CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004800110002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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23 April 1965
2:5X1
I
CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
The burden of evidence accumulated in recent
months indicates that "export of the revolution"
continues to be a key policy of the Castro regime
despite important Communist reverses in Brazil,
Chile, and British Guiana last year. Indeed,one
of the chief purposes of a meeting
of Latin American Communist leaders in Havana last
November was to add impetus to militant Communist
activity in the hemisphere. As before, responsi-
bility for administering Cuban support of revolu-
tionary groups in Latin America rests with the
General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI).
The Cuban leadership seems to be concentrat-
ing its subversive efforts on three countries--
Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia--where guer-
rilla and terrorist organizations have been operat-
ing for some time. This does not mean that Cuba
is cutting out other subversive efforts. Rather,
it seems to be concentrating largely on targets
of opportunity in other Latin American countries.
The Cuban Subversive Effort
versive activity in Latin America
Funds for the promotion of sub-
come out of the over-all DGI
budget, rather than from any
single DGI department. The
money is usually in US dollar
currency. Payments are made
only when the revolutionary
groups have submitted an accept-
able plan for armed struggle.
The department that directs
guerrilla warfare operations
has a budgeted account to pro-
vide food, clothing, and pocket 25X1
money for Latin American train-
ees in Cuba.
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the DGI in 1963
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disbursed about $250,000 to var-
ious Guatemalan revolutionary
groups. Of this money, some
$200,000 went to Marco Antonio
Yon Sosa's group--the most mili-
tant activist outfit operating
in the country. Another $50,000
was given to revolutionary groups
in EL Salvador, $30,000 to a
pro-Castro political organiza-
tion in Panama, and $15,000 to
pro-Castro subversives in Nica-
ragua.
DGI gave more than $1 million
to Venezuelan guerrillas between
1964.
'In addition to money, there
is the question of Cuban arms
assistance to revolutionary
groups on the continent. The
three-ton Cuban arms cache found
in Venezuela in November 1963
showed that Havana is both will-
ing and a
service.
thIs
cache was only part of "an un-
known amount of arms" sent to
Venezuela during the 1960-64
period. ALso, one of the
rifles found in a guerrilla
arms cache in Argentina. last
year had the same specifica-
tions as the Cuban rifles found
in Venezuela. In general prac-
tice, though, Havana. prefers to
provide insurgent groups with
funds to purchase arms so that
the arms themselves cannot be
traced to Cuban origins.
Cuban Propaganda
Providing guerrilla warfare
training, political indoctrina-
tion, and some financial assist-
-ance remain the major forms of
Cuban support for Latin Ameri-
can revolutionaries. Propa-
ganda, however, also is an im-
portant means by which Havana
:reaches and gives direction to
pro-Cuban groups on the continent.
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Havana radio broadcasts some
143 hours a week to Latin Amer-
ica in Spanish, French, Creole
(to Haiti), and in the Indian
dialects of Aymara and Guarani.
ALthough priority attention
is presently being given to the
sugar harvest campaign, Cuba's
press service and world-wide
radio facilities continue to de-
vote much time and space to La-
tin American "national libera-
tion" movements. Prominently
featured in recent days have
been the activities of Colombian
and Venezuelan guerrillas and
the "repressive" government ac-
tions taken against them.
In late 1964 and early
1965 Fidel Castro and Che Gue-
vara made several notable refer-
ences to Cuba's role in foster-
ing the "anti-imperialist strug-
gle" in Latin America. Castro
told a Western correspondent
in Havana in late October that
the continuance of the Cuban
revolution depends on "other
Cubas" succeeding on the conti-
nent. Castro expressed this
thought again in a public ad-
dress on 2 January 1965 in which
he said that the US would ulti-
mately be forced to come to
terms with Cuba when it has to
deal simultaneously with "sev-
eral" other revolutionary re-
gimes. On 19 April, Castro said
the guerrilla movements in Colom-
bia, Venezuela, and Guatemala
"cannot be crushed."
On 30 November 1964, Che
Guevara made the most militant
public statement on armed revo-
lution in Latin America to be
delivered by a ranking Cuban
official for some months. He
hailed what he called the grow-
ing strength of the Latin Ameri-
can "liberation movement," and
called for greater efforts by
the revolutionaries in the hemi-
sphere. Guevara made special
reference to the progress of
the revolution in Venezuela,
Guatemala, and Colombia. On
13 December, while in New York
to address the UN General As-
sembly session, Guevara said
that "bullets not ballots" will
bring revolution to Latin Amer-
ica. He candidly admitted that
Cuba has helped the "freedom
fighters" of Venezuela "acquire
military knowledge," and again
singled out revolutionaries in
Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colom-
bia for special praise.
