm indication of
his plans.
The settlement embodied in
the Act of Reconciliation, al-
though a diplomatic triumph for
Ambassador Bunker and the OAS,
will be only an initial step to-
ward reconstruction after one of
the most bitter and destructive
civil wars in Latin American
history. The hatreds fanned dur-
ing the past four months run deep
and will not be erased easily. A
compromise settlement is a new
experience for Dominicans, many
of whom consider it more logical
for one or the other of the rival
factions to go down in defeat.
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AGITATION AGAINST THE BOLIVIAN JUNTA INCREASING
Agitation against the Bo-
livian military junta by stu-
dents and miners is increasing,
but the junta is believed capable
of handling the situation. On
31 August, students from the Uni-
versity of Oruro blocked the main
square of the city in demonstra-
tions similar to those held dur-
ing the past two weeks at univer-
sities in Cochabamba and La Paz.
Miners at Huanuni struck for 48
hours on 26 and 27 August as did
those at the important Catavi -
Siglo Veinte complex on 30 and
31 August. The Catavi - Siglo
Veinte workers are threatening
to go on general strike on 7 Sep-
tember if their demands for
higher wages are not met.
The student demonstrations
and mine strikes, ostensibly
called over economic issues, are
designed primarily to embarrass
the junta and to create an atmos-
phere of agitation leading to its
eventual overthrow. The students,
led by their leftist rectors, are
using the financial difficulties
of the universities to explain
their discontent. Political mo-
tivations are evident, however.
The junta has already gone out
of its way to appease the stu-
dents and has programed budget
increases to remedy their eco-
nomic plight.
The strikes in the mines
are designed to make the junta
appear antilabor and to pres-
sure it into renouncing its mine
reform program. A reduction in
wages is the primary grievance,
but the miners are also demanding
other concessions which, if
granted, would scuttle the re-
form program. The Trotskyite
Revolutionary Workers' Party ap-
pears to have gained control in
some of the major mines, although
moderate elements are still prom-
inent. The mine situation is
delicate, and violence is pos-
sible in the coming weeks.
La Paz is relatively quies-
cent politically, at least on the
surface. Most parties are pre-
occupied with internal dissensions,
but there is evidence of growing
anti-junta sentiment in all. Cur-
rent political activity is focus-
ing on the issue of general elec-
tions and Co-President Barrientos'
definite, but unannounced, candi-
dacy. Most parties are calling for
an early return to constitutional
rule, and there are indications
that the junta might hold elec-
tions as early as next May.
The issue of Barrientos' can-
didacy is a potentially trouble-
some one, for it involves contin-
ued military unity. Some ranking
officers feel that Barrientos
should not run as a military can-
didate since this could plunge the
armed forces even deeper into the
political morass.
The rivalry between Barrientos
and Co-President Ovando is also
disturbing to many military com- 25X1
manders who see this as leading
to an eventual armed confrontation
between military units.
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INCREASING COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN BRAZILIAN LABOR MOVEMENT
Renewed Communist strength
in the Brazilian labor movement
is evidenced by the results of
recent important union elections.
In the large Guanabara metal-
workers' union, a Communist-
backed slate won by a margin of
two to one over the progovern-
ment ticket. Pro-Communists
also made electoral gains in key
Sao Paulo locals representing
metalworkers and bank workers.
Although the government has
sought to keep known Communists
off the ballots, it has been un-
able to prevent the formation
of tickets consisting of lesser
known party members and sympa-
thizers. Another Communist
technique has been to form unity
slates with ostensibly independ-
ent candidates.
is little official interest in
instituting relief measures.
Many of the reform programs
that would most benefit labor,
such as the low-cost housing
program, have yet to advance much
beyond the planning stage. Con-
sequently, proadministration
union candidates have had few
government achievements to which
they can point in their campaigns.
In view of the weakness of their
position, democratic union lead-
ers are pessimistic over coming
elections in the Rio de Janeiro
bank,textile, maritime, and con-
struction workers' locals.
At the moment, although
the outlook for the labor move-
ment is gloomy, government re-
strictions will probably prevent
Growing worker discontent any rash of strikes or demonstra-
over rising living costs and tions. The resurgence of Commu-
high urban unemployment has pro- nist influence in the unions,
vided the'extreme left with however, is likely to result in
solid issues to exploit. Another increased subversive propaganda
contributing factor has been an and agitation and to help opposi-
apparently general feeling among tion candidates in the October
workers that they are bearing ri electi
n
the brunt of the administration's
austerity program and that there
Colombia's mounting economic
and political problems may lead
to disorders which could shake
the Valencia administration.
Demonstrations began on 25
August in Boyaca State with a
civic strike protesting govern-
ment nonpayment of teachers dur-
ing the past five months. These
demonstrations--centered in the
state capital of Tunja, about 80
miles from Bogota--resulted in
injuries and property damage. In
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Bogota the next day the extremist-
dominated National Federation of
Universities (FUN) declared a 24-
hour solidarity strike with the
Tunja students. The Bogota dem-
onstrations also resulted in con-
siderable property damage. Dem-
onstrations temporarily subsided
when the government decided to
pay the Boyaca teachers, but on
30 August teachers elsewhere went
on strike to protest nonpayment
of salaries. Judicial employees
are also threatening strikes with
the same motive.
A rallying point for stu-
dent and extremist agitation in-
creasingly appears to be Camilo
Torres, a former priest who has
been released from his ecclesi-
astical vows and now devotes him-
self to advocating revolution to
solve the country's problems.
The Colombian Communist Party
(PCC) has reportedly decided to
back Torres, who may also be
seeking support from elements
in ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla's
party, the National Popular Al-
liance (ANP). A Communist-backed
mass rally is, in fact, being
planned for Torres in Bogota's
central square on 10 September.
Disorders may occur if the gov-
ernment tries to impede it.
There is also the possi-
bility that a wave of strikes,
especially by extremist-counseled
unions prone to violence, may
erupt in protest against new un-
popular economic measures. Sev-
eral labor unions have already
repudiated a gasoline tax, and
contemplated exchange reform
measures may be equally unpopu-
lar.
In addition, considerable
concern now revolves around sub-
versive organizations on the
Castroist model which are at-
tempting to set up combined
urban-rural apparatuses. Such
an organization is the "Army
of National Liberation" (ELN),
which has recently claimed
credit for the bombing of three
US-owned oil pipelines in Bar-
rancabermeja on 17 and 18 Au-
gust. The ELN and the dissi-
dent hard-line Communist party
(Marxist-Leninist Communist
Party of Colombia--PCC-ML) have
been responsible for one at-
tempted and two successful bomb-
ings aimed against US Govern-
ment property and personnel since
the beginning of the year.
Meanwhile, there is con-
tinuing disenchantment with
President Valencia within his
own Liberal Party, and key
factions of the Conservative
Party are threatening to leave
the coalition government. The
Ospinistas, a major Conservative
faction, are threatening to with-
draw from the government if
Valencia, does not give them
greater representation in the
next cabinet. The Laureanistas,
the other major Conservative
faction, are also at odds with
Valencia, and continue to threaten
withdrawal.
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