WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004900010001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

1965
OCI No. 0288/65
Copy No. 71
WEEKLY SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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(Information as of noon EDT, 6 May 1965)
VIETNAM
The Viet Cong have accelerated their military activity
to some degree but still do not seem ready to launch a
major new offensive. Hanoi, meanwhile, is taking extra-
ordinary measures to keep open its supply lines to Laos
and South Vietnam despite damage to these routes by re-
cent air strikes. Hanoi also has issued an editorial on
the proposed Cambodian conference that neither rejects
the possibility of Vietnam discussions there nor makes
any reference to the role of the Liberation Front--which
Peiping, still blatantly trying to sabotage the meeting,
says must represent South Vietnam. Peiping's most recent
propaganda suggests concern that some North Vietnamese
are losing heart in the face of heavier US air attacks.
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
GROMYKO'S TRIP TO PARIS
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's 25-30 April visit to
Paris marks the opening round in what Soviet leaders
probably hope will be a continuing series of talks with
the French on important European security questions.
"LIBERATION DAY" IN EAST BERLIN
For the V-E Day observances this week, Ulbricht has
revived his seven-point plan for German unification.
Kosygin, with other bloc and nonbloc dignitaries, will
take part in the 8 May celebration in East Berlin and
is likely to repeat familiar Soviet proposals on Euro-
pean security.
POLISH WRITERS PRESSING FOR GREATER FREEDOM
In an effort to force the regime to abandon its arbi-
trary cultural policies, dissident writers are starting
to raise sensitive issues that go beyond cultural mat-
ters. The regime, anxious for a firm show of popular
support in national elections on 30 May, is undecided
whether to clamp down hard on the intellectuals.
Page
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CAMBODIA BREAKS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE US
Prince Sihanouk's move is another stage in his diplo-
matic shift away from "neutrality" and toward Communist
China.
INDIA AND PAKISTAN BRACED FOR BROADER HOSTILITIES
Although there has been a de facto cease-fire in the
Rann of Kutch area since late last week, the earlier
Indian reverses there have generated strong pressures
on New Delhi for military retaliation against Pakistan.
CHINESE COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN NEPAL
The Chinese Communists have been trying for 15 years to
establish a position of influence in Nepal, not only
through attractive grant aid offers but also by infil-
trating government offices and expanding their control
of the local Communist Party. Through these efforts
they have gained some influence in the palace and laid
the groundwork for future subversion, while maintaining
an image of a peace-loving and benevolent people. (Pub-
lished separately as Special Report OCI No. 0288/65B)
THE CYPRUS SITUATION
Diplomatic activity quickened in Athens, Ankara, and
Nicosia last week in anticipation of this month's NATO
conference. Failure to achieve progress there on a
Cyprus settlement could result in shifts in Turkey's
international position.
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
CONSERVATIVE PARTY WINS ELECTION IN BASUTOLAND
London has promised the territory full independence
next year if the government formed by the victorious
Basutoland National Party can rule effectively F_
CONGOLESE ELECTIONS STRENGTHEN TSHOMBE'S POSITION
The political strength evident in preliminary returns
from the now-concluded national and provincial parlia-
mentary elections may induce Tshombd to run against
Kasavubu for the presidency.
NEW POLITICAL UPHEAVAL SHAPING UP IN DAHOMEY
Its divided,, ineffective regime has been unable to
cope with critical economic problems, and the army may
again seize control as it did in 1963.
EUROPE
NATO SPRING MINISTERIAL MEETING
With the annual spring ministerial meeting opening on
11 May in London, there seems to be little disposition
among European NATO members other than the Belgians to
face up to such fundamental problems as nuclear strategy.
WEST GERMAN IRRITATION OVER FRENCH POLICIES
Deepening differences between Bonn and Paris over such
key issues as German unification and European political
unity put a heavy strain on Franco-German friendship.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The presence of US troops averted a victory by the Com-
munist-directed and -infiltrated rebel forces headed by
Colonel Caamano. The rebels seized the political initia-
tive from the loyalists, however, by forming a "constitu-
tional government" with Caamano as president. A cease-
fire is in effect in Santo Domingo but is occasionally
broken by sporadic sniping at US troops.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
BOLIVIAN JUNTA CHIEF CHANGES TACTICS IN BID FOR PRESIDENCY 23
GROWING LABOR UNREST IN BRAZIL MAY LEAD TO COMMUNIST GAINS 24
Worker dissatisfaction over rising prices, unemployment,
and federal control of many unions will be advantageous
to Communists and other leftist opponents of the govern-
ment in important union elections in the next few months.
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The Viet Cong last week stepped
up somewhat both the rate and in-
tensity of their military activity,
and showed some willingness to at-
tack in greater strength. Their
pattern of activity, however, does
not at present suggest the start
of a major new offensive, but
rather the testing of some units
in combat. Where possible, they
are still avoiding major engage-
ments with South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment forces, which continued to
probe at Viet Cong base areas.
A combined air-sea-ground as-
sault by government troops against
a Viet Cong base and supply area
in Kien Hoa Province at the mouth
of the Mekong provided further
evidence that the Viet Cong have
been undergoing a period of re-
equipping and retraining. The
capture of a sizable arms cache,
evidently introduced by sea, as
well as of documents, revealed that
a major supply operation for units
around Saigon was in process from
March through May, and that the
Viet Cong were receiving some Chi-
nese Communist flame throwers and
ammunition for 70-mm.pack howitzers.
the almost total destruction of
a 30- to 40-car train and the de-
struction of or severe damage to
a number of SWATOW gunboats. No
aircraft were lost.
