CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004500040003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 19, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

State Dept. review
completed.
CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT I N T E L L I G E N C E
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The Chinese Communists view Africa. a.s a land
of opportunity, an area, where Lang-term gains in
their drive for interna.tiona.l recognition a.nd in-
fluence are assured and even immediate gains might
be won. Challenged by increased Russian activity
in the area a.nd anxious to play a leading role a.t
the second Afro-Asian conference scheduled for next
March, the Chinese have intensified their efforts
to expand political, cultural, a,nd economic con-
tacts on the continent. This ca.mpa.ign ha.s ha.d some
success but performance to date ha.s been spotty.
The Chinese are new to Africa, a.nd still feel-
ing their wa.y. With relatively few representatives
and limited resources, they a.re attempting to win
over shrewd African na.tiona.lists reluctant to be-
come embroiled in the cold war or the Sino-Soviet
dispute. Despite their handicaps, the Chinese are
confident that the tide of history is runnning with
them in underdeveloped areas. They go a.11 out to
identify China. with the experience of the underde-
veloped, convinced that in-time Africans will rec-
ognize Peiping as their s~ta.unchest supporter a.nd
the real revolutionary founta.inhea,d.
Peiping's immediate objec-
tive is to establish a, larger
presence in Africa, to obtain
a. wider base from which it ca.n
work toward longer range goals.
Although Chinese propagandists
sometimes write enthusiastically
about a "wa.ve of revolution"
sweeping over the continent,
Peiping probably regards this
a.s a hope for the future and ac-
cepts the present necessity for
working with the bourgeois na.-
tiona.lists who have come to power
in most of the newly independent
African states.
Unable to afford massive
economic and technical assist-
ance programs, the Chinese rely
mainly on propa.ga,nda., diplomatic
maneuver, and personal contact.
Their most dramatic recent ven-
ture in face-to-face persuasion
wa.s the ten-country tour of
Africa. last winter by Premier
Chou En-lai a.nd Foreign Minister
Chen Yi. No other major world
power has ever sent two such
high-ranking officials on a.
grand tour of the continent.
When they wound up their seven-
week trip last February, they
had scored no startling gains
but had put down a. solid
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AFRf~A
Tour of Communist Chino's
Chou En-lai and Chen Yi
id December through 0 Febrwry
Recognizes Coawwmst pima
Recognizes Natianai~si Cama
OF (`~T.n ~VI~
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foundation for subsequent ef-
forts to boost Peiping's stock.
Chou En-lei's Trip
newly posted representatives find
themselves in an unfamiliar but
potentially exploitable situa-
tion.
The Chinese premier during
his travels took a, generally
cautious line ca.lcula.ted to win
over moderate African opinion,
and made a, favorable impression
almost everywhere he went. Both
he a.nd Foreign Minister Chen
sought to refurbish Peiping 's
image--tarnished in the eyes of
some African leaders by its op-
position to the nuclear test ban
accord a.nd by its border war
with India in 1962. They re-
peatedly endeavored to counter
Soviet propa.ga.nda, depicting Chi-
na.'s leaders as irresponsible
militants and to present China
as a. responsible power with
world-wide influence.
They tried with consider-
able success to drum up support
for the Second Afro-Asian Con-
ference, to be held in Africa.,
which Peiping clearly hopes to
dominate as it did the 1955 meet-
ing in Bandung. At the same
time Chou a.nd Chen attempted to
play down the rival meeting of
nonaligned nations, strongly
backed by Yugoslavia. a.nd the UAR,
which is to take place in Cairo
this fall a.nd at which China.
will not be represented.
Ferha.ps the most important
aspect of the trip was the op-
portunity it provided for the
Chinese leaders to get top-level,
first-hand impressions of a part
of the world in which Peiping's
"People's Diplomacy"
The sharp rise in the num-
ber of African delegations trav-
eling to Peiping. in ,recent. years
illustrates the high priority
given to "people's diplomacy"
in Peiping's drive for greater
influence. More than 70 assorted
delegations arrived last year,
compared with about 25 in _1961,
and this year the figure is
likely to rise even more sharply.
African officials are treated
to red-carpet tours of the main-
land, and those of any impor-
tance are showered with atten-
tion by top Chinese leaders,..
including Mao himself.
The. Chinese have recently
played host to a number of Afri-
can leaders. Among these have
been President Abboud of the
Sudan, the.Kenyan ministers of
state and home affairs, Prime
Minister Abdirascid of the.So-
mali Republic, a. delegation of
key .parlia.ment members from
Burundi, former Za.nziba.ri for-
eign minister Babu, and a, vice
president of the new Republic.
of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.
Visits by the presidents of
Mali, Algeria., and the Somali
Republic are scheduled later
this year a.nd invitations have
been extended to King Hassan of
Morocco and other chiefs of
state.
