WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004800060001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

State Dept. review completed
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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Nw~ 3P- ultt 1
(Information as of 1200 EST, 18 March 1965)
Page
THE VIETNAM SITUATION r
A US air strike on 15 March heavily damaged Phu Qui
ammunition depot about 100 miles south of Hanoi.
South Vietnamese aircraft had hit military barracks on
Tiger Island on 14 March. No Chinese Communist or
Soviet military reaction to either strike has been
noted. The Chinese, however, are trying to encourage
neutral pressure against stepped-up US military action,
and private Soviet approaches to US officials are stress-
ing Moscow's interest in a negotiated settlement.- 25X1
In South Vietnam government forces
are clearly on the defensive in most of the countryside,
and the Quat administration is facing its usual problems
of countering political intrigue.
UNITED NATIONS
FUTURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS REMAINS MUDDLED
The special committee appointed four weeks ago has not
yet come to grips with the peacekeeping issue. One
difficult question is whether to confine deliberations
to future operations--as the USS:E and France prefer--
or to discuss past and present activities as well.
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE MAY MEET SOON
With the 1965 growing season approaching, the regime
will probably discuss agriculture and may define a
new program to replace the policies discredited fol-
lowing Khrushchev's ouster.
USSR TO BUILD GAS PIPELINES FROM CENTRAL ASIA TO MOSCOW 7
This project suggests growing confidence in the USSR's
ability to fabricate its own 40-inch pipe, and demon-
strates a continued preference for locating energy-
intensive industries in the European USSR rather than
in remote but fuel-surplus areas..
SECRET
19 Mar 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i
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Noe k)ri ultIl J! Nftwe
THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued)
ANTIREGIME HOAX UNDERSCORES PEIPING'S PROBLEM WITH YOUTH
Peiping's surprisingly strong reaction to an antiregime
hoax denotes a deep-felt--and probably justified--sus-
picion that the younger generation is unenthusiastic
about the Maoist brand of Communism.
CHANGES ON RUMANIA'S INTELLECTUAL SCENE
The Rumanian regime in recent weeks has taken some
important steps toward meeting the growing desires
among intellectuals for fewer controls over their ac-
tivities and for contact with the West.
AS IA-AFRICA
COMMUNISTS CLASH WITH MOSLEMS IN INDONESIA
Moslems are trying to disrupt activities of Communists
and their front groups, and the Communists have asked
for a ban on the most effective anti-Communist student
organization.
CYPRUS: FIGHTING BREAKS OUT
The fighting around a Turkish community in the north-
west is the first in several months. Ankara, which
plans a troop rotation by the end of March, has its
armed forces on an increased alert status.
NASIR LEADS ARAB STATES IN MOVES AGAINST BONN
As West Germany hastens its exchange of ambassadors
with Israel, Nasir has brought the Arab states far
toward a common policy of diplomatic retaliation.
Page
BURUNDI STILL UNSTABLE AS KING VACATIONS IN EUROPE
The new Hutu prime minister has not yet consolidated
his position, and Tutsi extremists seek to return Bu-
rundi to the pro-Communist camp..
SE CRE T
19 PJar 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUPN~MARY Page ii
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
BRITISH-RULED HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES HOLD ELECTIONS 17
Voting in Bechuanaland and Basutoland is strongly influ-
encing the way these territories will handle their great-
est problem--relations with South Africa--when, as seems
probable, they become independent next year.
FRENCH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS REVEAL WEAKNESS OF GAULLISTS 18
Lacking grass-roots support, the Gaullist party failed
everywhere except Paris to improve much on its showing
in the last local elections six years ago.
SIGNS OF NEW DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO PORTUGUESE REGIME 18
Stringent government economic policies designed to pre-
serve fiscal stability and create revenue to finance
military operations in Africa are alienating business-
men and others who have heretofore supported the regime.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
CASTRO CRITICIZES COMMUNIST WORLD RIFT AND VIETNAM POLICY 19
In Castro's view, the division in the Communist world
diminishes the prestige of international Communism and -
encourages the US to step up its attacks in Vietnam
PERONISTS GAIN IN ARGENTINE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 20
Although the government party retained its plurality
of 70 of the 192 Chamber of Deputies seats, the spec-
tacular jump by the Peronist-oriented parties from 17
to around 50 seats does not augur well for the govern-
ment's legislative program.
SECRET
19 Mar 65 CURRENT INTEL
LIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
PRESSURE GROWING FOR BOLIVIAN JUNTA CHIEF'S RESIGNATION 21
Even elements not politically opposed to Barrientos
agree that he should comply with a constitutional re-
quirement that presidential candidates resign from
public office 180 days before election day.
HONDURAN OPPOSITION PARTY BOYCOTTING CONSTITUENrASSEMBLY 21
Indications are that the dominant Nationalists remain
unwilling to meet any of the more important demands of
the opposition Liberals, whose more militant elements
may consequently take up arms against the regime.
SE CRE T
19 Mar 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iv
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SECRET
US aircraft struck deeper
into North Vietnamese territory
during the past week, hitting
a target about a hundred miles
from Hanoi on 15 March. This
attack followed a 14 March air
strike by South Vietnamese
planes on Tiger Island. No
military reaction by either
Communist China or the USSR has
been noted since the air strikes.
In South Vietnam the govern-
ment is clearly on the defensive
in most of the countryside. More-
over, the administration of Pre-
mier Quat is facing its usual
problems of countering political
intrigue.