Hanoi is taking additional
measures to counter the effects
of recent air strikes on trans-
portation routes leading to cen-
tral Laos and South Vietnam.
Twenty-one newly constructed
staging, rest, and refueling
points along a 15-mile stretch at
the intersection of Routes 15 and
101 have been detected in recent
photography.
Recent roadwatch reports in-
dicate that the Communists are
continuing to move large numbers
of trucks into the Laos panhandle,
although the numbers have decreased
from mid-April levels. The Com-
munists have resorted to traveling
at night, using effective camou-
flage, constructing bypass bridges,
repairing cratered roads, and em-
ploying new staging areas in ap-
parently successful efforts to
keep their supply lines open into
Laos and South Vietnam.
Military Developments
in North Vietnam
In last week's air strikes on
North Vietnam, US and South Viet-
namese aircraft concentrated on
fixed installations and continued
to conduct both day and night armed
reconnaissance missions. Several
ammunition dumps, a supply depot,
and a barracks area were attacked
with good results. Highlights of
the reconnaissance missions were
In other military develop-
ments, recent photographic analy-
sis indicates that North Vietnam
is readying several airfields for
use as recovery or dispersal bases.
Construction of revetments con-
tinues at Phuc Yen, and has been
noted recently at Haiphong/Cat Bi,
Vinh, and Kep airfields. Most of
the revetments under construction
have exhaust vent sites, suggest-
ing that they are intended for
use by jet aircraft. Vinh and
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Kep airfields would probably be
used as recovery bases to ex-
tend the combat time of fighter
missions.
Political Developments
Hanoi appeared to be mark-
ing time on the political front
this week, as it apparently at-
tempted a further assessment of
the varying cross currents in
bloc and free world policy
statements on the Vietnam issue.
Its only significant propaganda
commentary appeared in a 5 May
party daily editorial which
touched mildly on the proposed
Cambodian conference.
In sharp contrast to Pei-
ping's blatant effort to sabo-
tage the proposal, Hanoi's edi-
torial did not flatly reject
the possibility of Vietnam dis-
cussions at the conference, or
make any reference to the role
of the Liberation Front at such
a meeting. It noted only that
the US sought to use the pro-
posal to further its "deceit-
ful" policy of "unconditional
discussions" on Vietnam. The
editorial was Hanoi's first
reference to the conference
since the endorsement contained
in the joint DRV-USSR communique
on 17 April.
the 29 April joint Soviet-
French communique simply noted
that the US and UK now endorsed
a Cambodian conference, as the
USSR and France had earlier.
The Soviet Government has still
not formally responded to Brit-
ain's request on 26 April that
the cochairmen issue conference
invitations soon.
Peiping, on the other hand,
issued an official government
statement on 2 May fully endors-
ing the Cambodian Government's
conditions for a conference and
declaring that it firmly opposed US
efforts to link discussions con-
cerning Cambodia with Vietnam
and Laos. It also asserted
that it is "absolutely imper-
missible" for the South Viet-
namese Government to take part
in the conference and that South
Vietnam "must"be represented by
the Liberation Front. This is
the hardest position yet taken
on the Front's participation by
any of the Communist powers.
`Moscow's current cautious
attitude toward a Cambodian con-
ference was reflected in Foreign
Minister Gromyko's talks in
Paris last week. Gromyko ap-
parently refused to be drawn
out on the "ways and means" of
organizing a conference, and
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The Chinese gave unusual
VIP treatment to a North Viet-
namese delegation lead by
politburo member Hoang Van
Hoan which stopped off in Pei-
ping from 30 April to 3 May on
the way to V-E Day celebrations
in East Germany. Hoan is
reportedly pro-Chinese, and
the special attention accorded
him probably reflects Peiping's
effort to counteract Soviet
moves designed to enlarge Mos-
cow's influence in Hanoi.
The arguments probably
presented to Hoan, and no doubt
also to the Le Duan mission
which visited Peiping several
weeks ago on the way home from
Moscow, were summed up in an
article published by the lead-
ing Chinese theoretical journal
Red Flag and broadcast on 4
IPa`y. Entitled "Drive the US
Aggressors Out of Vietnam,"
this commentary confidently
asserts that a Communist vic-
tory now is actually "in sight."
The Chinese claim that
the war is now in a "new phase"
in which US defeat is "being
accelerated." They imply that
the. US is unwilling to become
involved in a large-scale war
on the ground and is carrying
out "military blackmail" in the
hope of breaking the will to
resist of the Vietnamese people.
Red Flag reiterates Peiping's
conte~fon that "war is decided
by men, not weapons," and pro-
fesses confidence that the DRV
will persevere in the struggle.
Peiping's most recent prop-
aganda suggests concern over
the possibility that some in
Hanoi are losing heart in the
face of heavier US attacks, and
this line may be in part fight
talk designed to stiffen Viet-
namese resolve. Attacks in the
Red Flag article on modern re-
vTioil is may reflect Peiping's
fear that Moscow has scored
some gains.
In Saigon, there has been
a noticeable increase in politi
cal tension, apparently related
to imminent cabinet changes and
to Premier Quat's efforts to
restrain the military by dis-
solving the Armed Forces Council.
New rumors of a possible coup
attempt cannot be substantiated,
but possibly reflect military
maneuvering for influence in
any command reorganization as
well as the continuing distrust
among Buddhists and Catholics.
