WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004800100001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 16, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

16 April. 1965
OCX No 0285/65
copy NO.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RETURN TO RECORDS CENTAI
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
'oB ? -i '!BOZ
wngroding and declassificaltion
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*me SECRET
C O N T E N T S
(Information as of 1200 LEST, 15 April 1965)
VIETNAM Page
Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow all responded negatively to
President Johnson's 7 April speech, although Soviet of-
ficials acknowledged privately that the speech was "at
least an advance." While China has rebuffed all over-
tures for negotiations, the North Vietnamese i
pn ex in
a speech last week seemed to be suggesting ges
ting someer,flon Hanoi's part. The DRV meanwhile is exhorting
its people to mobilize themselves to meet the "new sit-
uation and tasks." In South Vietnam,
Viet Cong activity picked up
slightly last week, particularly in the northern provinces.
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
THE BERLIN SITUATION
Since last week's harassment of traffic to Berlin, the 6
East Germans have avoided any new threat to Allied ac-
cess but continue to issue propaganda designed to impress
on West Berliners that their freedom and commerce with
the outside world depend heavily on Communist good will.
EAST-WEST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Both East and West European countries, taking advantage 8
of the trend toward greater political independence in
Eastern Europe, are seeking ways to expand trade through
new cooperative economic arrangements.
BULGARIA IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH BALKAN NEIGHBORS
9
Since last July, when a general settlement of Bulgarian-
Greek problems was negotiated, Sofia has been promoting
both political and cultural contacts with its neighbors.
THE DWINDLING CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP
The death last week of 10
reduced party central committee omemmember Ko bership to 181, down
from 194 in 1958. No members have been added, some 50
of the survivors are ill or out of favor, and the rest
are increasingly susceptible to diseases of age.
16 Apr 65
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
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ASIA-AFRICA
Page
SUKARNO'S POLICY EDGING CLOSER TO COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES 11
He
Chas fur-
ther discouraged domestic anti-Communist activities.
THE SITUATION IN LAOS
The Communists are making a major effort to keep open
supply arteries, while a new series of low-level polit-
ical talks is scheduled to start next week.
SENANAYAKE GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER IN CEYLON
The coalition apparently faces no early threat, but its
composition reflects conflicting communal and economic
interests and will be a source of continuing difficulty.
KENYA'S PRESIDENT HEADING FOR SHOWDOWN WITH PRO-COMMUNISTS 14
The breach between Kenyatta and pro-Communist Vice Pres-
ident Oginga Odinga has been widening for several months,
and the President now seems convinced he must act.
NOTES ON CONGO AND SUDAN
The Congolese Government's military position continues
to improve throughout the country, and elections are
proceeding without violence. Sudan's transitional re-
gime has set 21 April as the date for elections to in-
stall a permanent government.
EUROPE
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EUROPE (continued) Page
FRANCE AND THE EUROPEAN SPACE PROGRAM 16
The French have withdrawn a proposal that the European
Launcher Development Organization scrap its original
program in favor of a more advanced effort, but they
may still deal ELDO a mortal blow by deciding henceforth
to concentrate on developing their own launcher.
REORGANIZATION OF SPAIN'S STUDENT ORGANIZATION 16
A 7 April decree reorganizing the Spanish University
Syndicate has brought a lull in student agitation by
removing the immediate irritant stemming from regime
appointment of syndicate officials, but is qualified
enough to preserve the status quo effectively.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
SPLIT IN BRITISH GUIANA'S GOVERNMEN'.C NARROWLY AVERTED
A quarrel between Premier Burnham and Finance Minister 17
D'Aguiar, who head the two parties in the government
coalition, threatened to bring down the government until
a compromise was reached. The long-run outlook is for
more such confrontations.
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF FORTHCOMING OAS CONFERENCE
Included on the agenda is an examination of the opera-
tions 18
and the future of inter-American economic and
social organisms, including the Alliance for Progress.
Set for Rio de Janerio on 20 May, the conference will
be the first meeting since 1954 of the Organization of
American States' highest organ, the general conference.
VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES ARREST SUBVERSIVES OF RIGIiT AND LEFT 19
The Venezuelan Government is exploiting, both domesti-
cally and abroad, the interception of clandestine funds
destined for the Communist Party as well as the arrest
of a newspaper publisher accused of plotting, with ac-
complices of both right and left., to overthrow President
Leoni.