South Vietnamese aircraft
struck the Hon Gio military bar-
racks on Tiger Island on 14
March. Poststrike photography
revealed that of the nine admin-
istration and storage buildings
in the target area, one was
partially destroyed, another
severely damaged, and three more
sustained some roof damage. No
aircraft were lost on this raid.
The Hon Gio attack was fol-
lowed on 15 March by a US attack
on the Phu Qui ammunition depot
approximately 100 miles south of
Hanoi. Poststrike photography
indicates that the target area
suffered heavy damage. Eighteen
of the buildings were completely
destroyed and 11 severely dam-
aged. One aircraft and pilot
were lost at sea returning from
the mission.
Recent analysis of
photography of the Phuc
Yen airfield revealed that 19
dummy aircraft were parked there
along with 34 MIG-15/17 fighters.
There apparently has been no ad-
ditional deployment of fighter
aircraft into North Vietnam
since August 1964 when a regi-
ment of 36 fighters first oc-
cupied Phuc Yen.
Developments in the DRV
~ Noting
that the 15 March strike pene-
trated "deeper into our territory
than before," a 16 March party
daily editorial exhorted the
people and the armed forces in
the north to "always stand ready
...in coordination with the lib-
eration forces in the south" to
"defend... the airspace, territo-
rial waters, and territory of
our country."
The regime in Hanoi is also
attempting to bolster the con-
fidence of its people by assert-
ing that "volunteers" from all
over the world stand ready to
come to the defense of North
Vietnam. According to a Hanoi
radio domestic broadcast on 16
March, many youths from the
Soviet Union, Communist China,
and other nations have volun-
teered for service in Vietnam.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1
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vftiol SE CRS; T `"`
Chinese Communist Activities
Peiping reacted sharply to
the 15 March strike, warning
in a17 March People's Daily edi-
torial that "the further U im-
perialism goes in expanding ag-
gression," the "more impossible
will be the prospect of bring-
ing about a political settle-
ment." The editorial hinted
darkly that "the wa.r of aggres-
sion must be countered with a
war of antiagression."
While Peiping's public
posture on Vietnam remains in-
flexible, the Chinese have been
putting out mixed signals in
private, apparently in an ef-
fort to encourage confusion
abroad as to their intentions.
They sent the China. correspond-
ent of Agence France Presse
(AFP) on a.n unsoli ite rip
between 16 February and 1 March
which included stops in Kunming
and Nanning and a, rail journey
from Kunming to a point near
the Vietnamese border. The cor-
respondent claims to have seen
"no military activity whatso-
ever" and told officials in the
US Consulate General at Hong
Kong that a. medium-level Chi-
nese official in Kunming had
made the point explicitly that
Chinese troops were not prepar-
ing to intervene in Vietnam.
Similarly, during talks in
Peiping with President Ayub and
other Pakistani officials early
this month, the Chinese appar-
ently made another attempt to
encourage neutral pressure
against stepped-up US military 25X1
action in Vietnam by present-
ing themselves as reasonable
and willing to talk.
Peiping prob-
a.bly calculates that talks 25X1
SECRET
19 Mar 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 2
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`*W`' SECRET
conducted on this basis might
relieve the pressure on Hanoi
while permitting the Viet Cong
to continue their campaign un-
hindered.
Peiping continues to ex-
ploit events related to Vietnam
in the Sino-Soviet conflict.
Four of the Chinese students al-
legedly injured by the Soviet
police during the anti-US riots
in Moscow on 4 March received
a. hero's welcome when they re-
turned to China, on 14 March.
The Chinese have "categorically
rejected" Moscow's 12 March
note justifying Soviet actions
and have accused the USSR of
attempting to "reverse right
and wrong." The People's Daily
has flatly charged that t So-
viet Government has placed it-
self "under the thumb of US im-
perialism," and Peiping has given
wide publicity to its 16 Ma.rch
diplomatic note to Moscow which
reiterates charges of police
brutality and once again demands
Soviet apologies.
Although the USSR is hold-
ing to a. public position of un-
compromising support for North
Vietnam, private Soviet approaches
to US officials continue to
stress Moscow's interest in an
eventual negotiated settlement.
Moscow has rejected the
British proposal of 20 February
for joint action by the Geneva
co-chairmen to explore a. peace-
ful settlement and has published
its own draft of a. co-chairmen
message which condemns alleged
US violations of the Geneva.
agreements and demands that US
forces stop "aggressive actions"
against North Vietnam and with-
draw from South Vietnam.
In contrast to this un-
yielding public posture, private
approaches to US officials stress
Moscow's desire to a.void involve-
ment in the Vietnam conflict
and to cooperate with the US in
moving toward a. political set-
tlement.
The Soviet ambassador to
Luxembourg--a past source of
Soviet trial ba.lloons--told his
US colleague on 15 March that
the US and the USSR, as the
"only na.tions which really count,"
should be able to work out a
solution which would remove the
risk of wa.r. He contended that
Peiping, not Hanoi, is the "real
obstacle" to a settlement and
argued that air attacks against
North Vietna.m would not bring
a solution because Ha.noi is "not
the problem." The Soviet a.mbas-
sa.dor repeated earlier private
warnings tha.t, if the conflict
escalates, the USSR ma.y not be
able to avoid involvement.
