WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004900070001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 18, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

OCI No . 02;9.4/65
Copy'NQ
WEEKLY SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET 25
GROUP I Ex'tludad from automatic
,iowngrading,and'declp ifict},Iion
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SECRET
(Information as of noon EDT, 17 June 1965)
VIETNAM
Saigon's political crisis has been resolved, at least
temporarily, by the formation of a new "military
leadership committee" which is working out details
of a new government organization. As the Viet Cong
continue to press their summer campaign, Hanoi and
Peiping are stepping up their efforts to deter the US
The Communist World
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Peiping's latest blast makes it clear that developments
in Vietnam will not stop Chinese attacks on the Soviet
leadership or cause the Chinese to compromise on any
of the major points at issue.
TITO'S VISITS TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND EAST GERMANY
His talks will probably lead to further improvement
in bilateral relations, but he apparently found little
agreement with either Ulbricht or Novotny on the pro-
blems of international Communism.
POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN THE BULGARIAN REGIME
Recent events suggest that the trial of the Bulgarian
conspirators was cancelled as a result of efforts by
various party factions to turn the conspiracy to their
own advantage.
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COMMUNIST CHINA AGAIN INCREASING TRUCK INVENTORY
A revival of domestic production and an expansion of
imports had expanded the truck inventory at the end of
1964 to about 230,000, about 180,000 of which are less
than ten years old.
Asia-Africa
SECOND AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE PRELUDES
An atmosphere of disarray continues to pervade the
preparations for the conference, especially in the
physical and logistical arrangements, while the
Chinese Communists and other radically anti-Western
elements are pressing their campaign to dominate the
meeting.
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8
JAPANESE LEFT EXPLOITS VIETNAM ISSUE
As part of their campaign for elections to the Upper
House on 4 July, the leftists are agitating strongly to
draw the votes of the many Japanese who fear involvement
if the hostilities in Vietnam spread.
MALI REGIME MODERATING LEFTIST POLICIES
A combination of economic difficulties, disapointment
over French and Chinese Communist aid prospects, and
pressure from pro-Western neighbors is leading President
Keita to put some reins on Mali's extremists.
KING TAKES OVER MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT
Hassan II has resumed direct rule in an effort to end
a prolonged political impasse and to begin to deal with
the country's more pressing economic difficulties.
REBEL AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE CONGO
Rebel bands have resumed harassment of government po-
sitions around Lake Tanganyika. On the political scene,
Tshombd's party is rolling up a huge majority, according
to nearly complete election returns.
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NAOF OEM UIVEJ .1 low
Europe
NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEBATE IN SWEDEN
The military again urge an accelerated weapons research
program to reduce lead time needed for actual production.
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DEVELOPMENTS
The De Gaulle - Erhard talks in Bonn seem to have allayed
German fears about some French policies but the two
countries still differ about EEC agricultural financing
proposals.
BRITISH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Political and economic difficulties are causing specula-
tion that the Labor government may be forced into an
early election this fall. Opinion polls have the Conserv-
atives leading Labor.
Western Hemisphere
SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Heavy fighting resumed in Santo Domingo 15 June when
rebels attacked elements of the Inter-American Peace
Force. The action is indicative of increasing ex-
tremist influence in the rebel camp.
URUGUAYAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM SOUGHT AGAIN
Political leaders are calling for constitutional reform
again as an answer to the nation's economic problems.
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GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN PERU
The Movement of the Revolutionary Left has apparently
started guerrilla activity in remote and rugged east-
central Peru. Three ranches, two police posts, and a
mine have been raided since 9 June.
TEMPORARY RESPITE IN BOLIVIA
The military occupation of the nationalized mines has
brought a temporary respite to the month-old political
crisis but the duration of the lull probably depends on
how soon conditions improve at the mines.
UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
The commission meeting has served, as the Soviets in-
tended, as a forum for attacks on US foreign policies
and for polemics against the West.
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The political crisis in
Saigon has been resolved for the
time being by formation of a new
all-powerful "military leader-
ship committee" which is working
out details of new government or-
ganization to carry out the re-
forms desired by "Young Turk"
generals. It remains to be seen
if the committee members have
the political skill required to
manage this shake-up, particu-
larly in the environment of a
worsening military situation. As
the Viet Cong push ahead with
their summer campaign, Hanoi and
Peiping are increasing their ef-
forts to deter the US from
further escalation and, at the
same time,are preparing defenses
against the possibility of
heavier US blows.
Political Changes in Saigon
Premier Quat on 11 June
handed over full government power
to the military, after its lead-
ers had concluded among them=
selves that "radical" steps were
needed to resolve the political
crisis which he had asked them
to mediate. Although Quat and
his cabinet were retained in a
caretaker capacity, the National
Legislative Council and the pro-
visional charter have been abol-
ished.
All government prerogatives
now reside in a new 10-member
"military leadership committee."
This committee, headed by Gen-
eral Nguyen Van Thieu, Quat's
current defense minister and the
prospective new chief of state,
is to determine the new govern-
ment's structure and policies,
and set up a mixed military-
civilian "wartime" cabinet
headed or supervised by Air Vice
Marshal Ky.
Although government poli-
cies are still being worked out,
broad outlines are beginning to
emerge and have been reflected
in public statements by General
Thieu. These policies would in-
volve basically a program of
austerity, maximum concentration
on the war effort, and harsh
treatment of "political and eco-
nomic speculators." This pro-
gram appears in line with the
"revolutionary reforms" long ad-
vocated by Ky and other "Young
Turk" generals, as well as by
the Tri Quang wing of the Bud-
dhist hierarchy.
It remains highly question-
able, however, whether the mili-
tary leaders can manage a sweep-
ing internal shake-up without
provoking an adverse reaction
among certain civilian elements,
or without reverting themselves
to renewed infighting at a time
when the military situation has
also become more critical. The
Catholics and their allies have
already warned the military of
their " reference" for civilian
rule.
Viet Cong Campaign
In South Vietnam
The Viet Cong summer cam-
paign continues to gather momen-
tum. The major action of the week
involved a series of engagements
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`WF SECRET
in and around the district town
of Dong Xoai, in Phuoc Long Prov-
ince, 60 miles north of Saigon.
