WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004800010001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 12, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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WEEKLY
SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLlGEIVGE
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...,SECRET
C~RC?UP I Excluded from a+1~`omot
dgwngrading pnd q'Qelassifica i-n
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SEC'RET'
(Information as of 1200 EST, 11 February 1965)
Page
THE VIETNAM SITUATION
Hanoi apparently remains determined to continue the war
in South Vietnam at an intensive pace despite the US and
South Vietnamese air strikes. Heavy Communist pressure
persists in the South, and this week appears likely to
prove the most violent of the war to date, The politi-
cal response of Hanai and its Liberation Front has also
been defiant. Peiping, while moving cautiously, is issu-
ing increasingly bellicose propaganda. However, no sig-
nificant military deployment in China, the USSR, or North
Vietnam that can be considered direct reaction to the air
strikes has been detected thus far.
PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST PREPARATORY MEETING
Although before recent hostilities in Vietnam, Moscow
appeared determined to proceed with the March prepara-
tory meeting, the Soviets. now may find their plans com-
plicated by the Vietnamese crisis.
THE DOWNFALL OF LYSENKO
Biologist Lysenko"s ouster from :his institute in the
Academy of Sciences climaxes a tern-year campaign by
Soviet scientists to free resear~:h from the stifling
ideological dogmas of the Stalin era. His removal
will encourage restive intellectuals in other fields.
SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES CONTINUE
The USSR has bought considerable amounts of grain this
season, both for its own use and to meet export commit-
ments, and free world brokers ex]aect additional orders.
SOVIET MILITARY MEN OPPOSE "SUBJECTI'J'ISM" IN DOCTRINE
Recent statements by two high-ra~lking Soviet staff off i-
cers suggest that the military l~aadership of the USSR is
pressing for a greater role in the determination of mil-
itary doctrine and other matters relating to national
military policy.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
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~` SECRF; T
ASIA-AFR];CA
THE SITUATION IN LAOS 9
General Kouprasith Abhay, commander of the forces in the
Vientiane area, has emerged as a dominant figure in the
military establishment following last week's showdown
with Phaumi and Siho, who have fled to Thailand. There
appears to be no prospect at present of any effective,
opposition to Kouprasith.
SYRIAN REGIME MOVES LEFTWARD ~
The Baathists have successfully beaten down conserva-
tive opposition to their nationalization program, and
seem somewhat more willing to permit local Communists
to collaborate with them.
ISRAEL AND ARABS APPEAR EDGING CLOS~~R TO CONFLICT 10
The latest Israeli warnings havE; been aimed at intim-
idating Lebanon from participating in Arab plans to
divert the Jordan River headwatE~rs, but the Lebanese
claim they have no alternative. Sentiment seems to
be growing in Israel for some kind of preventive mil-
itary strike against the Arabs.
PRESSURES FOR RHODESIAN INDEPENDENCE CONTINUE
Prime Minister Smith is being pressed by extremists
within his party to tighten white rule, despite the
international difficulties which are likely to ensue.
GAMBIA BECOMES INDEPENDENT
This small West African country, hitherto under British
control, is expected to federate eventually with neigh-
boring Senegal, although the movE~ment in this direction
may be slow.
SECRE ~'
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SE CRE'T
ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
Page
COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 16
The six EEC countries are showing renewed determination
to hasten their economic integration, but the difficult
problems involved may be resolved only in another all-
inclusive "package deal" this summer.
ASSESSMENT OF DE GAULLE'S 4 FEBRUARY PRESS CONFERENCE 17
De Gaulle reasserted both his world power aspirations
for France and. his insistence that Europe be independ-
ent of US tutelege. He set no target dates for reform
of the international monetary system or for German re-
unification, but he may soon follow up on his proposal
to reorganize the UN.
STUDENT UNREST IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN' lg
Portuguese students declare that the aim of recent anti-
regime demonstrations in both gauntries is to free student
organizations from government c~antrol, but they deny any
connection between the two prat~est movements. The unrest
has embarrassed bath regimes, which are trying to improve
their image abroad.
WESTERN HEMIS]?HERE
CUBAN TACTICAL MISSILE DEPLOYMENT
Continuing relocation of Cuban ,surface-ta-air and cruise
missile units apparently is intended to shift emphasis
from area and coastal defense to point defense of spe-
cific military installations.
