SUKARNO AND THE COMMUNISTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004600100002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

SUKARNO AND THE COMMUNISTS
23 October 1964
OCI No. 0354/64A
Copy No. 5 7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
-OFFICE O F CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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;R,IAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
NATIONAL DEFENSE OFTHE UNITED STATES
THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
USC, SECTIONS 733 AND 794, THE TYANSMIS-
EVELATI':::,N OF 'Y HICH IN ANY MAIiNER TO
anent MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO F 7REIGN
MENTS. If marked with specific dissemination
in accordance with the provisions of LID i/77
ment must b hran?aied within the framework of
ation so imsas ose
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The relationship between Sukarno and the Indo-
nesian Communist Party (PKI) has been one of mutual
exploitation. Sukarno has used the party to help
him preserve his own power, and the party has used
Sukarno to increase its strength. In the process,
the once considerable gap in power and apparent
policy objectives between them has greatly dimin-
ished. The party continues to acknowledge Sukarno
as the nation's supreme leader, and, under its
chairman, D. N. Aidit, is following a policy of in-
filtrating the national government and consolidat-
ing the party's mass following.
Sukarno, seeking to maintain his own pre-
eminent position, to preserve national unity, and
to advance Indonesia internationally at the ex-
pense of the West, finds it totally inexpedient to
challenge the PKI. His tactics, combined with Com-
munist single-mindedness, seem likely ultimately
to bring Indonesia under Communist control.
The Indonesian Communist
Party has grown from a member-
ship of 12,000 in 1951 to a
claimed strength in 1964 of
three million members. It is
the largest Communist party out-
side the Communist countries
and is the most powerful and
efficient political organiza-
tion in Indonesia. The PKI's
rapid growth has been made pos-
sible by Sukarno's original
toleration and later encourage-
ment of its activity in return
for its strong support of him
and his authoritarian "guided
democracy"; by its successful
identification with Sukarno par-
ticularly in eastern and central
Java; and by its own good or-
ganization, resourcefulness
and hard work.
Through the years, Sukarno
has remained the focal point of
Indonesia; as he moves he takes
the national political structure
with him. Since independence
was achieved in 1949, he has con-
sistently shifted to the left.
In the last two years, this move-
ment has accelerated.
Sukarno's attitude toward
the PKI springs not only from
his own emotional bias toward
Marxism but also from his need
for a strong mass organization
to ensure popular acceptance of
his policies. He seems to have
repeatedly encouraged non-Com-
munist leftist-nationalist groups
or individuals to organtze pro--
Sukarno mass movements, but these
elements have lacked the drive,
the talent, and often the resources
to follow up the lead offered
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them by the president. At the
same time, Sukarno has largely
suppressed political opposition
to himself. Because this op-
position was invariably anti-Com-
munist as well as anti-Sukarno,
its suppression and the failure
of non-Communist groups to come
forward has had the effect of
leaving the field to the Commu-
nists.
The army is the only or-
ganization that retains a capa-
bility and an inclination to ob-
struct the Communists. During
the past two years, however,
Sukarno has brought the army
much more closely under his
executive control. Army lead-
ers, moreover, are loyal and
normally can be expected to fol-
low his directives. Local com-
manders occasionally offer tem-
porary obstruction to the PKI,
but the national trend favors
the Communists.
Party Strength
In addition to the party's
own membership, the PKI's prin-
cipal front groups and their
claimed membership are the Peas-
ant Front (BTI)--eight and a
half million; the Central Labor
Organization (SOBSI)--three and
a half million; People's Youth
(Pemuda Rakjat)--two million;
Women's Front (GERWANI)--almost
two million; and a cultural or-
ganization (LEKRA)--half a mil-
lion. Even with overlapping
membership and exaggerated
figures the party could prob-
ably muster from 10 to 12 mil-
lion persons susceptible to Com-
munist direction. In 1963, the
PKI set up a four-year plan
which established the party mem-
bership goal for 1967 at six
million and mass membership at
20 million.
