NEW PHASE IN SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS WITH THE US

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004500120003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

se 2006/10111: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500120003-9
w 14 August 1964
NEW PHASE IN SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS WITH THE US
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
M9
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
2on -9
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1"; OF THE UNITE]
THE E PIONA
AND 794, THE TR
I N CONTROLS
MUS1, NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
? E TS, If marked with specific dissemination
accardance with the provisions of DCID 1/
ithin the framework of
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14 August 1964
NEW PHASE IN SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS WITH THE US
The culmination of the Soviet strategic dis-
engagement from Cuba, marked by the transfer of
control of the antiaircraft missile system, intro-
duces a new phase in Soviet-Cuban relations with
the US. Moscow and Havana opened this round with
a concerted political offensive--at the UN and
elsewhere--centering on the issues of US over-
flights and the Guantanamo Naval Base, and they
are being careful to allow themselves ample room
for maneuver and retreat. If this approach fails
to satisfy them, it seems likely that Moscow will
promote a tactical line continuing periodic reaf-
firmation by Castro of his desire for an accommo-
dation with the US and adding measures to heat up
the atmosphere. The Soviet-Cuban relationship
will be tested in the process, but Soviet patience
is virtually assured by the recognition that the
mere survival of the Castro regime under manifold
US pressures is a substantial achievement for the
USSR.
Soviet Support for
Current Offensiv
The Soviet leaders undoubt-
edly have counseled restraint in
future Cuban-US relations, but
there is no reason to believe
that their hand was forced in
the present instance by unex-
pected unilateral moves by Castro
or that they are giving him only
grudging support. On the con-
trary, there is strong circum-
stantial evidence that the cur-
rent offensive, beginning with
the fishing boats - Guantanamo
water incident in early February,
is the product of careful advance
preparation dating back at least
to Castro's visit to Moscow in
mid-January.
The question of the transfer
of the air defense system to Cu-
ban control and the political
course in dealing with subsequent
US overflights was almost cer-
tainly a major item on the agenda
of Khrushchev's talks at that
time with Castro and his artil-
lery chief. The joint communiqud
issued after the talks noted that
Cuban Army personnel were quickly
mastering the "modern military
equipment" in their possession
and stressed that one of Cuba's
most important tasks was to raise
its "readiness to rebuff any ag-
gressor."
One of the questions raised
by the communique was the price
Khrushchev may have paid for
Castro's endorsement of Soviet
positions on three key points
at issue with the Chinese Commu=
nists. Subsequent events strongly
suggest that he promised to sup-
port limited Cuban moves against
both Guantanamo and the overflights.
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It seems highly unlikely that
the Cuban premier would otherwise
have risked embarking on such
ventures. In any case, the fish-
ing boats incident, which pro-
vided Castro with a pretext for
cutting off Guantanamo's water
supply, occurred just ten days
after his return from Moscow.
Timing and Tactics
The conduct of that incident
and the development of the cam-
paign against the overflights
thus far suggest that the Soviets
and Cubans envisage a protracted
period of agitation and maneuver,
not an early showdown on either
of these issues. In both cases,
they have employed time-tested
Communist tactics in creating a
synthetic "crisis situation" and
then maneuvering to probe the op-
ponents position and pick up any
available gains before easing the
pressures.
The Soviet leaders, for
their part, have never been noted
for forbearance when they believe
they have caught their opponents
in a difficult or untenable posi-
tion. They apparently agreed
with Castro that the riots in
Panama in early January created
a rich opportunity to agitate
against the US presence in Guan-
tanamo with the cry that the 1903
Base Treaty is null and void.
On the overflight issue, the
withdrawal of thousands of Soviet
personnel and the transfer of the
surface-to-air missile (SAM) sys-
tem provided a good opportunity
for striking at US violations of
Cuba's "sovereign rights."
The campaign against the
overflights followed the classic
Communist pattern of public and
private warnings--calculated to
generate alarm over an imminent
collision--accompanied by assur-
ances that the issue could be
settled peacefully if the US
would grant just concessions to
the Cubans. Although Moscow and
Havana appeared confident that
the US had worked itself into a
position untenable in the long
run, they probably did not ex-
pect that the offensive opened
by Castro's 19 April speech on
the Bay of Pigs anniversary would
force an early curtailment or
cessation of the overflights.
They almost certainly expected
the US to respond with strong
reassertions of its right and de-
termination to continue these
operations.
These assertions, they as-
sumed, would alarm many non-Com-
munist governments and create
a favorable climate for taking
the issue to the United Nations.
Public threats were supported
by private warnings of an in-
evitable clash and by hints that
the Soviets were genuinely wor-
ried. Soviet diplomats at the
UN tried to encourage Secretary
General Thant to use his good
offices toward a peaceful solu-
tion.
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declared that Cuba reserved the
right to shoot down US planes,
he expressed confidence that
the matter would be settled
peacefully.
By mid-June, it had become
clear that this agitation was
having little effect. Various
Latin American representatives
at the UN, for example, expressed
disbelief that Castro would
take any overt action against
US aircraft or would even bring
his case before the Security
Council in the near future. The
pace and strength of Soviet and
Cuban pronouncements diminished,
and the process of "crisis post-
ponement" replaced tactics of
crisis creation.
