SPECIAL REPORT THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM IN ETHIOPIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005000010002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 13, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

Ti SUCCESSIQN PROBLEM IN ETHIOPIA
CENTRAL, INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Emperor Haile Selassie, now 73, has wielded
absolute control over Ethiopia for more than three
decades. His wide popularity with the masses, his
international renown, and his political acumen have
kept in check the country's sharp ethnic, religious,
political, and social differences. His reputation
as a fearless military leader has also helped him
transform Ethiopia's diverse provincial territories
into a centralized state. The job is not finished,
however; his government is becoming more complex and
difficult to control while he is getting older--and
perhaps less alert--and is becoming the target of
mounting criticism.
Against this background, the continued stability
of Ethiopia may hang upon a peaceful and effective
succession to the Emperor. The heir apparent, the
present Crown Prince, does not appear to have the
aggressiveness to rule with absolute power. His ac-
csssion--if it takes place--will probably signal a
long period of political maneuvering by diverse ele-
ments, none of them strong enough to win a quick
victory. At that time, desperately needed reforms
and modernization will be even further retarded.
The Emperor and the Crown
The Emperor's formal title--
Conquering Lion of the Tribe of
Judah, Hailc Selassie I, Elect
of God, Emperor of Ethiopia--re-
flects the mystique of his leg-
endary descent from the house of
David and Solomon, his divine
consecration by the Coptic Chris-
tian Church, and his absolute po-
litical power. His wisdom, com-
bined with police state control,
have served to hold the empire
together.
Haile Selassie has outlived
his wife, most of his children,
most of his trusted advisers,
and, to some extent, the struc-
ture he manipulates to stay in
power. He has centralized his
control over a greater area than
his predecessors largely by per-
sonal discipline, ruthlessness,
courage, and an ability to pit
his rivals against each other.
Ha.ile Selassie became Regent
in 1916--when his predecessor was
deposed for flirting with Islam--
and Emperor in 1930. The Emperor's
struggle to lead his country out
of isolation and into the modern
world has been accompanied by
his attempt to allay historic un-
certainty over the process of
succession.
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In Ethiopia, the crown has
always been widely respected as
an institution, and depended upon
as a source of paternalistic
justice and authority. Loyalty
in Ethiopia, however, is personal,
not ideological, and has tradi-
tionally accrued to the individ-
ual strong enough to command it
within the institutional frame-
work of the throne. His Imperial
Majesty devoted 36 of 131 articles
in the 1955 constitution to de-
fining the imperial establishment.
The constitution, however, re-
mains little more than a blue-
print and is unlikely to deter-
mine the succession. Any occu-
pant of the throne is dependent
not only upon the constitution,
but also upon the clergy and a
blood link to the Solomonic
legend for mass public confirma-
tion.
Asfa Wossen was born 27 July
1916. As a child, when his
father's position was in danger,
he was given refuge in the Brit-
ish Legation for six months.
Named Crown Prince in 1930, he
spent the years of the Italian
invasion and World War II with
his family in England. His Eng-
lish education and British friends
caused him to be regarded in the
1950s as ostentatiously pro-Brit-
ish. The US ambassador recently
described the Crown Prince as
basically much more Western or-
iented than his father, and able
to talk on a variety of subjects,
but without a detailed knowledge
of Ethiopian affairs. He is also
believed to lack the forceful
character and the autocratic in-
clination of his father. The
Crown Prince is largely isolated
from Ethiopian leaders, and he
plays no role in the government.
Although neither the Emperor
nor the people like the Crown
Prince personally, at present
there appears to be no individ-
ual or group in Ethiopia capable
of blocking his accession. The
church, army, nobility, young
elite, and provincial officials
would support him, not so much
because the 1955 constitution
establishes his succession, but
because the Crown Prince is
suited by inclination and tem-
perament to the role of a consti-
tutional monarch. Most of these
elements apparently believe they
can manipulate him to serve
their own ends. Over the long
term, the Crown Prince probably
will become a figurehead, if he
remains in power.
Should the Crown Prince
step out of the picture, the
succession might fall-on one of
the Emperor's two grandsons.
One is Iskender Desta, 31, dep-
uty commandant of the navy and
the son of one of the Emperor's
daughters. The other is Prince
Paul, son of the Emperor's fa-
vorite second son. Prince Paul
was adopted by the Emperor after
his father's death and was named
Duke of Harar in 1959. The Em-
peror made his own way to the
throne via the Dukedom of Harar.
This year Prince Paul will be
18 years old, a constitutional
prerequisite for any crown prince.
Sons of the present Crown Prince
are much younger.
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If the royal lineage re-
quirements for succession pro-
vided for in the constitution
were not adhered to, hundreds
of Ethiopians could, by blood
alone, justify a claim to the
throne. Two aristocrats appear
most likely to be able to mar-
shal the necessary support. One
is Megesha Seyoum, governor gen-
eral of Tigre Province. He is
scion of the royal house of
Tigre, historically the strong-
est challenger to the Emperor's
royal house of Shoa. The other
is Asrate Kassa, present gov-
ernor
general
of
ince.