In discussing possible
terms for a. settlement, the So-
viet ambassador indica.ted that
an arrangement involving the
withdrawal, under appropriate
gua.ra.ntees, of all foreign forces
from South Vietnam, including
the North Vietnamese, "seemed
reasonable." The US ambassador
recalls that this same Soviet
official made a similar approach
regarding the desirability of a
:nuclea.r test ban treaty "very
early in the game."
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 3
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46993
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Noe
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SECRET
In his farewell call on
Ambassador Bohlen in Paris on
12 March, departing Soviet Am-
bassador Vinogradov took a
similar line. He repeated
several times that a continua-
tion of hostilities is pushing
the Vietnamese toward Peiping.
Vinogradov asserted that there
could be no thought of a con-
ference so long as US bombard-
ment of the DRV continued. He
expressed the hope that the
USSR could work with the US to
bring about peace in Vietnam.
Viet Cong Military Action
In the northern and cen-
tral provinces of South Viet-
nam, the Communists continue
their efforts to consolidate
their gains and reduce govern-
ment control to areas around
isolated towns and major pop-
ulation centers. Binh Dinh
Province remains the focal
point of Viet Cong operations
in the central coastal regions,
while increased guerrilla ac-
tivity in the highlands of
Kontum Province lends credi-
bility to the recent reports
of a build-up of enemy forces
in the northwestern portion of
the province. Sabotage and
interdiction of land lines of
communication remain widespread,
extending from the provinces of
Quang Tri and Thua Thien in the
north through the coastal prov-
inces of Quang Nam, Quang Ngai,
Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Khanh
Hoa. Control of the coasts by
the Viet Cong would facilitate
flexibility in logistical and
offensive operations, while sus-
tained denial of coastal high-
ways and railways to government
forces would seriously reduce
the mobility of these forces and
their capability for quick re-
action.
To the south, Communist
military pressure remains in-
tense in the provinces east of
Saigon, and in the tactical
areas of the government's 5th
aiad 25th Divisions, immediately
to the west and south of Saigon.
In the delta, the pattern of
Viet Cong activity continues to
suggest a holding operation,
with the insurgents consolidat-
ing their forces, refraining
from major attacks, but apply-
ing steady pressure on the
countryside in the form of ter-
rorism, harassments, and road
sabotage.
South Vietnamese Political
Developments
Uneasiness has persisted
in Saigon over a projected for-
mal military meeting on command
changes and over rumors of a
possible prior move by one or
another military faction. No
farm evidence of any advanced
coup plotting has been noted,
however
SECRET
19 Mar 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
Premier Quat, meanwhile,
has continued his efforts to
create an impression of action
on the part of the national gov-
ernment. He announced last
week a series of broad and spe-
cific measures on which realis-
tic progress might be expected,
and held a series of meetings
with a variety of officials as
well as with nongovernmental
figures in an effort to project
a favorable image of his govern-
ment and its policies.
Although the Qua.t govern-
ment is still moving to sup-
press potentially subversive
propaganda for peace, it con-
tinues to tolerate the peace
movement led by Buddhist monk
Quang Lien. The Buddhist Insti-
tute has indulged in further
acrobatics to deny sponsorship
of Lien's movement, while simul-
t:ar+eously endorsing the goal
of peace. An official Buddhist
position on the peace issue may
have been a topic of discussion
at a Buddhist administrative
congress this week.
19 Max 65 CURRENT INTEL IGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 5
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SECRET
FUTURE OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS REMAINS MUDDLED
The 33 members of the UN
Special Committee on Peace-
keeping Operations, appointed
by Assembly President Quaison-
Sackey four weeks ago, have
consulted endlessly with each
other without coming to grips
with the problem or even de-
ciding on committee procedures.
The committee is expected to
hold its first organizational
meeting about 26 March and, if
all goes as Quaison-Sackey
plans, will adjourn for about
two months to permit further
private consultations. The
committee's report is due to
the General Assembly by 15
June.
The special committee con-
sists of the Big Four--Nation-
alist China was left out in
order to get the USSR's cooper-
ation--plus six countries in
Africa, six in Asia, five in
the Soviet bloc, five in Latin
America, and seven in Western
Europe and the Commonwealth.
Opposition to an early meeting
of the committee by both the
US and the USSR is being in-
terpreted by many Africans and
Asians as further evidence
that Moscow and Washington in-
tend to strike a bargain be-
tween themselves on the future
of peacekeeping operations.
These countries fear that the
committee will then be asked
only to rubber-stamp approval
of an agreement which, to be
acceptable to the USSR, would
be bound to detract from the
assembly's powers in the peace-
keeping field.
One of the thornier issues
under discussion is the question
of whether the committee should
discuss past and present UN
peacekeeping operations or con-
fine itself to considering prob-
lems related to future under-
takings. France has threatened
to attend meetings only as an
observer if the committee goes
into past and present operations.
Paris maintains that once the
future conduct of peacekeeping
operations is settled the prob-
lem of past debts will be re-
duced to manageable proportions.
The USSR tends to take much the
same line.
On the problem of settling
financial arrearages, partic-
ullarly the Soviet and French
debts, it now seems evident that
the discussions will avoid em-
phasis on Article 19 and con-
centrate on the "restoration of
the UN's financial solvency."
