WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004500100001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/03/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500100001-3
31 July 1964.
State Dept. review completed
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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RETURN TO R CQ1 } C'
j r`' `'
M"DIAI.P.,ux 'MCA
SECRET
eluded from automatic
/and declassification
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vor SECRET NW
C O N T E N T S
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 30 July 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
AGRICULTURAL PROSPECTS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
The USSR's 1964 grain crop will apparently be large
enough to satisfy Soviet needs and make up much of
the deficit in the European satellites, which will
probably import about as much grain as last year.
China,'despite an improved crop outlook, seems to
be planning to import more grain than in 1963.
CEMA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING MAKES SOME PROGRESS
Rumania, the chief dissident in past CEMA efforts to-
ward economic cooperation, seems to have raised no
problems at this meeting, which apparently marked the
first effort to coordinate long-term economic plans
before they are completed.
SOVIET MIDYEAR PLAN RESULTS
Economic performance for the second quarter of 1964
dropped below the mediocre first quarter. The shift-
ing of priorities has compounded the problem of in-
creasingly intensive competition among various eco-
nomic sectors for limited resources.
USSR COMPLETES MODERNIZATION OF VOLGA-BALTIC WATERWAY 4
Completion of reconstruction of the Mariinskiy Canal
system provides a modern north-south transport system
for the European USSR significant from both the econom-
ic and military standpoint.
RECENT SOVIET MILITARY AID TO POLAND 4
Within the last year Poland has acquired the best
equipped and supported ground force in the satellites
--one of several indications that Warsaw Pact strat-
egy now calls for greater reliance on satellite armies.
LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES GAIN GROUND
They have so far encountered little resistance in their
drive to clear the Pathet Lao from the key road junction
between Vientiane and Luang Prabang, but the Communists
are not likely to relinquish control of the area for long.
Moscow, meanwhile, may be preparing to play an even less
active role in the Laos situation.
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
Page
SIGNS OF DISCONTENT IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
7
Both civilian and military leaders in the Kha.nh regime
appear restive, and top positions may soon be reshuffled
.
Viet Cong activity has been tapering off.
PAKISTAN FURTHER DEVELOPS "INDEPENDENT" POSITION
8
The Ayub government has made several new moves to
build its international ties outside the CENTO-SEATO
framework.
AREA NOTES
On Malaysia-Indonesia
9
and on Rwanda-Burundi
10
REBELLION CONTINUES TO SPREAD IN CONGO
Insurgents have captured another provincial capital;
Premier Tshombe is still preparing countermoves
GHANA CONTINUES LEFTWARD DRIFT
In recent months the Nkrumah regime has moved further
toward totalitarianism and has formed still closer
ties with the Communist world.
GREEK CYPRIOTS INCREASE PRESSURES ON TURKS
Economic and psychological pressures on the Turkish
community are mounting, and a Greek Cypriot military
campaign against Turkish strongholds may come soon.
EUROPE
CURRENT REVIEW OF THE NATO ALLIANCE
The fundamental questions raised at last May's NATO
ministerial meeting probably initiated the most thorough-
going review of the alliance ever undertaken. Prospects
are that it will produce no more than organizational ad-
justments and perhaps some reduction of NATO's programs.
Not even the French want to eliminate the alliance now,
and any general overhaul will depend on how Europe finally
SECRET
31 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii
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war SECRET 1
EUROPE (continued)
decides to organize itself and what relationship it
wants with the US. (Published separately as Special
Report OCI No. 0342/64C)
Page
DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE 14
The French President, in his 23 July discourse, redefined
his policy aims in more pointed terms than ever, particu-
larly criticizing the US role in European affairs and
German acquiescence in the "American hegemony."
ARRANGEMENTS FOR MALTESE INDEPENDENCE
The principal opposition party is dissatisfied with the
new constitution and accompanying defense and financial
arrangements. This, together with the colony's serious
socioeconomic problems, will result in a prolonged
period of unrest. No independence date has yet been set.