Last July the party en-
larged its central committee
from 35 to 50 members, appar-
ently to cope with increased
PKI membership and activity.
The PKI is organized and grow-
ing in each of Indonesia's twenty-
five provinces. Its greatest
strength, however, in terms both
of numbers and effective organi-
zation, lies in eastern and cen-
tral Java--areas of Indonesia's
densest population--and in north-
ern Sumatra.
Party Difficulties
Qualifications for party
and party front membership ap-
parently are relatively low,
and this partially accounts for
the large membership of the PKI
and its front organizations.
In a speech to the party confer-
ence last July, chairman Aidit
cautioned that "a military unit
which has a big number of sol-
diers but is not disciplined
enough will certainly not be
able to defeat the enemy." He
called for "iron-hard discipline"
and loyalty within all party units.
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He frankly described the
party's internal disagreements
as a "struggle without princi-
pLe," which if allowed to drag
on, would only hamper party
work and might develop into a
"more critical issue" involving
principles. He said it was dif-
ficult to decide among the fa.c-
t.ions because the comrades in-
volved were known to be loyal
to the party and the revolution.
Settlement must be through "com-
promise, consultation and a.gree-
ment.... Each one has to give
and take."
The disagreement apparently
centers chiefly on the pace of
party activity. Aidit seems
to take a, cautious approach,
believing that the PKI must con-
solidate its membership and its
political gains, strengthen its
peasant base, and increase its
influence within the government
before taking large or rapid
steps. He apparently is con-
cerned that the party's large
membership may lead some PKI
officials to a. false sense of
strength and induce them to
take premature action. Other
members of the politburo and
the central committee, led by
second deputy party chairman
Njoto, believe that the party
should use its already consider-
able strength to press its own
program, and that Aidit's cau-
tion is a waste of time. The
argument of this group seems
to be that although the party
must continue to support Sukarno,
it can extract significant con-
cessions from him and need not
fear retaliation. Even if re-
taliation should come, the argu-
ment runs,the party should still
be more aggressive than it is.
The disagreement does not
appear to have impaired party
effectiveness, and both points
of view are now represented among
Communists who hold government
posts. Aidit is the party's
principal point of contact with
Sukarno, but Njoto is probably
more active within government
circles. The militant faction
which, logically, supports Pei-
ping in the international Com-
munist dispute, is reported to
be larger than Aidit's -group.
A modus vivendi seems to have
been reached, under which Aidit
tolerates the openly pro-Peiping
activities in the party in the
international Communist movement
while Njoto gives Aidit the lead
in domestic affairs because of
his relationship with Sukarno.
There seems little Likeli-
hood of a split in the PKI under
present circumstances. The
strength of the militant faction,
however, and the growing influ-
ence of the party generally,
make it likely that more mili-
tant tactics will emerge in the
near future.
Since 1951, the PKI has
concentrated on peaceful infil-
tration and the formation of a
united front. Its chief politi-
cal demand is that it be given
greater representation in the
cabinet. This would facilitate
what PKI officials refer to as
"integration in the government."
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The party's principal or-
ganizational target is the
peasantry, and the BTI is the
party's largest and most active
front organization. At least
70 percent of Indonesia's popu-
lation of 103 million is en-
gaged in subsistence agricul-
ture. Peasant support of the
Indonesian revolution against
the Dutch was a key factor in
its success. With this example
and that of the Chinese Commu-
nists before it, the PKI sees
a sympathetic peasantry as a
strategic requirement for the
success of its own struggle,
whether by peaceful or by force-
ful means. Moreover, the peas-
ant is regarded emotionally,
by both Communists and non-Com-
munists, as the symbol of In-
donesia. The PKI's identifica-
tion with the peasantry could
thus psychologically deter the
army from using force against
the party.
