WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004900020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 14, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004900020001-84v 1965
'CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTE 'p o Ds CENT
State Dept. review
completed
.DIA review
-completed.
; IATELY AFTER US$
JOBS
SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgradingond declassification
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SECRET
(Information as of noon EDT, 13 May 1965)
VIETNAM
North Vietnam is augmenting its jet fighter strength
and building a second surface-to-air missile site near
Hanoi. As the North prepares to meet new air attacks,
the level of the Viet Cong's sabotage and harassing
actions and the intensity of their military attacks
rose sharply in the South. There are mounting indica-
tions of a marked improvement in Soviet - North Viet-
namese relations and a corresponding increasing dis-
pleasure in Peiping.
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
SOVIETS DISPLAY NEW WEAPONS
Among the five weapons shown for the first time in the
9 May Moscow parade were two probable solid-propellant
surface-to-surface missiles--one an ICBM--and a liquid-
propellant vehicle described as an "orbital rocket" ca-
pable of attacking targets "from any direction." Also
displayed for the first time were an antitank missile
and the T-62 medium tank.
SOVIET LUNAR SOFT-LANDING ATTEMPT AN APPARENT FAILURE 9
The wording of the Soviet announcement of a "hit"
strongly suggest that the probe was destroyed on impact.
SINO-SOVIET TRADE APPARENTLY STILL DECLINING
TASS announcement of the 1965 trade pact did not men-
tion further Soviet sales of petroleum products. China's
export volume may be smaller, since it no longer needs a
large surplus to repay its debts to the USSR.
SOVIET INTERNATIONAL FISHING OPERATIONS GROW
The fleet is expanding in traditional North Atlantic
and North Pacific fishing grounds and moving into Carib-
bean and African waters. The USSR is seeking new bases
for its fishing operations in the southwest Atlantic and
east Indian Ocean.
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14 May 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
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NOW SECRET :W
THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page
HUNGARIAN REGIME WOOS INTELLECTUALS 14
Honors have been conferred on writers severely criti-
cized in the past who, by reason of their continuing
domination of the literary scene, the regime hopes will
help reduce public indifference to its programs.
TRIAL OF BULGARIAN PLOTTERS PENDING
A speech last week by party chief Zhivkov--the regime's
first open admission of last month's plot to overthrow
it--seemed to be setting the stage for the trial and as-
suring the public that the regime has the situation under
control.
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN EASES
Tensions are easing in the Rann of Kutch, and both coun-
tries have thus far avoided provoking incidents in other
areas where troops are massed. India's arrest of Sheikh
Abdullah, the Kashmiri Muslim leader, has added to ten-
sions, however.
NEW YEMENI GOVERNMENT STRENGTHENS HOLD
In its efforts to free Yemen from Egyptian domination,
the Numan regime has obtained important tribal support,
and is trying to ease the opposition of the royalists
and their Saudi backers.
RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT WINS ELECTION SWEEP
With his new mandate from Rhodesia's primarily white
electorate, Prime Minister Smith will be able to push
through constitutional amendments consolidating white
control and to increase pressure on London to agree to
Rhodesian independence on his terms.
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO BRAZZAVILLE CONGO
Equipment delivered thus far has been only for the
ground forces
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Page
EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION TO HOLD "SUMMIT" MEETING 23
Harold Wilson is largely responsible for upgrading the
24-25 May meeting to prime-minister level, and has prom-
ised proposals for "building bridges" between EFTA and
the EEC.
BELGIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
The Social Christians and the Socialists who have ruled
Belgium in coalition since 1961 may lose some electoral
support in the 23 May elections, but not enough to un-
seat their government.
AUSTRIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
The election on 23 May promises to be close, with the
odds slightly in favor of Socialist Franz Jonas over
former chancellor Alfons Gorbach, the nominee of the
conservative People's Party.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The newly formed loyalist government under Antonio Im-
bert has been unable to seize the political initiative
from the rebel regime of Francisco Caamano, and little
progress has been made toward a compromise solution.
The US forces that continue to maintain an uneasy cease-
fire will eventually become part of an inter-American
force under the control of the Organization of American
States.
VENEZUELAN TERRORISTS ATTACKING US INSTALLATIONS 29
Numerous US Government and commercial installations in
various parts of Venezuela have been hit 25X1
SECRET
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,-SAW wool
SECRET
WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued)
INCREASING DIFFICULTIES OF BOLIVIAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT 30
Junta chief Barrientos is still groping for solutions
to Bolivia's acute political and economic problems.
His own presidential ambitions have contributed to his
government's insecurity.
GROWING OPPOSITION TO PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT ROBLES
The search for a means to dislodge Robles has become
virtually the sole preoccupation of a wide spectrum of
political and subversive elements.
SECRET
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in the face of the almost
around-the-clock pace of US and
South Vietnamese air strikes
against targets in North Vietnam,
Hanoi is undertaking a substan-
tial.. program to bolster its air
defenses with bloc assistance.
Jet fighter strength is being
augmented and a second surface-
to-air missile site is being
built near Hanoi. The air
strikes against the North con-
tinue to center on major roads
and rail Lines, but the airfield
at Vinh was also attacked with
good results.
guidance revetment, or the site's
road network. The pace of con-
struction seems faster than that
on the first site,
but is 25X1
still not complete. No missile
equipment has been identified at
either site thus far, but it
could be included in Soviet arms
shipments.
Analysis of high-altitude
photography reveals an
3A-2 site in the early stages of
construction 11 nautical miles
southwest of Hanoi.
