FINALND'S AGRARIANS SQUABBLE ON EVE OF PARTY CONGRESS
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5 June 1964
FINALND'S AGRARIANS SQUABBLE ON EVE OF PARTY CONGRESS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
'OFFICE OF C U R R E N T I N T E L L I G E N C E
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ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
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TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
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FINLAND'S AGRARIANS SQUABBLE ON EVE OF PARTY CONGRESS
The biennial congress of.Finland's dominant
Agrarian Party, set for 12-14 June, will be held
at a time when the party is increasingly troubled
by internal dissension and by indications of wan-
ing electoral support. Although no leader has
come forward to challenge directly President Kekko-
nen's tight control of the party, the cleavage be-
tween the pro- and anti-Kekkonen factions is widen-
ing. Moreover, Moscow's continued interest in
Finnish politics is most recently evident in a
Pravda attack against Agrarian Party Chairman Suk-
selainen which may have been in response to appeals
from Kekkonen supporters for help in discrediting
the man who represents a rallying point for the
anti-Kekkonen group.
Background
The Agrarian Party was
founded in 1906 as the Country
People's Union designed to serve
the interests of the largely
landless rural population. As
the farm population dwindled in
the exodus to the cities, the
party increasingly sought to
develop a broader base. The
image it now wants to cast is
that of a center party which is
not only responsive to the needs
of rural constituents, but able
to attract the vote of the urban
labor population as well. The
Agrarians' major rival for votes,
especially among the small farmers
and landless farm laborers, has
been the Communist-front Finnish
People's Democratic League (SKDL).
To picture itself as a
broadly based center party, the
Agrarian Party is considering
a proposal to change its name
to "The Agrarian Union--the Dem-
ocratic Center." This proposal,
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however, has drawn derisive
criticism from other Finnish
parties who claim that the Agrar-
ians are neither "democratic"
nor "center." They also assert
that the Agrarians are and al-
ways will be farmer oriented.
For 20 years the Agrarians
shared government responsibili-
ties with the Social Democrats
in a series of so-called "Red-
Green" majority coalitions. In
1957, the Social Democrats be-
came a divided party, and also
fell from President Kekkonen's
favor when they elected Vaino
Tanner, considered an archenemy
by the Soviets, as party chair-
man. Since 1958, the Agrarians
have been the dominant party in
the government and have kept the
Social Democrats in political
isolation, largely on the charge
that they do not support the
foreign policy line of Fenno-
Soviet friendship. The regular
Social Democrats and the splinter
Skogist party, however, now are
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on the brink of reuniting, and
hope to be in a position to
challenge the Agrarian hegemony
in the municipal election this
fall and in the next national
election--which is scheduled for
1966.
Kekkonen's Role
Urho Kekkonen has been the
Agrarian Party leader and its
chief policy-maker for more than
three decades. His controver-
sial personality has both at-
tracted and repelled allegiances
and has split the party into pro-
and anti-Kekkonen factions. By
tradition, Finland's president
remains above party politics,
but this has not prevented Kek-
konen from playing a primary
role in party affairs since his
election to the presidency in
1956.
Kekkonen's conviction that
the USSR is destined to become
the dominant power on the Euro-
pean scene was formed during the
war years and immediately after,
when he was beginning his own
rise to power in Finland. He
worked closely with J. K. Paasi-
kivi, president of Finland from
1946 to 1956, and the originator
of the Finnish policy of living
as a friendly but neutral neigh-
bor to the Soviets. The "Paasi-
kivi Line," as it became known,
now has become the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen Line, but Kekkonen has
modified and reshaped the policy
toward more outright accommoda-
tion to the USSR and suppression
of anti-Soviet sentiment at home.
Kekkonen prides himself on
the power role he plays on the
Finnish scene. And because he
has staked out such a dominating
role for himself, there is pres-
ently no heir apparent either
in the Agrarian Party or else-
where on the political scene.
He has shown himself to be ruth-
less in brooking no threat to
his leadership, and freely uses
his position in relation to the
Soviets as a means to silence
opposition both within and out-
side his party.
