WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004600090001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 16, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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16 October 1964
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RC!.. a_ Yr,f is.
GROUP I IKciud4 om automatic
downgrading am, d classification
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(Information as of 1200 EDT, 15 October 1964)
SOVIETS ORBIT THREE-MAN SPACECRAFT
The one-day flight of the world's first multimanned
spacecraft marks a significant advance in the Soviet
space program, and will probably provide large amounts
of unique biomedical and other data.
SOVIET MILITARY TEAMS INSPECT FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS.
The Ministry of Defense is apparently instituting
annual inspection trips to countries which have
well-established Soviet military aid programs.
AREA NOTE
On the USSR
Pa ;;e
CHINESE COMMUNIST FOOD PRODUCTION STILL. INADEQUATE
There is still no sign of plans to change the agri-
cultural policies that have failed to bring the
4-=5 million tons annual increase in grain output re-
quired by the 12-15 million annual population in-
crease.
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PLANNING PROCEEDS FOR CIVIL RULE IN SAIGON
Despite differences with Premier Khanh, the High
National Council seems ready to announce a pro-
visional constitution for South Vietnam and to
name a chief of state.
RIGHTISTS INCREASE PRESSURE IN LAOS
The Laotian Air Force is expanding operations
against Communist targets, while efforts con-
tinue on the diplomatic front to get rival fac-
tions together again in Paris.
IRAQI POLITICAL TENSIONS INCREASE
Rumors of possible coups are circulating freely
in Baghdad and the government is showing signs
of uneasiness.
CYPRUS STALEMATE CONTINUES
Little progress has been made toward getting the
Turkish Cypriots to give up their control of the
Nicosia-Kyrenia road, on which Turkish troop rota-
tion depends.
SECOND NONALIGNED CONFERENCE
The Cairo meetings, while following an anti-West-
ern course, failed to boost the prestige of its
participants or advance the concept of nonalignment.
BELGIAN AID PLANS FOR THE CONGO
Brussels has worked out a substantial increase in
its civilian and military support for the Tshombe
government to help restore orderly rule throughout
the Congo.
NORTHERN RHODESIA'S INDEPENDENCE PROSPECTS
The new state of Zambia has a strong economic base
and a moderate prime minister, but pressures from
radicals could upset the balance.
STATUS OF THE MULTILATERAL FORCE DISCUSSIONS
Completion of the proposed multilateral nuclear
force charter by the end of the year is still doubt-
ful. The UK holds to its land and sea proposal, and
other important European countries are undecided for
national reasons.
Pa ge
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EUROPE (continued)
FRENCH-RUSSIAN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Paris is likely to give the USSR credit terms of more
than five years during current trade negotiations,
contending that France must do so to remain compet-
itive.
LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS IN THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY
The party's Secretary General Waldeck Rochet seems
to be having trouble consolidating his authority al-
though he doesn't appear in immediate danger of los-
ing his job. The challenge to the Old Guard's grip
on the party may eventually come from one of two ris-
ing functionaries.
WEST GERMAN - WEST BERLIN RELATIONS
Bonn is expected to press for a Bundestag session in
Berlin before the end of the year as a part of its
program to strengthen its ties with the former Ger-
man capital.
AREA NOTES
On Finland and on Italy
Page
NEW SOVIET-BRAZILIAN OIL CONTRACT SIGNED
The USSR may provide almost a third of Brazil's total
petroleum imports next year, compared to slightly
more than 10 percent this year.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued)
VENEZUELAN TERRORISTS STEPPING UP ACTIVITIES
The Communist-dominated Armed Forces for National
Liberation (FALN),since 21 September, was responsi-
ble for a series of explosions, robberies, communi-
cations sabotage, and lately, the kidnaping of US
personnel.
AREA NOTE
On De Gaulle's trip.
CASTRO CONTINUES TO CUT POWER OF "OLD" COMMUNISTS
The Cuban regime continues to suffer from antago-
nisms between the "new" and "old" Communists. Cas-
tro is reportedly quietly reducing the influence
of the "old guard" in the government.
