WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004500080001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 17, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
ARMY review(s)
completed.
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1FC_RFT
GROUP I Excluded from autam
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(Information as of 1200 EDT, 16 July 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
EXPECTED PRONOUNCEMENTS ON GERMANY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 1
Khrushchev may use his 22 July visit to Poland to announce
the withdrawal of some Soviet troops from East Germany
and to propose further reductions of foreign forces in
Germany.
AREA NOTE 2
On Rumania
NEW SOVIET INITIATIVE ON UN PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS 3
The Soviet proposal for a UN peace-keeping force is
probably aimed at preventing action at the UN General
Assembly next fall on the question of Soviet arrears
for UN peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and
the Congo.
PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE USSR
Khrushchev, apparently anticipating the succession
problem, has given Leonid Brezhnev a new opportunity
to develop his political strength.
KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH TO THE SUPREME SOVIET
The Soviet Premier proposed improved standards of living
through wage increases and a pension plan for collec-
tive farm workers. Contrary to expectations, he said
nothing of a five-day 40-hour work week.
SOVIET BLOC TRADE WITH INDIA RISES SHARPLY
Bloc trade, which made up about 11 percent of India's
1963 total foreign commerce, has increased about 35
percent in the first three months of 1964.
AREA NOTE 6
On USSR
HIGH RATE OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Viet Cong are mounting large-scale attacks at an
unprecedented rate. They evidently are being reinforced
by Vietnamese Army regulars.
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17 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
MILITARY AND POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN LAOS 8
Both sides may be deploying in preparation for renewed
ground attacks.
NEPAL CONTINUES TO BROADEN FOREIGN TIES
King Mahendra relies chiefly on India and the US for
economic and military assistance, but is maintaining
trade and aid arrangements with Communist China and
Pakistan.
POLITICAL DIFFERENCES SHARPEN IN IRAQ 10
President Arif's steps toward close ties with Egypt have
alarmed many elements both inside and outside the-army,
but pro-Nasirists still do not trust him fully.
TSHOMBE TRIES TO CONSOLIDATE IN CONGO
The new premier has taken several moves to build up his
popularity, but he faces criticism for his one-man show
and a continued spread of rebel activity in eastern
Congo.
AREA NOTE
On Burma
FRENCH TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM AFRICA
France's planned phased withdrawal of most of its
troops from sub-Saharan Africa will probably be com-
pleted by 1967. Defense commitments will be assigned
to the mobile Intervention Force stationed in southern
France.
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EUROPE (continued)
THE KENNEDY ROUND TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS
Pessimism is growing in Europe over the outlook for
the Kennedy Round. There are fears the deadlock over
negotiating policies will threaten the entire tariff
talks.
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS STILL UNRESOLVED
Premier-designate Aldo Moro may be near a decision
whether an agreement can be reached to reconstitute the
center-left government but the allocation of cabinet
seats will still be a thorny problem.
RELATIONS STRAINED BETWEEN BOLIVIA AND CHILE
Bolivia's aggressive diplomatic efforts to regain its
outlet to the sea, lost to Chile after the War of
the Pacific (1879-1883), have already been felt at
the UN and may crop up at the OAS meeting 21 July.
AREA NOTE
On Argentina
Page
GROWING OPPOSITION TO THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT
Opposition to the Castello Branco government's policies
does not pose an immediate threat to the administration,
but could slow down the planned reforms.
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EXPECTED PRONOUNCEMENTS ON GERMANY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
Khrushchev's visit to Warsaw
on 22 July for the 20th anniver-
sary of Poland's liberation prob-
ably will be the occasion for im-
portant pronouncements on Germany
and on European security.
Although this occasion will
call for the usual denunciation
of West German "militarists" and
reaffirmations of Soviet guaran-
tees to protect Warsaw Pact mem-
bers from renewed aggression,
Khrushchev probably will also
advance "constructive" proposals
to prevent a resurgence of the
German threat and to underscore
the desire of the USSR and its
allies to strengthen European
security and cooperation.
Khrushchev may believe War-
saw will provide a good platform
for announcing the withdrawal of
some Soviet troops from East Ger-
many. He probably would portray
this move, following the with-
drawal of over 10,000 US troops
from West Germany in recent
months, as a further success for
his "policy of mutual example."