Both sides suffered heavy casual-
ties. The Viet:Cong launched a
regimental size attack on the
town and on a nearby US Special
Forces camp on 9 June and, dur-
ing the five-day battle that en-
sued, badly mauled several gov-
ernment relief forces. Action
has been broken off.
Enemy sabotage efforts
against roads and rail lines are
widespread, and appear calculated
to make the entire system inoper-
able. Long stretches of main
highways have been cut and the
coastal railroad is operable only
from Nha Trang southward for a
distance of 35 miles.
The 15 June bombing of the
civilian terminal at Saigon's
Tan Son Nhut airport, wounding
34 US military personnel, and an
earlier attempt to sabotage a US
Navy bus in Saigon, may fore-
shadow renewed terrorist activi-
ties against Americans.
Communist Political Moves
In anticipation of new US
moves to escalate the war in Viet-
nam, the Communists are seeking
to increase deterrent pressures
on Washington.
On 12 June the Front fol-
lowed up its threat of 9 June to
call in "volunteers" from the
DRV and "friendly" countries,
claiming that "now more than ever
before all the necessary condi-
tions for such action have ma-
terialized." The DRV has en-
dorsed these threats and the
North Vietnamese delegate to the
recent "Solidarity Conference"
in Hanoi made a speech--rebroad-
cast by the Chinese on 13 June
--which called for "donations
of weapons and volunteers" but
did not include the usual qualifi-
cation that this would take
place when the Front decided it
was "necessary."
A statement by the Libera-
tion Front central committee,
released on 14 June, raised the
possibility of DRV troops mov-
ing across the demilitarized zone
by claiming that "US warlike
policies" have erased the "tem-
porary demarcation line at the
17th parallel which divides Viet-
nam into two zones." Although
Peiping had claimed earlier that
US moves had given North Vietnam
the right to intervene militar-
ily in the South, neither Hanoi
nor the Front had ever commented
independently to this effect be-
fore.
The Chinese Communists once
again raised the specter of
another Korean-type war in an
article by the authoritative "Ob-
server" in People's Daily on 11
June. Responding o t e announce-
ment that US troops might play
a regular combat role in Vietnam,
Peiping warned that this action
was "fraught with extremely grave
consequences" and asserted that
it gave "all friendly countries"
a greater right to dispatch
volunteers at any time they were
"required" by the Front.
Peiping has been gradually
spelling out the conditions un-
der which it would intervene
directly in terms calculated
to present a convincing image
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Moscow continues to take
amore cautious nee in its deter-
rent warning
efforts to present the Front as
the "only genuine and legal
representative" of the South
Vietnamese people.
Chinese diplomats in Al-
giers reportedly told the Turk-
ish ambassador there recently
that Peiping might agree to a
moderate Afro-Asian resolution
on Vietnam appealing for an end
to the fighting and a beginning
of negotiations in exchange for
Turkish help in excluding the
Soviet Union from the meeting.
The Communists may be plan-
ning new political moves at the
coming Afro-Asian conference in
Algiers designed to tie the hands
of the US or put the onus for
continued hostilities on Washing-
ton. The DRV foreign minister
and a prominent Front diplomat
have been touring leftist Afri-
can capitals to line up support
for seating Front representatives
at the meeting. On 14 June
Hanoi's foreign minister demanded
participation of the Front as a.
"full-fledged member." This
would be a major step forward in
A new surface-to-air mis-
sile site in the vicinity of
Hanoi was disclosed by photog-
raphy This site--
locat a ou nautical miles 25X1
west-northwest of the city--
is the fourth one detected thus
far in the Hanoi area. Two re-
vetments of the new site are
almost complete and the other
four are in various stages of
construction. One of the other
SAM sites now appears to be near-
ing completion.
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The latest of Peiping's ma-
jor polemical blasts at Moscow--
the People's Daily - Red Flag
editorial. of T4_7une--makes t
clear that despite the increas-
ing seriousness of the situation
in Vietnam, the Chinese have no
intention of abandoning their
public attacks on the Soviet
leadership. The editorial broad-
side, entitled "Carry the Strug-
gle Against Khrushchev Revision-
ism Through to the End," is a
flat rejection of Soviet appeals
for bloc unity and a categorical
refusal to compromise on any of
the major points at issue between
Moscow and Peiping.
Published on the second an-
niversary of a major Chinese at-
tack on Khrushchev, the edito-
rial denounces his successors
for collusion with Washington
and for attempting to help the
US find "a way out" in Vietnam
through negotiations. Peiping
contends that the present Soviet
leaders--"more cunning and dan-
gerous" than Khrushchev--actually
represent a "privileged bourgeois
stratum" in the USSR and that
they merely "chant honeyed words
such as 'unity"' in hopes of be-
ing able to pursue their betrayal
of Marxism-Leninism without crit-
icism. These charges are not
new, but Peiping may believe that
constant repetition of them will
reinforce whatever suspicions
North Vietnamese leaders may have
of Soviet sincerity.
In the face of this continu-
ing Chinese challenge, Moscow is
maintaining its policy of general
restraint. Although Khrushchev's
successors have reaffirmed the
Soviet position on substantive
issues in dispute with Peiping,
they have attempted to avoid
harsh polemics and prefer to
counter Chinese charges by build-
ing a record of firm opposition
to "US imperialism," especially
in Vietnam. Moscow apparently
considers that its military as-
sistance to Hanoi, and its claims
of Soviet-DRV unanimity on meas-
ures to repulse "US imperialism,"
constitute effective weapons to
undercut Chinese charges.
On occasion, however, the
Soviets have reacted to partic-
ularly provocative Chinese com-
ments. After politburo member
Peng Chen's violent anti-Soviet
attack at the recent Indonesian
Communist Party anniversary
celebrations in Djakarta, for
example, Moscow publicly pro-
tested "slanderous" Chinese
statements.
The Soviets also continue
to publicize foreign party state-
ments in line with Moscow's po-
sition on interparty relations.
On 13 June, for example, Pravda
published a Portuguese party
resolution which called for a
new international meeting of Com-
munist parties in which the 81
parties which attended the 1960
Moscow conference should partic-
ipate.. While the Russians
probably do not anticipate a con-
ference in the near future, they
have sought to exploit Chinese
opposition to such a meeting
to demonstrate that Peiping is
not at all interested in resolv-
ing interparty differences.