The UN is presently in the hole
approximately $120 million. The
prevalant feeling is that if
the USSR contributes a sum that
will bring its arrears below the
two-year limit allowed by Ar-
ticle19, the remaining Soviet
debt could "lie dormant on the
books." The British UN dele-
gation, however, considers that
the whole slate of arrears must
be wiped clean if adequate vol-
untary contributions are t
f orthcomine
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SE CREST
The Soviet leaders are appar-
ently preparing to hold a meeting
of the party's central committee,
possibly within the next three
weeks. Rumors that a meeting was
imminent have been noted in Moscow,
and Prague Radio announced on 8
March that a plenum of the Soviet
party body would be held soon. A
Mongolian party-government delega-
tion has apparently been told not
to arrive in Moscow before 10
April, suggesting that the plenum
would be held earlier.
During the latter years of the
Khrushchev era, central committee
plenums were usually announced
several weeks in advance. The new
leadership may feel, however, that
such notice leads to premature dis-
cussion and polemics.
According to the Prague Radio
announcement the Soviet central
committee will discuss agriculture.
With the 1965 growing season ap-
proaching, agriculture certainly
seems the most.likely topic. Al-
though the new regime has made
some changes in agricultural pol-
icy and leadership, it has yet to
define a new program to replace
the policies discredited following
Khrushchev's ouster last fall.
The US Embassy in Moscow has
rioted signs of "forced draft" de-
liberation on means to improve
the operation of the economy, sug-
gesting that the plenum might con-
sider proposals for changes in
the economic system. From the
course of the discussion thus far,
however, it seems unlikely that
the Soviet leaders will be pre-
pared to embark on a new program
of economic reform for several
25X1
USSR TO BUILD GAS PIPELINES FROM CENTRAL ASIA TO MOSCOW
Construction will begin this
year on the ambitious and expen-
sive project of linking the Moscow
industrial area with natural gas
fields in Central Asia.
Initiation of this project
suggests a growing confidence on
the USSR's part in its ability to
fabricate larger quantities of 40-
inch-diameter pipe domestically.
It also demonstrates that the gov-
ernment continues to prefer to con-
centrate energy-intensive indus-
tries in the European USSR--at the
cost of transporting fuel great
distances--rather than to locate
new plants in remote, but fuel-
surplus areas.
Initially the system will
consist of two parallel 40-inch
lines, each capable of carrying
10 billion cubic meters of gas an-
nually. These two lines, accord-
ing to the Soviet press, will use
4,240 miles of pipe. The first,
scheduled for completion by 1967,
will. require almost a million met-
ric tons of steel pipe and a cap-
ital investment of more than $300
million. Eventually the USSR
plans to build a second and third
system--each apparently consist-
ing of two parallel pipelines--
along the same route and to ex- 25X1
tend the supply of Central Asian
gas to the Baltic and Leningrad
SECRET
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
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NOW, %W
REPRODUCTION OF A CONTROVERSIAL PAINTING THAT APPEARED IN FULL
COLOR ON THE BACK COVER OF THE FINAL 1964 ISSUE OF CHINA`YOUTH
"You press on, I ' l l catch up. " (Oi I painting)
The bodies of Lenin (1) and probably Mao Tse-tung (3) are among the stalks, being
trampled underfoot by the peasants.
Tiny figures bearing three red banners (2) representing the party's General Line,
the Leap Forward, and the Communes. The second banner, the one symboliz-
ing the Leap Forward, has fallen to the ground.
While all the plants are obediently bending to the West (to the left, in traditional
Chinese paintings), clothes, hair, and banners are streaming in the other direction, as
if to demonstrate that the East Wind does not consistently prevail over the West Wind.
650316 3
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SE Cam', T
The Communist World
ANTIREGIME HOAX UNDERSCORES PEIPING'S PROBLEM WITH YOUTH
Chinese Communist leaders
are angered and worried by the
success of an audacious anti-
regime hoax that appeared in
the last 1964 issue of China
Youth magazine. Their surpris-
nnggly strong reaction denotes
a deep-felt--and probably jus-
tified--suspicion that the
younger generation is unenthu-
siastic about the Maoist brand
of Communism.
China Youth--the major
journal r i.n octrinating
youth--reproduced a painting
which contains several clever
antiparty devices concealed in
an otherwise acceptable motif
typical of socialist realism
(see facing page). Millions
of copies had apparently been
distributed to all parts of
China weeks before enraged of-
ficials discovered the decep-
tion and recalled all copies.
Peiping's sensitive reac-
tion can be explained in part
in cultural terms. China's in-
tellectuals have traditionally
expressed antiregime sentiments
in the guise of safe-seeming
art, but this is the first known
important recurrence of the
usage under Communist rule.
Far more disturbing to party
leaders, however, are the grow-
ing signs, such as this hoax,
that the regime's massive indoc-
trination efforts directed at
young people have failed. These
efforts have been stepped up dur-
ing the past two years in an at-
tempt to rekindle some of the
zeal lost after the failures of
the Leap Forward. The regime
Is attempting to counter the
considerable disaffection which
:Lies beneath youth's surface con-
formity.
Mao himself, in recent com-
ments to visitors, has openly
displayed his increasing personal
distrust of China's youth. Re-
flecting this distrust are the
major changes that have been put
into effect over the last year in
the organization and leadership
of youth bodies. In a notable
example this February, Hu Yao-
pang, YCL head since 1952, was
shipped out to regional part
duties in northwest China
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SE CRET
CHANGES ON RUMANIA'S INTELLECTUAL SCENE
The Rumanian regime in re-
cent weeks has taken some im-
portant steps toward meeting the
growing desires among intellec-
tuals for fewer controls over
their activities and for contact
with the West. The regime's ac-
tions in the long run could lead,
despite cautious implementation,
to pressures for broader policies
of relaxation benefiting the en-
tire population.