Page
18
AREA NOTE
On Colombia
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SOVIET MANNED SPACE FLLGHTS
FLIGHT_ DATE PILOT
VOSTOK I i 12 Apr 61 Col Yu
VOSTOK II 4 Aug 61 MajG. 5.1
Gagarin
VOSTOK III
_11 Aug 62
Mai A. G. Nikolayev
VOSTt K. IV
-1,2-Avg 62, Lt Cal P. R.,F'opovich
VOSTOK V
_14 Jun 63
Lt Cal V. F. ltykovskiy
VOSTOK VI
16 Jun' 63
Jr. Lt V. V. iereshkovo
VOSKHOD
1.2 Oct 64
Cal V. M. Kcmarov
Crew
K Feoktistov
r B. B. Yegerov
;:CAPSULE-
DURATION YYELGHI ACHIEVEMENTS
I hr, 48 min 141425 lbs
10, 364 Ibs
10 ,364 lbs
weightless ness, including control of capsule.
Proved abi,li,ty to accomplish a near pass of
an prolonged a sness Simultaneous
tra !10_. nti control of two vc hicles. xten
ive.e poet v[tz ion witt, manual control.
te
119 hr, 6 min 10,412 First woman in space. First
non-pilot in
70 hr, 50 min L0,425 space. Comparison of male and female.
24 hr, 17 min 1-St. a rox, First multi manned flight. First scientific
E_4,000-
16S personnel In orbit.
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SOVIETS ORBIT THREE-MAN SPACECRAFT
The maiden flight of the
new three-man Soviet spacecraft,
the Voskhod, apparently went off
almost exactly as planned and
appears to have been a complete
success. The one-day flight of
the world's first multimanned
spacecraft marks a significant
advance in the Soviet space pro-
gram, and will probably provide
large amounts of unique biomed-
ical and other data. Launched
on 12 October from Tyuratam,
Voskhod was recovered after
slightly more than one day in
orbit.
Voskhod landed after 24
hours and 17 minutes in orbit.
The Soviets announced that the
three cosmonauts aboard were
unharmed.
The crew consisted of a
pilot, a doctor, and a scien-
tist. During the flight, the
doctor, an aviation and space
medicine specialist, reportedly
conducted physical examinations
and tests, while the scientist
monitored instruments, operated
equipment, and took photographs.
During the flight, the crew
maintained communications with
ground stations in the USSR over
several radio frequencies. A
television system, somewhat im-
proved over the Vostok system,
transmitted pictures of the
crew members and their activities.
Details of the capsule's
configuration and systems are
not known. The Soviet announce-
ment that the cosmonauts did not
wear pressure suits suggests that
the environmental control system
has been greatly improved over
that used on the Vostok capsules
and that the Soviets have a high
degree of confidence in the re-
liability of the Voskhod.
A multimanned spacecraft.
such as a Voskhod could be used
as part of an orbiting space
station. Future Voskhod flights
will probably be of longer dura-
tion, and may include attempts
to rendezvous and dock with
other spacecraft, manned or un-
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16 Oct 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SOVIET MILITARY TEAMS INSPECT FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS
The Soviet Ministry of De-
fense, through its general staff,
is showing increased interest
in the performance of Soviet
military personnel abroad and
is apparently instituting annual
inspection trips. It seems par-
ticularly interested in those
personnel instructing foreign
nationals in the operation and
maintenance of Soviet military
equipment.
Although the State Commit-
tee for Foreign Economic Rela-
tions, through its Chief Engi-
neering Directorate, controls
foreign military assistance,
the Ministry of Defense appar-
ently staffs training and main-
tena.nce missions a.broa.d and as-
sumes reponsibility for foreign
national trainees. Members of
the LOth Directorate, a main
directorate of the general staff
concerned with external rela-
tions, are beginning to make
regular scheduled visits to
countries which have well-estab-
lished Soviet military aid pro-
grams. During their visits,
these officers probably also
review military aid programs
as a basis for Ministry of De-
fense recommendations to the
Council of Ministers.
Recipients of Soviet miii-
tary aid, however, seem to
treat representatives of the
Chief Engineering Directorate,
which negotiates and adminis-
ters the military aid program
as a whole, with more interest
and deference than the general
staff visitors.
Available information in-
dicates that the inspection
parties pay particular atten-
tion to the performance of So-
viet military personnel. In
Syria, they reportedly examined
the "accomplishments" of Soviet
military advisers with the army.
In Iraq, the delegation is re-
ported to have stated its mis-
sion is the inspection of So-
viet military personnel and
not equipment.
A visit to Zanzibar in August
by the chief of the 10th Director-
ate coincided with the arrival of
additional Soviet military person-
nel and with reports that the Zan-
zibar and Tanganyika. military es-
tablishments would be combined.
Such a move would require addi-
tions to and perhaps changes in
the Soviet military presence.
