WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004800030001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 26, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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i _ F
Not
6 Febuy 1965
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
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VWAO
SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EST, 25 February 1965)
THE VIETNAM SITUATION
General Khanh's removal from power, apparently the in-
tention of both the coup and countercoup last week, does
not improve prospects for armed forces unity or political
stability. The pace of Viet Cong activity, meanwhile,
has stepped up considerably, and both China and North
Vietnam appear to have taken steps last week to bolster
their defenses. While neither Peiping nor Hanoi has
shown any interest so far in making negotiations on
Vietnam feasible, Moscow is privately urging the US to
consider some sort of neogitated settlement.
Page
UNITED NATIONS
UN ASSEMBLY ADJOURNS DESPITE ALBANIAN SHOWDOWN MANEUVER 4
An overwhelming majority of UN members beat back an Alba-
nian (i.e., Chinese Communist) effort to disrupt the
consensus procedure under which the session had operated
since 1 December to avoid a US-USSR showdown on the
Article 19 issue. President Quaison-Sackey will appoint
a committee of some 30 members to seek a solution to the
financial crisis during the six-month adjournment.
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
MOSCOW 1 MARCH MEETING APPARENTLY TO PROCEED ON SCHEDULE 5
At least seven of the invited parties,, however, will
apparently boycott the meeting. It will probably be
low key and is unlikely to endorse an early world Com-
munist conference or to issue pronouncements on issues
in the Sino-Soviet conflict.
NEW PRAVDA EDITOR CLARIFIES LINE ON SOVIET INTELLECTUALS 7
His major policy statement stressed the need for "expert"
recommendations of scientists and economists in decisions
on policy, but affirmed the party's commanding position.
On the issue of free discussion among artists and writers,
the line is more conservative.
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THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued)
INTERNAL OPPOSITION TO CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME
Peiping has launched yet another drive to discipline
dissident party members and intellectuals and is de-
manding political subservience of scientists and tech-
nicians for the first time since the Great Leap Forward.
PEIPING PREPARES FOR AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE
Recent Chinese Communist moves in Africa suggest that
Peiping is stepping up its efforts to lay the ground-
work for the second Afro-Asian conference, now sched-
uled to be held in Algiers next June,
Page
8
EAST GERMANS EXCAVATING DITCHES AROUND WEST BERLIN
The expense and effort required to ring the city with a
concrete-lined ditch are hardly warranted by the current
low refugee flow. The regime's intention may be to soft-
en the more objectionable features of existing fortifica-
tions, to highlight West Berlin's isolation, and, in time,
to reduce the number to border guards--whose poor morale
has been a chronic problem.
INDONESIA CONTINUES TWO-PRONGED CAMPAIGN AGAINST MALAYSIA 12
The Indonesian foreign minister has proposed secret talks
with the Malaysians, while Djakarta continues military
operations against Malaya.
ELECTION IN INDIA'S KERALA STATE LIKELY TO BE INCONCLUSIVE
The conflict between the now-separate left and right
Indian Communist parties is matched by splits within
the local Congress Party.
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
NEW TURMOIL IN THE BRAZZAVILLE CONGO 14
Three moderate cabinet ministers have been murdered, and
the premier is implying that Tshombe, Portugal., and the
US are behind a plot to overthrow the leftist Brazzaville
regime and partition both Congos for the "imperialists."
The US Embassy believes the murders were the work of re-
gime extremists bent on consolidating their power.
UGANDA STILL EMBROILED IN LEOPOLDVILLE CONGO REBELLION 1.5
New incidents continue to occur along the Conolese-
Ugandan border.
FRANCE'S POLICY OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
France is stepping up its diplomatic offensive for a
peaceful solution in Vietnam, advocating a settlement
based on the principles expounded at the 1954 Geneva
Conference. De Gaulle maintains that neutralization
of all Southeast Asia is prerequisite to peace and
stability in the area.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
MORE SOVIET AID AND TRADE FOR CUBA
Moscow's $170-million trade credit for 1.965 raises its
cumulative balance-of -payments support for Cuba to more
than $750 million.
26 Feb 65 CURRENT INTELMW EEKLY SUMMARY Page iii
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
CUBA SEEKING LONG-TERM SUGAR CONTRACTS IN THE FREE WORLD 20
Its satisfaction with its long-term, guaranteed-price
contract with the USSR has led it to try to make simi-
lar arrangements with free world purchasers. Spain has
been the most amenable to date, and Cuban negotiators
have had limited success with Morocco and Japan.
CONSERVATIVE LEADER ATTACKS BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES 21.
Guanabara Governor Lacerda, angered by reports that Pres-
ident Castello Branco is considering deferment of this
year's gubernatorial. elections, may be trying to alien-
ate the President's more "hard-line" supporters in hopes
of gaining their backing for himself in the 1966 presi-
dential. contest.
PROSPECTS IN CHILE'S MARCH CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION 22
The momentum which won the presidency for Eduardo Frei
last September will. probably help his Christian Democrats
gain more than a third of the seats in the Chamber of
Deputies--enough to sustain a presidential veto but well
short of a majority.