The identifica-
tion and position of this second
site indicate that construction
of a ring of sites around Hanoi
may now be under way. The first
site was about 15 nautical miles
south-southeast of Hanoi. At
least two more sites--one north-
east and one northwest--and a
support area will probably also
be built. Four sites and a sup-
port area comprise a normal So-
viet SA-2 regiment.
Two launch emplacements at
the new site are in an inter-
mediate stage of construction,
but work has not yet been started
on the other launch positions, a
Military Action in South Vietnam
As the North prepared to
meet new attacks, the level of
the Viet Cong's sabotage and
harassing actions and the inten-
sity of their military attacks
rose sharply. In the major
SECRET
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actions, a Viet Cong force of
three battalions attacked Song
Be, the capital of Phuoc Long
Province, about 75 miles north
of Saigon, in the first large-
scale effort against a provin-
cial capital in over three
years. A government heliborne
operation just north of Saigon
was put to rout by Communist re-
sistance. Other large-scale
actions took place in southern-
most An Xuyen Province and in
Hau Nghia Province west of
Saigon.
It is too early to tell if
the present upward swing, which
began in late April, will differ
significantly from past seasonal
offensive periods. Most of the
current Viet Cong activity has
been centered in the southern
part of the country, but this
may be a diversionary tactic
prior to a major thrust in the
northern provinces. There con-
tinue to be reports of large
Viet Cong troop concentrations
in these provinces, particularly
in the Quang Tin - Quang Ngai
border area and in northwest
Kontum Province.
Unconnected with this con-
centration but indicative of
the growth in Viet Cong strength
over the years, a recent joint
US - South Vietnamese reappraisal
of order of battle holdings on
Viet Cong main force units car-
ries as confirmed some 47,000
combat regulars compared with
the previous figure of 39,000.
The new order of battle accepts
nine Viet Cong regimental head-
quarters (up from five), and 61
regular battalions (up from 54),
including a confirmed North
Vietnamese unit in Kontum Prov-
ince. It also includes 17,600
Viet Cong support and line-of-
communications troops, bringing
total regular strength to 64,600.
Although this figure reflects
some recent growth through re-
cruitment and infiltration,
the upward revision results
for the most part from firmer
identification of units al-
ready in place.
Communist Political Developments
There are mounting indica-
tions of a marked improvement
in Soviet - North Vietnamese
relations and a corresponding
increasing displeasure in Pei-
ping as the influence of its
main rival increases. Hanoi's
celebration of the 20th anni-
versary of V-E Day, for example,
was marked by unusually warm
demonstrations of Vietnamese
support for the USSR. Not only
did the top three leaders send
a special greeting to the So-
viet leadership but they also
attended a mass rally and a
reception at the Soviet Em-
bassy. At the ambassadorial
reception the Soviet ambassador
referred to the recent improve-
ment in relations and declared
that they were "consolidating
and developing" from day to
day.
Soviet party leader Brezh-
nev, in his 8 May address com-
memorating the V-E Day anni-
versary, pledged increased as-
sistance to North Vietnam "if
necessary." He also stressed
that there was a "full unanimity
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SECRET
of views" between the USSR and
the DRV on ways and means of
countering US intervention in
Vietnam.
Privately, however, ranking
Soviet officials told Western
diplomats that Soviet aid was
still limited in scope, warned
of the dangers of escalation,
and expressed concern about an
alleged "serious turn" in US
foreign policy. Party presidium
member Shelepin, in a 7 May con-
versation with the US Army at-
tach6, urged the US to find
some way out of the impasse on
the Vietnam situation. In sub-
sequent talks with the British
and Israeli ambassadors, how-
ever, Shelepin repeated the
standard Soviet argument that
negotiations are impossible as
long as US air strikes continue.
Peiping publicly discussed
the possibility of negotiations
for the first time in months,
but the context made it clear
that this was an attempt to
counter whatever influence Mos-
cow might be exerting on the
Vietnamese toward negotiations.
In two authoritative statements
related to the V-E Day anni-
versary celebrations--a People's
Daily editorial on 9 May an a
'RedFlag article on 10 May--
P ieie ping stated that negotiations
with imperialists were sometimes
necessary as long as the "basic
interests of the people" were
not violated. However, the
statements emphasized that agree-
ments of this nature were a
temporary "tactic" and made it
clear that discussions with the
enemy were part of the standard
Chinese Communist tactic of
"fight-talk-fight-talk." The
main thrust of both statements
was to warn of the dangers of
a "Munich" in negotiations,
and the Red Flag article went
further tFain previous Chinese
public statements in warning
that Peiping would go on sup-
porting the Vietnamese people
whether or not the US bombed
China.
People's Daily's "Observer"
on 12 any also raised the issue
of negotiations in a clear at-
tack on the Soviet position.
Referring to Secretary Rusk's
speech of 3 May as a "trap,"
the article asserted that to
agree to enter into negotiations
on condition that the US stop
bombing North Vietnam is tanta-
mount to acknowledging that the
US was justified in the bombings.
"Observer" reiterated Peiping's
standard position that unless
US "aggression" is stopped and
US troops withdrawn from Viet-
nam, restoration of peace in
Vietnam "will be out of the
question."
Further evidence of Pei-
ping's mounting concern over
Moscow's "revisionist" influ-
ence with Hanoi was reflected
in four violent propaganda at-
tacks on the Soviet leadership
this week. In the most unusual
one, People's Daily on 7 May
carried full-page account--
complete with pictures and gory
details--of an alleged Soviet
suppression of a major anti-US
demonstration involving Viet-
namese students in Leningrad
on 3 April. Neither Hanoi nor
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Moscow had mentioned such an
incident, and the fact that Pei-
ping waited a month before pub-
licizing it suggests tha' if it
did occur the Chinese delay may
have been due to attempts by
Peiping to prod Hanoi into some
public response. Having failed
in this, Peiping apparently de-
cided to go ahead on its own in
hopes of creating friction be-
tween Hanoi and Moscow, or with-
in the North Vietnamese party.