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TITO'S VISITS TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Tito's talks with the
Czechoslovak and East German
leaders, Novotny and Ulbricht,
seem to have been generally suc-
cessful and could lead to further
improvement in Yugoslavia's re-
lations with their countries.
One immediate result will be to
strengthen Tito's hand for his
visit later this month to the
USSR. A comparison of the two
communiquds he signed indicates
that Tito found the general sit-
uation in Czechoslovakia con-
siderably more to his liking than
that in East Germany.
The talks revealed important
areas of bilateral agreement,
particularly in trade matters.
Tito also seemed in agreement
with his hosts in attacking the
US for its policies in Vietnam
and the Dominican Republic, as
well as West Germany for its
alleged unwillingness to accept
the status quo in Central Europe.
Tito's speeches on these subjects,
however, were generally milder
than those of his hosts, partic-
ularly in East Germany.
On the other hand, Tito
apparently found little agree-
ment with Ulbricht and Novotny
on the problems of the inter-
national Communist movement.
In his speeches he attacked China
for its policies and indicated
that it, along with the US, was
responsible for increased in-
ternational tensions. In East
Germany, Tito said that inability
to compromise on issues at dis-
pute in the Communist world
was no reason to keep quiet
about them. These matters,
however, were not mentioned in
the final communiquds.
Tito was on the spot in
East Germany because West Ger-
many, whose economic support
Belgrade needs, had indicated
that Tito's conduct there would
determine its future attitude
toward Belgrade. Nevertheless,
he stated his views on the Ger-
man problem (which are distaste-
ful to Bonn), visited the Wall,
and departed from usual Yugo-
slav statements to speak of the
need to normalize the situation
in West Berlin. Twice, however,
he explicitly admitted the
existence of differences with
the East Germans. There was
no mention of raising the status
of diplomatic relations to the
ambassadorial level nor of
withdrawing Yugoslavia's mili-
tary mission in West Berlin.
Ulbricht and Tito, who
have never really approved of
each other, made little progress
in improving their personal
relations. Novotny was with
Tito for all except one day
of his visit, but Ulbricht
accompanied him only when nec-
essary.. Tito, moreover, man-
aged to avoid mentioning U1-
bricht by name in the princi-
pal address of his visit.
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The trial of the conspira-
tors against the Bulgarian regime
has not been held, despite indica-
tions that first secretary Zhivkov
was ready to proceed with it in
early May. Recent events suggest
that the various party factions
sought to turn the conspiracy to
their own advantage in internal
party maneuverings, and that
Zhivkov finally felt compelled
to appeal to Moscow for help.
Soviet party secretary
Suslov, who has figured promi-
nentlyin all the more important
Bulgarian leadership changes of
the past 10 years, visited Sofia
and several provincial centers
from 26 May to 4 June. Judging
from his major speech, he de-
clined to involve himself in the
party factionalism. He praised
not only Zhivkov, but also party
secretaries Grigorov and Velchev
and state President Traykov.
Moreover, he never publicly men-
tioned the April plot or said any-
thing to support one or another of
the factions, except to express
appreciation for the party's close
support of the USSR in all mat-
ters.
Zhivkov's distress over this
stand was apparent in his state-
ment that he had asked Suslov to
make "some critical remarks" about
the fact that in the Bulgarian
party there are "shortcomings,
difficulties, and errors, that
there are even shocking things
in our work." Nevertheless,
Zhivkov went on to express his
fealty to the USSR, apparently so
he can claim that any attack on
his personal position is an at-
tack on Bulgaria's close alliance
with the USSR.
The plot and how it should
be handled have been the subject
of considerable party discussion
since Suslov's visit. It figured
prominently in the 8-9 June meet-
ing of the Sofia party organiza-
tion and the "all-army gathering"
of military party workers on the
same dates. It probably was dis-
cussed at the 10-11 June central
committee plenum.
The plenum gave Zhivkov a
backhanded demonstration of sup-
port; it "unanimously decided"
that he should end its proceed-
ings even though he had not
played a prominent role at it.
Immediately afterward, Zhivkov
traveled to Plovdiv, once the
stronghold of Anton Yugov, an ex-
partisan who was ousted from the
premiership in late 1962 for his
factional activity, either to re-
assert his authority or to seek
additional support.
Other members of the regime
who appear to be soliciting per-
sonal support include Deputy
Defense Minister Trunski, who
has a reputation as a Titoist.
On 13 June, in the presence of
the Soviet military attache and
"a Yugoslav comrade," he de-
livered a speech commemorating
the formation of his partisan
detachment which cooperated with
Yugoslav partisans during the war.
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Reviving domestic produc-
tion and expanding imports of
trucks are increasing Communist
China's truck inventory, which
had remained static since the
collapse of the leap forward.
The military holds perhaps half
of the inventory, which was
200,000 to 230,000 trucks at the
end of 1964. Of these about
180,000 are less than ten years
old.
Average annual new acquisi-
tions from domestic production
and imports between 1955 and 1960
far exceeded estimated retire-
ments, and added about 18,000
new trucks to the inventory each
year. From 1961 to 1963, new
acquisitions--imports and do-
mestic output--dropped to a level
approximately equaling retire-
ments, leaving the inventory
static in numbers. Road trans-
port does not appear to have
experienced serious problems
during those years, because
economic activity slackened and
military use of trucks was held
to a minimum.
Starting in 1964, acquisi-
tions have again clearly ex-
the output o the
angc un motor Vehicle Plant--
a Soviet-aid facility which has
accounted for most of the domestic
output since 1956--had climbed
back to about 15,700 units in
1964 from a low of 2,200 in 1961.
The plant's output in 1959, be-
fore the withdrawal of Soviet
technicians disrupted operations,
was about 17,200 units.
Imports of bloc vehicles
have continued into 1965--
although at drastically re-
duced levels since 1961, and
China has begun to draw upon
free world sources of supply
for heavier vehicles generally
beyond China's capabilities to
produce. Since late 1964,
2,000 heavy-duty trucks and
dump trucks have been on order
from Berliet of France.
China's productive capabili-
ties are still essentially
limited to copying the Soviet
ZIL-150 cargo truck at Chang-
chun, the country's only modern
truck plant. Implied claims of
production by plants other than
Changchun appear exaggerated.