CASTRO DEFIES OAS IN 26 JULY SPEECH
He "declared" a right to support revolutionaries in any
country aiding the Cuban revolution and praised those
governments which opposed the OAS sanctions against
Cuba. He also laid further groundwork for the case he
apparently plans to bring against the US at the UN this
fall.
PROSPECT FOR NEW EXILE ATTACKS ON HAITI
The recent three-week rebel incursion from the Dominican
Republic caused little physical damage but inflicted a
psychological defeat on the Duvalier regime which may en-
courage more such attacks soon.
18
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IVAW SECRET VW
WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN HONDURAS 18
Honduran Communists
are apparently stepping up efforts to mount a guerrilla
campaign in Honduras' north coast area.
UNITED NATIONS
THANT TRIES PERSONAL DIPLOMACY
The UN Secretary General's trip this month to Paris,
London, Geneva, Cairo, and Moscow has been essentially
a mission in personal diplomacy designed to win political
and, more particularly, financial support for the UN.
SECRET
31 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
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AGRICULTURAL PROSPECTS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
The USSR's grain crop this
year, although late, will ap-
parently be sufficient to satisfy
Soviet needs and meet a large
share of the deficit in the Eu-
ropean satellites. Sizable im-
ports therefore appear unlikely
unless bad weather either inter-
feres during the compressed har-
vest schedule or damages crops.
In Eastern Europe the out-
look is for the winter crop of
breadgrains (wheat and rye) to
exceed that of 1963--but remain-
ing below the 1957-61 average--
in all countries except Bulgaria
and Czechoslovakia. Both coun-
tries have suffered from drought,
and the combination of drought
and insect damage in Bulgaria
may reduce production to the
lowest level in several years.
Prospects for spring-planted
crops appear better than in 1963
except in Czechoslovakia and Po-
land, but rainfall is badly
needed to replenish below-normal
soil moisture reserves. Require-
ments for grain imports in the
next 12 months will probably not
differ significantly from last
year.
In Communist China, the win-
ter wheat and early rice harvests
are expected to be better than
in 1963 but probably still below
average. Although it is too
early to predict the outcome of
the important fall harvest, acre-
age has been expanded and growing
conditions are favorable in many
areas. Despite the improved crop
outlook, however, completed con-
tracts and current negotiations
suggest that grain imports in
1964 will exceed the 1963 total
of 5.7 million tons.
In North Vietnam, the har-
vests of early rice and subsidiary
crops promise to be better than
last year. Despite this favor-
able outlook, food imports will
probably be continued in order to
replenish stocks.
In North Korea, precipita-
tion was much below normal in May
and June, and nonirrigated crops,
particularly upland rice, are
probably suffering from drought.
However, no unusual imports of
grain are anticipated at this
time.
As of early July, available
information continued to indicate
that the 1964 Cuban sugar crop 25X1
totaled about 3.8 million metric
tons, roughly the same as last
year's poor harvest, although
production 25X1
may have been as high as 4.1 mil-
lion tons. Statements by Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez, Cuba's agricul-
tural chief, suggest that no ma-
jor advance in sugar production
will be made during the next two
years.
SECRET
31 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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The recent meeting in Mos-
cow of the Executive Committee
of the bloc's Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CEMA) solved
major problems of economic co-
operation "in a preliminary
manner," according to its com-
muniqud. No discussion of con-
troversia.l issues was reported.
Rumania., the chief dissident
in many CEMA activities, appar-
ently did not hinder cooperation.
Poland's representative noted,
however, that coordination is
being conducted "with full re-
spect for the interests of any
given country," a. concession
to the Rumanian viewpoint.
For the first time, an at-
tempt is being made to coordi-
nate the countries' individual
long-term economic plans before
they are completed. A review
of the results of bilateral
consultations to date on plans
for 1966-70 enabled the commit-
The Soviet economy's per-
formance in the second quarter
of this year was below the me-
diocre results achieved in the
first three months of 1964.
Difficulties caused by shifting
Priorities have compounded the
problem of increasingly inten-
sive competition among various
tee to estimate total planned
production and consumption of
major industrial products and
volume of trade among CEMA mem-
bers. Immediately after this
multilateral review, a second
round of bilateral talks began.