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Chinese Representation.
In Erica
Peiping's efforts to promote
more tours of China by African
leaders is accompanied by a cor-
responding attempt to send more
Chinese to Africa. Peiping's
minister of education, the chair-
man of its Commission for Eco-
nomic Relations with Foreign
Countries, and the head of the
committee far the promotion of
international trade have all
visited the continent in the
past eight months.
Peiping now maintains diplo-
matic ties with 15 African na-
tions to Taipei's 18. Five
countries--Burundi, ?Tunisia,
Kenya, Zanzibar, and Congo (Braz-
zaville)--have established re-
lations in the past six months,
and further gains are in pros-
pect.. Ethiopia indicated dur-
ing Chou's visit that it was
moving toward formal ties, and
Northern Rhodesia may also agree
to Chinese Communist representa-
tion when it becomes independent
la-ter this year. In addition,
some of the French-speaking
West African nations now recog-
nizing Nationalist China may
before very long follow the ex-
ample of Congo (Srazzaville)
and France by switching to rela-
tions with Peiping. At this
point, however, many moderate
African governments--Cameroon
and Nigeria are Hatable examples
--are genuinely suspicious of
the Chinese Communists and their
potential far subversion and
are not anxious to see them es-
tablished locally.
Propaganda
Chinese Communist posts
abroad serve as mayor propaganda
cutlets, Chinese diplomats and
press representatives throughout
Africa, as well as Chou and other
lesser figures tearing the con-
tinent, assiduously echo Pei-
ping's radio and press outpour-
ings. Peiping is depicted as
Africa's best friend, overflow-
ing with understanding of Afri-
can problems and sharing a com-
mon experience of foreign ex-
ploitation. The US is crudely
and blatantly attacked.
The Chinese now beam more
than 75 hours of radio propaganda
to Africa each weetc, as compared
with about 55 hours two years
ago. Languages include English,
French, Arabic, Cantonese, Swa-
hili, and Hausa--the nearest
thing to a lingua franca in
west Africa below the Sahara,
Ths Cantonese-language broad-
casts are directed toward the
more than 4{x,000 overseas Chi-
nese in east Africa, nearly half
of whom inhabit Mauritius, the
tiny British island in the In-
dian LDcean.
High-quality pamphlets and
periodicals in both English and
French are widely distributed
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in Africa,, and China. Pictorial,
the glossy LIFE-s zi a propagan a
magazine, appeared in Swahili
for tie fix'st time this past
spring..
New China News Agency:(NCNA),
Peiping's principa,l_a.gency-for
dissemination of propaganda and
collection of intelligence, now
maintains about 25 Chinese cor-
respondents in Africa. in.addi-
tion to numerous effective and.
often influenti;a.l local stringers.
Zanziba.r's ex - foreign minister
Babu, now a minister in the new
union's Directorate."of Planning,
formerly served as an NCNA.rep-
resentative in East Africa.
Areas of Specia,:l Interest
The Congo and East Africa
are two areas of special inter-
est to the Chinese Communists
and the focal points for Pei-
ping's current small,-scale of -
forts in support of revolution-
ary activity,. A lead editorial
in Peiping's People's Daily-last
month. hailed ~e "b~t'I~ -cries
coming from .the jungle." It
pointedly accused the Soviets
not only `of fairing to~support
"national independence movements"
wholeheartedly but of a.ctuallq
attempting to "frighten," the
Congolese into"submitting" to
the US.
-The Chinese maintain embas-
sies in the Brazzaville Congo
and Burundi--staging areas for
activity by the Committee of
National Liberation (CNL) made
up of exiles from the Leopold-
ville Congo dedicated to over-
throwing the Adoula, regime there.
Chinese diplomats a.re known to
be in regular contact with CNL
leaders in bath Bra.zza.ville and
Bujumbura. Burundi's ca.nita.l.
Peiping has given-the CNL
some a.id and f ina.ncia.l backing ,
and the Chinese presence in the
af~ea is expanding. The US Em-
bassy in Brazza.vil-le, however,
reports-that Chinese diplomatic
activity there has been low key
and circumspect. CNL unrelia.-
bility is an obvious cause for "
Peiping's concern. A Chinese
diplomat- ha.s complained that
the leading CNL representative
in Burundi squandered funds given
him on beer and women. For the
present Chinese a.id is primarily
~confine~d to advice and moral,
rather than monetary a.nd mate-
ria.l , support .
'''he Chinese a.re eager to
appear the staunch supporters
of revolutionaries around the
world, but reluctant to expend
their limited resources on fac-
~tion-ridden exile groups of un-
proven capability--a description
which, in addition to the CNL,
fits revolutionaries from the
Portuguese territories as well.
The contacts have been made,
however, and if the CNL or An-
golan exiles demonstrate greater
effectiveness the Chinese will
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probably come through with more
substantial support.