The PKI seems to recognize
the possibility that--perhaps
at Sukarno's death--it may have
to resort to force either to
defend itself or to make a bid
for power. The party appar-
ently does not feel that it is
now ready for confrontation
with the army, and it probably
hopes to avoid it entirely
through "government integra-
tion."
The PKI, although it no
longer publicizes it, presumably
also continues to try to infil-
trate the armed forces. The
party has considerable poten-
tial for disruptive activity
through its front organizations,
but its paramilitary capabili-
ties appear to be limited by
lack of arms. As a means of
acquiring military training and
at least a minimum supply of
arms, members of the peasant
and youth fronts and of the
large agricultural labor union
have enlisted as village guards
during periods of local security
disturbances. They have also
volunteered for military train-
ing during the struggle for western
New Guinea, and now in the anti-
Malaysia campaign.
The Communist labor federa-
tion, SOBSI, has long been the
largest labor organization in
Indonesia. It is less active
today, however, than it was ten
years ago, because the PKI has
almost abandoned activity among
wage earners to concentrate on
gaining peasantry allegiance.
The PKI,to avoid conflict
with Sukarno and the army, has
made no significant effort, how-
ever, to exploit Indonesia's ex-
tensive economic problems, which
include periodic food shortages.
Instead, the party urges the
people to increase production
and to endure hardship in the
interests of the anti-Malaysia
campaign.
Party Accomplishments;
the Cabinet
Since the cabinet reshuffle
in late August, three of Indo-
nesia's 79 cabinet ministers
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are Communist Party members, and
three others are pro-Communist.
Of the three party members, two
--Aidit and first deputy party
chairman Lukman--are ministers
in name only and exert little
influence through the cabinet
relationship-per se. However,
the third Communist, Njoto, and
one of the pro-Communists, Oei
Tjoe Tat, are ministers attached
to the Indonesian Government
presidium.
The presidium consists of
the three vice prime ministers,
meets almost daily,and is chiefly
responsible for administering
the government. The relation-
ship of Njoto and Oei to the
presidium appears to give the
Communists access to the full
scope of government policy and
an opportunity to exert influ-
ence on both formulation and
implementation. The two men
moreover, are said to be spe-
cifically assigned to Suba.ndrio,
who is first vice minister, min-
ister of foreign affairs and
foreign economic affairs, and--
in Sukarno's absence--acting
president. Subandrio lacks any
political following either in or
out of the government. He has
tried during the past 18 months
to curry fa.vor with the PKI,
and the presidium arrangement
makes him directly accessible
to possible Communist manipula-
tion.
Of the other two pro-Commu-
nists--Justice Minister Astra-
w.inata appears more insidious than
Labor Minister Sutomo. Although
the minister of justice in In-
donesia is not involved in
prosecution (this remains under
the attorney general), he does
control administration of the
courts.
Astra.winata took office in
November 1963. It soon became
clear that he hoped to reorient
Indonesia.'s Western-based legal
system and to make law and the
courts subservient to political
policy. Basing his approach on
Sukarno's dictum that the revolu-
tion is the true source of In-
donesian law, Astrawina.ta says
that judges must pronounce sen-
tences according to the "demands
of the people"; judges must know
who are the friends and foes of
the revolution before they can
perform their tasks properly;
and judges must be "cleansed"
so that only those who do not
deviate from the revolution oc-
cupy positions in the judiciary.
At a refresher training confer-
ence for judges in mid-Septem-
ber Sukarno seemed to give his
personal sanction to Astrawinata.'s
approach.
Astra.winata has also pio-
neered in the creation of "land
reform" courts. Initially these
courts were advocated by the
Peasant Front as a. means of pro-
ceeding against landlords and
government officials considered
to be thwarting the land reform
laws. Sukarno approved the
courts in mid-August. Astra.winata
earlier had announced that they
would be staffed by "revolution-
ary peasants." In late Septem-
ber the minister of agrarian
affairs announced that the land
reform courts would open shortly
with farmers as "member-judges."
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The PKI almost certainly will
seek to use the courts to ad-
vance its interest in the coun-
tryside through intimidation.
