POSITION OF NON-GAULLIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400120003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 15, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

elease 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79-0092 0440012( 3M Y 1964
OCI No. 0331/64B
Copy No. 5 9
SPECIAL REPORT
POSITION OF NON-GAULLIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRANCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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15 May 1964
POSITION OF NON-GAULLIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRANCE
The approach of municipal elections this fall
and the prospect of a presidential race before the
end of 1965 are generating a renewed political
awareness in Gaullist France. The principal op-
position candidate for the presidency, Socialist
Gaston Defferre, has been campaigning seriously
since February. Spokesmen for the traditional
parties have no illusions that they can oust De
Gaulle, but they hope to reassert their place in
national activities. They are trying to dispel
public apathy toward politics and establish a
basis for concerted action in the future. All the
parties profess to be adapting themselves to the
framework of the Fifth Republic, but the old-line
politicos, still in large measure prisoners of
the past, have yet to prove that they can over-
come their old divisions and face new issues
squarely.
Be politicization
A major psychological hurdle
facing the traditional non-Com-
munist parties in their efforts
to combat De Gaulle is widespread
disinterest in domestic politics.
Voter participation in national
elections went down from an av-
erage of 89.7 percent for the
period 1946-56 to 68.7 percent
in the first ballot of the 1962
elections. Some of the causes
of this growing apathy may be
temporary, but others are re-
lated to profound changes in
French national life.
The whole country became
irritated and disenchanted over
excessive parliamentary bicker-
ing in the final years of the
Fourth Republic, and this con-
tinues to benefit the Gaullist
regime, which is credited with
bringing political stability to
France. Moreover De Gaulle,
who acceded to power with over-
whelming public approval at a
time when the country was on the
verge of revolution over the
Algerian impasse, still is re-
garded as a deliverer. His suc-
cess in restoring peace to France
--after 23 years during which
French forces were constantly
engaged in one part of the world
or another--has inspired popular
acquiescence in his brand of
strong executive rule.
Among the more enduring
changes that have fostered po-
litical complacency is the rela-
tive prosperity of the past few
years. The lure of affluence
and the enjoyment of creature
comforts available to a broad-
ening market have blunted the
Frenchman's appetite for the
ideological squabbles of earlier
generations. Also, the
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socioeconomic changes which ac-
companied the accelerated urbani-
zation of the past decade have
disrupted old political alle=
giances, and no would-be suc-
cessor to De Gaulle has been
able to identify himself suc-
cessfully with the new urban
voters to the exclusion of other
candidates.
Under the double impact of
De Gaulle's strong executive
rule and of popular disenchant-
ment with the old-line politicos,
the National Assembly with its
"baggage" of parties has receded
into the shadows. The tradi-
tional parties, tending to "re-
RADICALS
AND
Party Strengths In
FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
ELECTED NOVEMBER 1-462
POPULAR
LEFT
UNION FOR THE
NEW REPUBLIC
AND DEMOCRATIC
UNION OF LABOR
COMMUNISTS 40
Committed to DeGaulle
482 *
SEATS
member everything and forget
nothing," are still divided by
political, economic, and cleri-
cal issues into five basic
groups. The durable French Com-
munist Party (PCF)--the second
strongest in terms of votes,
after the Gaullist Union.for the
New Republic (UNR)--now is con-
centrating on "protecting" the
republic from authoritarian
Gaullist encroachments and re-
mains subservient to Moscow.
The orientation of the remain-
ing four principal parties, all
of which support the republican
form of government, fray' be de-
scribed in the general and theo-
retical terms of yesterday: the
14 Deputies belong to splinter parties or
are unaffiliated and therefore not shown
* Are a pro-Gaullist faction of CNIP
INDEPENDENTS (CNIP)
VACANCIES 2~)
2
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Socialist Party (SFIO) is eco=
nomically leftist and anticleri-
cal; the Popular Republican Move-
ment (MRP) is somewhat to the
left in economic policy but, as
France's Christian democratic
party, is proclerical; the Radi-
cal Socialists are largely anti-
clerical and somewhat conserva-
tive economically; and the In-
dependents (CNIP) are proclerical
and also to the right on eco-
nomic issues. So long as De
Gaulle is on the scene, such is-
sues have little relation to
political reality.
Bases of Opposition
Substantive political is-
sues are not wanting, but the
opposition parties have yet to
find a way to exploit them ef-
fectively. Despite the touchi-
ness the government has displayed
over recent press criticism of
defense and foreign aid expendi-
tures, the non-Communist opposi-
tion groups have mixed feelings
on these issues. Although the
left-wing parties are agreed in
seeking a larger share of the
national income for labor, they
have not been able to come up
with a common program to achieve
this.