His supporters emphasize
Kekkonen's unique position by
recalling the crisis in Soviet-
Finnish relations in 1961 when
Moscow invoked-the 1948 Treaty
of Friendship and Mutual Assist-
ance and called for military
consultations because of the
"threat" of West German activity
in the Baltic. Kekkonen went
to Moscow for personal talks
with Khrushchev, and as a result,
the consultations were deferred.
It is generally accepted that
the episode was contrived by
Moscow primarily to ensure Kek-
konen's re-election early in the
following year. Such tactics,
however, enable Kekkonen to
claim that his Agrarian Party is
the only one which can govern
Finland in a manner acceptable
to the Soviet Union.
Party Dissension
The quarrel now going on
in the Agrarian Party on the eve
of its congress is obviously not
new, centering as it does on
issues that have been a source
of intramural contention for
many years. Resentment at Kek-
konen's arbitrary use of the
presidency to dominate the party,
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and at his overriding concern
for foreign affairs at the ex-
pense of a viable domestic policy,
have angered and alienated the
more conservative Agrarians who
control the party's parliamentary
group.
A major irritant is the con-
tinuing effort by the pro-Kekkonen
faction--the so-called "K-liners"
--to unseat the party's chairman,
Vieno Sukselainen. This group,
which includes former prime min-
ister Ahti Karjalainen, former
party secretary Arvo Korsimo,
and Matti Kekkonen, the Presi-
dent's left-leaning son, tried
at the 1960 and 1962 party con-
gresses to unseat Sukselainen
and replace him with someone more
amenable to Kekkonen's wishes.
Both attempts failed and Sukse-
lainen was returned to his post
by a comfortable margin.
The campaign against Sukse-
lainen now has moved from intra-
party and behind-the-scenes ma-
neuvers to the pages of Pravda.
Sukselainen's appearancebefore
Estonian exile groups in Sweden
and the United States triggered
Moscow's accusation in early
April that he was undermining
Finnish-Soviet relations, and
thus, by implication, endanger-
ing the cornerstone of Kekkonen's
foreign policy. Following the
appearance of the article, the
suspicion has grown in Finland
that the Soviet move to discredit
Sukselainen at this time was
initiated by the K-liners.
Ultimately, the Soviet at-
tack probably will have strength-
ened instead of weakened Sukse-
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lainen's position; indeed, many
elements, including much of the
Agrarian press, have already
rallied to his support. Although
resentment over Moscow's tactics
served to bring the anti-Kekkonen
Agrarians together, further Soviet
allegations prior to the congress
might be enough to upset the
balance and end Sukselainen's
tenure. The K-liners, however,
are probably reluctant to see
this effort pushed too far, since
it might result in a permanent
division of the party.
The 58-year-old Sukselainen,
a former prime minister, has
been party chairman since 1945.
Since 1954, he has also served
as director of the National Pen-
sions Institute. In 1961, he
was indicted in a state investi-
gation of the Pensions Institute,
and although he was subsequently
cleared, he resigned as prime
minister. One inconsequential
question not fully settled during
the investigation remains as a
threat to his job as party chair-
man and could be revived at this
time by his opponents as a measure
to discredit him.
The man most frequently
mentioned as a contender for
Sukselainen's position is party
Vice Chairman Johannes Virolainen,
who was elected to his post over
a K-liner. Virolainen, a former
agriculture minister, is considered
acceptable to Kekkonen--at least
until such time as Kekkonen can
maneuver a closer supporter into
the job.
Kekkonen's personal prefer-
ence for the party chairmanship
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FINNISH PARLIAMENT
(FOLLOWING FEBRUARY 1962 ELECTIONS)
CI 1
LIBERALS
DEMOCRATIC 13 LIBERAL
OPPOSITION UNION
(SKOGISTS) 1
2 200 SEATS
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
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is said to be former prime min-
ister Karjalainen, long regarded
as his pro.tegd and considered
by some as likely to succeed
him in the presidency. Karja-
lainen, however, has never made
his mark as a strong leader, and
he has very little rank-and-file
support. Behind many of the pre-
congress intrigues is former
party secretary Korsimo, who is
close to Kekkonen, but not well
liked within the party. His
war record as a deserter, as
well as his questionable politi-
cal ethics, have earned him an
unsavory reputation as the Pres-
ident's "hatchet-man."