The presence in the Saigon area
of persistent plotter Colonel
Pham Ngoc Thao
continues to provide grist for
coup rumors.
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The Communist World
GROMYKO'S TRIP TO PARIS
Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko's 25-30 April visit to
Paris marks the opening round
in what Soviet leaders probably
hope will be a continuing series
of talks with the French on im-
portant European security ques-
tions. The communiqud on his
visit reflected implicit recog-
nition by both governments that
the recent talks were aimed more
at setting a favorable tone for
future discussions than at a
serious substantive exchange.
During the talks, Gromyko
stressed familiar Soviet posi-
tions on Germany and, although
he did not advance any specific
proposals for a conference on
European security, other Soviet
officials informally told the
French that this'would be a good
subject for future consideration.
The USSR has been showing inter-
est in De Gaulle's proposals for
placing a German settlement in
the broader framework of Euro-
pean security, which it sees as
a means of further eroding the
four-power responsibility for
German reunification.
Soviet hints at the possi-
bility of some initiative on
European security seem designed
to foster discord among the
Allied powers and to arouse
old suspicions and fears on
the part of the West Germans.
Soviet propaganda has tried to
exacerbate antagonisms between
Bonn and Paris by implying a
greater accommodation of inter-
est between the USSR and France
than actually exists. The joint
communiqud hailed the recent
French-Soviet agreement to co-
operate in the field of color
television systems--a decision
which has not been well re-
ceived in Bonn.
In addition, Moscow may
hope to influence political is-
sues in West Germany--during
the election campaign there this
summer--by encouraging a debate
between the Erhard government
and Willy Brandt's Social Demo-
crats on future policy toward
France as well as the USSR and
East Germany.
In order to present its
policy toward France in a more
convincing way, the USSR has
been treating Paris with some
delicacy, carefully avoiding
linking the De Gaulle regime
with the other major Allied
powers. Soviet press attacks
on alleged Allied complicity in
the 7 April Bundestag meeting
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in West Berlin avoided specific
mention of France. Also, during
the harassment of Allied mili-
tary traffic in and around Ber-
lin from 5 to 10 April, the USSR
seemed to encourage the French
to believe that Moscow differen-
tiated between them and the US
and UK.
For its part, Paris has
generally professed satisfaction
with the visit because it opened
a dialogue with Moscow without
giving the Russians any concrete
advantages. The French feel they
successfully resisted Soviet at-
tempts to erode their position on
Germany and to use the talks for
propaganda purposes. Foreign
Ministry officials did express
some disappointment that Gromyko
took such a rigidly orthodox
position, since the Soviets ap-
parently had been more forthcom-
ing on such subjects as Germany
and European security in earlier
talks in Moscow with French Am-
bassador Baudet.
Although the recent talks
seem to have been primarily
concerned with Europe, Gromyko
reaffirmed Moscow's insistence
that there can be no question
of convening a conference on
Vietnam as long as US bombings
of North Vietnam continue.
The communique stressed the
convergence of Soviet and French
views on the necessity for strict
observance of the 1954 Geneva
agreements on Indochina and the
inadmissibility of outside in-
terference in the internal af-
fairs of the Indochina countries.
The Soviet press has
focused attention on the im-
portance of Gromyko's visit
as the beginning of a "politi-
cal dialogue" with possibili-
ties for "definite practical
results." The French foreign
minister is to pay a return
visit to Moscow sometime this
fall.
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The Communist World
The Ulbricht regime began
V-E Day anniversary observances
prior to the arrival of Soviet
Premier Kosygin, Polish Premier
Cyrankiewicz, other bloc dele-
gations, and representatives of
at least 13 nonbloc Communist
or leftist parties. For the oc-
casion Ulbricht has revived his
seven-point plan for German re-
unification in the form of a
"German Manifesto," presented
to the legislature on 5 May.
The manifesto calls for
renunciation of atomic arms by
both German states, creation of
a European nuclear-free zone,
recognition of East Germany and
the existing frontiers in Europe,
a nonaggression pact between
the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers,
a peace settlement, and intra-
European cooperation.
In a nationally televised
speech presenting the manifesto
to the legislature, Ulbricht
referred to West Berlin as a
"special territory." He argued
that the Western sectors must
become a "free, neutral city
..never a part of the Federal
Republic." He warned that the
East Germans were determined to
prevent West German political
activity in West Berlin and
reminded the West Berliners
that "those living on an is-
land must not let the sea be-
come their enemy."
Soviet Premier Kosygin
can be expected to devote his
address at the 8 May celebra-
tion in East Berlin to denigrat-
ing West Germany and warning
that there can be no reversal
of the political situation
that has developed as a result
of World War II--i.e., the
present borders in Central
Europe, the existence of two
German states, and the "inde-
pendent entity" of West Berlin.
His remarks are likely also to
contain familiar Soviet pro-
posals on the subject of Euro-
pean security, such as the
need for a peace treaty, a
nonaggression pact, and German
renunciation of nuclear weapons.
The occasion obviously
lends itself also to praise for
the Ulbricht regime and a re-
affirmation'"of-,,Soviet - East Ger-
man military strength, in line
with Moscow's continuing effort
to upgrade East Germany. In this
context bilateral East German
treaties of friendship and mu-
tual assistance with Poland and
Czechoslovakia may be announced.
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POLISH WRITERS PRESSING FOR GREATER FREEDOM
Increasingly vocal Polish
writers are forcing the regime
toward what may be a major de-
cision on dealing with dissi-
dence among the intellectuals.