He may also propose that
the four powers which maintain
troops in the two German states
join in a formal agreement on
further force reductions. Since
it is unlikely that the Soviets
foresee any prospects for such
an agreement, an announcement of
a unilateral withdrawal of Soviet
forces and a renewed bid for a
force reduction accord would be
aimed primarily at establishing
a more favorable climate for
advancing other Soviet objectives
in Europe.
High on the list of these
related objectives is the defeat
of the NATO Multilateral Nuclear
Force (MLF) project. Moscow took
advantage of the recent acti-
vation of the mixed-manned guided-
missile destroyer Biddle to make
a new attack on the MLF in 11
July notes to the seven NATO
members taking part in this
exercise. The notes termed the
Biddle a "prologue" to the MLF,
and renewed previous warnings
that West German access to nu-
clear weapons through the MLF
will .greatly increase the danger
of thermonuclear war. The notes
warned that the USSR and its
allies will respond with "ap-
propriate measures" to safe-
guard their security.
In view of the importance
the MLF has come to have in NATO
political and strategic affairs
and Moscow's apparent belief
that this project may miscarry,
Khrushchev may feel the time is
ripe to renew pressure for a
nuclear nondissemination agree-
ment. The 11 July Soviet notes
reaffirmed Soviet support for
"collective measures against
the dissemination of nuclear
weapons" and Khrushchev may
announce some modifications in
the Soviet position on such an
agreement. Although he un-
doubtedly recognizes that it
would be difficult for the US
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17 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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and other NATO members, partic-
ularly West Germany, to agree
to a nondissemination treaty
in the absence of Chinese Com-
munist adherence, he probably
would be confident that an os-
tensibly more forthcoming Soviet
attitude would at least help to
stimulate Western resistance to
MLF.
The Soviet premier may in-
tend to elaborate on the vague'
proposals to reduce and to limit
German armed forces made during
Ulbricht's visit to the USSR
last month. Khrushchev suggested
June the possibility of a pro-
gressive reduction of both nu-
clear and conventional forces
in Germany. He has no illusions
that proposals at this late date
for limitations on German forces
under some form of international
control would have any greater
chance of winning Western a.c-
ceptance than a formal agree-
ment to reduce foreign forces
in Germany. Such proposals,
however, in Moscow's view, would
give an impression of movement
in the USSR's German and Euro-
pean policies, stimulate fur-
ther resistance and confusion
over the MLF, and arouse old
suspicions, particularly in
Bonn and Paris, over the possi-
bility of Soviet-US understand-
ings at the expense of Western
Europe.
Khrushchev's attempts to
refurbish Soviet positions on
long-standing East-West issues
will be formulated with an eye
to preparing the ground for a 25X1
new cycle of negotiations which
Moscow anticipates following
Rumania: Nine days of
"frank" ov et-Rumanian discus-
sions at the highest level ap-
parently produced no concessions
on basic issues from either side.
Identical statements issued in
Moscow and Bucharest on 14 July
claimed only that "a. better mu-
tual understanding" resulted
from the "useful exchange of
views" on a broad range of sub-
jects, including bilateral state
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17 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
relations, party ties, bloc
economic problems, and the Sino-
Soviet dispute. The tone of
the statements implies, however,
that both sides feel it in their
best interest to avoid worsen-
ing relations by further steps
such as public polemics, which
ceased before the Rumanian dele-
gation left for Moscow. 25X1
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The Communist World
NEW SOVIET INITIATIVE ON UN PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS
The USSR's 7 July proposal
for a UN peace-keeping force is
probably aimed at preventing
action at the UN General Assembly
next fall on the question of
payment of Soviet arrears for
UN peace-keeping operations in
the Middle East and the Congo.
Moscow is seeking to fore-
stall a showdown on the applica.-
tion of Article 19 of the UN
Charter, which deprives a. member
of its vote in the General As-
sembly if its financial arrears
exceed its dues for two preced-
ing years. According to US
calculations, the minimum pay-
ment required before the Assem-
bly meets is about $10.2 million
for the USSR and seven other
Soviet bloc members. The USSR
owes most of this amount.