EXTREMIST EFFORTS AGAINST PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT
The escalation of a minor strike b 20
workers into demonstrations and a g
y eneralnstrikeuinrthe
capital seems to have been the work of a combination of
extremists
incident seems
also to be furthering the athbitions ofhlawyer-politician
Carlos Zuniga to organize a leftist-labor coalition.
16 Apr 65 CURRENT INTE LIGE~ WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii
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SECRET
Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow
all responded negatively to Presi-
dent Johnson's 7 April speech. Mos-
cow's characterization of the
speech as a "maneuver" was the
mildest propaganda reaction; Hanoi
and Peiping called it "hypocrisy"
and a "swindle." In private con-
versations Soviet officials took
a slightly less negative line,
acknowledging that the speech was
"at least an advance."
Navy F4B Phantom jet fighters, en-
gaged in an offshore high-altitude
patrol prior to the strike on 9
April, were attacked by four Chi-
nese Communist MIG fighters some
35 miles southwest of Hainan Is-
land. One MIG was shot down, prob-
ably by an air-to-air missile. One
Navy fighter failed to return.
DRV Political Developments
Within South Vietnam, evi-
dence indicating the presence of
elements of a regular North Viet-
namese division has mounted. Viet
Cong activity picked up slightly
last week, particularly in the
northernmost portion of the coun-
try. In the North, the Hanoi re-
gime exhorted its people to mobilize
themselves to meet the "new situa-
tion and tasks" which have arisen.
Both US and South Vietnamese
aircraft continued their bombing
and armed reconnaissance over North
Vietnam during the past week.
Strikes were conducted on five
days. Five bridges were virtually
destroyed, and several radar sites
which had been struck on 31 March
were further damaged. Results of
the armed route reconnaissance
were generally limited, possibly
as a result of Hanoi's directive
that all vehicles travel at night
or with an aircraft lookout .if day-
time travel is essential.
The week was also marked by
the first engagement of US air-
craft by Chinese Communist fighters.
Hanoi continued its efforts
to mobilize its political, economic,
and military apparatus to meet the
"new situation and tasks" which re-
gime leaders say have arisen as a
result of the continuation of US
military pressure. This was the
main trend evident at the semian-
nual session of the National Assem-
bly held from 8 to 10 April.
Deputies at the session were
ordered to spread the word that
the government is determined to
rally the populace to the defense
of the DRV, to the exertion of
greater economic effort, and to the
"active support" of the insurgency
in South Vietnam. The assembly
delegated to its standing committee--
the normal hub'of its operations--
a number of "new powers necessary to
make state operations suit" the
new situation. This move was prob-
ably intended to further party con-
trol over government operations.
The assembly also put the stamp
of legality on recent regime moves
to strengthen the armed forces,
voting to amend military laws to
increase the "fighting power" of
the military.
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Continued regime concern with
sustaining popular morale under
the strain of the air strikes was
evident at the assembly session.
Considerable stress was put on the
unity of the government with the
party and its policies. Repeated
attention was given to phrases
manifesting determination to con-
tinue to fight US "imperialism"
to tae end and to support the war
effort in the South despite US
military pressure on the DRV. Ho
Chi Minh claimed in his speech
that although the session met in a
tense atmosphere, it was filled
with "high spirits and the utmost
confidence."
Aside from the trend in Hanoi
propaganda, evidence of the effect
of the air strikes during March
and April on public morale is still
sparse.
Hanoi's propaganda on the
President's 7 April speech la-
belled ita"deception," and said
that the President's proposal for
unconditional talks was "hypoc-
risy.'.' Although,. DRV leaders
have made it clear that military
attacks on the DRV must cease
before negotiations can be even
considered, they have not di-
:rectly addressed themselves to
the subject of starting talks,
and still continue to speak
mainly in terms of an over-all
settlement of the "Vietnam ques-
1: ion."
In this vein, party chief
1[o Chi Minh last week put the
routine Hanoi demands for US
withdrawal from South Vietnam
and the settlement of the Viet-
nam question by the Vietnamese
people themselves in the context
of preconditions which must be
"carried out" before any inter-
national conference can be called.