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16 Oct 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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AREA NOTE
The USSR has ordered a
special rev ew of factory norms
--production quotas on which
wage payments are based--to be
completed by March 1965. An
upward revision is likely,
since the annual reviews or-
dered in 1956 have obviously
failed to keep norms in step
with technological developments.
At present, many workers are be-
ing paid a bonus for surpassing
norms which are set too low in
relation to the existing tech-
nology. The workers, however,
would resist any attempt tc in-
crease norms substantially.
CHINESE COMMUNIST FOOD PRODUCTION STILL INADEQUATE
Grain production in Com-
munist China seems about to
fall behind population growth
for the sixth successive year.
The sober national anniversary
prediction of a "relatively
high" harvest has been followed
by a trade official's statement
that the 1964 output will be
about 190 million tons or only
2-3 percent more than the 185
million tons the Chinese claimed
for 1957, when the population
was 80-100 million smaller.
The current food situa-
tion can be called good only
in comparison with the disaster
16 Oct 64
years 1959-61. Average daily
caloric intake, bolstered by
grain imports and a large in-
crease in production of subsi-
diary foods on private plots,
has climbed from a 1960 low of
about 1,400 to about 1,800, but
is still below the 2,200 esti-
mated for 1957. Subsidiary foods
now are providing up to 10 per-
cent of the total food available.
Grain production since 1962
has hovered at a few million tons
more or less than the 180 million
estimated by US intelligence for
1957. Output in 1964 may well in-
crease 2-3 percent over 1957, but
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will probably not reach 190
million tons.
No major changes appear to
be contemplated in the agricul-
tural policies which during the
last several years have failed
to bring the 4-5 million tons
annual. increase in grain output
required by the 12-15 million
annual population increase. In
addition, the regime has given
clear signs that private food
production will not be encour-
aged beyond its present level.
A Chinese official has
told China will
continue to import grain for
some years, largely to supply
the growing population and re-
build reserves. So far in
1964, Peiping has purchased a
record 6.4 million tons, con-
sisting of about two million
apiece from its major suppliers
Canada and Australia, well over
a million from Argentina, and
lesser amounts from Mexico,
France, and Burma. Since their
beginning in 1961, grain imports
have averaged 5.8 million tons
annually. Imports in 1963 to-
talled 5.7 million tons.
China has also undertaken
negotiations with Western grain
suppliers for future deliveries
with emphasis on long-term con-
tracts. A three-year, million-
ton deal has been concluded
with Argentina for deliveries
late this year and for 300,000
tons each to be delivered in
1965 and 1966. A million-ton
deal with France reportedly
calls for deliveries during
1965-67, Australian and Cana-
dian delegations have recently
traveled to Peiping to negoti-
ate 1965 purchases, and further
contracts with Argentina, which
has had an exceptionally large
wheat harvest, are likely.
Beginning in mid-1963, a
birth control campaign with a
mixture of coercive measures,
propaganda, and information
was started in some large urban
centers. Higher age restrc-
tions on marriage, threats to
welfare benefits, refusals to
grant offending couples assign-
ments in the same locality, and
similar measures are reported
to have reduced the birth rate
significantly in Shanghai.
However, nothing has been ac-
complished and little is being
attempted in the rural areas
where the birth rate problem
centers. Even an immediately
successful nationwide campaign
will not substantially reduce
pressure on food supplies for
a decade or more.
Grain production in the
near future will probably con-
tinue to make gradual gains,
but many of the factors contrib-
uting to increased production
since 1962 appear to be played
out. The chemical fertilizer
industry is not likely to re-
peat its 40-percent increase
in output between 1960 and 1964.
Pressure seems almost certain
to build up for reviving indus-
trial crop production at the
expense of food acreage so that
light industries--like the cot-
ton textile industry--dependent
on agricultural raw materials
may increase their level of
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The High National Council
appears on the verge of announc-
ing a provisional constitution
and naming a chief of state.
The council hopes that a pre-
dominantly civilian government
can be formed by 27 October, the
self-imposed deadline for re-
placing General Khanh's military
regime. However, differences
and-mutual suspicions between
Khanh and the High National
Council. have been evident and
may still force last minute
changes in the council's course
of action.
of the High National Council's
deliberations. The leader!; of
the People's Revolutionary Force
in Hue, two of whom sit on the
council, are likewise attempting
to keep control of local chap-
ters now existent in many cen-
tral Vietnamese towns. In some
of these towns, the movemer.it
appears to be losing much of
its initial steam, owing to a
combination of factors including
factionalism and a possibly
Catholic-inspired backlash against
involvement of students and pro-
fessors in politics.