A most significant step was
the choice of a reported moder-
ate, Demostene Botez, to replace
old-guard Stalinist Mihai Beniuc
as president of the Writers'
Union. The shift was accompanied
by a central committee message
to the union endorsing greater
freedom of expression. The mes-
sage implicitly attacked past
union leadership for "ignoring
the specific character of artis-
tic creativity," and called for
the "stimulation of a broad ex-
change of opinions."
Prior to these developments
the regime had been urging at-
tention to Rumania's national
literary heritage rather than
to that of the USSR. Also,
after 20 years of isolation,
Rumanian writers and critics now
can comment on such previously
taboo authors as Kafka and other
Western writers who are also be-
ing endorsed. The plays by mod-
ern American authors, including
O'Neill, Steinbeck, Miller, and
Albee, are being performed in
Bucharest, while only one modern
Soviet playwright is represented.
Party First Secretary Gheorghiu-
I)ej, over a year ago had said:
"We do not hide in our shell...
we are doing--and we will con-
tinue to do in the future--all.
that is necessary in order that
our readers may become better
acquainted with works of other
writers."
In addition, the first
major displays of abstract art
appeared in Bucharest in mid-
February. The regime's stamp
Df approval was evidenced when
'Vice Premier Birladeanu pur-
chased some of the displayed
paintings.
Trends of liberalization
and Westernization have also
reached into the fields of music
and social sciences. Although
music has never been subjected
to harsh restrictions, the Ru-
manian party and cultural press
has been agitating in recent
months for even more frequent
performances of modern Western
music. In the social sciences,
de-Russification and attention
to national traditions have
brought about the partial re- 25X1
habilitation of leading bourgeois
scholars of the interwar period.
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SECRET
Growing violence is develop-
ing in Indonesia between the
Communist Party (PKI) and Moslem
organizations. The greatest
number of incidents have occurred
in East Java, where the orthodox
Moslem party, Nahdatul Ulama (NU),
has its greatest strength, but
difficulties have also occurred
in Central Java and in Atjeh in
northern Sumatra.
The incidents appear to have
begun about last November. They
have occurred with increasing
frequency during the past six
weeks. Initially they arose from
resistance to illegal Communist
land seizures, but recently Mos-
lem groups have sought to disrupt
almost any Communist activity,
particularly meetings of Commu-
nist front groups.
In East Java a press polemic
of unusual vehemence and explicit-
ness has developed between PKI
dailies and papers controlled by
the NU. Last month the NU press
blamed the PKI for turmoil in
East Java, called for action by
the authorities "before it is
too late," and demanded the ban-
ning of all pro-PKI newspapers
on the grounds that they "stir
disunity, distort problems,
and spread slanders."
Until recently little public-
ity had been given these develop-
ments. Even now the Communists,
instead of denouncing the NU,
are using the pattern of violence
to develop a case against one of
their favorite targets, the
Moslem anti-Communist student
organization "HMI." Claiming that
the HMI is responsible for "ter-
rorist activities" in Java, the
Communists have asked Sukarno to
ban it. HMI's disappearance would
eliminate the most effective imped-
iment to eventual Communist capture
of the Indonesian university system.
The Communists apparently are
trying to undermine the other
groups by charging that the US is
supporting an anti-Communist move-
ment in East Java. In a recent
speech, Sukarno claimed that Islam-
ic organizations were being used
for subversion, and an eventual
government move against NU front
groups seems likely.
25X1
An Indonesian Government move
against American-owned oil com-
panies may be imminent.
The Communist Party has demanded
seizure of the companies for some
time, and on 18 March Communist
labor groups reportedly took control
,of the Stanvac refinery in South
Sumatra.
The Communists have also prob-
ably encouraged unrest in the
navy. Admiral Martadinata, the
chief of staff, has long been one
of their prime targets. Two
Communist officers were arrested
for their involvement in the re- 25X1
cent mutiny of junior officers
which aimed at removing him.
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tima
has
Famausta-
Principal British sovereign base area
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`ft"`w SECRET ~Iw
Communal fighting has bro-
ken out on Cyprus for the first
time in several months, and Tur-
key is taking steps which could
be preparatory to military in-
tervention.
The new violence began on
12 March in northwest Cyprus
near Lefka, the largest Turkish
town on the island. Units of
the Greek Cypriot National Guard
have virtually surrounded two
small Turkish towns nearby.
Lefka itself has not come under
direct attack. Despite some
relatively heavy firing, few
casualties are reported.
At the same time Greek and
Turkish Cypriot leaders have ex-
changed unusually bitter denun-
ciations.
The Turks appear to be pre-
paring once again for armed ac-
tion, possibly in connection
with the scheduled rotation of
their troops on Cyprus by the
end of March in the face of con-
tinued opposition from Nicosia.
Turkish armed forces are in an
increased alert status, and
training and readiness opera-
tions apparently will be stepped
up. The Turkish press re-
ports joint amphibious opera-
tions planned for the Gulf of
Iskenderun on 24 March. The
regularly scheduled rotation of
Turkish naval forces between
northern and southern ports is
under way and will double the
naval power in the Iskenderun-
Mersin area during the next two
weeks.