The USSR formally asserted
last March that it would not
restudy its refusal to pay for
the Congo and Middle East opera-
tions and warned that if the US
forces the issue, the USSR "may
be obliged to reconsider its
attitude toward UN activity."
During his recent visit to Scan-
dinavia, Khrushchev told the
Danish premier that the Soviets
would not pay and that "if they
want to throw us out of the UN,
let them go ahead." The Soviets
probably expect such statements
to generate strong pressures on
the US from other members to
work out a compromise solution.
Although Moscow is trying
to convey the impression of
some "give" in its position,
the memorandum restates Moscow's
long-standing position that all
UN peace-keeping functions must
be under the strict control of
the UN Security Council. This
would prevent action under the
1950 "Uniting for Peace Resolu-
tion" which empowered the Gen-
eral Assembly to authorize peace-
keeping operations when the
Security Council is hamstrung
by the veto.
The statement of the USSR's
willingness to "shoulder its
proper share" of the expenses
for a UN force probably reflects
a desire to settle the arrears 25X1
problem without losing face.
The memorandum offers no solu-
tion to the UN financial impasse
Further information on
Soviet intentions probably will
emerge from U Thant's talks in
Moscow at the end of this month.
Reaction to the memorandum
among UN members--particula.rly
the 21 members of the working
group established to find a solu-
tion to the UN's financial
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17 July 64
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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problems--has been generally
one of open-mindedness and the
feeling that "we cannot be
totally negative on the Soviet
approach." The majority of UN
The Communist World
members are anxious to avoid
a direct US-USSR confrontation 25X1
on the automatic application
of Article 19 at the coming Gen-
eral Assembl
PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE USSR
The appointment of Anastas
Mikoyan as chairman of the Presid=ium of the Supreme Soviet is
apparently intended primarily
to give his predecessor, Leonid
Brezhnev, a new opportunity to
strengthen his political hand
in anticipation of the succes-
sion problem.
Freed from the largely
ceremonial duties of titular
head of state, Brezhnev will
probably be able to expand his
authority in the party and in-
crease his chances of develop-
ing the loyalties necessary for
eventually achieving a command-
ing lead in personal power.
This move, however, in no way
rules out the likelihood of a
fight for the top job after
Khrushchev leaves the scene.
In contrast to Khrushchev's
designation in 1961 of Frol
Kozlov as his successor, the
present change is probably not
meant to signify that Brezhnev
has attained this position.
Brezhnev and Nikolay Pod-
gorny have been leading contend-
ers for the number-two position
in the hierarchy since they
were brought into the party's
leading executive body, the sec-
retariat, in June 1963 follow-
ing the incapacitating illness
of Kozlov. Both have been mem-
hers of the party's top policy-
making organ, the presidium,
for several years. Brezhnev is
now on a par with Podgorny in
terms of having a full-time op-
portunity to develop his politi-
cal strength.
Brezhev, almost 58 years
old, is.probably in general
agreement with most of Khru-
shchev's policies. He is be-
lieved to be reasonably able
and in fair health.
Mikoyan's special unoffi-
cial status as senior adviser
to Khrushchev will probably not
be impaired by his elevation to
the chairmanship of the Supreme
Soviet Presidium. He is likely,
however, to focus his attention,
even more than in the recent
pa.st, on foreign political and
economic affairs.
The Supreme Soviet job
seems to be ideally suited for
Mikoyan because the duties
can be readily tailored to
the capabilities of the incum-
bent. Nearing 69, Mikoyan
was out of action for several
months last year because of
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17 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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KHRUSHCHEV SPEECH TO THE SUPREME SOVIET
Khrushchev's major address
to the Supreme Soviet outlines
measures that will raise the
standard of living of the most
neglected groups in the popula-
tion.
Wage increases totaling
$3.7 billion annually are sched-
uled for 18 million workers in
education, medicine, public serv-
ices, retail trade, restaurants,
and local government. The aver-
age increment of 21 percent ap-
proximates increases granted
over the past five years to the
50 million workers employed in
industry, construction, trans-
portation, and the state farms.
Pay boosts for the service jobs
were originally slated for 1962
but were delayed by economic
difficulties and the continuing
low priority accorded these
groups. Enabling legislation
is expected during this session,
but some of the raises will not
be effective until the end of
1965.
contributions from the collec-
tive farmers are expected to
reduce the state's share from
75 percent this year to about
40 percent in 1965 and even less
in subsequent years. The rela-
tively high proportion of elderly
workers in the collective farm
labor force is reflected by the
fact that about 18 percent of
the total will be eligible for
pensions when the system is in-
troduced next January.