Political Developments
in South ie nam
Premier Quat has strength-
ened his hand by obtaining the
self-dissolution of the Armed
Forces Council, a potential ri-
val authority, but the proffered
resignations of military minis-
ters from his cabinet, just as
he was about to reshuffle sev-
eral civilian ministries, con-
fronted him with new problems.
These difficulties may be re-
solved by his reported decision
to downgrade the title and au-
thority of Commander in Chief
"Little" Minh and to retain Gen-
SE CRE T
14 May 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
eral Thieu as defense minister
with increased responsibilities.
Although retention of Cath-
olics Minh and Thieu should
mitigate Catholic alarm over a
Buddhist-inspired purge, a re-
cent Catholic resolution charg-
ing the government with bowing
to thinly disguised Communist
pressure reflects heightened
religious tension.
Concern that the
return of former junta leader
General "Big" Minh from "exile"
in Bangkok might encourage fur-
ther political intrigues ap-
parently prompted Quat and his
top generals to order air force
planes to turn back a commercial
aircraft bringing Minh to Saigon
on 12 May.
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ftople _"e
THREE-STAGE SOLID-PROPELLANT ICBM
SELF-PROPELLED SOLID-FUEL MISSILE
N
LIQUID-FUELED ICBM/SPACE BOOSTER
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
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Iftwo 1
Five weapons were displayed
for the first time In Moscow on
9 May at the parade marking the
20th anniversary of the defeat
of Germany. Included in the
showing were two probable solid-
propellant surface-to-surface
missiles--one an ICBM--and a
liquid-propellant vehicle de-
scribed by the Soviets as an
"orbital rocket" capable of at-
tacking targets "from any direc-
tion."
In connection with the
parade display of new and known
weapons, the Soviets are giving
wide distribution to a film
showing many modern offensive
and defensive weapons in opera-
tion. The parade and film ap-
pear to be part of a major ef-
fort to impress bloc and foreign
audiences with the strength of
the Soviet military arm.
The liquid-propellant mis-
sile is more than 100 feet long
and appears to have three stages.
This weapon has not yet been
specifically equated to any
known missile system.
The solid-propellant ICBM
is about 60 feet long, has
three stages, and is similar in
size and appearance to the US
Minuteman. Preliminary analysis
of the reentry vehicle indicates
it can carry a warhead of about
500 pounds. The Soviets claim
that it can be launched from a
silo.
Another weapon identified
as a solid propellant missile
was carried in a pod on a self-
propelled launcher. In a pri-
vate conversation, Marshal
Krylov, chief of the Soviet
Strategic Rocket Forces,
claimed that the missile has a
range of more than 2,000 miles,
but considerably more analysis
is required before Krylov's
claim can be proved or dis-
proved.
Also shown for the first
time was an antitank missile
about half the length of the
earlier Snapper and Swatter
antitank missiles. The missile,
whose mode of guidance is un-
clear, is mounted as a cluster
of six on the rear of an am-
phibious scout car.
The T-62 medium tank,
adopted by the USSR in 1961,
also was paraded for the first
time. It carries a 115-milli-
meter smooth-bore cannon.
The Ganef, an air-breath-
ing ramjet missile unveiled in
May 1964, was placed behind
antiaircraft guns this time,
suggesting that it has a ground
force air defense role. Last
November, it was paraded in
the surface-to-surface missile
section.
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14 May 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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The Soviet lunar probe, des-
ignated Lunik-5, has apparently
failed in an attempt to soft
land instruments on the moon.
The Soviets have announced
that Lunik-5, launched on 9 May,
"hit" the moon in the area of
the Sea of Clouds at approxi-
mately 3:10 p.m. EDT, 12 May.
This use of the word "hit"
strongly sug-
gest that the probe was destroyed
on impact. Moreover, the So-
viets stated that the "flight
and approach" of Lunik-5 pro-
vided "a great deal of informa-
tion... necessary for the fur-
ther processing of a system for
a soft landing on the moon's
surface."
Despite this apparent So-
viet attempt to conceal a fail-
ure to achieve a soft landing,
Lunik-5 still represents at
least a partial success in a.
program marked by failure.
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SINO-SOVIET TRADE:COMMODITY
COMPOSITION - 1954,1959,1963
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0L
1950
Textiles
Metals, Minerals
Agricultural Products
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SECRET `~
SINO-SOVIET TRADE APPARENTLY STILL DECLINING
Reports on the recently
signed Sino-Soviet trade pact
for 1965 suggest a continuation
of the decline in trade that
began in 1960.
the TASS announce
ment of the pact did not mention
further sales of petroleum prod-
ucts.
Under the 1965 pact, the
USSR will again supply China
with IL-18 transport aircraft,
as well as with helicopters--
probably the M41-6--motor vehi-
cles, farm equipment, and vari-
ous types of industrial hard-
ware. In exchange, Peiping will
continue to export traditional
goods, mainly textiles, agricul-
tural items, and minerals. The
volume of its exports may be
much smaller this year, however,
since it no longer needs to
maintain a large surplus in its
trade with the Soviet Union to
repay its debts. Although
TASS said both sides "show?d
a desire" for more trade and
a "wish" to hold talks on fur-
ther exchanges, meaningful ne-
gotiations are unlikely in the
current political situation.