Premier Pham Van Dong spelled out
essentially the same conditions
in a speech to the National As-
sembly. However, he put them in
terms of a "basis" which must be
"recognized" before a Geneva-type
conference could be held. Dong's
use of the word "recognized" may
have been designed to imply
greater flexibility on the part
of the DRV. In either case, the
basic demands on the US do not
appear to have changed. Hanoi
seems to be saying that any in-
ternational talks on Vietnam will
be merely for the purpose of put-
ting the stamp of approval on a
Communist victory in South Vietnam.
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Peiping is continuing its
hard line on Vietnam and has
rebuffed all overtures for ne-
gotiations. President Johnson's
7 April proposal for uncondi-
tional talks was dismissed in
the 11 April People's Daily as
a "big swindlee' d a "hoax"
requiring the unconditional sur-
render of the South Vietnamese
"people" to the "US imperial-
ists."
China. has not formally
replied to the nonaligned na-
tions'' appeal but has made clear
its lack of enthusiasm.
In the meantime Peiping
has rebuffed efforts by the
British and UN Secretary General
Thant to explore the possibility
of a negotiated settlement. The
Chinese formally rejected Lon-
don's proposal for a visit by
Patrick Gordon-Walker as "incon-
venient and unwelcome."
Peiping has charged that
the 9 April engagement between
US and Chinese planes near Hainan
Island was a "deliberate mili-
tary provocation against China."
on the part of the US. Chinese
newspapers have subsequently
published photographs portraying
what is claimed to be the wreck-
age of a US air-to-air guided
missile and an auxiliary fuel
tank allegedly dropped by US
aircraft while overflying Hainan
Island on 9 April. Except for
the almost pro forma warning
that the US must bear responsi-
bility for the "serious conse-
16 Apr 65
quences" of this action, how-
ever, the Chinese have made no
threats of retaliation.
Although there has been no
official Soviet reaction to
either the nonaligned nations'
appeal or President Johnson's
7 April address, Soviet propa-
ganda has stressed that there
has been no change in US policy
and that the US is actually ad-
vancing preconditions for ne-
gotiations. Pravda characterized
the President speech as a
"maneuver" to placate public
opinion and US allies and reit-
erated that negotiations are
impossible as long as the US
air strikes continue. The
Soviet press also ridiculed the
proposal for an economic develop-
ment plan in Southeast Asia.
Soviet Foreign Minis-
try officials acknowledged that
the President's speech "was at
least an advance." In a talk
with Ambassador Kohler on 8
April, Deputy Premier Polyansky
denied that the USSR had re-
jiected negotiations out of-hand
and asserted that Moscow favors
peaceful negotiation of all in-
ternational disputes, including
Vietnam. The Soviet leaders'
desire to hold the door open
to some form of eventual talks
without breaking openly with
Hanoi was also reflected in
their proposal on 8 April for
an immediate international con-
ference on Cambodia. Hanoi
and Peiping had already publicly
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endorsed the Cambodian appeal
of 15 March. Polish Foreign
Ministry officials informed the
British that a conference on Cam-
bodia would provide an oppor-
tunity to discuss Vietnam and
possibly Laos.
information
provided by a recent Viet Cong
defector that the 101st Regiment
of the 325th Division infiltrated
Into Kontum Province in February
of this year,
Meanwhile, the Soviets con-
tinue to assert that military
equipment now is on the way to
A Soviet diplo-
mat in Belgrade told a US Em-
bassy official on 9 April that
if the US continues its present
actions in Vietnam, Soviet "so-
called volunteers" would almost
certainly be dispatched to North
Vietnam. He claimed that the
Chinese had acknowledged the
need for Soviet assistance to
Hanoi and were no longer imped-
ing shipments of arms and rock-
ets. The Soviet diplomat warned
several times that although the
USSR understands the problems
facing the US, Moscow can "no
longer stand by and watch your
aggression against a socialist
state."
Military Developments
In the South
Viet Cong activity picked
up slightly last week, even
though combat results generally
favored the government forces.
Communists appear to be inten-
sifying their operations in the
northernmost part of South Viet-
nam, while possibly positioning
to step up activity in the cen-
tral highland and southern prov-
inces.
During the past week, the
Viet Cong launched coordinated
mortar attacks on three targets,
including an American advisory
compound, near the capital of
Quang Tri Province, which bor-
ders North Vietnam. At the
southern border of Quang Tri
Province, a government armored
column sustained heavy casual-
ties when it was attacked by an
estimated two Viet Cong bat-
ta].ions.on 13 April.