The committee also adopted
recommendations for cooperation
of interested countries in the
coal and power industries and
discussed development of Poland's
Belchatow brown-coal deposits.
An agreement formalizing
Intermeta.ll, the organization
formed by Poland, Czechoslova-
kia, and Hungary to coordinate
and integrate production of
their iron and steel industries
was signed during the Executive
Committee session. This orga.ni-
za.tion is independent of CEMA
although it is expected to co-
ordinate its activities with
a propriate CEMA organs.
economic sectors for limited
resources.
The half-year plan for in-
dustrial production was overful-
filled, but only because it had
been set low in the expectation
that the new emphasis on chemi-
cals and agriculture would cause
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31 July 64
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
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1W
%or
SELECTED DATA ON SOVIET ECONOMIC SIT
UATION
PERCENTAGE INCREASE
COMPARED WITH SAME PERIOD IN PRECEDING YEAR
Planned
1st half 1st half 1st half rate of
1964 1963 1962 increase
for 1964
Industrial Production 7.5
Chemical Industry 14
Fertilizer 23.4
Pig Iron 6
Crude Steel 6
Electric Power 11
Natural Gas 20
Crude Oil 10
Cement 3
Tractors - 1
Refrigerators 20
Washing Machines 27
Shoes 3
Cotton Fabrics 5
Meat (State-slaughtered) -18
Dairy Products 4
8.5 10 6.7
17 17 16.6
13 9 28.1
6 8 4.8
5 7.7 4.7
13 13 9.8
22 26 19.8
11 12 7.8
10 13 4.1
17 3 5.5
11 23 40.6
28 43 14
0.5 4 0.2
2 2 4.2
19 12 - (Figures not
2 6 - available)
6 6 4.6
* In most Instances the planned rate is the implied annual
rate necessary to achieve the goals of the 1964-65 plan.
25X1
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dislocations in the economy.
The 7.5-percent increase was
the lowest in recent years, and
no early improvement seems
likely.
Labor productivity failed
by a slight margin to reach its
planned rate of growth, and the
small increase of investment
over the same period for 1963
was less than half that required
to fulfill the current plan. In-
vestment increases of 37 per-
cent and 19 percent respectively
in chemicals and agriculture,
while impressive, were a.ppa.r-
ently not enough to meet the
year's goal.
In industry, production
rose most on a. percentage basis
in chemical products. Ferti-
lizers, however, failed to meet
their target despite an increase
of 23 percent.
The traditional growth in-
dustries--iron ore, pig iron,
steel, rolled metal, oil, gas,
coal, and electricity--were all
on target, but certain compo-
nents of the machine-building
sector increased at lower rates
than a year ago, probably be-
cause of retooling.
The depressing effects of
last year's harvest failure
are evident throughout the mid-
year report. An increase of
only 2 percent was registered
for the food and light indus-
tries, which were conveniently
combined to mask the poor per-
formance of the former. The
report claims that the 7.5-per-
cent growth in industrial out-
put would have been over 10 per-
cent had it not been for the
poor performance of the food
industry and a number of branches
of light industry.
Meat processing fell to
the 1962 level--18 percent be-
low the first half of 1963--
but sales rose by 2 percent.
This apparent anomaly stems
from the distress slaughtering
in the first half of 1963 which
reduced the herds but temporar-
ily increased stocks of meat.
Bread sales were up 1 percent
because of extensive wheat im-
ports, which also helped to
boost the volume of maritime
freight by 34 percent.
State housing construction,
as planned, showed little or no
increase over the first half
of 1963.
The increase of more than 5
percent in private savings high-
lights the shortage of accept-
able goods and services avail-
able to the Soviet population.
At the recent session of the
Supreme Soviet Khrushchev reit-
erated the government's concern
with the 2.5 billion rubles'
worth of unsold consumer goods
stored in warehouses. Using an
appropriate ruble-dollar ratio,
this is equivalent to about $1.4
billion worth of goods in the
United States.
