LATIN AMERICAN NATIONALISM AND THE CHILEAN THIRD-FORCE CONCEPT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004900120004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
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• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

lease 21000108130: CIA-RDP79=00927A0
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LATIN AMERICAN NATX NAI,r S11~ AATI, Tilt `CTUL N ?Q CE CONCEPT
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GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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An entrenched brand of neonationalism devel-
oped in Latin America since World War II ha.s char-
acteristically manifested itself internationally in
a quest for enhanced prestige through adoption of a
foreign policy which features "independence" from
the United States. Such nationalistic currents
underlay the third-force overtures of the Quadros-
Goulart administration in Brazil. A new approach,
however, now is being made by Chile's Christian
Democratic government to promote, shape, and direct
a reappraisal of Latin America's posture relative
to the world at large. This effort, although de-
riving much of its strength from basic nationalism,
differs fundamentally as a result of the addition
of inspiration and dogma from the Christian Demo-
cratic movement. This non-Communist, noncapita.list
approach has appeal to Latin American neonation-
alists and is reflected in Chilean President Frei's
recent conversations with European leaders.
The Emerging Nationalism
The current brand of nation-
alism in Latin America is asso-
ciated with a complex milieu of
accelerated development, revolu-
tionary expansion of mass aware-
ness, and the emergence of a
meaningful middle class. This
increasingly articulate and po-
litically significant group, at-
tempting to provide the leader-
ship for masses whose wants are
expanding, tends to deep frustra-
tion with the inadequacies of
traditional sociopolitical
structures as well as with the
distribution and ownership of
wealth and means of production.
One of the results has been the
rise of popular nationalism--a
nationalism which is political
and economic, but also cultural
and intellectual which has dis-
placed an older "aristocratic"
nationalism, and which has found
political expression primarily
in parties of the left such as
the Christian Democrats.
Popular nationalism emerged
early in Mexico because of the
Revolution of 1910, and involved
"nativism," or glorification of
the Indian cultural background
and legacy. This attitude mani-
fested itself in favorable legis-
lation enacted for the Indian
and mestizo masses by their mid-
dle-class political leaders,
including protectionist trade
measures adopted on the assump-
tion that domestic industry would
be stimulated to the benefit of
the workers. There followed
antiforeign economic laws and
increased state control of natural
resources, many of which were
foreign exploited. Before World
War II, similar legislation was
enacted in such other countries
as Chile, Uruguay, Colombia,
Bolivia, and Brazil.
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Nationalism has tended to
be highly emotional as well as
xenophobic. After World War II
it took an aggressive turn, mani-
festing itself for example in ef-
forts of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru
to assert territorial control
over 200 miles of adjacent ocean;
seizure of foreign fishing craft
by these nations along with Mex-
ico and Nicaragua; and anti-
colonialism directed especially
against British possessions in
the Western Hemisphere.
Latin American nationalists
remain suspicious, if not actually
hostile, toward foreign capital,
toward the government and pro-
grams of the United States, and
toward industrialized, "devel-
oped" nations. They demand a
greater place in the sun. They
are in a hurry to drive upward
politically and economically in
the world and therefore they
are willing to accept radical ap-
proaches that promise speedy re-
sults. An aspect of this is an
eager compulsion to adopt a pos-
ture of "independence" in world
affairs--attributable in part
to the need for expanded markets
for basic products and in part
to a nationalistic urge to win
greater international prestige.
Latin American nations have an
intense desire to participate in
international decision making.
The United Nations has provided
encouragement for these wishes
and strengthened the shib-
boleths of "self-determina-
tion," "sovereignty," and "in-
dependence."
Related to nationalism
is what the Latin Americans
call tercerismo, or the quest
for a "third position"--a con-
cept which cannot be equated
with neutralism. It appears
to be a reflection of the Latin
American nations' desire to
be accorded a greater world role
both individually and as a bloc
with a corresponding diminution
of US ties. This may lead them
to seek to reduce the US posi-
tion in the hemisphere on the
assumption that only thus can
they attain national fulfill-
ment.
Chile's Leadership
The current leadership of
Latin American tercerismo has
been actively sought by the
Chilean Christian Democratic
Party (PDC) which swept into
power in the 1964-1965 presiden-
tial and congressional elections.
This pursuit has tended to bring
Chilean foreign policy into con-
flict with US objectives in East-
West relations and the Organiza-
tion of American States--espe-
cially over the Dominican Republic
affair. The principal causes of
this have been Chilean popular
nationalism, basic PDC doctrine,
and a vision of Christian Democ-
racy as the vanguard of an inter-
American movement of the future.
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The ITUC IS, by its own def-
inition, an uncompromising party
of the left, and its program re-
flects this orientation. It is
not anti-Communist but rather is
non-Communist and maintains that
it must contest the Communist
Party at the grass roots in order
to defeat it. Therefore, the PDC
has attempted to penetrate ideolog-
ically the labor unions, student
groups, and other traditional
Communist strongholds. Nation-
alistic attitudes which the PDC
shares with the Communists include
steadfast opposition both to for-
eign imperialism and domestic
oligarchy. There is no doubt
that most PDC policy makers are
critical of capitalism and for-
eign interests in Chile, but they
favor legal nationalization of
foreign investment.
Christian Democrats, like
Communists, see themselves as a
world movement, but maintain that
their goal is a "social revolution
with liberty." In speaking of
this social upheaval, President
Frei has said, "we are in the
presence of a vast revolution.
Old formulas are dead and a new
age has been born.... Today we
are present at the birth of a new
civilization based on work which
will reach total development of
the human being at all levels of
society."