Several times during his
recent three-month tour of
Africa, Guevara praised the
fighting efforts of the pro-
Castro militants in these three
countries. He also spoke of
the need to form a Latin Ameri-
can "international" to coordi-
nate the "national liberation
movement" in this hemisphere.
There are good indications that
steps are now being taken to
set up such hemisphere-wide
machinery.
Another example of inciting
to revolution by propaganda was
a series of lectures on "The
Tactics of Revolutionary Strug-
gle in Latin America" delivered
in Havana in late February by
German Lairet, the so-called
"head of mission" representing
the Communist-dominated Vene-
zuelan National Liberation
Front. Lairet hewed closely
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to the Cuban line in saying that
the only way to establish a
Marxist-Leninist government in
Latin America is through armed
struggle. He argued there was
no other way to defeat the es-
tablished military forces which
he described as the greatest
bulwark against Communism.
Lairet declared that the
armed struggle must be combined
with the political struggle,
and that broad "national patri-
otic fronts" must be established,
in order, for example, to at-
tract the direct participation
of discontented military offi-
cers. All political action,
he asserted, must be aimed at
fomenting maximum political
and economic instability. In
pursuing this object, Lairet
urged that Communists spare no
effort to gain the support of
the middle classes. After vic-
tory, these elements will be
discarded, according to Lairet.
These tactics have long
been advocated by Fidel Castro
and are well spelled out in Che
Guevara's pamphlet on guerrilla.
warfare.
The Havana, Meeting
The meeting of Latin Ameri-
can Communist leaders in Havana.
last November had as one of its
main purposes the strengthening
of militant Communist activity
throughout the hemisphere. The
meeting's communique specifically
called for the Communists to
give "active aid" to the "free-
dom fighters" in Venezuela,Guate-
mala, Colombia, Honduras, Haiti,
and Paraguay. All Communists in
the hemisphere were also urged
to "intensify solidarity" with
the "anti-imperialist struggle
of the Panamanian people."
Representatives at the Havana
meeting also accepted the need
to overcome the internal fac-
tionalism that is plaguing many
Latin American parties, and to
promote their "solidarity with
Cuba."
Cuba, for its part, is reli-
ably reported to have promised
to withhold assistance from
any group that is not endorsed
by the local orthodox Communist
party. This is a sharp depa.r
ture from past Cuban practice.
Havana, formerly preferred to
work with revolutionary groups
not controlled by the local Com-
munist parties. The regular
Communist parties were considered
to be lacking in revolutionary
militancy. The change may par-
tially be the result of a cer-
tain Cuban disillusionment over
the failures of the Castro-style
guerrilla, organizations, and
the recognition of a, need to
repair relations with the old-
line Communist parties.
In any case, the impact of
decisions taken in Havana. are
now becoming evident. There
has, for instance, been a marked
change in the policy of the
Guatemalan Communist party. It
.has shifted emphasis from tac-
tics to increasingly close co-
operation with Yon Sosa's Cuban-
supported guerrillas. Similarly,
the Venezuelan Communist Party
Is trying to entice some left-
ist-extremist groups into a Na-
tiona.l Liberation Front to serve
as a political umbrella for the
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Cuban-backed Armed Forces of Na-
tional Liberation (FALN).
In Brazil, leaders of the
regular Communist party (PCB)
and the small pro-Chinese Com-
munist party (CPB) reportedly
are conferring on possibilities
for conducting joint activities
for the first time since the
two groups split in 1962. This
may well be partially the result
of the Havana meeting, and is
in line with Cuba's repeated
call for increased militancy on
the part of the hemisphere's
regular Communist parties.
In Colombia, the Cuban-sup-
ported Army of National Libera-
tion (ELN) is reliably reported
to be planning a "Latin Ameri-
can guerrilla movement" to be
coordinated in Havana and to
include guerrilla groups from
the Andean countries, and Guate-
mala. The Colombian Communist
Party, heretofore an advocate
of gaining power by peaceful
means, is now reported to have
decided to switch over to a pro-
gram aimed at encouraging armed
rebellion.
