SPECIAL REPORT THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004800070003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 26, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT
CROUP I Excluded-from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE BRAZ:[LIAN GOVERNMENT
In his first year in office President Castello
Branco of Brazil has been at pains to ensure that
his administration is essentially civilian controlled
and directed. He firmly avows that despite his
long military career, he is "not a, soldier-sta.tes-
man," but a civilian presiding over a. conventional
government.
At the same time the military are obviously
exerting influence on official policies to an un-
usual degree even for Brazil., where the armed
forces have traditionally been the ultimate politi-
cal arbiters. Their influence is felt in part
through participation of military figures in execu-
tive and advisory roles in the government. Even
more, perhaps, it is felt in strong pressures from
"hard-line" elements in the military for fundamen-
tal political reforms and quick economic solutions.
There is a general feeling among the armed
forces that now is the time to make certain that
corruption and subversion are permanently elimi-
nated, thus preventing a. return to the chaotic
politics that prevailed in Brazil for 30 years
before the overthrow of Goulart in April 1964.
The overwhelming majority
of the armed forces seem con-
vinced that by ousting Goulart
they prevented the imminent de-
struction of Brazil's constitu-
tional institutions and a pos-
sible Communist takeover. As a
leader of the revolution Castello
Branco shares the military in-
terest in making sure that its
aims are not lost in irresolu-
tion or half-measures. In a re-
port which he circulated shortly
before the Goula.rt ouster,
Castello Branco defined the mil-
itary's primary responsibility
as that of guaranteeing Brazil's
constitutional institutions,
not of defending particular gov-
ernments. (The constitution
provides that the mission of
the armed forces is "to defend
the country and guarantee the
constitutional powers and law
and order.")
In a departure from earlier
interventions by the military
into the political realm, the
leading officers considered
themselves in the events of
early 1964 the principal leaders
of an authentic revolution which
would be complete only when they
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THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT'S BASIC PROGRAM
I CURRENT ANTI-INFLATION PROGRAM
I . Federal budget deficit reduced by increasing revenues through tax reforms and by cutting
expenditures.
2. Subsidies eliminated on imports of petroleum and wheat; subsidies to railways, ports, and
other government enterprises reduced.
3. Restrictions placed on credit expansion and currency issue; central banking system created.
4. Wage levels held to noninflationary level by preventing frequent and drastic increases.
5. Private foreign investment encouraged by relaxing profits remittance laws, liberalizing
mineral concessions policy, and signing of investment guarantee agreement with US.
6. External financial assistance renewed, including both new capital and rescheduling
of payments on large short-term debt, of which more than $250 million postponed.
A. Economic Development
1 . Emphasize public investment in infrastructure, particularly power and transportation.
2. Increase agricultural production through technical assistance.
3. Improve distribution of agricultural and industrial supplies.
4. Reduce extreme inequalities in regional distribution of income.
5. Increase export earnings by expanding level and variety of exports.
1 . Revamp agrarian structure; promote utilization of unused and underused holdings.
2. Encourage development of free, democratic labor movement.
3. Construct low-cost housing for urban workers.
4. Improve educational system, including restricting excessive student politics.
5. Improve organization and efficiency of government through reform of administrative
framework.
6. Reduce number of political parties.
7. Combine military ministries under unified defense ministry.
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had destroyed the legacy of ir-
responsible, corrupt politics
inherited from the Vargas period
(1930-1954)--still very much
alive in some local governments
despite the efforts of the Cas-
tello Branco administration.
Consequently, they were deter-
mined not to return control of
the country to the politicians
a.s had occurred after several
similar armed forces revolts in
recent Brazilian history. This
attitude led to some excesses
during the period immediately
following 1 April as military
commanders took charge of the
massive investigations into
subversion and corruption under
the general supervision of an
army ma.rsha.l. Many local in-
quiries actually operated with-
out effective federal control
and became virtual witch hunts.
Politicians and military offi-
cers were at times stripped of
their political rights and posi-
tions on the basis of unconvinc-
ing evidence.
No advanced plans to operate
the government after the fall
of the old regime had been formu-
lated. In the confusion fol-
lowing Goulart's downfall, the
military assumed complete author-
ity for a., short period, acting
through the "Supreme Revolution-
ary Command," a three-ma.n body
representing the major military
branches.
Civilian Accent in the
Castello Branco Administration
Castello Branco assumed the
presidency on 15 April after
his election by Congress to fill
out Goulart's unexpired term.