The plants mentioned are ad-
mitted to be only assembly fa-
cilities that use components
from Changchun and from other
small spare-parts plants, and
have probably produced no more
than about 2,000 trucks a year.
Chinese plans call for doubling
Changchun's output, but no tar-
get date has been specified.
A contract just signed 25X1
with Berliet to set up an assem-
bly plant in China over the
next three years may represent
an attempt to gain capabilities
for producing more complex ve-
hicles. Berliet will probably
"train engineers and supply con-
sulting and engineering serv-
ices" toward assembly of ve-
hicles similar to the heavy-
duty trucks sold to the Chinese.
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Preparations for the Second
Afro-Asian Conference, which
opens in Algiers on 29 June, are
accelerating. Some moderates are
collaborating in an effort to
keep the conference from being
dominated by the radicals, while
the latter continue their rounds
of preconference consultations.
Developments at the prepara-
tory committee meeting, held in
Algiers from 4 to 8 June, indi-
cated that the moderates were
ill prepared to cope with radical
tactics. The Chinese Communists
and the radicals dominated the
meeting with the help of the Al-
gerian chairman, who reportedly
favored them at every opportu
nity. The moderates seem to have
made little effort individually
or collectively to stem the rad-
ical tide.
The preparatory meeting,
however, apparently failed in its
primary task--the preparation of
an economic resolution for con-
sideration by the foreign minis-
ters when they meet on 24 June.
Instead, a number of documents,
including the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development
report and a Chinese speech
stressing Afro-Asian cooperation
outside the UN, were collected
for referral to the foreign min-
isters.
Events appear to have been
especially discouraging to In-
dia. Anticipating that the
foreign ministersk meeting might
be "loaded" against its repre-
sentatives, New Delhi is con-
sidering the possibility of
downgrading the level of its
representation at the conference
proper. It is conceivable that
India would boycott the confer-
ence if both Malaysia and the
USSR--whose participation is
sponsored by India--were excluded.
Meanwhile, Chinese, Indo-
nesian and Algerian delegations
continue to tour Asia and Africa
to line up support for their
position at the conference.
Delegations from Hanoi and the
Communists' National Front for
the Liberation of South Vietnam
are also touring Africa, seeking
support for seating the Front
as either a full participant or
an observer.
At the same time, the pace
of Moscow's diplomatic and prop-
aganda campaign to assert its
"right" to attend has been quick-
ening. Although Soviet press
commentary and approaches to
foreign governments remain rel-
atively restrained, the extent
and intensity of the current
Russian offensive suggest a
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decision to oppose more actively
Chinese efforts to isolate the
USSR.
Moscow may win participation
if majority voting is adopted
early in the foreign ministers'
meeting. However, Chinese and
Indonesian insistence that all
decisions be unanimous could
block Soviet participation, as
well as that of Malaysia, South
Vietnam, and South Korea. What-
ever the outcome, the Soviets
will continue to point to Pei-
ping's heavy-handed and uncompro-
mising tactics as evidence that
the Chinese are more interested
in pressing their anti-Soviet
campaign than in strengthening
Afro-Asian forces.
There is still no indication
that any of the 10 moderate Afri-
can states which have decided
not to participate formally in
the conference--Chad, Congo (Leo-
poldville), Gabon, Gambia, Ivory
Coast, Malagasy Republic, Niger,
Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta--
will reverse their decisions.
The Moroccan foreign minister,
who among others has urged these
SECRET
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY
governments to attend, blames
France for influencing them.
He believes that De Gaulle
wants to build up Ben Bella as
an extremist, third-world, de-
structively anti-American force
in Africa and therefore has
played an "unhelpful role" in
conference preliminaries.
In Algiers, physical prep-
arations for the conference
have lagged to such an extent
that alternate arrangements
are being made to care for the
foreign ministers. They appar-
ently will meet in the Algerian
National Assembly chamber and
be housed in hotels within the
city.
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The Japanese left is capi-
talizing on popular opposition
to the bombing of North Vietnam
as the campaign for the 4 July
Upper House elections opens. Play-
ing upon deep-seated fears that
Japan may become involved if hos-
tilities spread, left-wing groups
mobilized 36,000 demonstrators
in Tokyo and over 100,000 through-
out the country on 9 June in a
"Day of National Action Against
US Aggression in Vietnam."
This was the largest such
demonstration since the Vietnam
issue flared up in February..
Although the rival leftist or-
ganizations which sponsored the
rallies failed to agree formally
on unified action, they did
achieve a de facto united front
insofar as Socialists, unionists,
and Communists employed similar
tactics on the same day. This
is the closest approach to unity
on the left since the anti - Secu-
rity Treaty riots of 1960, and
should help the leftists make a
stronger bid for broader support
in the election.
The leftist leadership may
now be counting on a confronta-
tion with the government to win
further "sympathy" votes. For
its part, the Sato government ap-
parently welcomes the challenge.
On 8 June, the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party issued a state-
ment strongly backing the US
position in Vietnam, although
many LDP members reportedly har-
bor private reservations. Fol-
lowing the demonstrations, the
minister of home affairs is re-
ported to have warned the cabi-
net of the danger of further
leftist agitation, and is said
to favor a crackdown.
Although the upcoming elec-
tion for the House of Council-
lors cannot result in any real
shift in power--which resides
in the lower house of the Diet
--it will serve as a political
barometer and will give the first
public verdict on Prime Minister
Sato and his almost completely
revamped cabinet.
MALI REGIME MODERATING LEFTIST POLICIES
A shift of pressures within
the regime appears to be influ-
encing Mali President Modibo
Keita to seek less doctrinaire
solutions to the country's prob-
lems. In recent months, a com-
bination of popular discontent
over deteriorating economic con-
ditions, pressure from pro-West-
ern African neighbors, and waning
exuberance over unrealistic hopes
of French and Chinese Communist
aid, have caused the government
to look for new backers. Con-
tinuation of the trend could
bring Mali into a more truly non-
aligned position and lead the
regime to exercise its "social-
ist option" in a more moderate
fashion.
President Keita has long
been in the middle between a
moderate, relatively pro-Western
faction with close ties to tra-
ditionalMalian society and an
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`NO' SECRET v4sof
extremist, pro-Communist group
which dominates the apparatus o
Mali's single party. Keita is
closer ideologically to the ex-
tremists, but he is also sensi-
tive to the regime's need for
traditionalist support.
