THE HANOI-DIRECTED NATIONAL FRONT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004500070002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 10, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

OCT No. 0339/64A
Copy No. 54
SPECIAL REPORT
THE HANOI-DIRECTED NATIONAL FRONT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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10 July 1964
THE HANOI-DIRECTED NATIONAL FRONT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION
The NFLSV--ostensibly a democratic and inde-
pendent organization but in reality established,
controlled, and directed from Hanoi--is the po-
litical complement of the fighting forces of the
Viet Cong. In its effort to provide an alterna-
tive to the government of South Vietnam, the NFLSV
has set forth a program of broad political and
economic objectives which can be accepted by the
majority of people in the South. It has also
created a phalanx of affiliated Front organiza-
tions to give the impression that it embodies
and represents every significant social, ethnic,
religious, and professional group in the country.
Although it has not yet been recognized by any gov-
ernment, the Front is attempting to project itself
as the "legitimate" regime in South Vietnam. Hanoi
propaganda has been echoing these claims. The
NFLSV has not obtained a significant degree of ob-
jective support from the South Vietnamese, but the
spreading war weariness and disillusionment with
the weakened anti-Communist regime in Saigon may
lead to an increased willingness to accept the al-
ternative offered by the Front.
The Formation of the NFLSV
The Ho Chi Minh - led Com-
munists in Indochina have per-
sistently operated under the
cover of a large "front" move-
ment. While resisting the Japa-
nese during World War II, Ho and
his comrades functioned behind
the facade of the old Viet Minh
league. In 1946, they formed
the Lien Viet or Vietnam United
Front, to conceal Communist di-
rection of the war against France
When the struggle shifted to
South Vietnam following the
Geneva.agreements of 1954, the
North Vietnamese organized the
Vietnam Fatherland Front to gar-
ner support for "reunification"
with the South.
This organization, head-
quartered in North Vietnam, had
little success in luring public
backing in the South. In late
1958, Hanoi apparently began to
plan to revitalize its front
apparatus in South Vietnam. Viet
Cong documents captured in that
period disclosed the Communists'
chagrin at their failure to win
over a significant following in
the South. These documents also
indicated that the Viet Cong
fully appreciated the importance
of winning popular favor if their
insurgency was to have any chance
of eventual success.
The underlying theory be-
hind the Communist front move-
ments in Vietnam is to establish
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very broad, general objectives
which can be accepted by the ma-
jority of people, and then to en-
list support from every section
of the population in an all-embra.c-
ing political organization. If
properly carried out, "all the
people" will unite inside one
organization against the "enemy"
--the Saigon government. This
theory is implicit in the
treatise on revolution in Viet-
nam, the People's War, People's
Army, written by the North iet-
namese minister of defense in
1961.
Hanoi had apparently com-
pleted by September 1960 gen-
eral plans for a new and widely
based front organization, os-
tensibly indigenous to the South.
At a North Vietnamese party con-
gress in September, Le Duan, the
party first secretary, called
for the creation of a "broad
united front" in the South which
would have the long-range goal
of establishing a "national
democratic coalition government."
The abortive coup against the
Saigon regime in November pro-
vided the final impetus for the
announcement of the Front's for-
mation.
In order to sustain the
fiction that the NFLSV was the
product of an indigenous band of
patriots in the South, Hanoi gave
no publicity to the new organiza-
tion until January 1961.
The NFLSV Manifesto
The new Front's manifesto
was broadcast from Hanoi on 29
January 1961--a procedure which
itself testified to North Viet-
nam's guiding role in the forma-
tion of the organization. When
broadcast again from Hanoi on
11 February, the manifesto con-
tained several significant
changes. Many passages which
tended to suggest Communist
origin or ambitions were altered
or deleted. The term "agrarian
reform," for example, was
dropped. Vicious and bloody
excesses had been carried out
under this slogan in North Viet-
nam, causing widespread revul-
sion in the South. Hanoi evi-
dently felt that the retention
of such material would tend to
undercut potential support for
the Front in the South.