The volume of trade has
dropped steadily, from a 1959
peak of $2 billion which ac-
counted for almost half of
China's foreign trade, to less
than $500 million in 1964. Con-
comitantly, the Chinese have
turned increasingly to the free
world for goods previously pur-
chased from the Soviets. Since
mid-1963, Peiping has contracted
for about $100 million worth
of free world industrial plants
to be built over the next few
years. Trade with non-Communist
areas increased about 25 percent
last year to about $1.9 billion,
accounting for over 60 percent
of China's foreign trade. 25X1
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14 May 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SOVIET-AIDED FISHING FACILITIES
Operating or Under Construction
Havana, Cuba
Conakry, Guinea
Tema, Ghana
Ras Banos, UAR (Egypt)
Las Khoreh, Somali Republic
GUINEA
l ..~.~ r
ip*
TAI.4ZANIA
Proposed or Under Negotiation
Montevideo, Uruguay
(Undetermined port), Sudan
Al Hudaydah, Yemen
Mtwaro, Tanzania
10, Colombo, Ceylon
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V L)lL (wltn l *Mr
The Soviet fishing fleet--
already the world's largest--not
only is expanding in traditional
North Atlantic and North Pacific
fishing grounds but during the
past three years has moved into
Caribbean and African waters and
now seeks new fishing bases in
the southwest Atlantic and the
east Indian Ocean.
Moscow's fishing research
vessels now operate widely in in-
ternational waters and establish
the basis for extension of Soviet
fishing operations and agreements
for land-based facilities. Re-
search vessels currently are ex-
ploring waters off Ceylon and
Uruguay. This has led to a de-
tailed Soviet proposal for estab-
lishment of a Soviet-aided Ceylo-
nese fishing industry, and feel-
ers have been extended in Monte-
video.
Fishing facilities ranging
from canneries to fishing ports
already are under construction in
several underdeveloped countries.
Although in most cases construc-
tion is designed to inaugurate
or support indigenous fishing ef-
forts, it also serves Soviet fish-
ing operations. Frequently the
fish for processing are supplied
at first by the Soviet fleet.
These arrangements already have
assisted in Soviet exploitation
of South Atlantic and Indian Ocean
fishing grounds.
Although much emphasis is
placed on investigating new areas,
the traditional North Atlantic
and Alaskan fishing grounds are
not neglected. Since 1962, fleets
operating there have increased
considerably in size.
The North Atlantic and Pa-
cific fleets are based in Soviet
ports and include vessels for
storing and preserving the catch.
The vessels in the Caribbean oper-
ate out of Havana, while those in
African waters use fishing facili-
ties developed under Soviet aid
programs and include a wide variety
of specialized ships which process
the catch.
The Soviet fishing fleet, al-
ready the most modern in the
world, continues to be improved.
Recent acquisitions range from $1- 25X1
million trawlers to $15-million
fish-processing refrigerator
mother ships.
Continuing purchases of ships for
the fishing fleet, despite general
cutbacks in purchases abroad of
industrial equipment, clearly indi-
cate Soviet intent to move ahead
with international fishing opera-
tions.
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MW
SECRET
The widespread lack of en-
thusiasm for party programs in
Hungary has moved the Kadar re-
gime to seek support from those
dissident writers and intellec-
tuals dominating the literary
scene whom it apparently sees
as the key to reducing public
indifference and pessimism.
Since early April, honors
have been conferred on several
writers who had been severely
criticized in the past. On 4
April Hungary's top literary
award was granted to Lajos Kas-
sak, a socialist writer who
joined the "conspiracy of si-
lence," i.e., refused to pub-
lish, after the 1956 revolt and
has been a symbol of Hungarian
writers' resistance to regime
controls. Since he began pub-
lishing again, his works have
been attacked in the party
press for having an "anti-hu-
manist, pessimist" bias.
A lesser prize was awarded
to Gabor Garai, a young modern-
ist and disciple of Kassak,
though not an outstanding critic
of the regime.
The doughty Marxist philos-
opher Gyorgy Lukacs, who partic-
ipated in the 1956 Nagy govern-
ment and was briefly imprisoned,
received public congratulations
and testimonials in mid-April
on his 80th birthday. These
honors were permitted even
though he had recently repeated
the outspoken criticism of the
regime's interpretation of "so-
cialist realism" for which the
party press censured him last
year.
The April issue of the
party's theoretical journal con-
tained new "ideological guide-
lines" which, although they
still stress the perils of ide-
ological laxity and the need for
firmer party leadership, favor
persuasion rather than "adminis-
trative measures"--i.e., intimi-
dation--and authorize the pub-
lication of dissenting ideologi-
cal views, even if they are
"alien to the socialist order."
In a commentary published
along with the guidelines, Hun-
gary's chief ideologist, Istvan
Szirmai, reviewed the regime's
concern over popular indiffer-
ence and admitted its continu-
ing failure to gain the support
of Hungarian youth. His remarks
reflected the difficulties in-
volved in providing an accept-
able substitute for the appeals
of Western civilization. Szirmai
made it clear, however, that
despite the ideological inroads
of Western culture, Hungary
intends to continue the devel-
opment of political and cul-
tural contacts with the West.
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Preparations for the trial
of the recently apprehended
plotters against the Bulgarian
regime appear to be largely com-
pleted, although no date has
been announced.
In a speech in Sofia on 8
May, party chief Todor Zhivkov
made the first official admis-
sion to the Bulgarian public
that an antiregime plot was un-
covered early last month. His
remarks appeared calculated to
prepare the public for the line
that will be taken at the trial
and simultaneously to give no-
tice that the regime is in full
control of the situation.
