RUMANIA ON THE EVE OF ITS FOURTH PARTY CONGRESS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004900110003-6
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• Content Type: REPORT

16 July 1,165
RUMANIA ON THE EVE OF ITS FOURTH PARTY CONGRESS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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Rumanian nationalism promises to be the driv-
ing force behind the activities of party leaders at
the fourth Rumanian party congress which convenes
in Bucharest on 19 July. Meeting within four months
after the death of party first secretary Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej, the congress will be under the leader-
ship of his successor, Nicolae Ceausescu, and will
enunciate programs at least as stridently national-
istic as any that would probably have been advanced
by Gheorghiu-Dej. Although Moscow has shown its
displeasure with Rumania's increasingly indepen-
dent policies over the past several years, the
congress is expected to strengthen the already firm
party control of Ceausescu, to adopt certain
Yugoslav party practices, and to advance Rumania's
ambitions in the Communist world.
Unlike earlier Rumanian
party congresses--the last held
five years ago--the upcoming
fourth congress will serve as a
public platform for summing up
past achievements and listing
the future goals of Rumania's
evolutionary course toward
national Communism.
The accomplishments likely
to be stressed include completion
of agriculture collectivization
in 1962, the regime's successful
defiance of the Moscow-directed
Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CEMA) in 1963, the
April 1964 declaration of 1u-
mania's independent role, pro-
gressive "Rumanization" of na-
tional minorities, and success-
ful completion of most goals of
the six-year plan (1960-65) es-
tablishing a broad industrial
base.
The outline of the future
course the leadership wishes to
take is contained in a series
of documents, including new
party statutes, an economic plan,
and a revised constitution,
which it will be the business of
the congress to adopt or endorse.
All of these papers bear Ceau-
sescu's personal stamp and are
strongly nationalistic in
character. Together, they pro-
vide for the further evolution
of Rumanian national Communism.
Their adoption by the congress
at a time of heightened fric-
tion with the Soviet Union over
Warsaw Pact matters will be
hailed in Rumania as the begin-
ning of a new era.
The Party Statutes
Prepared by the 31 May -
2 June central committee plenum,
the draft party statutes empha-
size Rumanian national interests
as distinct from those of the
Soviet Union. The preamble un-
derscores this by stating that
the party "bases all its activity
on Marxist-Leninist learning,
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applied creatively to the con-
ditions and specific pecularities
of our country." The new stat-
utes are replete with references
to "patriotism" and "love of
fatherland," and the nationalis-
tic line is pointedly advanced
in the section on the armed
forces. This section, in con-
trast to other East European Com-
munist party statutes, specifi-
cally charges that Rumania's army
is to be educated for "defending
revolutionary victories, the
nation's borders, independence,
national sovereignty, and peace."
The draft also includes a number
of provisions presently unique
to the Yugoslav party, the pio-
neer developer of national Commu-
nism, One of these, for example,
changes the title of the party
chief to secretary general, and
another eliminates candidate
party membership.
The statutes also call for
changing the name of the Ruma-
nian Workers' Party to the Ru-
manian Communist Party in con-
formity with the "present stage
of development of our society,
the stage of the completion of
socialist construction, and to
the final aim of the party--
the building of the Communist
society." Only two other par-
ties in Eastern Europe have
claimed to have reached this stage
of development, Czechoslovakia in
1960 and Yugoslavia in 1963. To
be consistent with this change
the revised draft constitution
calls for Rumania to be designated
a "Socialist Republic"--rather
than a "Peoples Republic" as it
now is--upon final approval of
the new constitution by the Grand
National Assembly in late July.
Aside from the possibility
of gaining a certain prestige for
the Rumanian party in Communist
circles, these changes in the
name of the party and the state
also indicate that the regime
is taking pains to make clear it
remains Communist.
The continuing goal of the
party to establish "close bonds
with the masses" also is ap-
parent in the draft statutes.
Thus, party seniority is to be
granted to former "revolution-
ary" elements such as ex -
Social Democrats who now are
party members. Included in
this concession would be all
who participated in strikes
during the 1930s as well as a
number of moderate leftist
elements.