The writers' uncompromising
mood stems from the regime's
unwillingness during the past
year to clarify its vague and
often arbitrary cultural pol-
icy.
Although it increased
paper allocations and allowed
the publication of three new
journals, most writers--party
members and nonparty alike--ap-
parently regarded these as half-
measures. Moreover, these con-
cessions were outweighed by
numerous petty restrictions,
censorship, and the frequently
emotional responses to cultural
issues by party boss Gomulka.
Despite the appointment last
December of a liberal as cul-
ture min
cally an
ster, Gomulka's basi-
the main determi-
nant of the regime's cultural
policy.
Now, taking advantage of
the regime's efforts to garner
popular support for the 30 May
national elections, the intel-
lectuals are raising sensitive
issues that go beyond cultural
matters.
The powerful and intransi-
gent Warsaw Chapter of the
Writers' Union will vote this
month on resolutions demanding
the abolition of censorship, of
the death penalty, and of sum-
mary courts, and repeal of a
"Stalinist" portion of the penal
code. These resolutions were
submitted at a stormy meeting
of the chapter on 29 March, at
which virtually all liberal
incumbents were re-elected to
the governing board despite
party attempts to install a new
proregime leadership.
Although furious at rank-
ing party writers for losing con-
trol of the meeting, the regime
reportedly has moved to avert
a showdown by promising that a
special commission will examine
writers' grievances if they with-
draw the anticensorship resolu-
tion. The party also has indi-
cated willingness to abolish the
"outdated" section of the penal
code. It reportedly feels, how-
ever, that it will have suffi-
cient support to defeat the
other demands.
This relatively mild re-
sponse indicates an awareness
of the strength of the dissi-
dents. It also suggests that
the party is marking time in
the pre-election period, post-
poning a decision on whether
to limit itself to selective
pressures or to initiate a full
clampdown. Influential party
hard-liners reportedly are sup-
porting the latter course, and
may be exploiting the cultural
turmoil as a means of gaining
Gomulka.'s ear. However, similar
reports--possibly regime-initi-
ated--have circulated in the
past and may be designed to
bring at least the party writers
to heel.
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CAMBODIA BREAKS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE US
Prince Sihanouk's decision
to break diplomatic relations
with the US this week marks
another stage in Cambodia's dip-
lomatic swing to Communist China.
Sihanouk has been actively
threatening the break since No-
vember 1963, when he asked for
the end of US economic and mili-
tary assistance and for a dras-
tically reduced US presence in
Cambodia. Following a border in-
cursion by a US plane last Octo-
ber, Sihanouk warned that he
would break relations if "another"
Cambodian was killed in an inci-
dent along the South Vietnamese
border. He has consistently as-
serted that the US shares re-
sponsibility with South Vietnam
for border incursions.
Sihanouk evidently has been
aware, however, that a break
would adversely affect Cambodia's
"neutrality" and jeopardize his
attempts to secure the interna-
tional conference on Cambodia
and South Vietnam which he has
sought in order to protect him-
self from both Communist North
Vietnamese and Western-backed
South Vietnamese pressures. Close
advisers, moreover, cited Cam-
bodia's dependence on the Mekong,
which runs through South Vietnam,
as an additional reason to pro-
ceed cautiously.
Last March, Sihanouk's cal-
culations were drastically upset
during the Indochinese Peoples'
Conference in Phnom Penh, which
he staged to show that there was
a groundswell of opinion support-
ing his view that a "neutral
solution" to the Indochina prob-
lem was possible. It became ap-
parent there that Peiping and
Hanoi would not support his call
for a conference on Vietnam, al-
though they continued to pay lip
service to convening one on Cam-
bodia alone.
However, when international
attention became focused on us-
ing such a conference to open
discussions on Vietnam and it
appeared the US would attend,
the Chinese Communists apparently
could
no longer support him on this
either.
After talks with Chou En-
lai in Djakarta in mid-April,
Sihanouk suddenly developed his
own "reservations." In a 24
April speech, he said that the
participation of the US and
South Vietnam was "unnecessary"
and that the conference could not
be held with the participation
of the "Saigon government" which
"certain socialist countries do
not recognize."
With the long-sought inter-
national conference evidently
blocked by Communist China, Si-
hanouk no longer needed to worry
about the US attitude and appar-
ently felt less constrained in
reacting to a "slanderous" arti-
cle in a US magazine and to a
new border incident on 28 April
in which one Cambodian was killed
and three wounded.
In a speech preceding the
official break, Sihanouk sought
to portray the move as being
forced on Cambodia. He indi-
cated that the maintenance of
SECRET
7 May 65
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PAKISI
K A, l HMI R
--OCl4 i. x.11\pu
Location of Indian military build-up
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SECRET ..r
consular relations would keep policies, however, will probably
the "door open" for a resumption depend on future events in
of full diplomatic relations Vietnam and the effect they have
with the US. A significant on his belief that a Viet Cong
adjustment in Sihanouk's present victory is inevitable. 25X1
There have been no further
clashes since late last week be-
tween Indian and Pakistani forces
in the Rann of Kutch, but large-
scale fighting between the two
countries could erupt neverthe-
less.
India has deployed about
100,000 men in positions to
strike at northern West Pakistan
and at East Pakistan, and India's
leaders are under heavy domestic
pressure to use these forces to
avenge reverses suffered in
Kutch. Even if the continuing
British efforts to arrange a
formal cease-fire in Kutch
succeed and border negotiations
are begun, these pressures seem
likely to slacken only gradually.
