MONGOLIA: SOVIET ADVOCATE IN ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004600120003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 6, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

OCX No. 0:356/64B
Copy No.,
57
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
elease 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-009 0046db1~O ' '-' ex? 1964
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downgrading a ieclassification
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Mongolian-Chinese relations have steadily de-
teriorated during the past few years, despite an
energetic effort by Peiping between 1955 and 1960
to increase its political leverage in Ulan Bator.
Mongolia's vigorous backing of Moscow in the Sino-
Soviet dispute has sparked most of the friction
with China, and it has increased as a result of the
recent Soviet-inspired publicity focused on Pei-
ping's old territorial ambitions in Mongolia.
It is clear that the leaders in Ulan Bator
believe both their foreign and domestic interests
are best served by close alignment with the So-
viet Union. During the past few years. the So-
viets have steadily increased the flow of aid to
Mongolia as a means of assuring continued politi-
cal dominance.
Some strains have been imposed within the Mon-
golian Communist Party by its submission to Moscow,
but purges conducted in 1962 and 1963 have appar-
ently left the pro-Soviet group in firm control.
Mongolian nationalism remains strong, but the
achievements and benefits made possible by the re-
lationship with Moscow tend to nullify any exist-
ing feelings of dissatisfaction.
The old spectre of Chinese
territorial ambitions in Mon-
golia was revived recently as
an irritant in relations between
Ulan Bator and Peiping. The So-
viet Union raised the subject
in a tendentious Pravda edi-
torial on 2 September ccomment-
ing on a July 1964 interview be-
tween Mao Tse-tung and a group
of visiting Japanese. The edi-
torial quoted selectively from
Mao's remarks in an attempt to
prove that the Chinese Communists
wanted to make Mongolia a "Chi-
nese province." Pravda asserted
that Mao had aske rushchev
in 1954 to agree to a Chinese
takeover. This assertion
formed a part of a general at-
tack on Peiping's "hegemonistic
schemes" in Asia which Moscow
has intensified in the context
of the Sino-Soviet dispute dur-
ing the past summer.
Actually, the Soviet
charges probably do not ac-
curately reflect present Chi-
nese policy toward the Mongo-
lian People's Republic (MPR).
According to the Japanese
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Kyakhta lnY Borzya
` r,
-?Sayn Shairda
100 200
STATUTE MILES
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account of Mao's remarks during
the interview, the Chinese
leader had urged the Russians
to give Mongolia "full independ-
ence." Chinese claims to sov-
ereignty over Mongolia, more-
over, were legally extinguished
by the Sino-Soviet agreement in
1950 on a "complete guarantee
of the independent status" of
the MPR. Some differences re-
mained between Peiping and Ulan
Bator over the alignment of
their boundary, but these were
formally settled in a treaty
signed in 1962. Probably with
an eye to its then inflamed bor-
der conflict with India, Pei-
ping seems to have adopted a
generous pose during negotia-
tions and apparently surrendered
its claims to most of the ter-
ritory in dispute. The agree-
ment was followed by protocols
in 1963 and 1964 incorporating
the results of ground surveys.
The domination of Mongolia
probably still remains a long-
range goal, but Peiping's at-
titude toward it in recent years
has been mainly defensive.
The Soviet charges seem
certain to accelerate the pro-
nounced downward trend in Sino-
Mongolian relations evident
since the conclusion of the
1962 border treaty. Taking
their cue from the Russian at-
tack on the Chinese, the Mon-
golians reacted quickly with
some very sharp propaganda of
their own. One Ulan Bator edi-
torial, for example, denounced
the "sinister" Chinese plans
to absorb Mongolia, and lumped
the Peiping leadership with the
"Kuomintang reactionaries,"
old Chinese warlords, and Man-
chu emperors in alleged ter-
ritorial maneuvers. If the
Chinese had succeeded, the edi-
torial declared, the people of
the MPR would have shared the
"fate" of the Inner Mongolians
and other national minorities
now under Peiping's hegemony.
This reaction is one more
illustration of Ulan Bator's
difficult geographic and po-
litical position, sandwiched
between the rival and powerful
centers of world Communism and
yet seeking to retain some
measure of independence and po-
litical flexibility. The na-
ture of the Mongolian dilemma
was readily apparent in the
editorial handling of an al-
leged remark by Mao that Mos-
cow had come to dominate the
MPR under the guise of ensur-
ing its independence. Although
the Mongolian propagandists
labeled this a "shameless
slander," they tacitly admitted
to Moscow's paramount influence
by acknowledging that Mongolian
independence would have been
lost had not the MPR "linked its
destiny" with the Soviet Union.