The latest shift seems to
have been triggered by the break-
off in late May of financial
talks with France. The lengthy
whether France would readmit
by assume part of the burden that
Bamako's ill-considered economic
programs have created during the
past five years of independence.
Paris insisted that Mali give
up full control over its cur-
rency--a concession which Mali's
leftist faction rejected as a
return to colonialism. An alter-
native salvation in the form of
MALI
D
BAMAKO
Timbuktu
0
MOIR
MIAMEY
UPP Y4tTA
the works. On the other hand,
Malian leaders appear responsive
to renewed Soviet attention.
Keita has arranged to vacation
in the USSR this summer.
increased Chinese Communist aid One domestic area in which
--a large cash advance was among the regime has stepped back has
the help reported to be avail- been in its relations with the
able--apparently has not material- large traditional merchant class,
ized. which is closely tied to the
moderate faction. The government
After these French and Chi- has agreed to ease and postpone
nese prospects dimmed, the moder- implementation of a stringent
ates persuaded Keita to send a new law--ideologically inspired
high-level delegation to Washing- and intended to direct peddlers
ton to seek an improvement in and youth into "productive ac-
Mali-US relations. Normally tivity"--which threatened the
strident anti-American radio livelihood of Mali's professional
propaganda has been toned down, traders. The threat of wide-
the government is reported to spread shop closings and of a
have decided to stay in the back- serious breakdown in the distribu-
ground at the forthcoming Second tion system apparently caused
Afro-Asian Conference; and a rap- Keita to rein in the extremists
prochement with conservative mem-
bers of the Afro-Malagasy Com-
mon Organization seems to be in
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4W.V 1%00
SECRET
On 8 June, King Hassan II of rister.of industry, mines, tour-
Morocco resumed the premiership,
which he had relinquished in No-
vember 1963, in an effort to end
a prolonged political impasse and
to initiate action to meet at
least the more pressing of the
country's economic problems.
The Casablanca riots last
March focused attention on rising
unemployment and living costs as
symptoms of a steadily deterio-
rating economy. The riots also
apparently convinced Hassan that
he could no longer resort to a
caretaker regime such as the two
which succeeded each other during
the past 18 months. Failing to
win support from Morocco's par-
ties for a government of national
unity, he accepted the only alter-
native, a government of ministers
individually responsive to his
wishes. Enough participation by
independent liberals was obtained
to satisfy the left and to hold
forth the promise of satisfying
some leftist demands, such as
those for elections and con-
stitutional revision.
The new government includes
many ministers from the previous
government and is composed of
persons selected for their tech-
nical or administrative competence.
Six ministers who were regarded
as deadwood-including?the-former
premier, Ahmed Bahnini--were re-
placed by six more energetic in-
dividuals. The addition of Mo-
hamed Laghzaoui, head of the gov
ernment's phosphate monopoly and
long a confidant of the King,
should give impetus to business
confidence. Laghzaoui, as min-
'ism, and artisanry, controls
virtually everything likely to
make money.
Mohamed Zeghari, techni-
cally vice premier, is unlikely
to be effective. Real authority
as the King's right hand will
continue to reside with Driss
M'Hammedi, director general
of the royal cabinet, who is
widely regarded as a prospective
premier.
Left-wing intellectuals and
labor have indicated restrained
approval of the King's action,
while the rightist Istiqlal has
denounced the move as uncon-
stitutional. The Democratic
Socialist Party, which had dom-
inated the previous governing
coalition, practically ceased
to exist when two of its most
prominent members resigned
from the party to stay in the
cabinet. The Popular Movement,
whose two members in the govern-
ment are the only ministers with
party affiliation, is apparently
satisfied with developments.
Only in the rural areas, how-
ever, will the King's action find
broad and enthusiastic support.
The King can be expected to
display considerable dynamism in
the next few months, and to hold
a referendum for constitutional
amendments, presumably amid con-
siderable fanfare. More than
showmanship, however, will be
needed to solve the basic eco
nomic malaise which set off the
Casablanca disorders.
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Rebel activity is again
picking up in the regions west
of Lake Tanganyika, but the rest
of the Congo is relatively calm.
Rebel bands have resumed harass-
ment of government positions
near Uvira, at the northern tip
of the lake. Other rebels are
concentrating around Fizi, and
lake traffic from Kigoma, Tan-
zania, has also increased.
Rebel activity continues to
wane in the northeast following
the 1 June capture of Buta.
Nearly final electio,r re-
turns indicate a huge majority
in the National Assembly for
Conaco, Premier Tshombd's na-
tional political cartel. With
only 10 of 166 seats unaccounted
for, Conaco and its allies hold
a commanding 112-44 lead. Presi-
dent Kasavubu's Abako party is
the second largest group with
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Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 seats. Conaco and its al-
lies also control 13 of the 21
provincial assemblies, which
are beginning to meet to select
national senators and to form
provincial governments. Party
affiliations at all levels are
still very weak, however, and
tribal and personal loyalties
will count for more when actual
votes are taken in the as-
semblies.
Tshombd's majority in par-
liament, if he can hold it to-
gether, clearly enhances his
position should he choose to
run for the presidency, locus
of power under the new constitu-
tion. Kasavubu has declared
his candidacy, but Tshombd ear-
lier this week sidestepped the
question. In his second provin-
cial tour in three weeks, Presi-
dent Kasavubu.drew onl mildly
enthusiastic crowds.
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DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
-??- International boundary
Province boundary
National capital
Province capital
CENTRAL AFRICAN RE'PUBLIC
O ion 200 W',
100 20
0 ]OO 20
0 Kilo-t,,
~..,
Doruma ~\. f..
Belaie 1san
Coquilhatville
Ktkwit
?
Ikela
KAMPA~A
f-AA uA/"
Goma XF.
O KIGALI 4 C
BUJUMBURA
a K9oma
ly .
.1 Kohgolov ~ j
7h1 ev Albertville
S;
BaudouinvilI
Man no 5r
..... ~ l: l,NGA.N1Ih'A
Jadotville ~?' rsa ~ ::
N-..~~*Elisabe(thville~.
(Port.)