Zhivkov emphatically de-
nounced Western accounts of mil-
itary involvement and specif-
ically absolved the Bulgarian of-
ficer corps. Nevertheless, he
conceded that there are "some
servicemen" among the plotters,
whom he characterized as "mis-
erable adventurists," and "un-
principled lovers of power"
SECRET
Page 15
numbering "less than the fin-
gers on two hands."
The three plotters named
by the regime thus far include
only one military man, General
Tsvetko Anev, commandant of the
Sofia garrison.
General Ivan Buchvarov and his
deputy also are under arrest.
Buchvarov, a central committee
member, was removed from an im-
portant post in the party ap-
paratus last December.
Zhivkov appears to have
passed through this latest po-
litical strife without seriously
jeopardizing his support from
Moscow. He has indicated by his
actions, moreover, that he will
not make important policy changes
as a result of the coup, although
a shake-up of the security ap-
paratus still seems likely.
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.ftoll _400f
Rann of Kutcir, arep
in WIIc/2 ciuslres
INDIA
AND
PAKISTAN
Location of military build-up
-Indian -Pakistani
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SECRET
Tensions are easing in the
disputed Rann of Kutch, and both
India and Pakistan have avoided
provoking incidents in other
areas where troops are massed.
The danger of large-scale clashes
persists, however.
Following the Indian build-
up of about 120,000 men opposite
the Punjab region of West Paki-
stan, Pakistan completed a pro-
tective redeployment of about
70,000 men by last week end. Op-
posing forces are separated by
only a few hundred yards in many
places, and the situation there
remains tense.
In the immediate area of
the Rann of Kutch, however,
there has been a substantial re-
laxation since the fighting
ended on 26 April. Intensive
British a !ox"s to come up with
a formal cease-fire agreement
have continued. New Delhi has
reportedly begun to withdraw
some of its troops from Kutch,
which reverts to marshland at
this time of year.
Delhi's arrest of the Kash-
miri Muslim leader Sheikh Abdul-
lah upon his return from Mecca
on 8 May has added a new threat
to the peace of the subconti-
nent. Following the arrest, Mus-
lim agitation in Indian Kashmir
was quickly crushed to prevent
its spread elsewhere in Pakistan
or India. Communal passions are
easily aroused, however, and
rioting could break out at any
time and inspire border clashes.
During the past week, the
United States has come under
heavy fire in the Indian Parlia-
ment as Indians have sought a
scapegoat for reverses suffered
in Kutch. Delhi now considers
Pakistan's deployment of US-sup-
plied tanks the key to Pakistan's
recent successes. Rather than
acknowledge US efforts to re-
strain both sides from using
US-supplied military equipment,
the Shastri regime seems to have
played up to this parliamentary
outcry.
At the same time Shastri's
visit to Moscow, which began on
12 May, has occasioned renewed
enthusiasm for the USSR. Although
any tendency by Western observers
to equate India and Pakistan in
the Kutch dispute has consist-
ently evoked deep resentment in
India, similar impartiality by
Moscow seems to have been ac-
cepted with equanimity. On 8
May the USSR called for a set-
tlement "by way of direct talks
with due consideration for the
interests of both sides." Rather
than complain, Shastri, before
enplaning for Moscow, thanked
the USSR for "standing by India
in times of trial."
This neutral position by
the Soviets has presumably been
carefully noted by Pakistani of-
ficials, who hope eventually to
persuade the USSR to stop block-
ing UN Security Council action
in the Kashmir dispute, as it has
done for the last nine years at
India's behest.
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PERSIAN GULF AREA
IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
Dhahran,
BAHRAIN 1.
0 MILES 300
0Shiraz
I" R A N
OF
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w
45001
The new Yemeni Government
has taken another modest step
toward asserting its independ-
ence from Egypt by obtaining
the approval and backing of a
conference of major tribes and
by decreeing a new interim con-
stitution. Moves to overcome
initial dissatisfaction with
the new government by Saudi
Arabia and the royalist tribes
are already under way, as is a
search for assistance in these
efforts from other Arab coun-
tries.
The government of Premier
Ahmad Numan, which contains a
majority of cabinet members
outspokenly opposed to Egyptian
domination of Yemen, is walking
a tightrope. It seeks to main-
tain enough of an anti-Egyptian
posture to capture the support
of the increasingly anti-Egyp-
tian republican countryside
while at the same time temper-
ing its actions enough to avoid
incurring Egyptian suspicion
that Numan is too dangerous to
use as a vehicle to the settle-
ment of the Yemeni civil war.
So far, Numan seems to be
succeeding. Last week's tribal
conference at Khamir passed
resolutions which set the stage
for a resumption of peace talks
with the royalists, nodded po-
litely to both Saudi Arabia and
Egypt, midly supported the lib-
eration of southern Arabia, and
sought assistance of all Arab
countries for "cooperation in
the maintenance of peace."
Egypt's massive propaganda
apparatus has publicized the
Khamir conference as a success
for Numan.
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Rhodesian Prime Minister
Smith's overwhelming victory in
last week's parliamentary elec-
tion strengthens his hand to
resume negotiations with London
regarding independence and in
the meantime to initiate con-
stitutional amendments designed
to consolidate white minority
control. While Smith continues
to voice the threat of a uni-
lateral declaration of independ-
ence as a last resort, he appar-
ently has been sobered by oppo-
sition from local business groups
as well as by London's warning
of stringent sanctions.
