WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7
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~1 May 1965 OGI Noa Q29~f65 Copy No a WEEKLY SUMMARY CEI~I.TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE State Dept. review completed SECRET GRDUP I Excluded from aukomatic' downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 ''~ SECRET `~ (Information as of noon EDT, 20 May 1965 VIETNAM Soviet surface-to-air missiles equi ment has apparently arrived in Hanoi, as indicated by ~ photography of the SAM site 15 miles south southeast of the city. Con- struction continues at the other SAM site southwest of Hanoi. Hanoi's fighter inventory also continues to grow, and Moscow evidently has also provided new ground equip- ment, There has been no authoritative Soviet commentary on President Johnson's 13 May speech, but Peiping and Hanoi have replied negatively, In South Vietnam, govern- ment forces are attempting to retain the initiative in the face of anticipated intensification of Viet Cong operations during the rainy season, which now is begin- ning. THE COMMUNIST WORLD USSR AGAIN TESTING WESTERN MARKETS No major buying binge has occurred or is likely during the next few months, but trade officials are indicating that purchasing plans may be firmed up later this year, perhaps in time for the fall chemical trade fair in Moscow. AGRICULTURAL PROSPECTS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES Prospects for the winter grain crop range from relative- ly poor in China to fair in the USSR and the Balkans and excellent in northern East Europe. Grain imparts this year are tentatively projected at 15 million tons. SECRET Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 B4ay 65 Page Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 ~-'~ SECRET `" THE CYPRUS DISPUTE There has been a brief new outbreak of fighting on the island, but negotiations are slowly developing between Greece and Turkey despite the suspicion and criticism of the Greek Cypriot leaders, Page 9 INDIA AND PAKIS"Y'AN KEEPING POWDER DRY 11 The two governments are holding in place the troops they have deployed on their borders, and British ef- forts to arrange a cease-fire have again bogged down. 11^HE FOURTH AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE 12 meld in Ghana from 10 to 1G Niay, the Communist-dominated meeting produced more vitriolic anti-US statements than ever before, but was also the scene of bitter Sino-Soviet wrangling, THE ARAB - WEST GERMAN IMBROGLIO 13 Bonn finally established relations with Israel last week, whereupon ten of the thirteen Arab League states broke their formal relations with West Germany. How- ever, the break may not be irrevocable, and none of the Arab states seems likely to recognize East Germany soon. ISRAEL AGAIN MOVES TO BLOCK ARAB WATER DIVERSION PROJECT 13 Last week Israel again shelled a Syrian construction site, following its policy of taking actions short of war to stanch Arab plans to divert the Jordan River's headquarters. SITUATION IN THE CONGO Returns thus far from the still-incomplete national and provincial election count indicate a clean sweep for Premier Tshombe's party. This has increased the nervous- ness of his political rival, President Kasavubu. The rebellion in the northeast continues to falter, 15 SECRE T Page ii WEEKLI' SUM11iARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 .~ SECRET '` ASIA-AFRICA (continued ETHIOPIA MOVING TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT The Emperor may soon try to divert pressures for inter- nal reform by giving more content to Ethiopia's pro- fessed nonalignment and possibly by recognizing Peiping. EUROPE FRANCE AT ODDS WITH OTHER EEC MEMBERS ON FINANCING The current debate centers on the EEC Commission's ef- fort to tie in future financing of the common agricul- tural policy--in which France has a heavy stake--with "supranational" reforms in the community structure. ITALIAN RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE The Italian Government, concerned that US preoccupation with extra-European problems may reduce flexibility in Western policy toward Eastern Europe, is about to initi- ate a series of high-level official visits to the area to improve relations. Business pressure for increased trade is a major impetus to this policy. SECRET Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 May 65 Page Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 ~"~` SECRET EUROPE (continued) Page NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE SKIRTS "REAL ISSUES" 20 Even the French adroit that this month's meeting of NATO foreign ministers failed to discuss "real issues affect- ing NATO" but they may further clarify their intentions toward the alliance at the meeting of defense ministers opening in Paris on 31 May. WESTERN HEMISPHERE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC The Imbert government has gained the military initiative and substantially reduced tyre size of the rebel-controlled area of Santo Domingo. Attempts to find a peaceful solu- tion have been thwarted by rebel leader Caamano's refusal to deal with Imbert and by the loyalists' reluctance to consider a compromise in view of their military successes. OAS efforts toward a truce have been somewhat undercut by the arrival of a special UN mission. BOLIVIAN JUNTA ENGAGES OPPONENTS As one of its first firm steps to counter-its strongest opponents and attack some of Bolivia's basic problems, the junta deported pro-Communist labor leader Juan Lechin, thereby setting off a general strike and violent protest demonstrations. ECUADOR'S JUNTA RIDES OUT ANOTHER CRISIS A week-long strike by merchants in Guayaquil was accom- panied by numerous plots by opportunist politicians and ambitious military men seeking to take advantage of the turmoil to unseat the military junta. CASTRO REGIME MOVES AGAINST DISSIDENTS The regime has arrested at least 100 persons in recent weeks, including three US citizens, on charges of spy- ing for the US. SECRET Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 SECRET Soviet surface-to-a.ir mis- sile (SAM) equipment has appar- ently arrived in Hanoi. Analy- sis of 0 photography of the SAM site located 15 miles south--southeast of Hanoi re- veals that five of the six launch revetments are covered with protective material and at least four of these appear to contain missile-associated equipment. The sixth revet- ment is unoccupied. The cen- tral guidance area and two of the three