SEC'RET'
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE YIEEKLY SUMMARY
Page
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WESTERN I3EMISPHERE I;continued)
Page
TURMOIL OVER PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OF BOLIVIAN JUNTA CHIEF 21
Although Bolivian law would appear to require Barrientos
to resign from the junta in order to seek the presidency,
he fears his probable successor would impose a military
dictatorship. His refusal to resign has incurred both
military and civilian opposition.
BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT MAY POSTPONE GIJ.6ERNATORIAL ELECTIONS 22
President Castello Branco apparently feels that major
political campaigns this year would have unsettling
effects on the administration's ;austerity and reform
programs, which are planned to have their major impact
by early 1966.
SECRET
12 Feb 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iv
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CHINA
7, ~, a~~d 11 February 1965
Chop Le Borracks
~.~ grid 11 February
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NORTH VIETNAM
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REPR45AL TARGETS
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{`'t ~YIETNAM~~
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? SECRET `'~
Hanoi apparently remains
determined to continue the war
in South Vietnam at an inten-
si_ve pace despite the US and South
Vietnamese air strikes on North
Vietnam. Since the first
strikes the Communists in South
Vietnam have maintained the of-
fensive they launched at the
end of their unilateral lunar
new year cease-fire, beginning
with two simultaneous attacks
on 7 February on US installa-
tions at Pleiku. During the
next several days there were
other large- and small-scale
attacks throughout the country.
Heavy pressure persists, and
this week appears likely to
prove the most violent of the
war to date.
No significant North Viet-
namese, Chinese Communist, or
Soviet military deployments that
can be considered a direct re-
action to the air strikes have
been detected thus far.
In response to the stepped-
up Communist offensive, which
included the largest direct at-
tacks on A~.~~ricans in the war,
US and South Vietnamese air
units on 7, 8, and 1.1 February
struck targets in North Viet-
nam associated with the infil-
tration into South Vietnam. On
7 February US planes attacked
North Vietnamese Army barracks
at Dong Hoi, headquarters of
the 325th Division, destroying
a total of 12 buildings and
damaging several more. One US
plane was lost and its pilot is
hissing.
Or, 8 February, the South
Vietnamese Air Force struck at
the Chap Le Barracks, home of
the North Vietnamese 270th Inde-
pendent Regiment, just north of
the Demilitarized Zone. Initial
paststrike photography indicates
that damage to the buildings in
the area was light.
On 11 February US carrier-
based aircraft struck the Chanh
Hoa army barracks just north of
Dong Hoi, believed to house ele-
ments of the 325th Infantry Di-
vision, and pilot reports indi-
cate the target was severely
damaged. Three US planes and
two pilots are still missing,
and the North Vietnamese claim
to have captured one. At the
same time, on the 11th, the
South Vietnamese Air Force at-
tacked the Chap Le barracks area
again. No information on the
success of this strike is yet
available.
The sustained intensity of mil=
itary action in South Vietnam since
the end of the Tet cease-fire
SECRET
12 Feb 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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has resulted in an impressive
demonstration of Viet Cong mili-
tary strength.
Although Viet Cong forces
have suffered heavy losses in
some of the fighting, they have
inflicted severe casualties on
the government. In coastal Binh
Dinh Province, two battalion-size
Communist attacks may have wiped
out nearly two companies of gov-
ernment regulars and part of
another battalion, although the
fate of the government forces is
still not fully known. US per-
sonnel have also suffered their
worst week of the .war, with heavy
losses in the Pleiku attacks, the
subsequent terrorist bombing on
10 February of an enlisted men's
billet in Qui Nhon, the capital
of Binh Dinh Province, and in
scattered fighting throughout the
country.
Many of the Viet Cong attacks
undoubtedly were in preparation
before and during the cease-fire.
Some, however, appear to have been
launched in response to exhorta-
tions by the Viet Cong's Libera-
tion Front to step up military and
political activity following the
retaliatory air strikes against
North Vietnam on 7 and 8 February.
In particular, a pattern of in-
creased violence against Americans
is indicated, not only by the
severity of the Qui Nhon bombing,
but by the mutilation of three
American advisers whose bodies
were found when government troops
on 10 February retook a district
town which had been briefly over-
run by the Viet Cong north of
Saigon.