The inadequate education
budget is potentially the most
popular issue. Over the long
run it may prove to be the most
damaging indictment of the
Gaullist regime because of the
bitterness it is generating
among youth squeezed out,of col-
lege and university. The Fifth
Republic has failed to provide
the accelerated school expan-
sion program clearly demanded
by the birth statistics. Al-
though the percentage of those
receiving a complete lycee edu-
cation and going on to the uni-
versity has increased from ap-
proximately 5 percent of the
appropriate age groups in 1955
to 12 percent in 1964, the pace
of improvement has not kept
abreast of the demand. This is-
sue has appeal among all social
classes, but not to the point
of assuring a united opposition.
Nor is there much likelihood of
arousing general support over
the government's blatant use of
the state-run radio and tele-
vision networks to the UNR's
own political ends.
On foreign policy issues
the opposition appears lethar-
gic, as in their reaction to
Foreign Minister Couve de Mur-
ville's broad statements on for-
eign affairs to the National
Assembly on 28 April. The op-
position on that occasion con-
centrated on criticisms of
method rather than substance.
Only on De Gaulle's approach
to European'unity and Atlantic
solidarity is there evident re-
sistance, but even here it is
difficult to rally a united op-
position in a political con-
frontation.
In sum, public dissatis-
faction is clear on a number of
specific points, but it is not
sufficiently strong or concen-
trated to give De Gaulle any
serious trouble.
3
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Opposition Unity Efforts
Most of the opposition
parties acknowledge that there
is general satisfaction with
the institutions of the Fifth
Republic, and particularly the
presidential system. Only the
Communists and SFIO Secretary
General Guy Mollet state clearly
that they wish to return to leg-
islative supremacy. The opposi-
tion parties also see alike on
many foreign and domestic ques-
tions, and several of them have
attempted to surmount their
parochial ideological differences.
A year ago, leaders of the
three principal non-Marxist op-
position parties--the Popular
Republicans,the Radical Social-
ists, and the Independents--
formed a study and coordination
committee to find ways to or-
ganize a broad movement of cen-
trist opinion, but have shown
little progress thus far despite
a decision announced late last
month to form a new "French
Democratic Movement" by this
fall. Spokesmen for all three
parties say they would consider
supporting such a movement if
the Socialists could be induced
to cooperate with it. The SFIO,
however, has proved skittish
about looking to the right for
electoral assistance.
Most right-wing Socialist
leaders would be willing to enter
an alliance with fellow anti-
clerical Radical Socialists.
They are reluctant, however, to
associate closely with the MRP
in view of the continuing con-
troversy over state aid to church
schools, and they would consider
it virtually impossible to commit
themselves to ties with the "re-
actionary" CNIP.
In December 1963 the Social-
ists initiated an effort to form
their own "mass support" movement
on the left. This effort involved
a "preparatory" study conference
sparked by SFIO Deputy Secretary
General Georges Brutelle, who
disapproves of the party's "tacti-
cal" cooperation with the Commu-
nists. The conference included
representatives of the splinter
United Socialist Party (PSU),
the Christian-oriented labor
union, agricultural and student
groups, and the principal auton-
omous political clubs--groups
not affiliated with any particu-
lar political ideology.
Three distinct factions
emerged at the conference. One
which wanted an informal move-
ment of the left for the princi-
pal purpose of backing SFIO presi-
dential candidate Defferre, was
supported by two of the most
prominent political clubs, the
Club Jean Moulin and the Club
des Jacobins, by the leftist in-
tellectual newspaper L'Express,
and by Francois Mitterran .o
the left splinter party, the
Democratic and Socialist Union
of the Resistance (UDSR).
Another faction, supported by
Gilles Martinet of the PSU,
wanted an SFIO rapprochement
with the Communist Party, with
the PSU acting as "a bridge"
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for the purpose of formulating
a common program. The third
faction, headed by SFIO Secre-
tary General Guy Mollet, wanted
to expand the party following
by devising a program designed
to appeal to a wide spectrum of
leftist opinion, but it opposed
opening the party's formal mem-
bership rolls to newcomers.
None of these ideas for
rallying the left into an en-
larged social democratic party
has gotten off the ground. The
only effective interparty coop-
eration has been the "tactical"
electoral understandings be-
tween the Socialists and the
Communists. Both parties gained
from these arrangements in the
national elections of November
1962 and the cantonal elections
of March 1964. On these two
occasions, each party on the
second ballot withdrew candi-
dates in those constituencies
where the other party was more
favorably placed to win. The
SFIO and PCF party newspapers
are currently engaged in a pub-
lic debate delineating those
differences which prevent the
cementing together of a popular
front.