missile-hold revet- ments are also under protec- tive covering. A possible mis- sile transporter was sighted at the third missile-hold re- vetment, and six other groups of unidentified equipment were noted within the launch area. Construction is continuing at the second SAM site, 11 miles southwest of Hanoi. At least five of the revetments are in various stages of construction but no missile-associated equip- ment has yet been noted there. There are indications the Soviets may be preparing to sup- ply Hanoi with jet light bomb- ers. Jet aircraft revetments capable of housing bombers have been constructed at several North Vietnamese airfields. Reports received last year stated that North Vietnamese personnel had received IL-28 training in the USSR as early as 1962. Hanoi's fighter inventory continues to grow. Photography revealed possibly as many as MIG fighters--57 at Phuc Yen and four at Haiphong/ Cat $i airfields, Construction or improvement programs are un- der way at seven fields in North Vietnam, several of which would probably be used as recovery or dispersal bases in the event of air attack. The Soviets evidently have d equipment. recently saw a ou armore cars parked along the road to the Hanoi air- port. His description suggests they are Soviet BTR-40 armored personnel carriers equipped with twin antiaircraft machine guns. Before this report North Vietnam was believed already to have about 100 pieces of armored equipment, including same 40 T-34 medium tanks. US Navy and Air Force air- craft conducted strikes against the DRV on only three days last week, following the suspension of air strikes from 13 to 17 May. Results were generally good against fixed targets, includ- ing a naval base, POL storage area, barracks area, and mili- tary radio station. In addition, a leaflet drop was carried out, and a large number of day and night armed reconnaissance mis- sions were flown over roads and rail lines south of the 20th parallel. SE CRE T Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 ~... ., clip-ttu ./ti Li-t'ang~ I ~'O S ~ 1 King-ming ` P ' N O-R T H "h4 ee~d ~~de Lana s?n ~t^~?~ . ~ I ~ ~''~ ~,. / y Phung salt' V I E T N,Q M P t- ~~4 samne?a~ C.~,+. , _i^C91Bhon~:., I "??ai sal L A O S ~ ~ ,- VIENTIANE ~? i ~. ~~,,...,,~.~ . ~~Uttaradit?~ Udon Thani~ ~ r Muang Phitsanubk Me I~ ;',.~ _.- $nl~Ch'I~~,+'k(yRr BAYARD -~ r Hai-r MACAO HCINO KONG i~ Iii"J~ THIN >.Ya-Ild. "; Ling ~shui F:,Paksa f 1 t .. 'tPleiku ~nui Nhon __ i J 4-L---. ` - C A~ U ~ ~? 1 A ` k3e~n Me Thuat ~ ~ ~ : - I ~ .~` '~r9 ,gBe D L t ~..)i y ~r~ ~~~ PHNOM PENH~~l ~ S Q (f j ~-J V / F~!! N A Vt'~ S 7eattarnnana Vinh Loi ~~ ~} ~Off~n L?na y !_.nl 3 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 r?r ~r SECRET Military Action in out etnam South Vietnamese forces have intensified their efforts to retain the initiative in the face of anticipated intensifica- tion of Viet Cong operations during the rainy season which now is beginning. Army patrols in Phuoc Long Province continue to find evidence--297 bodies so far--that heavy casualties were inflicted on the multibattalion Viet Cong force which attacked the provincial capital of Song Be on 11 May. Friendly losses were also extensive, however. An operation by .three gov- ernment battalions against two regular Viet Cong battalions in the southern coastal province of Bac Lieu resulted in a major Communist defeat, reportedly with 178 insurgents killed, 53 captured.. and 56 weapons seized. Timely and effective air support played a decisive role in both the Phuoc Long and Bac Lieu engagements. Successful govern- ment operations were also con- ducted in four other provinces. The Viet Cong last week. launched only two actions of significance, an ambush and a combined attack,/ambush. Communist Political Deve opments There has been no authorita- tive Soviet commentary on Presi- dent Johnson's 13 May speech, and ranking Soviet officials still seem convinced that there are no immediate prospects for negotiations on Vietnam. For- eign Minister Gromyko, in his (talk with the French foreign minister in Vienna, advanced i no new thoughts on the situa- tion. Premier Kosygin, in an address on 15 May, again under- lined the USSR's intention to ,strengthen North Vietnam's de- fensive capabilities and asked nonaligned countries to support this policy. Peiping, maintaining a hard line, has branded the President's renewed call for negotiations a "discredited hoax." The Chinese have again at- tacked the plan for easing the Vietnam crisis put forward last month by Indian President Radha- krishnan, terming it a "pre- posterous proposal" to fit the "urgent needs" of the US. Chinese propagandists con- tinue to play up the possibility of US air attacks on China it- self. In denouncing the Presi- dent's speech, People's Daily argued that, since a I~omb- ing of North Vietnam had failed to bring about negotiations, "Johnson now is attempting to find a solution" by threatening the Chinese people. Such Chinese efforts to whip up domestic support for re- gime policies-have become no- ticeably more intense. Besides daily domestic radiobroadcasts-- begun on 4 May--and rallies in Peiping, militia conferences have been held in major cities and most provinces. At these meetings the need for stepped- up training was tied directly to the Vietnamese war. A cam- paign has been launched to SE ARE ~" Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 ~ SECRET err encourage young people to take up sports activities of poten- tial military value, such as rifle shooting, signal communi- cations, and mountaineering. Hanoi too responded nega- tively to the President's speech, and to the five day sus- pension of air strikes. A For- eign Ministry statement on 18 May called cessation of the air raids a "trick'" designed to de- ceive world public opinion about the "so-called US good will for peace" and to pave the way for "new US acts of war." Only the four-point proposal set forth by Premier Pham Van Dong on 8 April, the statement concluded, could serve as the basis for settlement of the Vietnam ques- tion. This proposal had re- iterated IIanoi's standard de- mands that US forces be with- drawn from Vietnam, and the Viet Cong's Liberation Front be al- lowed to have a "decisive" role in the settlement. In a 15 May broadcast, Hanoi also flatly rejected Radhakrishnan's proposal for negotiations, claiming that it was aimed only at finding "a way out" for the US in South Vietnam. In a milder statement on 7 May, Hanoi had merely com- mented