Evidence that elements of
a regular North Vietnamese di-
vision are in northern South
Vietnam is increasing. I
(sizable Viet Cong
units are concentrating in a
guerrilla "war zone" about 50
miles north of Saigon, where
they would be in a position to
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launch actions against Bien Hoa,
Tan Son Nhut, or Ben Cat air-
fields. A new Viet Cong regi-
ment, forming in Tay Ninh Prov-
ince to the west, is believed by
US military authorities to be
approaching operational readi-
ness.
New fighting, largely at
government initiative, was re-
ported during the week around
Ban Me Thuot, the capital of
Darlac Province in the central
highlands, while along the cen-
tral coast, South Vietnamese
marines in Binh Dinh Province
continued to fight off probes
by a probable Viet Cong battalion
in the area.
There have been some indica-
tions that several recent govern-
ment military successes, coupled
with intensified air strikes,
may have disrupted some Viet
Cong military timetables. The
Viet Cong nevertheless retain
the capability of accelerating
the pace of their attacks well
beyond the reduced levels of re-
cent weeks.
Political Developments
In South Vietnam
Last week's naval mutiny in
Saigon, which led to the replace-
ment pending military inquiry
of naval commander Admiral
Cang, has raised military con-
cern over a possible precedent
for junior officers to take
matters into their own hands.
Premier Quat, who regards
General Dong as a troublemaker,
now hopes to carry out a major
command reorganization to bring
the military under tighter
civilian control. His plans,
which would leave only one
Catholic officer in a top com-
mand post, risk a serious
Catholic reaction if not even-
tual opposition of the military
in general. Although it is
possible that the views of the
Buddhist heirarchy have influ-
enced Quat's thinking, the
Buddhist clergy continues to
refrain from open political ac-
tivity except for the further
promotion of anti-Communist
themes among their followers
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The Communist World
THE BERLIN SITUATION
Since last week's harass-
ment of traffic to Berlin, the
East Germans have avoided any
new threat to Allied access.
For the moment, the regime
seems intent only on impressing
on West Berliners that their
freedom and commerce with the
outside world depend to a large
extent on Communist good will
and that the GDR will not toler-
ate so tangible a demonstration
of West German interest in the
city as the Bundestag meeting
of 7 April. At a press confer-
ence in East Berlin on 12 April,
officials of the regime-domi-
nated National Front warned that
there would be an immediate re-
sponse if the West German Bund-
esrat were now to meet in West
Berlin or if the city were the
setting for any political ac-
tivity of a "provocative" na-
ture.
Although regime spokesmen
were careful at first not to
link last week's Soviet-German
military exercises or the harass-
ment of access to the Bundestag
meeting, since 9 April they
have boasted that events "have
made it clear who makes the de-
cisions on our autobahns and
roads." In this vein, the of-
ficial East German news agency
rejected out of hand Mayor
Brandt's proposal for interna-
tional control of the access
routes, describing it as "out-
dated and unrealistic" and "an
attempt to interfere in the
GDR's internal affairs."
In an editorial published
on the first day of the Easter-
tide pass visits, Neues Deutsch-
land disclosed that stBeer- -
liners who cross over to see
relatives during the current
pass agreement will encounter
heavy propaganda directed against
West Berlin - West German po-
litical ties. The party paper
echoed earlier warnings by the
regime that the Bundestag ses-
sion will have "serious conse-
quences" for renegotiation of
the pass agreement, which it
suggested may be postponed from
June until after the West Ger-
man elections in September. This
suggests that the East Germans
;hope to exact from the West Ber-
lin Senat as the price for re-
negotiating the agreement a
pledge not to play host to West
German political meetings or
permit any expansion of the
Federal Republic's presence in
West Berlin. Pankow probably
jiudges that its chances of get-
ting such a commitment this fall
will be far greater than they
would be during an election cam-
paign in which Mayor Brandt and
other West Berlin leaders of the
Social Democratic Party (SPD)
are to play so prominent a
role.
