THE BREZHNEV-PODGORNY RELATIONSHIP IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004500110002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 7, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

7 August 1964
OCI No. 0343/64A--
Cody N:o
SPECIAL REPOR
THE BREZHNEV-PODGORNY RELATIONSHIP IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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7 August 1964
THE BREZHNEV-PODGORNY RELATIONSHIP IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
When Khrushchev brought Leonid Brezhnev, the
titular head of the USSR, and Nikolay Podgorny,
Ukrainian party chief, into the Soviet party sec-
retariat last year, he acknowledged privately that
they were leading candidates to succeed him. Sub-
sequently Podgorny; working full time in party af-
fairs, apparently pulled up close on the heels of
the more prominent Brezhnev, who was forced to de-
vote much of his time to the largely protocol func-
tions of his government post. By releasing Brezhnev
from that job last month, Khrushchev probably had in
mind giving him a more equal opportunity to compete
for the intraparty support that will eventually
determine the succession. The immediate purpose
of the shift, however, was probably to strengthen
the party executive leadership. Khrushchev's con-
tinuing failure to renovate the party presidium and
make other needed adjustments in the hierarchy sug-
gests that he has not yet made up his mind as to
the future shape of political leadership.
The Role of Second Man
Khrushchev--like Stalin
before him--has from time to
time utilized a favored senior
assistant in the administration
and control of party affairs.
The chosen man occupies the
second most powerful post in the
country and is presumed to be
the heir apparent.
Malenkov moved up from this
role when Stalin died, but proved
unable to maintain his leadership
in the face of party intrigue
against him. Khrushchev has
tried two men in the job; Kiri-
chenko, who overstepped his au-
thority and was discarded, and
Kozlov, who may have been saved
from a similar fate by his stroke
in the spring of 1963. Khru-
shchev's failure to designate a
new man since then is probably
derived in part from the realiza-
tion that his earlier choices
were not altogether satisfactory.
After contemplating the
record, Khrushchev may have de-
cided to try a new arrangement,
temporize awhile, or perhaps
simply exercise greater caution
in his choice of a successor.
In any case, his good health,
abundant energy, and natural
optimism probably precluded any
pressing concern on his part
about selecting another second
in command.
There was still the problem,
however, of the administrative
gap caused by Kozlov's illness.
Khrushchev solved this in June
1963 by bringing both Brezhnev
and Podgorny into the secretar-
iat. His decision served notice
that he had not decided on a new
favorite son, and had the added
benefit of putting two of his
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most loyal lieutenants immedi-
ately at his right hand. In-
deed, the question of loyalty
seemed to be a prime considera-
tion in the choice. Khrushchev
may have felt that his views
were not always being given
proper consideration--particu-
larly in the field of policy
administration.
Both Podgorny and Brezhnev
were strong political figures
and had been members of the
party presidium for a number of
years. Podgorny at the time
was the political boss in the
Ukraine, while Brezhnev, after
serving in a number of important
assignments, was becoming a
leading Soviet spokesman as
chairman of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet--nominally
the Soviet chief of state.
There is no indication
that they had been direct com-
petitors in the past, but their
current assignments make it
likely that they now will be
in contention for influence
and power.
Careers and Associations
Both Brezhnev and Podgorny
are members of Khrushchev's
Ukrainian clique and seem to
see eye to eye with him in mat-
ters of policy. Their ties
in the Ukraine, however, are
with different and possibly
competitive regional party or-
ganizations--Brezhnev with the
metallurgical and missile-pro-
ducing center of Dnepropetrovsk,
and Podgorny with Kharkov, the
second city of the Ukraine and
its foremost machine-building
center.
Brezhnev was born in 1906
in an industrial section of the
Dnepropetrovsk Oblast of a Rus-
sian family which for genera-
tions had worked in the metal-
lurgical industry. From the
time of his graduation in the
early 1930s from the local en-
gineering institute until 1950,
except for wartime service as
a political officer with Khru-
shchev on the southern front,
Brezhnev held various government
and party posts in Dnepropetrovsk
or in adjoining Zaporozhye Oblast.
Since leaving the Ukraine
in 1950, Brezhnev has had a dis-
tinguished career in such varied
jobs as chief party leader in
Moldavia, political boss of the
navy, and Khrushchev's viceroy
in Kazakhstan during the launch-
ing of the New Lands program.
He had also served a first tour
in the central party secretariat
overseeing industry, construction
and perhaps the secret police
(KGB). Since May 1960 he had
been titular head of state. In
all these posts Brezhnev was
making valuable contacts and
undoubtedly building a personal
following. His many years in
Dnepropetrovsk, however, have
had the most influence on his
career, and the men he worked
with there probably form the
hard core of his support.