With the abolition of the
probationary period for member-
ships, the party is reflecting
its new view of itself as a less
militant leader in a more ma-
ture society. Unprecedented in
Eastern Europe except for Yugo-
slavia, this step will ease the
admission of young professionals
and white-collar workers, partic-
ularly from the party's Union of
Working Youth. The resulting
enlargement of party ranks, while
presumably intended to improve
and extend political control
throughout the country, will
probably also bring new ideas
and new energies into the party.
Consonant with the draft
statutes of the party, the draft
constitution enunciates an un-
swerving independent policy
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course and prepares for further
evolution toward achievement of
a national Communist society.
In contrast to the consti-
tution adopted in 1952 which
contained glowing tributes to
the Soviet Union in its preamble,
the new constitution makes no
reference to that country. The
pervasive independent line of
the revised document is rein-
forced by language drawn from
the April 1964 declaration.
Rumanian foreign policy will
strive for "relations of friend-
ship and fraternal cooperation
with socialist states and co-
operative relations with coun-
tries of other sociopolitical
systems" based on "principles of
respect for sovereignty and in-
dependence, equality of rights
and mutual advantage, and non-
interference in internal affairs.
As a hedge against the auto-
maticity clauses in existing mili-
tary alliances, including the
Warsaw Pact, the draft spells
out the conditions under which
the Grand National Assembly can
declare war. The new constitu-
tion states that "war can be de-
clared only in case of armed ag-
gression against the Socialist
Republic of Rumania (SRR) or
against another state toward
which the SRR has mutual defense
obligations assumed in interna-
tional treaties, if the situation
has developed for which an obli-
gation of war is established."
The draft constitution
clearly is designed to rally
popular support behind the gov-
ernment,stressing as it does the
"democratic" privileges of na-
tionalities and intellectuals.
The effectiveness of such an ef-
fort may be limited, however,
because the constitution also
indicates that assimilation of
the minority groups will con-
tinue.
The draft also emphasizes
collective work in the govern-
ment and moderately strengthens the
role of the State Council by
granting it stand-by powers to
act when the Grand National As-
sembly is unable to meet.
The State of the Party
The stability and strength
of the Rumanian party leader-
ship now and during the past
decade have stemmed from its
unusual unity. The present
group comprises 19 individuals,
most of whom have been members
of either the secretariat or the
politburo since 1957.
The smoothness of succession
following the death last March
of long-time party boss, Gheor-
ghiu-Dej, was a good illustration
of the party leadership's homo-
geneity. At that time, the
key party posts were quickly
filled, apparently without con-
sultation with Moscow. Besides
Ceausescu, the top leadership
includes
three other
politburo
members,
Premier Ion
Gheorghe
Maurer,
head of state
Chivu
Stoica,
and Gheorghe
Apostol.
During the preparations for
the congress, this group has con-
tinued to depict itself as "col-
lective." As they did during the
period of succession to Gheorghiu-
Dej, these four men, like most of
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COMPOSITION OF RUMANIAN POLITBURO & SECRETARIAT
3rd Party Congress,June 1960
GHEORGHIU-DEJ, G.
CEAUSESCU, N.
MAURER, 1. G.
APOSTOL, G.
STOICA, C.
BODNARAS, E.
BORILA, P.
DRAGHICI, A.
MOGHIOROS, A.
GHEORGHIU-DEJ, G. (1)
CEAUSESCU, N.
MAURER, 1. G.
APOSTOL, G.
STOICA, C.
BODNARAS, E.
BORILA, P.
DRAGHICI, A.
MOGHIOROS, A.
BIRLADEANU, A. (3)
COLIU, D.
RAUTU, L.
16 July 1965
STOICA, C.
BODNARAS, E.
BORILA, P.
DRAGHICI, A.
MOGHIOROS, A.
STOICA, C.
RAUTU, L. (6)
NICULESCU-MI ZI L,
(1) Died on 19 March 1965
(2) Promoted to full politburo member in late March 1965
(3) Elected to candidate membership in November 1962
(4) Dropped from membership in March 1961
(5) Elected to membership in March 1961
(6) Elected to membership in March 1965
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UMANIA'S FOUR PIVOTAL LEADERS
CEAUSESCU MAURER
STOICA APOSTOL
the party hierarchy in the weeks
preceding the congress, have ad-
dressed the customary meetings of
the Bucharest city committee, the
regional party meetings, and con-
ferences of mass organizations.