The Cabinet Question
Agrarian Party dissension
has re-emerged at a time when
domestic politics are stalemated.
A nonpolitical caretaker cabinet
has been in office since last
.December when the Agrarians
failed to form a majority govern-
ment. Kekkonen is opposed to an
Agrarian-led minority government
on the grounds that a majority
cabinet would serve as clearer
evidence that his policies--
especially that of friendship
toward the USSR--are broadly
supported at home. Since he
prefers to avoid an electoral
challenge to the Agrarians at
this time, he has also adamantly
refused to consider demands of
the Social Democratic Party for
the dissolution of Parliament
and the calling of national elec-
tions before 1966--when they will
be mandatory.
The Social Democrats hope
to win some votes from the Agrar-
ians in the September municipal
elections. But in the event of
Agrarian losses, or even in the
case of a genuine party split,
it is more probable that Commu-
nists would be the beneficiaries,
especially in northern and east-
ern Finland where the vote is
traditionally radical.
Meanwhile the Agrarians
and the other non-Socialist
parties which formerly made up
the cabinet under Karjalainen,
began early last month to recon-
sider the question of reviving
their coalition. Since that
time, prospects have improved
for agreement on a majority cabi-
net, possibly even before Parlia-
ment's summer recess.
Outlook
Whatever the outcome of
these negotiations, the Agrarian
Party will continue to be the
dominant force in Finnish poli-
tical life for the foreseeable
future because of its identifi-
cation with President Kekkonen's
policy of maintaining friendly
relations with the USSR. Sukse-
lainen's re-election to the
party chairmanship, which now
seems likely, would represent
something of a setback for Kek-
konen, in that Sukselainen could
serve as a rallying point for
the sizable group that is in-
creasingly disgruntled over the
President's handling of Finnish
affairs. The chances of this
group openly challenging Kek-
konen, however, appear small in
view of the party's domestic
political interests and the
practical imperatives of Soviet-
Finnish relations. (SECRET)
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(Information as of 1200 EDT, 4 June 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
Page
EAST - WEST GERMAN TRADE EXPANDING
1
Interzonal trade this year will probabl
y exceed th
e rec-
OK
ord level of 1960, and long-range contr
the East Germans do not anticipate a Be
acts sugges
rlin crisis
t that
.
PEIPING PRESSES DRIVE FOR INFLUENCE IN ASIA
AND AFRICA
2
Looking ahead to the second Afro-Asian
conference
sched-
uled ten months from now, the Chinese Communists are T,,r
stepping up their campaign to counter increased Soviet
influence in the area.
COMMUNIST VIEWS OF THE LAOS SITUATION 3 Ol>
All Communist regimes are seeking some sort of interna-
tional conference in an effort to contrast their "rea-
sonable" TT.
approach with alleged US plans to intervene
militarily. Despite differences over procedures, their
tactics all seem aimed at a negotiated settlement to
legitimize military gains already made by the Pathet Lao.
All Communist capitals have raised the specter of a
dangerous East-West confrontation if the military situa-
tion is allowed to escalate.
THE SITUATION INSIDE LAOS5
Communists may be preparing to launch new attacks on the TTTTT " ''T ^ T
neutralists in the Plaine des Jarres area, and Pathet Lacy
leader Souphannouvong is pressing to renew talks regarding 3G'a'"AJsy'.;
the coalition government.
POLITICAL TROUBLES STILL PLAGUE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT 6
The release of four generals associated with the Minh VTT-_,
regime has helped little, and Buddhists and Catholics
are at odds concerning a controversial trial. Insurgent
activity has dropped off.
INDONESIA'S ANTI-MALAYSIAN CAMPAIGN IN POLITICAL PHASE 7
Djakarta is ostensibly toning down its active subversion
in favor of efforts to pursue its aims diplomatically xti~h
through a summit conference later this month.