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26 Feb 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iv
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Nmop
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THE VIETNAM SITUATION
As a result of the abortive
coup and the successful counter-
coup in South Vietnam on 19-20
February, General Khanh has been
deposed as military commander in
chief and sent into temporary
exile as a "roving ambassador."
The status of the civilian gov-
ernment of Phan Huy Quat has not
been affected. The removal of
Khanh, apparently a primary
goal of both the attempted coup
and of the generals who quashed
it, seems unlikely to unify the
armed forces, or to usher in
early political stability.
The appointment of General
Tran Van "Little" Minh as "act-
ing commander in chief" looks
like an interim compromise while
the more ambitious "young Turk"
generals, such as I Corps Com-
mander Thi and air force Chief
Ky, maneuver to obtain ultimate
control of the military.)
The pro-Catholic, anti-Bud-
dhist, and even pro-Diem over-
tones of the coup attempt now
appear to have sharpened reli-
gious animosities. Although
the Buddhist leaders distrusted
Khanh, they appear to suspect
that his ouster may be partly
aimed against them and that it
may have had US blessing. They
give no indication of any inten-
tion to protest and have limited
themselves to voicing support
for the Quat government, but
there are growing signs that
they may be looking toward a ne-
gotiated settlement to resolve
South Vietnam's problems. They
still speak, however, of a Viet-
nam divided between a Communist
North and a non-Communist South.
The pace of Viet Cong ac-
tivity meanwhile has stepped
up considerably. Although the
bulk of this activity is still
harassment and sabotage, armed
attacks appear on the rise.
Heavy fighting has occurred for
several days at a point on the
east-west road linking the gov-
ernment's II Corps headquarters
at Pleiku in the central high-
lands with its supply depots at
Qui Nhon on the coast.
In the central and north-
ern provinces, the Viet Cong
have further encroached on areas
formerly controlled by the gov-
ernment. In the coastal prov-
inces of Quang Ngai and Binh
Dinh, and increasingly farther
south in Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa
provinces, government troops
have pulled back into the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Shams 7
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% we 13p, DICE 1 '
immediate vicinity of district
capitals. Viet Cong sabotage,
which has closed the main north-
south highway in Phu Yen and
Binh Dinh, and the coastal rail-
road between the cities of Nha
Trang and Da Nang, is helping
to isolate the northern prov-
inces.
The sinking on 17 February
of a camouflaged vessel off Phu
Yen Province, and the subsequent
discovery of an estimated 80-
100 tons of arms and ammunition
on shore has resulted in the
most significant capture to date
of bloc equipment supplied by
North Vietnam to the Viet Cong.
The incident
25X1
-
gests that the Communists hsaveug
developed, or expect to develop
an extensive system of logistic
support through sea infiltra-
tion.
Both Communist China and
North Vietnam appear to have
taken steps during the past week
to bolster their defenses.
The Chinese Communists
have taken further steps to im-
prove air defenses in South
China.
the Chinese are building a
second new airfield near the
Vietnamese border, about 25
miles northeast of the exist-
ing; one at Mengtzu. An area
some 7,000 feet long has been
cleared, and approximately 34
construction buildings were
noted.
The Soviets are apparently
intensifying their efforts to
deter the US from more far-reach-
ing actions in Vietnam. They
are privately urging the US to
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NWO, 3P-4 UKbT NNW
consider some sort of negotiated
settlement. In the two weeks
following the flare-up in the
Vietnam situation, the Soviet
Union adopted a noncommittal at-
titude toward the possibility of
negotiations. Soviet officials
informed the French and British
ambassadors that there could be
no question of negotiations
while US bombings continue.
Moscow's lack of initiative has
resulted in part from the Soviet
leaders' desire to avoid an
open divergence with the Hanoi
and Peiping regimes. The USSR
probably also wishes to play
for time to assess further de-
velopments in US policy.
The Soviet press, however,
continues to report differences
between the US and its allies
and proposals by Western lead-
ers for convening a conference.
In line with this course, So-
viet Ambassador Vinogradov's
23 February call on President
de Gaulle seemed aimed at fo-
cusing attention on the crisis
and at isolating the US on the
question of a negotiated set-
tlement.
The Chinese Communists
and North Vietnamese so far
have showed no interest in
making it possible to hold ne-
gotiations on the Vietnam sit-
uation. Both Peiping and Hanoi
continue to call for unilateral
withdrawal of US forces from
South Vietnam as the only pos-
sibly solution. Chou En-lai,
for example, in a message to
the Indo-Chinese People's Con-
ference in Phnom Penh on 23
February, stated that the US
must withdraw its military
-forces from Indochina "com-
pletely, immediate) and un-
conditional)
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After disposing of essential
business on a "no-objection" basis,
and thanks to the US acquiescence
in a "procedural" vote, the 19th
UN General Assembly session ad-
journed on 18 February until 1
September. The intervening period
will permit further negotiations on
the financial crisis and future
peacekeeping operations by the big
powers and by a committee of 30-
odd members to be appointed by
President Quaison-Sackey. However,
the whole process of vacillation
and evasion has brought discredit
to the UN.