Smith's Rhodesia Front
swept all of the 50 seats elected
by the predominantly white "A"
roll. It entered no candidates
for the 15 seats representing
the mostly African "B" roll. On
the basis of incomplete returns,
the opposition Rhodesia Party
has definitely elected only two
Africans on the "B" roll, with
the remaining 13 seats probably
going to African independents.
None of the 15 African candidates
who may be included in the par-
liamentary opposition is known
to be connected with the African
nationalists who boycotted the
election.
Having gained the two-thirds
parliamentary majority required
to initiate amendments to the
1961 constitution, Smith prob-
ably will push through the re-
visions he discussed vaguely
during the campaign. Several
are designed to show a semblance
of progress for the Africans.
The standing of the tribal chiefs.
who receive government subsidies,
would be bolstered so that they
might supplant the nationalist
politicians as leaders of Rho-
desia's 4 million Africans. The
"B roll" franchise, which now
is limited by property and edu-
cational qualifications, may be
extended to all taxpayers, in-
cluding Africans in the tribal
reserves, who probably would
vote for their chiefs. However,
the Africans, who outnumber the
whites in Rhodesia almost 20
to 1, would still elect only a
small minority of the legisla-
tors.
The projected amendments
may constitute bargaining tac-
tics in the face of London's
opposition to independence un-
less eventual majority rule is
assured. Although Smith's vic-
tory statement held out the
prospect of obtaining independ-
ence by negotiation, in the
background was a white paper
purporting to prove Rhodesia's
capability for weathering Brit-
ish sanctions if need be.
The implicit threat to
declare independence unilater-
ally could be carried out if
London rejects the constitutional
amendments as a subterfuge de-
signed to thwart, rather than
promote, majority rule. If
London accepts them on the other
hand, Smith might cite such
"progress" as providing an ac-
ceptable alternative to full
independence, at least for the
time being.
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The USSR appears to be win-
ning the "competition" among it-
self, Peiping, and radical Afri-
can states to provide Congo
(Brazzaville) with a military
establishment to protect it from
the incursions it fears from Leo-
poldville.
Arrangements to equip Braz-
zaville's 1,350-man army prob-
ably were worked out late last
year. The first activity was
noted in January when a small
Soviet freighter, the Vyru, de-
livered two trucks, some communi-
cations equipment,a few heavy
machine guns, and small arms and
ammunition to Pointe Noire--Con-
go's seaport. In April, the
Ristna delivered more trucks,
nine armored cars, and 15-20
artillery pieces, and the Pyarnu
brought in four trucks, 10- TT -
bulldozers, and four vans--pos-
sibly mobile repair shops.
The presence in Brazzaville
of Soviet military technicians
was confirmed in February. It
appears that about 10-20 special-
ists have been active. Their
number may be increased in the
future to handle maintenance as
well as training on an expanding
variety of military materiel.
Presumably their responsibilities
for some time will be largely
limited to army and associated
land equipment.
Some Congolese trainees
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SECRET
EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION TO HOLD "SUMMIT" MEETING
The first "summit" session
of the European Free Trade As-
sociation (EFTA) since that
seven-nation organization was
formed in 1959 will be held in
Vienna on 24 and 25 May. Brit-
ish Prime Minister Wilson is
largely responsible for upgrad-
ing the meeting to prime-minis-
ter level, and he has promised
to make proposals for "building
bridges" linking EFTA with the
EEC.
Most EFTA members recognize
that they must strengthen their
organization if it is to achieve
its original purpose--a stronger
negotiating position with respect
to the EEC. In particular, they
want to restrain unilateral UK
initiatives toward the EEC,
limit the effects of a possible
Austrian "defection" to the EEC,
and prevent any similar move by
the Eanes.
The conditions laid down by
the EEC for Austria's association
are incompatible with its con-
tinued participation in EFTA. In
defending its case for EEC ties
at the Vienna meeting, the Aus-
train Government may argue that
the benefits it derives from
EFTA are meager. By way of il-
lustration, it might launch
another attack on the UK's uni-
lateral imposition of import sur-
charges last year.
Aside from what may happen
in Vienna, sentiment for strength-
ening EFTA is likely to increase,
Page 23
especially should the Kennedy
Round prove ineffective in re-
ducing barriers to trade. With
prospects that the tariff ne-
gotiations in Geneva will be
prolonged, speculation is al-
ready growing about exclusive
EFTA-EEC tariff reductions and
perhaps "deals" between the
EEC and individual Scandinavian
countries on specific items.
Seen in this context, the
strengthening of EFTA could work
to the advantage of its members'
bargaining position either with-
in the Kennedy Round or as a
"supplement" to it,
Development of EFTA seems
headed, on the one hand, toward
more effective consultative
mechanisms--designed to prevent
such actions as the UK's sur-
charge move--and, on the other,
toward making EFTA more nearly
the basis for an economic union
similar to the EEC. EFTA in-
dustrialists, trade unionists,
and government officials favored
widening the scope of EFTA at
a meeting in Helsinki last week
and the Scandinavians are ex-
pected to adopt a similar posi-
tion at a meeting of the Nordic
Council in Oslo this week.
The EEC countries would
react cautiously to any new
overtures that may emerge from
the Vienna meeting. There is a
widespread desire within the
EEC for narrowing the gap be-
tween the two blocs., illustrated
by recent EEC Commission
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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qW SECRET low,
approaches to establish liaison
with the EFTA secretariat on
"technical" problems. However,
this desire is matched by fear
that closer ties with EFTA might
mean a weakening of intra-EEC
ties. This risk has been magni-
fied by De Gaulle's diatribes
against the EEC institutions.