0. ~.. ~
ProvinrlaI boundaries ha,', been strips fated from existntg I
Z A M B I A
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEBATE IN SWEDEN
The question of acquiring
nuclear weapons is again under
active debate in Sweden. The
latest discussion follows the
recent pleas of the supreme com-
mander of Sweden's defense
forces, General Torsten Rapp,
for an accelerated program of
weapons research to reduce the
lead time required for actual
production. Last month Rapp
submitted his recommendations
to Defense Minister Andersson
in a defense report to be con-
sidered by a defense commission
appointed by the government.
In previous years, General
Rapp and the military have taken
the line that nuclear weapons
production is necessary if Swe-
den's neutrality is to be re-
spected. The dominant Social
Democratic Party, especially its
left wing, has discounted these
arguments, however, and emphasized
instead that Sweden's security
lies in world disarmament agree-
ments.
Many high Swedish officials
nonetheless believe that the
likely further proliferation of
nuclear weapons may leave Sweden
no choice but to acquire its own.
This view is held by Under Secre-
tary of Defense Frithiofson, who
maintains that the Soviets would
be more likely to observe Sweden's
neutrality if it had a credible
nuclear capability.
Press reaction to General
Rapp's proposals has been sur-
prisingly favorable. Most Con-
servative and Liberal papers and
even one Social Democratic paper
supported them. Those opposing
did so only on grounds that a
decision to expand weapons re-
search might harm Sweden's posi-
tion in disarmament talks. How-
ever, the Foreign Ministry in
its weekly editorial roundup re-
printed an article contending
that Sweden's position would ac-
tually be strengthened if it
were known that it did have a
nuclear capability. Some high
officials have said that Sweden
could have atomic weapons by
1970, if not earlier.
Swedish public opinion does
not appear ready as yet to ac-
cept a go-ahead on nuclear weap-
ons, but if other countries ac-
quire them in the next few years,
opinion would probably change.
In any event, final decision may
have to wait for the Social Demo-
cratic Party dongress in June
1968,even although a favorable
report by the defense commission
before then could be taken as an
indication of Sweden's intent.
to initiate a production program.
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'imr SECRET
The 12 June week-end talks
in Bonn between De Gaulle and
Erhard went more smoothly than
had been expected. De Gaulle
evidently had some success in
quieting German fears about his
policies.
As inducements, the French held
out vague promises of a "consulta-
tive" role for the European Par-
liament and of a summit meeting
on political unity without, how-
ever, offering any assurance of
what its outcome might be.
The French President indi-
cated there was still plenty of
time to make specific proposals
for revising NATO before 1969.
He said the McNamara proposals
for a select committee on nuclear
matters are still under considera-
tion in Paris. De Gaulle also
played down his theme of "Euro-
peanizing" the German unification
question and appeared tacitly to
accept the German position on
trade credits for the East Euro-
pean bloc.
The primary focus of the
meeting, however, was on European
integration--particularly politi-
cal union talks and the EEC Com-
mission's recent "package" of
proposals. These seek to finance
the EEC's common agricultural
policy (CAP), to provide the Com-
munity with an "independent"
source of revenue from agricul-
tural levies and tariff receipts,
and to grant the European Parlia-
ment real powers to control these
funds.
The French want to limit any
agreement to CAP financing and
are attempting to deprive the Com-
mission of the support its posi-
tion has among the other members.
The French proposed alternative
agricultural financing arrange-
ments for the next several years
in lieu of the shorter, interim
extension of present arrangements
which the Germans have suggested.
Although the Germans did
not agree with the French pro-
posals regarding the CAP, they
evidently were unwilling to make
an all-out defense of the "polit-
ical" aspects of the Commission's
proposals. They seem instead to
be asking for advances in indus-
trial integration as a quid pro
quo to further agricultural agree-
ments. Such a "deal" could have
the effect of both undercutting
and overloading the Commission's
package, and leaving any defini-
tive decision for an uncertain
future.
Despite the claim of mutual
"understanding" reached in Bonn,
the subsequent EEC Council meet-
ing in Brussels early this week
seems to have left the deadlock
unresolved. The French claimed
that since creation of a common
agricultural market for all prod-
ucts by 1967 would be "impose-
sible " and since general agree-
ment to contribute industrial
tariff revenue to a common fund
does not exist, the question of
the European Parliament's control
of finances "does not present
itself." Although the Germans
may now have bought this line,
the Dutch are presumably still
opposed to any financial agree-
ment which does not include in-
creased parliamentary powers.
Further EEC meetings are
expected before the end of
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SECRET
June--when current CAP financing
arrangements expire--and it is
difficult to foresee the eventual
outcome. It is questionable
whether the French will accept a
one-year extension of the present
arrangements as a fallback posi-
tion--knowing that the big issues
they are trying to avoid would
have to be faced again so soon.
It is also not clear what the
Dutch and the Commission will
do. Despite their desire to
avoid a "confrontation" with
De Gaulle at this time, they may
judge that conditions are more
propitious now for extracting
French concessions to an effec-
tive community than at some fu-
BRITISH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Political and economic dif-
ficulties continue to plague Prime
Minister Wilson's government, and
speculation is rising that he may
be forced to an early election
this fall. Recent public opinion
polls show the Conservatives are
now leading labor. Voters who
wanted A change from stand-pat
Conservative policies last Octo-
ber are disillusioned with the
government's erratic performance
and its failure to come up with
any solutions to Britain's basic
problem.
The economy shows little
signs of improvement. The trade
gap widened perceptibly in May,
as it has in recent months. Gov-
ernment spokesmen still tend to
be optimistic, however, pointing
out that the long-term trend in
imports is downward, and attrib-
ute the unfavorable May figures
partly to the rush of goods
shipped in after the reduction
in import surcharges on 27
April.
The accumulation of prob-
lems for Wilson comes at a time
when the legislative timetable
is extremely congested. Parlia-
ment is likely to spend most of
its time on the government
Finance Bill until summer re-
cess in late July, deferring
other priority legislation un-
til fall. The illness in the
meantime of two Labor MPs has
imposed an additional strain on
the government's paper-thin ma-
jority, reducing it from three
to one. The Conservatives have
not yet said whether they will
permit a "permanent pairing"
for the ill MPs. A decision to
do so would indicate the Tories
still do not intend any moves
at this time to bring about the
fall of the government.