He has
as
to the
throne
as
Crown
Prince
and
been listed among
Eritrea Prov-
good a claim
the present
has frequently
the Crown
Prince's loyal friends. Asrate
Kassa is egocentric, ambitious,
and capable of organizing if the
project is not too complicated.
The armed forces constitute
the most important of the three
principal sources of power in
Ethiopia. The others are the
Coptic Christian Church and the
nobility. The army dominates
the military forces, the only
politically significant organiza-
tions on a national scale in
Ethiopia. The air force, al-
though better trained and
equipped, is limited by size
to an auxiliary role, and the
navy is insignificant. The po-
lice force, nearly as large as
the army, is too dispersed and
too lethargic to be significant
in the power structure, but
mobile commando units are now
being organized.
The chief of staff has ad-
mitted tha;, because of antiquated
and chaotic reporting procedures,
no one really knows how many men
are in the army. Estimates vary
from 28,000 to 32,000. The army's
morale and effectiveness suffer
from poor organization, lack of
logistical support, and too many
officers who should be retired.
Even so, the army is the most
powerful element in Ethiopia,
and any successor to Haile Selas-
sie will have to reckon with
it. The Emperor professes an
ardent desire to improve the
army, but he probably does not
intend to create a really ef-
ficient force which could en-
danger his position.
The Ruling Establishment
The members of the ruling
Ethiopian establishment are com-
posed largely of the plateau-
dwelling Amhara and Tigre
peoples--who represent less than
30 percent of the-population.
They are the heirs of a centuries-
old culture and control almost
all the sources of power.
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The establishment can be di-
vided into two broad categories,
traditionalists and modernists.
The traditionalists typify the
majority of the population of
Ethiopia, regardless of geographic,
ethnic, or religious differences,
and they are almost entirely un-
educated. They include the peas-
antry, virtually the entire priest-
hood and heirarchy of the Ethiopian
Orthodox Church, lower- and-middle-
level gentry, military personnel,
and even some nobles and landed
aristocracy. The traditionalists
are loyal to the Emperor and to
the concept of the throne, and
have a vested interest in maintain-
ing the status quo. Generally
they are nationalistic and xeno-
phobic.
The modernists, numbering be-
tween 5,000 and 10,000 but con-
stantly increasing, have been ex-
posed to education and modern po-
litical ideas, mostly Western.
These individuals were selected
for education by the Emperor and
then placed in the government
bureaucracy and military officer
corps. Both military and civilian
modernists vary greatly in their
zeal for reform, however, and
family and ethnic differences keep
them from being a monolithic group.
Some, such as the older generation
which managed to get an education
before or during the Italian oc-
cupation of Ethiopia, are essen-
tially conservative. Although
this element is small due to the
Italians' deliberate wartime
policy of eradicating the Ethio-
pian intelligentsia, its members
occupy most top civilian and mili-
tary positions in today's govern-
ment. They are not totally op-
posed to change, but they are
determined to control it in
order to safeguard their own
positions.
Two main conservative
cliques have been apparent within
the modernists for many years.
One is currently led by Prime
Minister Aklilou Habte Wold,
and the other by Asrate Kassa,
governor general of Eritrea, and
General Merid Mengesha, the min-
ister of defense. Both cliques
have educated individuals from
various subdivisions in and out
of the nobility. Both include
civilian and military leaders,
although the prime minister's
group is heavily weighted to-
ward the civilian side.
The Emperor has carefully
balanced these groups and indi-
viduals against each other for
over a decade. He has so ef-
fectively stifled initiative that
no leader capable of directing
their discontent into serious
political action has emerged.
Both groups support the monarchy
and Haile Selassie personally,
while pressing him for reforms
which would increase their power
and influence. When the Emperor
goes, these cliques will prob-
ably unite to maintain the mon-
archy, probably by installing
the Crown Prince, while a bit-
ter power play takes place be-
hind the scenes.
The reformist modernists
are generally younger. They ac-
quired their education since the
post-Italian restoration of the
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Emperor in 1941. Most of them
were educated in England, but the
number educated in Ethiopia and
elsewhere is increasing. Rela-
tively few Ethiopians have re-
ceived Communist education, and
so far none of these has achieved
high office. Most reformists are
in the middle and lower echelons
of government or military service,
although the number of those who
are--or have been--in top posi-
tions is increasing. Reformists
are becoming evident in the Haile
Selassie I University, the press,
and private business.
Reformists are frustrated and
impatient with the Emperor's slow-
ness in implementing the reforms
dimly foreshadowed by the 1955
constitution. Proud of Ethiopia's
millennium of independence, they
are embarrassed that their country
lags behind far younger African
nations in political, economic,
and social progress. Reformists
acknowledge the necessity of re-
taining the throne as a symbol of
national unity, however. If the
Emperor continues to increase his
stature as an African leader, even
the most radical-minded reformers
may hesitate to recommend his re-
moval or even press successfully
for rapid changes.