In East Africa also, the
Chinese are in contact with
exile groups from southern Afri-
ca. Dar es Salaam, the Tongan-
yikan capital, is at present
the area's most important cen-
ter for this activity. Over 20
Chinese are assigned to the em-
bassy there. In Tanganyika in-
fluential exiles are signed up
for bloc tours, and promising
young Africans are recruited for
bloc study--some for academic
programs, others for training in
terrorist techniques. In Dar
the Chinese are busy cultivating
refugee groups from &fozambique,
Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and
South Africa; they are probably
hopeful over the long run of
developing a disciplined. corps
of cadres effective in local
liberation struggles and at the
same time responsive to Peiping,
In Zanzibar, a 1.,600-student
university is reportedly planned,
probably with Chinese aid and
destined to house refugees un-
dergoing political indoctrina-
tion. Over 60 Chinese
the island now
Peiping has
a so provided Zanzibar with about
$500,000 in direct budgetary sup-
port, and $14 million in inter-
est-free developmental credit.
In East Africa the Chinese
also work through established
government leaders. Zanzibar's
Babu has made frequent visits
to Peiping and has received.
funds Pram the Chinese. In
Uganda, Peiping is reported to
have made cash payments to sev-
eral prominent members of the
ruling Uganda People's Congress.
Oginga Odinga, Kenya's ambitious
and influential minister of home
affairs, has been in contact
with the Chinese and visited
Peinin~ this spring. He has
selected and dispatched
Kenyans far training in the
bloc; 20 were sent to Communist
China for guerrilla trainin
~ Od i nga ,
a radical African, has long re-
ceived funds from both the Chi-
nese and the Soviets.
Sino-Soviet Competition
The Soviet Union has re-
:ently moved to counter Chinese
efforts in Africa, and Sino-
Soviet competition for influence
there is becoming increasingly
apparent. Algerian President
Ben Bella 's visit to the USSR
in May and Khrushchev's trip to
Egypt were exploited to demon-
strate Soviet support for "na-
tional. liberation movements" and
to gain endorsement by important
neutralist leaders of a wide
range of Soviet policy objec-
tives, The Soviet Union has
sought inclusion in the Afra-
Asian conference on the grounds
that it is an Asian state. The
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magnitude of Moscow's recent
a,id promises in part reflects
the campaign to contrast Soviet
COMMUNIST ECONOMIC CREDITS AND GRANTS E%TENDED
TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES
ability to render tangible help
AFRICAN COUNTRIES
COMMUNIST
USSR EASTERN EUROPEAN
t0 emer incY countries Wlth the
p t~
-
CHINA
COUNTRIES
slogans and more nebulous prom-
ALGERIA
51.8
228.0
7.4
ices of the Chinese.
ETHIOPIA
- _
101.8 ~
'~I.B
While the Chinese premier
GHANA
19.6
88.8
81.5
steered clear of anti-Soviet
GUINEA
26,5
73.1
25.2
polemics in public speeches dur-
KENYA
98.0
7
-
ing his African tour--probably
MALI
19.6
55,5-
22.6
at his hosts' insistence--it
was clear from the start that
MOROCCO
-
-
17.2
an important objective of the
SOMALI REPUBLIC
21.6
SZ.2
5.6
trip Wa.S t0 undercut MOSCOW tS
influence.
SUDAN
TUNISIA
-
23.0
27.8
19.5-
UAR
4.7
833,0
182.9
ZANZIBAR
TOTAL
14.5
176.3 1,
-
488.2
14.0
367.7
In Algiers, Chou cited
China s early support for Alge_
ria.n revolutionaries--support
which actually predated that of
the USSR.
The Soviets retaliated as
best they could. At the airport
in Mali when Chou landed, natives
were plying the crowd with anti-
Chinese pamphlets--clearly echo-
ing Moscow's polemical tracts.
Earlier last winter the
Chinese in Mali outmaneuvered
the Soviets, pre-empting a Soviet
trade fair site for a propagan-
distic show of their own. The
Chinese pitch at this exhibit,
as elsewhere in Africa, wa,s
cleax and unmistakable. "We're
like you--backward, but we're
making big strides. We've ha.d
your problems a,nd we've learned
the hard way. Now you can learn
from us--no strings attached."
In Mali, as in Guinea, and
Ghana, where Peiping is build-
ing a wide variety of small
factories, Chinese technicians
are skillfully gaining grass=
roots good will at the expense
of Moscow and the West. Pei-
pings advisers reportedly
"blend" readily into the African
landscape.- They do not ask for
cars, refrigerators, or luxuri-
ous houses. They a.re prepared
to live on a. small amount of
rice, ride bicycles or walk,
and to accept the same hard-
ships as their Malian counter-
parts.. Most importantly,
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Peiping has a reputation for
sending these technicians mare
quickly than auy other country
in the world. Mali's minister
of .development recently remarked
that to get technicians from
the US takes "one year to never,"
from the Soviet Union, "six
months to a year," from Commu-
nist China, "forty-five days."