The last serious fighting
was on 26 April, when Indian
forces withdrew from a raised
area known as Biar Bet ("bet"
is the equivalent of "island").
Although Pakistani troops advanced
a few miles southwest of Biar
Bet, they apparently did not es-
tablish direct contact with the
Indians again.
On 30 May, Pakistani Presi-
dent Ayub informed British Prime
Minister Wilson that he had issued
instructions to his troops not
to take any new action which
might aggravate the situation.
India's army chief issued similar
orders two days later, and a
de facto cease-fire has been in
effect since then, except for
occasional artillery exchanges.
New Delhi claims that its
forces inflicted heavy casual-
ties on Pakistani forces and
suffered only light losses them-
selves, but it has not been able
to conceal the fact that Indian
troops retreated in the face of
a Pakistani advance. With the
memory of its 1962 defeat at
the hands of the Chinese Commu-
nists still rankling, the Indian
Army badly wants a victory.
Pakistan, on the other hand,
is content to rest on its laurels
for the moment. In its view
its forces performed well, and
it holds a sizable piece of the
territory it claims in Kutch.
Ayub is taking only minimal
precautions against the imposing
Indian build-up on his borders
in order to avoid giving an ex-
cuse for further hostilities
which might not go so well for
Pakistan.
There has been no evidence
to support Indian charges of
collusion between Pakistan and
Communist China in recent devel-
opments. Since India has roughly
four times as many men under
arms as Pakistan, the Pakistanis
count on India's fear of Communist
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1..w
Greek
Area
10 Miles
Syrianokhori
Morphou
Newly constructed I urkish Cypriot road
(Alignment unknown)
uk Kaimakli
uriotissa
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CYPRUS
,'jai i?,HRAA'EAN SEA
Myrtou \`\ Saint Hilarion Cast cr
t Agirdha
1
i
Photl'a+~
i
Kithrea
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SE CR.ET
China to tie down about half of
the Indian Army. Despite the op-
portunity to offer such support
during the past week, China did
nothing to divert Indian atten-
tion to a "second front," al-
though this could have been done
with only a stiff diplomatic
note.
On 4 May, Peiping denied
any military collaboration with
UN officials have been able
to reduce the danger of clashes
between Greek and Turkish Cyp-
riots at two important points on
Cyprus. UN troops have taken
control of a newly built road
between two Turkish Cypriot
strongpoints--Temblos and Saint
Hilarion Castle--thus preventing
a ,probable Greek Cypriot attack
on the road. In Nicosia, the
Turkish Cypriots last week ac-
cepted proposals for UN investi-
gation of buildings on both sides
of the green line, the demarca-
tion line between the communities
there. Following the investiga-
tion, the Greek Cypriots removed
the 18-day ban on Turkish Cyp-
riot travel into or out of the
capital.
There is considerable diplo-
matic activity in Athens, in
Ankara, and, to a lesser degree,
in Nicosia in preparation for
the 11-13 May NATO Ministerial
Conference in London. Both
Athens end Ankara appear hopeful
Pakistan, but indirectly threat-
ened the Indians if they should
"widen the war." The Chinese
warned that if New Delhi took
this course it would be playing
with fire and would "certainly
come to no good end." Peiping,
however, urged settlement of
the border dispute by peaceful
negotiations
that serious negotiations over
Cyprus and other Greek-Turkish
issues can be held before and
during that meeting. President
Makarios was called to Athens
on 6 May to discuss with Greek
leaders the coordination of
Greek and Cypriot policies.
Ambassador Hare in Ankara
believes the Turks are approach-
ing the NATO meeting as a cru-
cial and possibly final test of
their ability to solve the Cy-
prus dispute within the context
of Turkey's Western orientation.
He warns that the degree of
frustration and bitterness in
Turkey is such that failure.to
move toward a Cyprus solution
at London could lead to early
and extensive changes in Turkey's 25X1
international positions as well
as to a more aggressive policy
toward Cyprus itself.
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The first popular election
for the National Assembly of the
British territory of Basutoland
has resulted in a close victory
for the conservative Basutoland
National Party (BNP),which won
31 of 60 seats. The BNP rep-
resents the traditional tribal
leaders who have maintained
their ascendancy with British
backing, and its leaders favor
close collaboration after in-
dependence with South Africa,
which completely surrounds
Basutoland. The BNP has re-
ceived substantial financial
support from the government of
South Africa. A minor tradi-
tionalist party won four seats.
Britain, which now re-
tains responsibility for Basuto-
land's internal security and
foreign relations, has prom-
ised full independence next
year if meanwhile the govern-
ment formed on the basis of
the 29 April elections shows
itself capable of maintaining
law and order. The transi-
tion to independence may be
disrupted, however, by the
Basutoland Congress Party (BCp),
which,appeared the stronger
party but won only 25 seats. .The
BCP opposes collaboration with
South Africa, seeks to dis-
place the tribal chiefs
Congolese national and pro-
vincial elections were offi-
cially ended on 30 April. Com-
plete results are not yet avail-
able, but preliminary returns
indicate that a clear majority
of the national deputies will
support in varying degrees
Tshombd and his national politi-
cal vehicle, CONACO. Although
this evidence of political
strength may eventually induce
him to run against Kasavubu for
the presidency, Tshombd has yet
to: announce his intentions. For
the time being, an uneasy truce
7 May 65
exists between the two leaders,
and Kasavubu says he intends to
keep Tshomb6 as premier at least
until June.