that the offer ran counter to India's proper role as chair- man of the International Control Commission in Vietnam. Civil defense activity in Hanoi con- tinues to suggest a belief that the air strikes will be extended to targets farther north. Same government agencies have already been moved outside Hanoi, and the evacuation of dependents of foreign personnel appears to have been largely completed. A program is also under way to establish more permanent air raid shelter facilities. Political Develol:ments n out ietnam Premier Quat has now succeeded in carrying out mili- tary command changes which, together with the recent dis- solution of the Armed Farces Council, are designed to in- crease civilian control over the armed forces. The poten- tially powerful High Command headed by General "Little" I4iinh has been abolished, and Minh has been made chief of a reconstituted Joint General Staff subordinate to the De - fense Ministry, which remains under General Thieu. The mili- tary, however, seem likely to conta.nue to exert significant political influence. Quat reportedly still plans a cabinet reshuffle, al- though the changes may occur on a piecemeal basis. He may be having difficulties in en- listing Catholic cooperation. The majority of Catholics do not seem willing to oppose the government openly, although they consider it Buddhist-in- fluenced. On the Buddhist side, the growing preoccupation of monl'. Tri Quang with alleged Catholic obstructionism and plotting may foreshadow a new period of Buddhist restive- ness. ~ SE CRE T Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 SE CRE T For the first time since French have ,just made the the USSR began its extraordinary ~ first sale--a $10-million grain purchases from the West in plant to produce composition the fall of 1963, its trade rep- wall coverings--under last resentatlves appear to be show- October's trade and credit ing serious interest in Indus- arrangement with the USSR. trial equipment and factories. No major buying binge has oc- curred or is likely during the next few months, but trade of- ficials are indicating that pur- chasing plans may be firmed up later this year, perhaps in time for the fall chemical trade fair in Moscow. Some recent contracts re- late to additional equipment for installations purchased earlier. An American firm, for example, has sold $3 million worth of equipment for mining projects initiated several years ago. On the other hand, the Moscow remains reluctant, however, to take on further debt obligations. Relatively large sums of credit offered by the UK and France remain un- used, as does the entire $65 million approved by Rome af- ter considerable haggling last year. Since long-term cred- its became available a year ago--largely at Soviet insist- ence--credits worth only $140 million have been accepted. In some cases, the USSR has pleaded a lack of foreign ex- change and said that deals for importation of complete plants cannot be concluded unless the seller takes part of the plant's production or other Soviet ex- port goods as payment rather than requiring cash. Some foreign exchange will be needed for grain purchases this year, but the total will probably be only about $150 mil- lion--a quarter of last year's outlay. SECRET Fage 5 WEEKLY SUMNtARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Q Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 SECRET AGRICULTURAL PROSPECTS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES As of mid-April, prospects for the winter grain crop ranged from relatively paor in Communist China to fair in the USSR and the Balkans and excellent in the northern part of Eastern Europe. The Communist countries will con- tinue in 1965 to be net importers of grain from the free world, with total grain imports tenta- tively projected at 15 million tons. In the Soviet Union crop prospects as of mid-April ap- peared relatively favorable al- though not quite as promising as they were at the same time in 1964. Soil -noisture conditions were fair to excellent in almost all of the most important agri- cultural areas. Livestock prod- ucts should be more plentiful than in recent years because of a much improved feed-livestock ratio. Overfulfillment of pro- curement plans for meat, milk, and eggs in the first quarter of 1965 is a reflection of abundant feed supplies produced in 1964. south, but prospects in the north appear excellent. Poor prospects for winter wheat in Communist China result from a drop of about ten percent in sown area and from continuous wet weather. in North China which delayed much of the planting. It is still too early to deter- mine the prospects for the early rice crop. Soil moisture levels appear to be favorable in most parts of Central, East, and Southwest China. In South China, the country's major early rice area, soil moisture conditions appear normal for this time of the year. The Soviet Union this year has already contracted for 3.2 million tons of wheat from the free world, and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe are expected to impart 6 to 7 mil- lion tons. China has already contracted for about 4.5 million tons Soil moisture conditions in Eastern Europe were generally adequate and better than a year ago. Winter wheat was adversely affected by late seeding in the SE CRE ~' / In 1964 China bought about 6.6 million tons of grain from the West for domestic use. Page 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 ?.... .~ SECRET Asia.-Africa THE CYPRUS DISPUTE Cypr~.is generally has been quiet, but firing erupted briefly between Greek and Turkish Cyp- riots in the port city of Limas- sol this week. The incident followed an lncrea.se in communal tension apparently caused by Tur- kish Cypriot ~.nsistence+-against the advice of Uri commanders on Cyprus.--on continuing prepara- tions for a parade in Lima.ssol by armed fighters during Turkish holiday festivities on 19 May. Relations between Greece a.nd Turkey were somewhat improved as a result of direct contacts between their foreign ministers at the NATO Ministerial Confer- ence in London last week. Neither the Turkish idea of bilateral negotiations under NATO auspices nor the Greek suggestion for talks under UN supervision was adopted, but the two governments agreed to continue conversations through normal diplomatic chan- nels. Greek Cypriot newspapers, which frequently reflect the views of kresident Makarios, have opposed the bilateral talks and complained that efforts to reach a solution have beon side- tracked by NATO and should be returned to the UN forum. In public statements on his return from a. recent visit to Athens, President Makarios conceded that the London discussions had eased tension but said he opposed all pressures for a. "spurious" solu- tion, such a.s giving either Greek or Cypriot territory to Turkey in return for Turkey's accepting Cyprus' union with Greece. SECRET Page ~ iYEEKLY SUMMARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 rr+ ~/ ? JAMMI ANll KASHMIR acq.m I.pua1 *?; AWALIsINDI ; ~r~ ~~ Lahore ~ ~,~~r mow- PAKISTAN NEW E`LHI t~ I< 1''STA1V Qacca:, Arabian Sea ..... ?...,.