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The most prominent of
Brezhnev's early associates is
presidium member Andrey Kiri-
len.ko, Like Brezhnev and most
members of the Brezhnev group,
he is a Russian who built his
career in the Ukraine. He
served as Brezhnev's deputy in
Zaporozhye from 1944 to 1947
and succeeded Brezhnev as party
leader of the Dnepropetrovsk
Oblast in 1950. He is now one
of Khrushchev's first deputies
for party affairs in the Rus-
sian Republic (RSFSR).
Another member of the old
Dnepropetrovsk group is Nikolay
Mironov, now chief of the de-
partment in the party apparatus
which supervises the KGB. The
list also includes the current
party boss of Tula Oblast, the
chairman of the party-state con-
trol committee for the RSFSR,
and a deputy chairman of the
USSR State Planning Committee.
The latter three are also full
members of the party central
committee.
Unlike Brezhnev, who worked
his way up in the Dnepropetrovsk
party apparatus and welded his
following together slowly,
Podgorny arrived late on the po-
litical scene and came in at
the top of the Kharkov organi-
zation, inheriting the leader-
ship of an already powerful ap-
paratus. His subsequent reliance
on-Kharkov officials to fill key
posts in the Ukraine indicates,
however, that Podgorny's associ-
ation with Kharkov was no less
significant for his career than
Brezhnev's with Dnepropetrovsk.
Podgorny had no connections
with Kharkov until after the war.
He was born in 1903 near Poltava,
trained as a sugar-refining ex-
pert, and worked for a number
of years as Ukrainian minister
of the food industry. In 1946,
when Khrushchev was head of the
Ukrainian party organization,
Podgorny was appointed perma-
nent representative of the
Ukrainian council of ministers
to the government in Moscow.
In this normally dead-end post,
he obviously did something to
impress Khrushchev, for in 1950,
at the age of 47, he was trans-
ferred to party work as first
secretary of Kharkov Oblast.
After only three years,
Podgorny took another big step
ahead to become the number-two
man in the Ukrainian party, and
in 1957 he succeeded Kirichenko
in the top Ukrainian slot.
Podgorny's deputy and suc-
cessor in Kharkov, Vitaly Titov,
has also done well. A native
Ukrainian like Podgorny, he was
sent to Moscow in early 1961 to
head one of the cadre departments
in the central committee. In
late 1962 he was chosen to direct
a new commission created to su-
pervise all cadre departments
and, in the process, he attained
membership in the party secre-
tariat.
Probably the most striking
demonstration of Podgorny's use
of the Kharkov organization to
solidify his own position oc-
curred in July 1963 when the
Ukrainian leadership was
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reorganized following his trans-
fer to Moscow. Several offi-
cials closely associated with
Kharkov were brought up into
the top leadership, and Vladimir
Shcherbitsky, the second rank-
ing official in the republic
under Podgorny and a former
party boss in Dnepropetrovsk,
was demoted. The reorganiza-
tion seemed to demonstrate quite
clearly Podgorny's ability to
influence personnel appoint-
ments in the republic.'
Shcherbitsky had been the
Ukrainian premier since 1960
and a candidate member of the
party presidium in Moscow since
1961. There was no official
explanation for his removal but
the facts suggest that he was.
not wholly acceptable to Pod-
gorny. While there is no evi-
dence that Brezhnev was involved
in or affected by the demotion,
Shcherbitsky is a native of
Dnepropetrovsk, served there
under Brezhnev,and took over
leadership of the oblast from
Kirilenko in 1955.
Shcherbitsky was replaced
as Ukrainian premier by Ukrai-
nian second secretary Kazanets,
a' man from neither of the two
"rival" oblast organizations.
Kazanets undoubtedly had hoped
to succeed Podgorny as first
secretary, but the choice went
to Petr Shelest, a lower rank-
ing secretary. Shelest, a
Kharkovite by birth, subse-
quently received Shcherbitsky'.s
candidate slot*on the presidium
in Moscow.
In addition., two of Shelest's
chief assistants in the Ukrainian
party are products of the Kharkov
organization;'one of them was
Podgorny's political deputy there.
Podgorny seems to have made sure
that the present Ukrainian or-
ganization was sewed up tightly
before he left for Moscow.
Strengths and Weaknesses
A comparative assessment
of Brezhnev and Podgorny sug-
gests that neither has a de-
cisive advantage. In terms of
age and education they are about
on a-par.
Brezhnev is clearly the
more experienced of the two,
however, particularly in party
administration. He probably
has a wider range of friends
and supporters and may even
have political strength within
the KGB.
Podgorny, for his. part,
should be able to count on
valuable support from the pow-
erful Ukrainian party organiza-
tion. He might profit from his
'past association with Vitaly
Titov to secure a hold over party
personnel matters. This is a
vital area for the would-be pre-
tender. To date, Khrushchev
has exercised this function him-
self through Titov,a lesser sec-
retary.