In its final version, how-
ever, the manifesto still bore
a remarkable similarity to Le
Duan's speech before the party
congress in Hanoi, using his
words to describe some of the
Front's aims. Outlining a ten-
point program, the document de-
clared that the Front's most im-
mediate task was to overthrow
the Saigon government, implicitly
through armed insurrection. When
this was achieved, the Front
would form a "broad national
democratic coalition administra-
tion" to "negotiate" with North
Vietnam on "reunification." These
and other goals of the Front,
such as the adoption of a for-
eign policy of "peace and.neu-
trality," and the redistribution
of land in the South, were iden-
tical with the actions long advo-
cated for the South in North Viet-
namese propaganda broadcasts. The
goals were so phrased, however,
that the politically inexperienced
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masses in the South would under-
stand them to mean little more
than the replacement of the
current Saigon government by a
more "representative, humane"
administration.
The manifesto contained
several highly generalized state-
ments on the necessity of social
and economic reforms designed
to appeal to every possible dis-
satisfied element in the South.
Such words as democracy, Social
justice, full employment, higher
wages, lower rents, etc.,-were
liberally used. A general am-
nesty to all political prisoners
of the Saigon government was
promised. The document also
played on Vietnamese sentiments
of nationalism, calling for the
elimination of foreign cultural
influences and a return to Viet-
namese traditions.
Organizing the NFLSV
One of the first acts of
the Front was to set up a "Pro-
visional Central Committee" to
serve until a formal congress
could be held. Regional, pro-
vincial, district, and village
committees were also formed.
This structure closely paral-
leled that of the Viet Cong in
the South which, in its turn,
was patterned after the Commu-
nist Party in the North.
The Communist-associated
backgrounds of the Front leaders
stood out clearly. The chair-
man, Nguyen Huu Tho, was a law-
yer who had been involved in
pro-Communist political agita-
tion in Vietnam since 1947. The
secretary general, Nguyen Van
Hieu, was a pro-Communist jour-
nalist who had spent most of
his career propagandizing in
favor of the Communists and
North Vietnam. Other leaders,
such as Vice Chairman Huynh Tan
Phat, had similar backgrounds
of pro-Communist activity.
To conceal the extent of
Communist domination and yet give
Hanoi a clearly explicable voice
in the Front, the formation of
an ostensibly new Communist party
for South Vietnam was announced
in January 1962. This organiza-
tion was given the name of the
People's Revolutionary Party
(PRP). It openly admitted its
Marxist-Leninist character, and
claimed lineal descent from the
original Indochinese Communist
Party and from Hanoi's Communist
(Lao Dong) Party. The NFLSV im-
plied, however, that the PRP was
to form only a constituent po-
litical element with a voice al-
legedly equal, but certainly not
superior, to the non-Communist
groups active in the organization.
It was clear, however, that
the PRP exercised effective con-
trol of Front activities. There
is evidence that the members of
the PRP were identical with those
of Hanoi's Lao Dong Party appa-
ratus in South Vietnam. It is
this apparatus which guides the
Viet Cong. The chief represen-
tative to the NFLSV, Vo Chi Cong,
is a seasoned revolutionary, ac-
tive in Vietnam since 1928.
There are tenuous indications
that Cong was in North Vietnam
in 1959.
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Captured Viet Cong prisoners
in South Vietnam reveal that the
units responsible for directing
the NFLSV in.Hanoi are the Re-
unification Department of the
Lao Dong Central Committee, and
the Reunification Commission of
the North Vietnamese Government's
Council of Ministers.
Two other "political par-
ties," the Radical Socialist
Party and the Democratic Party,
were also established as con-
stituent bodies of the Front.
It is interesting to note that
the only two political parties
permitted to exist in North Viet-
nam, aside from the Communist
Party, bear almost identical
names. In the North they supply
a facade of democracy to the po-
litical process in the country,
and operate in such a manner as
to attract support from the in-
tellectual and "bourgeois"
classes. They have the same
function in the South. Similar
groups existed in the Communist
Front during the war against the
French, and it is probable that
some of their members were among
the personnel ordered by Hanoi
to remain in the South after
the 1954 Geneva agreements.
The first congress of the
NFLSV in February 1962 formal-
ized the provisional central
committee into a 52-man perma-
nent body and expanded the
Front's political manifesto.
The essential aims and objec-
tives, however, remained the
same. NFLSV propaganda claimed
that the meeting was "truly rep-
resentative" of the people and
heavily attended. Actually,
fewer than 200 people partici-
pated and "elected" the 52-man
committee.