SECRET
31 July 64
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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I-Ow W
oven ets
nene4'ye
MARIINSKIY SYSTEM
Voznesen'ye to Cherepovets
Cherepovets
t r.: tv~-)
Kalach-No-D nv
VOLGA- BALTIC
WATERWAY
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SECRET W
USSR COMPLETES MODERNIZATION OF VOLGA-BALTIC WATERWAY
The completion of the re-
construction of the 150-year-old
Mariinskiy Canal system is the
final step in a major move to
open up a modern north-south
transport system in the Euro-
pean part of the USSR.
Until now, the commercial
and strategic importance of the
Volga-Baltic network has been
restricted by the inadequacy of
this vital link. The reconstruc-
tion increased the average mini-
mum depth of the canal from six
to twelve feet, permitting ships
to obtain higher speeds, and
substituted seven large rein-
forced concrete locks for the
39 small wooden ones. Ships
with an average carrying capac-
ity of 2,700 tons are able to
transit the route once passable
only for 600-ton vessels. Transit
time from Leningrad to Cherepo-
vets has been cut from eleven
days to two and a half.
The most significant aspect
of the new network is economic.
Eventually it will carry 12 mil-
lion tons of cargo annually, six
times its past capacity. From
a military point of view, ship-
yards along the route and on the
Black Sea will be more useful,
since they now have a direct sup-
ply route to the Northern and
Black Sea fleets. The route can
also be used to transfer small
destroyers and submarines.
In spite of the vast im-
provement in the structure of
the waterway, commerce will still
be limited by ice conditions, 25X1
which leave the waterway open
to navigation only from about
mid-April to mid-November.
RECENT SOVIET MILITARY AID TO POLAND
Soviet military aid within
the last year has given Poland
the best equipped and supported
ground force in the satellites.
The Warsaw Liberation Day
parade on 22 July marked the
31 July 64
first public display in a satel-
lite army of FROG-4 (26-nauti-
cal-mile) rockets, of any siza-
ble quantity of Scud-A (150-n.m.)
surface-to-surface missiles
(enough to support two field
armies), and of SU-7/Fitter
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ground support fighters. The
parade also included Snapper
antitank missiles and a new am-
phibian armored personnel car-
rier. Some of the other satel-
lites are believed to have some
of this equipment, but none has
it all. In addition, the Soviet
shipment of at least 30 JS-3
heavy tanks to Poland prior to
June 1964 facilitated the crea-
tion of a tank army, also unique
among the satellites.
This enhancement of the
military capability and prestige
of the Gomulka regime appears
to represent a fairly recent
coalescing of Polish and Warsaw
Pact military needs. For sev-
eral years, Polisi military lead-
ers have been dissatisfied with
obsolete ground and air equip-
ment provided by the USSR. Polish
officers, particularly from tank
units which participated in the
Warsaw Pact exercise "Quartet"
in September, openly expressed
their resentment of the fact that
while Poland made the largest
manpower contribution to the
Warsaw Pact of all the satel-
lites, it did not have equipment
as modern as that of the East
Germans and Czechs.
From the Wawsaw Pact stand-
point, the bolstering of Polish
forces is in line with indica-
tions that the USSR has reduced
its estimate of the size of So-
viet troop formations it can
mobilize and deploy forward un-
der modern war conditions. Thus,
it must depend to a greater ex-
tent on forces now in the for-
ward area, including the satel-
lite armies, and these forces
need to be better equipped and
further integrated into Warsaw
Pact planning.
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Ph,j A
4 Muong 4'as
Vag Vie`ng
Sian Namon
Road,:.
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' NORTH
Mu
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an ?ng oc La ua
au Kout
r t Onb Ie
Phou Keng? hahay
uong Phanh. P IJE hang ava_n
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ARREE
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Ban Khang,-;,.,
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Nawpa SECRET
Laotian Government forces
have been successful in the
early stages of their drive to
dislodge the Pa.thet Lao elements
from the area near the junction
of Routes 7 and 13.
The Pathet Lao have offered
little resistance to this latest
clearing action, apparently pre-
ferring to concentrate their
small forces at Muong Kassy.