The Uruguayan Communists
have begun preparations for a
Latin American "solidarity with
Cuba congress" to be convened
in Montevideo this summer. This
is in line with a proposal to
convene multilateral meetings
at regular intervals to provide
more effective coordination
among Latin American Communist
parties. In addition, a source
of proven reliability has re-
ported that a Latin American
Communist "politburo" has been
established to coordinate
the implementation of the agree-
ments reached at Havana.
It is composed of repre-
sentatives of Castro's party
and the Communist parties of
Bolivia and Uruguay. This group
recently held its first meeting
in Havana. The following survey
discusses Cuban-supported subver-
sive activities in some of the
countries singled out for spe-
cial attention at the Havana
meeting.
Havana, impressed by the
fact that the Venezuelan Armed
Forces of National Liberation
(FALN) is a well-established
Communist-terrorist apparatus,
continues to place Venezuela
at the top of its subversion
list. The FALN can draw upon
some 2,000 supporters--several
hundred of whom are full-time
activists who have received
training in Cuba--spread through-
out the country. Beginning in
late September 1964, the FALN
stepped up its activity, pri-
marily in the countryside.
25X1
Recent
reports
indicate
that
the 25X1
Venezuelan
Communists
are
pre-
paring a comprehensive plan of
political action throughout the
country to complement the FALN's
guerrilla operations. German
Lairet, in his recent Havana.
lectures, said that the FALN
is currently seeking to incor-
porate more peasants into its
guerrilla units and has stopped
recruiting in the cities. He
said that as a consequence of
this policy, the number of
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Principal Targets of Cuban Subversion in Latin America
EL SALVADOR .-, NICAIRACUA
PANAMA
COSTA RICA . s t %% -
CUBAN SUPPORTED
GUERRILLA LEADERS
DOMINICAN
---, REPUBLIC
HAIT1;1
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25X1
peasant guerrillas in Falcon
State, one of the principal
areas of guerrilla operation,
had increased from 14 to 44 per-
cent. Lairet declared that
never again would the FALN make
the mistake of trying for a
"quick victory" by means of ur-
ban terrorism--a tactic which
failed miserably in late 1963 in
trying to bring down the govern-
ment of former President Betan-
court.
There may have been a Cuban
angle in the recent intercep-
tion in Caracas of more than
$300,000 destined for the Vene-
zuelan Communist Party (PCV).
The fact that the couriers had
connections with the Italian
Communist Part (PCI ties in
with h
last December
a the Cubans intended to use
the PCI as a secure communica-
tions link to the Venezuelan
Communists. It also fits with
another report that Cuba had
promised FALN leader Alberto
Lovera that it would extend
considerable financial assist-
ance to his organization this
year.
The Cubans will certainly
continue to give priority to
the training of Venezuelans in
guerrilla warfare tactics. I1
It is pos-
sible the Cubans may also have
one or more guerrilla advisers
in the field with the Venezuelan
insurgents.
Castro's chosen instrument
for carrying out antigovernment
activities in Guatemala is the
guerrilla movement led by Marco
Antonio Yon Sosa. He was the
recipient of $200,000 in DGI
funds in 1963 alone. Yon Sosa
was reported to be in Mexico
City in early April making ar-
rangements with the Cuban Em-
bassy there for more weapons.
Yon Sosa's group probably has
a hard core strength of from
75 to 300. Since the end of
1964, these insurgents have
specialized in terrorist activ-
ity in and around the capital,
Guatemala City. On 31 December,
terrorists destroyed the US AID
mission garage in Guatemala
City along with 23 vehicles.
On 20 February, ten soldiers
were killed or wounded by gre-
nades thrown by Yon Sosa's ter-
rorists during a parade in the
capital. The terrorists also
initiated a series of bombings
during the 31 March celebration
marking the anniversary of the
Peralta coup, even though a
state of siege had been in force
by the government.
Despite this emphasis on
urban terrorism, the country-
side has not been neglected.
There, the Communists and
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pro-Castro guerrillas have har-
assed military outposts, assas-
sinated certain military offi-
cers or persons unpopular with
the peasants, and raided small
businesses. The outlook more-
over, is for more rather than
less rural violence along these
lines. The central committee
of the Guatemalan Communist party
is reliably reported to be mak-
ing preparations for beginning
the "armed struggle" throughout
the country. The party also is
trying to form a "national front
of resistance," including Yon
Sosa's guerrillas.