~~/ , ...... ( ' ~ ~ ~$aY al ~ ~~.'gYr a ~' ,,. ,T Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 ,.,,f . ~N~~{{~l~ .' ~` AI'1a ~ PAKISTAN ,,,.~? Location of military buildup Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 SECRET 25X1 India and Pakistan are hold- ing in place the heavy concentra- tions of forces deployed along their borders. Any incidents could quickly revive the danger- ously charged atmosphere of two weeks ago. There is new concern on both sides about possible air clashes. Each government has accused the other of sending reconnaissance aircraft over its territory. The possibility of uncon- trolled incidents between ground forces, on the other hand, seems to have been slightly reduced. Troops on both sides are begin- ning to believe that there will be no war and therefore are prob- ably somewhat less trigger-happy. Only limited progress has been made by the British in their efforts to formulate a cease-fire agreement. With its efforts bogged down amid quib- bling by both sides, London has been considering bluntly asking Rawalpindi and New Delhi whether they still want British ?ood offices. SE CRE T 25X1 25X1 Page 11 WEEKLY SUM~hARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 SECRET THE FOURTH AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE The fourth general confer- tervention." The conference af- ence of the Communist-dominated , firmed the "legitimacy" of "revolu- Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) , held in Ghana from 10 to 16 May, was marked by bitter Sino-Soviet infighting and the most violent propaganda attacks against the US ever to come from this quarter. Initial indications are that both Moscow and Peiping scored certain suc- cesses, but neither gained a clear victory. Hopes of radical third- world elements to inject new life into the AAPSO apparatus appear to have been largely frustrated. Some 400 delegates from 70 countries and numerous observers from various Communist fronts and Cuba attended the conference, which met at Winneba near Accra. A considerable number of member organizations, particularly the more moderate ones, failed to par- ticipate, thereby shrinking fur- ther the base of this nongovern- mental movement which the Commu- nists inspired nine years ago. The host Ghanaian regime became more deeply involved in AAPSO than it has ever been before, and emerged with a place on the Cairo- based permanent secretariat. Al- geria's leadership was less strong than previously; its delegation was downgraded at the last minute, possibly to avoid angering moder- ate African governments due to attend Bandung II in Algiers in June. The over-all thrust of the meeting, revealed particularly in a "Winneba Ieclaration" and in the conference's general political res- olution, was more intemperate and more specifically anti-US than ever. The US was repeatedly be- labored as the chief source of "imperialist aggression" and "in- tionary violence" to counter "im- perialist violence" and endorsed individually a lengthy list of "armed peoples struggles" in Af- rica, Asia, and Latin America. Although no serious outbreak of Sino-Soviet polemics occurred in public, the Chinese and Soviet camps battled endlessly over a wide range of issues in the closed committee sessions. "Third World" leadership on this occasion proved too feeble to forestall a tendency for dele- gations to divide on pro-Chinese or pro-Soviet lines. The intensity of the disputes, especially on pend- ing memberships and other oganiza- tional questions, prevented deci- sions on many of the questions be- fore the conference, and these now have been bucked to the secretar- iat or to the executive committee, which is to meet in Guinea next November. The aggressive tactics pursued by the Chinese in these wrangles appear to have irritated at least some third-world dele- gates and probably did little to advance Peiping's efforts to ex- clude Moscow from Afro-Asian gather- ings. The issue of Latin American participation in AAPSO was again finessed. Although the long-pro- jected "three continents confer- ence" was announced for Havana next January, it apparently is to be a separate operation. After a confused hassle, Peiping was fi- nally declared to have been chosen as the site of the next AAPSO plenary, two years hence. Moscow, backed up by Egypt and India, can be expected to continue to maneuver for a change of venue. SE CRE T Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 ~.r SE CRE T The establishment of West Ger- may be an Egyptian warning to King man - Israeli diplomatic relations. Idris to get in line. Egyptian on 13 May prompted ten of the thir- pressure has been exerted against teen Arab League states to break Tunisia for some time, but Presi- formal ties with Bonn, but Arab ~ dent Bourguiba has continued to recognition of East Germany is not, ~ call for moderation and rational- for the moment, in prospect, West I ity, and asked what good the break German officials see in Arab will- would do the Palestinian refugees. 25x1 ingness to continue economic, cul- tural, and consular relations a hopeful sign that Germany's tradi- tionally strong position in the Middle East will not be impaired for long, and that formal rela- tions will be resumed in a few months. At the 1~ March meeting of their foreign ministers, most of the Arab states had committed them- selves to severing relations with Bonn if it recognized Israel. Iraq, anxious to be in t}ie forefront, broke on 12 May, and within a few days Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAR, Lebanon, Yemen, Algeria, and the Sudan followed suit, Kuwait canceled its agreement to exchange ambassadors with Bonn. Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya refused to go along. The oil- field sabotage in Libya last week Neither Bonn nor Tel Aviv has yet appointed an ambassador, and it may be several weeks before either does so. licly that Bonn granted Israel a security guarantee. On 13 May Israeli artillery shelled a Syrian construction site in the second such attempt to in- timidate Syria from proceeding with the Arab project to divert the Jor- dan River's headwaters. As on the previous occasion in mid-March, the Israelis first provoked a border incident which gave them a pretext for firing on the diversion work. The place attacked in March was close to the border and visi- ble from Israel, and Syria sub- sequently shifted its construction activity away from the border and out of sight. The physical damage to the project in each case was slight because work is still in a very early stage. A Syrian was killed on 17 March, however, and SE CRE T Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 v PROPOSED ARAB DIVERSION PROJECT Israeli shelling of Syrian work sites Canal or conduit i i i i i i i fAt~;,~ ~tnr~rAs ~~~; idYPT~ ISRAEL IJEAZ) SFA M~~EY DESERT Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 ..r ~/ SE CRE T another was wounded in the latest attack. Israel evidently has chosen not to wait to see how much water the Arabs divert before taking ac- tion. At the same time, the Is- raelis apparently do not believe they will have to go to war, at least within the near future, to protect their water interests. In commenting on the most recent in- cident, the chief of operations of the Israeli Army indicated that Israel's choice was not "between resignation and war" but rather lay within a wide range of military and political actions which were "not in the nature of war." 25X1 25X1 The dispute between Premier Tshomb~ and President Kasavubu seems to have been papered over for the time being, but their basic rivalry remains. Tshombd, whose political strength grows as the returns trickle in from the six- week-long national and provincial assembly elections, is apparently waiting for Kasavubu to make the next move. Kasavubu, meanwhile, is becoming more nervous. Each man's aavisers, as well as some unemployed politicians, continue to feed their feud, and are appar- ently trying to force a showdown between them. Election returns indicate a sweep for Conaco, Tshombe's na- tional political coalition. With its political allies, Conaco now claims 65 of the 120 assembly seats re- ported thus far. A total of 166 seats are at stake. Although Kasa- vubu's Abako party is the only one to win a majority of a delegation from any one province, it is seri- ously split. Conaco's grouping has won control of 8 of the 13 provincial assemblies for which results are available. Eight prov- inces are still to be heard from. The rebellion meanwhile con- tinues to falter, and government clean-up operations in the north- east are going fairly wel~ sE crET Page lg WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 SECRET Pressures for reform in Ethiopia have become more in- tense recently, and the Emperor may soon attempt to alleviate them by diverting attention to foreign policy. One result may be recognition of Communist China. At the least, the Ethi- opian Government will probably try to create a more nonaligned image before the Afro-Asian Con- ference scheduled to open in Algiers on 29 June. Fro-Western officials, in- cluding the prime minister, have recently told the US Embassy that pressure is growing far a major shift in Ethiopian policy. The government's more radical elements argue that other Afri- can countries such as Guinea, Egypt, and Somalia have bene- fited materially from closer relations with Communist coun- tries, without losing Western aid. These elements are said to believe that the US could not and would not react to a shift toward nonalignment. Ac- cording to the embassy, the Em- peror may feel that such a move might appease members of the young elite in government and university circles, who have keen urging more rapid modern- ization of the country. The Emperor might also attempt to divert the irritations of the elite from himself by asserting that it is US aid which has failed rather than his regime. the Council of Ministers now has agreed to recognize Communist China. The Chinese have offered aid ii' recognition comes prior to the Afro-Asian Conference. The Emperor agreed aver a year ago to "normalize" relations with Communist China and has several times given the impression that recognition would be accorded when it would best serve Ethiopia's interests. Meanwhile, according to the Ethiopians, the Soviets are pushing for acceptance of a Soviet military assistance pro - gram. Any military offer would have special appeal at present in view of a current squeeze on the Ethiopian Armed Forces budget. Soviet deliveries to Ethiopia's neighbor, Somalia, is also a major factor. The Emperor and other Ethiopian officials insist that in a few months the Somalis have received more armor than Ethiopia has received in a decade. Fears of Somalia's intentions and mili- tary prowess, although often based on inadequate or incorrect information, nonetheless color Ethiopian thinking. The Emperor is intensely proud of the prestige his elder- statesman-type leadership among African states has brought to Ethiopia, and he may believe that a more nonaligned posture for Ethiopia would increase this influence. He has already indicated that the US Army's Kagnew communications center-- considered a "US military base" by most Africans--is an increas- ing political liability to him. SE CRP, T Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 SE CRE T Debate in the EEC Council of Ministers oz. the c~mriission's financing proposals has sharpened the lines of conflict between France and the other five on the future development of the community. France termed "unnecessary and premature" the proposals for an independent community source of revenue from customs receipts a.nd rejected any gain in budget- ary powers for the European Par- liament. It strongly objected as well to an EEC right of veto over community subsidies far any agricultural exports not in keep- ing with community policy. The commission's proposals were gen- erally supported by the other five--even though important dif- ferences, some of them tactical, remain among them--a.nd Italy a.nd the Netherlands wish to go even further in strengthening the parliament. The discussions thus appear to have been an initial but by no means conclusive success for the commission's effort to tie in the future financing of the common agricultural policy (CAP) --which