Although Pathet Lao propaganda
has protested the attacks, there
are as yet no clear signs of
countermoves. It is unlikely,
however, that the Communists
will relinquish for long their
control over this "liberated
area," which has been denied
to the rightists since early
1961.
Premier Souvanna, on 27 July
returned to Vientiane from
Luang Pra.ba.ng, where he had sub-
mitted four cabinet changes for
the King's approval. The cabi-
net shifts, involving the re-
placement of several members of
General Phoumi's rightist fac-
tion, are intended to curb cor-
ruption and inefficiency in the
government. They also appear
to reflect the efforts of mem-
bers of the Sananikone clan to
downgrade the political power
of Phoumi, their long-time polit-
ical riva.l.
Moscow may be preparing to
play an even less active role
in the Laos situation. Soviet
notes of 26 July to the other
Geneva Conference powers charged
that US actions made it impos-
sible for the USSR and the UK
to fulfill their functions as
co-chairmen. The notes warned
that if the latest Soviet pro-
posal for another 14-nation con-
ference next month is rejected,
the USSR would be compelled to
re-examine its position as co-
chairman, which has become "fic-
titious."
The Soviets may believe
that President de Gaulle's 23
July statement, which excluded
Britain from the four powers
"bearing direct responsibility"
in Indochina, provides a good
opportunity to transfer the main
locus of East-West contact on
Laos from the co-chairmen to
direct exchanges among the in-
terested powers.
Although it is unlikely that
the Soviets intend to dissociate
themselves entirely from the
Geneva machinery, they probably
believe that by following De
Gaulle's lead they can increase
pressure on Washington and London
and avoid embarrassing divergen-25X1
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SIGNS OF DISCONTENT IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
There are signs of in-
creased discontent and restive-
ness among top civilian and mil-
itary leaders in the South Viet-
namese Government. Various
sources and rumors in Saigon
have recently indicated that
General Khanh will become chief
of state and turn the premier-
ship over to someone else, pos-
sibly to General Minh, the pres-
ent chief of state, or to Gen-
eral Khiem, now defense minis-
ter. These two appear to have
the strongest individual mili-
tary followings.
Khanh has recently re-em-
phasized his view that a mili-
tary effort must be directed at
North Vietnam and possibly Com-
munist China, the "real aggres-
sor." His emphasis on the ex-
ternal threat may be due in part
to concern over growing opposi-
tion by disaffected elements
pushing for a general reshuf-
fling of the government. Khanh
may also be attempting to pres-
sure the US into supporting
some form of an extended war.
Khanh held a meeting on
25 July of all senior cabinet
members and corps commanders,
reportedly to discuss ways of
improving the war effort and
what should be done regarding
relations with France.
Vietnamese students, con-
tinuing their agitation against
the French, wrecked a French
war memorial in Saigon on 28
July. The National Student As-
sociation has criticized the
government for not taking, stronger
measures against the/French,
and has demanded that it nation-25X1
alize French property or make
way for a government that would.
Viet Cong military ac-
tivity appears to be taper-
ing off after an intense three-
week campaign of large-scale
attacks and terrorism against
strategic hamlets, but some
large-scale attacks are still
taking place. On 28 July a
Viet Cong force of battalion
strength ambushed a relief
force near a district capital
30 miles north of Saigon. This
was the first major engage-
ment between the Viet Cong and
government forces in five
days.
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NOW, *fto,
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PAKISTAN FURTHER DEVELOPS "INDEPENDENT" POSITION
Pakistan has made several
new moves in recent weeks to
build up its international ties
outside the CENTO-SEATO frame-
work and further dilute its par-
ticipation in SEATO.
In western Asia, Pakistan
has joined with the other two
regional members of CENTO--Iran
and Turkey--in establishing a
new organization for "regional
cooperation for development."