In addition, Ceausescu, Stoica,
and Maurer also have jointly spoken
for the first time before special
sessions of high-ranking officials
from the ministries of the armed
forces and of internal affairs.
While the intention has been to
gain backing and allegiance, es-
pecially of the latter two groups,
these joint appearances have under-
lined the collective character of
the leadership. The joint appear-
ances may also have served to dis-
abuse those who might hope for dif-
ferences in the hierarchy on de-
fense and security policies.
However, it seems inevitable
in most collective leaderships
that one man rises to a position
of "first among equals," and in-
formed observers believe that
Ceausescu is just such a man.
Moreover, despite the outward ap-
pearances of unity, it will not
be surprising to find other
leaders jockeying for relative
increases in power as the party
congress approaches.
Ceausescu is apparently at-
tempting to consolidate and
fortify his own position inside
as well as outside the party by
placing men he trusts in responsi-
ble positions. Within the party,
he reportedly intends to diminish
the role of the politburo and in-
crease the authority of the sec-
retariat, which he heads.
The deft hand of Ceausescu
seems evident in the treatment
given party leadership in the
revised statutes. These enun-
ciate the principle of collec-
tive leadership. A new provision
specifies, however, that a "party
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member may hold only a single
post of political leadership
that demands permanent activity,
whether in party or state or-
gans." Ceausescu could apply
this provision to relieve Presi-
dent Stoica of his position as
a central committee secretary
and thus add to his own relative
influence within the collective
leadership.
Ceausescu may also try to
reduce the power of internal af-
fairs minister and politburo mem-
ber Alexandru Draghici who could
pose a threat to his pre-eminent
position. Aware of the chal-
lenge Draghici represents
through his control of the Minis-
try of Internal Affairs and his
considerable influence in the
army, Ceausescu may plan to re-
move him from the ministerial
post at the coming congress.
Cornel Onescu, whom Ceausescu
recently appointed deputy inter-
nal affairs minister, is rumored
to be Draghici's replacement.
Commentary in the party
press suggests that the party
positions of still other members
of the hierarchy may also be af-
fected at the coming congress.
Alexandru Moghioros and Petre
Borila, each of whom is known
to be seriously ill, may not be
re-elected to the politburo.
Moghioros and Borila are the
only two members of the party
hierarchy who have not addressed
any of the precongress meetings.
Stefan Voitec, a candidate polit-
buro member and Ceausescu sup-
porter, may replace Moghioros.
There is no information avail-
able on Borila's possible suc-
cessor. Apostol and Maurer may
also be overshadowed by Ceau-
sescu's influence at the congress.
Their background and political
style do not seem compatible with
those of the increasingly asser-
tive party first secretary.
Domestic Policy Changes
The fourth party congress
will endorse Rumania's gradual
move away from Soviet influence
in the past year or so, the ex-
pansion of cultural and other
contacts with the West, and the
accompanying modest slackening
of internal discipline over the
populace. Like its counterparts
in Hungary and Poland, the Ru-
manian leadership has become in-
creasingly convinced of the wisdom
and necessity of winning at least
the grudging cooperation of the
population in order to assure at-
tainment of the regime's ambi-
tious foreign and domestic plans.
In its drive for acceptance, the
regime has imitated some of the
devices used by the Hungarians
and the Poles. Wherever pos-
sible, it has substituted persua-
sion for coercion--a practice to
which the coming congress is ex-
pected to give added impetus.
Perhaps the most obvious
area of internal liberalization
is the cultural sector. Initiated
in mid-1963 and consisting of
three broad stages--de-Russifica-
tion, glorification of Rumania's
national cultural heritage, and
re-establishment of Rumania's
cultural ties with Western Europe
--this liberalization policy con-
tinues in force, subject to close
control and scrutiny by pol-
icy-making bodies in the govern-
ment.