must be agreed upon by July, according to a council- imposed deadline--with "supra- national" reforms in the commu- nity structure. The commission was also over- whelmingly supported last week in a. European Parliament debate on the financial regulations by all the delegates except rep- resentatives of the French Union for the New Republic. The 1JS Embassy in Paris has noted that even in France considerable sup- port exists for the commission's proposals, although it questions whether De Gaulle will be swayed by such opinion. Paris evidently intends to try to avoid a.n outright test of its community attitudes and attempt instead to get an interim financial arrangement safeguard- ing its basic economic interest in the CAP, The others might agree to such a provisional ar- rangement, but the Netherlands is still insisting on "political" concessions for accepting heavy financial costs and Germany may also prove to be tough on this ,issue. Should a.ny of the mem- bers continue to back the com- mission and the French refuse to make concessions, community ;financing would in effect be blocked. Commissioner Mansholt has taken the position that the fi- nancing of agricultural support would then revert to the national governments--a particularly heavy burden for France. He ha.s hinted as well that the com- munity's position on a. world-wide grains agreement--which again the French favor--would be un- tenable without EEC decisions on internal agricultural and financing policies. SE CRE T Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 A9ay n5 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 SECRET ITALIAN RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE Improving relations with Eastern Europe is becoming a main Italian foreign policy ob- jective. Rome feels that recent international events have danger- ously slowed the process of East- West detente. It is particularly concerned that US preoccupation with extra-European problems may reduce flexibility in Western policy toward the East European states. A series of high-level contacts is in prospect, with President Saragat and Foreign Minister Fanfani scheduled to visit Poland, and Fanfani, prob- ably accompanied by Premier Moro, to go to Yugoslavia. Recently, in his first major foreign policy speech, Fanfani cited as signs of improving re- lations last month's signing of technical cooperation agreements with Czechoslovakia and Rumania along with a cultural-agreement with Poland, and he pointed to Italian-Yugoslav cooperation as a model of peaceful coexistence. He argued that an increase in trade, including orders for com- plete industrial plants, might be stimulated if Italy could of- fer East Europeans easier credit. The major impetus for greater trade with Eastern Europe comes of course from businessmen, and the number of exchange visits be- tween Italian and East European commercial delegations has markedly increased. Trade with Eastern Europe, however, is only a little over three percent of Italy's total world trade. Ex- ports to most East European countries were up slightly in 1964, but imports generally de- clined as the Italians sought to bring trade with the area more nearly into balance. Rorne has held the line on long-term cred- its except for an $8-million guaranteed ten-year credit made available to Czechoslovakia in 1964. Italy has long-term trade agreements with all the Eastern European countries, including Albania. Among these countries, Rumania, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in that order, are its most important trading part- ners. Yugoslavia's importance is likely to increase. Italy also signed a cultural agree- ment with Albania in March under which Tirana is seeking some Italian technical assistance. A significant recent devel- opment is the increasing interest of Yugoslavia, Poland, and Ru- mania in establishing production and marketing arrangements with Italy which would facilitate sales of their products in third countries, including those be- longing to the Common Market. SE CRE T 19 WEEKLX SUMMARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 SECRET The NATO foreign ministers who have returned from their con- ference in London are generally relieved that an acrimonious French-US exchange was avoided, but more concerned than ever at the deep divergencies the meet- ing did nothing to resolve. Ac- cording to a senior official of the French Foreign Ministry, the French delegation was "well pleased in the circumstances" with its relations with the US delegation in London, but Paris is fully aware that "none of the real issues affecting NATO" had even been discussed there, Several such issues--par- ticularly the differences over nuclear strategy which have prevented any real progress in the NATO Force Planning Exer- cise (NFPE) for two years--are scheduled for further airing at a meeting of NATO's defense ministers in Paris from 31 May to 2 June. It is questionable, however, that the ministers will be able to agree even to continue the NFPE effort in or- der to come up with acceptable force goals for 1965-1970. France still insists that exist- ing strategic guidance--which SECRE T Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 biay 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 '"`~ SECRET `"'` provides for immediate massive nuclear retaliation against any enemy attack--must not be changed. Moreover, the French defense min- ister may simply say that the problem of force goals is not relevant since De Gaulle consid- ers NATO "no longer responsive to its defense mission." alliance. The Paris meeting may there- fore serve to clarify France's ultimate intentions toward the the French are studying various aspects of their NATO relations and the effects on France if it pulls out of NATO Western Hemisphere The Imbert government in the Dominican Republic has gained the military initiative and sub- stantially reduced the size of the rebel-controlled area of Santo Domingo, US military forces, augmented by the recent arrival of some 400 Latin Ameri- can troops, continue to guard the neutralized areas of the city and are targets of sporadic sniper fire. Attempts to find a politi- cal solution to the 27-day-old crisis have thus far been thwarted by rebel leader Caamano's refusal to deal directly with Imbert and most recently by the loyalists' reluctance to consider a compro- mise formula in view of their recent military successes. Ef- forts by the Organization of American States to achieve a peaceful