The assembly by a vote of 97
to 2, with 13 abstentions,* beat
back an Albanian maneuver--pre-
sumably instigated by Peiping--to
disrupt the consensus procedure
under which the session had been
operating since 1 December. The
surprise Albanian ploy was designed
to precipitate a confrontation be-
tween the US and the USSR at the
last hour over the arrears ques-
tion and voting rights. Most UN
members believed that since the
Albanian delegate could not be
persuaded to desist, the US should
save the day and the UN by avoid-
ing the confrontation. The vote
was taken on the basis it would
"not involve or prejudice" the
question of Article 19. The as-
sembly president ruled before the
vote that it was without prejudice
to the legal positions of the
various members.
In general, UN representa-
tives reacted very favorably to
the US handling of the problem. A
canvass of Latin American delegates
revealed that the group as a whole
was "much relieved" and believed
that the final vote was favorable
to the US world posture. The Latin
Americans, who usually take a very
legalistic view of the UN charter,
also felt that the strictly jurid-
ical situation involving Article
19 was saved by the US explanatory
statement. However, Soviet Ambas-
sador Fedorenko contended publicly
on 24 February that the US has lost
its fight by agreeing to a roll
call vote, thus making the penalty
question a "dead issue."
Despite general relief that a
showdown has been averted for the
time being, the formidable problem
of negotiating some settlement on
the arrears question remains. The
composition of what promises to be
a cumbersome committee is still un-
settled--presumably Nationalist
China will be excluded in order to
get Moscow's participation. The
fact that for three months most
assembly members have preferred to
relinquish their own right to vote
rather than to deprive financial
delinquents of theirs will not make
the secretary general's dues-col-
lecting any easier. Above all, it
would seem that, despite valiant
efforts, the General Assembly is
slated to lose at least those pow-
ers granted to it by the 1950
"uniting for peace" resolution
which made it virtually coequal
with the Security Council in peace-
keeping.
* aura ania lined up with Albania. Abstaining were Algeria, Burundi,
Congo(Brazzaville), Cuba, France, Guinea, 'Mali, Portugal, Rumania, Sene-
gal, the UAR, Tanzania, and Yemen. Cambodia, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia
did not participate.
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The Soviet leaders appar-
ently have decided to proceed
with the Communist meeting
scheduled for 1 March.
The Italian, Bulgarian, and
East German parties have announced
that they are sending delega-
tions to Moscow. Peiping and
the Chinese-oriented parties--
the Albanian, Japanese, Indo-
nesian, North Korean, and North
Vietnamese--can be expected to
boycott the meeting. Rumania,
in addition, has refused to at-
tend any meeting unless all the
invited parties attend. Moscow,
therefore, probably can count
on, at most, 19 of the 26 mem-
bers of the "editorial commis-
sion." *
This meeting probably will
be represented as merely the
first of a series of preparatory
sessions which will discuss prob-
lems facing the Communist move-
ment and measures to promote
unity. It is unlikely either
to endorse an early world Com-
munist conference or to issue
pronouncements on substantive
issues in the Sino-Soviet con-
flict. Any communiqud probably
will be limited to an anodyne
reference to the value of regu-
lar consultations in strengthen-
ing cohesion and a display of
solidarity in condemning US
policy in Vietnam and elsewhere.
The need for Communist bloc
unity was the main theme of the
Warsaw Pact meeting in January,
oil Kosygin's statements in North
V:Letnam and North Korea, and of
Soviet treatment of the recent
15th anniversary of the Sino-
Soviet Treaty of Friendship,
Alliance, and Mutual Assist-
ance. The Russians are likely
to avoid any suggestion of con-
frontation or showdown with the
Chinese at the 1 March meeting.
Peiping has renewed its
attack on the planned meeting
by rebroadcasting on 20 Febru-
ary a statement by a pro-Chinese
Australian Communist leader de-
nouncing the gathering as a
continuation of Khrushchev's
plan to "impose revisionism"
on the world movement. The Chi-
nese may already have set the
wheels in motion for a meeting
of their supporters in Peiping--
something they indirectly threat-
ened to do last August.
*The Dare the Bulgarian, Hungarian, East German, Cuban, Mongo-
lian, Polish, Russian, Czech, French, Italian, West German, British,
Finnish, Argentine, Brazilian, Syrian, Indian, US, and Australian
Commmunist parties.
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A major policy statement by
Pravda's new editor, Aleksey
Rumyantsev, has defined the new
regime's position toward the
Soviet intelligentsia. The ar-
ticle affirms the party's command-
ing position, but its major in-
tent is to stress the need for
the "expert" recommendations of
scientists and economists, and
thus to sanction their expanding
role in decision-making. The
line is more conservative, how-
ever, on the issue of free dis-
cussion among artists and writers.