As some time would be
needed to prepare for an am-
phibious assault on Cyprus, air
strikes appear likely if Ankara
decides on the need for early
action.
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25X1
25X1
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NOW i%o
'WAIT
SIERRA LEONE J
States believed about to break with West Germany
States believed about to break with West Germany
and recognize East Germany
State believed about to break with West Germany
with position on East German recognition uncertain
States apparently intending to continue relations
with West Germany
DEMOCRATIC
;AND
REPUBLIC
OF THE
eAN.D~I
CONGO
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
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SECRET
NASIR LEADS ARAB STATES IN MOVES AGAINST BONN
Egyptian President Nasir
has brought the Arab states
far toward a common stand
against West Germany in response
to its recognition of Israel,
but his success is not complete.
Nasir has threatened that
once formal West German - Is-
raeli diplomatic relations are
established, he will break dip-
lomatic and economic relations
with Bonn and recognize East
Germany. At a meeting of the
13 Arab League states in Cairo
on 13-14 March, only Morocco,
Tunisia,and Libya did not follow
his lead on the question of
breaking with Bonn. Nasir has
apparently induced five of the
states to announce that they
will establish relations with
East Germany. Syria still has
not agreed but is expected to
fall in line.
It is not yet clear, to
what extent there will also be
an economic break with West
Germany. Those states which
have agreed to sever diplomatic
relations are also ready to
break economic ties in the event
Bonn takes further "hostile"
measures against any Arab state.
Measures regarded as "hostile"
probably would be Bonn's payment
to Israel of monetary compensa-
tion for the undelivered items
in their recently terminated
arms agreement, or a cutoff of
present West German aid to an
Arab state.
Egyptian pressure has al-
ready caused repercussions in
Lebanon that could become seri-
ous. Although Lebanon in the
end lined up with Egypt on break-
ing with Bonn, pro-Nasirites
have demonstrated against the
Lebanese Government's moderate
stand during the Cairo meetings.
The security of President Hilu's
regime may be undermined if it
wavers or fails to follow Cairo's
lead to the fullest.
Bonn is both satisfied
over the rapid Israeli accept-
a.nce of the German recognition
offer and apprehensive lest some
Arab states recognize East Ger-
many, in addition to breaking
ties with West Germany. Bonn
of:Picials have taken a concilia-
tory line toward the Arab states
other than Egypt, and thus far
Bonn has limited itself to offi-
cial protests against the attacks
on its embassies in Iraq and
Yemen this week. Meanwhile,
special representative Birren-
bach has returned to Tel Aviv,
apparently bearing the word that
Bonn wishes to complete the dip-
lomatic recognition process
through a quick exchange of am-
bassadors .
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``W SE CRE T
CONGO GOVERNMENT STARTS DRIVE ON NORTHEAST BORDER
The oft-postponed govern-
ment military operation to
seal the northeast border of
the Congo has started, while
upcoming elections preoccupy
the government apparatus in
most of the country.
Ugandan Prime Minister
Obote's attitude toward the
Congolese rebels remains ambig-
uous.
Border incidents con-
tinue, owever
Ugandan authorities
probably are still providing
the rebels sanctuary and offer-
ing some logistical support.
Meanwhile, preparations
for the Congo's parliamentary
elections are proceeding. The
voting--to be staggered province
by province--starts this week end
in the Katangan provinces and is
scheduled to finish in the
northeastern provinces by the
end of April. At the recent
Organization of African Unity
conference in Nairobi, Tshomb6
invited the rebels to return
and stand for offices. He also
invited several countries to
send observers; none has yet
responded.
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NW
SECRET'
BURUNDI STILL UNSTABLE AS KING VACATIONS IN EUROPE
The political situation in
Burundi, which revolves around
the endemic Tutsi-Hutu tribal
struggle for power, continues
to simmer in the wake of the
assassination of the Hutu prime
minister in mid-January and the
expulsion of the Chinese Commu-
nist diplomats in early Febru-
ary. The new prime minister,
Joseph Ba.mina., another Hutu,
has yet to consolidate his posi-
tion, and the radically inclined
Tutsi leaders continue to seek
ways to re-establish their in-
fluence.
The King, who has asserted
a, strong personal role in recent
months, left on 10 March for
two months' vacation in Europe.
During this period he expects
to exert his influence through
his personal secretary and other
individuals responsible directly
to him. Just before he left,
the King moved key government
SE CRE'T
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ministries--Justice and Informa-
tion --into the royal secretariat
under his personal control. He
already directly ruled the army
and gendarmerie. The King also
dissolved parliament, apparently
to preclude any steps to oust
Ba.mina, there.
The US Embassy in Bujumbura
is concerned that the Tutsis
may nevertheless act during the
King's absence and believes
that disturbances and even an-
other assassination cannot be
discounted. It fears that the
King's inexperienced appointees
and the timid prime minister ma.y
be easy prey to the veteran
Tutsi plotters and that Tutsi
extremists will be encouraged
to try to return Burundi to the
pro-Communist camp. The radical
foreign minister recently de-
clared on his own that Burundi
would resume diplomatic relations
with Peiping when the political
situation becomes "more settled."