The rest of the population is
either Moslem or pagan. The con-
centration of Moslem elements in
the lowland periphery of the
Amhara-Tigre highlands has for
centuries haunted the establish-
ment with fears of Moslem encircle-
ment. Ethnic Somalis,.for example,
occupy about one fifth of Ethiopia,
and the restive northern province
of Eritrea is at least half Moslem.
The December 1960 Coup Attempt
The Emperor's aura of semi-
divinity, his personification of
the state, and the myth of im-
perial infallibility were badly
damaged by the Imperial Body
Guard's attempt to place the
Crown Prince on the throne in
December 1960. Naively planned
and poorly executed, the revolt
was crushed when support from
the army failed to materialize.
The Emperor hurried back from
Brazil and quickly faced down
the rebels.
For some time thereafter
the Emperor had grave doubts about
the loyalty of the Crown Prince.
Apparently he eventually believed
the latter's explanation that he
was in effect the prisoner of the
conspirators, and that his seem-
ing collusion came from the knife
they held to his back and his de-
sire to preserve the monarchy
when the coup appeared at first
to be succeeding. The Emperor
dealt harshly with the conspira-
tors, and soon dashed any hopes
that he would implement reforms.
In April 1961, the Emperor's
"Delegation of Authority" speech
urged ministers and other offi-
cials to shoulder responsibility
for running the government while
he pledged to confine himself to
policy. The speech evoked cynicism
and despair from the young educated
elite, who are aware that Ethiopia
is still governed without reforms
and without delegation of author-
ity. However, the Emperor's de-
pendence upon the army to save him
served to make the rank and file,
as well as the officer corps,
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increasingly conscious of their
power. The Emperor's subsequent
capitulation to the army"s demand
for pay raises has reinforced
this feeling.
During the past two years
pressures for reform have inten-
sified. Top military and civilian
leaders went so far as to present
a petition to the Emperor in
1963, calling for a decentraliza-
tion of power and a real delega-
tion of authority to cabinet min-
isters. In 1964, middle- and lower-
level army personnel demanded an-
other pay raise. The Emperor ig-
nored the petition for authority,
but did yield on the pay raise is-
sue. Such a success, especially
by younger elements, may encourage
greater boldness.
During the past year, coup
plots and petitions favoring re-
form have appeared with some reg-
ularity. No military or civilian
leader has yet emerged, and no
significant cohesion has developed
among the Emperor's critics. In
addition, internal pressure for
reform has been fairly well ob-
scured by the Somalia-Ethiopia
border dispute, Eritrean dissi-
dence, aid negotiations, and Pan-
African matters.
The resignation of the Ethi-
opian ambassador to the United
States in early 1965, while rela-
tively insignificant in itself,
again focused attention in Addis
Ababa on internal affairs. The
Emperor displayed unusual nerv-
ousness over the attention given
by the young educated elite to
the fact that the ambassador re-
signed in protest against the
Emperor's failure to institute
internal reforms.
Government control in the
provinces has slipped to the
point where both police and army
forces have been taxed to main-
tain internal security. Clashes
with Somali nomads, who winter
in about one fifth of Ethiopia,
are less serious than at the
time of the February 1964 "war"
with Somalia, but they are con-
tinuing, and no solution to the
basic problem is in sight. In
the northern province of Eritrea,
absorbed into the Empire in 1962,
unrest has become so troublesome
that the Emperor resorted to the
unusual, and dangerous, step of
granting the governor general sub-
stantial authority to deal with
the situation. In the southern
provinces of Bale and Sidamo,
Ethiopian attempts to control
tribal disruptions and assert
Amhara hegemony have created
severe unrest.
This year, the widening
contrast between the slow eco-
nomic and social development in
the provinces and the rapid
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urbanization of Addis Ababa has
so exacerbated differences be-
tween the ruling minority and the
other tribes and peoples that the
Emperor has ordered that no public
media may mention the name of any
tribal group or association.
There are no political parties
and no organizations for polit-
ical activity, but labor and stu-
dent organizations are close to
attaining national scope that will
cut across tribal, religious, and
other traditional patterns. Un-
less handled with increasing firm-
ness, they may soon become major
factors in the political scene.
Only the Emperor's power
and astuteness have kept the
empire from fragmenting. With-
out his wisdom and absolute con-
trol, no one could have intro-
duced reforms at such a leisurely,
evolutionary pace while keeping
political agitation far below that
in most other developing nations.
Even he may be hard pressed to
continue this performance.
None of the possible suc-
?cessors is likely to be initially
able or willing to employ the
same repressive tactics. The
Crown Prince will probably re-
ceive initial support from most
Ethiopians, who feel that de-
struction of the monarchy would
bring chaos. However, he is
likely to become a constitutional
monarch initially, and possibly
a figurehead for whatever group
is able to attain real power.
The absence of rigid central con-
trol during any power struggle
is likely to encourage many
groups and cliques to attempt
to assert themselves. The re-
sult will almost surely be a
period of political instability
and possibly disorder. No group
presently on the scene appears
capable of quickly gaining con-
trol. Much will depend upon the
timing and circumstances of the
Emperor's departure from ef-
fective rule. The longer he re-
mains in control the better the
chances for constitutional mon-
archy and parliamentar overn-
ment to succeed him
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