Military activity is at a
low level. On 28 April, merce-
naries sallied briefly into the
Sudan and destroyed a rebel camp
there. Khartoum has protested to
Leopoldville and increased its
border guard, but the incident
seems to have blown over for the
moment. Aid of some sort to the
rebels via the Sudan seems to be
continuing, however.
SECRET
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There are increasing signs
of another upheaval in the gov-
ernment of Dahomey. With the
country facing critical eco-
nomic problems and governed
by a divided, ineffective re-
gime, the army may again seize
control as it did in October
1963.
Dahomey is virtually with-
out economic resources, and
its chronic budgetary deficits
have heretofore been made up
by France. However, this year's
deficit will apparently exceed
six million dollars--twice the
amount France has agreed to pay.
Paris has told Dahomey that it
must either find other sources
of aid or carry out drastic re-
forms.
A French study commission
in late April proposed a reform
program that included an immedi-
ate 10-percent salary cut for
government workers and various
measures to step up tax collec-
tions. It is generally believed
that dismissals or pay cuts for
government employees, who con-
stitute over half of the coun-
try's wage labor force, would
Lead to public demonstrations
and disorders which would "com-
pel" the army to intervene.
Dahomey's system of dual
executives, instituted in Janu-
ary 1964, has not worked well.
Moderate Vice President Ahoma-
degbe, who also functions as
premier, and leftist-supported
President Apithy barely tolerate
one another. Although the con-
stitution gives more power to
Ahomadegbe as head of govern-
ment, his ineptness and vacil-
lation have allowed the Apithy
faction to prevail on several
key issues, such as the recogni-
tion of Communist China and the
proposed trial of former presi-
dent Maga.
Ahomadegbe is likely to
be the principal victim of any
shake-up. He apparently real-
izes the danger, for he has
been cultivating his tribal sup-
porters and organizing "comman-
dos" armed with axes and machetes,
but these would be no match for
Soglo's army.
There are some indications
that the French, who evidently
expect an early change of re-
gime, may favor one headed by
Apithy, who was top man from
1957 to 1959 when Dahomey was
moving toward independence under
France's guidance. His restora-
tion apparently would be condi-
tional on separating him from
his present leftist supporters.
Ma.ga, also has friends in Paris
and is the leader preferred by
Ivory Coast President Houphouet-
Boigny, who hopes to woo Dahomey
back into his grouping of moder-
ate African states. Former for-
eign minister Zinsou, a compe-
tent moderate, has also been
"sounded out" as a possible head
of a new government.
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7 May 65
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The predominant mood in NATO
on the eve of the annual spring min-
isterial meeting--convening in Lon-
don on 11 May--is one of deepening
uncertainty over the future of an
alliance the very existence of which
is increasingly challenged by France.
Although Belgium's Foreign Min-
ister Spaak appears eager again to
attack De Gaulle's negative attitude
toward NATO, there seems little dis-
position among other members to de-
bate such fundamental problems as
nuclear strategy, force planning,
and the question of a major reor-
ganization. Moreover, preoccupation
with this year's elections in France,
West Germany, and certain other mem-
ber countries argues in favor of de-
ferring any showdowns until the
next ministerial session in December.
The customary review of the in-
ternational situation may produce a
clash. between the French and the US
as well as others. The French have
said they would object to any iden-
tification of "Vietnam as an area of
''special. concern" to NATO and would
even oppose mention of the subject
in the final communique. More re-
cently, however, French officials
have suggested France might not ob-
ject to mere reference to Vietnam
in the communique but would disas-
sociate itself from any implication
of support for US policy. The US,
on the other hand, expects to de-
vote considerable attention to the
Vietnamese conflict. The British
Foreign Office is also taking the
position that a matter of such ob-
vious importance to the V?'est cannot
be ignored by NATO.
France promises to be trouble-
some on other matters. Paris, for
example, will try to twist any NATO
statement on the German question to
put it in an entirely European con-
text. The French may also indicate
that further reductions in their par-
ticipation in NATO affairs are in
the offing.
One potentially bright spot is
the improved prospect that the London
gathering will facilitate direct
Greek-Turkish talks on Cyprus. The
Greek foreign minister is making ac-
tive preparations for meetings with
his Turkish counterpart during the
conference. Turkey has eased pres-
sures against Greece to open the way
for such an encounter, which it prob-
ably sees as a final effort to solve
its differences with Greece within
the context of the Western alliance.
The general disinclination to
grapple with basic affairs in London
is best illustrated by the fact that
discussions of the alliance's mili-
tary problems has been deferred for
a meeting of defense ministers in
Paris at the end of May. The US, UK,
and some others hope it will be pos-
sible at that time to make some
progress on several thorny issues
related to the alliance's force plan-
ning, which has been stalled for
several years because of differences
over strategy. But France's defense
minister, Pierre Messmer, recently
predicted the talks will be futile
because of the unbridged gap be-
tween ITS and French strategic think-
ing.
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7 May 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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NW-11 `V00,
SECRET
Europe
WEST GERMAN IRRITATION OVER FRENCH POLICIES
Deepening differences be-
tween Bonn and Paris over such
key issues as German unifica-
tion and European political
unity have put a heavy strain
on Franco-German friendship.
Suspicions are growing among
West Germans that De Gaulle
may be willing to sacrifice
Western unity and basic German
interests in favor of his own
long-range goals. His current
flirtation with Moscow has
deepened these suspicions.