Peiping's use of racism in
the struggle with Moscow is a
key element of the Chinese of-
fensive in Africa. At Afra-
Asian gatherings, such as the
Cairo Writers Conference in
1962, the major meeting in Moshi,
Tanganyika, last year, and the
Afro-Asian Solidarity Council
meeting in Algiers this spring,
Chinese representatives have
conducted high-pressure lobby-
ing with African delegates to
persuade them of an identity
of Chinese and African interests
--the need for the nonwhites to
stand together. In approaching
Africans the Chinese lump West-
ern Europeans, Americans, and
Russians together in general.
opposition to the colored, down-
trodden, have-Hots of the world.
Chou En-Lai used this line con-
stantly during his tour of
Africa.
Peiping' racism by innu-
endo has raised cries of dirty
pool from Moscow.. Izvestia has
accused Peiping of ung- a
"Chinese wall" between Moscow
and Afro-Asian nations, and the
chief Soviet delegates at the
Solidarity Council meeting in
Algiers angrily berated those
who set "peoples, countries, and
continents," against each other.
Africans are increasingly dis-
gruntled by such airing of the
Sino-Soviet +quarrel in Afro-
Asian forums, and the harangu-
ing of Peiping's representa-
tives has brought sharp criti-
cism on several occasions.
In efforts to enlarge their
role in Africa the Chinese face
several formidable obstacles.
They are clearly not in
a position to satisfy all Afri-
can wants and, although sympa-
thetic wards can make modest
credits appear more generous,
hardheaded African nationalist
leaders may increasingly came
to seek suable material aid
instead of ideatagical palaver
and the flowery words of friend-
ship.
In North Africa, Peiping
finds itself confronted with
Cairo's own. ambitions in the
Afro-Asian world. North Africa.
was the least successful por-
tion of Chou En-lai's tour.
Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria,
with their greater sophistica-
tion, European orientation, and
relatively higher standard of
living, received the premier
with palate reserve. Certainly
they were less receptive than
the mare militantly anticolonial,
authoritarian regimes of Guinea,
Ghana, and Mali.
Even in wooing militant
revolutionaries the prospects
may Hat be altogether rosy.
Peiping undoubtedly has few
illusions about the fang-term
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reliability of many of those
it trains and hopes to influence.
For many, African nationalism
comes first and Communism second,
and a. potential recruit can be
nurtured on scholarships and
small handouts only to sour into
a.n unresponsive bourgeois na-
tionalist, self-indulgently
squandering Peiping's funds.
Although there is no firm
evidence of Chinese involvement
in the army mutinies in East
Africa-and the coup in Zanzibar,
the doubts that led to the abrupt
cancellat-ion of Chou's visits
to Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika
last winter persist. In addi-
tion, widespread East African
distrust of Asians a,lrea.dy in
the area,, primarily emigrd In-
dians a.nd Pakistanis, ma.y carry
aver to the Chinese, offsetting
their most assiduous propaganda
efforts.
Curiously the Chinese may
also be vulnerable on the very
issue of racial discrimination
they are pushing so hard against
the US and the Soviet Union.
Dozens of African students who
went to China three or four years
a.go have returned disillusioned
a.nd openly critical. They were
appalled at the low standard of
living, the heaves handed polit-
ical indoctrination, and the
obvious efforts to segregate
them. Racial pride and cultural
a.rrogancy have often hurt Pei-
ping's prospects where the Chi-
nese have come into close con-
tact with Africans.
Despite obvious handicaps
the Chinese a,re determined to
press forward, a.nd their drive
far influence will gain momentum.
Chou En-lai, speaking this spring
before a. joint session of the
Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People's Congress and
the State Council, revealed
plans for sharp increases in
the number of Chinese stationed
in Africa, and a,n expansion of
economic aid projects in the
area, .
As a useful tool in the
two-pronged drive against the
US a.nd the USSR, Peiping will
probably p1a.y up the racial
theme ever more stridently. In
public statements a.nd private
conversations with Africans,
China's diplomats will continue
to berate Washington as champion
of the status quo and vestigial
colonalism, and at the same
time take snide pokes at Moscow
for la.gga,rd support of revolu-
tionary struggle. What the Chi-
nese are unable to provide in
material a.ssista,nce they will
attempt to make up for in sympa-
thetic counseling and voluminous
propaganda, support.
main.
However, until they can
convince the continent's 1ea.ders
that African nationalism is be-
ing supported for its own sake
and not for ulterior Chinese
motives, a degree of native Afri-
can suspicion a.nd doubt a.s to Pei-
ping's real intentions will re-
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