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w
IQ InterAmericon
Peace Force
SANTO DOMINGO
Principal Rebel-Held Area
Rebel-Infiltrated Area
I _. I
MQNnE SR n IrT.PU 0.n0 PIAZ fldtap ,_
1 AN.R000 K y'~~Afop 2 r15 f?. LA ROMANA
' l N iba _ Aa . "P ^s S n ~otnFpG L _,
.x.. ..~.. ]J -.._. ,. 1. ~ 1 ~ ~La Romano
~..) JUAN- t~??. Su^-'-r" r."al SAN 4IFI ? Y \~1 El 5 bo
Y-- J, AZUA LS DIS RTO ~-/Mt~ 5'tl.~ `.'^._..w...OHiBUey
-??- International boundary
-"'-'- Provincla boundary
National capital
0 Provincia capital
-? s- Re (road
an_VR Cabrera
f Cal b~~~\.{ X21...+'e?. ESPjd'I ~~.
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Western Hemisphere
Heavy fighting took place
in Santo Domingo on 15 June and
skirmishing continued on 16 June
as the rebels attacked elements
of the Inter-American Peace Force
(IAPF). The action was indica-
tive of the increasing influence
of extremists in the rebel camp,
who are opposing negotiations,
and are calling for violence.
US forces occupied about ten
percent of the rebel area in or-
der to flush rebels from their
firing positions. The Caamano
regime in its propaganda accused
the US of initiating the action
and is citing the incident as a
reason for having the UN under-
take mediation between the IAPF
and the rebels. The fighting
cost 3 US dead and 37 wounded and
5 Brazilians wounded. Rebel cas-
ualties were substantial and in-
cluded the death of Andres Riv-
iere, French soldier-of-fortune
and military adviser to the reb-
els. Until this episode there
had been more than 900 rebel
cease-fire violations since 7 May.
The incident occurred the
day after the rally commemorating
the anniversary of the ill-fated
1959 invasion of the Dominican
Republic from which the 14th
of June Political group (APCJ)
takes its name. Rafael Taveras,
who is emerging as the major
leader of the APCJ, spoke and
said that to gain the revolution's
aims "there is no other way" than
to extend violence "to all the
people." The Caamano regime felt
compelled to co-sponsor the dem-
onstration in order to avoid the
appearance of APCJ domination
of the rebel movement. Jose
Pena Gomez, rebel propaganda
chief and official in Juan
Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary
Party,(DRP), attempted to indi-
cate that Communism was not the
guiding ideology of the rebel
government when he said at the
rally that the 1959 invaders
did not come "to establish on
our soil a Communist revolution."
There are other indications
that the rebel government's con-
trol of the extremists is not
complete. During the fighting
of 15 June Caamano indicated to
UN observer Mayobre that he had
ordered that the shooting stop,
but.that he was not at all sure
that he would be obeyed. Ex-
tremists control many of the
rebel paramilitary units, per-
haps 65 percent of them, and
the APCJ has its own intelligence
net independent of that of the
government.
Some rebel leaders such as
Defense Minister Manuel Montes
Arache seem concerned over the
growing extremist strength.
This may have been the cause of
an unexpected visit of two PRD
officials to the OAS representa-
tives. These two leaders stressed
their desire for an early politi-
cal settlement and agreed that
solving the Communist problem is
a necessity. Another PRD offi-
cial has indicated that when he
made proposals for granting con-
cessions, Caamano talked to some-
one else, probably Minister for
the Presidency Hector Aristy,
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N"ale sar
SECRET
and then said they could not be
accepted.
There is evidence of divi-
sion within the extremist faction.
The APCJ and Marxist Dominican
Popular Movement are opposed to
the relatively cautious policies
of the Dominican Popular Social-
ist (Communist) Party (PSPD).
The PSPD opposed the holding of
the APCJ's 14 June rally, perhaps
because it was not allowed to
present its own speaker. The
APCJ is reported to be Caamano's
"favorite" extremist group, but
the PSPD is still in close con-
tact with the President's advis-
ers, particularly Foreign Minis-
ter Jottin Cury.
Imbert's Government of Na-
tional Reconstruction apparently
hoped that the renewed fighting
would cause the US to allow loy-
alist troops to attack the reb-
els. Imbert said his troops were
placed on the alert on 15 June
and were ready to move. He later
expressed regret that Dominicans
were not permitted to solve their
own problems. The loyalists ap-
parently did take advantage of
the opportunity and lobbed some
mortar shells into the city.
The loyalists have been
seriously hurt, both at home and
abroad, by rebel allegations of
atrocities, including a charge
of mass executions. Some of
the allegations are probably
true. Individual loyalist mil-
itary and police units have
carried out some executions to
avenge rebel atrocities com-
mitted during the early days
of the uprising. The Inter-
American Human Rights Commis-
sion took quick action in inves-
tigating the charges and thereby
forestalled an appeal to the
UN by the rebels.
In the interior, fears of
major, rebel-inspired violence
have so far proved groundless.
Because of stringent security
measures taken by loyalist
forces, including numerous pre-
ventive arrests, there were
only isolated disturbances in
connection with the 14th of
June anniversary. Rebel lead-
ers evidently feel that the de-
velopment of militant support
in the interior is one of the
few remaining cards they have
left to play. There are continued
reports of attempts to create
widespread disturbances and Com-
munists are planning for a pos-
sible general strike.
The rebel complaint to the
UN concerning the false charge
that the US was attacking the
rebels received immediate Soviet
endorsement. The USSR charged
that the renewed fighting demon-
strated again that the OAS is
incapable of dealing with the
crisis and has proposed that the
Security Council meet in Santo
Domingo to hear Caamano's alle-
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The president of Uruguay's
nine-man National Council of
Government, Blanco Party leader
Washington Beltran, is again call-
ing for constitutional reform as
an answer to the nation's eco-
nomic and political woes. In a
recent political address he
scoffed at rumors of a possible
coup and said Uruguayans will
solve their problems legally.
Beltran and many other Blanco
leaders, as well as leaders of
the major faction of the opposi-
tion Colorado Party, publicly
favor replacing the present cum-
bersome council. Although the
Blancos want a single executive,
the Colorados have historically
supported the plural executive
as a safeguard against abuse of
power. The Colorados admit, how-
ever, that the nation's situation
is desperate and they have asked
for a national plebiscite late
this year. They reportedly would
favor a five-man executive rep-
resenting only the majority party
and having a president with a
four-year term.