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Podgorny also may be aided
over the short run by having
what appears to be a particu-
larly close personal associa-
tion with Khrushchev. This re-
lationship could be a disadvan-
tage, however, after Khrushchev
leaves the scene. In addition,
Podgorny has the handicap of
being of non-Russian nationality.
It is the question of rel-
ative ability that raises the
greatest problems. In the So-
viet system the leader so
eclipses his lieutenants that
the latter rarely emerge into
ful.1 view. Brezhnev, however,
has been put on display more
than most of his associates
and therefore a fairly accurate
assessment of his abilities
seems possible.
On balance, Brezhnev re-
sembles a weaker version of
Khrushchev
Khrushchev's ebullience and may
have less of his drive.
There is a good possibility,
however, that Podgorny is more
of a top-flight leader than the
record indicates. Moreover,
it is to be emphasized that, as
a late starter, he has been as-
sessed by very few people in the
West. He is undoubtedly ambi-
tious, and may bring to the Mos-
cow scene the special talents of
the behind-the-scenes maneuverer.
Recent Activities
Brezhnev's and Podgorny's
activities since their appoint-
ments to the secretariat have
not been sufficiently publicized
to provide an adequate picture
of their respective responsibili-
ties. Brezhnev has often sub-
stituted for Khrushchev at party
conferences and meetings with
foreign Communist leaders, and
during Khrushchev's absences 25X6
from Moscow he has generally been
He is ap-
parently a good administrator
but seemingly not a man of great
or deep convictions.
Podgorny gives the im-
pression of being a careful but
self-confident administrator.
he certainly has none of
called upon to manage routine
party affairs. In this regard
he appears to have been acting
as Khrushchev's second-in-com-
mand, performing some of the
functions previously allotted
to Kozlov. As for substantive
areas of responsibility, there
is almost no information, with
the exception of some tentative
evidence tying him to the mili-
tia, the judicial system, and
perhaps the KGB.
Podgorny's activities have
been only slightly more revealing
than Brezhnev's. He appears to
have steadily expanded his range
of responsibilities since his
appointment to the secretariat
and has played an increasingly
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prominent role in the leadership,
particularly since the beginning
of this year.
There is some evidence that
Podgorny has been moving into
Suslov's field of relations with
foreign Communist parties. In
the summer and fall of 1963,
during Suslov's prolonged ill-
ness, Podgorny for instance took
part in briefing visiting for-
eign party delegations.
He headed a party delega-
tion to Rumania in the spring
of 1963, presumably to assess
and attempt to discourage emerg-
ing signs of divergence from .
Soviet policies, and he has been
prominent in subsequent dealings
with this increasingly independent-
minded satellite. He also sub-
stituted for Khrushchev at the
revolutionary celebrations in
Cuba in January 1964 and led a
government-sponsored delegation
to France the following month.
In April, his
political status was considerably
enhanced by his appointment to
head a special commission to work
out measures for strengthening
the lagging livestock sector.
The commission is composed of
six other presidium members, in-
cluding Brezhnev.
Podgorny's growing prom-
inence has been clearly reflected
in the portrait displays on na-
tional holidays. In November
1963 he still ranked eleventh
or twelfth in the leadership.
By May Day 1964, however, he
had jumped to fourth place--
joining Brezhnev, Mikoyan, Sus-
lov, and Kosygin in the inner
core around Khrushchev.
Future Prospects
In releasing Brezhnev from
the presidency last month, Khru-
shchev probably had in mind giving
him a more equal opportunity with
Podgorny in the succession com-
petition and at the same time
strengthening the executive
leadership of the party. There
is no indication, however, that
Brezhnev--let alone Podgorny--
has actually moved into the num-
ber-two spot.
Having set up a competitive
situation between the two, Khru-
shchev now may be content to allow
"the better man" in the course
of time to emerge clearly as
second in command. When that
happens, Khrushchev presumably
will do some recasting of the
top leadership to suit the "vic-
tor," as he did in May 1960 when
Kozlov moved into the slot. In
view of his past experience,
however, Khrushchev way be re-
luctant to center full. second-
in-command authority on one man.
He might therefore, try
to maintain a permanent balance,
preferring to risk an eventual
succession struggle in the in-
terests of smooth current opera-
tions.
On the other hand, if
Khrushchev expects to run the
Soviet Union for, say, another
five years, he must find it hard
to think of either one as his
successor. Brezhnev will then
be nearly 63, and Podgorny 66,
and Khrushchev presumably would
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prefer to select someone with
a longer expectancy of rule.
The longer he hesitates, the
more likely it becomes that a
third force outside the influence
of either contender will arise.
Khrushchev may therefore
hope for the appearance of still
another new leader, younger and
more vigorous, in whom he can
center his aspirations for carry-
ing forward his policies. Khru-
shchev can have no assurance,how-
ever, that such a third force
will develop along lines accept-
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