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SOUTH AFRICA British High Commission Territories
WEST
AFRICA=
yMBR1
kND
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SE CRET
BRITISH-RULED HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES HOLD ELECTIONS
Elections held this month and
next in Bechuanaland and Basuto-
land--British High Commission ter-
ritories adjacent to South Africa
--are determining what kind of in-
digenous governments these terri-
tories will have when, as seems
probable, they become independent
next year. The viability of each
state will depend on cooperation
from South Africa, yet each is
under increasing pressures to
serve as a, forward base for Afri-
can nationalists seeking to over-
throw South Africa's white regime.
In the 1 March elections in
Bechuanaland, Seretse Khama.--a
proponent of close and friendly
relations with South Africa--and
his Bechuanaland Democratic Party
(BDP) won 28 of the 31 popularly
elected seats in a newly enlarged
Legislative Assembly. Now prime
minister, Seretse has announced
his determination to foster South
African trade and investment, and
has indicated that Bechuanaland
will not join in any economic sanc-
tions against Pretoria. He argues
that other African states must
recognize the geographic realities
for a nation of only 500,000 with
a primitive pastoral economy, sit-
uated amidst white-ruled South
Africa, Southwest Africa, and Rho-
desia.. Seretse is aiming for com-
plete independence by September
1966, and Britain is likely to con-
cur.
Basutoland, where elections
are due next month, has relatively
bleak prospects for independent
existence separate from South Af -
rica., which completely surrounds
this small, barren territory and
provides indispensable employment
for at least 100 , 000 of its 800 , 000
population. Basutoland politics
are, however, the most volatile of
the three territories. The coun-
try has become a haven for South
African subversives, and the mili-
tant antiwhite Pan-African Con-
gress, headquartered in Maseru,
has linked itself with the strong-
est local party, the Basutoland
Congress Party (BCP). The BCP
seeks to displace the tribal chiefs,
who retain their ascendancy with
British backing.
Elections for the Basutoland
Assembly have been repeatedly post-
poned ostensibly because of Brit-
ish fears of serious violence be-
tween the BCP and the two tradi-
tionalist parties which favor col-
laboration with South Africa. The
election delays have increased the
ti^a.ditiona.lists' cchances, but
it is doubtful that any indigenous
regime could effectively restrain
the militant refugees. Britain
is pledged to grant independence
within a year of the elections,
urLless flagrant disorders occur.
In South Africa, the ruling
Nationalist Party is anxious to
have friendly or at least passive
neighbors, and its spokesmen say
they will pursue a constructive
policy of aid toward Basutoland
and Bechuanaland, as well as Swazi-
land, the third High Commission
territory, where traditionalist
elements are strongest and inde-
pendence may be deferred several
years. But hostility from these
territories against South Africa. 25X1
would probably be countered with
harsh and crippling restrictions on
trade or migrant labor.
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NMI., 14~
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FRENCH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS REVEAL WEAKNESS OF GAULLISTS
The most noteworthy result of
France's municipal elections on 14
March--the first of two rounds--
was the Gaullists' failure to shake
the local fiefs of the old-line
parties. The returns indicate that
the Gaullist Union for the New Re-
public (UNR) was unable to improve
much on the meager showing it made
in the last municipal elections six
years ago, when it was in its or-
ganizational stage.
The customary runoff ballot
will take place on 21 March. This
year, however, a Gaullist-inspired
electoral law revision prohibiting
any change in party lists between
the two ballots in cities of over
30,000 people helped decide an un-
usually large number of contests
in the first round. Definitive
results were obtained in two thirds
of the 159 cities in question.
Only in Paris did the new elec-
toral law accomplish the polariza-
tion of leftists around the Commu-
nists and of moderates around the
UNR that the Gaullists had hoped
for. As a result the Gaullists
will probably come out on top in
at least 9 of the 14 Parisian dis-
tricts on the second ballot andthere-
by gain an absolute majority in the
30-member Paris Municipal Council.
Marseille Mayor Gaston Def-
ferre, the principal opposition can-
didate for the presidential race in
December, has a comfortable lead
over both the Communists and the UNR.
Barring an unlikely coalition of
these two elements against him, he
should easily win re-election as a
councilman in the runoff. His re-
designation as mayor would then seem
assured--enabling him to retain his
base for the presidential campaign.
SIGNS OF NEW DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO
Although Portugal continues
to present a facade of passive po-
litical conformity, there are signs
of economic discontent containing
a potential for political unrest.
In northern Portugal middle-
income businessmen who have been
supporters of the Salazar regime
are reportedly dissatisfied with
1964 tax regulations which were in-
stituted to finance military op-
erations in Portuguese Africa.
They feel the new taxes discrimi-
nate against them in favor of more
influential people. This has led
them to question the regime's Af-
rican policy.
Rising prices and discontent
with low wages are also generat-
ing complaints from regime support-
ers. Industrialists are dissatis-
fied with the rigidity of wage pol-
icies, especially in areas where
the emigration rate is high. These
irritants are blamed on the govern-
ment because it controls the econ-
omy. Various major industries are
reportedly ready to raise wages,
but Premier Salazar made it clear
in a recent major speech that
wage pressures must be resisted for
the sake of stability.
Another potential ally of the
traditional intellectual opposition
may be small rural landowners, who
expect shortly to be subjected to
higher real estate appraisals.