solution have also been somewhat undercut by the arrival of a special UN mission. Forces loyal to Imbert's Government of National Recon- struction took the military ini- tiative on 13 May in Santo Do- mingo's northern industrial sec- tor, which is separated from the main rebel-controlled area by the US-held corridor. Loyalist army and air force troops, sup- ported by tanks and artillery forces from General Wessin's axmored units, drove eastward until they gained control of the city's factory area and the main broadcasting facilities of Radio Santo Domingo, which had been an important weapon in the rebels' hands until loyalist forces blasted it off the air earlier in the week. The loyalists' military successes have made pro-Imbert leaders increasingly outspoken in their opposition to a compro- mise political solution and in- creasingly truculent concerning US political pressures. A 19 May broadcast on the Dominican Armed Forces Radio San Isidro SE CRE T Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 `.Polo Fields 650516 4'!552 ~l ~,~.... ~~!17ET Hotel ~ _ ~ EI Einbajador {ar~t.,,II idly SANTO DOMINGO ~~/(?ANAMA n 13L0.ND5 u g~ Principal Rebel-Held Area Rebel-Infiltrated Area -??- International boundary ' "' Provincia boundary ? Netlonal capital o Provlncia capital t~ Rallroatl Roatl 0 20 40 Miles 0 2fi q~0 Kilometer, Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 `"~ SECRET ~ openly ckias~tised those outside "advisers who feel they have the authority to guide our in- ternal affairs." There has been a correspond- ing deterioration in the morale of the rebel forces. While some elements remain in the city's northern sector, the rebels now for the most part are confined to the same downtown Santa Do- mingo area from which they began their operations late last month, While there are indications some of tkietn would like to abandon the fight and seek a compromise po- litical solution, a hard-core group--which probably includes most of the rebel leaders--is defiantly holding out for a set- tlement clearly favoring the rebel cause. Rebel gloom may well have deepened with the killing on 19 May of a key leader, Lt. Col, Rafael Fernandez Dominguez, who was leading a probing attack on the loyalist-held presidential palace. He was the Caamano "re- gime's" minister of the interior. One or more leaders of the pro- Castro 14th of June Political Group--one of the three Dominican Communist parties--was also killed during the attack. Caamano lost no time in charging publicly that Fernandez Daminguez and the others had been "assassinated from behind" by US troops. The rebels probably hope such charges will inflame public opinion against the US and stiffen rebel resistance. Reports from various points in the Dominican interior con- tinue ~to describe local condi- tions as calm but uneasy. For the most part, the populace re- mains confused and disoriented about the rival "governments" in the capital and is awaiting a clear sign of which will emerge as the victor before offering allegiance. Food supplies re- main critically short in some areas desY?ite US emergency re- lief measures, and unemployment is a worsening problen- in a few localities. Police and army garrisons throughout the country- side are in complete control of their areas of jurisdiction, al- though roadblocks and checkpoints to prevent arms smuggling are in evidence. From his safe haven in Puerto Rico, ex-president Juan Bosch--whom rebel leaders con- tinue to regard as the "spiritual father" of the revolt--still pur- ports to be their chief spokes- man. Throughout the crisis his role has been somewhat ambiva- lent, and his statements have ranged from the relatively mild to the caustic. True to form, Bosch has displayed a high de- gree of naivetd about the nature and direction of the rebel move- ment; this appears at least par- tially due to his reliance for information on the rebel leaders in Santo Domingo, with whom he is in frequent telephone contact. Despite the rebels' persist- ent claims that "six or more" countries are about to extend SE CRE T Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 -.~. SECRET diplomatic recognition, no foreign government has yet done so. The rebels continue to appeal for such action, how- ever. UN action to stop the fighting in the Dominican Re- public has involved both ef- forts at Security Council ses- sions in New York and Secretary General Thant's dispatch of a special mission, headed by Jose Mayobre, chief of the UN Eco- nomic Commission for Latin Amer- ica. Mayobre, a personal friend of Bosch, has impressed US Em- bassy officials as predisposed to favor the rebels, and his early reports to Thant appear to bear this out. Meanwhile, members of the Organization of American States are increasingly dismayed by the orga nization's inability to stop the fighting between the contending L>ominican forces. The five-nation special OAS peace commission, :aturned from Santo Domingo to Washington on 17 May after viewing with deep resentment the UN intervention in the situation. In a 19 May meet- ing, the cammission recommended that a special OAS representative be empowered to go to Santo Do- mingo and attempt to mediate be- tween the rival governments. Al- though no one has yet been desig- nated,former president Jose Figueres of Costa Rica is ru- mored to be a likely selection. Progress in farming the In- ter-American Armed Force in ac- cordance with an earlier deci- sion of the OAS is continuing, with some 400 troops from Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua already on hand in Santo Domingo. Units from Brazil and possibly other countries are expected shortly. Details on how the force is to be used have not yet been fully decided, how- ever. SE CRE T Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 ~ SECRET ~ Bolivia's junta president Barrientos has taken his first firm steps to counter his strong- est opponents and to attack some of the country's basic problems. In doing so, however, he has in- curred the most serious crisis of his six-month rule. Faced with an imminent series of politically inspired strikes, the junta seized the initiative by arresting and deporting pro-Communist labor leader Juan Lechin on 15 May. At the same time, government security forces were put on alert in anticipation of labor disturbances. Lechin 's labor organizations, the Bolivian Workers Central and the Mine Workers Federation, responded promptly to the government ac- tion by calling for a general strike and protest