The political response of
both Hanoi and the Liberation
Front to the air strikes has also
been one of defiance. The Lib-
eration Forces Command urged all
troops to "strike strongly, and
really lastingly, in order to pro-
tect the North and liberate the
South." In propaganda statements
and official protests to the In-
ternational Control Commission,
Hanoi adopted essentially the same
posture used after the Tankin Gulf
crisis last August--an expression
of injured innocence, determination
to pursue objectives in South Viet-
nam, and willingness and readiness
to meet future US military action.
North Vietnam described the
air strikes as unwarranted US
aggression and portrayed the re-
sults--it now claims the destruc-
tion of 12 US aircraft--as a vic-
tory for its air defense units.
The first in a series of nation-
wide mass protest demonstrations
in Hanoi rallied 70,000 people.
Peiping is moving cautiously
while at the same time attempting,
with increasingly bellicose prop-
aganda, to encourage Hanoi and to
deter the US from moves to enlarge
the conflict. There has been a
steady escalation in the Chinese
war of words since 8 February, and
massive anti-US rallies are being
staged all over China.
The editorial blast in Peo-
ple's Daily on 10 February is very
~I".-I~warns ominously that if
the US is bent on spreading the war
to China, Peiping will "have no
~'E C.~ET
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,~'E CET
alternative but to go along with
it to the very end," and that in
such an event "the whole of South-
east Asia, the whole of Asia
would be aflame w~.th the revolu-
tionary fire." The editorial
notes that America's "meager
force" in Asia is spread thinly
over a "long arc from South Korea
to Indochina," and that if the
conflict were expanded, the "time,
place, and scale of the war"
would be beyond US control.
This ,. latest outburst con-
tains Peiping's most specific pub-
lic commitment thus far to action
in response to new US moves. It
is very carefully ~Shrased, however,
to give the Chinese wide freedom
of choice in their reaction.
Speaking of a US decision to en-
large the struggle, Peiping as-
serts that "an invasion of the
DRV is also an invasion of China"
which the Chinese would be duty-
bound to oppose with "concrete
action,"
This is much more precise
than the formulation used in the
official statement about the Viet-
nam situation issued by Peiping
on 8 February--and last August fol-
lowing the Tonkin Gulf incident
--which used the broader term "ag-
gression," Thus refined, the Chi-
nese promise to help Hanoi defend
itself is firmest in regard to the
contingency Peiping probably re-
gards as most remote, a major
ground offensive against North
Vietnam, In other more likely
situations the Chinese leave them-
selves room for maneuver.
Peiping's latest statement
implies that it expects more air
strikes against North Vietnam but
makes no promise of an immediate
Chinese response. Instead, it
claims that such attacks will never
frighten the "South Vietnamese
people" and that whatever the US
does they will "certainly redouble
their efforts to deal one heavy blow
after another on the US aggressors."
The events in Vietnam have al-
~most certainly made it more diffi-
cult for the USSR to choose between
.increased support for the DRV--with
.its consequent implications for So-
~viet-US relations--and a disengage-
ment which could be exploited by
]?eiping. -The initial decision to
:send the Kosygin mission to Hanoi
`vas probably based an the premise
i~hat a commitment of Soviet military
-rt Sa"r~nse?ttx?airrrissile site .
-'d . Sarface to-air' missile assembly area .
`1~ ..Cruise missi('e site
T?'~ Crrrisa mr's,s91e facility??; ; -
i~Q7,'~ . Ae~ s~mba~s rleaote.vacated itrsial tatio
CUBAN TACTICAL MISSf LE DEPLOYMENT
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SECR.~~'
Western Hemisphere
Relocation of Cuban sur-
face-to-air and cruise-missile
units apparently is continuing.
High-altitude photography
revealed that the
M sites at Caibarien and
have been moved from the Santiago
de Cuba cruise-missile storage
site and the Ma.ya.ri Arriba. cruise-
missile facility., The new loca-
tion of most of the cruise mis-
siles and equipment is unknown,
although the high-altitude recon-
naissance mission 25X1
Nuevita,s have recently been
abandoned. The new location
of the Ca.iba.rien site has not
been found, but high -altitude
phatogra.phy indicates that the
Neuvitas unit may be moving to
Altagracia. near Camaguey. This
change would be consistent with
the continuing Cuban program
of shifting SAM deployment from
area defense to point defense.