Much of the German dis-
enchantment with De Gaulle
stems from his thesis that
German unification is a Euro-
pean problem. French efforts
to embody this idea in a US-
UK-French declaration marking
the 20th anniversary of V-E
Day were regarded in West Ger-
many as part of a deliberate
attempt to freeze the US out
of Europe. The anti-American
tone of De Gaulle's 27 April
television address strengthened
this feeling, and Soviet For-
eign Minister Gromyko's visit
to Paris last week raised the
specter. of a Franco-Soviet
deal on Germany.
De Gaulle's persistent
refusal to engage in prelim-
inary talks on European polit-
ical unity is another irritant.
.According to Erhard, De Gaulle
agreed during their January
meeting at Rambouillet to a
May meeting of the Common Mar-
ket foreign ministers, to be
followed by an EEC summit on
political integration in July.
Both Erhard and.ex-Chancellor
Adenauer, a chief advocate of
close Franco-German ties, are
said to have urged De Gaulle
to keep his "promise." De
Gaulle, however, is standing
fast on his insistence that
further progress must be
achieved in EEC agricultural
matters before any discussions
on political unity can be held
and that any such talks must
consider steps to develop a
common European defense policy.
In addition to these
larger issues, minor irrita-
tions, such as the aggressive
French promotion of a color
television system incompatible
with one developed in Germany
and the alleged failure of the
French to respond suitably to
the Soviet harassment of Berlin
access in early April, have
worn tempers thin.
Whatever its disappoint-
ments, Bonn apparently intends
to avoid a showdown. With a
difficult national election
campaign in the offing this
summer, the chancellor and his
fellow Christian Democrats may
reason that they can ill afford
the spectacle of a quarrel with
a major ally at this time. Hence,
Erhard probably will attempt
to make the best of the situa-
tion when he next meets De
Gaulle in late June.
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SECRET
The presence of US troops
in the Dominican Republic averted
a victory by the Communist-di-
rected and infiltrated rebel
forces headed by Colonel Fran-
cisco Caamano Deno. The rebels
seized the political initiative
from the loyalists, however, by
forming a "constitutional gov-
ernment" with Caamano as presi-
dent and are trying to gain rec-
ognition for a leftist govern-
ment in which the Communists are
deliberately minimizing their
participation.
The US Presence
US military forces rapidly
increased from the small force
of marines originally landed on
28 April. By 5 May some 19,500
troops were in Santo Domingo and
environs, and a naval force was
patrolling the Dominican coast.
On 3-May, a link-up was effected
between the 4th Marine Expedi-
tionary Brigade, which landed on
the western edge of Santo Domingo,
and the 82nd Airborne Division,
which deplaned to the east at
San Isidro Air Base. They es-
tablished a corridor several
blocks wide between the US Em-
bassy and the Duarte Bridge and
thus sealed off the major rebel
area from the rest of the coun-
try. The US forces also pro-
tected the international zone
consisting of the area where em-
bassies are located.
While the US forces have
not been embroiled in any sus-
SECRET
7 May 65
Page 19
tained or large-scale fighting
they have been continually har-
assed by sporadic sniper fire
that has thus far killed nine
men and wounded 54. US naval
and air forces have conducted
daily reconnaissance of the
country and surrounding sea
areas.
The activities of the Or-
ganization of American States
in Santo Domingo have been fo-
cused so far on the efforts of
Secretary General Mora and a
five-nation peace committee to
revise the cease-fire agreement
reached on 30 April. They de-
veloped a new agreement--which
was regarded as largely unnec-
essary by US officials--and
then devoted most of their ef-
forts to trying to enforce it
on undisciplined rebel elements.
Earlier it had been hoped they
would work toward a plan for
assuring an effective non-Com-
munist constitutional govern-
ment, but this evidently was
postponed pending the outcome
of the OAS debate in Washington
on creating an inter-American
military force.
The rebels, realizing that
the presence of US forces pre-
vented a final military show-
down with the loyalists, grasped
the political initiative and
established what they call a
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Pala
Fields
I ` \ VENEZUELA
uarte
bridge
SANTO DOMINGO
Principal Rebel-Field Area
Rebel-Infiltrated Area
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SECRET
"constitutional government"
headed by Caamano, who appears
to be the only rebel leader`de-
veloping a mass appeal. Former
president Juan Bosch, who en-
dorsed Caamano's election as
"president," probably has been
somewhat discredited by his fail-
ure to return from Puerto Rico
and rally the rebels. Caamano,
whom former ambassador Martin
has called the country's "only
potential Castro," was reliably
reported to be leaning heavily
on what he felt was the sound
advice of the Communists.
The emerging Caamano gov-
ernment has strongly attempted
to present a respectable facade.
Several left-wing members of
Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary
Party are in the cabinet, as
are some opportunistic military
cohorts of Caamano.
Two of the leading cabinet
members are Hector Aristy, "sec-
retary of state for the presi-
dency," and Manual Montes Arache,
"secretary of state for the
armed forces." Both men are
closely associated with the reb-
els. Aristy, who has been de-
scribed as a dangerous oppor-
tunist, is the self-styled "po-
litical adviser" to the rebel
command. Montes Arache has been
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SECRET
one of Caamano's chief military
lieutenants during the revolt
and is the former commander of
the Dominican Navy's frogman
unit.
At least two members of the
Caamano cabinet have reported
Communist connections, and most
have no government experience.
The government has sent two mem-
bers of the extreme left wing and
anti-American segment of the
Social Christian Revolutionary
Party abroad on diplomatic as-
signments, one to Chile and the
other to the OAS. The rebel
"Radio Constitution" has also
attempted to create an aura of
legitimacy by calling the gov-
ernment the legal successor of
Bosch.