Ideologically, therefore,
Chilean Christian Democracy, in
endeavoring to present an imagina-
tive nationalistic program, is
much farther to the left on the
political spectrum than its Euro-
pean counterparts. Frei dreams
of a synthesis of justice and
freedom in an economy that is
based entirely on man's ability,
not on inherited factors of
money, class, or race. In order
to achieve this goal he has pro-
posed leftist, Christian, non-
Marxist, noncapitalist solutions
which have the twofold purpose
of raising Chile's standard of
living and undermining Communist
popularity with the masses.
Non-Communist, Noncapitalist
One of the PDC's fundamental
inconsistencies is apparent in
its attitude toward Communism.
Although the party has always ar-
gued for the legality of the Com-
munist Party and at various times
has supported Communist candidates,
it is ideologically in conflict
with Communism over the applica-
tion of Christian values to pol-
itics and the concept of the
"social revolution with liberty."
Furthermore, the party is divided
between a vociferous group of
pseudo-Marxist extremists and a
majority of moderates. As a re-
sult, the party is unable to
agree on the true character and
significance of Communism in Latin
America, and tends officially to
ignore the dangers of Communist
subversion.
As nationalists, most PDC
members nevertheless summarily
reject Communism as a non-Chilean
ideology directed by a foreign
nation. Frei himself has de-
nounced "as typical of their sys-
tem" the Communist propagandists
who attacked him during the presi-
dential campaign. He has also
said, "We reject Communist doc-
trine and tactics. But before
,Communism we see that there is
;something worse: anti-Communism."
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Frei's statement sums up
the somewhat more definite Chris-
tian remocratic attitude toward
capitalism. The PDC has his-
torically been critical of the
heavily protected, high-profit,
restricted-market "capitalism"
prevalent in Chile and most of
Latin America. Therefore, the
party rejects capitalism as a
valid solution for Chile's eco-
nomic and social problems. In
a recent interview Frei said,
"Capitalism, while successful
in the United States, has not
worked out in Latin America, nor
does it represent the joint hu-
man and ideological values of
our concepts of life--capitalism
as a social philosophy and Com-
munism as its antidote are ob-
solete."
Independent Foreign Policy
This rejection of both Com-
munism and the Latin American
type of capitalism, together
with progress in the Christian
lemocrats' attempt to capture
and lead Chilean nationalism,
has led toward an "independent
foreign policy" posture. This
position is personified by For-
eign Minister Valdes, who has
declared that the world is di-
vided between north and south,
i.e., between have and have-not
nations. Latin America, he said,
"must have a voice in and be a
connecting bridge with the
peoples of the unsatisfied na-
tions which have come to call
themselves the third world, the
nonaligned, or the noncomprised."
Latin America, he went on, "can-
not exhaust itself only in the
organization of a perfect inter-
American system. The ancient
nationalistic systems of other
epochs have lost force and na-
tionalisms must act solely in
benefit of the people and not of
mere small groups of privilege
and monopoly."
Valdes, who sees Latin Ameri-
can economic underdevelopment,
social misery, and disunity--as
well as the United States--as
foes, has always despised the
paternalistic attitude of the
"colossus of the north" toward
the rest of the American nations.
Earlier this year he provoked
controversy by stating that the
interests of the US and Latin
America in the Organization of
American States were divergent.
He demanded--and later denied
that he had demanded--economic
compensation for support of US
policies, implying that the Latin
American nations could thereby
increase their influence within
the inter-American system and
presumably satisfy their national-
istic aspirations.
The foreign minister, in
contrast to President Frei, de-
lighted in the success of their
current European tour, saying
that now Chile would enjoy greater
respect "in certain quarters."
Frei, on the other hand, continued
to advance Chilean nationalism
and tercerismo in a doctrinaire
manner, albeit not at the expense
of the United States.
In Paris, Frei urged Europe
to join Latin America in a new
alliance for progress. He stated
that Chile wanted to build politi-
cal independence without forcing
a showdown with the US. "We want
a system linked with all people,
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especially Europe." The United
States, he went on, "is a world
power and it exerts hegemony in
several parts of the world. Among
the people of Latin America there
is a desire for true political
and economic independence. I
want a system without hegemony,"
he said. Reporting these state-
ments, the Manchester Guardian
called Frei-tie-"fie Gaulle of
Latin America."
More sophisticated and
wiser politically than Valdes,
Frei has not allowed himself to
be placed in a position of open
opposition to the US. He has
apparently gained limited French
economic, cultural, and technical
assistance for his country. This
reflects his admiration of France
and the similarity between
Chilean tercerismo and re
Gaulle's own Fiord world" pol-
icy. From all of the evidence
available, Frei has made a great
impression on European ruling
circles. His idealistic sin-
cerity and nationalistic belief
in his country have overshadowed
his apparent naivete about Com-
munism.
Chilean tercerismo has de-
veloped in conjunction-with the
growth and popularity of the
Christian Democratic Party, the
emotionalism of Latin American
nationalism, and the majority re-
jection of Communism and capi-
Frei: "Excuse me, Mr. Policeman. Where do I find the third road?"
DeGaulle: "Wait just a moment. I' m also looking for it,"
esmzo -Bogota, El Tiempo, 7 July 1965
talism as a solution to Chilean
problems. Chile's present "in-
dependent foreign policy" seeks
a cultural and economic entente
with Europe; it calls for trade
and diplomatic relations with
all countries; it presses for
more inter-American political
and economic cooperation with-
out US predominance; and, finally,
it is an attempt to make Chile
influential in the international
field. Increased European eco-
nomic assistance and moral sup-
port might enhance the future
prestige of Chilean tercerismo
among other libera -
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