CHANGE IN EAST GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004900040003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

lease 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04900040003-4
28 May 1965
CHANGE IN EAST GERMANY
E N C E
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MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
rHE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
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A kind of ersatz stability has been growing in
the Soviet Zone, the so-called German Democratic
Republic (GDR) during the last three years. Erec-
tion of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 was the turn-
ing point that forced the East German people to ac-
commodate to Walter Ulbricht's regime. From this
accommodation, the regime has gained enough security
and self-confidence to enable it to satisfy pres-
sures both from the outside and within for some re-
laxation of domestic policies and a general over-
haul of the country's economy. With these develop-
ments a sense of national self-interest has begun
to evolve. While the regime has as yet had no cause
to regret these changes, it is still too early to be
confident that it will not backtrack.
Popular Attitudes
The majority of East Ger-
mans remain anti-Communist but
with decreasing emotionalism.
The popular temper is no longer
one of potential revolt. Many
of the really dissatisfied East
Germans fled through the open
Berlin border before the wall
closed it in mid-August 1961.
Among those who remain, there is
a general attitude of acquies-
cence encouraged by the pres-
ence of 20 Soviet divisions, by
the efficiency of the security
apparatus, and by a few key con-
cessions granted in the last
year or so.
This new attitude is re-
flected in the slow but steady
rise in the levels of economic
productivity, and in a general
decrease in the incidence of
barn burnings and industrial
sabotage. It is also illustrated
in the surprisingly small number
of pension-age East Germans who
have opted to remain in the West
since the regime began allowing
them to visit relatives in West
Berlin and West Germany last No-
vember.
With the relaxation of do-
mestic tensions, East Germans
have come to express their com-
plaints openly. These center
on the lack of personal free-
doms--particularly the freedom
to travel--a sense of being cut
off from developments elsewhere
in Europe, and the disparity
between their standard of living
and that of the West Germans.
Even rank-and-file party members
feel free to criticize and fre-
quently deride official explana-
tions of foreign and domestic
political developments.
The regime's most signifi-
cant shortcoming in the eyes
of the people--a liability also
recognized by the leadership--
is its character as an unpopu-
larly elected government running
an artificially created portion
of a Greater Germany. In a
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"poll" last December the central
committee found that the people
generally do not support or un-
derstand the party's ideological
and political policies, partic-
ularly with regard to West Ger-
many. To meet this problem,
propaganda techniques were re-
vamped.
Only the youngest genera-
tion, however, is likely to re-
spond positively to the new ap-
proach. A poll conducted by the
West Berlin Senat after the first
Christmas Pass period reflected
the first signs of a sense of na-
tional identity and consciousness
among East German youth. To cul-
tivate such sentiments the re-
gime sponsored a nationwide youth
convocation last May--the first
of its kind in ten years.
Gies. He offered them increased
responsibility and greater in-
centives and, with their support,
proposed to test the idea that
the productive techniques of
Western management can be blended
into a planned economy.
The introduction of the
"new economic system" began with
the reorganization of the indus-
trial associations into super-
enterprises somewhat resembling
major subsidiaries of a large
Western corporation. Reforms
in prices, planning, and banking
are being introduced in stages.
The "new economic system" has
brought administrative order into
the East German economy and seems
to be working fairly well. But
without more basic reforms it
is unlikely to lead to any sig-
nificant increase in the pres-
ently disappointing rate of eco-
nomic growth.
Recent reforms in the econ-
omy grew out of the failure of
earlier, quite unrealistic plans
to "overtake and surpass" West
Germany. Retrenchment brought
obvious benefits in 1963-64, re-
ducing the backlog of unfinished
investment projects, ending for-
eign trade deficits, and greatly
easing inflationary pressures in
the consumer market.
At the same time, Ulbricht
pushed the development of a new
program to create popular con-
fidence and to reassert a sense
of purpose, the so-called "new
economic system of planning and
management." Ulbricht set out
to win over the technical elite
--engineers, economists, and
executives--who previously had
been ignored by his planners and
alienated by his economic poli-
Economic retrenchment and
reform, however, have given some
relief and encouragement to the
long-suffering population. The
process of easing inflation was
painful--wage cuts and price in-
creases for consumer goods--but
produced welcome results. Daily
necessities now can be bought
without queuing and are generally
affordable. There is renewed
hope of further improvement in
living conditions.
The regime has promised to
improve the quality and assort-
ment of-consumer goods and the
availability of services, and
the first results have begun to
appear, although the consumer
is still far from satisfied.
Without promising, the regime
has also encouraged the people
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to look forward to a five-day
work week within the next few
years. As a result, although
East Germans have no prospect
of "catching up with" West Ger-
mans, they are conscious of be-
ing better off than at any time
since World War II.