Cruise-missile equipment
has also been transferred re-
cently. a con-
voy of cru se-m?ss a equipment
was photographed moving out of
the Banes coastal defense
site. The same photography re-
vealed that numerous cruise-
missile vehicles and crates
showed that some cruise-missile
gear was a.t the port of Banes.
The other actions ma,y well have
been taken in order to establish
additional coastal defense launch
sites along the coast, or to de-
ploy the ground forces version
of the missile to selected mili-
tary camps.
Nearly 150 cruise missiles
were delivered to Cuba during
the Soviet military .build-up in
1962, but only four coastal de-
fense Launch sites--with about
ten missiles each--were set up.
The rest of the missiles have
been kept in storage areas.
SECRET
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SE CR~;T
Western Hemisphere
TURMOIL OVER PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OF BOLIVIAN JUNTA CHIEF
Rene Barrientos is deter-
mined to stay on as president
of the Bolivian junta in spite
of his presidential candidacy
in the national elections now
scheduled for 26 September.. Bar-
rientos fears that should he
resign from the junta, his prob-
able successor, commander of
the armed forces General Ovando,
would annul the elections and
impose a. military dictatorship.
Barrientos' resignation
was requested in a. cabinet meet-
ing last month, probably on the
basis of a constitutional re-
quirement that candidates for
election resign from public of-
fice 180 days before the elec-
tion date. It is likely that
this legal issue masked the
feeling of certain officers that
the military should stay out of
politics. Barrientos refused
to resign, a.nd his stand has
since been given a. legal and
public blessing in a press ar-
ticle by a prominent constitu-
tional lawyer.
The relationship between
lBarrientos and General Ovando
:remains cordial on the surface.
On the other hand both men are
,ambitious for the presidency,
a.nd their cooperation is based
~aa.inly on the respect of each
:l=or the other's assets, namely
Barrientos' popularity with the
~:ivilia,n population and Ovando's
f~ta,nding with the armed forces
:~s a respected commander.
Division within the armed
j"orces over the two leaders
does not exist a.s yet, but there
i'.s little doubt that opinion
groups have developed over cer-
i;a.in issues. In general, the
debate is over the role of the
a~,rmed forces in the life of the
nation. Ovando is believed to
k-e aiming at a condition where
the military will be the final
a~.rbiter in Bolivian a.ffa.irs.
A. Barrientos government would
p~roba,bly depend more upon civil-
ians in the decision-making
process.
SECRET
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SECRET
Western Hemisphere
A p~oposa.l by President Strong opposit3n n to the
Castello Branco to postpone all postponement proposal has
gubernatorial elections scheduled come from such widely di-
for this year has become a vergent sources as the Labor
major political issue in Brazil, Party and the far right. The
A presidential adviser has governors themselves appear
confirmed press reports that divided on the matter according
Castello Branco is preparing to to the political advantage they
ask Congress either to extend see in the alternatives. The
the terms of the governors con- powerful Magalhaes Pinto of
cerned for one year or to allow Minas Gerais has strongly en-
indirect elections by the state dorsed the postponement. How-
legislatures. ever, Guanabara Governor Carlos
La.cerda, whose attitude will
heavily influence the final
Voting now is scheduled outcome, has yet to make his
far October in 11 of the 22 views known. Lacerda is a top
states. The President a.p- presidential contender and
patently feels, however, that probably would make a.n all-
political campaigns at this out effort to block post-
juncture would have unsettling ponement if he concluded that
effects on the government's gubernatorial elections would
stabilization and reform policies. help his candidacy. At the
This year is considered de- moment it appears likely that
cisive in the effort to have the administration could gain
the austerity program dem- sufficient congressional support
onstra.te success by early 1966. for some form of postponement.
Castello Branco seems deter-
mined to leave office next
yeax when his term expires.
He realizes that he would come
under increasing pressure from
hard-liners to defer the 1966
presidential a.nd congressional
elections and to remain in power
indefinitely if the country's
urgent economic problems a.re
not alleviated.
SECR~~'T
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