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Ever conscious of their
nationality and proud of the
Latin origin of their language,
Rumania's leaders chose the
Maxim Gorky Institute in Bucha-
rest as one of the first im-
portant targets of de-Russifi-
cation. Closed down in Septem-
ber 1963, the institute, which
specialized in providing Rus-
sian-language training, became
part of the Slavic Languages and
Literature Department at the
University of Bucharest.
A number of other steps also
have been taken since the lat-
ter half of 1963 which have had
the net effect of removing the
USSR and the Russian language
from any special position in
Rumanian life. The activities
of a Soviet reading room in
the center of Bucharest have
been discontinued; obtrusive
Russian names recalling the first
flush of postwar "friendship"
have vanished from the fronts of
movie houses and theaters and
have been replaced by their orig-
inal nonpolitical names; and
streets named after Soviet party
figures, military leaders, and
scientists have been renamed.
Implemented without any formal
declaration of policy by the
leadership, these changes serve
as surface indicators of pos-
sibly more basic changes to come
in Rumanian policy.
The regime also has given
greater attention to Rumania's
national cultural heritage--
particularly in the literary sec-
tor--by the frequent recalling
of the names of famous Rumanian
authors and composers from the
past. Paralleling this has been
the almost frenetic movement to
re-establish contact with West-
ern literature. At a recent meet-
ing between party. leaders and
representatives of cultural life,
party first secretary Ceausescu
gave additional impetus to the
gradual cultural thaw by calling
for diversity and individualism
in literary style and by empha-
sizing the value of direct con-
tacts with writers and artists
from all countries. He added a
cautionary word, however, by
citing the need to analyze ar-
tistic and literary works from
a Marxist-Leninist--and by im-
plication a Rumanian nationalist
--standpoint.
As a result of cultural
liberalization, Rumania has in
the past year endorsed such pre-
viously taboo authors as Kafka,
permitted displays of abstract
art by Rumanian artists, and
allowed more frequent performances
of modern Western music. In ad-
dition, de-Russification and at-
tention to national traditions
have brought about the partial re-
habilitation of several leading
bourgeois scholars of the inter-
war period.
While relaxation of regime
controls over the cultural sec-
tor is probably designed to
satisfy the ever-increasing
desires of the intellectuals for
greater freedom and easier con-
tacts with the West, these con-
cessions also advance the re-
gime's campaign to broaden its
base of support. This care-
ful liberalization of cultural
policy may eventually lead to
a relaxation in domestic policy
of benefit to the general popu-
lace.
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INDEXES OF RUMANIA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1959-70
Plan
Five Year Plan (1966-1970)
? The planned growth of investment and of gross agricultural production
during 1966-1970 is estimated, as is the planned growth of agricultural
production in 1965. Other figures are from Rumanian official sources.
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The Economy
As Rumania approaches its
fourth party congress, its lead-
ers have reason for satisfac-
tion with the economy's perform-
ance. Most of the goals for
economic growth during the 1960-
65 plan probably will be met.
Since 1959, Rumania has sus-
tained one of the highest indus-
trial growth rates in the world,
15 percent a year, and has more
than doubled both capital in-
vestment and foreign trade turn-
over. Agriculture, however, re-
mains a major cause for concern
since output increased little
after 1959 and has fallen far
short of plan goals.
The Rumanian leaders are
confident of the soundness of
their new economic policy. After
many years of subservience to
Moscow, they have decided to set
their own industrialization
goals and to conduct their for-
eign trade so as to best serve
their national interests. Ac-
cordingly, they are willing to
cooperate with CEMA only to a
limited degree, have greatly ex-
panded trade with free world
countries, and negotiated sub-
stantial medium-term credits
from these countries.
The economic plan for 1966-
70, to be approved by the con-
gress, provides for a continua-
tion of the successful policies
of the past plan period. Em-
phasizing rapid industrial
growth and development of a
broad industrial base, the plan
continues to give priority to
the chemical, machine building,
metallurgical, and electric power
industries. Apparently no signif-
icant changes in the still highly
centralized system of economic
planning and management are con-
templated, presumably because of
the success of the present system.