Labor Minister Sutomo's
task may have been spelled out
for him when Subandrio told the
SOBSI conference in September
that the government soon will
"simplify" the pattern of Indo-
nesian trade organization by
dissolving the "spiritless"
unions exploited by the imperial-
ists. Sutomo has challenged
one non-Communist labor federa-
tion for membership in the
ICFTU, and that federation is
considering withdrawal from the
international organization. At
a recent labor meeting in Java,
Sutomo reportedly encouraged
unions to seize foreign enter-
prises, cautioning, however,
that the actions should not hurt
production.
National Front
and-Local Government
The National Front was in-
troduced by Sukarno in 1960 in
an effort to fuse all loyal po-
litical elements into a single
state party. It has become, in-
stead, largely a tool of the
Communist Party.
The National Front is ad-
ministered nationally by an
executive council and is com-
posed of subordinate councils
at the provincial, subprovincial,
and village levels. Eighty per-
is reported to be Communist con-
trolled and most of the provin-
cial councils are under similar
influence. At the national
level, the front serves in an
advisory capacity and as an agit-
prop (agitation-propaganda) or-
ganization.
At the provincial level,
the National Front has been in-
tegrated into the government
administration. Local adminis-
tration, until recently, was
based upon joint decisions of
the Pantja Tunggal, a five-man
body composed of the governor,
the local army commander, the
police chief, and representa-
tives of the attorney general's
office and of the National
Front. Although a new system
of provincial government was
introduced in September, giv-
ing most army territorial com-
manders executive authority,
the Communists are not likely
to be contained to any signifi-
cant degree. Njoto is one of
several cabinet ministers ap-
pointed to coordinate central
and local affairs under the
new system.
The Communists are cam-
paigning for the removal of
non-Communist provincial and
local officials and their re-
placement by PKI members or
persons who would be susceptible
to Communist direction. In
areas of PKI strength, there
have been several instances of
cent of the executive membership I conspicuous success.
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Activity Outside the
Government
Paralleling its support
of the government since 1951,
the PKI has engaged in probing
tactics intended to advance its
strategic position and to test
government reaction. Instances
of militancy have increased in
number although not necessarily
in intensity during the past
year. In September 1963 a
Communist-led mob gutted the
British Embassy. In January
1964 groups a.ppa.rently led by
Communists seized the offices
of British interests in Java
and Sumatra.; the government
later took control of the prem-
ises. Sukarno probably would
have seized British interests
eventually anyway, but the Com-
munists evidently forced the
pace of these takeovers.
In May and June, the BTI
conducted a. series of unilateral
land seizures in ea.stern and cen-
tral Java. The seizures were
justified on the grounds that
the land reform and crop shar-
ing laws were being violated by
corrupt landlords. In mid-June,
acting president Leimena (Su-
ka.rno and Subandrio were in
Tokyo) denounced these "unilat-
era.l actions," ordered regional
administrators to prevent fur-
ther occurrences,a.nd directed
that complaints be referred to
the local Pantja Tunggal for
official settlement. In mid-
August, however, President Su-
ka.rno stated in his independence
day speech that the "unilateral
action" of farmers wa.s under-
sta.nda.ble in view of the slow
implementation of the land re-
form laws and announced that
land reform courts would be
established to punish those who
were thwarting implementation
of the law.
In mid-August a group,
again apparently led by Commu-
nists, seized the USIS library
in Jogjakarta, central Java. Al-
though Subandrio promised the
library would be returned in a
week, no action has yet been
taken. Postoffice employees,
controlled by a Communist union,
are refusing to disseminate a
USIS publication.
Repeated demonstrations
have occurred against both the
UK and US consulates in Medan,
northern Sumatra, and some violence
has taken place. Communist-led
unions have obstructed a land
exchange agreement in northern
Sumatra between the Goodyear
Rubber Company and the govern-
ment. Plantation personnel and
installations of both Goodyear
and US Rubber have been repeat-
edly harassed by demonstrations,
threats, and minor incidents.