He was given greatly increased
executive powers by the revolu-
tion's basic law, the Institu-
tional Act, including special
punitive authority and simpli-
fied procedures for obtaining
quick congressional action on
vital legislation.
The armed forces provided
Castello Branco his only reli-
able support. Nevertheless,
he made clear his intention
from the outset to be a civilian
leader. He resigned his army
commission and in symbolic testi-
mony to his sincerity gave away
his uniforms. In speeches be-
fore military groups he reminded
the armed forces of their tra-
clitional responsibility to legal-
ity and urged them to stay out
of politics. Senior military
officers, such as Army Chief of
Staff Decio Escobar, followed
the President's lead in direct-
ing their subordinates to keep
the military out of politics
and vice versa.
Castello Branco has filled
virtually all the important
cabinet posts with civilians,
usually experienced technicians.
In the formulation and day-to-
clay execution of the administra-
tion's basic policies of finan-
cial stabilization, social re-
form, and economic development,
he ha.s tended to rely almost
completely on his civilian cabi-
net members for counsel, partic-
ularly on Planning Minister
Roberto Campos. The only active
military officer in the cabinet
T
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aside from those in the defense
posts, Interior Minister Cordeiro
de Farias, seems to have little
influence beyond his field of
competence, the supervision of
federal independent agencies.
Of the three military min-
isters, War Minister Costa e
Silva, who represents the army,
has by far the strongest influ-
ence, and his views have weight
outside the purely military
field. His strong advocacy of
civilian supremacy has restrained
others who would prefer to have
the armed forces run the coun-
try. Costa. e Silva has consist-
ently demonstrated his respect
for and loyalty to Castello
Branco, his friend of long stand-
ing, and apparently supports
the President's policies. While
there are great differences in
personality and methods between
the two men, they appear to
share the same basic views and
to work together without serious
friction.
The war minister also is
an important buffer between
Castello Branco and the hard-
liners in the military, for
whom he has some sympathy.
These are the "pushers" who
find the President too slow and
cautious in advancing the aims
of the revolution. Costa e
Silva has cooperated with the
President, for example, in re-
assigning troublesome hard-
liners and has discouraged pub-
lic political statements by ac-
tive officers.
The military's influence
is considerably more apparent
in the "unofficial cabinet" than
among the ministers. President
Castello Branco has drawn many
advisers from close associates
who served in the army with
him over the years. A number
of them head important execu-
tive departments and are con-
sulted on both nonmilitary and
military matters. Among those
in the inner circle is retired
General Golbery Couto e Silva,
chief of the National Intelli-
gence Service, which was formed
last year to provide the Presi-
dent with a steady flow of in-
formation on political and se-
curity matters. Another is
General Ernesto Geisel, chief
of the Presidential Military
Household, who is frequently
consulted by the President on
policy matters not related di-
rectly to his responsibility
as principal military adviser
in the executive office. Cas-
tello Branco also seems to rely
heavily on two other army of-
ficers, General Jurandyr Ma.mede
and Colonel Carlos de Meira
Mattos.
These are the most impor-
tant among the small number of
career military people who are
directly involved in the deci-
sion-making process. Generally
they are long-time friends of
the President, respected and
competent. As confirmed legal-
ists, they strongly respect the
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traditional role of the armed
forces as defenders of the con-
stitutional institutions.
The present regime has fol-
lowed the Brazilian tradition
of naming military officers to
head many administrative agen-
cies. The president of Petro-
bras, the state oil monopoly,
for example, is a, retired army
marshal, and Brazil's state-
owned motor vehicle plant is
run by a major. However, such
officials have relatively lit-
tle effect on broad policy.
The Hard-line Military
Despite the substantial
voice that the officer corps
has in the government through
appointments to official posts
and through close personal ties
with Castello Branco, there is
considerable dissatisfaction
with the regime, and even oppo-
sition, among the so-called
hard-line elements of the armed
forces. In terms of capabili-
ties and intent, the hard-liners
appear to constitute the most
serious potential threat to the
administration, although they
probably comprise only a minor-
ity of the military.