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Historically, the MPR has
had very little choice in its
dependence on the USSR, since
the Soviets had a 25-year head
start on Peiping in cementing
their foothold. Mongolian dip-
lomatic and trade ties were
tightly monopolized by the So-
viets, who discouraged other
foreign contacts until well after
World War II. Ulan Bator's lack
of diplomatic relations, in fact,
helped defeat Moscow's 1946 bid
to have Mongolia. admitted to
the UN. In 1948, the MPR was
finally recognized by North Ko-
rea., but its first free world dip-
lomatic ties did not come until
1955.
1955 that the Chinese were hop-
ing to undermine Moscow's in-
fluence through a. program of
economic competition. Under an
initial assistance agreement,
10,000 Chinese laborers were
sent to Mongolia. to help build
industrial and housing projects.
Peiping subsequently sweetened
the pot with several economic
credit grants which by 1960
totaled $115 million. Sino-
Soviet economic competition has
provided a real shot in the arm
to Ulan Bator, since by 1963
total assistance extended from
Peiping and Moscow mounted to
approximately $800 per capita..
Nowhere else., inside or outside
the bloc, has Soviet or Chinese
assistance been of such magni-
tude.
During this period Moscow
supplied nearly all foreign as-
sistance received by Ulan Bator.
Prior to the end of World War II,
however, Soviet aid was mostly
military in character. The pat-
tern began to change in the late
Forties, in part because of a
greater Soviet capability to
render aid, and also because of
a. desire to ensure continued So-
viet political domination in
Ulan Bator in the face of the
establishment of the Peiping re-
gime. Between 1950 and L963
the Soviets extended over $650
million in economic assistance
to the MPR. This aid has been
a. major factor in sustaining and
developing the Mongolian economy.
Soviet concern over Peiping's
intentions in Mongolia. was not
ill-founded. It became clear in
In recent years Moscow
has pointed to its assistance
to Mongolia. as an example of
the benefits which can accrue
from close cooperation with the
USSR. Mongolian party chief
Tsedenba.l has described the re-
lationship between the MPR and
the USSR as a. "model of equal-
ity and mutual assistance be-
tween large and small states,"
which has "great significance"
as a. guide to underdeveloped
nations in reorganizing their
"socioeconomic" life.
Economic Situation
In reality, economic con-
ditions in the MPR are not nearly
as good as implied by Tsedenbal.
Despite bloc assistance, the
Mongolians have had consider-
able trouble keeping up with
planned economic targets.
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Significant gains have been made
but the expansion of agriculture
and industry started from a very
small ba.se,a.nd these activities
are still woefully undeveloped.
The MPR remains heavily depend-
ent on livestock for the bulk
of food consumed, for the liveli-
hood of its one million people,
and for most of the raw materials
used for industry and exports.
The nature of Mongolia's
economic difficulties was clearly
evident in the severe setback
caused by very heavy snowstorms
last winter and spring which took
a heavy toll in livestock. Emer-
gency pleas had to be made to
Moscow for additional assistance,
and two new Soviet aid agreements
were announced between March and
May 1964, one specifically de-
scribed as a, contribution to
help "overcome" Ulan Bator's
"temporary" economic problems.
The agreements, which were
followed by a third Soviet credit
grant in October, also appeared
designed to fill gaps left by
the disruption of Chinese eco-
nomic assistance to Mongolia..
Peiping's largesse between 1956
and 1960 earned it little politi-
ca.l leverage in Ulan Bator, and
it appears that the Chinese have
given up serious thoughts of eco-
nomic competition there with Mos-
cow. Although the Chinese are
apparently following through with
assistance on some long-programmed
Mongolian industrial projects,
it is believed that Peiping has
balked at firmly earmarking much
of the promised credits for the
1961-65 period. ALL remaining
Chinese construction workers in
Mongolia returned home between
April and July 1964, probably
at Ulan Bator's request inas-
much as the recent agreements
with the USSR provide extensive
Soviet manpower and technical
assistance on construction
projects.