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5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i
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ing up the defense establishment and working to modify a
constitutional ban on armed forces as such. It will be
some time, however, before the public can accept mili-
tary forces commensurate with Japan's booming economy an
growing role in world affairs. (Published separately as
are gradually fading, and the government is slowly build-
ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
SHIFTING JAPANESE ATTITUDES ON DEFENSE
The antimilitarist feelings prevalent in postwar Japan
Special Report OCI No. 0334/64A)
SHASTRI TAKES OVER IN INDIA
The new prime minister faces an uphill battle to con-
solidate his powers as Nehru's successor.
TANGANYIKA MOVES TO CONSOLIDATE UNION WITH ZANZIBAR
Steps are being taken to integrate the two regimes in
the diplomatic and military spheres, but pro-Communists
8 O1i
and their bloc advisers continue active on Zanzibar.
CONGO ARMY DISINTEGRATING
The army has proved completely ineffective against reb
in the Kivu area, and other dissidents annarPntly fa=1
THE CYPRUS SITUATION "11 tv~
The British may pull out their contingent from the UN L)
force in the face of a sharp increase of anti-British
activity by the Greek Cypriots; arms continue to arrive T--- r~ r ~; NS
for both communities.
BRITAIN RESUMES NEGOTIATIONS OVER BASES IN LIBYA
Talks regarding British military air-transit and stag-
ing rights at El Adem are resuming after a five-week
breakdown. London is apt to make concessions to keep
what it considers a vital air link with the East.
FRENCH-TUNISIAN RELATIONS EMBITTERED BY LAND SEIZURE
Since the abrupt nationalization of French-owned farm-
lands in Tunisia, Paris has taken certain economic re-
prisals and is contemplating further sanctions if the
Tunisians persist in their present course.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPANISH COAL STRIKE
The government has made wage concessions to striking
miners and is considering other moves which may have
long-range economic and political implications.
13 OK
14 Pill
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5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii
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EUROPE (continued) Page
DEBATE ON ECONOMIC POLICY SHAKES ITALIAN GOVERNMENT 14
Premier Moro's enemies in his own and the opposition
parties are using Italy's current economic difficulties
to attack his government. The government's failure to
move forward with promised reforms is causing Moro's
Socialist coalition partners to threaten to reconsider
their participation in the cabinet.
SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS TO CONSIDER NUCLEAR ARMS ISSUE 16
Prime Minister Erlander and his government are being
pressed for decisions on whether Sweden should develop
a nuclear weapons capability, and this issue will be
a major topic at the ruling party's congress this month.
FINLAND'S AGRARIANS SQUABBLE ON EVE OF PARTY CONGRESS
The dissension within Finland's dominant political party
centers around President Kekkonen's arbitrary use of his
office to dominate the party and his overriding concern
for foreign affairs at the expense of a viable domestic
policy. However, because Kekkonen personally is closely
identified with the imperative national policy of friend-
ship with the USSR, no direct challenge to his leadership
is likely to succeed. (Published separately as Special
Report OCI No. 0334/64B)
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
CUBAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Cuban control of the air defense system seems imminent.
Ship operations reflect recent and future withdrawal of
a large number of Soviet military personnel. The mili-
tary alert has been relaxed somewhat. During the alert
four missile sites were moved.
RACIAL TENSIONS INCREASING IN BRITISH GUIANA
The bitterness between the Negro and East Indian commu-
nities is creating a cycle of brutal racial attack,-and
counterattack which will prove hard to stop. Janet
Jagan's resignation as home minister may portend an
effort by the ruling party to decrease the effectiveness
of the police force.
AREA NOTE
On Canada
ELECTION AFTERMATH IN PANAMA
President Robles' election was confirmed without
incident but evidence of pre-election deals with pro-
Communists and others suggests his power and freedom of
action may be limited.
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0
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued)
POSTELECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BOLIVIA 20
President Paz Estenssoro won his third term as expected, Olt,
but random violence in mining areas and moves by his
principal opponents to unite in an effort to overthrow
him suggest that the political situation will remain
uneasy for some time.
ARGENTINE LABOR AGITATION 21
Tension is rising as the General Confederation of Labor"
proceeds with its campaign to extract political and eco-
nomic concessions from the government by briefly occupVJTra' r'Z'r,n~.IO1VS
in
bu
in--
t
bli hments
g
s
- es
a
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5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iv
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