The council's 17 members
apparently now agree that the
installation of a national as-
sembly should be deferred for
three months or more to arrange
some form of elections which
would give the assembly a more
representative base. They in-
tend to authorize the chief of
state to select, with council
approval, a premier who in turn
will form his own cabinet. Gen-
eral expectations are that they
will ask General Minh to stay on
as chief of state.
Council members are con-
cerned that Khanh is applying
pressure. to retain power, and
suspect he may try to discredit
their work. Khanh continues to
insist that he prefers a key
military role in the new govern-
ment, but has manifested a clear
willingness to stay on as premier.
The Buddhist leadership is
continuing to discourage demon-
strations pending the outcome
In the central highlands,
there are signs of renewed res-
tiveness on the part of tribal
minority groups. Rhade tribes-
men who participated in last
month's uprising in Darlac and
Quang Duc provinces reportedly
continue to be disaffected,
Local Vietnamese security offi-
cials fear a resumption of their
armed dissidence. There is also
a report that other tribes in
Pleiku and Kontum provinces may
stage an uprising.
Total Viet Cong activity
declined slightly during ti..e
week, but was far more intense;
this is reflected in the mzrked
increase in government casual-
ties and weapons losses. For
the first time in recent weeks,
there were also several battal-
ion-sized or larger actions,
including a major confrontation
in Tay Ninh Province resulting
in sizable casualties on both
sides.
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RIGHTISTS INCREASE PRESSURE IN LAOS
There are indications that
the rightists plan to step up
their military pressure against
the Pathet Lao while efforts
continue to get the rival fac-
tions together again in Paris.
King Savang recently told the
US ambassador he hoped that be-
fore the end of the year the
government will have reasserted
its authority over the Plaine
des Jarres as well as areas of
central Laos now held by the
Pathet Lao.
The Laotian Air Force al-
ready is expanding operations
against Communist targets in
central `and southern Laos. On
14 October, government aircraft
began a series of strikes in
the border corridor used by the
North Vietnamese to move troops
and materiel into southern Laos
and South Vietnam.
The Pathet Lao, who ap-
parently had some advance warn-
ing of the air strikes, have
warned that,"if massive attacks"
are carried out, "a dis-
astrous war would again occur
in Laos." In a 10 October note
to the Indian ambassador in
Vientiane, the Pathet Lao called
upon representatives of the In-
ternational Control Commission
to visit Khanh Khay for an "ur-
gent" meeting.
SECRET
16 Oct 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
On the political scene,
there are persistent reports
of friction within the right-
ist camp. General Phoumi,
whose strength had been cur-
tailed following the April
coup, now appears to have won
back the support of securLty
chief General Siho who com-
mands a significant number of
troops in the Vientiane area.
Phoumi's opponents are the
Sananikones and their military
front man, General Kouprasith.
A precarious equilibrium-is
being maintained; neither fac-
tion appears willing to assume
the onus of prematurely upset-
ting the Souvanna coalition and
thus alienating necessary West-
ern support.
Premier Souvanna has re-
turned to Paris, prepared to
resume talks with Prince S:ou-
phannouvong over terms for re-
convening a new international
conference.
Souphannouvong has spent
most of his time in Peiping
since the initial Paris talks
broke up in late September,
and he has not yet indicated
whether he is prepared to re-
turn to Paris to join in fur-
ther negotiations.
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ar SSECRE 1' f.,
Baghdad is more restless
than at any time since last No-
vember's anti-Baathist coup.
Rumors of possible coups are
circulating freely and the gov-
ernment is showing signs of un-
easiness.
Tensions between pro- and
anti-Egyptian elements in the
regime have grown recently be-
cause of signs--particularly
the arrival of around 200 Egyp-
tian troops--that Iraq is mov-
ing toward some form of early
union with Egypt. Rumors, re-
inforced by Israeli broadcasts,
that this force soon will be
greatly augmented have increased
the apprehension of anti-Egyp-
tian elements both in and out
of the government. It is also
widely believed that a forth-
coming meeting of the "joint
presidential council," estab-
lished by the two countries last
summer, will result in.a new
step toward political union.
These moves and counter-
moves may be related to the re-
cent redeployment of a consider-
able number of Iraqi Army units.