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West Berliners and West Ger-
mans seem to feel that having
the Bundestag meet in West Ber-
lin was worth the inconvenience
and harassment and that it rein-
forced the city's ties with the
Federal Republic and underlined
the hope for eventual reunifica-
tion. Bundestag President Ger-
stenmaier has taken the position
that the Communists will resign
themselves to such parliamentary
sessions if they are held often
enough, perhaps twice a year.
There has been some public
criticism of the failure of the
Erhard government and the Allies
to react more vigorously to Com-
munist encroachments on access.
The chairman of the Berlin
branch of the SPD complained
that the United States should
have put a stop to the Commu-
nist "antics," and West German
Vice Chancellor Mende, leader
of the Free Democratic Party,
found the Allied response inade-
quate.
Mayor Brandt, who has ex-
pressed satisfaction with reac-
tion of the Allies, has voiced
some concern over the psycholog-
ical effects which the harassment
may have on Berlin's economic
life. He fears that West Ger-
man investors will re-examine
the advisability of committing
funds to the city's expansion
in view of the renewed demon-
stration of the vulnerability
of its land routes to the West.
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Both East and West Euro-
pean countries are seeking ways
to expand trade through new
cooperative economic arrange-
ments. The most sweeping of
these--the recently publicized
proposal by the West German
Krupp combine to couple its
capital and technical and
managerial skills with Polish
labor and raw materials--will
probably be modified in the
course of current negotiations.
The proposal, however, suggests
the growing complexity and
range of the many current ef-
forts at cooperation.
Programs already in opera-
tion, however, include not only
licensing and subcontracting
arrangements (see inset) but
also joint construction proj-
ects.. Current proposals add
joint management of enterprises
to be built in East Europe.
SOME EXAMPLES OF
EAST-WEST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Poland-Belgium-Sweden: Economic cooperation pacts calling
for joint production of equipment for third countries, exchange
of technical know-how, joint industrial training, and consulta-
tion among industrial experts.
Poland-Rumania-Hungary-West Germane Proposed West Ger-
man investment of capital and managerial skill in bloc indus-
trial enterprises,
Programs Already in Operation
Czechoslovakia-UK: Semifinished British textiles finished in
Czechoslovakia and re-exported.
Hungary-Finland: Jointly owned agency to market Hungarian
electrical goods in Finland.
Yus~oslavia-Italy : Production under Italian license of Fiat auto-
mobiles in Yugoslavia for sale in Eastern Europe.
Hungary-UK: Jointly produced tractors, using British engines
These moves toward in-
creased economic cooperation are
taking advantage of the trend
toward greater political inde-
pendence in Eastern Europe.
Furthermore, East European
countries are dismayed at the
lack of progress in intrabloc
cooperation, and are thus look-
ing to the West for ways to
further their technological ad-
vance.
Nearly all the recent in-
novations stimulate East Euro-
pean hard-currency earnings
through new exports. Moreover,
the market for goods produced
under Western license is en-
hanced by the established rep-
utations and marketing know-how
of the Western firms involved.
In addition, production-sharing
pacts, under which the Western
supplier of a factory takes a
portion of its production as
repayment on his investment, en-
able Eastern European countries
to acquire technology and ad-
vanced equipment without adding
substantially to their already
considerable medium and long-
term indebtedness to the West.
A group of Belgian business-
men has just visited Poland to
discuss new joint efforts. West
Europeans looking for new export
markets see in Eastern Europe a
significantly rising demand for
their output of heavy industrial
machinery, and many believe that
East Europe's limited ability to
generate new exports for West-
ern markets can be improved.
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SECRET
The Communist World
BULGARIA IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH BALKAN NEIGHBORS
Bulgaria last July nego-
tiated a general settlement of
its problems with Greece, and
since then has been promoting
political contacts with its
other Balkan neighbors. This
campaign to break out of its
heretofore isolated position is
making some progress. In the
long run, these new contacts
are more likely to work changes
in Bulgaria than in the states
with which it is dealing. Con-
tinuing contact with the inde-
pendent Communist states of Ru-
mania and Yugoslavia and the in-
flux of ideas from Greece and
Turkey may eventually encourage
Sofia. to loosen its ties with
Moscow.
In late January Yugoslav
Foreign Minister Popovic visited
Sofia, for three days. While
not enthusiastic about his visit,
he was "satisfied," according
to Yugoslav officials in Sofia.
The visit was symbolically im-
portant and was closely followed
by a number of agreements, such
as the abolition of visa require-
ments between the two countries.