The Front skeleton has,
however, been fleshed out ex-
tensively with a phalanx of af-
filiated "liberation" organiza-
tions. These groups have been
added to give the impression
that the Front is representative
of every significant social,
ethnic, religious, and profes-
sional group in South Vietnam.
There is, for example, "The As-
sociation of Workers for the
Liberation of South Vietnam,"
and similarly named associations
for students, women, and youth.
These groups appear to be mainly
small staffs operating with very
little actual public participa-
tion. Wherever possible, these
NFLSV groups are affiliated with
corresponding international Com-
munist-front organizations. This
affiliation gives them an inter-
national character, stimulates
publicity about them, and makes
them appear far more important
than they actually are.
Front Propaganda
The NFLSV also boasts an
especially well-organized propa-
ganda arm, the Liberation News
Agency (LNA). This was created
by Hanoi early in 1961, paral-
leling the establishment of the
Front itself. LNA still provides
the easily controlled mechanism
for information dissemination
which the Communists have found
so essential and effective in co-
ordinating and backstopping their
political agitation activities.
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The North Vietnamese news
agency itself frequently is
observed quoting LNA stories,
doubtless to provide them with
wider dissemination.
NFLSV propaganda publica-
tions are printed in several
languages in Hanoi by the gov-
ernment's official publishing
houses, apparently to be distrib-
uted abroad under the aegis of
the North Vietnamese Government.
English-language editions of
Front documents, for example,
have been distributed in England
at meetings organized by a Brit-
ish Communist front organization
which receives the material from
the London correspondent of the
North Vietnamese newspaper Cuu
Quoc. In France, they reach
the large resident Vietnamese
community through the North Viet-
namese economic mission in Paris.
Presumably Front material is
sent to Paris from Hanoi in reg-
ular official channels.
NFLSV Activities Abroad
One of the main aims of
the Front since its formation
has been to publicize abroad its
program and activities, and the
actions of the insurgent army.
By representing itself as an or-
ganization struggling to free
Vietnam from "neocolonialist and
imperialist aggression," the
NFLSV attempts to appeal to the
sympathy of the newly emerging
countries. Expressions of for-
eign support are useful to the
Front in proving its "importance"
to the public in South Vietnam.
A. steady flow of telegrams of
greetings and congratulations go
out directly from the Front to
foreign governments and heads
of state. The coordination and
advice probably comes from Hanoi,
which has by now gathered con-
siderable experience in the tech-
niques of international relations.
The Front has long been send-
ing representatives on overseas
tours, mainly to the Communist
bloc, and to meetings of leftist
and Communist-sponsored confer-
ences abroad. Only a few indi-
viduals from the South, most not-
ably Nguyen Van Hieu, have par-
ticipated in these activities,
suggesting that the NFLSV has
encountered difficulties in mov-
ing in and out of South Vietnam.
It is believed that a hard core
of "delegates" stabled in North
Vietnam, where entrance and egress
is easier, make up the Front's
touring serivce. During the past
two years, Hanoi has been in-
creasingits efforts to gain in-
ternational stature for the NFLSV.
Front delegates, under Hanoi's
sponsorship, have increasingly
appeared abroad at Communist-
sponsored world or regional con-
ferences on an equal footing with
national delegations.
Permanent Front "missions"
have also been established abroad
during the past two years in
Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Cuba, Algeria, and Egypt.
The organization of the
Front office in Algiers exempli-
fies NFLSV operations abroad.
This mission was established in
February 1963 by Huynn Van Tam,
who had headed a delegation to
the Afro-Asian Lawyers Conference
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in Conakry in October 1962.
There is no evidence that the
Algerian Government has taken
official notice of the NFLSV mis-
sion. Tam has, however, contrib-
uted articles to local French-
language newspapers and under-
taken many other political sup-
port activities, including film
showings and speeches to leftist
youth meetings. In view of the
long history of Algerian opposi-
tion to French "colonialism,"
Hanoi probably sees Algeria as
a fertile area in which to en-
list support for the insurgency
in South Vietnam.
At the Communist-sponsored
Conference of "Anti-Colonialist
Youth" in Algiers in May 1963,
Tam appealed for world-wide sup-
port of the insurgency in South
Vietnam. Tam also attended the
Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity
Meeting in Algiers in March 1964.