There are two loose group-
ings among the hard-liners, but
the composition of these a.lign-
ments seems to vary according
to the specific issues involved
at any given time. Perhaps the
more vocal are the relatively
small number of self-styled
"durissimos"--ultra.hard-liners
--represented by retired Admiral
Sylvio Heck, one of the most
energetic but ineffective critics
of the government, and several
other high-ranking officers
both active and retired. Among
them are several congenital
plotters who, like Heck, seem
to have gained new stature
through their identification
with the movement that over-
threw Goulart. Others, includ-
ing such right-wing figures as
Generals Mourao Filho, Moniz
de Ara.ga.o, and Alves Ba.stos,
are self-appointed overseers of
the revolution who feel that
Castello Branco has not been
firm enough in dealing with po-
litical and economic problems.
Many of them charge that the
government's economic policies
and agrarian reform program are
"socialistic."
The Heck group commands lit-
tle firm support in the armed
forces and seems to have no ef-
fective organization. The nu-
cleus of a formal organization
may exist in the Radical Demo-
cratic League, which has brought
together a, number of military
men and right-wing civilians in
Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.
The ultra.ha.rd-liners' opposi-
tion to aspects of the austerity
and reform programs is often
echoed by certain conservative
financial interests such as the
powerful Federation of Indus-
tries of Sao Paulo and the lead-
ing landowners' associations.
These organizations are espe-
cially critical of the govern-
ment's restrictive credit pol-
icies and tight tax laws. The
influential newspaper 0 Esta.do
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do S. Paulo is another impor-
TanT7'boos er of the Heck camp.
A more significant politi-
cal force than the Heck alliance
are the younger hard-line mili-
tary officers, mainly at the
colonel-major level. They gen-
erally respect Castello Branco
and agree with what he has been
doing, but feel that he has not
pursued the aims of the revolu-
tion diligently enough. They
tend to overlook practicality
in their idealistic pursuit of
reform.
There is considerable dis-
satisfaction among these younger,;
nationalistic officers over
what they regard as undue soft-
ness toward corruption and sub-
version. They assert that the
purge campaign against leftist
and corrupt politicians has
fallen far short of its stated
purpose of "cleaning up Brazil."
The government is also criti-
cized, often naively, for pur-
suing a gradualist approach in
curbing inflation. According
to the hard-line, price con-
trols must be instituted and
further rises in the cost of
living should be halted "by
decree."
Although a large percentage
of officers at the middle and
lower grades in all of the serv-
ices probably hold these views,
they have no acknowledged leader
nor is there any sign of effec-
tive organization. Nonetheless,
they will continue to bring
pressure on the administration
periodically for further inves-
tigations into subversion and
corruption and-for cure-all
economic measures and social
reforms.
Net Effects, Prospects
To a great extent the firm
leadership and personal prestige
of Castello Branco alone have
averted encroachment by the
armed forces. In all probabil-
ity a lesser individual would
have fallen under military domi-
nation during the early months
of the revolution with resultant
damage to the constitutional
order. Castello Branco acknowl-
edges that only with armed forces
support does he have the strength
to carry out basic reforms and
implement the austerity program,
at least until the government's
policies have shown satisfactory
results clearly discernible to
the public. At the same time
he emphasizes that "a president
cannot rest his support on
bayonets lest he be stabbed by
them." Accordingly, as long
as Castello Branco continues in
office and can avoid any sudden
economic and political deterio-
ration, the military's influence
probably will remain subordinate.
Prospects are that the military
will continue to participate in
policy formulation but will not
determine it unless drastic
changes for the worse occur.
The President is, neverthe-
less, sensitive to the rumblings
among the hard-liners and can
be expected to take appropriate
precautions to ward off any
dangerous build-up in hard-line
pressure, granting concessions
when necessary. His agreement
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last year to a one-year exten-
sion of his mandate and his re-
luctant decision to intervene
in Goias State and remove Gov-
ernor Mauro Borges last fall
are in part illustrative of his
willingness to compromise under
unusually heavy demands.
For the longer run, the
question of electing Castello
Branco's successor--presidential
elections are scheduled for No-
vember 1966--will become para.-
mount to the military. Castello
Branco is the only figure at the
moment whose candidacy would
be supported by the a.rmed forces,
but for the present he appears
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determined not to run. Of the
leading candidates at the moment
-.-Governors Carlos Lacerda of
Guanaba.ra, Adhemar de Barros of
Sao Paulo, and Magalhaes Pinto
of Minas Gerais--none a.ppea.rs
acceptable to the armed forces.
If it appears that an undesir-
able candidate would gain the
presidency and Castello Branco
remains adamant in his plans to
leave office, this would greatly
increase the chance of a move
by the hard-liners to install
a. military-dominated regime.
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