Other Political Forces
The impotence of the old-
line parties has led to a re-
vival of a political tradition
which had its origin in the
revolution of 1789--the autono-
mous political clubs. A number
of leftist political theorists
have organized these clubs with
the purpose of devising programs
around which new parties with
genuine mass appeal might be
formed. They include influen-
tial journalists, trade union
officials, scientists, and a
liberal sprinkling of disen-
chanted politicians of the
Fourth Republic. They are
stressing such popular themes
as social assistance, economic
expansion, increased worker
participation in industrial
development, an equitable farm
policy, European unity, and
Atlantic cooperation, in an
effort to evolve comprehensive
platforms on which broad social
democratic accord could be
reached.
The almost singular moti-
vation behind this effort to
regroup the opposition parties
into large, more effective for-
mations is, of course, to de-
feat the UNR at the polls. Iron-
ically, however, it is in a
sense a response to pressure
from De Gaulle himself, Who has
long castigated political fac-
tionalism. His institutional
innovations of the Fifth Repub-
lic are aimed at reducing the
number of parties and encourag-
ing them to seek broader bases.
De Gaulle has remained generally
aloof from the parties, prefer-
ring to play the role of presi-
dential arbiter. However, by
tacitly encouraging the fortunes
of his massive supporting party,
the UNR, he is in effect plac-
ing pressure on the splintered
opposition to come together in
order to survive. He hopes that
two or three major parties will
eventually emerge, which would
improve the outlook for continuing
stability after he leaves office.
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The constitutional revision
of October 1962 to provide for
popular election of the presi-
dent was also a step in this
direction. The effect of this
was to force opposition parties
and groups with broadly similar
programs to unite in order to'
put up presidential candidates
capable of attracting a majority.
Party coalescence is also
the general objective of the
current UNR attempt to reform
the municipal electoral system,
although a political motive is
also present. The legislation
proposed would oblige the parties
in cities of over 30,000 popula-
tion to merge into groupings
sufficiently large to challenge
the UNR. This would be made
necessary because voters would
no longer be permitted to split
tickets, and parties would not
be permitted to combine for the
second round.
The Gaullist party hopes
that the resulting polarization
would rally to its banner large
numbers of MRP and Independent
voters. In this, the UNR would
be counting on their fear of the
tactical arrangements between
the SFIO and PCF. There is, how-
ever, a danger that a Communist-
Socialist popular front may be
found in several key cities if
this legislation is passed.
Regardless of the effect
of the proposed municipal elec-
tion law, closer Socialist-Commu-
nist relations are developing,
and the presidential election will
accelerate the trend. The non-
Communist left has long nurtured
the hope of using the PCF's vot-
ing strength without having to
make any commitments to the party
as such. The relaxation of East-
West tensions and the desire to
unseat De Gaulle combine to en-
courage an accommodation with
the Communists for the presiden-
tial race. Maurice Duverger,
for example, recently argued
in Le Monde that the PCF is "be-
comtng more and more a party like
the others." He envisages the
possibility of Gaston Defferre's
election in 1965 as a result of
a tacit Communist agreement to
back him without according him
the formal endorsement which
would scare off potential sup-
porters to the right of the
Socialists.
Communist leader Maurice
Thorez, however, has tried to
impress the electorate that he
has an alternative to supporting
Defferre or proposing a PCF can-
didacy. He told the PCF central
committee in late March, with
ample publicity, that he approved
the broad lines of De Gaulle's
foreign policy, thus endeavoring
to imply a willingness to see
the general re-elected. The Com-
munists certainly approved the
disruptive effect Gaullist policy
has had on the Atlantic Alliance,
and Thorez' statements there-
fore take on a measure of plausi-
bility. At this stage, there-
fore, Defferre cannot be sure
that the SFIO will gain the Com-
munists' support without making
promises or other commitments
to them.
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Prospects for a Defferre Victory
In any event, the appear-
ance of more leftist opposition
candidates, such as Radical So-
cialist Senator Andre Cornu who
recently decided to run, will
tend to dissipate De Gaulle's
opposition and reduce Defferre's
chances.
The supporters of both the
UNR and Defferre have been im-
pressed by the extensive US ex-
perience with mass parties. Pub-
lic opinion polling in France is
coming into wider use and Theo-
dore White's book, The Making of
a President, 1960, is being care
fully studied-.--Both UNR politi-
cos and the several leftist po-
litical clubs backing Defferre
have shown marked interest in
campaigning "a l'americaine."
It is not clear, however, whether
these groups fully comprehend
how much depends on grass-roots
organization in US party prac-
tice.
If De Gaulle chooses to
seek re-election, he could prob-
ably defeat even a candidate en-
dorsed by both the SFIO and the
PCF. However, the UNR's politi-
cal future is still so linked to
De Gaulle's active role that his
withdrawal would unleash attacks
on it from all sides. Even if
this happened, the old party
lineups of the pre-Gaullist era
would be unlikely to revive.
Some coalescence along the lines
encouraged by the current in-
stitutional framework now seems
much more probable. This would
in general be a positive and en-
during improvement. The ma-
jor drawback, however, will
continue to be the threat of
a Socialist-Communist alliance.
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