His speech, predictably, dealt
with the "certainty of final
victory for the South Vietnamese
people" and appealed for moral
and material support. Tam's
actions illustrate another im-
portant use of the Front abroad.
Through these overseas offices
the NFLSV is able to funnel
funds and medical supplies to
the Viet Cong.
travel from the South, however,
is unknown.
The NFLSV as the "Legitimate"
Government of South Vietnam
The Front's international
activities also seek its recogni-
tion as the "true representatives
of the South Vietnamese people"
by as many foreign governments
as possible. No foreign state,
Communist or non-Communist, how-
ever, has yet officially recog-
nized the NFLSV as the govern-
ment of South Vietnam. The dif-
ficulty of establishing a firm
operational base for a full-
fledged Communist government in
the South probably remains a
prime problem for Hanoi.
The establishment of a pro-
visional government, however,
is clearly part of the Commu-
nist strategy for South Vietnam.
Lately, NFLSV pronouncements and
activities have suggested that
the "legalization" of the Front
is being carried out at an ac-
celerated pace. It is probable
that the Communists hope to
dress the Front in trappings of
legitimacy prior to any inter-
national conference on the in-
surgent war in order to gain
NFLSV a voice in the proceedings.
The international travels
of Front members have also in-
cluded open visits to Hanoi.
During October 1962, an NFLSV
delegation led by Nguyen Van
Hieu visited North Vietnam and
was given the red-carpet treat-
ment. During the past year,
NFLSV representatives have shown
up more frequently and openly in
the North; their exact method of
The Front's second congress
in January 1964 produced some
of the first public hints that
efforts to attain legitimacy was
being speeded up. A speaker
alleged that many governments
already consider the Front a
"real government" and receive
its delegates as "real diploma-
tic envoys of the state." This
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theme was picked up by the pro-
Communist journalist Wilfred
Burchett, in an interview with
Ngyuen Huu Tho published in
April 1964. Burchett referred
to Tho as the "de facto premier
of most of South Vietnam," and
to the NFLSV as to "all intents
and purposes, a government."
According to Burchett, the ques-
tion "of setting up a provisional
government is obviously the or-
der of the day." Hanoi later
sought to give greater publicity
to this image of the Front as a
legitimate government by rebroad-
casting the Burchett interview.
Traditionally, such activi-
ties as tax-gathering and food
production conducted by the
Viet Cong have been carried out
under the ostensible auspices of
the NFLSV. Viet Cong political
action documents, and most other
nonmilitary publications in South
Vietnam, are also put out in the
name of the Front. The Viet Cong
military forces have been "offi-
cially" an arm of the NFLSV since
1961.
More recently, the evidence
has begun to indicate that the
Front is building a formal gov-
ernmental organization in the
South. The communiqud of the
second Front congress, for ex-
ample, announced that a "num-
ber of problems of economic con-
struction" and of the "people's
livelihood" had been settled.
Burchett's article claimed also
that the NFLSV leaders are faced
with increasing administrative
tasks because of the growing
amount of territory coming un-
der their control. He claimed
that the Front has now set up
committees--"ministries in em-
bryo"--for military affairs,
external affairs, information,
and education. The efforts of
the Viet Cong, under the cover
of the NFLSV, to tighten and
expand the Communist governmental
apparatus in the "liberated"
parts of the country have been
reflected in the infiltration
from North Vietnam during the
past year of special groups of
administrative cadres and gov-
ernmental specialists.
Southern Public Support
0f NFLSV '
It is.clear that the NFLSV
does not have anything like the
support it claims among the South
Vietnamese populace. In the
"liberated" zones, of course,
the Viet Cong can point to every-
one who cooperates with them
rather than risking his life as
a Front supporter. Both in and
out of the Communist-controlled
areas, however, it is probable
that there is very little objec-
tive allegiance to the NFLSV,
either among the politically
conscious classes or the peas-
antry. Despite its blandly
stated aims and the careful at-
tempt to disguise its domina-
tion by the Communists, the
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real nature of the Front is
well known.
During the last year, how-
ever, the Front probably has
found more favorable public
opinion for its work as a result
of the political upheaval and
disarray in Saigon and the un-
remitting Viet Cong military
pressure. These developments
have produced a growing war
weariness among the populace,
and probably some tacit accept-
ance of the Front's authority 25X1
as the only real alternative to
the weakened anti-Communist mil-
itary in Saigon.!]
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