Cuban-supported, "national
liberation"-type insurgency ap-
pears to be just getting under
way in Colombia. Havana regards
a newly formed, pro-Castro or-
ganization called the Army of
National Liberation (ELN) as
the country's number one terror-
ist group. Fabio Vasquez, the
group's chief of guerrilla opera-
tions, returned to Colombia in
late November after having gone
to Cuba the previous month seek-
ing funds. Havana had earlier
given the ELN $25,000 to set up
uerrilla one onsIr _J
This group--
which numbers about 50--is the
one which attacked the small
town of Simacota in Santander
Department on 7 January.
Recent information indicates
the ELN has been perfecting its
organization and building strength
for future actions- I
sev-
a echelons of protective cover
separate one leader from the
action group in Santander
Department. This is an indica-
tion of the professional tech-
niques being employed by the
.ELN in the face of persistent
efforts on the part of the
Colombian authorities to arrest
:ELN members.
Other Cuban Targets
There are increasing re-
ports of Cuban cooperation with
perennial antigovernment plot-
ters in Panama. A number of
Panamanians have recently re-
turned to Cuba, for a, refresher
course in guerrilla warfare
techniques. More are expected
to leave for Cuba, soon.
Serious Cuban involvement
in plotting against the Robles
government apparently had its
origin late last year when the
militant Panamanian revolution-
ary leader, Lelis Amadeo Rodri-
guez, submitted a report urging
Havana to exploit Arnulfo Arias'
Panamenista Party. He quite
correctly described this party
as the only Panamanian political
party with genuine mass support.
His report aroused Castro's
interest and reportedly led to
an investigation in Panama, by
a personal representative sent
by Che Guevara. Lelis Amadeo
Rodriguez departed for Cuba on
23 March reportedly to collect
the aid Cuba had offered.
lover 40 leftists.
lextremists and Communists have
returned to that country from
exile, since October. All had
been involved in an abortive
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guerrilla campaign in December
1963, and many spent their
exile in Cuba undergoing addi-
tional training in guerrilla
warfare techniques.
7n Ecuadorl
a "hard-line"
leader recently returned from
Cuba with about $100,000 to
finance antigovernment activ-
ities.
the Cubans requestea m e
cuadoreans to supply them with
certain official government
forms and passports. These are
intended for use as false docu-
informed that Guevara's whole
book has been translated into
the Creole idiom.
The Paraguayn minister of
interior announced in January
that 62 Paraguayans living in
exile in Montevideo had recently
left for Cuba to receive train-
ing in subversive activities.
There is also good evidence of
continued Cuban contact with
Paraguayan exile guerrilla bands
operating in Argentina near the
Paraguayan border.
mentation to enable Latin Ameri-
cans to travel to Cuba clandes-
tinely and to enter other La-
tin American countries at will.
The Honduran Communist
Party (PCH) is preparing to
launch guerrilla operations
along the north coast. The
party calculates that the anti-
regime sentiment which is build-
ing up in Honduras can be turned
to its advantage. Approximately
70 PCH members and other left-
ists-extremists are reliably
reported to have received guer-
rilla training in Cuba.
Recent Havana radiobroad-
casts have emphasized the need
to form a united revolutionary
front in Haiti. The most re-
cent Creole broadcasts have
featured selections on how to
make preparations for the "first
stage" of revolution. The
Haitian listeners have been
Cuba probably will continue
its pattern of concentrating
support on those Latin American
revolutionaries who have some
prospects for success, rather
than taking a "shotgun" approach
to revolution in the hemisphere.
Guerrilla organizations in Vene-
zuela, Guatemala, and Colombia
probably will continue to re-
ceive the bulk of Cuba's sup-
port.
Nevertheless, Cuba's lead-
ers may now be less confident
about the early emergence of
"new Cubes" in Latin America.
Castro's regime has been in
power for over six years and
the appeal of Castroism today
is probably less than at any
previous time among the masses
in Latin America. Castro's ap-
peal seems to have gone down-
hill steadily since the October
1962 missile crisis. Moreover,
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nowhere in Latin America are
political, social, and economic
conditions as unstable as they
were in Cuba. at the end of the
Batista. era.. It may also be
that the Cuban leaders them-
selves are becoming more pre-
occupied with making their own
politico-economic "'system" work,
and realistically appraise their
chances of bringing down another
government in this hemisphere
in the short run as slim at best.
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However, the existence of
Cuba's highly professional es-
pionage and subversion agency,
the DGI, and developments stem-
ming from the Havana. meeting
of Latin American Communists
in November, serve to illustrate
that "export of the revolution"
continues to be an immutable
feature of Castro's policy.
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