Rumania is the only Eastern Euro-
pean country that has not recog-
nized a need for major economic
reforms in industry.
Rates of planned economic
growth during 1966-70 are to be
high but not as high as during
the past few years. The planned
annual rate of growth for na-
tional income is 7 percent, com-
pared with 9 percent achieved
during 1960-64. The rate for
industrial production is to be
about 11 percent compared with
15 percent during 1960-64. The
industrial goals appear generally
realistic, since a large number
of plants currently under construc-
tion will come into production
during the next plan period.
The difficulties encountered
in raising agricultural produc-
tion during 1960-64 have led the
regime to set for 1966-70 more
realistic and lower goals in
agriculture than in the previous
plan. These call for an increase
of only 20 percent in total ag-
ricultural output above the 1961-
65 average, to be accomplished
largely by expanding programs of
mechanization, land improvement,
and use of chemical fertilizer.
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The expected slowdown in
over-all economic growth will
not greatly affect the growth
of consumption. Real wages of
workers are to increase 4 to
4.5 percent a year, almost as
fast as in 1960-64, and farmers
also are to receive a share of
the planned 30-percent increase
in total consumption. Compared
with the anticipated results of
1961-64, capital investment from
state funds will increase 50
percent during 1966-70. Based on
the expected level for 1965, the
annual rate of growth is only
6-7 percent, less than half the
annual rate achieved during the
1960-64 period. The allocation
of investment will be similar to
that during 1960-65, with in-
dustry receiving over half the
total and agriculture about 14
percent.
According to the plan, for-
eign trade turnover is to increase,
but at the annual rate of 7 per-
cent rather than the 16 percent
achieved in 1960-64. Requirements
for imported machinery and equip-
ment are likely to grow far less
than during 1960-64 because of
the much slower growth planned for
investment. Growth of trade with
the free world, which increased
232 percent during 1960-64, is
expected to slow down, although
the regime will reportedly seek
to increase the free world's share
to 35-40 percent of total foreign
trade during 1966-70, compared
with 32 percent at present.
Although the Rumanians hope
to import $1 billion worth of
machinery and equipment from the
free world during 1966-70, the
main problem will be to expand
exports rapidly enough to cover
imports. During 1958-64, Ru-
mania incurred a cumulative com-
modity trade deficit with the
free world of $150 million,
which was approximately covered
by medium-term credits. Al-
though free-world countries may
be willing to extend additional
medium-term credits to Rumania,
repayments will soon become-a
problem, and Rumania will prob-
ably wish to limit its imports
in order to keep total indebted-
ness at a reasonable level.
Foreign Policy
The Fourth Congress will
lay the basis for continuation
of the main lines of Rumania's
foreign policy, incorporating
the changes that have occurred
in this field since the last
party congress in June 1960.
Taking advantage of the in-
creased maneuverability afforded
by dissension in the Communist
world, Bucharest has conspic-
uously broadened its contacts
with both the non-CEMA Communist
states and the free world, while
at the same time largely eliminat-
ing its subvervience to the USSR.
It has maintained friendly rela-
tions with the other Eastern
European countries, including
Albania and Yugoslavia, and
taken some small steps to im-
prove its political and cul-
tural ties with Communist
China. At least indirectly,
some of the Eastern European
countries have been influenced
in their thinking by the suc-
cesses of the Rumanian policy.
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Bucharest has from the be-
ginning supported Moscow in the
Sino-Soviet dispute, although
this support has become progres-
sively less evident. At least
since April 1964, when the Ru-
manian party issued its so-called
declaration of independence and
followed up with a flurry of ex-
plicitly anti-Soviet speeches,
Bucharest has repeatedly demon-
strated its disagreement with se-
lected aspects of Soviet policy.
Most dramatically, it refused to
bend to pressures to attend the
international Communist meeting
held in Moscow last March. The
Rumanian position has been to re-
frain from participation in in-
ternational Communist party meet-
ings which might formalize the
intra-Communist split and detract
from regime efforts to build an
image of "neutralism" within the
world Communist movement.