An ominous development in
recent days has been the delib-
erate avoidance by the Communists
of any direct link with the gov-
ernment and their apparent prep-
arations to go underground.
t the same time the Communists
evidently have been maintaining
close but discreet links with
Caamano and appear to be strongly
influencing his policies. They
appear to be undertaking a dual
policy of attempting to control
his government completely while
at the same time preparing to
fight against any broad coali-
tiongovernment when US forces
are withdrawn.
The Loyalist Junta
Attempts by the loyalists
to mount an offensive against
the rebels in downtown Santo
Domingo fell apart on 29 April
because of poor leadership, lack
of .communications, and low mo-
rale. By 30 April all offensive
action on their part had ceased,
and they were dealt a severe
psychological blow when a police
fortress fell with a loss of
some 800 men and large quanti-
ties of arms. Many of the loyal-
ists seemed to feel that further
fighting should be left to the
US forces.
The loyalists' junta, gen-
erally accepted to be under the
orders of General Wessin and
the rest of the military high
command, has failed completely
to create an effective govern-
ment. Its sole accomplishment
has been to retain the loyalty
of most provincial military
units, but by 6 May, even this
gain was precarious because of
a failure to re-establish nor-
mal governmental activities.
Public confidence has been un-
dermined by appointments such
as that of notoriously corrupt
former police chief Belisario?
Peguerro to a high police post.
The loyalists seem ready,
however, to support any US ef-
fort to establish a more effec-
tive government to serve as a.
counter to Caamano and the reb-
els. Ambassador Bennett has
suggested a broadly based anti-
rebel government headed by the
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tough, controversial participant
in the Trujillo assassination,
General Antonio Imbert, one of
the few men who apparently can
command the allegiance of key
loyalist military officials.
It appears, however, that an es-
sentially nonpolitical junta
with three civilian technicians
might be the result of the im-
passe.
Soviet propaganda reaction
to the crisis in the Dominican
Republic has been neither excep-
tionally shrill nor unusually
extensive. Ambassador Fedoren-
ko's performance at the UN Se-
curity Council sessions has re-
flected Moscow's apparent de-
cision to await further develop-
ments in the situation. Despite
his 4 May harangue against US
actions, Fedorenko did not give
the impression of exerting any
pressure for speedy or hostile
action. Moscow, however, would
almost certainly obstruct any
US effort to secure adoption of
a resolution referring the Domin-
ican crisis to the OAS. In 1954
the USSR vetoed a Security Coun-
cil resolution referring a Gua-
temalan complaint against the US
to the OAS.
Soviet press commentary
has already referred to Caamano
as the duly elected constitu-
tional provisional president
and notes the US refusal to rec-
ognize his government.
Junta President Barrientos
has not abandoned plans to be
elected constitutional president
of Bolivia, despite the with-
drawal of his candidacy last
week. His failure to secure
strong political backing and the
military's growing concern about
his political machinations have
only led him to change his tac-
tics.
Ostensibly, Barrientos has
given the political parties a
free rein to draw up slates of
candidates to contest the 31 Oc-
tober elections. The initial
reaction of the parties and pre-
sumably some military circles
has been one of pleasure mixed
with relief.
When enough public pres-
sure has been generated, Bar-
rientos and his prospective vice-
presidential running mate, Gen-
eral Ovando, will consent to be
nominated.
There is no doubt of Bar-
rientos' ability to mobilize
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Western Hemisphere
large numbers of peasants will-
ing to act on his behalf, but
his political strength elsewhere
is not so certain and his claims
of support from the influential
Nationalist Revolutionary Move-
ment are probably exaggerated.
Moreover, it will not take long
The Brazilian Government
is the target of increasing crit-
icism by organized labor because
of rising prices, growing unem-
ployment, and continued federal
control over many unions. This
dissatisfaction will be advan-
tageous to Communists and other
leftist opposition groups in im-
portant union elections in the
next few months, including sev-
eral in the highly industrial
Sao Paulo area.
The chief source of worker
discontent is the government's
refusal to'meet demands for
steep wage hikes. Although sub-
stantial boosts in the minimum
wage in urban areas were recently
sanctioned, union leaders point
out that salaries continue to
lag behind the cost of living,
which in the first quarter of
this year alone rose more than
19 percent. Another source of
labor's dissatisfaction is ris-
ing unemployment generated by
an economic recession that has
plagued Brazil for the past few
for the opposition parties to
realize that Barrientos has
no intention of withdrawing
from politics, or allowing them
any chance to take power. Their
reaction could be violent.
months. Particularly hard hit
have been the vital automotive
and textile industries.
Labor, meanwhile, is chaf-
ing under the direct govern-
ment supervision imposed over
approximately 400 unions follow-
ing the ouster of president
Goulart because they were heav-
ily penetrated by Communists.
The administration has recently
restored independence to some
unions considered cleansed of
Communists and corrupt offi-
cials. However, many of these
are threatened with a resur-
gence of Communist influence
when elections of officers are
held. Under present law, such
elections must be within 45
days after government control
has ended. Although known Com-
munists will not be allowed to
run, they are already active
behind the scenes promoting
"united front" slates which
they can influence.
SECRET
7 May 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 24
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Approved For Release 2008/04/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04900010001-9
 Approved For Release 2008/04/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04900010001-9
~. ~.. a ._.: New
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04900010001-9