Encouragement of scienti-
fic participation in policy for-
mulation is pointed up by a
critical reference to previous
"distrust and intolerance" of
the intelligentsia, when "an
autocratic 'leader,' sure of his
own infallibility, considered
himself the supreme arbiter in
all spheres of human activity."
The party, asserts Rumyantsev,
resolutely opposes the unwill-
ingness of "certain leaders" to
consider scientific recommenda-
tions and will not deny the
exploration of new avenues in
scientific research because they
do not yield immediate results.
Khrushchev is the obvious cul-
prit here, and since his ouster,
scientists have argued for the-
oretical research unhampered by
demands for its immediate appli-
cation.
Rumyantsev in effect pro-
vides a theoretical basis for
some of the trends that have
developed since Khrushchev's
ouster. He cites precedents
from Lenin for the enlistment
of academicians and economists
in elaborating the basic features
of the economic plan for 1966-
70 and for the use of experts to
provide new solutions for manag-
ing the economy. The Rumyantsev
line seems to follow Kosygin's
pragmatic approach to economic
administration.
The article is also compat-
ible with recent reminders by
military and party spokesmen
that military doctrine is formu-
lated by the party on the "sci-
entific" recommendations of mil-
itary professionals. It further
suggests that the new leaders
will continue to encourage open
discussion of controversial sub-
jects as they have done with
Lysenko and Liberman.
Rumyantsev's comments on
the artistic intelligentsia con-
tinued the carefully moderate
line set in recent editorials
on cultural policy, criticizing
past "excesses" but making no
major concessions to liberal in-
tellectual interests. He con-
demned the injection of personal
tastes into artistic questions
by certain "leaders" as well as
attempts to solve such problems
by "administrative methods."
He also appeared to sanction the
recent defeat of several Stalin-
ist hold-?overs in cultural and
scientific organizations with a
reference to those who had re-
ceived "undeserved support in
the not too distant past." How-
ever, he reaffirmed the party's
demand for ideological confor-
mity in the content of art and
warned that the struggle against
"bourgeois ideology" must continue.
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Rumyantsev's call for care-
ful deliberation in deciding
whether a given idea is ideolog-
ically acceptable suggests that
the regime is not anxious to
raise the problems of ideologi-
cal purity in art at this time.
Although opening the door to
somewhat greater stylistic ex-
perimentation, he warned that
the party cannot tolerate "a
swamp of ideological emptiness,
decadence and naked formalism."
Peiping is becoming increas-
ingly concerned over dissident
party members and intellectuals
and has launched yet another
drive to discipline them.
In an unusually frank ad-
mission in his year-end report
on the state of the nation,
Premier Chou En-lai had warned
that the "sinister winds of capi-
talism" were still blowing into
China. As a result, subversive
elements were being "ceaselessly
generated... in party and govern-
ment organs," invariably trying
to "find protectors and agents
in the higher leading organiza-
tions." Although claiming that
only 5 percent of the population
really opposes the party, Chou
conceded that some of the re-
mainder "may follow our lead
somewhat hesitantly." To count-
eract these hostile forces, Chou
promised an even tougher appli-
cation of the socialist educa-
tion campaign then in full swing.
The party leadership is
especially disturbed over intel-
lectuals, regarding some as
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For the first time since
the Great Leap Forward, criti-
cism of intellectuals is being
broadened to include scientists
and technicians. From 1961 to
1964 Peiping consciously tried
to protect this group from ex-
cessive political interference,
but last month the party journal
Red Flag, once again stressing
aat it was more important to be
"Red" than "expert," warned that
the state could make only limited
use of the knowledge of natural
scientists who have faulty polit-
ical beliefs.
This harder line probably
reflects Mao Tse-tung's personal
position. Last fall Mao com-
plained to foreign visitors that
science students, as well as
those in other fields, lacked
ideological conviction and would
have to be "steeled" with heavy
doses of manual labor and indoc-
trination. It is not clear how
far the regime intends to go in
intruding politics into science,
but a continuation of the present
trend will almost certainly im-
pede the progress of training
and research programs.
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Sao, SECRET v4wr
PEIPING PREPARES FOR AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE
Recent Chinese Communist
moves in Africa suggest that
Peiping is stepping up its ef-
forts to lay the groundwork for
the second Afro-Asian conference,
now scheduled to be held in Al-
giers next June. During the
past two weeks the Chinese have
been concentrating their atten-
tion on the UAR and Algeria.
A delegation of high-level
Chinese foreign policy officials
arrived in Cairo on 15 February
for extended talks with the
Egyptians. This group includes
two vice ministers of foreign
affairs and the head of the For-
eign Ministry department deal-
ing with North African and Near
Eastern affairs.
The subjects under discus-
sion have not been announced,
but plans for joint action in
Africa and the Middle East are
probably important items on the
agenda. The Chinese may be en-
gaged in working out preliminary
arrangements for a visit by Pre-
mier Chou En-lai. According to
a story in the authoritative
Cairo newspaper Al Ahram last
December, Chou wars scheduled for
a swing through the Middle East
and Africa in March.