SECRET
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JE ("HE I'
The Social Christians and
the Socialists who have ruled
Belgium in coalition since 1961
may lose some electoral support
in the elections on 23 May, but
not enough to unseat their gov-
ernment. The Social Christians
are likely to lose strength to
Flemish nationalists and to the
business-oriented Liberals,
while the Socialists may drop
some votes to French-speaking
extremists in southern Belgium.
Gains by the Liberals, normally
to be expected in view of the
Belgian tendency to vote against
the parties in power, promise
to be limited by the negative
image created by the party's re-
fusal to support legislation
aimed at reducing friction
Austria's presidential elec-
tion on 23 May promises to be
close, with the odds slightly
in favor of Socialist Franz
Jonas over former chancellor Al-
fons Gorbach, the nominee of
the conservative People's Party.
Socialists have won all three
presidential contests since
World War II, but the People's
Party have always held the chan-
cellorship, a more powerful post.
As mayor of Vienna, Jonas
will have the advantage of sup-
port from a cohesive, well-
disciplined party organization
in Austria's largest election
between Belgium's French- and
rutch-speaking groups.
A Social Christian is again
likely to lead the postelection
government, although not neces-
sarily Prime Minister Lefevre
who has had problems within the
party. Paul Vanden Boeynants,
the popular 46-year-old party
president is among the leading
candidates for the premiership.
Henri Spaakc, a Socialist and
the architect of Belgian cooper-
ation with the United States on
Congo policy, will probably stay
on as foreign minister. He has
expressed a preference for the
job, and virtually removed him-
self from consideration as prime
minister.
district. He will also bene-
fit from the view of most Aus-
trians that good government
will be best served if the two
dominant political parties con-
tinue to divide the country's
two highest elective offices.
Gorbach will benefit from
a personality which many Aus-
trians see as well suited for
what is an essentially nonpar-
tisan office. He is also bet-
ter known nationally by virtue
of his tenure as chancellor
from 1961 to 1964.
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Polo
Fields
650519
47552
Hotel
Or El Embajador
9AHAMA
ISLANDS
.Caribbean Sea R1CO
CK POI NTS
L Puerto
? \ry Pla[a
Manser5o
Nouel
SANTO DOMINGO
Principal Rebel-Held Area
Rebel-Infiltrated Area
cow'.
. aAaief.-c
fl k Inmeters
H,g-y
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-??- International boundary
Provincia boundary
? National capital
Provincia capital
-4--;_ Railroad
Hoad
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,saw %we
SECRET
The newly formed loyalist
government in the Dominican Re-
public, headed by Antonio Im-
bert, has been unable to seize
the political initiative from
the rebel regime of Francisco
Caamano, and little progress
has been made toward a compro-
mise solution. The US forces
there will eventually become
part of an inter-American force
under the control of the Organ-
ization of American States (OAS).
The US and OAS Presence
Some 22,700 US troops, sup-
plemented by 38 naval combat and
supply ships, are maintaining
an uneasy truce supervised by a
five-nation OAS Peace Commission.
Except for intermittent sniper
fire, little military action in-
volving US forces has recently
occurred. US casualties now
total 15 dead and 85 wounded.
On 12 May US marines extended
the international zone in Santo
Domingo several blocks eastward
to protect foreign embassies.
In an unprecedented move
on 10 May, the OAS gave the
Peace Commission authority for
establishing an Inter-American
Armed Force in the Dominican Re-
public which will be controlled
by a vaguely defined "OAS uni-
fied command." Brazil and sev-
eral Central American countries,
after delaying over technicali-
ties, are acting to provide con-
tingents. In Argentina and Co-
lombia, military officers are
pushing reluctant governments
to participate in the force.
Chile, .Uruguay, Mexico, Ecuador,
and Peru do not favor an OAS
role in the Dominican Republic
Western Hemisphere
and probably will not supply
troops.
The Peace Commission and
OAS Secretary General Jose Mora,
aided by the papal nuncio, have
attempted to bring the two Do-
minican factions together, per-
haps to form a coalition govern-
ment, but have met with intransi-
gence from the Caamano group.
The proposal to send several
Latin American "wise men" of in-
ternational renown--Jose Figueres,
Alberto Lieras Camargo, Romulo
Betancourt, and Luis Munoz Marin
--to seek a political solution
appears to have failed to obtain
support.
The Imbert Government
The five-man Government of
National Reconstruction (GNR)
headed by Imbert was formed af-
ter much delay on 7 May. In its
original conception the GNR was
to be broadly based, but many
Dominicans evidently are identi-
fying it with the established
political order, and it has
thus far not generated popular
enthusiasm. Only one of its
five members has been associated
with the moderate left, and it
lacks a representative of former
president Joaquin Balaguer, who
is still a formidable political
power. The GNR has appointed
many established military
figures and members of the gov-
ernment of deposed president
Reid to important posts.
In an attempt to gain pub-
lic support Imbert ousted eight
previously discredited military
officers. Despite indications
soon thereafter that loyalist
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SECRET
General Elias Wessin would vol-
untarily retire, he subsequently
reneged and remains in his old
position as commander of the
armed forces training center.
His continued association with
the Imbert government can be ex-
pected to cut into any popular
support the regime might acquire,
since Wessin has become to many
of his countrymen a symbol of
decadence and brutality.
It was hoped that Imbert
would make a rapid start toward
restoring normal governmental
and economic activity, but only
moderate success has been at-
tained thus far. Secondary gov-
ernmental officials have either
sided with the rebels or refused
to commit themselves to a gov-
ernment which they view as hav-
ing an uncertain future. Rebel
control of important financial
and communications installations
has hindered economic activity.
In the face of this failure,
Imbert is described as becoming
frustrated and considering mili-
tary action against the rebels.