demonstra- tions. Violent demonstrations took place. in La Paz on 17 May but were broken up by police and armed forces units. This was the first time that army troops have been used against civilians since the junta took power last November. As of the morning of 20 May, no other serious demonstrations had oc- curred, mainly because of gov- ernment concessions to labor and student leaders and preven- tive armed patrols by police and military. Although the junta has dealt firmly with the agitators thus far, there is growing evidence of dissension and lack of coordi- nation in the government. Bar- rientos has indicated that var- ious concessions on his part have been necessary to keep the sup- port of armed forces commander General Ovando, army commander La Fuente and Minister of Defense Suarez. Most political and student leaders, who up to now have re- mained passive in the crisis, are likely to move into active oppo- sition should any sign of govern- ment weakness become apparent. A general strike of minersb printers, and factory, bank, and construction workers remains in effect.- Leftist-extremist-led labor resistance to the govern- ment probably has been intensified by the junta crackdown. Recent government decrees have ordered a nationwide state of siege and mo- bilization of army troops and ci- vilians,and have declared all la- bor union posts vacant. The far left must react strongly to these measures if it is not to lose prestige and following. SE CRE T Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 SECRET ECUADOR'S JUNTA RIDES The military junta in Ecuador appears to have weath- ered another challenge to its authority,this time a merchants' strike in Guayaquil which lasted throughout the week of 10 May in protest against a new tariff schedule on imports. During a week rife with ru- mors of plots by opportunist pol- iticians and even by ambitious military men to exploit this sit- uation, the junta demonstrated determination to remain in power. Martial law was imposed in Guaya- quil and freedom of expression was suspended. A plot involving a few air force officers was bro- ken, the arms cache of the ter- rorist Detachments of Secret Or- ganization was seized, and dis- sident political elements, in- cluding former president Arose- mena, were neutralized. The armed forces appear to have drawn together behind the junta, put- ting aside at least for the mo- ment discussions of bringing about a change in the government. To cope with the Guayaquil crisis, tYie government even withdrew troops from the sensitive Peru- vian border area. The strike settlement pro- vided for creation of a special commission chaired by the minis- ter of finance which will hear the views of the merchants and consider revision of the new OUT ANOTHER CRISIS tariff law. Meanwhile, goods in the customs houses may be removed at the old rates, al- though the new rates finally agreed upon will apply retro- actively. After putting on an impressive show of force, the government made its concessions from strength rather than from weakness, and the Guayaquil in- terests were denied the type of victory they gained last October when they protested earlier tax reforms. Ecuador's economic situation, especially in the coastal area, has deteriorated badly this year, largely because of a decline in exports of bananas--ins chief crop. The new tariff schedules reflect an IMF recommendation, and are aimed at discouraging luxury imports, thereby helping close a serious foreign exchange gap resulting from the fall in banana exports while imports remained at a high level. Although the junta has sur- vived possibly the greatest dan- ger to its position in two years, the factors which have threatened stability are still-present. Most political factions have joined a new "front" to work against the government and on behalf of an early transition to civilian rule. Their success,as always in Ecuador, will depend upon the junta's ability to preserve relative unity within the armed forces. SE CRE 7' 26 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 ~.r' SECRET CASTRO REGIME MOVES AGAINST DISSIDENTS The Castro regime has made scores of arrests in the past few weeks, charging the victims with syping for the US. These arrests and the resulting trials, which ma.y bring sentences of up to 30 years, serve a.s a. stiff warning to others in Cuba. who are not in harmony with the regime. They also supply convenient sub- ject matter for continuing strong propaganda attacks against the US. The Cuban Department of State Security arrested 53 Bap- tist ministers and lay officials in western Cuba on 8 April. A 63-yeas -old US missionary and his son-in-law, also a US citi- zen, were arrested as Leaders of the alleged spy ring. The Southern Baptist denomination is one of the largest and probably the most cohesive of Protestant groups in Cuba.. Its 10,000-mem- ber congregation apparently is solidy opposed to the Castro government and staunchly resists the regime's encroachments a.nd conformist pressures. Other Protestant, denominations, which usually are more zealously op- posed to the regime than the Catholic Church, may also soon become targets of Castro's se- curity forces. The government in the past ha.s on occasion sharply curbed the activities of certain evangelical sects. In late April, the regime arrested eight people in Cama - guey Province. This group al- legedly was supplying the US with information on troop move- ments a.s well as economic infor- mation. Seven others were ar- rested in Havana. on 2 May far spying, according to a regime announcement. Havana radio an- nounced on 12 Ma.y that 31 addi- tional counterrevolutionaries in Camaguey Province had been arrested on charges of belong- ing to yet another espionage net. This group is said to have sent secret military and economic information to the US via the US Naval Base a.t Guantana.mo Bay. In addition to the two US Baptist missionaries, another US citizen who has run a farm in Cuba. for several years was arrested on charges of espionage in early May. All three prob- ably will receive lengthy prison sentences. The death penalty has also been exacted in one re- cent case, that of a Cuban cus- toms official executed for "col- la.borating with the enemy.:' SE CRE T Page 27 WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 May 65 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Approved For Release 2008/05/21 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004900030001-7 Ta .s ~r~l~I