:these visits may since have
been postponed, however, in view
of the fact that they apparently
had been planned to coincide
with the Afro-Asian conference
before it was put off from March
until June.
Another Chinese delegation
is in Algiers, taking part in
the Afro-Asian economic seminar
sponsored by the Afro-Asian Peo-
ple's Solidarity Organization
(AAPSO). Meetings began on 22
February and were scheduled to
last for five days. This will
provide an opportunity for im-
proving the already close rela-
tions between China and Algeria.
Shortly before the delegation
arrived, the Chinese had agreed
to supply equipment for the mili-
tia. forces of Algeria's National
Liberation Front. Preliminary
negotiations for this accord
probably took place last December
during' a two-week visit to China.
by high-ranking Algerian mili-
tia officers.
While the seminar was going
on, a 13,000-ton Chinese dry-
cargo freighter was turned over
to the Algerian Government on
24 February. This gift points
up the importance Peiping attaches
to developing closer ties with
Algiers. The vessel, purchased
from Norway in 1964 for $1.5 mil-
lion, was one of the 15 ships
assigned to China's international
shipping fleet.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 10
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Recent Ditch and
Fenceonstruction
I
An,
WEST BERLIN C
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The Communist World
EAST GERMANS EXCAVATING DITCHES AROUND WEST BERLIN
The East Germans have be-
gun to excavate a series of
ditches at a number of points
along the sector and zonal bor-
ders around West Berlin. Else-
where, they are erecting elec-
trified fences which appear to
be of a temporary nature.
The ditches, which are 16
feet wide and 9 feet deep, ap-
pear designed to supplement
existing border fortifications.
In time, they may replace the
combination of barbed wire,
cleared strips, and barricades
which ring the Western sectors
adjacent to East Germany, though
not all the Wall runnin throw h
the center of Berlin.
"cla.im the Ulbricht
regime p ans to "modernize" the
sector/zonal borders by 1970,
replacing the barriers erected
since August 1961 with a ditch
backed by a high wire fence and
a paved concrete or macadam
strip suitable for vehicular
patrols.
The East Germans have
massed approximately 140 bull-
dozers at Busendorf, a, military
training area just outside the
city, apparently as a, prelude
to an all-out effort to complete
the ditchdigging. With this
equipment they could do so this
year and--with additional equip-
ment, especially heavy-duty
ea.rthmovers--probably by Sep-
tember, at a minimum cost of
$2 million. About 40,000 tons
of concrete would be required
to line the entire excavation
at a, cost of an additional $9
million--to prevent washout.
Such an expenditure is within
the regime's capability and
would not unduly strain the econ-
omy.
One 1,600-ya.rd ditch now
has been dug, and work is under
way ,at five other sites oppo-
site the British and French sec-
tors.
The expense and effort re-
quired to ring the city are
hardly warranted by the refugee
flow---fewer than 600 escapes in
the Berlin area. in 1964. Rather
it would appear that the system
of ditches is designed to soften
the more objectionable features
of the existing fortifications
and to highlight West Berlin's
physical separation from the
surrounding territory. In time,
the ditches may permit some re-
duction in the number of border
guards patrolling the sector/
zonal borders.. Poor border
guard morale is a chronic prob-
lem for the Ulbricht regime.
The equivalent of three guard
companies have fled into West
Berlin since August 1961.
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INDONESIA CONTINUES TWO-PRONGED CAMPAIGN AGAINST MALAYSIA
Indonesia's confrontation
of Malaysia continues to combine
military activity with offers
of a peaceful settlement.
Indonesian Foreign Minister
Subandrio has proposed secret
ministerial-level talks with Ma-
laysia for the first week of
March
Thai Foreign
Minister Thanat will act as an
intermediary. According to
Thanat, Subandrio has promised
to stop all incursions and in-
cidents before the talks and
for as long as negotiations
might continue.
Military activity continues,
however. Two more Indonesian
landing attempts against the Ma-
lay Peninsula occurred on 24
February.
tained initially.
Within Indonesia, pressures
are mounting from both Commu-
nist and official elements for
at least a nominal government
take -over of seven American-owned
rubber plantations'in North Su-
inatra. Some sort of government
supervision seems likely although
American management may be re-
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The threat of a Communist
victory in the 4 March elections
in India's Kerala State has been
sharply reduced by the conflict be-
tween the now-separate left and
right Communist parties. Although
the two factions together have long
commanded more voter strength than
any other political group in the
state, the current campaign is in
their eyes as much a battle for
leadership of the Communist move-
ment as a serious bid for power.
As a result, Congress Party
chances are a little better. De-
spite high-level intervention from
New Delhi, the Congress has been
unable to patch up the split that
brought down the Congress government
last September. There is some pos-
sibility that the two Congress
groups, with the help of independ-
ents, could emerge with sufficient
strength to form a shaky coalition
government, but such an arrange-
ment would depend upon greater con-
cessions than either side has thus
far, been willing to consider. It
now appears more likely that no
workable governing combination
will evolve, and that the direct
administration from New Delhi--
president's rule--which has been 25X1
in effect since September will be
renewed for another six months.