It had been planned that Egyp-
tian troops were to participate
in two highly publicized ma-
neuvers, but this has now been
ruled out, possibly because
anti-Egyptian groups in Iraq
were apprehensive.
One force has been deployed
in the desert near the Jordanian
and Syrian border, ostensibly
on the orders of the United Arab
Command as a counter to possi-
ble Israeli threats to Jordan.
The pro-Egyptian elements
appear to have formidable as-
sets at the moment, notably con-
trol of a number of important
army positions. Victory for
them, however, would probably
lead to an eventual violent re-
action by many army officers who
would strongly resent Egyptian
domination, and by the Kurds, 25X1
who do not want to be submerged
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No significant progress has
been made toward ending the im-
passe over opening the Nicosia-
Kyrenia road, and the Makarios-
Grivas split continues.
states for his demand for un-
fettered independence for (vorus.
This will probably move some
opposition Turkish politicians
to end their advocacy of closer
Turkish cooperation with the
nonaligned states.
The Turkish Cypriots have
resisted pressures from both the
UN and Ankara to transfer control
of the road from their armed
police to the UN. Makarios re-
mains adamant that unless the
road is removed from Turkish
Cypriot control the Turks will
not be permitted to rotate their
troops on Cyprus. Some members
of the Turkish contingent have
petitioned Ankara not to insist
on rotation if the price is a
vital Turkish Cypriot conces-
sion on the road.
Recent tours of Turkish
Cypriot areas by US officials
have revealed a gradual improve-
ment in the economic situation
as the Greek Cypriot blockade
has been eased. Morale among
the rank and file appears to
be fairly good, but local
Turkish leaders in Western
Cyprus are described as "tired
and beaten" men.
Makarios won support at
the conference of nonaligned
While in Cairo, Makarios
also came out for the first time
publicly for abolition of ~]1
foreign bases on Cyprus as a
precondition for enosis--union
with Greece. General Grivas, on
the other hand, continues to
push for enosis and is not calling
for abolition of the present
British bases. In a speech on
11 October, he went out of his
way to be conciliatory in refer-
ences to Turkey and Premier Inonu.
Greek Foreign Minister
Kostopoulos says that his coun-
try is aware of the need tc im-
prove its position on Cyprus in
the face of growing opposition
from Makarios. He states that a
new committee has been set up in
Athens to coordinate all govern-
mental efforts to improve Creek
political assets on the island.
Greek officials state they are
still in the dark as to the spe-
cific details of the Soviei-
Cypriot agreement recently con-
cluded in Moscow.
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CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
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The second nonaligned con-
ference followed a predictably
anti-Western course, but evi-
dently did little to, promote the
concept of nonalignment or en-
hance the prestige of its prac-
titioners.
Dissension between moderate
and extremist leaders marred the
final sessions. A Sukarno-led
move to introduce a number of
pro-Chinese and specifically
anti-Western statements into the
final communique was eventually
overruled by the Tito/Shastri/
Nasir clique favoring more gen-
eral and less controversial res-
olutions. Publicity over the
split, however, helped to destroy
the aura of unanimity and states-
manship which conference leaders
had hoped to achieve. The furor
in the world press over Tshombe's
unexpected appearance and ensu-
ing confinement overshadowed the
activities of the conference it-
self and helped further to dis-
sipate any atmosphere of dignity
which might otherwise have been
realized.
The already shadowy concept
of "nonalignment" has become
only more confused. Efforts to
establish permanent lines of
communication among conference
participants failed to win ma-
jority support, and the final
resolution made no attempt either
to define nonalignment or to
spell out its principles.
The West bore the brunt of
condemnation. Nevertheless,
most of the anti-Western sec-
tions of the communique were
broadly phrased, and none hit
as hard as their extremist back-
ers had suggested. Articles
on such potentially dangerous
subjects as divided nations,
colonialism, and disarmament
were couched in fairly general
terms. The US and Britain were
scored most heavily and specif-
ically on the issue of foreign
bases.
Efforts by various individ-
ual leaders to increase their
own international stature and
promote their pet interests ap-
pear to have been largely un-
successful. With the eventual
acceptance of the Yugoslav pro-
posal on coexistence, Tito ap-
pears to have acquired more than
most, although his victory was
a narrow one over Sukarno's ex-
tremist group. The absence of
Nehru's strong influence, as at
Belgrade, partly accounts for
Sukarno's greater impact. Shas-
tri held his own among th