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Nm.~ Now
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Western Hemisphere
CASTRO CRITICIZES COMMUNIST WORLD RIFT AND VIETNAM POLICY
In a speech broadcast
over Radio Havana's world-wide
facilities on 13 March, Fidel
Castro declared that the Sino-
Soviet dispute is diverting
the "socialist camp" away from
its primary task of struggling
against "Yankee imperialism."
He was especially critical of
the failure of Moscow and Pei-
ping to come to Hanoi's aid
with "arms and men."
In Castro's view, the
division in the Communist world
only encourages the US to step
up its attacks in Southeast
Asia and diminishes the pres-
tige of international Communism.
He also asserted that "as long
as we have imperialism in front
attacking, it would be ridicu-
lous to sit down and discuss
whether they are greyhounds or
mongrels, whether they are made
of paper or iron."
The Soviet Union was the
chief target of Castro's barbs.
He implied that Moscow should
take risks in Southeast Asia
today that it refused to take
during the Cuban missile crisis
in 1962. Castro boasted that
the Cuban people had welcomed
the introduction of Soviet
strategic missiles into Cuba
even though they realized that
war could result, and that they
had "disagreed with their being
taken away." Referring to the
Vietnam situation, Castro said,
"we don't go for the idea of
shutting our mouths and pre-
tending we are morons to see
whether the Americans spare our
lives."
Castro was also critical of
discussions of differences among
Communists "unless they can
yield something positive." This
seems to have been a veiled ref-
erence to the recent "consulta-
tive" meeting of Communist par-
ties in Moscow. A Cuban dele-
gation headed by Raul Castro was
on hand for that meeting, but
the indications are that Cuba's
decision to attend was made only
when it became clear that the
participants would not be asked
to agree to measures which would
further exacerbate the Sino-
Soviet controversy.
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Western Hemisphere
PERONISTS GAIN IN ARGENTINE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
The initial count of the
14 March election in Argentina,
in which half of the 192 Cham-
ber of Deputies seats were at
stake, indicates that President
Illia's People's Ra.dica.l Civic
Union (UCRP) came out with its
plurality bloc of about 70 seats
still intact. The most spectac-
ular winners, however, were
the various Peronist-oriented
parties which cumulatively out-
polled the UCRP and raised their
representation in the chamber
from 17 to around 50 seats.
These gains were achieved de-
spite the employment of a. pro-
portional representation system
specifically designed to prevent
the Peronists from winning a
large number of seats. The re-
maining 70-odd seats are dis-
tributed among 10 or 11 small
parties.
Hard-line Peronist deputies,
mostly from the Popular Union
(UP) party, probably will form
the nucleus of a large opposi-
tion bloc which may not augur
well for the government's leg-
islative program. It was these
same Peronists who abetted and
directed much of the antigov-
ernment labor agitation that
marked the Argentine scene last
year, culminating in Peron's
abortive attempt to return in
December. Since the elections,
they have also renewed their
cry that Peron's return is es-
sential to the "pacification"
of the country.
In any case, there is likely
to be a polarization of forces
in the chamber between the Peron-
ist bloc and the UCRP. Some
of the small parties which have
recently withdrawn their sup-
port from the government pro-
gram can be expected to gravitate
toward the Peronists. The final
analysis may show that success
of the government's program will
depend on continued backing from
the approximately 20 neo-Peron-
ist deputies--those favoring
Peronism without Peron.
There are as yet no indi-
cations of what impact the elec-
tion results have registered,
but they can scarcely avoid en-
couraging the belief, particu-
larly among the military, that
Illia's "tolerance" of the Peron-
ists has backfired. It is too
eELrly to judge how the military
will react. However, they will
probably allow the Illia. govern-
ment at least some period of
grace to determine whether it
coin govern effectively in the
face of a strengthened and much
more virulent opposition.
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There is increasing pres-
sure on General Barrientos to
resign from the junta he now
heads by 26 March if he intends
to remain a candidate for the
Bolivian presidency in elections
set for September. The case for
resignation is based on a con-
stitutional requirement that
presidential candidates who hold
public office resign 180 days
before the election date.
Opposition parties and dis-
contented labor groups are spear-
heading the drive to get Barrien-
tos to step down. However, many
Bolivians who are not politically
opposed to Barrientos--including
some army officers--agree that he
should comply with the constitu-
tion. Thus far, Barrientos has
refused to do so on the grounds
that the requirement does not ap-
ply to him as head of an interim
government. In reality, he fears
The opposition Liberal
Party boycotted the inaugural
session of the Honduran constit-
uent assembly on 16 March, and
has indicated an intention to
stay away as long as its many
fundamental differences with the
dominant Nationalists remain
unresolved. The assembly, how-
ever, is to go about its work.
As the first order of business,
it is likely to delegate author-
ity to Chief of Government Lopez
until a new constitution is pro-
mulgated and Lopez is installed
as president under its terms.
that should he resign, commander
of the armed forces General
Gvando would impose a military
dictatorship.
ports Barrientosi
In
a, private conversation with US
officials, Ovando expressed the
view that military opinion would
leave Barrientos no choice but
to resign.
Negotiations between the
two parties are expected to
continue, and it is possible
that some compromise will be
worked out. The indications
are, however, that the Nation-
alists are unwilling to meet
any important Liberal demands.
As a consequence, the more
militant factions of the Liberal
Party may join the Communists
and other subversives in armed
opposition to the regime. ~~ 25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800060001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800060001-5
Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800060001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800060001-5
w
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04800060001-5