A concentrated effort is under
way to force Peace Corps person-
nel to leave northern Sumatra.
Since the institution of
the new regional administrative
system, the protection of US in-
terests, both government and
private, has improved s'_ightly.
The principal area of anti-
American expression is currently
in northern Sumatra.
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Sukarno's 17 August Speech
Sukarno's independence day
speech on 17 August confirmed
his accelerated swing to the
left during the previous 18
months and charted a course
close to the immediate objec-
tives of the Communist Party.
He left no doubt that intensi-
fied anti-Americanism would con-
tinue and that his long-range
intent was to get the US and
Britain out of Southeast Asia.
On domestic policy, he em-
phasized that the "retooling of
reactionaries would be carried
on at all levels without letup.
He reiterated his long-standing
concept of NASAKOM--the fusion
of nationalist, religious, and
Communist elements in Indonesian
society and government--and said
that whoever opposes NASAKOM op-
poses the Indonesian revolution.
Sukarno endorsed the Communist
concept of two stages of revo-
lution, noting that the present
bourgeois democratic stage would
be succeeded in due course by a
socialist stage.
The PKI immediately identi-
fied itself with Sukarno's speech
and prepared to exploit it in
furthering its own program. Aidit
issued a special statement on
18 August welcoming the speech
as "fully in line" with the
struggle of the Indonesian and
Southeast Asian peoples "at pres-
ent." He instructed PKI provin-
cial officials and party members
to study the speech so that it
may be used to "guide the In-
donesian people in their activi-
ties."
Sukarno's 17 August speech
promised a cabinet reshuffle,
and the tenor of the address
seemed to promise a major change
favorable to the Communists.
Such a change reportedly was in
prospect but at the eleventh
hour the three army territorial
commanders in Java reportedly
appealed directly to Sukarno to
retain Defense Minister General
Nasution, long a target of the
PKI. Sukarno agreed, and appar-
ently decided to keep several
other moderates who had been
slated for removal.
It was this reshuffle on
27 August that brought Njoto
and Sutomo into the cabinet.
General Nasution, although re-
tained, has a considerably re-
duced role and is largely by-
passed in terms of significant
administrative and policymaking
channels.
Rumors are circulating that
the August reshuffle did not go
far enough, and that Sukarno will
make further changes when he re-
turns home from his current tour.
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Sukarno's major foreign
policy goal is to rid Southeast
Asia of Western influence. His
domestic predilection is toward
leftist totalitarianism.
He sees the Communist
Party as the country's only ef-
ficient and dynamic organiza-
tion which not only gives him
its own support but can organize
and deliver mass support as
well. Sukarno can set out
broad policy lines, but he needs
a source of ideas to attack
specific problems. Many Com-
munist ideas apparently have
become acceptable to him.
He has curbed army power
---which once served to balance
and contain Communist strength
--presumably because he be-
lieved the army, if permitted
to keep a significant politi-
cal influence, would restrict
his own role and his policies.
Moreover, he foresaw that army
obstruction of the Communists
could lead to a polarization of
forces in Indonesia which
could disrupt national unity.
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Looking abroad, Sukarno
sees the Communist countries
not only as natural partners
in anti-Westernism but appar-
ently as the ultimate predomi-
nant force in Southeast Asia.
He has moved toward Peiping,
as Moscow has followed a policy
of relaxation toward the West.
Sukarno is 64 years old,
but although suffering from a
kidney complaint, remains re-
markably active. If he lives
a few more years, it is likely
that he will eventually preside
over a modified Communist re-
gime.
The PKI still need. Su-
karno to protect it while it
consolidates its gains, and
it probably hopes he will sur-
vive a few more years but no
longer. Within that time, if
present trends continue, PKI
infiltration of national and
local government and Communist
organization of the peaantry
will have become so effective
that at Sukarno's death the party
can make a bid for power with
good chances of success. (SE-
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