Travel Reforms
The regime has also taken
the first steps toward alleviat-
ing the people's sense of iso-
lation. Since last November,
pension-age East Germans (65 for
men, 60 for women) have been per-
mitted to visit relatives in West
Berlin or West Germany for up to
four weeks a year. Three million
of East Germany's 17 million
people are eligible for these
visits, and 1.5 million are ex-
pected to take advantage of the
opportunity. Under the Berlin
pass agreement, arranged ini-
tially for Christmas 1963 and
renewed in 1964, West Berliners
may make four one-day visits to
relatives in East Berlin each
year.
While the East Germans wel-
comed these programs, they were
critical over the requirement that
Berlin pass visitors must exchange
a minimum amount of currency
at an artificially low rate, and
that pensioners must not accept
the West German Government's
grant-in-aid of 50 deutsche-
marks. These programs have in-
creased popular pressures to
further widen travel privileges.
The regime also is trying
to soften its reputation for
hard-fisted justice by emphasiz-
ing "corrective treatment," im-
posing generally milder sen-
tences, and resorting in many
instances to restrictive meas-
ures short of imprisonment.
Last October, Ulbricht an-
nounced the regime's first large-
scale amnesty which freed some
10,000 political and common crim-
inals over a two-month period.
Before the amnesty, between
July and September 1964, West
Germany had been allowed to ran-
som between 800 and 1,000 polit-
ical prisoners for payments in
goods and cash. Another release-
for-ransom deal involving 1,000
prisoners is currently under way.
Policy Toward Intellectuals
The regime's cultural po-
licies have been ambivalent.
Some of Kafka's works, once all
banned, now are being published,
partially in response to pres-
sures from other Eastern European
countries. Writers denied publi-
cation only ayearago now appear
occasionally in the regime-con-
trolled press, receive official
recognition for controversial
works, and are permitted to
lecture publicly--even traveling
to West Berlin to do so.
On the other hand, the re-
gime has been fighting a rear-
guard action to prevent artists
and intellectuals from challeng-
ing the basic tenets of Marxism-
Leninism or its self-appointed
role as cultural arbiter. Last
April, Ulbricht convoked the
Second Bitterfeld Conference for
the purpose of urging a return
to "socialist realism" under re-
gime guidance. Addressing the
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party plenum last December, id-
eologist Kurt Hager sternly
warned that the regime would not
permit the watering down of its
cultural policies at the behest
of "revisionists" inside or out-
side the bloc, and that "bour-
geois decadence and abstraction-
ism" would not be tolerated.
The case of Robert Havemann,
a professor at Humboldt Univer-
sity, illustrates the regime's
ambivalent policy. A year ago
he was ousted from the party and
fired from the university for
lecturing on the necessity of
liberalizing Communism. In De-
cember, he was interviewed by a
Western journalist, presumably
with official knowledge. The
interview, published in the West
German weekly Der Spiegel under
the title "Marxism Suffers From
Sclerosis," urged fewer controls
and claimed that the GDR had
far to go in de-Stalinization.
Nonetheless, he has not been
imprisoned and is still allowed
occasional contacts with for-
eigners.
.Religious Policy
The regime has struck a
bargain with the Evangelical
Church, the major religious
faith in East Germany. The basis
of understanding is that organ-
ized religion will not be har-
assed if the clergy supports the
regime's political goals.
After quiet and delicate
negotiations last spring the re-
gime released imprisoned clergy-
men. West Berlin Bishop Dibelius
announced in October that, for
the first time since 1933, no
pastors were in prison anywhere
in Germany. Church officials
also report a rise in the number
of baptisms, confirmations, and
marriages, and a concomitant
decline in the number of people
apostatizing and undergoing sec-
ular regime-sponsored confirma-
tions. The regime also is per-
mitting church-oriented convoca-
tions, and allowing clergymen
to travel abroad to interna-
tional meetings such as Vatican
II and the recent Pacem in Ter-
ris conference in New York.
A significant concession
to private conscience was the
creation last fall of labor bat-
talions--unique in Eastern Eu-
rope--in which conscientious
objectors could fulfill their
military service obligation.
The number of conscientious ob-
jectors now reportedly exceeds
the total in West Germany.
Of course, the situation
is still not ideal from the
church's point of view. The six
theological faculties and three
church training centers provide
too few graduates--about 85 a
year--to staff the country's
4,500 pastorates. In the Saxony
church district, for example,
only 1,000 of the 1,350 pastoral
offices are filled. Bishop
Dibelius has warned that it would
be "pure nonsense" to assume that
the regime had embarked on a lib-
eraliza.tion process.
The Party
In the last 15 months,
Ulbricht has further rehabili-
tated and in some cases read-
mitted to party membership many
of his real or imagined opponents
of the past. These include former
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politburo member Paul Merker,
former justice minister Max
Fechner, "revisionist" economists
Fritz Behrens and Arne Benary,
and ideologue Wolfgang Harich.