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NNW
VOO
SECRET
NEW TURMOIL IN THE BRAZZAVILLE CONGO
Tension and confusion have
been running high for two weeks
in Congo (Brazzaville) amid
signs that the continuing power
struggle between the leftist
regime's extremist and more
pragmatic elements has entered
another active phase. The most
clearly discernible effect so
far has been an acceleration of
the country's steady slide to-
ward anarchy.
The new crisis began on
12 February with a radio speech
by Premier Lissouba, a pragmatic
leftist, alleging an elaborate
plot to overthrow his government
and partition both Congos for
the benefit of "imperialists."
Characteristically he implicated
Tshombd, who he said was conniv-
ing with a variety of Western
interests--mostly European. Lis-
souba advised his listeners not
to be "astonished" by any "sport-
ing events" they might soon see.
Five days later, with ten-
sion and rumors mounting, Braz-
zaville radio announced that
three prominent civil servants
had been abducted on the night
of 15-16 February and that the
bodies of two of them had been
recovered. It blamed "unknown
commandos" sent by the plotters
from Leopoldville to sow unrest
in Brazzaville's civil adminis-
tration.
That same day, however, Lis-
souba told the US ambassador,
while insinuating a US role in
the alleged conspiracy, that the
three victims were themselves
in on the plot and had been dis-
posed of either by local "Portu-
;guese nationals" who feared ex-
posure or by freewheeling extrem-
ists of the Brazzaville regime's
youth organization (JMNR).
The US Embassy is convinced
that the three officials, all
known as moderates who disap-
proved of the regime, were in
fact murdered by JMNR militants
acting on instructions from ex-
tremists bent on consolidating
their power position. Youth
leaders are closely associated
with the ruling party's most
extreme leftist elements, nota-
bly politburo secretaries Bou-
kambou and Noumazalay. The em-
bassy's conviction is supported
by a spate of recent arrests,
including at least one moderate
cabinet minister, and by the
thrust and timing of regime
propaganda and news releases.
On 19 February it was announced
that a committee had been created
to help "accomplish the work of
the government," with membership
drawn from party institutions
dominated by extremists.
Many aspects of the Brazza-
ville power struggle remain ob-
scure, including the position
of Lissouba, who is probably the
extremists' main target. Simi-
larly, little has been heard
lately of enigmatic President
Massamba-Debat, who is not him-
self an ideological leftist
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DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
-? - International boundary
~??_~ Province boundary
Q National capital
* Province capital
LEO 'OtDVf
d* tc
Ktk4wit .,
Lisala Bumba keti
'BeiaTe
?
*Lodja
_Paulis
5,., UAL A
:N TAL
,...,~ Kolwezi~ Jadotville
ru 4 Fort Portal
Kasmdi
Tl) KAMPA A
tl~ i
KIGALI
ram" * Btt1UMBURA
ulirnbaSl I I Kigama Tabn
C3kaAt3 ongolo
*l,
'i Albertville
Kabon o Baudou
g Manono
NORD
... *Elisabetbville
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`01 SECRET *MW
although he has quietly acqui-
esced in the extremists' steady
accretion of power since the 1963
revolution. His hand would seem
to have been strengthened by a
change in the military command
which also occurred last week.
Other "Loose ends" include
indications that warrants may be
out for the arrest of Nouma.za.lay
and the top JMNR leader
UGANDA STILL EMBROILED IN LEOPOLDVILLE CONGO REBELLION
Events this week threaten
to cause further serious diffi-
culties between Uganda and the
Congo. Incidents along their
border continue, the latest re-
ported to have occurred on 22
February when aircraft bombed
a missionary school four miles
inside Uganda., injuring some
children and damasxinrr hiiildino
The Uga.nda.n forces--appar-
ently two companies--which en-
tered the Congo on 14-17 Feb-
ruary have reportedly now with-
drawn to their own territory.
They made no significant gains
and suffered moderate losses.
Leopoldville claims to have
recaptured Ka.sindi, one of the
points where the Ugandans crossed
the border. Rebel forces, how-
ever, are still in control at
Mahagi, where the second incur-
sion occurred.
Although Obote has
long supported the rebels, his
emotional state and his long-
standing fears of an invasion
,of Uganda by mercenaries sug-
gest that his moves were an ir-
rational response to the bomb-
ing of an Ugandan customs post
on 13 February.
This week end, the OAU
foreign ministers meet in Nai--
robi. Tshombd reportedly plans
to attend, although some radi-
cal states may attempt to block
his participation. At this
gathering, the African mod-
erates, reinforced by the re-
cent Nouakchott meeting of
French-speaking states, may
take a. stronger stand in support
of the Congolese premier.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 15
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SECRET
Europe
FRANCE'S POLICY OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
French Foreign Minister
Couve de Murville's fervent ad-
vocacy of a negotiated Vietnam
settlement during his mid-Feb-
ruary Washington visit implies
a stepped-up diplomatic offen-
sive for a peaceful solution.