In a recent demarche to
Turkey, the Bulgarians proposed
an early meeting to seek agree-
ment on specified major outstand-
ing problems.
On a lower political level,
Sofia's "mayor" visited Athens
in mid-January and extended an
invitation to the mayor of Athens
to visit Sofia this May. The
mayors of the port cities of
Varna. and Piraeus will exchange
visits in the near future.
Bulgarian efforts to pro-
mote Balkan rapprochement have
been particularly active in
the cultural sphere. Sofia is
trying to establish a league
of Balkan writers. Plans have
been made to hold an annual
noncompetitive Balkan Film
Festival. Artists from other
Balkan countries are being
invited to the opening of Bul-
garia's Jubilee National Art
Exhibition. Recently a. con-
ference of Balkan, Adriatic,
and Cypriot students was held
in Sofia..
Proceedings of the Balkan
Committees for Peace and Under-
standing, which are scheduled
to meet in Athens in early Ma,y,
may well provide an indication
of the success of the Bulgarian
campaign. Past meetings have
foundered when Bulgaria and
Rumania. have called for a Bal-
kan summit conference which
Greece and Yugoslavia have in-
sisted must be preceded by
bilateral resolutions of out-
standing problems. This con-
dition appears now to be largely
accomplished or on the way to
accomplishment except in the
case of Albania.--whose attend-
ance of past meetings has been
blocked by Greece and Yugosla-
16 Apr 65
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 9
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Aftw
SECRET
The dwindling ranks of
Communist China's top leader-
ship suffered another loss
with the death on 9 April of
politburo member Ko Ching-
shih. Full and alternate mem-
bers of the party central com-
mittee now number only 181,
down from the full strength of
194 reached in 1958 when ad-
ditions were last made. Of
the 181 surviving, 16 are known
to be out of favor and 33 oth-
ers have not made public ap-
pearances in six months or
more, probably in most cases
because of poor health.
The leaders of Communist
China are men in their sixties
and seventies. They are in-
creasingly susceptible to
diseases of age and increas-
ingly dominated by narrow, in-
flexible views. These charac-
teristics make them more prone
to unreasonable behavior, while
tending to sap their effective-
ness in managing the party and
government apparatus.
Suspicious of almost every-
one outside their own shrinking
circles, Chinese leaders have
been insisting on an ever
tighter hold over the levers o
Leadership distrust ex-
tends down into the lower ranks
of the party. Last winter the
central committee ordered a mas-
siLve campaign to eradicate cor-
ruption at this level.
Although the regime
often speaks of the need to pro-
mote younger men, Mao's profound
distrust of them has been a bar
to any delegation of real power.
Moreover, the prospect for
change in the near future is slim.
Replacements for Mao and his in-
ner circle of immediate lieuten-
ants would presumably be drawn
from the present shrinking central
committee, which is exclusively
composed of old-guard revolution-
aries--men who seem to be just as
dogmatic and hostile to the US as
the present team.
SECRET
16 Apr 65
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 10
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SECRET
25X1
SUKARNO'S POLICY EDGING CLOSER TO
In two recent speeches to
army and government leaders
President Sukarno has defined
Indonesian policy in a. way that
comes close to meeting Communist
Part objectives.
Two da.ys later Sukarno an-
nounced a. purge of the leader-
ship of a pressure group called
the "Generation of 45" led by
Third Deputy Prime Minister
Chairul Saleh, who has been under
st:rong attack by Indonesian Com-
munists. Sukarno accused the
organization, among other things,
of competing with political pa.r-
"
ties and of opposing "Nasakom.
In a, speech on 11 April to
the Consultative Assembly, made
up of top politicians, Sukarno
announced that the "national
democratic" stage of the Indo-
COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES
nesian revolution was almost
complete and that the country
hadl already entered the stage
of "Indonesian socialism." In
effect he told the non-Commu-
nist parties to halt their anti-
Communist activities and com-
plained of hypocrites lacking
in the spirit of true "Nasakom"
--a word Sukarno coined to de-
scribe his goal of harmony among
nationalist, Moslem, and Commu-
nist elements.
Communists have abided with
Suka.rno's ban on all demonstra-
tions until after the 18-26
April celebration of the Bandung
Afro-Asian conference.
SECRET
16 Apr 65
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 11
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