Agreed economic objectives in-
President Ayub practically elude the eventual merger of
repudiated Pakistan's obligations their national airlines. Foreign
as an ally against the Communists Minister Bhutto has undercut ef-
in Southeast Asia when he re- forts by Iran and Turkey to por-
cently told an interviewer that tray the new organization as sup-
he did not believe his country porting CENTO objectives. Ayub
would get involved in hostilities probably hopes that strengthening
there because "our policy is to Pakistani ties with Iran and
avoid war unless we are attacked." Turkey outside CENTO will allow
This goes considerably beyond greater freedom to downgrade
Pakistan's previous refusal to Pakistan's participation in pacts
allocate troops for possible ac- and reinforce his "independent"
tion in Laos because of the grow- foreign policy.
ing military threat from India.
Pakistan, like France,now
supports the convening of a 14-
nation conference in Laos, as
demanded by Communist China, the
USSR, Cambodia, and North Vietnam.
Pakistan's Foreign Minister Bhutto,
who recently talked with De Gaulle,
presumably raised this issue.
At the recent Commonwealth
conference in London, Ayub man-
aged to weaken the final com-
muniqud's reference to the Ma-
laysian problem--a favor to the
Indonesians, who support him in
the Kashmir dispute with India.
Ayub, who would like to inherit
Nehru's mantle as foremost Asian
statesman in the Commonwealth,
was generally recognized on this
occasion as the principal spokes-
man among the Asians on the
broader issues.
Peiping will welcome these 25X1
developments as evidence of the
success of its efforts to court
A yub.
The Chinese have recently
stepped up their campaign to
expand their ties with the Ayub
government and thus to encourage
Pakistan's movement toward a more
"independent" international posi-
tion. The Pakistan commerce
minister has just returned from
Peiping with Chinese proposals
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SECRET E
for an expansion of trade. Paki-
stan International Airlines--
the only nonbloc carrier flying
regular service to mainland
China--now is acting as world-
wide general travel agent for
the official Chinese tourist
agency. Last week the official
Chinese and Pakistani news agen-
cies signed a friendship and
cooperation agreement.
Chinese efforts to promote
closer relations with Pakistan
will probably increase further
during the months ahead. Peiping
is working hard to expand Chi-
nese influence in the whole Afro-
Asian bloc and is probably count-
ing on assistance and support
from Pakistan.
Indonesia-Malaysia: Although
there is no evidence that Dja-
karta directly inspired the 21-
25 July rioting between Malays
and Chinese in Singapore, In-
donesian activities certainly
contributed to the tense atmos-
phere which precipitated them.
The violence further strains
Malaysia's tenuous internal re-
lationships and can easily be
exploited as part of Indonesia's
long-range program against
Malaysia.
months has been directed at in-
flaming Malay racial feeling
against the Chinese who comprise
about 75 percent of Singapore's
population. During the weeks
preceding the riots, local Malay
extremists promoted a separate
propaganda. campaign that was 25X1
virulently anti-Chinese and
hostile to the Chinese-dominated
Singapore government.
An Indonesian propaganda
campaign during the last four
SECRET
31 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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 Approved For Release 2008/03/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500100001-3
WWMOI~ too
SECRET
Rwanda-Burundi: The con-
tinuing bitter tri al rivalries
in Rwanda and Burundi (shown on
Congo map on reverse of this
page) may soon lead to another
attempt by Rwandan refugees to
invade their homeland from Bu-
rundi. The refugees are members
of the minority Tutsi tribe who
fled three years ago when the
majority Hutu tribe seized power
from them. They made several
invasion attempts early this year
and once got within 25 miles of
Kigali, the capital, before Rwan-
da's 1,500-man army and police
force stopped them.
The US Embassy in Kigali
reports strong indications that
a renewed attack is likely in
the next few weeks. Refugee
military leaders reportedly are
gathering in northeastern Burundi.
The Tutsi forces may be
tougher this time. Some have had
guerrilla training in Communist
China, and others have acquired
rifles while fighting alongside
Congolese rebel forces. The
Tutsi-dominated Burundi Govern-
ment winks at the refugees' ac-
tivities.
New reprisals by the Hutus
against Tutsis still in Rwanda
are likely if another invasion
is attempted. In the wake of
previous forays, some 10 000 Tut-
sis were slaw htered.