Paris has maintained that peace
and stability in Southeast Asia
can be achieved only through
neutralization of the entire
area, and that only neutraliza-
tion will avert an escalation
of the present conflict or a
humiliating Western withdrawal.
France is now pressing for an
international conference to
reach a settlement.
In an official statement
on 10 February, French Informa-
tion Minister Peyrefitte reaf-
firmed his government's belief
that solution of the problems
of Southeast Asia must come
through an international agree-
ment conforming to the princi-
ples expounded at the 1954
Geneva Conference. De Gaulle
sounded the same theme last
week in an exchange of views
with Cambodian Prince Sihanouk.
Paris press reports that France
would not support the US in a
war with Communist China prob-
ably reflect an official atti-
tude in view of the French con-
tention that a Western military
victory in Vietnam is impossible.
The 1954 Geneva formula con-
tains three principal ingredients:
a negotiated cease-fire, with-
drawal of foreign forces, and
the eventual reunification of
North and South Vietnam. De
Gaulle would not regard as
disastrous the possibility that
a unified Vietnam might profess
a formal commitment to Commu-
nism, since he believes in the
inevitable preponderance of
national over ideological con-
siderations. He would expect
the eventual emergence of a
"nationalist Communist" regime
ready to play off the USSR
against Communist China.
Paris thinks it has an
"honest-broker" role in a dis-
cussion of a Southeast Asian
settlement not only because of
its past interest and influence
there but also because of its
diplomatic access to all inter-
ested parties.
De Gaulle of course is
motivated also by his drive to
establish France's claim to big-
power status. He would expect
France's prestige to be improved
as a result of its contribution
to solution of a problem involv-
ing the major powers. He also
expects France to regain a posi-
t:Lon of some influence, albeit
admittedly secondary to China's,
in an area with traditional
French ties.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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%01 w
Million dollars
1,000
900
USSR
FREE WORLD
OTHER COMMUNIST
635 625 640
615
575
410 425
~.
405
380
335
330
x'35
180:
85
'5O23 2
CUBAN
FOREIGN
TRADE
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SECRET %no
Western Hemisphere
Soviet-Cuban trade will
register a significant increase
this year, considerably beyond
the previous peaks of about
$635 million set in 1962 and
1964. This increase is made
possible in part by Soviet will-
ingness to finance another sub-
stantial imbalance in trade.
Moscow has agreed to pro-
vide $170 million worth of goods
on credit this year--raising its
cumulative balance-of-payments
support for Cuba to over $750
million. For its part, Cuba is
to increase 1965 exports to the
USSR by about $70 million--
shipping 2.1 million tons of
sugar, 500,000 tons more than
in 1964. Neither the five-year
trade pact nor the 1965 proto-
col just signed indicates whether
the USSR will continue the prac-
tice of paying $20 million in
hard currencies for 20 percent
of the first million tons of
sugar it buys. Under its long-
term sugar purchase contract,
however, it is committed to pay
six cents per pound which, in
view of current low sugar prices,
represents sizable nonreimbur-
sable aid to Cuba.
It is estimated that So-
viet imports from Cuba will
reach about $300 million and
that over $450 million worth of
Soviet goods may be delivered
this year. The USSR will con-
tinue to meet Cuba's requirements
for essential fuels, foodstuffs,
raw materials, and equipment.
Moscow recently paid $40 million
in hard currency for 500,000 tons
of Canadian wheat and flour for
shipment to Cuba. It also con-
tinues deliveries under its $325
million development credits, and
is expected to continue to main-
tain some 2,000 economic techni-
cians in Cuba.
By contrast, Cuba's pur-
chases from the West will be
smaller this year than last be-
cause it has used most of its
Western credits and the foreign
exchange it earned while sugar
prices were high.
This squandering of wind-
fall revenues, and other aspects
of Cuba's economic mismanage-
ment, presumably came in for
Soviet criticism during the re-
cent lengthy trade negotiations
with Cuban ministers of economy,
industry, and agriculture, as
we:Ll as foreign trade. Moscow,
however, is fully backing the
Cuban drive to restore and im-
prove agricultural production.
Unprecedented deliveries of So-
viet agricultural equipment are
expected to play an important
role in increasing sugar produc-
tion this year--by at least ten
percent.
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Cuba's satisfaction with
its long-term, guaranteed-price
sugar contract with the USSR
has encouraged it to attempt
similar arrangements with major
free world purchasers. Spain
has been the most amenable to
date, and Cuban negotiators
have had limited success with
Morocco and Japan.
Cuba has signe a
five-year agreement under which
Spain will pay 6.71 cents per
pound for an annual minimum of
120,000 tons of sugar. The
Spanish will gradually increase
purchases through 1970, with the
option of buying up to 200,000
tons annually.
Spain's willingness to pay a
premium price may also have
been increased by Cuba's hints
that it was considering indem-
nification for Spanish proper-
ties nationalized in Cuba.