On 18 June- wou o nothing about
the overflights at that time
because it did not wish to create
difficulties for President
Johnson. He insisted, however,
that if the overflights continue
after the US elections, "Soviet
soldiers" would shoot the air-
craft down. In early July, Cas-
tro took a conciliatory line in
his interview with a New York
Times correspondent, implying
is no action would be taken
before November, when Cuba will
place its ca.se before the UN
General Assembly. Although he
The record of th'.s "first
round" against the overflights
underscores the Soviet-Cuban in-
tention to allow ample room for
maneuver and retreat. It is
unlikely that there is any pre-
cise blueprint or timetable for
subsequent rounds. Future
tactics will be adjusted in
the light of US policy and the
emergence of new opportunities.
The extent to which Khru-
shchev and Castro have engaged
their prestige on this issue
probably should not be exaggerated.
Cold-war experience suggests
that Communist leaders do not
necessarily feel compelled to
make good on their threats in
order to avoid the political
costs of having bluffs exposed.
Repeated Soviet threats and
deadlines over the course of
the four-year Berlin offensive
obviously did not commit Khru-
shchev's "prestige" as deeply
as it appeared to many Western
observers. He manipulated pres-
sures and inducements to over-
come Western resistance to ne-
gotiations and relaxed or with-
drew "deadlines" without hesi-
tation when the West consented
to talks or when the risks ap-
peared to be approaching a dan-
ger point.
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There have been no con-
vincing indications that the
Soviet leaders fear some uni-
lateral Cuban act of provocation
in an attempt to force a show-
down. They undoubtedly have
studied Castro's political opera-
tions and his consistent skill
in maneuver and caution in avoid-
ing head-on collisions from
which there is no retreat. In
view of the potential hazards
involved in the transfer of the
SAMs to the Cubans, the Soviets
almost certainly worked out at
least a general understanding
with Castro regarding the use
of these weapons.
Apart from any formal agree-
ment, other considerations would
discourage Castro from risking
some dangerous action on the
gamble that the USSR would have
no choice but to come to his
rescue in the event of US repris-
als. In view of Castro's
well-known bitterness over So-
viet behavior in the missile
crisis, it would be surprising
if he did not continue to doubt
Moscow's willingness to accept
serious risks of a direct clash
with the US in order to protect
Cuba.
It is doubtful that the
Soviets and Cubans at this stage
have decided on a subsequent
course of action more vigorous
than their present political cam-
paign against the overflights.
Moscow probably will encourage pe-
riodic reaffirmations by Castro
of his desire for an accommoda-
tion with the US. In addition,
pressure tactics in the next
round of their offensive may in-
clude well-publicized test-fir-
ings of Cuban SAMs and other
military displays calculated to
increase the credibility of
sharper threats.
Meanwhile Moscow and Havana
can be expected to make strenuous
efforts to rally the support of
Afro-Asian UN members for a res-
olution branding the overflights
as illegal and demanding their
cessation. They may believe
that a General Assembly debate
on the matter would be so em-
barrassing to the US that Wash-
ington might consider some form
of negotiated settlement to
avoid it.
There will almost certainly
be successive periods of pres-
sure and relaxation timed to take
advantage of developing circum-
stances and opportunities, but
the high stakes involved probably
will rule out any prolonged mora-
torium on agitation. The Soviet
and Cuban leaders appear confi-
dent that the US must eventually
retreat from its claims regard-
ing the legal basis for the over-
flights. They clearly would make
every effort to represent such a
retreat as a major US concession
and as a long step toward US ac-
ceptance of the permanence and
legitimacy of the Castro re-
gime.
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Moscow realizes that its
only chance of achieving its
fundamental aim of ensuring the
survival and strengthening of
the Castro government is to con-
tinue its persistent efforts to
bring about a relaxation of US
pressures and economic boycott.
In the Soviet view of the global
competition with the US (and
with Communist China), the fact
that the Castro regime continues
to survive despite these pressures
is a substantial achievement.
The Soviets have long attempted
to draw world attention to it by
stressing that the "invincibility
of the freedom island" lies in
the courage of its heroic people
and in the support of the social-
ist countries. For Moscow, the
historic significance of the
Cuban revolution is that it
brought the "beacon light of
Communism" to the Western Hemi-
sphere.
Because of the great value
the Soviets attach to Castro's
ties with the Soviet bloc, they
can be expected to maintain a
patient and tolerant attitude
in their dealings with Cuba.
Great dissimilarities in experi-
ence and temperament inevitably
have produced frequent strains
in Soviet-Cuban relations. In
addition to Cuba's natural un-
easiness during a period of de-
tente in US-Soviet relations,
frictions could arise from
any efforts by Castro to exploit
the Sino-Soviet conflict to gain
greater Soviet assistance or
from conflicting tactics and
ambitions vis-a-vis Latin Ameri-
can Communist parties.
The Soviet leaders over
the past decade have accumulated
considerable experience in deal-
ing with such difficult egotists
as Sukarno, Ben Bella, and Nasir,
as well as certain Communist
statesmen closer to home. There
is no reason to believe they will
allow occasional exasperation with
Castro's pretensions and admini-
strative methods to override their
basic interest in supporting his
regime.
Neither the Soviets nor the
Cubans are above circulating ru-
mors and reports of mutual. hostil.-
ity and disillusionment as part of
the effort to enhance Cuba's pro-
fessed ability and desire to pur-
sue an "independent" policy directed
toward closer economic and politi-
cal ties with non-Communist coun-
tries. It is conceivably more than
a coincidence that within a few days
after Castro assured a New York
Times correspondent in early 7uly
ofCuba's desire for extensive
talks with the US and acknowledged
that Cuban "passion and extremism"
were partly responsible for the
break in US-Cuban relations, the
Soviet a a or assured I _j
that Castro was a
changed man and anxious for an ac-
commodation with the US. (SECRET
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