SECRET
31 July 64
Page 10
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 Approved For Release 2008/03/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500100001-3
N"Moo, %W
CAMEROON
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
Province boundary
National capital
Rebel held region
Rebel activity
0 100 200 Miles
0 100 200 Kilometers
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
6ANCL
gJnoa9
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MYAt- DOMBE
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i +t
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,,, WANDA'
Bukavu ?K ALI
Approved For Release 2008/03/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500100001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500100001-3
10.1-1
Rebels
continue
in
eastern
Congo, and
ing
little
resistance
now
almost
worthless
tional Army (ANC).
%%No
SECRET
to advance
are meet-
from the
Congo Na-
Small groups of insurgents,
including ANC deserters, are ad-
vancing northward toward Stan-
leyville after the capture last
week of Kindu, capital of Mani-
ema Province. The commander of
the Stanleyville garrison has
sent two companies to meet the
rebels, but neither is consid-
ered reliable. Whether Stanley-
ville falls may depend on the
attitude of its volatile resi-
dents. They vigorously cheered
Tshombd on his visit there on
25 July, but supported Antoine
Gizenga's leftist regime two
years ago.
In Albertville, rebel-held
capital of North Katanga, Gaston
Soumialot announced on 21 July
the creation of a "Provisional
Government of National Libera-
tion" with himself as president.
If Stanleyville falls, Soumialot
may move his "government" there.
So far few of the disorganized
and uncoordinated rebels acknowl-
edge his leadership, but he may
become their titular leader by
default.
New violence has broken out
in Mai-Ndombe Province in the
western Congo. Rebels captured
at least two towns this week.
Their statement that they intend
to "march on Leopoldville"--lit-
tle more than a hundred miles
away--may cause some consterna-
tion in the capital and complicate
TshombC's problems there.
Tshombd is increasing his
efforts to organize a force to
engage the insurgents.
SECRET
31 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
Since the referendum in
January proclaiming Ghana a one-
party state, the Nkrumah regime
has continued to move toward
totalitarianism and still closer
ties with the Communist world.
With Nkrumah reaffirming his
fundamental bias for Marxism-
Leninism, Communist influence
in the country is expanding
steadily.
Nkrumah's coterie of left-
ist and pro-Communist advisers
in recent months has gained in-
creased authority over the man-
agement of Ghana's economy at
the expense of Western-oriented
civil servants. The recently
appointed minister of finance,
K. Amoaka-Atta, is a vociferous
exponent of socialism and closer
economic ties with Communist
countries. Other extremists
dominate the committees set up
to administer the seven-year
development plan inaugurated
last March. The ultimate goal
of the plan is a totally social-
ized economy.
Through import-licensing
procedures, vigorous efforts are
being made to reorient trade to
the "socialist" countries. The
current goal is to increase im-
ports from these countries from
10 percent of Ghana's total in
1963 to 30 percent this year.
Ghana recently shifted from West-
ern sources to the USSR for the
bulk of its crude oil require-
ments. This decision was influ-
enced in part by Ghana's desire
to utilize credits with the Com-
munist countries and to con-
serve foreign exchange, but
political considerations are
also behind the move.
Ghana's involvement with
Communist countries has deepened
on other fronts. The Soviets
have begun constructing for the
Ghana Air Force a large base
at Tamale in northern Ghana
which will be capable of handl-
ing heavy aircraft. Recently
the USSR provided two naval
patrol-boats. Peiping has ex-
tended a new interest-free
credit of $22.4 million, al-
though Ghana has drawn only
about $3 million from a. $19.6-
million credit granted in 1961.
Total economic grants and credits
by Communist countries to Ghana
now stand at $212 million.
The educational system, one
of the few remaining bastions
of Western influence, is ex-
pected to receive a substantial
infusion of Soviet teachers this
fall. The regime's ideological
institute at Winneba, where
political cadres are taught
Marxist-Leninist theory adapted
to the special requirements of
"Nkrumahism," already supports
a lecture campaign in the second-
ary schools and will shortly
implement a system of compul-
sory political courses in both
secondary and advanced schools.
SECRET
31 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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,%We 111111111110
BULGARIA
Kormaki ' Teblos
Kyreaia