In 1962 a proposal to return
to a single executive was de-
feated by a large margin at the
polls. Many Uruguayans may now
recognize, however, the basic
defects in their governmental
system and the need for a stronger
government to cope with the coun-
try's worsening economic situation.
The cost of living contin-
ues to soar; it has increased
approxima ely 21 percent in the
first half of 1965. Although
the free market peso quotation
dropped slightly to about 47 per
dollar on 1 June, this figure
still represents nearly a 120-
percent increase over a ten-
month period. Capital flight
is apparently increasing. The
central bank is reportedly nego-
tiating for an $8.8 million foreign
loan with an interest rate at or
above 8.5 percent. The piece-
meal approach to the foreign ex-
change and credit problems and
willingness to pay such high
interest rates are an additional
burden on the economy and harm-
ful to Uruguay's credit standing
abroad.
Public employees have staged
intermittent work stoppages and
strikes to protest the govern-
ment's failure to pay wages earned
during April. The government
claims it lacks sufficient funds
and may have to postpone the May
payroll until July.
Another national problem is
the prolonged drought which has
seriously hurt agriculture and
curtailed use of electric power.
Any new government would
have to-face these and other eco-
nomic problems. Constitutional
reform alone will not help very
much. It would require great
courage to enact the austerity
measures necessary to permit the
country once again to live within
its means.
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The Movement of the Revo-
lutionary Left (MIR), a pro-
Cuban, pro-Chinese Communist or-
ganization, has apparently begun
guerrilla activity in remote and
rugged east-central Peru.
On ;? June, 13 armed men at-
tacked two haciendas (ranches)
and a mine some sixty miles
northeast of Huancayo, stealing
dynamite, clothing, money, food
and other articles. Another
group raided a hacienda to the
south, near the borders of Junin
and Huancavelica departments on
12 June. Two police posts have
also been attacked. Although
accurate information regarding
the raids is not available, the
evidence is strong that they
were carried out by the MIR as
the beginning of its "armed
action" stage of revolution.
The MIR has about 1,000
members, at least 150 of whom
have received extensive guerrilla
training in Cuba, Communist China,
Government security forces
are pursuing the guerrillas
in the central zone, but no con-
operations.
tact has as yet been made.
The terrain and uncooperative
attitude of the peasants will
make it difficult for the
authorities to apprehend the
insurgents. Although the guer-
rilla activity does not pose
an immediate security threat,
it will encourage other extreme
leftist groups to mount similar
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TEMPORARY RESPITE IN BOLIVIA
The military occupation of
all nationalized mines in Bolivia
late last week has brought a, tem-
porary respite in the month-old
political crisis. The miners,
demoralized, without their ex-
treme leftist leadership, and
faced by an overwhelming force,
reluctantly agreed to the 23 May
decree reorganizing the mining
industry. The junta must soon
show, however, that conditions
will improve under the mine reha-
bilitation program. Otherwise,
the miners' resistance is certain
to stiffen again and another
crisis may occur.
Bolivia's major political
parties--except the center-right
Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB)
--have been left in confusion.
The Nationalist Revolutionary
Movement (MNR), the country's
largest, is split between those
favoring a center-left front to
oppose the junta and those will-
ing to work with the junta. Her-
na.n Siles Zuazo, the MNR's nominal
leader and spokesman for the anti-
junta faction, has lost control
of the party and, following an
order for his arrest, has taken
asylum in the Uruguayan Embassy.
Juan Lechin's National Leftist
Revolutionary Party and the Com-
munist Party are in shambles,
their leaders deported and their
bases of support--the labor or-
ganizations--destroyed. Only
the FSB, which escaped the per-
secutions, has retained its or-
ganization intact.
The power struggle between
co-presidents Barrientos and
Ovando remains a potential threat
to armed forces unity and politi-
cal stability. Barrientos re-
tains the upper hand at the mo-
ment with Ova.ndo characteristi-
cally biding his time. Barrientos
has told US officials that
Ovando "deserves a, well-earned
rest in Spain, perhaps as ambas-
sador." Barrientos probably will
not act until he is certain
of his ground and also that the
unity of the armed forces will' not
be impaired.
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The United Nations Disarma-
ment Commission (UNDC) meeting,
which adjourned 16 June, has
served the more obvious purposes
for which the USSR convened it
in May--as a forum for attacks on
the foreign policies of the
United States and as a vehicle
for further polemics against the
West in general. When the debate
did focus on disarmament, the
various countries presented their
traditional views, and there is
no reason to believe that the
further negotiations which have
been called for will be any more
productive.
The Yugoslav resolution call-
ing for a World Disarmament Con-
ference, which was passed by 89
votes, was supported by most of
the nonaligned nations. They
were discouraged by the lack of
progress in the UNDC and desired
Chinese Communist participation
in any future negotiations. Sev-
eral NATO powers also voted for
the resolution despite US op-
position. A world conference
poses many knotty problems, such
as the attendance of divided
states, and it is almost certain
that China would not accept an
invitation to attend. It is, in
any case, dubious that such a
large forum would prove any more
manageable than the UNDC.
When Moscow called for the
UNDC meetings, it had been hoped
the Soviets would agree to re-
convene the Geneva Eighteen-
Nation Disarmament Committee
(ENDC) this summer. They are
clearly not eager for such talks,
however, and abstained on the
eventually approved resolution
of the eight nonaligned nations
of the ENDC. The resolution
appeals to all countries to ad-
here to the limited test-ban
treaty and calls on the ENDC to
consider a comprehensive test-
ban treaty, a nonproliferation
agreement, and the reduction of
military budgets.
If the eighteen-nation
group meets, some delegates want
it to do the preliminary work
for the proposed world conference.
It is doubtful whether this or
any other useful work can be
done in a gathering from which
France and China are absent.
Many speculate that another
round of fruitless talks might
seriously impair the ENDC's
prestige and effectiveness as a
disarmament forum. In short, the
combination of rigid national
positions, preoccupation with
other international problems, and
the unwillingness of the Chinese
to sit down and negotiate does
not seem conducive to any real
progress on disarmament this
year.
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IVWPII JCI,Kt 1 ``w`
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