This position, together
with Rumania's emphasis on its
historical attachment to Bessara-
bia and the regime's de-Russifi-
cation campaign, has underscored
Bucharest's determination to in-
sist upon recognition of its na-
tional sovereignty. Rumania may
even intend to reduce its Warsaw
Pact commitments and ties. This
would be a final and most signif-
icant step, since the pact is
the only formal instrument of
control over Rumania remaining
in Moscow's hands.
Rumania's dissatisfaction
with its Warsaw Pact obligations
came into sharp focus at last
January's pact conference. At
that meeting, then party leader
Gheorghiu Dej reportedly objected
strongly to a proposal for in-
creased integration of Rumanian
military units under the Warsaw
Pact Joint Command--headed by
Soviet Marshal Grechko. Al-
though an integrated command
would have been consistent with
Soviet efforts to transform the
pact from a device for political
control over Eastern Europe into
something closer to a true mili-
tary alliance, Bucharest had
already expressed its strong
disapproval of precisely this
kind of alliance.
Grechko then visited Bucha-
rest on 24 May and 15 June, sug-
gesting that Rumanian-Soviet
friction over pact affairs had
become more intense. This was
also the impression left by
party chief Ceausescu when he
failed to make any mention of
the pact or the USSR in his ad-
dress to the mid-June meeting
of the Rumanian armed forces
party organization. This speech
was delivered in the interval
between Grechko's two visits.
Rumanian Armed Forces Min-
ister Salajan is technically
one of Grechko's deputies within
the Warsaw Pact Joint Command.
Recurring examples of lack of
coordination between them, how-
ever, indicate a breakdown of
communications which detract
from pact capabilities. More-
over, the Rumanian regime has
exhibited little interest in im-
proving its lackluster air and
air defense forces--from the
standpoint of equipment and per-
formance the poorest of any in
the pact. It also had reduced
the basic conscript term from
24 months to 16 months--the
shortest of any Communist country
--almost certainly over Moscow's
objections. During the last
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three years, however, the re-
gime has modestly improved its
ground forces, particularly
through, the acquisition of tac-
tical surface-to-surface mis-
siles (FROG and Scud).
Rumania's efforts to ex-
pand relations with the non-
Communist world, especially
Western Europe, also reflect its
quest for increased independ-
ence. The level of diplomatic
representation has been raised
with a number of Western Euro-
pean countries, including Aus-
tria, Belgium, France, and Great
Britain. Bucharest has entered
into a variety of technical,
scientific, and cultural accords
with individual Western coun-
tries. These accords have been
supplemented by increased ex-
changes of visits by governmen-
tal, parliamentary, technical-
scientific, and academic delega-
tions, as well as artistic
groups.
Rumanian-US relations also
have improved considerably since
1960. Agreements have been con-
cluded for the settlement of
claims of US nationals arising
out of war damages, nationaliza-
tion of American property, and
commercial and financial debts.
Since the Rumanian party's dec-
laration of independence in
April 1964, diplomatic represen-
tation between the two countries
has been raised to ambassadorial
level and negotiation for eco-
nomic, cultural, and political
exchanges have, increased.
US-Rumanian relations pres-
ently are under some strain.
Difficulties in negotiations
with US suppliers for key indus-
trial installations have dis-
turbed regime officials. However,
Bucharest has hewed to a reason-
ably restrained line on Vietnam,
probably because of its desire
for closer US ties, the economic
aspects of which could be of
great importance in the regime's
drive for independence. Despite
such restraint, the foreign policy
report at the coming party con-
gress will be critical of certain
US policies, particularly those
involving Vietnam.
The Uncertain Outlook
With the April 1964 declara-
tion, Rumania's leaders estab-
lished policy lines from which it
would be difficult--if not dis-
astrous--to turn, and about which
they cannot procrastinate. What
the leadership appears to want
is a degree of independence from
the USSR approximating that en-
joyed by the Yugoslavs. The up-
coming congress will undoubtedly
establish the basis for arriving
at this goal.
To achieve it will require
continued successful resistance
to Soviet pressures, adroit han-
dlingof the country's expanding
relations with the free world,
continued economic growth, and
the loyalty of the party, police,
and army to Ceausescu. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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