Contrary to previous ex-
pectations, Khrushchev said
nothing about the long overdue
introduction of the 5-day, 40-
hour work week to replace the
present 41 hours spread over 6
days. The monthly minimum wage
for all service employees was
reaffirmed as 40-45 rubles
($45-$50) by the end of next
year. This date is in accord-
ance with the present 1964-65
plan, but three years later than
the one set in the Seven-Year
Plan.
Khrushchev also proposed
a systematic pension plan for
collective farm workers,'the
one labor group not covered by
the state pension system. The
need to replace the current
optional system has long been
recognized, but the weak fi-
nancial condition of many farms
has precluded action. When
Khrushchev first mentioned the
new plan in February, he indi-
cated that the funding would be
the responsibility of the farms
themselves. He has now conceded
that assistance from the state
will be necessary, but rising
Another point of interest
in the speech is Khrushchev's
assertion that grain reserves
will be built up to equal half
or even the total annual require-
ment of the country. The first
figure--approximately 25 million
tons--could be attained after
several good harvests, but ac-
cumulation of a full year's sup-
ply could only be a goal for the
indefinite future. He named no
date when repeating his standard
claim that the USSR will overtake
the US in peaceful economic com-
petition.
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17 July 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SOVIET BLOC TRADE WITH INDIA RISES SHARPLY
Soviet bloc trade with India
was up sharply in the first three
months of 1964, roughly 35 percent
over the corresponding period last
year. This trade made up about 11
percent of India's total foreign
commerce in 1963 and accounted for
a large part of India's foreign
trade growth in the last few years.
New trade agreements and aid de-
liveries plus repayment of roughly
$55 million in debts to the USSR
will raise the total again this
year.
The USSR and India have made
a considerable effort to expand
the volume as well as the variety
of commodities traded. According
to the five-year agreement which
went into effect in January, trade
is scheduled to total about $360
million this year and to reach
about $440 million by 1966, roughly
twice the 1963 level. The Soviets
will export a variety of industrial
products and take agricultural and
light manufactured products in ex-
USSR: Moscow has ordered more
than TGT-million worth of commer-
cial vessels in the West in the past
six months, in. spite of the scarcity
of foreign exchange and the diffi-
culties encountered in financing
proposed purchases of chemical
equipment. This emphasizes the im-
portance the USSR attaches to ex-
panding its maritime and fishing
fleets.
Soviet officials have ordered
four new refrigerator ships from
Denmark, six secondhand ones from
Sweden and three from West Germany,
Dutch and British dredgers, and sev-
eral Japanese fish-processing ships.
New Agreements also have been
concluded this year with Communist
change. For the first time, they
will buy engineering, chemical, and
plastic products, items India has
pushed to diversify its exports.
Another recent agreement
calls for continued Soviet deliv-
eries of petroleum products. In-
dia has received over two million
tons since 1960. The 750,000 tons
it. bought last year made up about
25 percent of its imports of pe-
troleum products and this year's
imports will probably be even
higher.
Eastern European trade with
India, which totaled over $200
million last year, also registered
a sharp increase in the first
three months--up almost 40 percent.
A higher level of trade will prob-
ably continue,as Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary 25X1
have concluded long-term trade
agreements in the last year simi-
lar to the USSR-India deal.F__
countries. Poland indicated in April
that between 1966 and 1970 it would
provide the USSR with 175 vessels of
various types, worth about $600 mil-
lion. During the same period Hungary
will deliver 38 dry-cargo vessels;
Belgrade, 25 vessels worth $120 mil-
lion by 1966. Already under construc -
tion are 12,000-deadweight-ton (DWT)
cargo ships and 21,000-DWT tankers.
Last year imports of almost 100
ships worth over $500 million account-
ed for over 55 percent of the addi-
tions to the Soviet commercial fleet.
Purchases from non-Communist coun-
tries, totaling just under $190 mil-
lion, included 11 tankers, 21 dry-
cargo ships, and 12 fishing vessels.
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17 July 64
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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