Havana announced on 20 Feb-
ruary a commercial agreement un-
der which Morocco will buy 565,-
000 tons of Cuban sugar in
1966-67. Morocco will pay 3.15
cents per pound and payments in
convertible currency will fall
from 35 percent in 1966 to 25
percent in 1967.
Cuban officials seem con-
vinced that this type of longer
term agreement provides the
soundest basis for Cuban eco-
nomic and financial planning.
They can be expected to continue
efforts to arrange similar ac-
cords with other free world coun-
tries. Nevertheless, despite
these longer term agreements and
the expected increase in the
1965 sugar crop, the drop in
sugar prices in the last 12
months will seriously reduce Ha-
vana's 1965 buying power in the
West .,
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SECRET
Western Hemisphere
CONSERVATIVE LEADER ATTACKS BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES
Guanabara Governor Carlos
Lacerda is sharpening his opposi-
tion to Brazilian President
Castello Branco's policies. He
delivered his strongest public
attack on the government thus far
in a 12 February radio speech in
which he condemned the adminis-
tration for allegedly betraying
the revolution that overthrew the
Goulart regime last year. As
leader of a key state and spokes-
man for influential conservatives,
Lacerda's attitude toward the gov-
ernment is crucial.
Lacerda focused his attack on
the issue of free elections, ap-
parently in reaction to reports
that Castello Branco is consider-
ing deferment of gubernatorial
elections now scheduled for Octo-
ber in half of Brazil's 22 states.
The governor is naturally alarmed
by any action that encourages
"hard-liners" to continue press-
ing for cancellation of next
year's presidential election in
which he will be a leading con-
tender.
Lacerda alleged that corrup-
tion is still tolerated and that
self-interested politicians con-
tinue to dominate official poli-
cies. He called the presidential
advisers "intriguers" and "grave-
diggers" of the revolution. The
criticism directed at the Presi-
dent himself was relatively mild,
limited to charges of political
ineptness and indecisiveness.
While the speech probably
does not represent a full break
with the administration, it does
widen the division between the
governor and Castello Branco.
Lacerda may be attempting to
drive a wedge between Castello
Branco and his supporters, par-
ticularly those who are pushing
for a more complete cleanup of
politics, in hopes of gaining
their backing in the 1966 cam-
paign. He has had some hope of
being the "candidate of the rev-
olution" but now apparently be-
lieves that the regime is work-
ing against his candidacy. The
US Embassy suggests that he may
even be thinking of preparing
for a possible future coup at-
tempt if his chances of election
should appear slim.
The speech may have grave
implications for stability in
Brazil. Should Lacerda continue
to pursue a line of acrimony and
demagoguery, he would encourage
interparty rivalries and fric-
tion which have remained rela-
tively temperate under the pres-
ent regime. These tactics
would also greatly reduce the
government's prospects for gain-
ing public acceptance of the
all-important austerity program.
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Western Hemisphere
PROSPECTS IN CHILE'S MARCH CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION
Chile will hold national
congressional elections on 7
March. In contention are all
seats in the 147-member Chamber
of Deputies, and 20 of the 45
desks in the Senate. Whereas
last September's presidential
race ultimately amounted to a
contest between two coalitions,
the legislative contest will
find the seven significant po-
litical parties individually
struggling for position. Three
lesser parties also hope to gain
admittance to the Congress, and
one could conceivably elect a
senator. In some districts cer-
tain parties are cooperating be-
hind one or another candidate.
The outlook is for a con-
tinuation of the momentum with
which Eduardo Frei's Christian
Democrats (PDC) won him the
presidency, albeit with a de-
cided decline in vote percentage
as their nominal Conservative
and Liberal allies of September
run for themselves. Further-
more, the Communists (PCCh) can
be expected to hold their own
or even to gain in seats, and
to register a strong percentage
increase in their electoral sup-
port. Other parties are unlikely
to improve upon their numerical
strength in the present Congress.
In popular vote, the Popu-
lar Revolutionary Action Front
(FRAP)--made up of Socialists,
Communists, and National Demo-
crats--may draw about 35 percent,
with the PCCh attracting about
half of that. The PDC should
run slightly stronger than FRAP
as it moves toward becoming a
national majority party, while
the three traditional parties--
Radicals, Liberals, Conserva-
tivESs--will divide the remainder
of the ballots.
Indications are that the
PDC may pick up 5 senators, the
Communists 2, and National Demo-
crats I at the expense of the
Liberals (-3), Socialists (-2)
and Radicals (-2), and an In-
dependent. In the Chamber,
the PDC probably will more than
double its present 28 deputies,
at the expense of the Radicals
(_1.0), Liberals (-10), Conserva-
tives (-5), Socialists (-4),
and National Democrats (-3).
The Communists may gain a seat
for a total of 17 in the new
Conngress.
The ruling Christian Demo-
crats will almost certainly
thus be left well short of a
majority, although with more
than the third needed in the
Chamber to sustain a presiden-
tial veto. They therefore
will find it necessary to at-
tract the support of other leg-
islators either through coopera-
tion with another party, which
is improbable, or by achieving
agreements with individual con-
gressmen.
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