The difficulties encoun-
tered in meeting the goals of
the 1961-65 Five-Year Plan, how-
ever, apparently have not af-
fected living standards signifi-
cantly. Soviet a.id has filled
the gap. Mongolians are better
fed and better clothed than in
the past, and are served by nation-
wide educational and public
health systems.
Policy planners in the MPR
expect an increased flow of as-
sistance from the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)
to alleviate the country's eco-
nomic problems. Moscow permitted
Mongolia. to become,in June 1962,
the first non-European member
of CEMA. Discussions were held
in Ulan Bator in October 1963
with representatives from the
USSR and the European bloc coun-
tries to coordinate Mongolian
economic planning for the next
20 years.
Current Chinese Relations
Mongolia's public criticism
of China has been accompanied
since 1963 by harassment and
restriction of Chinese travelers
and diplomats in the MPR.V
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Despite the increased fric-
ti,on, there is some evidence to
suggest that ULa.n Bator is re-
Luctant to allow relations to
deteriorate to the point implied
inl its propaganda diatribes
against Peiping. The Mongolian
delegation to the Chinese Na-
tional Day celebrations this
year, for example, was led by
one of the MPR's highest rank-
ing party and government offi-
cials, S. Lubsan.
There is some indication
that the MPR may, probably at
the bidding of the new Soviet
leaders, tone down its strident
anti-Chinese stance. A joint
Polish-Mongolian communiqud,
issued at the end of a recent
visit by Tsedenba.l and after
Khrushchev was bounced, stated
th .t ideological differences
in, the Communist movement should
not be transferred to relations
between states. The Mongolians
have been exceedingly cautious
in their references to the re-
cent Soviet party-government
changes, apparently being anx-
ious to avoid being caught up
in any internal Soviet quarrel.
Utan Bator's silence on the
purge also reflects the equivo-
ca.l position taken by the new
Soviet leaders, who have them-
selves gone slowly pending con-
solidation of their own position.
Since Premier Tsedenbal and
his lieutenants are convinced
that Mongolian domestic and
foreign interests are best
served by close alignment with
Moscow, however, it is likely
that the course of MPR-Chinese
relations will closely follow
the general trend established
by the Soviet Union.
Domestic Political Developments
One factor which has long
complicated Ulan Bator's rela-
tions with both Moscow and Pei-
ping has been the presence of
significant Mongol minorities
in both countries. Pa.n-Mongol-
ism, or the political union of
all. Mongols into a. "greater Mon-
golia," has been an important
issue in the past. It has been
soft pedaled by the present
Mongolian leadership, however,
because of the obvious problems
such a policy would create with
the Soviet Union and Communist
China..
The spirit of nationalism
reflected in the Pan-Mongol
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movement has also exerted an in-
fluence on political developments
inside the MPR during the past
few years. In September 1962,
for example, D. Tomor-Ochir was
ousted from the Mongolian party
politburo on charges of being
anti-Soviet and "nationalistic."
In December 1963 L. Tsend was
also dropped from the politburo
amidst indications that he had
lost the confidence of the So-
viets and had probably become a
threat to Tsedenbal. It is pos-
sible also that Tsend had ob-
jected to the increasing role of
CEMA in Mongolian economic plan-
ning. In both cases there were
indications that the purged lead-
ers favored a more independent
role for Mongolia vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union. They were both
charged with overstressing the
"positive" contributions of
Genghis Khan, thereby arousing
nationalist passions "inconsist-
ent with the doctrine of prole-
tarian internationalism." There
is no solid proof that either
was pro-Peiping, but either or
both may have favored "using"
the Chinese as a counterweight
to Moscow.
It appears that the purges
have removed any serious threat
to Tsedenbal's leadership and
the implementation of his poli-
cies. There is certainly no
evidence that the position of
the party chief or his lieu-
tenants has been significantly
weakened as a result of their
pro-Soviet stand. The achieve-
ments of the regime--brought
about largely because of the
relationship with the So-
viet Union--mitigate overt
expression of hostility toward
the national leadership or to-
ward the Soviet Union. In re-
turn for Soviet protection and
economic assistance, the Mon-
golian regime will probably
continue to conduct itself as
a grateful satellite should,
copying the Soviet model in do-
mestic programs and supplying
prompt and unequivocal support
for all Soviet foreign policies.
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