The Caamano "government"
continues to stress its claims
of legitimacy and constitution-
ality but has failed to extend
its control outside of Santo Do-
mingo. The rebels have, how-
ever, consolidated their hold
on the northern sections of the
capital, engaging in several
fire fights with loyalists while
doing so. The rebels have at-
tempted to present a facade of
Western Hemisphere
effective government by setting
up ministries, but their min-
isters have been able to perform
only limited functions.
Perhaps the chief strength
of the rebels has been their
ability to utilize propaganda
media. adroitly. The rebel-con-
trolled "Radio Santo Domingo
(Constitutionalist)" has broad-
cast a stream of increasingly
bitter anti-US invective, attack-
ing Ambassador Bennett and accus-
ing US troops of "criminal acts."
The rebels have also become more
active in the publications field,
putting out a weekly magazine and
a newspaper.
Caamano appears to lack an
aptitude for political affairs,
and appears to be relying more
heavily on advisers, particularly
opportunistic "Minister of the
Presidency" Hector Aristy. Com-
munists and extremists are near
the top of the rebel regime, al-
though they do not hold any of
the cabinet posts. They are
particularly active in the prop-
aganda field and as leaders of
rebel paramilitary units.-
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Western Hemisphere
the capital appears to be based
on an uncertain military and
police loyalty rather than genu-
ine public acceptance. Con-
tinued unsettled economic con-
ditions that have led to unem-
ployment and rising food prices
might cause disturbances and
prorebel gains in the interior.
Rebel attempts to gain in-
ternational support by project-
ing a moderate image have not
succeeded. No country has rec-
ognized Caamano. According to
press reports, President de
Gaulle has underlined France's
objections to US policy by in-
structing his ambassador to
maintain contact with Caama.no.
The Caamano "regime" re-
portedly has not asked the Com-
munist countries to recognize
it. Mao Tse-tung, however, has
declared the "firm support" of
the Chinese people, the Soviet
Union has given support in the
UN Security Council, and Cuba
has given Caamano heavy and fa-
vorable news coverage. The reb-
el leadership may feel that form- 25X1
al recognition from Communist
states would be a liability now.
The Venezuelan Communist
Party (PCV) and its leftist ex-
tremist allies have used US ac-
tions in the Dominican Republic
as an excuse to undertake ter-
rorist attacks on US installa-
tions. Targets in Caracas have
included the embassy, the US-
Venezuelan Binational Center,
and the Inter-American Geodetic
Survey. The home of the US con-
sul and the Binational Center
in Maracaibo have also been ma-
chine-gunned. In addition, there
have been at least 12 other at-
tacks on property owned by US
firms.
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Western Hemisphere
The difficulties of General
Rene Barrientos' military govern-
ment are intensifying as time
passes and no solutions are found
for Bolivia's acute political
and economic problems. More-
over, Barrientos' uncertain
leadership gives no assurance
that prospects for stability
will soon improve.
Barrientos' ambition to rule
as a popularly elected president
has been an important factor
behind his government's insecu-
rity. Although well liked by
most Bolivians, he has been un-
able to secure much support for
his candidacy from the political
parties. Moreover, he is un-
willing to give up the junta
presidency despite legalities
requiring candidates to resign
from public office 180 days be-
fore elections. As a result
of this impasse, Barrientos with-
drew his candidacy on 30 April
but then moved last week to
postpone indefinitely the presi-
dential elections scheduled
for 31 October. Barrientos
probably engineered the post-
ponement to gain time to consider
another strategy by which he
might become a constitutional
president. This latest move
has brought him under renewed
criticism from most political
parties, but his general popu-
larity seems unaffected.
Bolivia's economic problems
are closely tied to the politi-
cal situation. When the junta
first took power last November,
it characterized itself as an
interim government and promised
sweeping economic reforms as
well as a quick return to con-
stitutional government. How-
ever, it soon discovered that
it lacked the competence to
cope effectively with complex
economic problems.
The most pressing of these,
inherited from the Paz regime,
is the ugly situation prevail-
ing in Bolivia's vital tin-
mining industry. The tin-mining
areas are centers of extreme
leftist and Communist influence
which have not been controlled
by any government since 1952.
Moreover, COMIBOL, the state
mining corporation, is burdened
with managerial irresponsibility
as well as unruly labor, and
is close to bankruptcy.
International deficit
financing has been obtained,
but further assistance is pred-
icated on a wide-ranging reform
of present mine labor practices
which inordinately favor the
miners at the expense of effi-
cient production. All attempt-
ed reforms have been strongly
resisted by the miners acting
under their extremist leader-
ship.
ership.
Barrientos is aware.that
the miners can be brought under
control only by military action.
He has indicated that his gov-
ernment is willing to undertake
such an operation, but is moving
with deliberation because he is
also aware that the miners will
probably put up a stubborn de=.
fense. The miners are armed,
they are fierce fighters, and
they are under determined lead-
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J L U (LtL I "
Western Hemisphere
GROWING OPPOSITION TO PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT ROBLES
Growing public dissatisfac-
tion over the Robles administra-
tion's meager progress in al-
leviating Panama's basic prob-
lems is creating an atmosphere
increasingly conducive to po-
litical upheaval that could be-
come violent.
The search for some means
to discredit, if not dislodge,
President Robles has become vir-
tually the sole preoccupation
of a wide spectrum of political
and subversive elements in Pan-
ama. Communist groups are mak-
ing daily attempts to set off
a student strike and other demon-
strations against the US ac-
tion in the Dominican Republic.
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I%W aJ U a 4 L ..I d Z N"O
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