The East German people prob-
ably are not convinced by the
regime's continually expressed
intentions to liberalize domes-
tic policies, even though there
are signs that this time the
leadership means it. Rather
surprisingly, Ulbricht referred
favorably on two occasions in
the last six months to the con-
troversial critique of Soviet-
directed Communism by the late
Italian Communist leader, Pal-
miro Togliatti. A dominant theme
at the December plenum of the
central committee and in the sub-
sequent lower level party elec-
tions was that officials must
be more sympathetic and respon-
sive to popular opinion.
The party is faced with
the necessity of attracting
technocrats into its ranks to
help with economic reform. How-
ever, their admission--many of
them are opportunistically
rather than ideologically moti-
vated--causes strains with the
older generation of orthodox,
militant Communist functionaries.
For the moment the basic
power structure remains un-
changed. Personal antagonisms
among the top leaders are kept
in check by the dominating
figure of Ulbricht. Since the
Wall, the aging first secretary
has become something of an
"elder statesman," a court of last
resort, and has delegated more
and more of his responsibili-
ties to others. Relatively
young experts like Guenter Mit-
tag and Erich Apel exercise
the power of immediate decision.
EAST GERMANY'S TOP THREE
ULBRICHT
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Erich Honecker appears to run
party affairs on a day-to-day
basis as Ulbricht's undisputed
deputy there. More recently,
he also seems to have handled
some governmental matters, nor-
mally the prerogative of Premier
Willi Stoph, who after achieving
that office last September suf-
fered a period of eclipse until
May Day this year.
Reasons for the Reforms
Pressures on Ulbricht to
institute the past year's re-
forms have come not only from
inside the GDR but also from the
USSR and the East European coun-
tries. He had long been able
to evade de-Stalinization by
pleading that East Germany's ex-
posed position on the bloc's
western frontier demanded a gar-
rison-state atmosphere. As a
result, East Germany and its
party were more and more turning
into Stalinist fossils and be-
coming a source of general em-
barrassment to the bloc.
East Germany's vulnerable
position was brought home to
Ulbricht when the loosening of
intrabloc ties revealed an in-
creasing willingness on the part
of brother satellites to ignore
East German state interests.
Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and
Hungary in the last two years
have signed trade agreements
with West Germany that include
West Berlin, which East Germany
considers a separate political
entity. There is some evidence
that Pankow fears that Moscow
might ultimately make a deal
with the West at East Germany's
expense.
The reforms are intended
to improve East Germany's intia-
tives abroad. The economic re-
forms are also intended to make
East Germany more competitive
in foreign markets, both in the
bloc and in the West, by upgrad-
ing products and modernizing
business methods. Steady prog-
ress is required if East Germany
is even to hold its own in to-
day's markets.
The reform program also is
closely linked to the GDR's
policy toward West Germany. For
example, Pankow portrays the
Berlin pass agreement, signed
with the West Berlin Senat, as
supporting the GDR contention
that West Berlin is a separate
political unit--one of the three
German states, which can and must
learn to work amicably with each
other. Ultimately, the reforms
seem designed to help establish
an atmosphere conducive to di-
rect East - West German negotia-
tions and to take advantage of
West Berlin Mayor Brandt's view
that West Germany can ameliorate
living conditions for the East
German people in exchange for
economic concessions.
From the standpoint of its
internal policies, the Ulbricht
regime apparently hopes that a
measured degree of unorthodoxy
and flexibility will enable it
to win popular commitment to its
objectives. The reforms so far
enacted, however, have not greatly
affected the lives of most East
Germans. Their loyalties are
still doubtful. But for the rel-
atively few--e.g., factory man-
agers and farm chairmen--whose
support in the first instance
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is necessary, new incentives
should prove efficacious.
Prospects
The reforms suggest that,
even as elsewhere in Eastern
Europe, a new and more realistic
element of national self-inter-
est is affecting East German
policy. Responding primarily
to pressures from the Soviet
bloc, East Germany has embarked
on a new course.
While there has been no re-
treat since Khrushchev's ouster,
neither have there been new con-
cessions. The regime now appears
to be marking time, assessing
the results so far. The central
committee plenums in December
and April were distinguished by
an undertone of caution in all
but economic policies. It ap-
pears doubtful that Ulbricht
will carry through his promise
to add duplicate candidates to
electoral lists this year, to
increase pensions, or to lengthen
vacations.
However, the future of the
present trend is not assured.
There are strong conservative
forces within the party opposing
even those reforms already granted.
There are several reports, for
example, that the Ministry for
State Security bitterly opposes
the Berlin pass agreement and
the pensioner visits. Ulbricht's
incapacitation or death could
serve to spark a conservative
resurgence. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
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